Climate Change at the Center

The Public Communication of CICERO Center for International Climate Research

Hedda Susanne Molland

Master thesis in Culture, Environment and Sustainability

Centre for Development and Environment

UNIVERSITY OF OSLO

30.11.2017

2017

Climate Change at the Center: The Public Communication of CICERO Center for International Climate Research http://www.duo.uio.no/

Print: Reprosentralen, University of Oslo

Abstract

This a study of how the researchers and staff of CICERO – Center for International Climate Research in Norway, participated in public discourse as expert commentators on the UNFCCC climate negotiations and the reality of anthropogenic climate change. In the Norwegian context CICERO is a visible actor in public discourse on climate change. Furthermore, climate researchers and research organizations such as CICERO produce information essential for how we address climate change. With a foundation in research that offers the Center epistemic authority, the Center has both power and responsibility. I discuss the roles of CICERO and how people at the Center communicated boundaries and connections between the Center, the climate research community, the Center’s lay audience, civil society and politics.

Framed by the history of CICERO and climate research, the main part of my study is a critical discourse analysis of CICERO’s public communications, i.e. popular articles, op-eds and interviews, in the time of the Conference of the Parties 15 in 2009, and the Conference of the Parties 21 in 2015. I find that the Center strongly identified with the climate research community. However, the Center also presented a willingness to collaborate with government and international political decision-makers, as long as the Center perceived these groups to be ready to address climate change. Furthermore, CICERO represented state leaders and other political decision-makers as the most important actors in the face of climate change. Civil society, conversely, was mostly left out of the Center’s commentary, apart from a few references and a temporary willingness to debate climate skeptics in 2009. Thus, the Center made civil society appear irrelevant for climate research and for how we address climate change, apart from as an extension of government-led initiatives. I also find that CICERO presented an ambivalent attitude towards their lay audience who were largely represented as passive recipients of information, which further served to underscore the passivity of civil society.

The analytical traditions that informed my analysis are intellectual history as well as the overlapping fields of science and technology studies and the public communication of science and technology. My primary methodology was critical discourse analysis. For background information I performed semi-structured, open-ended interviews with seven people at CICERO.

III

Acknowledgements

When a group of politicians name a research center CICERO, you almost expect there to be a pun somewhere. In what way does contemporary climate research resemble a Roman orator? I will not answer this question here, but will say that there is indeed a subtle pun to be found for the reader of this thesis.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my informants at CICERO, and especially Christian Bjørnæs who assisted me on multiple occasions. Though there is some criticism to be found in this thesis, I would like to underscore my appreciation of work you do and the time you all took out of your busy schedules to answer my questions.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Nina Witoszek, whose sharp pen and extensive knowledge have guided my work. I would also like to thank all the other helpful people at SUM and especially Anne-Line Sandåker and Gudrun C.E. Helland, for showing me that it is possible to feel even more at home at the University of Oslo, than I already did.

Moreover I would like to thank Helge Jordheim, Einar Wigen and other people in the Synchronizing the World project at the University of Oslo. Though the project did not relate directly to my research, I am ever grateful for your suggestions and enthusiasm for me and my studies, and for giving me the opportunity to work with such inspiring scholars. In that regard, I would also thank the Science Studies Colloquium at the University of Oslo for granting me a scholarship.

In addition, I thank my parents, for their bright insights and faith in me, and the rest of my family for tolerating both my absence and my enthusiasm for things far from their minds. On that note, I want to thank Jenny for a forever friendship, Anita for helping me keep all the pieces together, Guro for listening to my rants and giving some much needed advice on a few chapters, and Ravn for being the best climbing buddy.

In conclusion, I want to thank my partner, Henrik, for being rock solid and for reminding me how to be silly when I forget.

Table of contents

Acknowledgements ...... IV List of figures ...... VIII List of abbreviations and acronyms ...... IX 1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 My rationale: Why a climate research center? ...... 2 1.2 Objective and research questions ...... 3 1.3 The context of my analysis ...... 5 1.4 A roadmap: Overview of this thesis ...... 7 2 Literature review, analytical framework and methodology ...... 8 2.1 Literature review: Climate research in society & communication across boundaries 8 2.2 Analytical framework ...... 13 2.2.1 Boundaries, connections, actors and practices ...... 15 2.3 Methodology ...... 24 2.3.1 Discussion of methodology ...... 24 2.3.2 The material and its collection ...... 28 2.3.3 Reliability, validity, limitations and generalizability ...... 30 2.3.4 Ethical considerations ...... 32 3 The history of climate research with CICERO in focus ...... 33 3.1 Before CICERO ...... 34 3.2 The first few years ...... 37 3.3 Towards the 2000s ...... 41 3.4 A new CEO and ongoing climate negotiations ...... 43 3.5 COP 15 and “Climategate” – from optimism to uncertainty ...... 46 3.6 New CEOs and a new global agreement ...... 48 3.7 Concluding remarks: Research and policy – friends out of necessity? ...... 53 4 In 2009: A “Circus” in Denmark and Confrontations in Norway ...... 55 4.1 Overview ...... 55 4.2 The presence, platforms and public expertise of CICERO in November and December 2009 ...... 55 4.3 A “Circus” in Denmark: CICERO’s commentary on COP 15 in 2009 ...... 58 4.3.1 Preparing for failure? CICERO and COP 15 ...... 58 4.3.2 Analysis of CICERO’s take on COP 15 in 2009 ...... 59

4.4 Confrontations, consensus and credibility ...... 69 4.4.1 CICERO and climate skeptics in 2009 ...... 69 4.4.2 CICERO on the reality of climate change ...... 70 4.5 Comparative analysis of 2009 ...... 75 4.5.1 Solid or permeable boundaries? ...... 75 4.5.2 Credibility where credibility is due? ...... 78 4.5.3 CICERO’s ambivalence towards their readers ...... 80 4.5.4 Civil society got a mixed message ...... 81 4.6 Summing up the chapter ...... 83 5 In 2015: An Agreement is Reached While CICERO Shuts the Gate on Climate Debate 84 5.1 Overview ...... 84 5.2 The presence, platforms and public expertise of CICERO in November and December 2015 ...... 84 5.3 An alliance of state leaders and researchers? CICERO’s commentary on COP 21 .. 86 5.3.1 From Copenhagen to Paris: CICERO and COP 21 ...... 86 5.3.2 Analysis of CICERO’s take on COP 21 in 2015 ...... 89 5.4 CICERO Shuts the Gate on Climate Debate ...... 99 5.4.1 After “Climategate” and Onwards ...... 99 5.4.2 The defense of climate change research ...... 102 5.5 Comparative analysis of 2015 ...... 107 5.5.1 CICERO made themselves relevant ...... 107 5.5.2 But what about Norwegian climate politics? ...... 110 5.5.3 Public communication towards their lay audience ...... 111 5.5.1 Civil society, still out in the cold? ...... 114 5.6 A summary of the chapter ...... 117 6 Conclusion ...... 118 6.1 Conclusions of the study...... 118 6.1.1 Additional remarks ...... 122 6.2 Explanatory value and analytical implications ...... 124 6.2.1 The knowledge of CICERO and their lay audience ...... 124 6.2.2 Relating to policy and civil society ...... 125 6.2.3 Research PR: Credible, legitimate and interdisciplinary communication ...... 127 6.3 Suggestions for further research and concluding remarks ...... 129 Primary sources ...... 131

Bibliography ...... 139 Appendix 1 ...... 146 Appendix 2 ...... 149

VII

List of figures

Figure 1: Adapted model of Fairclough’s three-dimensional conception of discourse as embedded in society (1992, 73)...... 26 Figure 2: Frequency of mentions of keywords related to CICERO and COP 15 in Norwegian media during September 2009 to April 2010...... 56 Figure 3: Frequency of references to keywords related to CICERO and COP 21 in Norwegian media during September 2015 to April 2016...... 85

VIII

List of abbreviations and acronyms

APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation AR4: IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report AR5: IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report CDM: Clean Development Mechanism CICEP: Center for International Climate and Energy Policy CICERO: Center for International Climate and Environment Research – Oslo COP: A Conference of the Parties CRU: The Climate Research Unit at University of East Anglia EU: The European Union FrP: The Progress Party of Norway (Fremskrittspartiet) GHG: Greenhouse gas IMO: International Meteorological Organization (1873-1951) INDC: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions IPCC: United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change MIT: Massachusetts Institute of Technology NDC: Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs after the Paris Agreement was ratified) NGO: Non-Governmental Organization NIVA: The Norwegian Institute for Water Research NRK: Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (Norsk rikskringkasting) NTB: Norwegian News Agency (Norsk Telegrambyrå) PCST: Public Communication of Science and Technology RCN: The Research Council of Norway SPM: IPCC Summary for Policymakers SSB: Statistics Norway STS: Science and Technology Studies SV: Socialist Left Party of Norway UiO: University of Oslo, Norway UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change VG: Verdens gang (Norwegian tabloid newspaper) WMO: World Meteorological Organization

But science has not always had its niche, nor are the boundaries of its present niche permanent. The intellectual ecosystem has with time been carved up into “separate” institutional and professional niches through continuing processes of boundary-work designed to achieve an apparent differentiation of goals, methods, capabilities and substantive expertise.

– Thomas Gieryn, 1983

XII

1 Introduction

In 1990, a small research center was established to address a large problem. Throughout the 1980s the rising concern that humans might be causing climate change had spread from the scientists workrooms to the corridors of power, both in international politics (Miller 2004) and in Norway (Asdal 2011). In 1988 the United Nations founded the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a scientific and intergovernmental assessment body. Moreover, the United Nations conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, where the nations of the world instituted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), was a breakthrough in terms of civil society activity in international decision-making (Corell and Betsill 2001). In the midst of all this, CICERO Center for International Climate Research emerged.

Thus, in the span of five years, climate change made the fields of research, politics and civil society intersect. As an interdisciplinary Center on the still emergent research field of climate change, CICERO, played a key role in legitimizing the emergence of a Norwegian position on climate politics in preparation for international climate negotiations (Nilsen 2001, 133-137). However, it would take another decade for climate change to fully enter public discourse. CICERO was mandated from the beginning to communicate on climate change, but it was not until the early 2000s that climate change became a theme in Norwegian media (Tjernshaugen et al. 2011). And as this topic entered the Norwegian public consciousness, so did CICERO.

At the turn of the millennium, researchers giving public expert commentary on climate change were for the most part unheard of in Norway; today it is an established field in the public discourse, a field that is dominated by one small research center: CICERO. The Center has taken on many public roles. Overtly and directly, the CEOs, researchers and public communicators at this Center have communicated the difference between their own contributions, and that of others groups in Norwegian public discourse. At the same time, people at the Center have bounded off the Center’s territory of expertise and paroled the limits. Why? As they maintain the difference between the Center’s contributions and that of others, they uphold their credibility and legitimize their role in public deliberation on climate change (Gieryn 1995).

In the footsteps of Thomas F. Gieryn we may think of discourse as mapping society. On this map we can identify research as a territory, bordering on other social territories, such as civil society and politics. In this study I examine the history and public roles of CICERO by analyzing how the Center’s territory of public expertise has been defined and how it has evolved in the face of history. Moreover, climate change is an issue that makes research, politics and civil society meet. I therefore discuss how CICERO’s many public roles have changed in the public convergence of politics, civil society and the Center. In short, my ambition with this study is to strengthen understanding of how a small research center can be an important part of our public history and society.

1.1 My rationale: Why a climate research center?

A new and productive angle to examine in the public communication of climate change is to look at a research center such as CICERO. Especially interesting are the roles of CICERO and how the Center has constituted a field for themselves1 in public discourse. As I will show in this study, CICERO has, throughout their history, been a hybrid with multiple roles in society related to different groups. With this study I present insights into how an influential organization contributes to Norwegian discourse on climate change. Moreover, as the Norwegian climate discourse partakes in a wider international discourse, my findings may also shed light on this context.

The chief characteristics of CICERO are research and the communication of knowledge on climate change to society. The Norwegian Ministry of Environment stated in 2001 that CICERO had a national task of public dissemination of climate research, a statement reiterated in 2007 (Miljøverndepartementet 2001, 201; 2007, 58). As experts in public discourse, the Center affects policy-making and public understanding. With a foundation in research that offers the Center epistemic authority, they contribute to construction of social reality (Peters 2008, 132). For this reason they have both power and responsibility in public discourse. Furthermore, climate researchers and research organizations such as CICERO produce information essential for how we address climate change. Therefore, a study of public communication on climate change by an

1 I refer to the Center with third person plural pronoun in recognition that they are a group of people. I elaborate on the justification for this in 2.4. 2

actor such as the Center can provide key information on decisions made and actions taken in politics and civil society.

With this study I provide insights into how research centers as public communicators can both inform and be informed by their historical context. As a study of the way a hybrid climate research center operates as a public communicator, my analysis provides insight into how such communication is affected by tensions, challenges and opportunities for communication and epistemic authority. I also present insights on the implications of the roles of CICERO for other groups in society, especially political decision-makers and civil society. In this regard, my analysis contributes to an elaboration of theories of separation and connection between climate research and other sectors of society, especially as these relationships regard public expert communication on climate change. The study can therefore increase our understanding of the social role of research and the part such centers play in our society.

1.2 Objective and research questions

As climate politics, society and our understanding of climate change have changed, so has CICERO. In this study I therefore examine their roles in public discourse throughout their history, with a particular focus on their public communication in November and December 2009 and November and December 2015 as these were important moments for the Center. I approach this topic with analysis of how the Center maintained distinctions between research and other parts of society, how they connected with their audience and related to other actors in society, and what the implications of these practices were. Furthermore, these issues regard how the Center presented their own expertise and how they addressed the expertise of other groups. With this in mind I pose the following research question:

 What roles has CICERO had as a research center in Norwegian public discourse on climate change?

My underlying perspective is historical, coupled with an analytical framework that combines science and technology studies and the public communication of science and technology. The premise of my study is that public expert commentary on climate change discourse and climate politics, shapes and is shaped by its historical context.

This includes, but is not limited to: the experience of separation and/or integration of climate change research in society; views on authority, expertise and identity, including research specialization; and shared and diverse conceptualizations of climate change and ways to address it.

I use the methodology of critical discourse analysis to study how CICERO discursively constituted boundaries, by which I mean demarcations made between research and other social practices to communicate that research has a unique and separate standing in society. Moreover, I study how they established connection, perhaps even exchange, between the Center and their lay audience, civil society and political decision-makers. Boundaries and connections must be discussed together, as they to some degree are two sides of the same coin; both represent a kind of relationship.

I present three sub-questions to articulate my main research question in detail. Firstly, I seek to answer how CICERO maintained the boundaries between their own practices and other social domains in public discourse. I do this by asking:

 How has CICERO constituted their identity in public discourse by setting boundaries between themselves and other social actors such as political decision-makers and civil society?

Secondly, I seek to answer in what ways CICERO despite, or by means of these boundaries, established connections with different parts of society. I do this with a particular focus on their readers, civil society and politics. I therefore ask:

 How has CICERO established connection with their readers and other sectors of society in communicating around or through these boundaries?

In addition, in order to address the wider context CICERO’s communication practices partake in, I ask:

 What are the implications of CICERO’s communication practices for other actors in the Norwegian climate change discourse?

These three questions address communicative challenges and opportunities of research demarcation, identification, and boundaries, as well as boundary-crossing communication and the relationship between research, politics and civil society. The

methodology of discourse analysis opens up for perspectives different from those of CICERO. I therefore incorporate a wider context of actors and forces into my analysis. Nevertheless, my main focus remains on the public communication of the Center.

1.3 The context of my analysis

Norway presents a remarkable context because of its mixed interests regarding climate change. On the one hand, the country is one of the world’s largest exporters of oil and gas. Its small population of slightly more than 5 million inhabitants (as of November 2017), as well as the country’s governments, have depended on petro-industry for its income since the 1970s. On the other hand, climate science is established in Norway, as exemplified by CICERO, and Norwegian researchers have contributed to the conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). These conclusions have also been accepted by the Norwegian government since the Panel published their first assessment report in 1990. From 2003, climate change has increasingly become a part of the Norwegian environment debate (Tjernshaugen et al. 2011) with much focus on whether Norway should reduce its emissions through domestic cuts or pay for such cuts abroad (Hovden and Lindseth 2004). From 2009 onwards, there was increased focus on the nation’s international contributions to climate change mitigation in Norwegian media (Johannessen 2014).

CICERO’s leaders, the state of research, political needs and public discourse have changed the Center. When the Center began their work in 1990, the Norwegian prime minister and the Center’s first CEO intended to use the interdisciplinary research to develop arguments Norway could bring to United Nations (UN) negotiations in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Nilsen 2001, 134-137). Towards the 2000s the Center assumed a more publicly visible role as a commentator on, among other things, the annual Conferences of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, which began with that meeting in Rio in 1992.

The COPs have increasingly become events that draw attention to climate change in the media across the world (McNatt et al. 2017). In later years, two meetings garnered particular attention abroad and in Norway.2 The Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen in 2009, abbreviated somewhat confusingly “COP 15”, and the Conference

2 According to the media archive and analysis tool Retriever. Search words “klimatoppmøte OR COP OR UNFCCC”. 5 of the Parties in Paris in 2015, abbreviated “COP 21”, were the focal points of two attempts at a global regime on climate change. As I will show in this study, in line with these events, CICERO increased their visibility in the Norwegian public sphere, in November and December 2009 and November and December 2015. Their public communication in these periods was of particular importance for the Center and it seems likely that it had added impacts on the Norwegian public. I therefore chose to focus much of my analysis on these two periods.

There are two recurring themes in CICERO’s communication practices during these months in 2009 and 2015 that are of specific interest: CICERO’s commentary on the COPs and the Center’s contribution to debates on the reality of climate change, anthropogenic or otherwise. In this study I present close analysis of some representative texts from the Center on these two themes. I chose these themes because they concern discussions of climate action and epistemic credibility in public. They therefore present a potential for encounters between CICERO’s climate expertise and other parts of society, which means they concern negotiation of boundaries and connections.

The parties of the UNFCCC failed to come to an agreement in 2009, but during COP 15, across all inhabited continents, the coverage of climate change in major newspapers reached its highest in current history (McNatt et al. 2017). The media controversy “Climategate” also began in 2009 and it was the founding year of the Norwegian organization the Climate Realists, who are skeptical to anthropogenic climate change. In this year, CICERO provided expert commentary on the negotiations and debated the Climate Realists and other professed “climate skeptics” in Norwegian media and on their own webpage. In 2015, the French hosted COP 21 in Paris. In contrast with COP 15, this meeting ended with a global climate change agreement. Though still important, climate change was less visible in Norwegian and international media in 2015 compared to in 2009. Furthermore, by 2015 CICERO had extensively cut down on their own contributions to debates with climate skeptics.

Given the contrasts and similarities between these two historic moments, a comparison of CICERO’s public communication at the time around the two events can provide insights on how researchers and research centers who act as public experts on climate change and climate politics are informed by history. It can also contribute to an understanding of changes in the relationship between CICERO and public climate 6

change discourse and shed light on the historicity of the Center’s roles in relation to other parts of society.

1.4 A roadmap: Overview of this thesis

In this introduction I presented the topic of this study and discussed the objective and rational of my analysis. In the next chapter I summarize relevant literature and present my analytical framework. I also review my methodology and material, along with the reliability, validity, limitations, generalizability, and ethical considerations of my analysis. The two periods in 2009 and 2015 that make up the main part of my analysis are framed by a larger historical context that can be traced back at least to the end of World War II. Chapter 3 looks at this history and the evolution of CICERO, from before the Center was established in 1990, through their political dealings in the early 1990s, a change in profile in the 2000s and onwards. Chapter 4 examines the public communication of the Center in the period around COP 15, November and December 2009. It is divided into an overview of the Center’s discursive practice, and two sections with descriptive textual analysis of, respectively, how people at CICERO commented on COP 15 and discussed the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Chapter 4 ends with a comparative analysis of the Center’s communication practices on these themes in this period. Chapter 5 is structured the same way as chapter 4, with a focus on CICERO’s texts produced in the period around COP 21, in November and December 2015. In chapter 6 I summarize my conclusions from the two periods, and by way of this answer my research questions. I also discuss implications of the findings of the previous chapters and address the potential for further research. I conclude with some considerations on relational perspectives of climate change discourse, research communities and expert commentary.

2 Literature review, analytical framework and methodology

2.1 Literature review: Climate research in society & communication across boundaries

I draw my main analytical framework from the overlapping fields of science and technology studies (STS) and the public communication of science and technology (PCST). Before I discuss my analytical framework, the vast research that has been done on science in society and the public communication of science deserves a brief review.

