Algeria: from One Revolution to the Other? the Metamorphosis of the State-Regime Complex
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Algeria: From One Revolution to the Other? The Metamorphosis of the State-Regime Complex Mohammed Hachemaoui Centre Maurice Halbwachs (Paris) Sociétés politiques comparées, 51, mai-août 2020 ISSN 2429-1714 Editeur : Fonds d’analyse des sociétés politiques, FASOPO, Paris | http://fasopo.org Citer l’article : Mohammed Hachemaoui, « Algeria: From One Revolution to the Other? The Metamorphosis of the State-Regime Complex », Sociétés politiques comparées, 51, mai/août 2020, http://www.fasopo.org/sites/default/files/varia2_n51.pdf Sociétés politiques comparées, 51, mai/août 2020 1 Algeria: From One Revolution to the Other? The Metamorphosis of the State-Regime Complex Abstract A dominant narrative describes the postcolonial Algerian trajectory as a “revolution” which has alternately experienced a “Party-state”, the “Islamist peril”, a “civil war” then an “autocracy”—the “crisis” of the latter precipitating a “popular uprising” that caused the fall of the “raïs” and imposed a “transition”. Breaking with the doxa, this study establishes that the domination, resulting from the counter-revolution of the 1950s, is based on a praetorian state-regime complex. The critical sequence that starts with the military coup of 1992 is less a “civil war” than a fierce neoliberal restructuring giving rise to the “reinvention of tradition” of the garrison state as “organized crime”. Drawing a “strategic learning” from the success of the praetorian counterrevolution orchestrated by the Egyptian secret police in 2013, the powerful Algerian deep state has been arranging the anti-Bouteflika V street demonstrations. Beyond an apparent radicalism, the hirak contributes to freezing the authoritarian status quo: anti-political, it operates a structural avoidance of the conflicts at work in the shade of praetorian neoliberalism. Celebrating brotherhood with the army, the late counter-revolution has increased the “caging” of the Algerian people. Algérie : d’une révolution à l’autre ? Les métamorphoses du complexe État-régime. Résumé Un récit dominant décrit la trajectoire postcoloniale algérienne comme une « révolution » qui a connu tour à tour le « Parti-État », le « péril islamiste », une « guerre civile » puis une « autocratie », la « crise » de cette dernière précipitant un « soulèvement populaire » provoquant la chute du « raïs » et imposant une « transition ». En rupture avec la doxa, cette étude établit que la domination politique, issue de la contre- révolution prétorienne des années 1950, s’appuie sur un complexe État-régime prétorien. La séquence historique qui s’ouvre avec le coup d'État militaire de janvier 1992 est moins une « guerre civile » qu’une violente néolibéralisation prétorienne, nécessitant la réinvention de la tradition de l’État-garnison comme « crime organisé ». Tirant un « enseignement stratégique » du succès de la gigantesque mobilisation orchestrée par la police politique égyptienne contre le président élu Mohamed Morsi en 2013, la puissante police secrète algérienne orchestre, canalise et encadre les manifestations de rue anti-Bouteflika V. Sous une apparente radicalité, ledit hirak contribue à figer le statu quo autoritaire : antipolitique, il opère un évitement structurel des conflits qui travaillent la domination néoprétorienne et néolibérale. Célébrant la fraternité avec l’armée, cette contre-révolution pacifique achève de renforcer la « mise en cage » du peuple. Keywords Algeria; crony capitalism; infrastructural power; military regime; neoliberalization; shock therapy; state violence; war of maneuver. Mots-clés Algérie ; capitalisme de copinage ; guerre de mouvement ; néolibéralisation ; pouvoir infrastructurel ; régime militaire ; thérapie de choc ; violence d’État. Sociétés politiques comparées, 51, mai/août 2020 2 Eclipsed by the topic of “transition toward market democracy” that dominated mainstream political science throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, the study of authoritarianism has been experiencing a renewed interest in the field in recent years.1 The rediscovery of this problem, seen as obsolete, is due, on the one hand, to the obvious failure of “transitology”2 and, on the other hand, to the institutionalization, in the wake of the neoliberalization of the welfare states, of “de-democratization”, “post-democracy”, “oligarchy” and “authoritarian freedom”.3 Despite this welcomed renewal, the enigma of institutional change within authoritarian durability remains however largely unexplored.4 To avoid the fallacy that Charles Wright Mills called the “historical provincialism”, or the “assumption that the present is a sort of autonomous creation”5, the author of The Sociological Imagination