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Introduction Between the end of March and the begin­ Are the People Backward? ning of May 2016, the Algerian journalist Algerian Symbolic Analysts and Kamal Guerroua published a series of art­ icles in the French-speaking daily newspa­ the Culture of the Masses per Le Quotidien d’Oran, in which he com­ plained about the difficulty of changing the mentality of the Algerian people. Faced with what he described as a pathetic, fatalist and passive society, he asked successively: “Why can’t we change?,” “Are our youth really lazy?,” “Who must change ... and how?” and finally “But why are we like this?”1,2 While Guerroua is presented alternately as a Thomas Serres scholar, a journalist or a novelist, he illus­ Tristan Leperlier trates the activity of a composite social cat­ egory that participates in diagnosing the This article studies representations of the two aspects of this activity: first, attempts Algerian population. Aiming at a social Algerian population promoted by franco- to determine who is responsible for the and political reform, these actors try to phone intellectuals in a context of long- ongoing crisis, and second, the reproduc- understand the characteristics of their standing crisis and uncertainty. Borrow- tion of cultural prejudices in a context of “people,” often by pointing to their so- ing the category of symbolic analysts increased transnationalization. Moreover, called pre-modern or passive behaviors. from Robert Reich, it looks at the way in it argues that one can interpret the politi- This paper investigates the representa­ which novelists, scholars and journalists cal and intellectual commitments of these tions of the Algerian population promoted try to make sense of a critical situation by analysts by drawing on the triad concept by francophone intellectuals in a context diagnosing the culture of the Algerian of “Naming, Blaming, Claiming,” which of longstanding crisis and uncertainty. population as deviant or backward. Aim- has been used to study the publicization Borrowing the category of symbolic ana­ ing to encourage social and political of disputes. lysts from Robert Reich, it looks at the way reform, these actors try to understand the in which novelists, scholars and journalists characteristics of their “people,” often by Keywords: Algeria; Culture; Crisis; Post- try to make sense of a critical situation, pointing to their so-called pre-modern or colonialism; Symbolic Analysts sometimes by diagnosing the culture of passive behaviors. This article analyzes their fellow citizens as deviant or inher­

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ently backward. For Reich, symbolic ana­ sions in Algeria and beyond. The article historical context. Commentators have lysts are those who identify problems and will be divided into four sections. The first often described the gap between the uto­ solve them by manipulating symbols. In part presents the context of the civil war pian expectations that followed indepen­ Algeria, these actors are trying to solve that introduced the idea of a historical dence in 1962 and the realities of daily life, the problem of a persistent political and break and an increasing gap between which was increasingly marked by perva­ social instability in the aftermath of the secu­lar intellectuals and the rest of the sive hardship. After the end of French civil war (1992-1999). In order to do so, society. The award-winning author Rachid occupation, the revolutionary elites they manipulate notions such as “the peo­ Boudjedra serves to illustrate this point. embodied the hope of colonized peoples ple” or the “Algerian culture” to under­ The second section focuses on the role of beyond Algeria, as they were committed stand the causes of the crisis and propose social scientists in the production of cul­ to fulfilling national independence, their own solutions. In the following turalist explanations for the absence of a achieving economic prosperity and rede­ pages, we study two aspects of this activ­ democratic transition. Here, some of the fining the global balance of power (Carlier ity: first, attempts to determine who is writings of Lahouari Addi allow us to study 311-16). During the rule of Houari Bou­ responsible for the ongoing crisis, and the production of a diagnosis that insists médiène (1965-1978), an authoritarian second, the reproduction of cultural pre­ on national political culture to explain the developmental state was in charge of judices in the postcolony given a context absence of democracy. The following part organizing the economy and planning the of increased transnationalization. Subse­ shows that a commitment in favor of polit­ country’s evolution. Internationally, Alge­ quently, we will see how this discursive ical change also leads some analysts to rian diplomacy was