Climate change research and society

Much research has been done on the history of climate science in society. In A Vast Machine (2010), historian Paul N. Edwards provides an elaborate overview of the history of climate change science as it developed into a global knowledge infrastructure. His particular focus is on modeling and computation, but he also brings attention to the politics of global warming. In the Norwegian context, Kristin Asdal (2011) has written thoroughly on the history of environmental politics in relation to the natural sciences in Norway from World War II onwards. She presents useful insights on the relationship between scientific production of knowledge and political processes, but the role of climate research is only a portion of her overall analysis. Concluding this trio, historian Yngve Nilsen (2001) discusses the history of Norwegian energy politics until 1998. He provides exclusive information on the early years of CICERO in relation to Norwegian oil politics and also elaborates on the different roles of the climate expert. However, apart from this work little research has been done on CICERO. Jørund Bergrem (2005) included CICERO in his Master thesis, but his focus was on the Center’s connections to the University of Oslo, an organizational perspective. While Nilsen and Bergrem provide useful information on the Center they say little of their public orientation. Only an interdisciplinary paper by journalism student Hanne Jakobsen (2009) has been written on CICERO’s communication practices. Furthermore, much has changed at CICERO since these studies were made, which justifies a new assessment.

The anthology Klima, medier og politikk, (eds. Eide et al. 2014) covers various perspectives of the meetings of media, politics and climate change, but focus remains on the role of media. Moreover, scholars in the MediaClimate network have studied how journalists in different nations addressed COP 15 as a media event, summarized in Global climate – local journalism: a transnational study of how media makes sense of climate summits (eds. Eide et al. 2010). Both of these books are great resources for climate change in public discourse, but there still appears to be room for elaboration on the role of climate researchers as public experts, both in the Norwegian context, and in general. While Sunniva Tøsse’s PhD (2012) addresses the meeting of climate scientists and the media in science communication, her primary approach was interviews, not discourse analysis of communication by public experts.

Science and technology studies

My analysis is influenced by the traditions of Science and technology studies (STS). Many STS scholars have in later years confronted some of the field’s assumptions of the detachedness of science from society. The Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (eds. Jasanoff et al. 1995) gives an overview of theory and methods in STS. It presents discussions on science and technology as social practice and institution, on communication, controversy and political involvement. Much of the anthology shows how STS has developed into a field that explores the interrelationship of science and policy, the role of scientific authority and expertise in relation to politics, and the influence of politics on science.

An important contribution to STS in later years was the problematization of the notion that science is distinct from social practices. Sheila Jasanoff, one of the editors of the abovementioned handbook, also edited the book States of Knowledge: The co- production of science and social order (2004). Here she defines “co-production” as “…shorthand for the proposition that the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it” (2004, 2). Bruno Latour follows the same line in Pandora’s Hope (1999) as he describes how knowledge is produced in relation to materiality, and interrelates with social and political thought and action. Both these perspectives show how research is

9 integrated in society and provide a premise for my analysis, though I do not draw on them extensively in my discussion.

In my analysis I focus on the demarcation of research from other social practices, and the demarcation of CICERO from other groups in society. Thomas F. Gieryn introduces the term “boundary work” to describe this demarcation practice in the article "Boundary work and the demarcation of science from non-science" (Gieryn 1983). He discusses it further in the abovementioned handbook and a later monograph (Gieryn 1999). His premise is that science is a part of our culture, much as is argued with co-production and chains of translation. Sundqvist et al.’s (2015) approach issues of legitimacy and credibility in more recent years. Their work looks at ways to shield and connect research and politics through formalization versus popularization of language and separation versus integration in knowledge production. They problematize a highly rationalized and idealized image of research as separate from society, but at the same time recognize the usefulness of demarcation for the role research can play in society.

However, neither Gieryn nor Sundqvist et al. present discourse analysis in the intersection of boundary work and public communication of climate research. Gieryn (1983, 1995) emphasizes conflictual situations where boundaries between science and other parts of society are challenged or transformed. I study both situations of explicit conflict and stability, where boundaries are established and maintained. I link this perspective to public communication, which, when occurring across such boundaries, may influence and be influenced by them. Moreover, the role of boundary work in public communication has been studied before, but not from a research center to a more heterogeneous and unspecified lay audience. Sundqvist et al. (2015) study the meeting of expertise and policy, while Wilson and Herndl (2007) look at communication between experts in different fields in the closed context of deliberative meetings. In addition, the focus of my analysis opens up for an elaboration of Gieryn’s discussion on the dynamic relationship of dependence and independence between scientists and political decision-makers. I have extended this perspective in my inquiry into the relationship between climate change research and civil society.

The public communication of science and technology

The public communication of science and technology (PCST) is an intersecting field to STS. From the 1990s onwards, many PCST scholars have criticized traditional views on science dissemination. In the first issue of the journal Public Understanding of Science, Brian Wynne argues for a broad conceptualization of expertise that encompassed both scientists and Cumbrian sheep farmers (1992). In the Handbook of Public Communication of Science and Technology (eds. Bucchi and Trench 2008), Massimiano Bucchi elaborates on the distinction between a traditional model of the public understanding of science and one that focuses more on the public communication of science (Bucchi 2008). For Bucchi a clear distinction between a homogeneous public and the scientific community is too simplistic. He argues that there is a qualitative difference between expert and lay knowledge that is not simply a matter of degrees of ignorance. However, for instance Weingart see an increased emphasis on the integration of public and scientific community as at risk of romaniticizing lay knowledge (Weingart 1997, 611). Such developments in the perspective of popularized communication of science justifies an in-depth study of how CICERO relates to their lay audience to see to what extent such perspectives have moved beyond PCST and entered public communication practices.

Many scholars have discussed the relationship between social science and public culture, for instance within the Frankfurt School and Max Weber’s elaboration on the relationship between experts and politicians (e.g. Weber 1999, 165-167). However, according to Angela Cassidy little research has been done in later years on the specific issues social scientists face when publicly communicating their research (2008, 225). The public communication of interdisciplinary research that spans both natural and social sciences seems even less explored than what Cassidy (2008) argues is the case for social sciences. Cassidy does not mention interdisciplinary research in her review of the public communication of social sciences. Conversely, Sundqvist et al. (2015) look at formalization and separation in three different, interdisciplinary climate research organizations. But these organizations do not produce climate research as much as they synthesize it for policy purposes, and they do not communicate specifically in the public sphere. It seems likely that public communication with a foundation in interdisciplinary research, such as that performed at CICERO, shares commonalities and differences with

11 the kind of challenges faced by social sciences and natural science. The interdisciplinary character of the public communication of CICERO is not my main focus, but the choice of this topic means that insights into such practices may be gained from my analysis.

Spanning boundaries

With a position as a research center, public communicator of research and expert commentator on climate change, CICERO holds a hybrid position in Norwegian society, between a research organization, a policy-adviser and a co-producer of public opinion. Some scholars who study research communication speak of “boundary- spanning activities” or “boundary roles” (Rödder 2012, 159), hybrid organizations that move between science and politics, such as the IPCC (Miller 2001), boundary negotiations (Trompette and Vinck 2009) and intermediaries (Callon 1994). Moreover, Bucchi (2008) and Sarah Tinker Perrault (2013) open up for different perspectives on the relationship between researchers and other actors in society. According to Bucchi the public communication of science can be viewed as cross-talking between discourses under specific circumstances “…at the intersection between specialist and popular level” (Bucchi 2008, 67). Perrault (2013) argues for a “democratic” ideal for the public communication of science, where both researchers and civil society are involved in knowledge evaluation. However, Edwards problematizes the degree to which so-called “extended peer review”, the inclusion of lay people in assessment of climate research’s data and methods, is conducive to research on climate change (2010, 421-427). My analysis adds insights to these issues by addressing to what degree CICERO’s public communication represents a boundary-spanning practice and how they themselves represent the popular communication of expertise knowledge.

If research centers are hybrids that negotiate across boundaries between research and public issues, the postulation of “mode 2” science or “post-academic” science becomes relevant. Gibbons et al. (1994) (on mode 2 science) and Ziman (2000) (on post- academic science) argue that science has changed in recent years. According to them, new science is decentralized, more heterogeneous and applied; it moves out from the academic context of the university, and into politics, bureaucracy, the business sector and other institutions. However, according to Weingart (1997), scholars presented this way of doing science as the “finalization” of science already in the 1970s. The

important similarity between “finalization” and “mode 2” science is “the socio-political orientation of science as the ultimate stage in the evolution of the relation between science and society” (Weingart 1997, 611). Further, Weingart states that this is not descriptive of science as a whole, but applies specifically to policy-related fields, such as climate change science. As CICERO is an independent research center mandated to perform and communicate applied research (CICERO 2006b) they appear to fall squarely within this perspective. However, it seems unlikely that they are at the ultimate stage of their evolution.

General considerations

Many in the field of STS and PCST have written on environment and climate change science. These fields lend themselves to a study of meetings of materiality, science and politics, they focus on the natural world and are at the same time often policy relevant and easily politicized. From what I have found, there is a lack of research on communication practices and boundary work when it comes to research organizations such as CICERO. With reference to my research questions, analysis of the public communication practices of a center like CICERO can present interesting findings on: 1) the construction and maintenance of boundaries between research centers, politics and civil society in public discourse on climate change; 2) how such a research center addresses the broader public through their own channels for public communication of climate change knowledge; and 3) how they navigate different roles in relation to other actors in society.

2.2 Analytical framework

In the 1990s, discussions of the roles and positions of science in society turned into the debate coined “the Science Wars”. The debate centered on scientific authority and involved discussion on the interpretation of Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996 [1962]) and the “Sokal affair”.3 Previously mentioned scholars such as Latour and Gieryn address the “Wars” in their works, as does Ziman (2000). As Greg Myers argues, one can discuss popularization of science and how

3 A hoax where a nonsense paper passed through supposed rigorous peer review and was published in the journal Social Text. Alan Sokal announced his hoax, using it to criticize perspectives in social science. 13 debates in the public sphere are informed by the public sphere without necessarily reopening this debate (Myers 2003, 269). However, some of the arguments in the debate were founded on a Cartesian dualism where mind and matter were seen as ontologically separate. I therefore find it necessary to point out that my perspective is closer to that of monist analyticism, where both the mind and the body are regarded as embedded in the world. This pragmatic position, where primacy is given neither to materiality or sociality, is elaborated by Patrick T. Jackson in The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations (2011, 113-155). Though the position is pragmatic, it does not necessarily lead to relativism or idealism: I do not argue that anything counts as knowledge, as some STS scholars purportedly have (Edwards 2010, 437). I do not mean to undermine the epistemic authority of climate research, but I do mean to analyze the social roles of a climate research center. This is the line I walk in my analysis.4

Jasanoff’s “co-production” and Latour’s “chains of translation” appear closely related to monist ontology. However, the terms easily become “catch all” for all processes where materiality, culture and society are involved, all aspects of human life. For me they provide a critical point of reference, but in the analysis of discourse materiality may play a less prominent part. Still, materiality enables, mediates and shapes communication. Material perspectives are thus relevant for my analysis, but they stay in the background as part of a bigger picture of research and communication.

The interactive perspectives of Jasanoff and Latour can also be connected to Mustafa Emirbayer’s article “Manifest for a Relational Sociology” (1997). Emirbayer delineates between seeing the world as made of static things or dynamic, unfolding relations. The latter of these perspectives means to “…reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre- given units such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis” (287). Arguing for a relational perspective, he gives primacy to context and process in sociological analysis (290). Emirbayer draws on the work of Andrew Abbott who argues that we should look for “things of boundaries”, not “boundaries of things” (1995, 857). Abbot’s general argument is that social entities come into existence through the construction of boundaries: “Boundaries come first, then entities” (1995, 860). However, entities can also construct boundaries. Nevertheless, the relationship remains processual, and I find this chicken-or-the-egg dilemma is best described by a

4 This is also how I justify drawing on the empirical findings of CICERO’s researchers in this study. 14 focus on dialectic relations over essences. Following these perspectives, the relations between climate change research and other social entities are significant to understand CICERO’s role in public discourse.

A critical historical perspective is prominent in my analysis. I place the communication practices of CICERO in the period around the climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 and in Paris in 2015 within longer historical lines, as both their actions and the premises of their actions are historical products. According to Norman Fairclough, to be critical is to show hidden connections and causes. It also implies acknowledgment that things can be different (Fairclough 1992, 9). Intellectual historian Quentin Skinner (2002) argues that historical insight into a subject lets us see its qualities and potentials and how it relates to our present situation and the choices we face. For Skinner it can:

…help us to appreciate how far the values embodied in our present way of life, and our present way of thinking about those values, reflect a series of choices made at different times between different possible worlds. This awareness can help liberate us from the grip of any one hegemon[i]al account of those values and how they should be interpreted and understood. Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from the intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them (2002, 6).

Thus I believe the historical dimensions of public communication on climate change presented in my analysis can challenge an established understanding of such practices by showing their historicity and open up for new, even more useful perspectives.

2.2.1 Boundaries, connections, actors and practices

The boundaries of research

By “boundary work” I mean the construction and maintenance of demarcation of research from other practices in society. In his 1983 article, Gieryn describes boundary- work as a rhetorical style where researchers describe science5 for public and political authorities, to expand the domain of science and defend professional autonomy. Though Kuhn reinvented theorization of the demarcation of science, Gieryn (1995) argues that

5 Though Gieryn talks about “science” I prefer to use “research” here, something I get back to below. 15

Kuhn’s perspective on structures lacks a discussion of the practice that demarcates research from other aspects of the world. Gieryn turns this critique also on Robert K. Merton and Karl Popper. He wants to move focus away from structures and onto the social practice aspects of science. Gieryn talks about “science”, but I use “research” in my analysis, something I get back to below. I believe the premises of Gieryn theories are as applicable to research as to science, as both regard epistemic practices and authority.

Extending this discussion by drawing on Jørgensen and Phillips (1999), boundary work can be seen as the result of discursive conflict where actors from different discourses compete to establish meaning within the same discursive space. Boundary work is the discursive constitution of research as a distinct practice by implicitly or explicitly referring to the standards that convey epistemic authority, presented as the defining trait of research. Such standards can be norms like those proposed by Merton in 1942, namely communalism, universalism, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism (Gieryn 1995, 398-400). They can also be models of scientific practice such as Popper’s criterion of empirical falsification (Gieryn 1995, 395). Even Imre Lakatos’ (1978) scientific research programs with their hard core of theoretical premises can be used as a reference for the boundaries of research. Boundary work can also be done through reference to academic position, title or community, or by the application of specialist language, jargon or genre that carry research connotations.

From the perspective of “boundary work” we can map out society as consisting of territories with boundaries, of which science is one, and political decision-making and civil society are others. In Gieryn’s works referenced here, he uses a cartography metaphor to discuss how research monopolizes, expands, expels and protects its territory when challenged or in conflict with other domains. The cartography metaphor can also be used to discuss the maintained demarcation of research from other parts of society. Such separation from for instance politics and civil society can bring epistemic authority and credibility to research, but it can also undermine legitimacy and relevance. Thus boundary work presents opportunities and challenges for researchers who publicly communicate climate change.

Gieryn generally refers to “science” and not “research”, as I did above. His focuses in particular on natural science and this may have implications for his theories such more 16 rigid demarcations between science and society, as research often is considered more applied. At the same time Cassidy (2008) hypothesizes that the distinction between “science” and “social science” in public communication is more categorical in Anglophone cultures than for instance in German, where the word Wissenschaft can encompass both. This hypothesis can be extended to Norway, where a similar word, vitenskap, to a certain extent, can denote both these fields. However, with some exceptions for specific issues of natural science, I generally refer to the knowledge production at CICERO as “research” for four reasons: the interdisciplinary and applied character of the work done at the Center is not necessarily covered by the term “science” with its normative and disciplinary connotations; the Center is a part of the Norwegian institute sector with the sector’s emphasis on applied research, and is categorized by the Research Council of Norway (RCN) as a research institute; the term research better encompass theories of mode 2 science, post-academic science or finalization as the terms relate to applied research; and CICERO refers to their work as forskning (not vitenskap) which translates more closely to research.

In discussing the communicative practices of a research center, a pragmatic problem is the matter of who to study as discursive actor. From an institutional and organizational point of view CICERO is a unit, but what about when it comes to communication? From the outside, the organization appears more uniform, internal variations appear less dichotomous, and the general culture or pattern of practices of the Center more distinct. When presenting a statement for a CICERO researcher, media in Norway usually refer to both the researcher’s specialization and their status at CICERO. In my interviews, CICERO’s researchers recognized the interdisciplinary character of the Center, but they repeatedly emphasized their individuality and independence as researchers – what one senior researcher described as their separate “platforms”. From within CICERO researchers define the Center by the distinct practices and specializations of the individual researchers.6 However, I focus on CICERO as an actor in public discourse because the Center is the main reference point when these researchers participate in public discourse, the Center has influence. From the outside CICERO appears more like a unit, so that to a certain extent the Center, and not simply the individual researchers, acts in public debate. Furthermore, most texts, even a text from CICERO, is usually a

6 Interview with current communication director Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. Interviews with CICERO researchers 2016, CICERO offices, Oslo 17 product of many contributions, not a single author (Asdal et al. 2008, 249-250). As I recognize that this is a multifaceted issue, I refer to CICERO, researchers and other staff at the Center as “they” not “it”, as their communication practices and public influence are products of a joint effort at the Center. It is also worth noting here the paradoxical fact that when I treat CICERO as an actor, I contribute to the demarcation of the Center.

Expertise and public communication

In this study I mostly focus on the expert commentary of CICERO in the public climate change discourse. I therefore do not focus so much on the public communication of research, but rather public communication of climate issues with a basis in research. Scholars of PCST have usefully discussed communication practices by researchers that go beyond the communication of research. According to Peters (2008), one reason research is discussed in public is because they connect to policy issues and therefore demand collective decision and democratic involvement of citizens, enabled especially through mass media. Peters emphasizes the diversity of public research communication as he makes a distinction between researchers as public experts, as popularizers of research, and as discussant in a meta-discourse on the research-society relationship. It is mainly the first, and to some extent the third, of these roles, that are relevant in this study. Peters shows how researchers as public experts can act as policy-advisors and public commentators combined. They are not (only) communicators of scientific knowledge, which is abstract, general and theoretical, but of expertise knowledge, which “…is concerned with the analysis and solution of practical problems in specific situations” (Peters 2008, 132). The distinction between expertise knowledge and scientific knowledge compares to Nilsen (2001, 22-23, 151)’s distinction between experts “in their field”, who have a general and more applied knowledge, and experts “on their subject”, who have a more specialized approach to knowledge.

I use Peters’ (2008) archetype of researchers as public experts, with additional perspective from Nilsen, to describe the role performed by CICERO researchers in their discussion of the COPs and arguments against climate change. As the people at CICERO’s communication department use the researchers at the Center as a source of their communication, the term can be extended to also include this group. Peters reasons that public experts participating in the public sphere affect policy-making as they take

18 part in “the construction of a social reality”, delineating fact from fiction, in a way that politicians cannot ignore (Peters 2008, 132). From this perspective epistemic authority becomes part of the public picture and credibility becomes vitally important. As Edwards points out “making [expert] knowledge work means getting people to trust it – to buy it on credit, as it were, where the credit belongs to an authority they are willing to believe” (2010, 397). CICERO’s reputation is, as Wynne argfues (1995, 377), an important part of how people understand the climate knowledge they communicate, perhaps even more important than specific dissemination of technical information.

Here it is worth pointing out that only one of my seven informants at CICERO described the Center’s public COP reporting as “expert commentary”. The others refrained from using the term “expert”. This may have to do with a more everyday understanding of the term in Norwegian discourse, but as current communication director Christian Bjørnæs pointed out:

We want to demarcate that our competence is something else than for instance the one that experts in NGOs [non-governmental organizations] or the business sector contribute with. This is not an explicit policy at [CICERO], but I think it is pretty common. I rarely experience that a researcher wants to be spoken of as an expert rather than as a researcher [forsker].7

In not referring to themselves as experts, CICERO increases their credibility through a kind of boundary work. As they enter public discourse they set themselves apart from (other) experts in society. Peters states: “As experts, scientists do not possess a monopoly of relevant knowledge; values and interests will come into play and public controversies may evolve” (2008, 143). Thus omitting the term reduces the vulnerability of the Center’s communicators. “Expert” may be too generic to specifically describe the kind of commentary performed by CICERO. However, whether people at CICERO see themselves as experts or not, they may still perform the role of public experts. I used the term “experts” for its overall applicability and as an acknowledgement that researchers are one among many kinds of groups with an elaborate understanding of an issue.

In entering public discourse, CICERO relates to an audience that can be described as “lay” in comparison with the Center’s own professional expertise. Norman Fairclough

7 Email correspondence with Christian Bjørnæs, 11.10.2017. 19 defines discourse as “a practice not just of representing the world, but of signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (1992, 64). He therefore defines discursive communication as acting in and upon our world, giving it meaning and socially constructing it. As mentioned above, boundaries can be implicitly communicated by the style of communication, such as language use or genre. It can also be done by implying that the readers are at a different level of understanding than the author. The condition of some of CICERO’s boundaries can thus be studied by how the Center addresses, relates to and represents their audience.