recommends studying “trend[s] of considerable length” in order to grasp the “structure of an epoch”:6 “We study trends in an attempt to go behind events and to make orderly sense of them”.7 This vigilance, which follows in the footsteps of both Marx and Weber, is all the more justified because “many social processes require a significant period of time to work themselves out”. Also, the investigation of such “slow-moving causal processes”8 only in the present will “not only risk studying incomplete sequences but greatly restrict the number of cases”.9 THE PUZZLE The present study aims to understand the dialectic of the event and structure and it also considers, following in the footsteps of William Sewell Jr., that “the key to an adequate theory of event is a robust theory of structure”.10 In keeping with historical sociology and as per Andrew Abbott, this study suggests that temporarily, the “‘causal force’ of enchainment” is “inevitably sequential” and that “order makes a difference”. It adds that synchronically, “reality doesn’t happen in main effects but in interaction”.11 In a radical break with “presentism”—the dominant “regime of historicity” that proceeds by “tyranny of the moment” and “rewriting, day by day, of the past”—12 this research is intended to take the “historical turn”13 in the study of politics seriously. Structured around the theoretical advances in historical institutionalism, this article sees institutions as inherently “distributional instruments laden with power implications”.14 Indeed, once established, institutions do not remain static as gradual and incremental shifts may introduce fundamental institutional transformations.15 By perceiving change and stability as “inextricably linked”, this perspective provides crucial insight into how institutions evolve over time. Even if institutions matter however, not all of them matter evenly. Hence the heuristic importance of disaggregating heterogenous authoritarianism. I therefore define a political formula as the political and institutional arrangement of the regime and the state, (political) economy and polity.16 Oddly, scholarship tends to treat states and regimes separate, rarely bringing them together without mixing them up.17 To fill this gap, it is important to build a theoretical bridge that couples them, especially given that each aggregate 1 For a review of the literature, see inter alia Levitsky and Way, 2010; Art, 2012. 2 For a critique of the transitology model, see Stark, 1996; Stark, Bruszt, 1998; Dobry, 2000; Burawoy, 2001. 3 Inter alia, Collier, 1979; Cristi, 1998; Crouch, 2004; Bayart, 2008; Hall, 2008; Somers, 2008; Camau, Massardier, 2009; Dabène et al., 2010; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Winters, 2011; Brown, 2015; Dardot, Laval, 2016; Brown et al., 2018; Chamayou, 2018; Harcourt, 2018. 4 Hibou, 1999; Camau, Geisser, 2003; Tsai, 2006; Heydemann, 2007; Slater, 2010; Hachemaoui, 2015. 5 Mills, 1959, p. 151 6 Ibid, pp. 151, 152. 7 Ibid, p.153. 8 Pierson, 2004, pp. 82-102. 9 Sewell, 2005, p. 83. 10 Ibid, p. 219. 11 Abbot, 2001, p. 193. 12 Koselleck, 1997; Traverso, 2011; Hartog, 2012. 13 Mills, 1959; Somers, 1996; Abbot, 2001; Sewell, 2005. 14 Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 8. 15 Ibid; Streeck and Thelen, 2004. 16 For lack of space, I will deal here especially with the state-regime issue without neglecting the second one. For the relationship between political economy and polity, see inter alia Marx, 1985; Polanyi, 1983; Hirshman, 1963 and 1986; Gamble, 1988; Weiss, 1988; Waldner, 1999; Hibou, 2006; Amable and Palombarini, 2017. 17 Downing, 1992; Ertman, 1997; Slater, 2010. Sociétés politiques comparées, 51, mai/août 2020 3 juxtaposes diverse logics of power and temporality. While the state can be characterized as the “locus of political power”, a regime may be depicted as “that part of political system which determines how and under what conditions and limitations the power of the state is exercised”.18 Accordingly, we can apprehend “state power” as the conceptual key to tackle the state-regime complex. Michael Mann famously disentangled the “power of the state” along two axes: “despotic” and “infrastructural” power. Despotic or hierarchical power, considered as a type of “distributive power”, relates to “the range of actions which the elite [of the state] is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups”.19 Infrastructural power, considered as a type of “collective power”, “enables states to diffuse their power through or penetrate their societies”.20 It refers to “the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm”.21 Power may be “extensive” or “intensive”, “authoritative” or “diffused”.22 In authoritarian systems,23 infrastructural power may have “the capacity to prevent some political outcomes from occurring