at its zenith, as its activity can be understood through the call for a disciplinary project directed at spokesmen advocated the forgiveness of prism of the process of “Naming, Blam­ the Algerian population in order to correct Third-World debt and the nationalization ing, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and Sarat), its backward behavior. To illustrate this of resources. Yet, disillusions and woes a triad concept that explains the produc­ point, the paper invokes recent articles soon followed this early period of hope tion of public disputes. from journalist Kamel Daoud, published and ambition. A drop in oil prices and the As Guerroua’s case illustrates, the limits after the Arab Spring. Finally, the last sec­ subsequent economic crisis fed the dis­ between the literary, academic and media tion looks at the consequences of the enchantment of workers and students, fields can be especially blurry, since all of transnationalization of these figures, as resulting in a succession of strikes and these fields are subsumed in the broader their analyses are appropriated and instru­ riots at end of the 1980s and an uprising field of intellectual production. In this art­ mentalized outside of Algeria. in October 1988 (Chikhi, “Algérie”). The icle, our main symbolic analysts are a nov­ latter marked a clear break in regard to elist, an academic and a journalist. They The 1990s as a Historical Break the dominant conceptions of historical have all reached a level of national and To understand the production of diagno­ progress espoused by intellectuals from international recognition that allow them sis of the Algerian people by our symbolic revolutionary or reformist backgrounds. to intervene regularly in public discus­ analysts, one must start by looking at the The following years saw the constant

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de­gradation of the political situation and historical failure, rather than a form of dis­ responsibility as intellectuals and, at the the rise of the Islamic Salvation Front dain for the masses. same time, they search to attribute blame (Front Islamique du Salut, FIS) as the main During the civil war, Algeria witnessed the at the national level in terms of finding political party in the country. The interrup­ development of a descriptive literature those whose moral and political failures tion of the electoral process by the army that analyzes the mental state of the have brought the country to crisis (Mil­ in January 1992 exacerbated the tensions, popu­lation and the supposed illnesses of stein). This investment in politics is espe­ and the country fell into a spiral of polit­ the country (corruption, violence, funda­ cially evident for a novelist such as Rachid ical violence, leading to the disaggrega­ mentalism). This tendency was high­ Boudjedra. A former nationalist militant tion of the national community. At the lighted by the rise of a new generation of during the war of independence, the nov­ same time, Algeria faced a structural authors, such as Yasmina Khadra and elist born in 1941 was ostracized by the adjustment program, the dismantlement Boualem Sansal, who excelled in the regime for a few years in the 1960s before of public services and an economic liber­ genre of the crime novel—a kind of writing returning to Algeria. Writing both in alization that benefited crony capitalists that is well-suited to describing psycho­ French and in Arabic, he became a major (Brahimi El Mili). logical and cultural deviance. In their figure in the national literary field and a This historical context allows us to better works published at the end of the 1990s, close counselor of many ministers situated grasp the position of our social category. both of these writers described a society to the left of the ruling coalition. Yet, the Once belonging to the elite, these actors tortured by paranoia, intolerance, histori­ victory of the FIS during the legislative were suddenly confronted with increased cal confusion and cynicism (Khadra; elections of December 1991 endangered competition in the intellectual field (nota­ Sansal). While very different in style, both him both as an individual associated with bly by Islamist figures), a growing precar­ Khadra and Sansal were products of the the governing elite and as a secular intel­ iousness resulting from structural adjust­ developmental state’s elite schools in the lectual. In 1992, a few months after the mil­ ment, and Jihadi violence against secular 1970s; Khadra was trained in Cherchell’s itary coup, Boudjedra published a pam­ figures. Some of them left the country military academy, and Sansal graduated phlet entitled “FIS de la haine,” in which he because of the war. While they had been from the Polytechnic School of Algiers. As moved away from his position as a novelist trained to become a vanguard