In studies of the public understanding of science, the canonical view of popularization was long a unidirectional, two-stage and linear model where the (passive) public was a blank slate of ignorance to be written with knowledge by (active) scientists. This view saw a clear-cut boundary between a homogeneous public and the scientific community, with authoritative knowledge only in the latter group. Popularization meant a risk of dilution or distortion of the original knowledge. By its critics, this model is named the “deficit model” or the “diffusionist” conception of public communication of science, depending on which of its characteristics are emphasized (Bucchi 2008) (Myers 2003, 266). Bucchi (2008) argues that this conception is too simplistic. He points to three ways of communicating research: the deficit model focused on transferring knowledge, the dialogue oriented which opens up for discussion of the implications of research, and the participatory, where knowledge is co-produced by various actors (2008, 69-70).

Perrault also points to an alternative way of perceiving research communication, as she promotes a “democratic” approach. According to Perrault this would lead from a culture that emphasizes the “public appreciation of science and technology” to one that focuses on the “critical understanding of science in public” (2013, 7). As mentioned, my focus is on public communication with a basis in research and not on the communication of research as such. Still, Bucchi (2008) and Perrault’s (2013) critiques show how the different ways researchers relate to their audience contributes to the way the latter are represented and in what options they see for relating to the knowledge communicated.

There are different ways to understand climate change and not all need be based on a technical understanding of the research. John Shotter describes a social “knowing ‘from within’ a situation or circumstance” (Shotter 1993, xiii) while Jackson (2015) promotes a pluralistic understanding of knowledge illustrated by the different ways of knowing 20

Scotch whisky. Their arguments may also be applied to ways of understanding climate change. For Shotter and Jackson there is a connection between knowledge and understanding, that matches Wynne’s point that “a proper approach to PUS has to problematize what is meant not only by ‘science’ but also by ‘understanding’” (Wynne 1995, 364). Regarding the public understanding of climate change, Ryghaug et al. (2011) identify different sense-making devices among a lay audience, one being how it is relevant in their own lives.

However, “lay audience” is a generic category that describes a diverse group, who may only be identified as a group in that they are “lay” relative to CICERO’s professional expertise. As Shotter (1993) argues, the same technical information may appear as different kinds of knowledge for different groups, in different situations. So who are the Center’s lay audience? This question is difficult to answer, as CICERO communicates on many platforms. According to a survey performed by the Center in 2009, the readers of their magazine were people working in ministries, the private sector, non- governmental organizations (NGOs) and the interested public (CICERO 2009c, 23). This detailed description stands in contrast with Bjørnæs’ description of Klima’s target audience as “…the interested public …, not other experts [on the topic]”.8 Indeed the 2009 survey shows that there may have been many among Klima’s readership that had a different kind of expertise on climate change than the one found at CICERO. However, Bjørnæs pointed out that CICERO’s most important target group were “people who use climate knowledge to come to a decision in their work”.9 They wrote more serious articles for this group and other, more “easy” articles for “people in general”. It seems implied here that the first group was individuals with personal influence in their line of work, such as leaders in government and industry. This perspective was echoed by a CICERO researcher who said he “visualized someone working in a Ministry” when writing op-eds and popular research articles.10

Political decision-makers and civil society

Gieryn shows how in democratic countries science and politics have a relationship that is close, but not too close. Too close a relationship might challenge the credibility of

8 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 9 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 10 Interview with CICERO researcher 2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 21 science, which may appear just like another opinion in the crowd, or the legitimacy of politics, which may appear superfluous in the face of technocratic decision-making. Thus the distance science maintains from politics needs to be “…far enough for science to be objective and authoritative, close enough to be useful” (Gieryn 1995, 439). In conjunction with Gieryn’s theorization is the expression “policy relevant but not prescriptive”. This is the term the IPCC uses to describe their assessment work (IPCC Secretariat 2010) and it is used by CICERO to describe their research.11 The term in itself is an example of boundary work as it signals a clear distinction between research and politics, where the first informs the latter without making the political decisions.

The term parallels Peters (2008) take on the Habermasian description of the “decisionist model”. In this model the relationship between research and politics is presented as a linear communication of information from the researchers to the political decision- makers, with research as a basis on which the latter can make rational decisions. I use the term “political decision-maker” in this study to signify that this is a diverse group, from political leaders to bureaucrats and ministry officials who rely on research to develop policies. In this way, CICERO can present their role as an adviser to political decision-makers, as “…making the client’s implicit preferences explicit; developing possible decision options; and determining and assessing consequences using clients’ preferences” (Peters 2008, 133). This represents research as neutral in relation to political decision-making. However, Shaw and Robinson (2004) challenge the idea that a relationship between research and politics can be “relevant but not prescriptive”, a dissemination of knowledge that is linear and unidirectional, devoid of political influence. According to them, the relationship is more integrated. Jackson (2014) points out that historically social research was considered by some as a way to remove the irrationality of political power struggle by presenting the most rational choice for going forward, a more technocratic form of governance. These three perspectives present different ways researchers can relate to and represent political decision-makers. Thus political decision-makers may be represented with varying relevance for knowledge production and varying control over decision-making.

I focus on “civil society” rather than “the public” in my analysis to signify the complexity of citizen activities that are relevant for climate change, as civil society is

11 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 22 not a single, homogeneous group, but a network of associations, groups, movements and individuals. Jan Aart Scholte presents a useful definition of civil society: “a political space where associations of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape societal rules” (Scholte 2014, 324). By this definition civil society is not synonymous with NGOs, though many NGOs are included in the definition. Drawing on (Andresen and Gulbrandsen 2005, 172) and Vormedal (2008) I divide relevant NGOs into activist NGOs with a membership base, advisory NGOs with an intellectual base, and lobbying NGOs associated with business and industry.

Scholte’s definition moreover, means that civil society is not synonymous with “the general public”, a term with a less explicit political orientation. Central in Scholte’s definition of civil society are citizens as members of political community who come together to deliberate, strategize and mobilize. At the same time, by excluding political parties, the definition emphasizes that civil society actions does not aspire to occupy official authority, and thereby do not take the roles of what I in this study describe as “political decision-maker”. Instead, they aim to “…influence the principles, norms, laws, and standards that govern the collective life of human beings” (Scholte 2014, 324). Furthermore, Scholte’s definition does not imply unanimity or even civility in civil society, and it intentionally does not make a neat distinction between civil society and commercial, official and political party activities; as these activities can overlap to a varying degree. In addition, for the purpose of my analysis I underscore that civil society can contain people with different kinds of expertise (Perrault 2013, xiii-xiiii).

While Gieryn (1995, 1983) does not elaborate on the relationship between civil society and science, Perrault proposes a view that sees science, and by implication research, as an interactive part of civil society (Perrault 2013, 16). The degree to which the research community and civil society depends on each other can be analyzed from different perspectives. Steven Yearley (2008) shows that environment NGOs have an ambiguous relationship to natural science. Naomi Ichihara Røkkum (2015) argues in her Master’s thesis, that Norwegian NGOs have some channels for influencing climate negotiations, if not climate research. Moreover, civil society may influence political decision-making, impact society and thus influence what kind of research is done, through activism, mass movements, and, at the extreme end, revolutions. In Norway many parts of civil society use the findings of climate research in climate action advocacy, from official NGOs

(such as the Bellona Foundation); to looser communities of bloggers; networks; and other less clearly defined groups. Consequently, civil society, just as political decision- makers, can be considered part of CICERO lay audience and can use the information they communicates to guide decision-making and how they influence society.

Within civil society we find a group that can loosely be defined as “climate skeptics”. They are people who publicly argue that climate change is not real, that it is not anthropogenic, or that it is but we should focus our efforts on other things than mitigation and similar arguments (Mann 2012, 23). Some of them are researchers critical to the use of modelling in climate change research (Edwards 2010, 411-418). In some ways this group is too heterogeneous to be encompassed by one term. Describing all those who criticize climate change research as “skeptics” seems possibly confusing, because the term denotes a specific kind of scientific virtue within the philosophy of science. However, in my analysis I have found it useful to be able to refer to them with a generic term. When necessary I therefore use the term “climate skeptics” as it is broader, and less contentious than for instance “climate deniers” or “climate critics”.

2.3 Methodology

2.3.1 Discussion of methodology

My in depth textual analysis focuses on popular articles, interviews and op-eds from November and December 2009 and November and December 2015. I analyze these texts to identify instances of discursive confrontation where boundary work and maintenance is performed. In extension of the perspective on boundaries, I also identify instances where CICERO related to their audience and signaled the relevance and legitimacy of their research in and for civil society and political decision-making. My approach to this analysis is guided by Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. There are some other perspectives on discourse that inform my analysis as well.

For Jørgensen and Phillips (2002 [1999]), discourse analysis starts with a social constructivist and anti-essentialist perspective that looks critically at the connections between knowledge, social processes and social action. This echoes Emirbayer’s “relational sociology”, discussed in my analytical framework. Following Jørgensen and

Phillips (2002, 144), demarcation of CICERO’s communication practices as a kind of discourse is therefore a strategic decision related to the purpose of my analysis. This also regards treating the Center as an actor in their own right. Though pragmatic, this demarcation of discourse is not arbitrary, but justified by the aims of my research and through analysis, with help from secondary literature.

To systematize the way we can conceptualize discourse, Jørgensen and Phillips draws on Foucault’s original term “order of discourse”. For Jørgensen and Phillips this term describes “a complex configuration of discourses and genres within the same social field or institution” (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 141). Overlap of discourses is what defines an order of discourse. I tentatively propose that it is useful to see the research done at CICERO as a kind of discourse that, through the Center’s public communication practices, intersects with other discourses within the public discussion of climate change. Their discourse and that of others partially cover the same (social) terrain, which they compete to define, within what can be called the discursive order of climate change. My study of communication in the intersection of research and public discourse can be described as a study into the order of climate change discourse, though I only identify and document a small part of this order of discourse.

Myers (2003) argues that the way we view popular research has consequences for the way such texts are studied. If popularization happens along a continuum, a distinction between public and “pure” research discourse becomes difficult. In addition, some roles central to CICERO are somewhere between expert and lay persons, such as the Center’s communication department. Myers points out such diversity, as does Peters (2008). Following Myers I relate my analysis to what a particular text was doing in its context (Myers 2003, 271), instead of analyzing it as a popularization of research discourse.

Interviews

My interviews with CICERO researchers were largely performed at an exploratory stage in my research, to get a basis for analysis and to gain background information on the Center later confirmed in other sources. I gained knowledge of the people at CICERO through the use of the Center’s webpage and through my first interviews. In accordance with discussion by Berry (2002, 682) and Aberbach and Rockman (2002, 674), I used open-ended questions and a semi-structured approach as that allowed me to

25 reach contextual nuances, reasons and premises for their points of view. I confirmed the factual information I gained by comparing it with other sources. Given my main focus on CICERO’s public communication, the interviews as such were of less analytical relevance. I therefore only present quotes from these interviews when they provide insights not accessible elsewhere.

Critical discourse analysis

Questions of methodology are ontological as they regard how we exist in the world and thereby gain knowledge from it. I use Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of discourse as embedded in society in systematizing my analysis. This conceptualizes a discursive event or instance of discourse as simultaneously a piece of text, an instance of discursive practice and of social practice (Fairclough 1992, 4). Fairclough’s model looks similar to Figure 1. However, Fairclough takes the position of a critical realist, which can be described as a dualist perspective that makes a distinction between the material and social world. For Fairclough there is also such a distinction between discourse and other elements in society (Fairclough 2005). As mentioned above, my perspective is closer to that of monist analyticism (Jackson 2011, 113-155). This means that I see Fairclough’s model and its distinctions as an ideal typification applicable in analysis for pragmatic reasons, not for its “realness”. I have therefore taken the liberty to adapt his model slightly. Where his lines are solid, I want to signal fluidity in the relationship between the different categories and have therefore made the lines stippled.

Figure 1: Adapted model of Fairclough’s three-dimensional conception of discourse as TEXT embedded in society (1992, 73).

DISCURSIVE PRACTICE (production, distribution, consumption)

SOCIAL PRACTICE

Fairclough proposes an analysis with many levels that complement each other hermeneutically (Fairclough 1992, 85-86). He recommends an order of analysis from

26 discursive practice, to textual elements, to social practice, and again to discursive practice. I operationalize this perspective on discourse in society through analysis of the language in CICERO’s texts; the nature of the Center’s text production, distribution and interpretation; and the institutional, organizational and other social circumstances of the Center’s communications during discursive events (Fairclough 1992, 4). The finished analysis is a combined product of all these levels of interpretation.

Tools for a textual analysis of boundaries and connections

Practitioners of boundary work (see p. 15-16) draw on the broader context in which they are embedded. This makes boundary work an intertextual practice. Fairclough’s application of intertextuality is defined in part by the work of Mikhail Bakhtin who argued that an utterance had to be interpreted within the chain of communication to which it is only a link (Bakhtin 1998, 44). Fairclough points out that:

…there are ‘horizontal’ intertextual relations of a ‘dialogical’ sort… between a text and those which [precede] and follow it in the chain of texts. …there are [also]‘vertical’ intertextual relations between a text and other texts which constitute its more or less immediate or distant context: texts it is historically linked with in various time-scales and along various parameters…” (1992, 103)

Fairclough links these vertical and horizontal dimensions respectively to the divide between manifest intertextuality, which is direct quotation and discourse representation, and interdiscursivity, which is closer connected to discursive conventions (Fairclough 1992, 103-104, 117-130). Texts also “set up dialogical or polemical relations between their ‘own’ discourses and the discourses of others” (Fairclough 2003, 128). Thus discursive boundaries and connections can be found in many forms of intertextuality. By combining Fairclough’s perspectives, I interpret manifest intertextuality in CICERO’s texts as different ways of addressing other discourses, through dialogue, polemic or otherwise. I also identify and analyze concrete references by the Center to institutions, norms and other criteria of research authority. Finally, I approach boundaries and connections in CICERO’s interdiscursive practices. This includes more implicit references to authority, legitimacy and credibility as well as representations of other aspects of society, for instance implicit and explicit inclusion and exclusion.

In addition to an overall focus on intertextuality, I focus on three different but related textual elements that signify intertextuality. The first of these regards CICERO’s use of metaphors as a way to organize central ideas on an issue. Metaphors are a way of constituting a worldview where certain connections and boundaries seem more acceptable than others, as focus is on specific sides of a phenomenon to the exclusion of others (Foss 1996, 359, 361). The way people at the Center use metaphors can therefore be interpreted as arguments for particular perspectives of reality.

The second of the textual elements in focus regards semantic modality. For Fairclough modality is “…the dimension of grammar of the clause which corresponds to the ‘interpersonal’ function of language” (Fairclough 1992, 158). This means that modality, through modal verbs, adjectives, adverbs and pronouns, or lack thereof, indicates the affinity between the author and statement, which signifies degrees of commitment and identification. As Fairclough’s view on modality goes beyond written commitment to a proposition, it contributes to analysis of CICERO’s boundaries and connections in and outside of research. In its extension it has to do with how authors relate to their audience (Fairclough 1992, 159-161) and who authors communicate with (Fairclough 2003, 165- 166).

This perspective extends to the third element of importance in my textual analysis: representation of actors. Important ways of representing actors in text are the use of nouns and pronouns; the grammatical role of actors in the clause, including an active or passive position; and whether they are personalized or objectified, named or classified and, if classified, whether it is a specific or generic reference Fairclough (2003, 146- 147). Representation is of social significance as it says something about the relationship between actors and what kind of agency is available for those represented (2003, 155).

2.3.2 The material and its collection

My source material can be sorted into three different categories: 1) public communication by CICERO researchers and staff; 2) semi-structured interviews with CICERO’s current and former staff; and 3) evaluation reports on the Center by the Research Council of Norway and the Center’s own annual reports and strategy documents.

Category 1) makes up the main body of my empirical material. It consists of texts like opinion pieces (op-eds)12 in newspapers, articles in CICERO’s own magazine and on their webpage, and their commentary in the media in the period around COP 15 and COP 21. As mentioned, November and December 2009 and 2015 were the two months the Center saw the most coverage in these years, and they were important years for climate change. It seems the climate conferences increased CICERO’s visibility in the public. My focus is therefore on these months, as such an increase in activity and visibility makes them of particular importance for the Center’s public self-identification and communication. Most of CICERO’s public communication is in Norwegian. The same goes for my interviews with people from the Center. I therefore translated all such quotes, with helpful input from my supervisor and friends with English as their primary language. Key words from Norwegian are included bracketed and in italics. I indicate if a CICERO text was originally in English.

In identifying relevant texts in source category 1) I have followed four criteria: i) they extensively discuss the reality of climate change or discuss one of the two COPs; these topics were chosen because I believed it likely they would present opportunities for CICERO to relate to other actors in society; ii) the texts were either written by someone from the Center, had extensive contributions from someone from the Center or were published on one of the Center’s own platforms; iii) in addition the texts needed to directly address CICERO’s role in relation to other actors or social events, such as their activities at the climate negotiations; iv) narrowing in on the material further, I preferred texts from people with an important or visible role at the Center, though this was not an absolute requirement if the other criteria were satisfied. These criteria enable me to cover the breadth of CICERO’s boundary work and points of connection in public discussions of the COPs and the reality of climate change. I excluded CICERO’s participation in radio and television as the analysis of such sources would introduce non-lingual and discursive elements that go beyond the scope of this study. This is also why I limited analysis of visual elements on their webpage and in their periodical.

Source category 2) and 3) provide insights into the broader social and discursive practices CICERO takes part in. The same goes for secondary literature on the history

12 I refer to texts by CICERO staff in newspapers as op-eds though they have various styles and perspectives, as this makes for easier writing and is what the newspapers designate them as. 29 of climate research and politics. I interviewed seven people from CICERO. Most of these people had a long history at the Center and could therefore provide extensive historical insight. Some interviews focused on people with connections either to one of the two discursive themes, COPs and “climate skepticism”, or communication practices of the Center. Only two of my interviewees were women. While I consider the role of women as public experts an interesting topic, issues of gender were not a part of my analysis. I therefore do not believe that this selection bias is a problem for my analysis.

I used the media monitoring, analysis tool and news archive Retriever13 to find and access many of the articles written or contributed to by CICERO. Sometimes Retriever lacks articles or creates doubles, making it a less than perfect archive (Srebrowska 2005). However, it is the most comprehensive news archive in Norway, which is why I chose it. I limited by search to Norwegian media as the Center has been delegated a public communication role in Norway and it is in this country they are most visible. My main search word was “CICERO”, which gave me access to texts associated with the Center. I used the analysis function of the archive to identify a clear increase in CICERO’s public communication activity and references to the Center in Norwegian media in November and December of 2009 and 2015, around the time of COP 15 and COP 21. I also used CICERO’s own webpage, as their periodicals Cicerone and Klima were not available through Retriever. The internet archive Wayback Machine14 and the newspapers own open archives gave additional information. When possible I compared versions from Retriever, Wayback Machine and CICERO’s webpage to identify changes or find information left out of a source. References to Cicero that did not refer to the Center were of an insignificant number.

2.3.3 Reliability, validity, limitations and generalizability

As I analyzed the various CICERO texts, I used the program N-Vivo. I mainly used the “nodes” function to code various concepts, parts of text. This helped me structure and organize my findings so that they were easier to sort and analyze. However, in accordance with Kuypers (2010, 306), I did not apply a specific “coding scheme”, apart from the analytical premises of boundary work and PCST. The discursive and textual

13 Retriever is owned by the Norwegian news agency NTB and the Swedish news agency TT. 14 Wayback Machine is owned by the Internet Archive, a non-profit online library. 30 patterns and practices I identified were discovered, not a priori, but through extensive reading and close textual analysis.

In addressing validity it is necessary to make a distinction between what is found in a particular text and what was the motivation of the author in writing it. This is reflected in intellectual historian J.G.A. Pocock’s discussion of what the author “was doing” with a text, an action not fully concluded that “includes evoking from others responses the author could not control or predict….” (Pocock 1985, 7). CICERO communicated with the texts analyzed in this study, but they did not have full control over the consequences of the texts, their interpretation or the discourse to which they contributed. The texts established the boundaries of the Center’s research and points of connection to actors outside these boundaries. Some interpretations may have been intended by people at the Center. However, due to the social nature of language and the overlapping of discourses, these practices may have communicated other perspectives not necessarily envisioned by people at the Center, but which have discursive implications.

When it comes to the generalizability of my findings, I follow the tradition of Max Weber’s ideal typification. From this perspective, concepts and theories are instrumental idealization, not nomothetic generalizations. This makes them provisional and pragmatic (Jackson 2011, 143). As ideal typifications are not pictorial representations of objects or processes (Jackson 2011, 145) my analysis presents particular highlights in CICERO’s history and communication practices useful for understanding the roles of the Center. I do not attempt at a complete or all-inclusive picture. There are limitations to my analysis as I mainly focus on two months in two years and on two particular themes. However, these months are of discursive importance for CICERO’s public communication and for public perceptions of the Center (see p. 29). The same goes for the themes. Nevertheless, there may be other points in time where people at the Center communicated differently. Thus my analysis cannot be taken as a description of CICERO’s communication practices as a whole, but only as regards the periods and themes I focus on. This also means that others analyzing the same material may find different traits worth highlighting. My ambition is that my findings are justified by my analytical deliberation and explanation of choices in focus throughout my analysis.

2.3.4 Ethical considerations

The most important ethical consideration in my analysis is for my informants. Paragraph 5 of the guidelines of the Norwegian National Research Ethics Committees, says:

As a general principle, those who are made the subjects of research are entitled to have their personal information treated confidentially. The researcher must prevent any use and communication of information that might inflict damage on individuals who are the subjects of research (§ 5).

As the interviews were performed to gain an overview and general understanding of CICERO, confirmed by other sources, I do not reference most of my informants directly in this study. However, some play an important role in the Center’s public communication or have in other ways provided insights that require a reference. Some of my informants are easy to identify even if anonymized due to the size of the Center and the positions of these informants. To anonymize them would seem almost a mockery of the guideline above. My focus is on the textual and organizational sides of CICERO, not personal information of these individuals. The public nature of the topic as well as the public roles of these informants as researchers and public communicators of research makes me confident that the information they provided is not of a sensitive character. I have therefore, with their explicit consent, chosen to not anonymize some of my informants. This requires consideration of how I use and reference statements. Informants that are anonymized are only referenced with place and year. In agreement with my informants I used a recording device to ensure correct citation. In addition, all quotes cited directly or paraphrased have been controlled by the person quoted, though not in the context I present them in here. I therefore make a distinction between the perspectives of these people and the results of my own analysis, including my paraphrasing. As to the quality, integrity and fairness of my analysis, I alone stand fully responsible.

With these considerations in mind I move on to the historical context of climate research, CICERO and their entry into public discourse.

3 The history of climate research with CICERO in focus

For centuries research on the climate has been guided by, and contingent on international collaboration (Edwards 2010). Already in the 18th century, scientists, seafarers and others with varying degrees of expertise shared observations on weather occurrences around the world, gradually creating international research networks, first on weather and later on the climate. Towards the end of the 20th century, research on the climate and climate change became part of a globalized worldview both for politicians and researchers. Through the UN, world leaders concluded that handling both climate research and politics would require international, multilateral cooperation and agreements, if not global governance (Miller 2004). This development correlated with an increase in findings and eventually scientific consensus on the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Thus international forces of a political and scientific character, such as international agreements and lack thereof, and multilateral research efforts and organizations, affected climate change research. Directly, they affected access to funds, data and knowledge. In addition, they influenced the public visibility and justification of such research in society. International negotiations on climate change also became a research field in itself. An international element is therefore an integral part of a study on climate change research.

When Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland established CICERO Center for International Climate and Energy Research – Oslo,15 she did so in part because she wanted such researchers to develop a vocabulary that could promote Norwegian interests in an increasingly globalized world (Nilsen 2001, 105-106, 128). The Center’s research is focused both on the local and global aspects of climate change, but these perspectives are tied together in climate discourse. To understand the communicative practices of CICERO, the fact that the Center’s founders thought of the Center in relation to international negotiations from the beginning, makes it important to look at how such negotiations have shaped their history and their public communication practices. Thus, with CICERO in focus, a history of the public expert commentary of a

15 Later changed to CICERO Center for International Climate and Environmental Research – Oslo, though the Center’s official name is CICERO Center for International Climate Research. 33

climate research organization gains from looking specifically at the Center’s relationship with international negotiations. These negotiations also manifest the meeting of two practices in society: research and politics. They therefore present an interesting example of how a climate research foundation produces legitimacy and applicability, as well as independence and credibility. The two themes of public communication and climate negotiations is therefore the red thread of the following chapter, though I make some necessary detours to highlight CICERO’s relationship to Norwegian politics and academia.

The history of climate change research has been outlined and thoroughly studied elsewhere. In this chapter I provide a brief overview of the history of the first 150 years of climate research’s existence, and then from the 1980s onwards I focus on the slow rise of an international research and policy network on anthropogenic climate change. Within this mix of forces, factors and actors, I trace the emergence and workings of a small, interdisciplinary and policy relevant research center, named CICERO.

3.1 Before CICERO

Already in the 18th century there were attempts at establishing an international standard for weather data registration. As the telegraph appeared in the mid-19th century, it revolutionized communication. The potential for studying the climate increased in tandem with the drastic increase of data sharing speed. Nevertheless, a lack of international standards tangled analysis, as did the lack of data and calculation capacities. The International Meteorological Organization (IMO), established in 1873, was the first attempt at an international network on climate research, but it never got much purchase and functioned only as an advisory body. Though it was international, it

was certainly not global. The impact of atmospheric CO2 on the surface temperature of the Earth was suggested already in 1807. Swedish Svante Arrhenius was the first credited with proposing, in 1896, that human activities could cause global climate change. The first International Polar Year in 1882-83 got support from the IMO, and laid the groundwork for further international collaboration on geophysical research and exploration.

In 1933, after much analysis and attempts at explanations, Scandinavian meteorologists, among them Norwegian Vilhelm Bjerknes (1862-1951), produced an early dynamical theory of the general circulation of air. Bjerknes also established the Bergen School on meteorology, which became world leading in its field at the time and the instigator of modern weather forecasting, at least on a descriptive level (Edwards 2010, 90-93). In 1950, the UN established the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which contributed greatly to the development of a global infrastructure for climate research. Climate science progressed in meandering ways, supported by developments in data technology, the West’s fear of the USSR during the Cold War, and many other factors. The 1950s and 1960s were also when satellite programs were being developed, presenting information for researchers and trouble for Cold War diplomacy. By the 1970s, the possible reality of anthropogenic climate change started to enter political consciousness. The path towards a theoretical, conceptual and digital apparatus for studying and analyzing the climate gets a far more thorough treatment in Paul N. Edwards’ A Vast Machine (2010), from where I have taken the details above.

In Politikkens natur, naturens politikk (2011), Kristin Asdal shows how nature was integrated into Norwegian politics after World War II. In the early 1950s, the Biochemical institute studied fluoride pollution in Årdal, which led the Norwegian Ministry of Industry to reimburse the farmers in the area. The Norwegian government established several public agencies in the next decade to tackle continued pollution problems. Among them were the Norwegian Institute for Water Research (NIVA), in 1958, and the Norwegian Smoke Damage Council (later part of the National Pollution Control Authority), in 1961.16 In 1972 the United Nations established the Environment Programme. In Norway, the Norwegian Ministry of Environment (currently the Ministry of Climate and Environment) saw daylight.

Corroborating Asdal’s picture of politics and research intertwined, historian Yngve Nilsen (2001) shows how the history of the Norwegian climate debate was not only about the relationship between industry and environment, but also about expert knowledge and politics. He describes the emergence in Norway of closed “problem- solving communities [problemløsningsfellesskap]” from the late 1970s, where experts

16 Joined the Directorate for Nature Management in 2013 to become the Norwegian Environment Agency.

“in their field”, who hold a general and applied knowledge, were linked to political power. An example is SIMEN, a research project on national oil politics, performed by socio-economists at Statistics Norway (SSB) in 1988-1989. According to Nilsen, SIMEN was the first expert network that contributed to the Norwegian climate debate and they had strong ties to both state administration and management (Nilsen 2001, 102).

The 1980s’ acid rain debate brought the Norwegian government and research into international negotiations. The water surveillance program of NIVA provided research findings and a discourse on the limits of nature. This development correlated with growing demands from the government for “clear and indisputable” scientific data they could use in such negotiations. Asdal argues that the scientific discourse of the time merged with a specific, purpose-oriented and “governed” context (Asdal 2011, 144).

In parallel with these developments, the Norwegian state made a move to make research more independent from the government. “The Langslet doctrine”, introduced in the Report to Parliament no. 60, 1984-5, stated that ministerial research funding to a large degree should be channeled through research councils. These would have the strategic responsibility of the Norwegian institute sector and decide on overarching and long- term research programs and initiatives, to maintain the democratic principle of the independence of research from politics (Nilsen 2001, 20). During this period the Norwegian institute sector got some new additions in the field of environment research, such as the Norwegian Institute on Nature Research (established 1988). Already existing environment oriented institutes, such as NIVA, The Norwegian Institute for Air Research and Transport economic Institute were made independent foundations organized under the research councils. The Langslet Doctrine signaled a division of research and politics, where political decision-making and knowledge production were separate practices. The intended relationship was perhaps one where research educated politics, as described by Sundqvist et al. with the phrase “speak truth to power” (original Price 1965, in Sundqvist et al. 2015, 420).17

17 This phrase was originally coined by Quakers regarding international conflict (Cary and Rustin 1955). As exemplified in Sundqvist et al. 2015 and in Price (1965), it moved into science theory and STS discourse describing a neutral relationship between research and politics 36

International environmental and climate politics and research in the 1980s was marked by the fear of nuclear war and thereby nuclear winter, the acid rain debate, and the increase in the size of holes in the ozone layer, but also by the work of the Brundtland Commission. The UN World Commission on Environment and Development started this work in 1983, which was led by the Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. The Brundtland Commission presented the report Our Common Future in 1987. Thereby they grounded the term “sustainable development” as an integral part of international environment and development politics. The report was also one of the first big steps towards an international focus on anthropogenic climate change. Shortly after, in 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was founded by WMO and the UN Environment Programme to inform future international climate negotiations (Edwards 2010, 391). As Miller shows (2004), the Panel was the product of a growing international perspective, in the UN and in meteorological research, of the climate and climate change as a global issue.

In Norway, the expertise on climate politics at the entrance of the 1990s, including CICERO, was originally closely associated the national oil-economy research that had developed in Norway in the 1980s (Nilsen 2001, 129). In the 1990s, social economists became the lead profession on climate politics in Norway (Asdal 2011, 177). In late 2016, people with a background in social economics still made up 25 percent of the researchers at the Center.

3.2 The first few years

After what appeared as a sudden decision in 1989 by then-prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, CICERO was established in the spring of 1990, (Nilsen 2001, 121). The Center was initially intended as a research center on climate change focused on social sciences and law, (St. prp. no 1, 1989-90 in Bergrem 2005, 49) but this changed quickly. Geophysicist Ivar S.A. Isaksen was one of the first three researchers to join the Center. Ted Hanisch, former undersecretary to the prime minister from 1986-1989, became the first CEO. He had no background in climate politics or research, other than as a representative of the prime minister, but he had strong ties to the Labor party. Some of the first researchers at the Center were brought in from “the Iron Triangle”. This

37 nickname hid an academic and political network which set the premises for Norwegian economic politics development after World War II (Nilsen 2001, 17, 127-128).

The early late 1980s and early 1990s saw the establishment of several research centers in Norway, in an attempt to promote policy-applicable, interdisciplinary research that could meet new problems in part caused by research, but where research could also find solutions (Bergrem 2005, 20-22). Shortly after the government founded CICERO in 1990, the University of Oslo (UiO) presented a definition of a research center. According to the UiO the research center rested on the following premises: 1) it was a wholly or partially independent unit; 2) it was appointed for a shorter or longer period; 3) It was to conduct problem-oriented research and/or education; 4) It was to be of an interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary character. According to this definition the research center had its own offices, a separate board and management with decision-making authority on personnel and economic matters, as well as academic plans and priorities. It also had its own statutes guiding its practice (UiO 1992, 27, in Bergrem 2005, 26). All of these qualifications applied to CICERO. However, while most centers were established by or through a university, this Center was not.

From their initiation, CICERO focused their research on international politics in relation to climate change, which reflected in the their three interdisciplinary research areas in 1991: 1) cost efficiency, energy politics and distributional effects of different agreements and measures; 2) international institutions and negotiation processes; and 3) modeling of anthropogenic changes in the atmosphere as a foundation for political decisions (Annual Report 1992 in Bergrem 2005, 78). Reflecting another side of CICERO’s international leanings, Ivar S.A. Isaksen, who later joined the Center, was one of the authors of the IPCC’s first assessment report presented in May 1990. CICERO researchers have since co-authored several of the subsequent assessment reports. In the early 1990s, Ted Hanisch was also Norway’s political representative at the Panel, and received thanks in the second assessment report (IPCC 1995, v). In general, Norwegian scientists have had a strong presence in the IPCC both in relative (compared to Sweden) and absolute terms (Norges forskningsråd 2012, 102). As intended when WMO and the UN established the Panel, IPCC reports have in turn laid much of the scientific foundation for international climate negotiations. They have done so by synthesizing research findings on climate change from across the field, giving

38 politicians facts to bolster the credibility and authority of their arguments and pointing out the urgency of action.

It is no coincidence that Brundtland and associates founded CICERO before the nations of the world agreed to the Climate Convention in a UN conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Initially left out, Hanisch talked himself into being an observer on the delegation to the Rio climate negotiations through his Brundtland connections. According to (Nilsen), Hanisch used the three years he was CEO to establish a wider “CICERO network”, a problem-solving community (2001, 151). This network linked the Center with other institutions, such as the Department of Economics at UiO; the Norwegian Petroleum Institute (an industry association); people from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Environment; as well as economists from the consultant bureau ECON (now Pöyry). He also worked on internationally, with for instance the World Bank (Nilsen 2001, 137). Hanisch’s network overlapped with the government bodies that were a part of the Norwegian negotiation delegation. The Center was also building competence by recruiting researchers from UiO. The CICERO network, which at the time moved on the boundary between academic researchers and expert “in their field” (see Nilsen’s definition on p. 18) developed a climate discourse apart from other actors in the Norwegian climate debate. This was a discourse the government would later apply in international climate politics (Nilsen 2001, 128, 167).

According to Nilsen, Hanisch thought that he and Brundtland, in their work with CICERO, laid plans for an international regime that would allow Norway to continue its oil production (Nilsen 2001, 105-106). Though this was a somewhat grandiose statement, it appears indeed that the Center initially performed their information mandate by developing a Norwegian political discourse on climate politics in an international context. Nilsen backs this up not only from interviews with Hanisch, but also from speeches and letters performed by Hanisch and Brundtland at the time (Nilsen 2001, 128, 134-137). With research from CICERO backing them, and through Hanisch’s position on the delegation team, Hanisch and Brundtland wanted to present the Norwegian view in international negotiations as a uniform standpoint that did not reflect the turbulence of Norwegian politics in the early 1990s. They further wanted an agreement that would allow Norway to continue its oil extractions, an agreement that did not require equal emission reductions from all its member countries. The argument

39 that Norwegian oil production was “green” in comparison with fossil fuel production in other countries was the linchpin in this discourse (Nilsen 2001, 135-137).

As Hanisch joined the Norwegian delegation in Rio in 1992, he brought with him a conceptual toolkit which would in part be integrated into an international regime for emission accountability. Part of Hanisch’s toolkit was a policy note he co-authored with amongst others Rajendra Kumar Pachauri and published at CICERO in 1992. Pachauri was at the time director of Tata Energy Research Institute and later head chair of the IPCC. The policy note was named “The Climate Convention: Criteria and Guidelines for Joint Implementation” (Hanisch et al. 1992). Nilsen’s analysis of letters between Pachauri, Hanisch and others reveals a network interested in shaping international discourse on climate politics. “Joint implementations” refers to collaborative efforts between nations for emission cuts in one nation that count in all contributing countries. As the Norwegian government perceived international climate politics as a threat to the Norwegian oil wealth, they used one-sided joint implementation in other countries to legitimize domestic increase in emissions that came from extraction and conversion of the oil to other investments (Nilsen 2001, 206).

The same year that Hanisch performed his role as observer at the negotiations in Rio, informing the delegation on the discourse the CICERO network was developing for climate negotiations, the Center published Cicerone for the first time. Initially it was much like a pamphlet, a few pages written by the administration, as a newsletter it covered three categories: news from climate research; news from the political arena; and news from the Center. CICERO intended Cicerone to be their way to fulfill the information task the government gave the Center at the inception in 1990: “…to keep the country’s politicians, authorities, institutions of education, media and public opinion, as well as the international community informed on developments in international climate politics” (CICERO 1992, 1). The stated target audience was broad: ministries and agencies, independent research institutes and university institutes, research councils, the media, business organizations and companies, political parties and their parliament groups, and voluntary organizations. It was always free to subscribe, which makes it hard to judge the significance of the publication, though circulation was around 1,000 by 1996 (CICERO 1997) and 9,600 by 2013 (CICERO 2014). Over the years CICERO researchers have performed their information task in

other ways as well, including seminars, expert interviews and presentations, participation in policy-making panels and work on government reports, and, perhaps more noticeable, with opinion pieces and interviews in the media. Still, Cicerone, later renamed Klima, was certainly the Center’s special channel for communicating their research findings and the Center view on climate research and climate change to civil society, politicians and the public in general.

In 1993, CICERO had a change in tact, as Helga Hernes became the new CEO. Hernes also came from the Labour Party, where she had held a position as undersecretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, she did not want the Center to be seen as a political actor and resigned her position as observer in the Norwegian negotiation delegation (Nilsen 2001, 167). In this way she drew a line between CICERO as a research center and the Norwegian government as decision-makers; they worked in separate territories on separate issues.

In 1994, warning of extreme weather events became a part of the Norwegian forecast practices and eventually the Norwegian vocabulary (Kverndokk 2015, 236). The same year, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was agreed upon in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, entered into force. This instigated the annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) on climate change negotiation and CICERO did not leave the climate negotiations alone. In 1995, researchers from the Center were on the list of NGOs participating at COP 1 (UNFCCC 1995), a position they also held at the Kyoto meeting 1997 (UNFCCC 1997, 72). At COP 15, 15 years after Hernes resigned her position as part of the Norwegian government delegation, a member of CICERO’s staff was back in the Norwegian negotiation group.

3.3 Towards the 2000s

In 1995, the first CICERO homepage was established and the Center hired their first information employee who worked 50 percent. Initially the webpage mainly focused on news, establishing the Center’s information profile (Bergrem 2005, 75). The same year the Center made a discrete name change, as they changed the “E” in “CICERO” from Energy to Environment, signaling a broader platform and a move away from Norwegian energy politics. CICERO followed this up two years later with a collaboration with

41 other research institutes who worked on the environment through the research project SAMRAM, presenting findings from all the institutes in Cicerone (Bergrem 2005, 76).18 By the time Hernes left the Center in 1996, their profile had changed from close affiliation with the government, to closer association with other research institutes.

In 1997, some UNFCCC parties agreed on the Kyoto protocol. The same year in Norway, the CICERO board appointed Knut H. Alfsen as CEO of the Center. With a PhD in physics and years of economic research for SSB behind him, his research profile and lack of direct connections to the government meant CICERO took another step towards a more neutral, research-oriented profile. He had, however, connections to the “Iron Triangle” via SSB. Alfsen had not done climate research, but he had been involved in the debate on national emissions stabilization, arguing against the Labor party’s gas politics (Nilsen 2001, 233).

In 1998, researchers from the Center joined in an expert debate on the efficacy of green taxation versus quota trade. This debate came in part as a response to the recent agreement in Kyoto which opened for joint implementation and clean development mechanisms (CDM). Quota trade systems, along with CDM and joint implementation, were part of the Kyoto protocol’s “flexible mechanisms”. Futhermore, they linked closely to the framework Hanisch and associates promoted in the early 1990s, in regard to Norwegian oil politics. In this debate the Center worked to get rid of the “lobbyist stamp” and desired to appear less partisan and more critically oriented than in previous participations in politic debate (Nilsen 2001, 233-34). Thus, CICERO’s desire for a more neutral position in the 1998 debate signaled that they were moving away from their role as conceptual producer for the Labor Party, at least in public.

In 2000, the tenth year of CICERO’s existence, the Research Council of Norway (RCN), an association formed of the previous research councils in 1993, had the Center reviewed as part of an evaluation of the environment institutes of the institute sector. The evaluation committee presented CICERO’s self-evaluation in the report and there the Center emphasized research production over information work, seeing the second as enabled by the first (Norges forskningsråd 2000, 11). In general the RCN committee was positive to the work of the Center and their contributions to the Ministry of

18 This communication collaboration was started in 2001 with several research institutes (CICERO 2002). 42

Environment, as well as their role as a national expertise center, which informed the public on climate research. However, the committee, which included a member of said Ministry, suggested that the Center should be more oriented on current issues in climate research, and not be as strictly disciplinary in their approach.

CICERO, on the other hand, emphasized their identity as a research institute, stating that they were not a “consultant bureau”, so as to justify the little commissioned research done at the Center (a practice that continues today). The emphasis on institute, not center, signaled academic ambitions that matched the Center’s move away from politics and entry into networking with other research institutes, as well as the more research-oriented background of their CEO, Alfsen. The RCN committee nevertheless expressed a desire for more commissioned research (Norges forskningsråd 2000, 40).