leading the such, they were confronted with the gap to offer a stylized but nonetheless virulent way to social and intellectual advance­ between official promises and the reality account of the country’s political situation. ment, they were brutally confronted with of crisis. While they described a patho­ As a communist, Boudjedra had often cri­ the crisis experienced by the country dur­ logical and morbid society, they also ticized the conservatism of Algerian soci­ ing the 1980s-1990s (El Kenz). Conse­ remembered a lost normalcy, thus laying ety. Yet, with the fall of the USSR and the quently, the subsequent diagnoses con­ a potential foundation on which to rebuild rise of Islamism, he abandoned his prior cerning the culture of the Algerian people the polity (Naudillon). investment in the dichotomy between are a way of understanding this apparent When participating in public debates, our progress and archaism for a new under­ symbolic analysts assume their own standing that counterposed modernity to

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archaism (Chikhi, “Islamisme”). This con­ reconceptualize the country’s situation Algerian scholars underlined the continua­ ceptual break implied a shift toward a brings us back to the first etymology of the tion of the “political, security and eco­ more inquisitorial tone. In his pamphlet, notion of crisis, the Greek krisis which nomic crisis” after the end of the civil war he pointed to three kinds of responsibility refers to a moment of judgment, of dis­ (Bennadji). in order to understand the Algerian crisis. tinction, of construction of the criteria use­ This “failed” transition, coupled with the First, he accused a neocolonial “fran­ ful in order to allow a renewed under­ memory of the civil war, led certain social cophony” of erasing the diversity and sin­ standing of the situation (Cristias 7). In scientists to develop an analysis blaming gularity of Algerian culture and promoting other terms, the troubled period of the a “patriarchal culture,” which was unsuited the FIS on its satellite TVs (Boudjedra, 1980s and 1990s fed the demand for a to the rule of law and perpetuated “tradi­ 23-27). Second, he blamed a corrupted para­digm shift. tional segmental structures,” for the state for bringing a “culture of laziness and At the end of the 1990s, a dominant con­ behavior of the ruling elite and the popu­ inertia” to the people (67). These politics ceptual toolkit was available for whom­ lation (Remaoun). Slowly but surely, inter­ made possible the rise of Algerian neo­ ever wanted to think about political pretations based on a form of cultural evo­ fundamentalists, described by Boudjedra upheavals. The narrative of democratiza­ lutionism began to flourish in the academic as a minority of mentally defective fascists tion based on the global expansion of an field. The example of Lahouari Addi is par­ whose political program was limited to Anglo-Saxon liberal model was widely ticularly interesting in this regard—pre­ violence and regression (16, 111). In other propagated during the period of the so- cisely because of his intellectual commit­ words, our symbolic analyst identified called “third wave.” In fact, in Algeria the ment to anti-essentialist approaches. those who led a large part of the popula­ period of extreme violence followed a Primarily trained as a sociologist of rural tion to endorse what he understood as a political opening that partially matched societies, Addi later moved his field of backward politico-religious program. this model. At the end of the Black Decade, interest to the political sphere, as he pre­ some longstanding specialists of the pared his doctorat d’état in France at the Culture and Politics region remained hopeful that the erosion École des Hautes Études en Science Soci­ The protean crisis experienced by Algeria of the authoritarian model could give birth ales.3 Working notably on questions of from the 1980s onward stimulated the to a genuine democratic transition populism and power in Algeria, he activity of the symbolic analysts, as they (Quandt; Leveau). Yet, a few years later, the became a commentator on the country’s were also compelled to find new ways to persisting influence of the military, the vio­ latest political events, and his informed speak of the community. In order to study lent repression of the Kabyle uprising of opinion continues to regularly appear in the trajectory of the country after Bou­ 2001 and the struggles at the top of the Algerian newspapers.4 médiène’s death in 1978, they sought to state between the new president Addi’s interest in anthropologists studying develop a new understanding of the world Abdelaziz Bouteflika and his prime minis­ the Maghreb—such as Gellner and Geertz— that would move away from Third-Worldist ter Ali Benflis demonstrated the inade­ allows him to reflect the refutation of dogma. Their attempt to explain and quacy of this wishful thinking. Rather, essentialist analysis regarding the role of