As a bridge between politics and research, the RCN was inclined to promote policy- relevant research, but research that affiliates too closely with politics faces problems of independence and credibility. In this regard it is telling that the committee emphasized the Center’s role in relation to the climate negotiations, where CICERO had previously worked towards more independence. They also argued that when it came to research in the Global South, the Center should focus on flexible mechanisms, that is joint implementation, CDM, quota trade (Norges forskningsråd 2000, 20-21). Joint implementation was the measure set forth by the CICERO network in the early 1990s to justify unhindered continuation of Norwegian oil extraction. Indeed, flexible mechanisms were the same, politically-embedded measures the Center had tried to distance themselves from in public political discourse.

3.4 A new CEO and ongoing climate negotiations

CICERO was not particularly visible in the media in the 1990s.19 With CEO Alfsen in place, the Center’s information activities slowly increased (CICERO 2002) and from 2000 to 2001 their information staff doubled (CICERO 2001, 2002). In a report to the Norwegian Parliament [Storting] in 2001, the Ministry of Environment emphasized CICERO’s contribution to the construction of a research platform that Norwegian government officials could use to negotiate internationally. The report also suggested

19 Shown in Retriever’s archive, confirmed by CICERO staff, 22.09.2016 and 25.11.2016. 43 that the Center was assigned the special national task of informing on and disseminating research (Miljøverndepartementet 2001, 201). The Parliament’s Energy and Environment committee later reaffirmed this suggestion in a recommendation to Parliament (Energi- og miljøkomiteen 2002). In 2003, the Ministry of Environment budgeted funds to strengthen the Center’s information practices (CICERO 2003, 3).

CICERO had changed Cicerone’s status to “popular scientific journal from CICERO” in 2001, and in 2002 changed it again, to “journal from CICERO” (my translation). As it was not a peer reviewed journal the choice of classification may have caused some confusion as to the academic level of its articles. However, the Center showed the diversity of their periodicals’ information profile with a combination of broad and specialized articles. These and the above configurations match up with the launch of the “Klima – ABC online” on the CICERO webpage in 2002. Here they presented simplified information on climate change and research (Styrets beretning 2002, 1).

Pål Prestrud took over as CEO in June 2002. His previous research on artic fox did not directly connect to climate research, but his scientific background, including that as research director for the Norwegian Polar Institute, may have strengthened CICERO’s new research profile. Still, the Norwegian Polar Institute sorted under the Norwegian Environment Agency, a unit under the Norwegian Ministry of Environment. Prestrud became the Center’s longest-sitting CEO and held the chair until 2012. A name search on Retriever makes him out as the CICERO CEO who, apart from current CEO Kristin Halvorsen, garnered most attention from the press per year in office. Early in 2003 CICERO’s board described him as the Center’s new public face (CICERO 2003). Around the same time, Prestrud stated in the annual report that he wanted the Center to be seen as a provider of reliable information in the discord and confusion that marked the climate debate (CICERO 2003, 3).

CICERO’s annual report of 2005 shows that the same year the Kyoto protocol went into force, subscriptions to Cicerone went up by approximately 20 percent, a record increase. According to the same report, webpage traffic also increased significantly (CICERO 2006a, 6) In the foreword to this report, CEO Prestrud connected both of these trends with CICERO’s identity as a provider of “reliable and comprehensive knowledge about climate issues” as a basis for political action. He further signaled optimism as he saw an international breakthrough in public understanding of the reality 44 and threat of anthropogenic climate change. By the next annual report, of 2006, Prestrud grounded the Center’s identity as a prominent group of experts on climate change: “Never before has CICERO’s expertise been more in demand” (CICERO 2007, 3).

2007 showed that CICERO was not the only optimist when it came to public will to tackle climate change. As the IPCC presented their Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), Al Gore and IPCC won the Nobel Peace Prize, and the Conference of the Parties at Bali began plans for a new climate regime. In addition, the Ministry of Environment restated, with more decisive language than previously, that the Center had a specific task of information and research dissemination (Miljøverndepartementet 2007, 58). In connection to this task they emphasized the Center’s international work. According to former communications director (2001-2004) and later CICERO researcher fellow and research director Andreas Tjernshaugen,20 the Ministry’s political statement ensured the Center safer financing for information work for a time, making them less dependent on on-going evaluations. In June 2007, the same month as the report to Parliament was presented and accepted, CICERO relaunched Cicerone as Klima: Norwegian magazine for climate research (my translation). As a magazine it had a new logo, less organizational info, longer feature articles, more focus on visual communication and a less formal and text-heavy format. While Cicerone focused on research reporting, Klima opened more for op-eds that discussed from a broader research platform, without necessarily a research article written by someone from CICERO as a starting point.21

Though the Ministry of Environment signaled its approval of CICERO’s activity in its 2007 report to Parliament, that year the CICERO board changed the Center’s statutes to the exclusion of the Ministry. Previously, it was the Ministry who appointed the board, but now UiO would do the appointment (CICERO 2009a). According to special advisor Kjell Arne Hagen at CICERO, CICERO initiated this change, as the appointment process had been overly bureaucratic and caused delays, including a gap between 2006 and 2008 when CICERO had no board. By disconnecting from the Ministry they also signaled that they had “an arm’s length distance to the authorities”.22 This cleared up any misunderstandings of the Center’s affiliation with the Ministry and ensured easier funding applications. It also strengthened their identity as an independent research unit

20 Interview with Andreas Tjernshaugen 04.11.2016, Store Norske Leksikon offices, Oslo. 21 Interview with Guri Bang, 29.09.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 22 Interview with Kjell Arne Hagen, 25.11.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 45

as “…it quickly became politics when the Minister of Environment was deciding who would become leader of the board”.23 In other words, this change showed that the Center wanted to appear more independent from politics and closer to academia.

Throughout their history, CICERO remained small, compared to the larger of the environment institutes. However, they bolstered their critical mass by joining forces with researchers at the UiO, both through part-time employment of professors, through collaborative projects with certain university departments (such as the Department of Economics) and by having PhD candidates do their research at the Center. The Center has always been formally independent, but Bergrem argued in 2005 that CICERO’s connection to the university may have built a bridge between the university and the institute sector (2005). With the new board appointment system in 2007, ties between the Center and the university appeared stronger. Officially the relationship between the university and the Center remained one of “peripheral involvement”.

3.5 COP 15 and “Climategate” – from optimism to uncertainty

As early as 2007, CICERO provided advice for several countries in preparation for the Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009 (CICERO 2008, 3). COP 15 was a much awaited affair and at COP 14, the year before, the UNFCCC parties decided that 2009 would conclude with a new climate regime. In October 2009, Tora Skodvin, research director at the Center, expressed doubt via the news agency NTB as to whether a new climate agreement would be reached at COP 15, due to Barack Obama’s lack of support in Congress (Skårsdalmo 2009). By December the optimistic tone had disappeared completely and CICERO researchers, among others, anticipated that the negotiations would conclude without a new agreement. However, the Center considered their mandate on public communication of climate knowledge to have been thoroughly upheld during the selfsame year. In their annual report, Prestrud especially commended CICERO’s communication department for their work during COP 15 (CICERO 2010, 3). CICERO communicated from COP 15 to news outlets and on their own webpage, and hosted seminars and press briefings for journalists in Copenhagen during the conference (Jakobsen 2009, 5).

23 Interview with Kjell Arne Hagen, 25.11.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 46

In 2009, the government decided to bring an “extended delegation” to the COPs. According to Røkkum, who interviewed the at the time Minister of Environment Erik Solheim on the subject, the Ministry included civil society as observers to the negotiations, but did not give them full access to the proceedings (Røkkum 2015, 35). Several organizations were included, such as Norwegian trade and industry federations, the RCN and NGOs like the Bellona Foundation. However, researcher Guri Bang of CICERO was the only person who came from an independent research institute (UNFCCC 2009, 126-129). Thus the role of the Center in Norwegian and international politics appeared ambiguous in this group of NGOs and politically involved organizations. On the one hand, the presence of CICERO researchers at the COPs (they had members in the delegation until 2013) was a token to the research merit of the Center. They joined the delegation “…as researchers”.24 Bang “…believe[s] … CICERO was invited because [they] had researched the climate negotiations since the [Center’s] inception in 1990, which gave [them] a track record in the field”.25 The Center upheld the mandate to develop knowledge on climate negotiations and international agreements on climate change. From this angle, Bang’s presence meant that CICERO gained useful and applicable knowledge from observing the negotiations.

On the other hand, the COPs were the kind of climate conferences from which, back in 1993, Hernes, then-CEO of CICERO, had resigned from her position as observer in the Norwegian delegation. She wanted to signal that the Center was not an actor in Norwegian climate politics, thus solidifying their position as an independent research center. In contrast with Hernes, Guri Bang did not have political connections. Nevertheless, the Center’s return to the negotiation team challenged the impression that they were separated from Norway’s climate governance. Media scholar Andreas Ytterstad argues that Bang’s participation in the Norwegian delegation showed CICERO’s tacit assent to the Norwegian government. Their membership in the delegation incorporated the Center into Norwegian power structures and showed a front of general agreement on Norwegian climate politics (Ytterstad 2012, 21).

By the end of 2009, the convergence of two separate events was publicly received as a crisis for climate change research in what was called “Climategate”. First, hackers

24 Interview with Guri Bang, 20.03.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 25 Interview with Guri Bang, 20.03.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 47

leaked e-mails from the servers of the Climatic Research Unit (CRU) at the University of East Anglia, a contributor to the IPCC reports. The emails appeared to compromise the scientific credibility of findings of anthropogenic climate change. Then, in January 2010, errors in the AR4 were revealed, especially regarding predictions of glacial melting in the Himalayas. This led to international debate on the credibility of climate change research and the IPCC and on the relationship between research and policy. After several reviews of IPCC and their reports, the general conclusion within the international climate change research community was that the AR4 mistakes were of less significance for the overall picture. Though the emails from CRU showed some issues when it came to transparency and operations of peer review, there was general agreement that their findings were solid overall. Many have written on this in later years, among others Berkhout (2010), Wynne (2010) and (Trench 2012).

Climategate corresponded with the awaited COP 15, so climate research was already high on the media agenda. As I discuss in-depth in chapter 4, CEO Prestrud and other CICERO staff debated those who argued against climate change both in newspapers and on the Center’s webpage. All issues of Klima in 2010 had articles that discussed the events and the questions they raised. By the end of 2010, the optimism that had entered the Center’s annual reports in 2006 was certainly waning. An article in Klima referenced a Synovate-CICERO survey from 2010 that showed only six in ten Norwegians believed climate change was anthropogenic and this was a trend also in other countries (Bjørnæs 2010, 12). CICERO also made new guidelines stating that their researchers could only participate in public debate on the basis of their own research (CICERO 2011, 3).

3.6 New CEOs and a new global agreement

In 2012, oceanographer Cecilie Mauritzen, former senior researcher at the Norwegian Meteorological Institute with a PhD from MIT, became CICERO’s CEO. She was one of the authors of AR4 and contributed to AR5 which IPCC in part published while she was in office. She was perhaps the Center CEO with the most relevant scientific credentials. However, as CEO she also participated in government meetings, for instance in a meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Norway and the United States (CICERO 2013a, 3). In the end, Mauritzen’s CEO stunt was short, as she

48 left the position in December 2013. According to an article on CICERO’s webpage Mauritzen resigned from her position of her own volition, as reorganization of the Center in preparation for the future had ultimately been demanding and wearing “both for [her] and the organization” (CICERO 2013b). Without speculating at what caused this friction, it is clear that CICERO and Cecilie Mauritzen were not meant to be.

The initial UiO-appointed CICERO board made Kristin Halvorsen their first CEO- appointment in 2014.26 Considering that the reason the Center wanted the university to appoint the board was, at least in part, to create more distance from politics, the board’s choice could be taken as somewhat ironic. Halvorsen came to the Center as the former leader of the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV). Certainly she had experience in leadership, but she had also been a profiled Minister of Finance from 2005-2009 and Minister of Education and Research from 2009-2013. She had no background in climate research, but her former party was a known environmental advocate. Even though the Labour Party and SV were often in confrontation over environmental and climate politics, they remained in a coalition government for eight years, giving Halvorsen ties to the Labor party. CICERO’s first two CEOs had a background in the government and came from the Labor party. Albeit in a new context, the Center had returned to this practice. Still, the political table had in some ways turned since the early 1990s, as the new government elected in the fall of 2013 was conservative-led.

The appointment of Halvorsen does not seem to have faced as much controversy as might be expected. Though the general approval of her appointment and work by my CICERO informants work can be taken with reservations, there was not much noise in the media either. On March 28, 2014, the same day the board officially announced the appointment of Halvorsen, the nation-wide, daily radio program Dagsnytt atten interviewed her on the position (NRK Radio 2014). When the host asked Halvorsen about her political background in relation to the Center, Halvorsen said she recognized this as a big role-change and emphasized that she was there to lead the researchers, not be involved in research. Halvorsen further emphasized that the Center delivered high level research. She specifically mentioned the IPCC, signaling the scientific merit and (by implication) the political neutrality of CICERO in their contributions to this work.

26 The board that chose Mauritzen as Prestrud’s successor in December 2011 was the last to be appointed by the Ministry of Environment. This board served from 2008 to 2011 (CICERO 2012a, 8). 49

Journalist Kjetil Alstadheim was one of the few who publicly criticized the appointment of a former party leader as CEO of a research center. In a comment in Dagens Næringsliv (Alstadheim 2014) he picked up on possible credibility issues CICERO could face with a former politician as leader. In Dagsnytt atten, Halvorsen, on the other hand, testified to the openness of the Norwegian political milieu and thought that her background in politics gave her experience in the importance of good research for good politics. Her political connections were, of course, not ignored by CICERO. Bang pointed out that “it would have been a bit different if Kristin Halvorsen had been part of the government’s negotiation delegation in 2009 [as a representative of the Center], as I or Håkon Sælen [the CICERO delegate from 2011-2013] do not have political party connections”.27 Moreover, readers of her op-eds and statements on climate change on behalf of the Center would be hard put to forget her past as a well-known politician.

2014 was also the year the communication department turned Klima into an exclusively online publication. Articles published in the print-version of Klima had increasingly been published on the CICERO webpage, but even with this full transition away from paper print it remained important for the Center that the online format was also a magazine and not a blog. Comments could only be addressed to CICERO’s Facebook and Twitter pages. The reason for the transition was, apparently, because to print and send out Klima was costly and the Center was going through a financially difficult period. However, Bjørnæs, who by then had become communication director at the Center, said he also saw the physical print as an outdated practice and wanted to reach beyond the subscribing “congregation”.28 It was easier and cheaper to buy advertisements via Facebook than to send out print copies they did not even know were opened. Though the Center may have lost some readers who did not fall within the algorithms of Facebook, new forms of online communication meant increased precision in CICERO’s communication work.

IPCC presented AR5 in parts from 2013 to 2014, with contributions from at least five CICERO researchers. As mentioned, the Center had contributed to the reports since IPCC started producing them. The researchers who author the assessment reports do so with grounding in their research proficiency. However, the IPCC author lists credit the

27 Interview with Guri Bang, 20.03.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 28 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 50 contributors with their affiliation and countries of origin. CICERO was the institute of the Nordics that contributed most to the Panel’s analysis (Norges forskningsråd 2015, 30). IPCC, in turn, describe their reports as policy relevant (IPCC Secretariat 2010). Their Summaries for Policymakers can be described as hybrid-document, products of both research and political negotiations (Shaw and Robinson 2004). Despite the potential for political controversy that follows such documents, CICERO takes pride in their affiliation with the IPCC as exemplified by Halvorsen’s comments in Dagsnytt Atten March 24, 2014. In addition CICERO Research Director Fuglestvedt has, since 2015, been one of seven vice chairs for the Working Group I of the IPCC board. Therefore for many closely associated the Center with the Panel.

CICERO’s association with the IPCC and their policy relevant assessments flows right in with the groups and panels in which researchers of the Center have participated, for government and political parties. In 2014 political scientist Bang was a member of the Labor party leader Jonas Gahr Støre’s “party neutral climate panel”, while climatologist Fuglestvedt joined climate and environment minister Tine Sundtoft’s “climate council” the same year. Certainly, these politicians thought the Center’s contributions to their panel lent credibility to their respective parties, who could imply that their policy plans were grounded in research. At the same time CICERO researchers, such as abovementioned Bang and Fuglestvedt, were able to contribute their knowledge directly to those in power, interacting with politicians in ways that may have appeared more effective than writing opinion pieces in newspapers.

In 2015, CICERO focused their research in three fields (all of which encompassed both social and natural sciences): the economy of climate change; the climate system; and adaptation and emission reduction, including research on international agreements. In addition, the Center had a team working on climate finance and innovation (Norges forskningsråd 2015, 36). Since 2011, CICERO has also hosted CICEP, a research unit on environment-friendly energy and international climate agreements, and collaborated with several social sciences and natural sciences institutes, especially through the institute network called CIENS established in 2006. Though the Center does not provide an overview of the disciplines of their researchers, as of November 2016, according to the Center homepage, they had 50 researchers in employment. Reviewing their background I found that approximately two thirds had a background in the social

51 sciences, the most common disciplinary backgrounds appeared to be political science, social economics, and atmospheric sciences (CICERO 2016b, a).29

The new government, who took their place at the end of 2013, stopped the practice with an “extended delegation” to the COPs. From then on CICERO had no more access to the negotiations than any other non-state organization present at the negotiations. At COP 21 in Paris 2015, only three representatives from non-government bodies were part of the official Norwegian delegation (in comparison with almost 30 non-government representatives at COP 15). In Paris at COP 21 CICERO hosted a pavilion for discussions and knowledge sharing together with the NGO Bellona, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Yara International ASA, a Norwegian fertilization and chemistry company. Here they gave press briefings and hosted presentations and panel discussions. To their audience in Norway they did as they had done many times before: gave expert commentary on the proceedings. In addition, they fronted a separate series of articles in Klima online, with comments on the negotiations as they progressed.

In the end the Parties of the UNFCCC passed a global climate agreement in Paris in 2015, the full consequences of which remains uncertain. This agreement was unlike the Kyoto agreement. Rather than starting with binding emission limits, the nations that ratified the agreement presented and will continue to present their own nationally determined contributions (NDC). Since Kyoto in 1997, terms like joint implementation and CDMs have been a part of international and Norwegian climate change discourse. One of the reasons for this was that the binding limits of the Kyoto protocol set concrete goals that different nations could respond to with mechanisms such as CDMs and joint implementation, and quota trade. International collaboration mechanisms for emission cuts such as these were a part of CICERO’s research field since Hanisch first presented his policy note in 1992 (see p. 40). After the agreement at COP 21, some researchers at the Center expressed uncertainty about how, and if, such mechanisms would fit with the new, nationally decided goals (Boasson 2016). Still, the Norwegian government, who for 20 years had cut most of their emissions in projects outside of Norway, hoped to join a framework set up by the European Union (EU) that will allow them to continue such practices through an agreement on climate politics towards 2030. I return to CICERO’s discussion of COP 21, the agreement and Norwegian politics in this regard, in chapter 5.

29 Their research at CICERO may have moved beyond the field of their official degrees. 52

3.7 Concluding remarks: Research and policy – friends out of necessity?

International climate change research has, from its slow start in meteorology in the 19th century and onwards into the 21st century, had an ambivalent relationship to political decision-making. As we have seen in this chapter, such research has been both embedded in and separate from politics. From the first attempt at the International Meteorological Organization in 1873, to the breakthroughs in the field in the early 20th century, to the diplomacy of satellites during the Cold War, to UN commissions and the IPCC in the 1980s, to the Norwegian Labor party’s own politics, we see a circular dance of politics and climate change research.

For CICERO it became bit by bit pertinent to maintain strict boundaries vis-à-vis politics. In the early 1990s, former politicians led the Center, but this changed, and up until 2013 they had three CEOs with progressively more relevant research backgrounds. During these years the Center also cut ties with the Ministry of Environment, who appointed their board until 2007, and established connections with both the University of Oslo and various other research institutes. From the beginning CICERO was involved in the work of IPCC. They proudly paraded such connections as tokens of research credibility. Still, the Center did not utterly cut ties with politics as their researchers joined the official Norwegian negotiation delegation to the Conferences of the Parties from 2009 to 2013. They also contributed their insights to expert councils formed by various political parties. And of course, CICERO upheld their role as public communicator of climate change research. They did this by informing the general public on new climate research, including the work of the Center and the IPCC, through their own popular publication and webpage, and through interviews and op-eds in many Norwegian newspapers, both local and national. The Center’s special niche had become the Conferences of the Parties, and on these they gave expert commentary, discussed political proceedings and possible measures against climate change.30 With this commentary, CICERO navigated close to the boundary between research and politics.

The line CICERO draws between their research and political decision-making is made clear by the words of Christian Bjørnæs, the Center’s current information director:

30 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 53

CICERO’s research is “policy relevant but not policy prescriptive”.31 CICERO’s research should, by this definition, help lay a foundation of knowledge for political decisions and policy. To uphold the authority of research, its producers need to maintain the perception that they provide something other than just another opinion in the crowd, they have a strong foundation in rules and principles of knowledge production, distinction from politics. At the same time, politicians need to define their territory apart from research in order to leave room for political choice (Gieryn 1995, 434-439). At the same time, as Asdal shows, when it comes to the environment, politics demands certain kinds of answers to act, while research desires to deliver these answers (2011, 170).

Sometimes roles such as CICERO’s can be established by contrast to other parts of society, sometimes by affiliation with such parts. The kind of complex relationship described in this chapter raises the question of how CICERO cemented their identity and role as a policy relevant research center. In other words, how the Center set boundaries between themselves, civil society and political decision-making. Moreover, this relationship also raises the question of how CICERO legitimized the relevance of their work in relation to these parts of society. The rest of this study therefore looks more closely at how the Center participated in public discourse as expert commentators on climate change negotiations and the reality of climate change. Through this I present insights into how the Center maintained their identity as an independent and research- oriented center; how they met other social actors and forces in communication, such as civil society and politicians; how they produced a discourse that may have informed both the Center and society; and what public expert commentary with a basis in research entails. In chapter 4 and 5 I analyze, respectively, CICERO’s communications before, during and after COP 15 in 2009 and COP 21 in 2015 regarding the negotiations and arguments against anthropogenic climate change. In chapter 6, I summarize my conclusions from these chapters and present a generalized discussion of their implications in a broader context of climate discourse and applied research.

31 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 54

4 In 2009: A “Circus” in Denmark and Confrontations in Norway

4.1 Overview

In the following chapter I look at the public communication of CICERO in November and December 2009. The general topic is the Center’s public communication in the months around the Conference of the Parties 15 (COP 15) in 2009. I focus on how CICERO communicated boundaries and connections between themselves, climate research community more generally, their lay audience, politics and civil society. The first section is a brief summary of the Center’s public communication practices in November and December 2009. Then follows two segments where I present textual analysis of their communication practices in these months. The segments focus on the climate conference in Copenhagen and CICERO’s contributions to discussions on the reality of climate change, anthropogenic or natural. In the concluding section I make a comparative analysis of the Center’s communication on these two themes. The topics of the conclusion are brought into chapter 6, after a discussion of the Center’s communication practices in the time of COP 21, in chapter 5.

4.2 The presence, platforms and public expertise of CICERO in November and December 2009

There was a noticeable increase in CICERO’s media presence in the period around COP 15. The Conference was hosted in Copenhagen December 7-18, 2009 and, according to the news analysis archive Retriever, CICERO was mentioned in Norwegian media over 380 times in November and over 600 times in December that year (See Figure 2). In these two months people from the Center were cited in at least 191 texts in Norwegian media. However, some of these were information pages of organizations and others were print and online versions of the same article.

In the course of November and December 2009, CICERO participated in discussions on several topics, not just those related to the climate conference, including debates with various climate skeptics. CICERO’s discussion of the climate conference was to a large

55 extent commentary on political decision-making. In addition, as mentioned in chapter 3, in November 2009 there was the hacking of the email server at CRU. This was the first of two events instigating the media controversy dubbed Climategate. Though staff at CICERO told me they did not see Climategate as a problem for CICERO, the CEO at the time joined in several public discussions with climate skeptics before and in connection with the CRU hacking. Before further discussions of the climate conference and arguments against climate change, I look at the types of platforms the Center used for public communication in November and December 2009.

Frequency of references during June 2009-May 2010 900 CICERO* 800 700 COP15 600 500 CICERO AND København 400 300 Klimatoppmøte (Climate 200 top meeting) 100 0

Source: Word search in Retriever Norway AS media archive. Date of search: 23.10.2017. http://web.retriever-info.com** * Fewer than 10 references to the philosopher Cicero. ** Klima is not a part of Retriever's archive

Figure 2: Frequency of mentions of keywords related to CICERO and COP 15 in Norwegian media during September 2009 to April 2010.

Klima was CICERO’s own chief public communication channel. In 2009 the magazine filled 40 A4 format pages and was printed in color. It was also made available as a downloadable pdf-file on the Center’s webpage. Communication director Tove Kolset was the chief editor and the magazine was produced with help from researchers and communication staff at CICERO.

Klima issue 6-09, the last issue of 2009, came out at the end of November. The front cover showed Copenhagen’s sculpture of H.C. Andersen’s The Little Mermaid with the question “What happens in Copenhagen?” underneath. With this framing one could

56 expect the issue to be all about COP 15, was it not for a smaller set of captions drawing attention to research done at CICERO. In fact, only 6 out of the 25 texts in the magazine addressed the climate conference, of which one was the editorial and another was the standardized interview on the back cover of the issue. Presented in this way, it seemed that CICERO used the newsworthiness of COP 15 to draw attention to other matters of climate change, to highlight their research and frame climate negotiations and climate research within the same context.

In November and December 2009 approximately half of what CICERO published on their website as self-styled web news addressed COP 15. This news was in the form of updates and commentary on the proceedings, with increased intensity in December (CICERO 2009b). During the conference most of the Center’s web articles covered the negotiations. There were also posts on CICERO’s news briefs and seminars in Copenhagen. The rest of the updates were either research news related to other topics within the Center’s field, or refutations of arguments against anthropogenic climate change. Their discussions on the reality of climate change also included short introductions called Klima ABC, which answered questions of why the climate is changing, what the consequences could be and what “we” could do about it.

Nine op-eds written by CICERO staff were published outside of the Center’s own communication channels. Of these, the five published in newspaper prints were all published in nation-wide newspapers that had their main offices in Oslo. In their public communication on other platforms, the Center thus focused nation-wide, but was at the same time somewhat capital-bound. Commentaries and quotes from people at CICERO were published in newspapers of all formats, from the very local to the national, and from the topic-specific to the more general. The news bureau NTB interviewed CICERO researchers, which often led to extensive citations in newspapers that used the bureau’s services. CICERO’s economist Steffen Kallbekken, Pål Prestrud who was the Center’s CEO at the time, and the prior CEO Knut H. Alfsen, employed as head research director, were the three most quoted people from the Center in this period. The CICERO board declared Prestrud the “new face” of CICERO when he was appointed (Andersen et al. 2003, 1).

4.3 A “Circus” in Denmark: CICERO’s commentary on COP 15 in 2009

4.3.1 Preparing for failure? CICERO and COP 15

The major climate change topic in November and December 2009 was COP 15. In the second issue of Klima in 2009, a guest author from the Fridtjof Nansen Institute voiced doubts about the possibility of an agreement (Andresen 2009, 38). Optimism continued to diminish through 2009, and many researchers, including CICERO’s Guri Bang, did not believe there would be an effective agreement.32 On November 15, 2009, the Danish prime minister announced that they had changed the plans for an agreement into a two- step model where COP 15 would be the first step towards an agreement. COP 15 was still considered an event of international and diplomatic importance for climate change and some hoped for a decisive move towards an agreement in Copenhagen.

During November and December 2009 CICERO discussed COP 15 in Klima, on their webpage and in Norwegian newspapers. The Center used their research expertise to present expert commentary on the proceedings. This included reports from their people in Copenhagen and discussions before and after the negotiations. Some CICERO researchers present at COP 15 performed as “spokes people”33 for CICERO. During the negotiations the Center gave news briefings from the cruise ship Norrøna, which hosted most of the Norwegian NGOs present in the capital.

The negotiations from December 7-18, 2009, became surrounded by controversy. The organization and coordination of the event was inadequate and chaotic, it was revealed that Denmark had a draft for the agreement ready before the negotiations even started, and there were several protests and general activism by civil society and Global South countries. The negotiations concluded with the rejection of the two-step model and the originally planned agreement. This was replaced with a short statement developed by negotiators from the USA and some Global South countries, signed by most, but not all the UNFCCC parties. COP 15 was, by many, considered a failure. However, the

32 Interview with Guri Bang, 20.03.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 33 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 26.10.2016, CICERO offices, Oslo. 58 sentiment that COP 15 was a first step towards a different approach to climate agreements can be seen in some CICERO web articles in late December 2009.

One recurring issue at COP 15, which sprang out of the IPCC’s AR4 from 2007, was the desire to limit the absolute increase in global warming by two degrees Celsius as part of the international agreement. The necessity and efficacy of such a goal was discussed by CICERO. The Center also focused on what relations between the Global North and the Global South could mean for a possible agreement. Both China and the United States were considered obstacles to the agreement, as these two parties appeared to hold diametrically opposite positions. The United States desired that all countries would be obliged to share the responsibility and cut greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, since they saw this as the only way to ensure sufficient emission cuts to halt climate change. The United States also saw it as a possible challenge to their own trade competitiveness on the international market, if they were to be regulated while others were not. China, along with several other countries of the Global South, desired an agreement which would let them continue emitting GHG at least until Global North countries had shown willingness and ability to reduce GHG emissions. They argued that responsibility for past emissions in the Global North should be recognized in the agreement and that the Global South therefore should not face the same restrictions as the North; particularly because Global South countries might need to emit in order to develop in the way countries of the Global North already had (Skodvin and Andresen 2009, 268, 274).

4.3.2 Analysis of CICERO’s take on COP 15 in 2009

In this section I present a textual analysis of CICERO’s public expert commentary on COP 15, with a focus on texts that highlight how CICERO self-identified and related to other actors in public climate change discourse in November and December 2009.

Building up to the negotiations

On the last day of October 2009, CICERO published an interview on their webpage with Guri Bang, political scientist and at the time senior researcher at CICERO. The interviewer mentioned that Bang was part of the Norwegian negotiation delegation. In fact she was there as an observer. She was not there to advice the Norwegian

59 negotiators.34 With access to parts of the negotiations not open to the public, she was restricted by rules of confidentiality. In the CICERO interview, however, her role was left un-specified (CICERO 2009e). Therefore the Center’s communication department did not explicitly set a boundary between politicians and negotiators on the one hand, and researchers on the other. During November and December 2009 Bang gave much less commentary on the proceedings than Kallbekken, the most quoted of the Center’s staff in this period. Underemphasizing her presence lessened confusion regarding CICERO’s position at the negotiations. However, the Center may have benefitted from an article on her role and their desire to learn from the negotiations. This was only mentioned in a byline in Klima a year later (Kallbekken and Tjernshaugen 2010, 9). Another insightful perspective could have been the Norwegian government intention to include civil society and research in politics on climate change by inclusion in the delegation.

In the CICERO interview at the end of October, Bang made it clear that she did not expect a “ratifiable” agreement (CICERO 2009e). She thought the negotiations would continue into 2010. Bang expressed uncertainty and pessimism with phrases such as: “[It is] difficult to predict who will take the lead”; “It will be difficult for the USA to commit…”; “It is probably a lot more difficult for [the EU] this time…”; and “…the finance crisis makes it difficult to establish comprehensive climate measures in the EU in the short term [perspective]…” (CICERO 2009e (italics added)). Communicated through the repetition of the adjective “difficult” and other adverbs, Bang’s reluctance to say who would shape the negotiations signaled uncertainty towards the speed of political decision-making. Though the EU and the USA seemed prominent candidates, even they would find it a challenge to make political decisions that could lead to an agreement. Still, her focus was on the powers of nations and the unions, not internal forces within these countries or relationship between national leaders and other actors.

A month later, on November 25, CICERO provided a longer interview with Jorunn Gran from CICERO’s communication department on the coming negotiations (Gran 2009) that ended on a more optimistic note. Presenting the Center’s interdisciplinary foundation, she interviewed sociologist Andreas Tjernshaugen, aforementioned political scientist Bang, and economist Kallbekken, as well as CEO Prestrud, all from CICERO.

34 Interview with Guri Bang, 20.03.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 60

Newspapers would usually only interview one CICERO researcher. The Center, on the other hand, could muster more authority on their own webpage both in numbers and disciplinary breadth. In this way, this article signaled the importance of the topic and the potential of CICERO researchers as public commentators. The interview seemed to list the main points of the negotiations, in an overview of COP 15 written for a lay audience. The sub-headings stated that the USA held the key to the negotiations; that many countries (both Global North and South) had goals; and put focus on the two degrees limit as a central, political goal. Before concluding, Gran summarized what the parties would discuss in Copenhagen.

Gran’s interview included some indirect criticism of political decision-makers. In particular, Kallbekken problematized the relationship between climate research and international politics. He presented the IPCC as policy relevant by pointing out that the Panel was the empirical source of the two degrees goal, which required global emissions to peak in 2015 and be cut in half by 2030. Furthermore, he underscored the difference between the IPCC’s conclusions and the expected global warming from cuts proposed by world leaders. In his opinion, limiting warming to two degrees Celsius was not a realistic goal, but “we” talked about it since delays were costly (Gran 2009). He did not clarify who his “we” referred to or who would pay the cost. It can be interpreted as an unspecific and general we, that all who took part in the climate discourse kept the goal in mind. However, given Kallbekken’s mention of the IPCC at the beginning of the same paragraph, as well as his own statement on the necessity of the cuts, “we” seemed to refer to the narrower group of the climate change research community. From this perspective IPCC, CICERO and the wider research community were telling the hard truth of necessary measures to limit climate change, but they made no political decisions.

At the end of November, in issue 6-09 of Klima, CICERO presented a similar line of criticism as it underscored the difference between researchers and politicians, in particular amorphous political groups such as EU leaders and the United States Senate and Congress. In the abovementioned interview Bang pointed out that though the U.S. had “the key” to the agreement, Obama’s mandate was “severely limited” by the Senate and Congress (Gran 2009). The Klima issue was made before the abovementioned interview, but launched after it. In the editorial, under the title “The good intention

[viljen]”, editor Kolset announced: “Now it’s finally settled: There will be no legally and internationally binding climate agreement in Copenhagen” (Kolset 2009, 3). “The final nail in the coffin” was hammered in by the Danish prime minister in a meeting with Obama and state leaders from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), in Singapore on November 15, 2009 (Kolset 2009, 3). Fitting with the genre of an editorial, Kolset seemed to present the opinion of the Center by including arguments from CICERO researchers who had contributed to the issue in her discussion.

Kolset began the editorial with a child-like expression that rhymes in Norwegian: “We want to, we want to, but can’t make it [Vi vil, vi vil, men får det ikke til] ” (Kolset 2009). After this informality, she gave a brief overview of the political processes behind COP 15 through a discussion of dilemmas and decisions. This mix of an informal tone and discussion of uncertain politics gave the impression that CICERO sided with the, perhaps confused and at least disappointed, readers. Up for inspection were the politicians who decided to postpone the agreement. The issue of who was responsible for the loss of an agreement at COP 15 in 2009 was not made explicit in this piece. The “we” in the initial phrase, repeated later in the editorial, seemed to indicate CICERO, Klima’s readers and politicians. However, the only mentioned event that led to the lack of an agreement was the meeting between Danish prime minister and the APEC leaders. In this way Kolset left readers with the impression that these people were responsible, presenting distance between state leaders, on the one hand, and researchers and civil society, on the other. The latter group lacked influence to affect decisions, regardless of protests. She admittedly understood the difficulty of political proceedings, especially Obama’s struggle with Congress in the United States and the Norwegian delegation’s “will” to have an agreement. However, her focus on the slowness of negotiations, the chaotic sides to international politics and the ineffectiveness of protests from civil society, hinted that though we, without political power, wanted an agreement, political maneuverings meant we did not get one.

Kolset argued that COP 15 in 2009 was unnecessarily “hyped up” as the last chance to agree on way to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius. As her next sentence described protests from climate activists and African countries, she seemed to give them some of the responsibility for the hype. Overall, CICERO presented the meeting as part of a process. Gran described COP 15 as a “milestone” in the interview discussed above

(Gran 2009), and CEO Prestrud noted in a comment in Klima 6-09 discussed below, the hyping of the meeting, though he did not point to responsibility (Prestrud 2009b). In an interview after COP 15, Kallbekken blamed the Danish hosts and the environmental movement for the hype (Ursin and Aursland 2009). Kolset’s editorial also left readers with the impression that someone, perhaps politicians and activists, had confused them. However, if there were mistaken or dishonest communicators out there, CICERO, in contrast, would avoid “hyping” and tell it as it was.

The impression of that COP 21 was chaos separate from CICERO’s public communication fits well with Kolset’s concluding remarks. She used the “circus” as metaphor for the coming meeting, the ring populated by “delegates, bureaucrats, politicians, researchers, business people, activists and tourists” (Kolset 2009). Other news outlets also described COP 15 in 2009 as a circus (Lean 2009; Wilson 2009; Corn 2009), The Guardian article even presented activists as the circus hosts (van der Zee and Barkham 2009). As mentioned, Kolset’s “we” seemed to encompass Klima’s readers, who she knew from a recent survey, were interested politicians and people who worked in organizations and the business sector. Most likely some of these would be at COP 15, maybe even in the negotiation rooms. But what was CICERO’s role at this circus? With the metaphor Kolset acknowledged that COP 15 was chaotic and performative, and that researchers were a part of this show. At the same time she showed that CICERO had detached reflexivity to identify the negotiations as a circus. Thus the Center could communicate on the proceedings from a distance and bring order and insight to the readers. Her penultimate sentence was that the Copenhagen meeting would be an arena for learning and disseminating, a perfect arena for CICERO as a public climate communicator, a role separate from politics.

After the introduction to Klima 6-09, CICERO researcher Andreas Tjernshaugen gave an overview in the article “What happens in Copenhagen?” (Tjernshaugen 2009, 6). The article covered four pages, more than any other articles in the issue. According to Tjernshaugen, the main questions at COP 15 were related to who was responsible for emission cuts and financing of mitigation and adaptation. With a simple, structured overview that resembled the interview from November 25, Tjernshaugen summarized and discussed key issues of the negotiation. His message was clear: World emissions were still increasing, and “this trend must turn within few years if there is to be a chance

63 at reaching the two degrees goal” (Tjernshaugen 2009, 4 (italics added)). Tjernshaugen signaled the necessity of such mitigating measures given a wish to limit global warming to two degrees, but also uncertainty of future climate politics. This was underscored when he stated that the two degrees goal was “…very demanding”. He represented the agency of politicians to mitigate, but his statement that the “trend”, not the actors, had to turn also served to obfuscate responsibility. What was certain was that researchers could tell politicians what was necessary to reach political goals. Tjernshaugen left the issues of how to organize, govern and even agree on a plan for going forward, open.

Klima 6-09 also presented what seemed “the voice of the Norwegian people”, mediated by Hilde Lamvik from the Norwegian Board of Technology, an independent body for technology assessment established by the Norwegian Government in 1999. Lamvik’s introduction was an unequivocal statement: “The people’s climate council is clear: We do not have time to wait. We need a climate agreement now! All of 93 percent of the people’s climate advisers consider it urgent to pass a new global climate agreement” (Lamvik 2009, 10). The people’s climate council was presented as a “global people hearing”, though there were only 44 meetings in 37 countries. Though “the people” was a generic and unspecific classification, the relationship between these people and politicians was presented as one where both were active. The Norwegian panel gave their advice to the Norwegian minister of environment and then it was “…up to the politicians show if they want to listen” (Lamvik 2009, 10). In addition, the council’s advice no. 3, which demanded “…knowledge dissemination about the climate…” and larger contributions from “science” (Lamvik 2009, 11), fit with CICERO’s own mandate and ambitions. Thus the Center and “the people” seemed on the same page.

In Klima 6-09’s return column CICERO’s then CEO Pål Prestrud discussed the potential for an agreement. He began with musings on what Al Gore and Bill Clinton talked of after Gore signed the Kyoto protocol and communicated familiarity in describing the dilemma “…those two boys [gutta]…”35 faced (Prestrud 2009b, 22). Without holding back, Prestrud was “…not in doubt that [signing the protocol] was the right choice” (2009b, 22), even if the United States Congress did not support them. He also had sympathy and understanding for Obama who was “completely right” in using

35 Norwegian this expression is more one of familiarity than patronization, used in newspapers with expressions such as “the football boys [fotballgutta]”. 64 time to get through a climate law. The Congress got a rougher treatment. Prestrud blamed them for the failed Kyoto protocol and presented them as the main obstacle in the coming negotiations. Individual politicians could be related to, but more ambiguous political actors such as the Congress were kept at arm’s distance. For Prestrud there was hope even if the nations did not agree in Copenhagen: Obama might win the Congress over, China was on the move, and the EU presented offensive climate politics. What also gave hope for Prestrud was accelerated change in public understanding of and attitude towards climate change. Echoing Lamvik’s discussion of the people’s climate council, Prestrud presented state leaders and civil society as finally agreeing with what climate researchers had known for a long time: Something had to be done about climate change.