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Islam in contemporary Muslim society and This is the reason for the failure of the less cautious. Thus, observers in the daily to advocate for a socio-historical approach regime, which is not because of the press often propose anthropological (Deux antrophologues). At the same time, wrong model or the wrong-headed readings of politics in Bouteflika’s Algeria he focuses on the development of an implementation of a more or less co- that point to “local mentalities” and their Algerian political culture, at the crossroads herent economic policy [emphasis so-called pathological consequences of traditional structures, the war of inde­ added]. It is about political represen­ (violence, superstition, corruption, sub­ pendence and French modernist influ­ tations where the individual, as a sub­ mission to the leader).5 ence. According to him, this culture pro­ ject of law, does not exist, and where duces specific representations of the state the group is sublimated by a discourse Changing the Regime and the People and explains the rise of the FIS as well as of the leader, who enjoys an external Cultural evolutionism is common in Alge­ persisting populism and political violence. authority. This is like the old traditional rian public debates. By promoting a vision While refusing an approach that would political order that negates the political where the characteristics of the “people” disqualify a reified Islam or Arab culture, and considers the leader as a man who explain the persisting corrupt, paternalis­ he develops an analysis based on various rights the wrong rather than some­ tic and violent nature of the political order, myths associated with liberal democracy one who protects individual freedom. symbolic analysts reproduce the older (sovereignty of the voters, openness of We must overcome a culture based notion of “colonizability.” Malek Bennabi, electoral competition, empty space of on justice and replace it with a culture a sociologist and philosopher born in power). Conversely, he opposes this ideal based on freedom [emphasis added].” Constantine who notably studied the rela­ system based on representation and rule (L’Algérie d’hier 74-75) tionship between Islamic culture and of law to a disorganized Algerian society This excerpt illustrates a change in the modernity, coined this term in the 1970s. prone to rioting where political power is diagnosis proposed by symbolic analysts. His idea of colonizability explains under­ privatized and cannot fully emancipate While Boudjedra focused on the external development and colonization by invok­ itself from a medieval form of religious and internal actors responsible for the ing a backward understanding of religion control (“Les partis politiques”). Addi is backwardness of the population, Addi and social inertia. Consequently, he also certainly not the only political analyst to suggests that cultural reform is necessary advocated for cultural and religious take for granted this mythology of the in order to solve the country’s issues and reform in order to promote a Muslim “good democratic system.” Nevertheless, encourage a transition towards modern renewal in Algeria (Bennabi). Bennabi’s what is especially telling is that his refuta­ political behavior. Yet, there is a distinc­ reflection displaces responsibility for the tion of essential difference leads to an tion to be made between academics and colonial occupation from the imperial analysis based on cultural evolutionism: other analysts, thus introducing a nuance power, France, to the occupied people. “State power in Algeria is vacant be­ in our meta-category. While Addi’s writ­ The philosopher remained influential after cause there are no ideological mecha­ ings are too careful to employ orientalist his death in 1973. Not only was Bennabi a nisms to return it to its owner: society. clichés, many of his contemporaries are reference for the djazʾara, an elitist Islamist

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trend inside of the FIS (Labat 75-78), he tioned the anarchic depiction of the peo­ act as “real democrats” draws on his was also an inspiration for a political and ple proposed by minister of Interior denunciation of a social conservatism that cultural movement launched by Noured­ Dahou Ould Kabia, accusing him of acting he perceives to be one of the main ills dine Boukrouh at the end of the 1980s. His in a colonial fashion. The following year, he afflicting the country. Moreover, in addi­ heirs are still currently active, most notably published a short paper addressed to tion to his critique of Islam and his defense in the liberal political party Jil Jadid (“New Bouteflika predicting that