Five days after the release of Klima 6-09, Tora Skodvin had a two-page op-ed in the December 5, 2009, issue of the socialist newspaper Klassekampen (Skodvin 2009). Skodvin also presented the context of the upcoming negotiations, but focused on the relationship between key actors, mainly China and the United States. Combining the political authority of the UNFCCC with the epistemic authority of the IPCC, Skodvin pointed to the convention’s 1992 goal to stabilize concentration of GHG at a level that did not lead to “… ‘dangerous manmade disturbance of the global climate system’” (Skodvin 2009, 22). She then explained the two degrees goal, something not done in other CICERO communications in these months. Her explanatory power came from the IPCC, whom she credited with the claim that more than two degrees Celsius in global warming would lead to non-reversible disturbances in the global climate system. For Skodvin the boundaries between politics and research were one-way permeable, with researchers advising politicians on the best course of action. Thus a line was also drawn between who set the goals and who did the research to identify how the goals were best realized. Skodvin took the stance of a detached commentator as she wrote “many researchers assume that the two degrees goal will require at least halving of global emissions by 2050…” (Skodvin 2009, 22 (italics added)). She also made it clear that the climate research community had insights that could help world leaders reach their goals, without researchers themselves entering into politics. Other actors were not mentioned.

Yet in contrast with Prestrud, Skodvin was uncertain on whether a U.S. climate law would make China willing to compromise since the latter demanded a 40 percent cut in

65 emission from 1990 levels of Global North countries by 2020 (Skodvin 2009, 23). Her expectations for the COP 15 negotiations were even more uncertain and pessimistic:

…if the parties at all succeed in coming to an agreement, it will most likely not be anywhere close to establishing the emission reductions many researchers think is necessary to reach the two degree goal (Skodvin 2009, 22, (italics added)).

Skodvin presented climate negotiations as a long process, from the Climate Convention that went into force in 1994, to the Kyoto protocol, and many later disagreements and dilemmas. In the end, she concluded, there was still a long way to go before an international agreement was reached. The impression she gave was that though the research was there to give political goals a foundation, it was hard to make politicians follow up on such goals on time, and with the actions required.

During the negotiations

COP 15 started on December 7, 2009. By December 11, in a webpage interview with Kallbekken, CICERO made it clear that the negotiations were going slow and were off the official track (Pileberg 2009c). The first week appointed negotiators and bureaucrats from each country who would work out drafts for the new climate agreement. The second week state leaders from the different countries would join and discuss what the final version would look like. However, things did not develop according to this plan. It was hard to come to agreement on any kind of draft and, Kallbekken pointed out, if the official tracks did not lead anywhere, then a draft had to come from “somewhere else” (Kallbekken in Pileberg 2009c). This was an allusion to the Danish draft, which had been produced through “an initiative on the side” (Kallbekken in Pileberg 2009a). CICERO presented a view of negotiations where, despite official routines and rules for the negotiations, not everything was official: There were things going on behind the scenes that did not follow the ways or solutions of the official UNFCCC process.

The Copenhagen Accord, a non-binding document which endorsed the continuation of the Kyoto Protocol, was agreed to by most of the UNFCCC parties on December 18. By the end of the negotiations, frustration and political skepticism seemed to peak at CICERO and elsewhere. Already in the third line of a CICERO webpage article on December 17 (CICERO 2009d), the undisclosed interviewer made a distinction between

66 the professional negotiators and the politicians who by then had “officially taken over” the negotiations (CICERO 2009d). The use of the adverb “officially” implied that the people of the latter group had been a part of the procedure all along. The article summarized the confusion and conflict, with statements from Bang and Kallbekken, and concluded by making explicit what was initially implied. The real negotiations were not the same as the official ones: “The real negotiations are to a large degree going on behind closed doors [på bakrommet] and include, according to sources, only a handful of countries” (CICERO 2009d). Thus the Center cemented the impression of secret negotiations, where powerful, but unspecified, actors made decisions about climate change, while the research community, CICERO, their readers and civil society in general were kept in the dark.

The aftermath

After the negotiations ended it only took CICERO five days to return to a more optimistic note with a Center webpage interview titled “Many bright prospects [lyspunkt] after Copenhagen” (Pileberg 2009b). CICERO researcher Tora Skodvin said that though the Copenhagen Accord left many questions unanswered, all the major parties were doing “climate politics” within their own nations. She went on to state that:

When we have trouble making an international system of agreements, it is because of principles: China has a principle that the rich countries should commit first, and the USA has a principle that China must commit to an international control system (Skodvin in Pileberg 2009b).

In the end the largest problem, according to Skodvin, was with principled countries, some of which desired supreme national sovereignty, and therefore refused a top-down climate change agreement. They did not want “…to be monitored by an international supervisory body…” (Skodvin in Pileberg 2009b). As we will see in chapter 5, this issue was to a certain extent resolved by COP 21 in 2015. All the same, for Skodvin, China and the U.S. remained the key actors at COP 15. Skodvin’s emphasis on national powers left the impression that the Center, their readers, even civil society in general, remained as spectators without the agency to influence international decisions.

On Christmas Eve, in an op-ed in the newspaper Dagbladet, CICERO researcher Hege Westskog discussed the relationship between political and private action with celebrity

67 meteorologist Siri Kalvig. They described the relationship between political and private action as one of the many “circle dances [runddans]36” of the climate problem: “… we have to make sure that good spirals occur, where positive interaction between the private and the public sphere, between attitudes and actions, contribute to solving the problem” (Westskog and Kalvig 2009, 58 (italics added)). Their use of “we” seemed to indicate the necessity of collaboration of all sides, but their main question was which sphere was the prime mover of climate mitigation.

Westskog and Kalvig recognized that good interaction required “mild compulsion” and governance. In their discussion, they compared findings from a Norwegian survey with findings from a similar Swedish survey. Swedes were apparently “far more” inclined to believe in anthropogenic climate change. This, Westskog and Kalvig implied, was because the Norwegian government contributed far less to promotion of the understanding of climate change than the Swedish government. As they saw it, there was an interaction between political effort for reduced emission and understanding of the “brutal reality” of climate change. Higher belief in anthropogenic climate change in Sweden was connected to their reduction in emissions by 9.1 percent since 1990, while Norway had increased emissions by 11 percent. CICERO was appointed by Parliament with the national task of providing the public with knowledge on climate change (see p. 43 and 45). Westskog and Kalvig alluded that the Norwegian government was not giving CICERO and other initiatives enough political and financial support, to the detriment of Norwegian climate change efforts.

Westskog and Kalvig framed this discussion within a more personal dialogue. They kicked-off with quotes from Arnold Schwarzenegger, governor of California at the time, who had held a speech at COP 15. The first was his statement at COP 15 that the people had the solutions to the climate problems and the second was “We’ll be back”. Kalvig and Westskog then discussed what to eat for Christmas with climate change in mind. Westskog felt that, “honestly” the actions of any one individual were so insignificant considering that “China opens a new coal power plant weekly” (2009, 58). This segued to discussion of the relationship between public and private action addressed above. In conclusion they returned to the issue of what to eat for Christmas. The personal

36 Runddans, a common metaphor in Norwegian, describes a repetitive and circular movement, where the causal power is hard to trace. A parallel can also be drawn to atmospheric climatic movements. 68

communication of Kalvig and Westskog showed how researchers could struggle with the same uncertainties as other people and that they were open to different ways of thinking about climate change. Though they had a high degree of knowledge about climate change, they could step down from their ivory tower and be just like any other citizen. Indeed, the expressions of frustration and helplessness combined with discussions of political influence left readers with the impression that though private individuals had some capacity to act, it was the responsibility of the government to ensure a good feedback relationship between private and public forces.

4.4 Confrontations, consensus and credibility

COP 15 in 2009 was a political and complex affair. Here CICERO’s public expert commentary ranged from general historic and political overviews, to reporting on the proceedings, to more personal perspectives. However, the political proceedings in Copenhagen were based on the premise that climate change was real and caused by humans. Without general consent in this regard there would be no global agreement and less funding for climate research. Westskog and Kalvig combined these perspectives to some extent in the op-ed discussed above, as did the discussion of the opinion of the People’s Climate Panel. In the following section I present other ways CICERO addressed this question and their response to challenges during November and December 2009. First I give an overview of the theme and then follow the textual analysis which is divided into four segments with different themes.

4.4.1 CICERO and climate skeptics in 2009

November 2009 began with a somewhat troublesome period for climate change research dubbed “Climategate”. Public interest for climate change seemed to peak in Norway around COP 15, but by spring 2010 public opinion polling in Norway showed that 20 percent of those interviewed considered themselves climate skeptics. Similar trends were seen abroad (Eide and Ytterstad 2010, 244, 257). The emails from the hacking of CRU were first leaked on November 17, 2009 (Trench 2012, 282). CICERO had at that time already a confrontational position towards arguments against anthropogenic climate change. At least since 2007, the general idea at CICERO was that “…it was

69 very important to refute criticism immediately”.37 CICERO used their webpage for refutations and the CEO was on the barricades fighting for climate change research. The Norwegian climate skeptics group The Climate Realists [Klimarealistene]38 was founded in February 2009 (Brønnøysundsregistrene 2017)39 and officially registered a year later. CICERO’s confrontational approach to arguments against anthropogenic climate change was not new with Climategate. However, the media exposure of the leaked emails and the later discovery of mistakes in IPCC’s AR4 meant the event became a focal point for later debates on climate change.

According to current communication director at CICERO, Christian Bjørnæs, there was an understanding at the time that “…Prestrud, as a representative for the institute, should defend climate research” (italics added).40 As former researcher director of the Norwegian Polar Institute, Prestrud had broad expertise, which, according to Bjørnæs, gave him the right credentials for this kind of discussion.41 Apart from Prestrud, only two other CICERO people confronted climate skeptics under their own name. The Center also used their own webpage to anonymously respond to some of the arguments against climate change, anthropogenic or otherwise. Arguments for the reality of climate change without mention of those rejecting such findings were also present in CICERO’s popularization of research.

4.4.2 CICERO on the reality of climate change

Refuting poor science and relating to royalty

As mentioned Klima 6-09 came out at the end of November. Researcher Rasmus Benestad of the Norwegian Meteorological Institute had a guest piece in this issue where he argued against a research report that claimed sun activity was more important for climate change than earlier assumed. With reference to research by him and a colleague, Benestad stated that he had tested the analytical methods of the report up against “…data from climate models where one knows what the answer will be”.

37 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 38 I have not found an explanation for the use of “realist”, but its proponents contrast it with “climate alarmist”. It is likely an allusion to scientific realism and skepticism towards modelling, though the term realism seems to have many meanings, some lauding IPCC reports for their realism (Nerlich 2014). 39 A government agency that manages various public registers for Norway. 40 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 41 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 70

Accordingly, he found that the authors of the report’s methods were “…completely unfit in scientific studies” (Benestad 2009, 39). In this way rejecting the researchers as contributors to a research debate on climate change, Benestad went on to problematize the “publish-or-perish” culture of research that led to such reports. Though Klima had a varied reader group, Benestad appeared to direct his discussion towards the climate research community and their internal problems. This was the only article in Klima 6-09 that addressed arguments against established climate change research.

In Klima 6-09 there were recommendations for popular literature on climate change, including Kongelig polartokt ([A] Royal Polar expedition) (Frederik et al. 2009). Kongelig polartokt was published in the fall of 2009 and combined the personal experience of the royal heirs of Sweden, Denmark and Norway with the knowledge of researchers and pictures from Greenland, Svalbard and the Arctic Ocean. UN secretary- general Kofi A. Annan stated in the preface that this combination of personal remarks and scientific arguments was fairly unique (Frederik et al. 2009, 9). It presented a meeting between two institutions with an old history of collaboration: science and royalty.

The book was part of CICERO’s detailed popularization practices to provide publicly accessible information on the consequences of climate change. In the Klima recommendation the authors of the book were presented as the royal heirs. What the recommendation left out was that CICERO’s own CEO, Pål Prestrud had written a section of the book. Associating the Center with the royal families of Scandinavia could have been seen as a win-win situation. I have not found an answer to why they left Prestrud out of the Klima recommendation, but it was perhaps the result of a consideration of different audiences and different ideals. While the royal heirs gained credibility and legitimacy from their involvement with climate researchers, associating with the royal family perhaps did not heighten the research profile of the Center. Some may have perceived the book as an affront to objective communication of research, and those with a critical approach to power in society could see such collaboration as support of old power-institutions.

Still, through the book, Prestrud and the other researchers could get the message through to an audience that paid less attention to climate change than they did to the royal families. As the Norwegian monarchy is mostly symbolic, the legitimacy of the 71

Norwegian royal family rests on their political neutrality, their connection to Norwegian core values, and their public-mindedness, as representatives of the Norwegian people. Framed in this way, Prestrud’s contribution made CICERO and climate change appear publicly relevant, not politically controversial, and connected to typical Norwegian values. This way climate change could catch the eye of those with other interests than research or politics. Indeed, though Prestrud discussed how “we” can meet the climate challenge, he left out reference to any one political party from the chapter. This made his “we” expansive and consensus oriented.

CICERO’s systematic rejection of claims against anthropogenic climate change

In November and December 2009, adopting a standardized and formalized form, CICERO responded through their own webpage to three claims against anthropogenic climate change (Seip and Prestrud 2009; Seip 2009; CICERO 2009f). The Center’s short answers referred to a recent argument from a named person in a news outlet and refuted it with a factual declaration in the heading of the response, the statement “this is incorrect” and a more elaborate explanation as to why it was so. Thus, CICERO’s short and systematic rejection included research information for their readers.

In the last of these responses, titled “The ten warmest years globally have been from 1998 and onwards” (Seip 2009), CICERO Professor Hans Martin Seip argued against Tom V. Segalstad, associate professor at UiO’s Natural History Museum. Segalstad argued that NASA’s temperature series were unreliable. The same day, CEO Prestrud and Seip had short comments in Aftenposten. While Seip refuted Segalstad’s arguments both on CICERO’s webpage and in the op-ed, Prestrud demanded with the title of his short piece: “Document your claims, Segalstad!” (Prestrud 2009a). With an exclamation mark and pronoun, Prestrud directly addressed Segalstad. He continued being direct and forceful as he stated that Segalstad abused his position at the Natural History Museum by spreading “disinformation”, rejecting his authority in the climate change discourse. Confrontation was a pattern in Prestrud’s public debate technique.

Debate between Pål Prestrud and the Climate Realists

In late October 2009, after a conference of the Climate Realists at UiO, some group members were interviewed in the popular journal Teknisk ukeblad. Shortly after, CEO

Prestrud was interviewed in the same journal, openly dismissing their scientific credibility. His statement: “- The Climate Realists are just ignorant and opinionated [synsere]” headlined the interview (Valmot 2009). He rejected their scientific credibility by stating that they performed no research in the field of climate change. He further undermined their position as credible communicators on climate change by stating that they presented a twisted picture of what the IPCC and climate research entailed. In this way Prestrud offensively defended the scientific credibility and merit of IPCC, whose work CICERO had contributed to for years. According to him, the Panel aggregated and synthesized “all” scientific publications on climate change as a foundation for “…probable development”. Though Prestrud did not mention the Panel’s adherence to organized skepticism á la Merton (1973), his emphasis on the Panel’s ability to discuss their results openly, made this an implicit reference. The Climate Realists’ claim that the Panel did otherwise was, according to Prestrud, an “insult” to the IPCC.

Prestrud’s direct address to Segalstad was the exceptions to his confrontations with Climate Realists, whom he in general seemed to talk more of than with. Prestrud’s statement that solar researcher Pål Brekke was “…Norwegian champion [norgesmester] in giving a one-sided representation of the sun’s influence” (Prestrud in Valmot 2009), was an example of a direct third-person reference. Prestrud thus ridiculed Brekke’s own scientific merit, with the metaphor of “champion” emphasizing Brekke’s one-sided perspective and lack of skepticism towards his own judgements. Prestrud quickly met with a response in Teknisk Ukeblad from Pål Brekke (Brekke 2009) and professor of chemistry at the University of Bergen, Olav M. Kvalheim (Kvalheim 2009). Brekke accused Prestrud of trying to be the “chief judge of the climate”. He picked up the discussion of scientific credentials by pointing out that Prestrud’s own background was in biology. Kvalheim described Prestrud in scare quotes as a climate “researcher”. The two Climate Realists tried to enter a turf war over who had the scientific credentials to define climate change research and, by extension, who could discuss scientific proof of anthropogenic climate change. This did not work. While Kvalheim and Brekke referred to their own scientific credentials, Prestrud referred to the greater research community IPCC and CICERO were a part of, hence invoking the peer review system and aggregated findings on climate change.

Prestrud’s last contribution to this debate that year was the op-ed “The climate debate gets tougher” in Teknisk ukeblad on December 11, 2009, during COP 15 (Prestrud 2009c). Here Prestrud discredited Kvalheim and Brekke and supported the IPCC. Kvalheim had stated that the Panel used past data to predict future climate change, which to Prestrud, only showed his lack in knowledge of how the Panel worked. Prestrud pointed out that the Panel’s models were not “empirical” but “…built on the physical laws of nature”, a crucial point for climate research (Prestrud 2009c). He stated that the absurdity of Kvalheim’s arguments and his cherry-picking of data regarding

CO2 sensitivity, in addition to his lack of understanding of climate research, took away his right to be taken seriously. Prestrud elaborated:

It is a multitude of many thousands of researchers, research communities, research organizations and scientific journals who have the same opinion as the climate panel and who Kvalheim and his likeminded thereby accuse of scholarly fraud and conspiracy. If [Kvalheim] were to be right then all the control systems in research councils, journals (peer review), research institutions, and many other places would have failed completely over a 20 year period (Prestrud 2009c (italics added)).

By and large the walls Prestrud erected around climate change research and the IPCC were those of scientific consensus and aggregation of data. This seemed a mix of Merton’s (1973) value of disinterestedness and Popper’s (1972) accumulation of failed falsification.

When it came to Brekke, Prestrud acknowledged that sun radiation mattered, but repeated an argument from the first Teknisk ukeblad interview: Sun activity had been stable for the last 30–40 years. For Prestrud, the uncertainty of climate research was not a challenge to the scientific merit of IPCC. Indeed the CEO used the fact that solar radiation research was uncertain to make the argument that climate change may become worse than what the Panel predicted if radiation increased again. He thus drew on the same uncertainty Brekke was accusing the IPCC of ignoring, to make an argument for the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change.

“Climategate” and the credibility of climate change research

In the wake of the hacking of CRU a brief debate developed between Prestrud and Per Jan Langerud, who later wrote a book arguing against global warming (Langerud 2012).

Towards the end of November 2009, Langerud stated in the online newspaper ABC Nyheter that the CRU hacking had revealed IPCC’s involvement in a “massive climate swindle” (Langerud 2009). A week later Prestrud had his own op-ed in the same place (Prestrud 2009d). He challenged Langerud’s arguments, his argumentative style and his use of sources. Referring to Langerud in third person, Prestrud did not go into dialogue, but used the title of his op-ed to state that Langerud was spreading “disinformation”.

Prestrud defended climate change research with a combination of two strategies. He minimized the importance of CRU for the IPCC and presented climate science as a large and solid international institution:

Climate research is wide in scope and takes place at most universities across the world. A handful of researchers who don’t follow the ethical rules of research aren’t close to topple the solid edifice today’s climate knowledge rests on (Prestrud 2009d (italics added)).

His metaphor of climate knowledge as held up by a “solid edifice” reminisced Popper’s analogy: “We are workers who are adding to the growth of objective knowledge as masons work on a cathedral” (Popper 1972, 121). In this way, Prestrud implicitly demarcated climate research as a credible and legitimate practice by specific standards of objective knowledge: Popper’s falsification, reproducibility and accumulation of research. He continued by pointing out that a “multitude” of published scientific studies showed that ice-melting across the globe was a fact that could not be disputed. Again he leaned heavily on scientific accumulation and consensus.

4.5 Comparative analysis of 2009

In this section I discuss trends in CICERO’s public communication in 2009. I focus on boundaries and connection points between the Center and climate change research, on the one hand, and the Center’s lay audience, civil society and politics, on the other.

4.5.1 Solid or permeable boundaries?

All the texts from CICERO that discussed COP 15 in 2009 and were analyzed in this chapter, demarcated between researchers as knowledge providers and politicians as decision-makers. Especially Skodvin (2009) and Tjernshaugen (2009) focused on the

75 role of researchers as knowledge-providers. This positioning does not come as a surprise and resembles what Peters describes as the “decisionist model” (Peters 2008, 133). CICERO delegated the tasks thus: while the research community presented options and consequences of a decision, state leaders had the privilege of decision- making regarding what to do about climate change. The Center justified their distance from political decision-making in their public commentary on the COP 15 proceedings accordingly. This gave them legitimacy and relevance, as providers of important knowledge on climate change and climate politics, as well as authority and credibility, as neutral communicators, in public and political discourse.