the president of women’s rights, he also depicts a popu­ Generation”). During Boukrouh’s political would be lynched by his own people if he lation unfit for a modern economy, uncivil career, he experimented with various ran for a fourth term.6 and dirty. In an editorial published in May strategies in order to promote socio-polit­ A firm opponent of the regime, Daoud 2014, just after Bouteflika’s reelection, he ical reform. After joining Bouteflika’s early participated in the protests of January rejected what he labeled a form of “ange­ governments as a minister, he subse­ 2011, in the aftermath of the Tunisian revo­ lism” and “emotional populism” and advo­ quently returned to his first love: writing lution. Yet, despite his commitment in cated for a reform of the population: critical analysis of Algerian politics. One of favor of democracy (or precisely because “Many find their happiness in sub- his last essays has an eloquent title: of it), Daoud’s editorials have become mission, in devouring and in corrup- “Reforming People and Power” (Réformer more and more directed at the Algerian tion [emphasis added]. Few are those peuple et pouvoir, 2013). Indeed, the idea population. In his daily column, he started who think about future generations or that in order to end the political deadlock, to cast the people as guilty for the political collective interests. This is the equa­ one has to change the people first, deadlock. After initially calling for the fall tion that must be changed, this is the remains a widely shared trope among of the regime, he then regarded the vic­ responsibility that we have to accept Algerian intellectual elites. tory of the Islamists in the first elections in and demonstrate. Speaking continu­ This last point brings us to our third sym­ Tunisia and in Egypt with hostility, going ously of a people who are victims and bolic analyst, renowned editorial writer so far as to ask if “Arabs (were) ready for “treacherous intellectuals” has now be­ (and novelist) Kamel Daoud, who was democracy?”7 From this perspective, he come an annoyingly easy option. What born in 1970. Since beginning his career in demonstrates the contradiction of a liberal must be changed is this people, these the middle of the 1990s, the journalist from discourse on democracy that considers individuals [emphasis added]. We must Oran has been a vocal critic of the Alge­ conservative or progressive liberalism as explain what is a resignation and what rian regime. His daily column, published the only rightful form of democratic gov­ is a constitution. We must demonstrate in the Quotidien d’Oran under the title ernment. Undoubtedly, his personal expe­ that creating jobs is better than build­ Raïna Raïkum (“Our opinion, your opin­ riences as a former Islamist sympathizer as ing more mosques. That work is a duty. ion”), has allowed him to denounce the well as a journalist who has directly faced That effort is glory. That public spirit is corruption and the violence of the ruling the consequences of Jihadi violence must not naivety.” (“Oui, il faut changer”) elite, and the general absurdity of the be taken into account. His criticism regard­ This editorial illustrates Daoud’s belief that political order. In 2013, he publicly ques­ ing the inability of Algerians and Arabs to public discussions must now be reori­

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ented given the failed attempts to change this phenomenon. When Daoud describes largely promoted. Working in contact with the political order. Defending the right of the Algerian people as “three-quarters European or American environments, our intellectuals to be critical of the popula­ ignorant, careless of the land that will be symbolic analysts appropriate and trans­ tion, he advocates for a social-cultural handed down [to the next generation], form some of the values that are often aggiornamento in order to instill civic val­ bigoted, dirty, uncivil” (“Pourquoi les viewed as so-called benchmarks of West­ ues into the social body. In so doing, he Algériens”), one is immediately struck by ern modernity, such as secularism or gen­ echoes a widely shared position among the similarity with the vocabulary once der mixity. It is especially noticeable for Algerian symbolic analysts in favor of a used to describe the colonized masses. In French-speaking intellectuals, who are reform of the education system. At the his afterword to the Wretched of the Earth, more easily inserted in the northern shore same time, he endorses the idea that one the nationalist militant and historian of the Mediterranean. Tellingly, Kamel should teach the values of modern market Mohamed Harbi underlines the persisting Daoud publishes his op-eds in renowned economy to the masses, since they are prejudice regarding the apathetic and Western newspapers such as La Repub- desperately lazy. In short, he proposes a anarchic masses after independence, this blica, Le Monde and the New York Times. disciplinary undertaking in order to cor­ time held not by French colonists, but After teaching in France, Lahouari Addi rect popular backwardness. Algerian revolutionaries (308). This dualist also spent a couple of years in the United imagery counterposing a reformist elite to States, in prestigious universities such as A Postcolonial and Transnational Configu- a backward population reproduces a fic­ Princeton and Georgetown. Even the nov­ ration tion of “modernization from above” that elist Rachid Boudjedra, who belongs to an In addition to the various difficulties that was colonial in origin (Pitt), before becom­ older generation and remained a fervent these intellectuals faced during the 1990s, ing a marker of postcoloniality. communist, was forced to find refuge in one must also consider the history of their These narratives of backwardness also rely France in the 1960s. For linguistic, political political commitments to understand their on the rejection of the Islamist model and and professional reasons, French-speak­ critical relationship to the “people.” For a commitment to a liberal ideal, which ing symbolic analysts are exposed to the example, writers have faced the moral, invokes rationality, civility, and efficiency, normative claims that come with an ethno­ religious or linguistic criteria imposed by as a superior form of modernity. The rejec­ centric mythology of modernity. Subse­ the authoritarian state. In response, their tion of an allegedly pre-modern political quently, they further reinterpret these political fight has favored a moral and culture can be traced back to the ethno­ principles according to their own political political liberalism rather than a commit­ centrism underlying liberal thought agendas and social strategies. ment to democracy (Leperlier). At the (Abdel-Nour). From this perspective, the The coupling of the postcolonial and same time, to fully grasp the conse­ development of an approach based on transnational aspects of this configuration quences of these narratives on the Alge­ cultural evolutionism is certainly related to is evident when we look at the way in rian people, it is useful to look at the post­ a—sometimes forced—insertion in a global­ which some of our actors have been wel­ colonial and transnational dimensions of ized space where this normative model is comed in France. For French-speaking

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Thomas Serres Algerian writers, the former imperial of L’Etranger told from the perspective of ated with this transnational configuration. power remains the place for international the brother of the Arab killed by Meur­ In a text published for the French news has a PhD in political science from the recognition, where prominent novelists sault, Camus’ hero. This novel was warmly website Mediapart, he suggested that EHESS. He is currently an associated such as Boudjedra, Khadra or Sansal have welcomed in France, where Daoud was despite his accurate depiction of the situ­ researcher with Développement been awarded various prizes. Neverthe­ praised as a “new Camus,” an aura that ation in Muslim countries, Daoud had & Société in Paris and an Adjunct less, when reproduced in a different space, was reinforced when an Algerian Salafist transgressed a “methodological border” professor at UC Santa Cruz. His research their discourses change in meaning. For imam launched a fatwa against the jour­ by applying the same analytical frame for focuses on the politics of crisis and example, in the Algerian context, Boudje­ nalist in late 2014. While the preacher was Muslims in Europe, thus providing ideo­ transnationalization in Algeria dra criticized not only the Islamists, but later sentenced to jail, these threats logical fodder for the European far right email: [email protected] also the regime and French neo-colonial­ revived the memories of the civil war and (“L’Ecrivain-journaliste”). Indeed, while the ism. Yet in the French context, he appeared reinforced Daoud’s position as a leading critique produced by our analysts in Alge­ as a spokesman for the critique of the figure of the Algerian “democratic” intel­ ria aims at changing the political and Muslim religion, a faith associated with ligentsia. At the beginning of 2016, follow­ social order, it can be appropriated in fundamentalist threats and with the sensi­ ing the events in Cologne,9 he published France in order to promote Islamophobic tive issue of the veil, while all but ignoring a series of articles in the international agendas. In the former métropole, their his criticism of the West.8 After the publica­ press in which he proposed his diagnostic Algerian origin serves to legitimize preex­ tion of his pamphlet, Boudjedra became on the pathological relationship to sex isting racial prejudice, as they become an epitome of resistance to Islamic fanati­ existing in the “world of Allah” before sug­ what Vincent Geisser labeled as “alibi cism and was compared to Zola and Vol­ gesting that one should change the soul Muslim intellectuals.” taire. His criticism of Islam and appropria­ of the migrants (“Cologne, lieu de fan­ tion of modernist values allowed French tasmes”). Though the author analyzed an Conclusion: Naming, Blaming, Claiming in journalists to portray him as a promoter of event that occurred in Europe and was the Postcolony Enlightenment ideas in a country doomed directed at a Western audience, his prose This paper has studied how symbolic ana­ by backward forces. In other terms, the was nonetheless marked by his own polit­ lysts explain the political situation in Alge­ discourse was reinterpreted from the van­ ical commitment against puritanical ria in the aftermath of the civil war of the tage point of the former métropole; while forces in Algeria. While the article sparked 1990s and given the persistent corruption initially produced in a predominantly Mus­ some criticism, it was also met with wide and authoritarianism under Bouteflika. In lim society, it was then appropriated in a support in the French press, in which offering a diagnosis of the Algerian peo­ French context of national anxieties and Daoud was portrayed as a free spirit advo­ ple, they participate in public discussions racial prejudice. cating for reform in a backward environ­ and attempt to remedy the longstanding A similar phenomenon occurred in the ment. In this context, it is worth noting that political and economic crisis faced by the recent Daoud polemic. In 2013, the jour­ another of our symbolic analysts, Lah­ polity. In order to better grasp the changes nalist published his first novel, a narration ouari Addi, underlined the risks associ­ of their diagnosis over time, one can look

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Tristan Leperlier at their political and intellectual commit­ of invoking “indigenous” traits (Islam, Ber­ ment through an analytical frame used for ber or Arab identity), it draws inspiration obtained a PhD from the EHESS studying the publicization of disputes, from liberal standards of reform and in sociology and literature. He is based on the triad concept of “Naming, echoes prejudices against a local culture associated with the Centre Européen de Blaming, Claiming” (Abel, Felstiner, and that now appears to be unfit for a modern Sociologie et de Science Politique and Sarat). The first term, “naming,” indicates polity. It goes without saying that a long­ his research focuses on Algerian writers the need to identify the problem and to standing crisis is reflected in certain cul­ and intellectuals, especially during the frame it as a matter of public interest. From tural habits that merit analysis, but it is civil war. this perspective, we can see that the coun­ important not to view the symptoms as if email: [email protected] try’s issues are increasingly framed in cul­ they were the cause. Yet, we have seen tural rather than economic or political that our symbolic analysts can also repro­ terms. As culture becomes the main causal duce a fiction of cultural exception and factor for the crisis, the second discursive social backwardness. In so doing, they function of the dispute sees the redirec­ legitimize both local and foreign interven­ tion of the blame from dominant powers tions aimed at correcting the masses and (the regime, the neo-colonial West) or improving the country’s “human capital.” specific groups (the Islamists) to the gen­ Focusing on the population’s behaviors eral population. Our symbolic analysts and beliefs not only echoes persistent invoke the childish or pathological behav­ racial prejudices inside and outside of the ior of the masses in order to explain cor­ postcolony. It also erases the geopolitical ruption, violence, economic inefficiency or and historical factors as well as the global lack of democracy. Finally, they claim that economic structures that explain the Alge­ changing the people’s culture is crucial to rian configuration. Finally, limiting the ending the polit­ical deadlock; they advo­ causes of social, economic and political cate social reform rather than revolution, imbalances to local cultural factors indi­ and view the latter as dangerous given the rectly legitimizes the transformative unpreparedness of the masses. Unsurpris­ dynamics associated with neoliberal ingly, they uphold education and culture restructuring. as two areas of priority for public policies, in order to shape a modern population. This call for social reform is different from attempts at cultural renewal that occurred at the end of the colonial period. Instead

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