CICERO also signaled distance by taking the role of a seemingly detached reporter. This role-taking seems in part the product of the chaos and pessimism regarding the negotiations. The most polemic description of COP 15 by CICERO came from Kolset, as she predicted that it would be a “circus”. The term was used by others to describe the activists at COP 15 (see for instance van der Zee and Barkham (2009)), but CICERO made “the circus” the perfect metaphor for the negotiations: Some things were just for show and the actions of different nations merged to create a chaos beyond the audience’s control or understanding. Though CICERO had expected that COP 15 would not end with a strong agreement, the Center’s reporting from the conference and some of their more extended commentary, implied political machinations. CICERO’s webpage articles solidified the impression that something was going on that neither researchers nor civil society were involved in.

CICERO’s description of chaos at COP 15 seemed to reflect the reality of the situation (Meilstrup 2010, 113-114). Upon Barack Obama’s arrival at the negotiations Hillary Clinton allegedly stated: “Mr. President, this is the worst meeting I’ve been to since the eighth-grade student council” (Clinton in Landler and Cooper 2010), while the newspaper Bergens Tidende described the event as a “scandal” (Jansen 2009). There were large public protests in Copenhagen (Ytterstad 2010). CICERO, on the other hand, barely mentioned that they had a researcher on “the inside”, so to speak, as part of the Norwegian negotiation delegation. It would not have reflected beneficially on a research center such as CICERO to be too closely associated with such a disorganized institution. As a reporter they could make clear that they were a part of the audience and not a part of the “circus” in Copenhagen.

The dichotomy between CICERO, on the one hand, and the Climate Realists and other skeptics, on the other, was nevertheless set in much starker contrast than that between the Center and the negotiators of COP 15. Reporting on COP 15, the Center made it clear that politicians performed a different task than the one CICERO considered their domain. Conversely, the Center’s systematic refutations of claims against climate change and the confrontational attitude of CEO Prestrud made it seem as if the Climate Realists were trying to perform the Center's task, and that the Center though they were doing so poorly. Thus CICERO set up boundaries in an attempt to monopolize this kind of discourse and exclude what the Center deemed unreliable research and commentary (Gieryn 1983, 792). The Center presented themselves as a knowledge producer and communicator, while skeptics were merely disinformers.

Prestrud outright rejected statements from Climate Realists, but did not defended such arguments with a focus on his own position, as CEO of a climate research center. He referred to the wider research community. In this way he took the position of an expert in the field of climate research, more than a professional expert speaking from his own research platform (Nilsen 2001, 22-23). In some ways this role-taking resembled the role of former CICERO CEO Hanisch, who had taken on the role of a “knower of the field” of climate politics, when the Center was initially established (Nilsen 2001, 151). However, Prestrud was communicating this role publicly, while Hanisch had been working in the corridors of power and politics.

The fact that CICERO rejected those who argued against the premise of the Center’s research should come as a surprise to few. Prestrud’s discussions with the climate skeptics overshadowed the less hostile sides of CICERO’s approach to arguments from skeptics. However, Prestrud’s polemics may also have pushed away those of the Center’s readers who were less sure about where they stood, but who felt encompassed by the CEO’s derision. In addition he may have framed his arguments against the skeptics in a way did not appear to concern his lay audience. Though he never mentioned them, Popper (1972) and Merton (1973) seem to be the main providers of Prestrud’s “defense speeches”. These were a mix of appraisals for organized skepticism, disinterested peer review, and the universal and communal aspects of the IPCC as an international knowledge sharing system. The accumulated findings of climate change sprang out of this foundation, and being part of a bigger system of research was

Prestrud’s best line of defense. However, he took these practices for granted as “true” merits of science and never got into the details of how they formed the basis for good research. Had he taken a less partisan stance, his defense would have been of more interest to those already familiar with such discourse; it might even have been a public discussion with academics as the primary audience (Bucchi 2008, 63-64).

In principle, uncertainties are not a problem for research, as researchers can expect them to eventually be resolved. However, CICERO’s hesitancy in discussing such issues in public may be explained by a concern that uncertainty could be taken as a challenge to the current applicability of their research and expertise (Peters 2008, 133-134). As I will show in chapter 5, a way to circumvent such challenges is to use Imre Lakatos’ theory of the “research programmes”. Lakatos’ theory balances an acknowledgement of fallibility in a research program with an emphasis on the importance of an unrefuted theoretical core for said program to progress (Lakatos 1978, 110-112). The Center could have used this theory as a justification of the presence of uncertainty in science to subsequently discuss the social risks of climate change beyond what research predicts, without undermining the credibility of their research. Indeed, Prestrud used uncertainty to stress the risk of climate change and the importance of climate action, but only mentioned it in passing. In hindsight, he could have elaborated on this perspective to present climate research and CICERO as relevant for climate politics and society, in preparation for potential catastrophes.

4.5.2 Credibility where credibility is due?

As mentioned, CICERO communicated that the knowledge of the Center and the wider climate research community was relevant, but not prescriptive for climate politics. Decisions would still have to be made, in Copenhagen or after. The ideal of the decisionist model is that research presents alternatives so that a rational and informed decision can be made by political leaders (Peters 2008, 133). The articles I analyzed largely implied the responsibility of governments in mitigating climate change. Westskog and Kalvig (2009) pointed to government awareness programs, CEO Prestrud (2009b) and Bang (in CICERO 2009e) gave the United States Congress responsibility for the lack of a new agreement, while Kallbekken (in Gran 2009) discussed the GHG emission cuts offered by the UNFCCC parties.

However, CICERO’s commentary bespoke frustration at a disregard for the findings of research: Kallbekken (in Gran 2009) argued that the IPCC had shown what measures were necessary to meet the two degrees goal, and the politicians were not following suit. The Center may have supported Norwegian government policies with the content of their news briefs at COP 15 (Jakobsen 2009). But when the Center appeared as communicators to the Norwegian public at home, they took a stance in opposition to international political machinations. Indeed, CICERO seemed to be more exclude from political decision-making than what they would have liked. Gieryn points out that researchers need to be recognized as separate and relevant for political decision-making (Gieryn 1995, 434-439). Ryghaug et al. (2011) found that political decisions are an important sense-making device for public understanding of climate change. Therefore it seems likely that CICERO in part saw it necessary to underscore the veracity and importance of the information provided by the climate research community, as a response to the uncertainties of international climate politics. Especially Tjernshaugen (2009), Skodvin (2009) and Bang’s (CICERO 2009e) descriptions of the uncertainties and complexities of international political coordination, seemed to communicate this position. As it was contrasted with the orderly commentary of researchers and the important information they could provide, this was the closest the Center got to argue that the ultimate role of research was to advance particular programs to reform society (Jackson 2014, 274-275).

CICERO’s intent to appear as a credible source of information for climate politics, regardless of the decisions of said politics, may not have benefitted from their debates with climate skeptics. As discussed, Prestrud’s aggressive approach overshadowed the Center’s more tempered presentation of information on the reality of climate change. Later, in their annual report for 2010, CICERO came close to a call to arms for the defense of climate change research: “CICERO welcomes more climate researchers in the public debate. The voice of science must not be silent” (CICERO 2011, 3).

Paradoxically, this aggressiveness, combined with Prestrud’s focus on highly theoretical merits of science, made the skeptics appear like the only group in these debates, apart from the climate research community, whose views were of significance for CICERO. Though the Center took a dismissive position on arguments against climate change, when Prestrud and others at the Center debated the climate skeptics, their practice

79 belied their words. Through the debates, the Center communication strategies served to legitimize the position of climate skeptics, by presenting their arguments as worthy of a response. In addition, when arguing outside their own channels, such as in TU, CICERO appeared on equal footing with the skeptics. CICERO’s recognition of the climate skeptics arguments may have strengthened public views that anthropogenic climate change was still a scientific controversy (Ryghaug et al. 2011).

4.5.3 CICERO’s ambivalence towards their readers

Through Prestrud’s aggressive debates with the skeptics, CICERO may have polarized views and entrenched opinions among their readers, something that was later the view at the Center.42 However, while Prestrud’s polemics accentuated difference, discussion can present opportunities for a dialogue on climate change, in some ways exactly because of the apparent equality of the participants (Fairclough 2003, 41-42). CICERO’s willingness to respond on the webpage and enter into discussion on other platforms created arenas where questions could be asked and addressed for the general public to read. Though the debates were aggressive, seeing the arguments for and against CICERO could perhaps answer readers’ uncertainties, and through evaluation relate more to the information provided by the Center. Shaw and Robinson argue that regulated dialogue between researchers and other groups over the understanding, presentation and contextualization of information may increase the relevance of that information for those who are not researchers themselves (2004, 90). Wilson and Herndl (2007) also show that discussing different ways of interpreting findings may increase understanding among all parties, if conditions are regulated and conversation mediated by certain boundary negotiating practices.

However, with the exception of a confrontation with climate skeptics, CICERO did not enter into public discussion. For most of their communication regarding COP 15 and the reality of climate change in this period, they took on the role of public expert commentator. As Peters points out, this is an ambiguous role, as commentary on current events connects rather easily to what other actors in society consider relevant, while it also “…means crossing the boundary of science, entering society as an actor, and exposing oneself to internal and external criticism” (Peters 2008, 143). Such

42 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 80 uncertainties about positions in relation to the readers and others in the debate could be alleviated by formalizing communication, “…structuring and controlling the procedures adopted in this domain of practice by means of standards, guidelines and protocols” (Sundqvist et al. 2015, 418). CICERO’s response to claims against climate change on their webpage was certainly formalistic. With the exception of communication director Kolset’s editorial and CEO Prestrud’s commentary in Klima 6-09, it seems the involvement of the Center’s communication department on the webpage and in Klima worked as a deterrent to a more personal touch. In the newspapers, CICERO landed on both sides of the formal versus personal spectrum. Skodvin (2009) kept a neutral position in discussing the historic context of COP 15, while senior researcher Westskog and Kalvig (2009) were more personally involved. For Sundqvist et al. (2015), formalization is not the same as separation. However, when looking at CICERO’s public communication, the closest they came to their lay audience was by being personal, presenting themselves as people with uncertainties and opinions, instead of an extension of the research community via formalized discourse.

As CICERO presented questions as sub-headings in their commentary on the proceedings, they almost assumed a dialogical stance vis-à-vis their readers. When they answered the questions in the sub-headings, they made it appear as if they answered questions the readers had, not questions from the Center. Thus they mimicked quoting the reader in the text (see p. 27) (Fairclough 1992, 117). However, as the questions were neither given a reference nor quotation marks, they were not presented as actual questions from the Center’s lay audience, but only as a pretense at such dialogue. Consequently, the questions created ambivalence between the Center and their readers as it was uncertain to what extent they represented the readers perspectives (Fairclough 1992, 119). Therefore, the CICERO’s lay audience may have wondered if the Center only saw relevance in their own questions, or if others also could ask and be answered by the Center.

4.5.4 Civil society got a mixed message

The Norwegian civil society may have made up a sizable bulk of CICERO’s readership (see p. 21). However, if the Center appeared selective and at best ambivalent towards

81 their lay readers’ contribution to a conversation on climate change and climate politics, they gave an even more ambivalent message in their representation of civil society.

As discussed, CICERO drew a line between the Center and the politics of COP 15, underscored by what seemed like frustration that the latter did not listen to empirical truth and implement effective climate policies. In addition, and especially in Klima, the pronoun “we” often spoke for the readers as well as the Center. In this way representing companionship, they connected with other groups that were not at the negotiation table. With the help of the Norwegian Board of Technology, the Center also represented what seemed the unequivocal voice of “the people” in the Klima article on the people’s climate panel. Furthermore, Kongelig polartokt presented the Scandinavian people, represented by the royal heirs, and climate researchers as united by a concern for the North Pole, in the fight against climate change. As Prestrud wrote in the book: “We can take measures [against climate change]” (Frederik et al. 2009, 99(italics added)).

All the while, and somewhat paradoxically in light of CICERO’s description of COP 15 as “circus”, the Center built up under established power structures. For one thing, they appeared to give a tacit accent to monarchy by contributing to Kongelig polartokt. Furthermore, their commentary on the negotiations made nations, even the EU, appear as homogeneous units. Such a discussion of international climate politics left out civil society by disregarding non-state international collaboration, NGOs, groups and networks, and relationships between citizens and government within nations.

When the Center represented civil society they had a strong consensus orientation and mediated voices and perspectives via the royal families and the Norwegian Board of Technology. CICERO quoted mainly politicians, and – with the exception of the article by The Norwegian Board of Technology – they did not directly represent statements or actions of NGOs or other actors in civil society. Neither did they comment on their webpage or in later issues of Klima on the Climate Justice March in Copenhagen on December 12, 2009, which mustered between 60,000 and 100,000 participants (Fisher 2010, 14). In some cases, they partially blamed NGOs and activists for the COP 15 hype (Kolset 2009; Ursin and Aursland 2009). State leaders and appointed negotiators may have been at the center of attention at COP 15, but they were not the only ones present in Copenhagen. Those from CICERO present in the capital shared the event with many Norwegian NGOs. During the conference, civil society were largely 82

excluded from the venue, in part due to poor organization of the Danish hosts (Fisher 2010), which literally left civil society out in the cold. Even so, CICERO did not discuss why these organizations were present at the negotiations or what influence they might have had. In the end, CICERO presented state leaders as those with the power to decide, behind closed doors, whether climate change would or would not happen. Other actors did not seem to matter in the big picture.

4.6 Summing up the chapter

This chapter sought to answer how CICERO contributed to public discourse in November and December 2009 and positioned themselves in relation to other groups in the climate change discourse. The Center legitimized their research by presenting it as relevant for political decision-making, but underscored the difference between this knowledge production and the decisions made. This practice seemed in part to enhance credibility of climate research in the face of political decisions that did not reflect the urgency communicated by the Center. At the same time, they aggressively demarcated the difference between their knowledge and what climate skeptics argued. However, this confrontational attitude may have legitimized the arguments of skeptics by elevating them to the same position as researchers. As a result, they may have strengthened opinions that climate change was controversial. However, their willingness to answer questions, or at least refute claims, presented a platform for public dialogue on climate change and its implications that was not exploited. For this reason, their position towards their readers seemed somewhat ambivalent. They also spoke with an inclusive “we” and addressed questions on COP 15. Nevertheless, these were questions posed by CICERO, not their readers. In addition, the Center mediated views of civil society through other actors and focused on the overall consensus. Though the views and positons of political actors at the negotiating table were thoroughly discussed, the Center did not discuss the views, actions or activism of civil society. All the same, it seemed the Center aimed to connect with their lay audience through values and cultural perspectives. I have not discussed CICERO’s commentary on Norwegian politics in this chapter. That is in part because they did not extensively discuss such politics in this period. However, this is part of the discussion in the next chapter where I look at the Center’s public communication in the period around COP 21 in 2015.

5 In 2015: An Agreement is Reached While CICERO Shuts the Gate on Climate Debate

5.1 Overview

In this chapter I continue my analysis of CICERO’s communication practices. First I provide an overview of the Center’s communication practices during November and December 2015, after which follows a textual analysis of the boundary work and connective effort in their public communication practices. This analysis is divided into two themes: COP 21 in 2015 and discussions of the reality of anthropogenic climate change. Within these themes I present the texts chronologically. The chapter ends with a comparative analysis of CICERO’s discourse on the two themes and a discussion of the implications for the Center’s readers, civil society and political decision-makers.

5.2 The presence, platforms and public expertise of CICERO in November and December 2015

CICERO’s media presence peaked in November and December of 2015, in correlation with COP 21, as it had done with COP 15 in 2009 (see figures 2 and 3). However, the Center was referenced around half as many times in Norwegian media in these months in 2015 as they were in 2009, and around one third less in than in 2009 for 2015 as a whole.43 People from the Center were quoted in around 260 media articles in November and December 2015, though many of these quotes were in newspapers re-reporting news from NTB. So even though the number of references to CICERO had reduced in these months, the number of articles they were quoted in had increased with at least 69 in comparison with in the same months in 2009.

Not only had the numbers changed, the Center had changed some of their communication practices. CICERO’s webpage was thoroughly redesigned in the spring of 2015. Texts were bolder and bigger and they used more and larger images. They put

43 2109 references to “CICERO” in 2009, and 987 references during Nov. and Dec. 2009, versus 1333 references to “CICERO” in 2015 and 480 in Nov. and Dec. 2015. Source: Retriever archive, 01.11.2017. 84 news articles and links to information sites on the Center’s main projects up front, while they removed the informative snippets of the Klima ABC. They published long articles in Klima on COP 21, but did not discuss arguments against anthropogenic climate change on any of their own platforms. Some CICERO researchers argued for the reality of anthropogenic climate change when interviewed on other media platforms, but the Center no longer systematically refuted claims from climate skeptics, as they had done in 2009. The Center’s researchers and people in the communication department wrote most Klima articles, while the communication department wrote all of the news articles. CICERO also labelled each article and news message with the names and titles of those from the Center who had contributed to a specific piece. Most Klima articles therefore had a researcher’s name attached, even if the article was authored by someone in the communications department. This heightened the impression that the Center’s public communication had a basis in research.

Frequency of references during June 2015-May 2016 600 CICERO* 500 COP21 400

300 CICERO AND Paris

200 Klimatoppmøte (Climate top meeting) 100

Source: Word search in Retriever Norway AS media archive. Date of search: 23.10.2017. http://web.retriever-info.com** *Fewer than 10 references to the philosopher Cicero. ** Klima is not a part of Retriever's archive.

Figure 3: Frequency of references to keywords related to CICERO and COP 21 in Norwegian media during September 2015 to April 2016. Klima’s transition from a paper and online publication to an online-only magazine in 2014 meant CICERO could publish longer articles without waiting for the paper publication.44 Thus the Center could comment on issues as they unfolded, which gave

44 I refer only to Klima for publications after spring 2014, as there are no issue numbers after this. 85

their articles more immediate relevance. The Center shared such articles through social media, a practice they used extensively during COP 21.45 CICERO presented only five “news” articles on their webpage in November and December 2015, four of which were published during the negotiations. The Center published 15 articles in Klima during these months. The total word count for these articles came to a few hundred words less than for issue 6-09 of Klima in 2009.46 Their main public communication topic in November and December 2015 was the climate negotiations as twelve of the Klima articles discussed COP 21. In other words, they reduced the “news” activity, while communication through Klima was kept at approximately the same level as in 2009 when issues were published every two months. However, given this overall reduction, they had relative increase in focus on the annual climate conference.

Outside of their own communication channels, CICERO staff wrote four op-eds, less than half of what they produced in the same period in 2009. Of these only one was published in a printed paper, the national newspaper Dagsavisen, which had its main office in Oslo. Steffen Kallbekken and others at the Center contributed with extensive material to longer articles on other platforms, including national new sites and online magazines. As in 2009, Kallbekken was the most quoted of the CICERO staff and was the Center’s top commentator on climate negotiations. Physicist Bjørn Samset appeared as the Center’s spokesperson regarding arguments against climate change.

5.3 An alliance of state leaders and researchers? CICERO’s commentary on COP 21

5.3.1 From Copenhagen to Paris: CICERO and COP 21

In preparation for COP 21 in Paris in 2015, CICERO presented an overview of their own planned presence at the conference, a witty article with definitions of various COP terms, and a longer article in Klima on the history of the new, more “comprehensive” agreement. All in all they seemed to take the future agreement as a given.

45 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 46 Approximately 16.940 in Klima 6-09 and 13.650 for Klima articles from Nov. and Dec. 2015. 86

Preparations for COP 15 in 2009 were split into two processes, one towards the continuation of the Kyoto protocol and one for an agreement for all parties of the UNFCCC. In contrast, preparations for COP 21 in 2015 focused on the development of one agreement for all members of the Climate Convention. The UNFCCC structured the Kyoto agreement and the previously hoped for Copenhagen agreement in a top-down format where emission reduction goals were agreed upon at international meetings and nations had to follow up. The plans for the Paris Agreement took a different form, described as bottom-up. The last minute Copenhagen Accord in 2009 opened up for a bottom-up approach, as it emphasized submission of reports on mitigation actions from the nations (UNFCCC 2010, 6). CICERO senior researcher Guri Bang argued in a research article that the result of the COP 15 proceedings was an important step towards the bottom-up structure of the Paris Agreement (Bang 2015a, 520). As mentioned in the previous chapter, during COP 15 there was opposition to the top-down approach, due in part to a conflict between Global North countries who wanted the Global South to be required to cut emissions, and Global South countries who did not want to cut emissions at the risk of reduced development. A bottom-up approach seemed to balance these different interests as everyone would have obligations, but these would be differentiated by capacity and national decisions (Bang 2015a, 520).

Running up to COP 21, the countries of the UNFCCC submitted their goals for national emission cuts, called the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), which may have contributed to the general atmosphere of expectant optimism. CICERO’s optimism can be traced back at least to Bjørnæs statement in Klima in December 2014 that COP 20 was an important step towards a global agreement in Paris (Bjørnæs 2014). By summer 2015, the Norwegian Minister of Climate and Environment, Tine Sundtoft, described herself as “more optimistic” in an op-ed published in the newspaper Dagbladet and on the Ministry’s own webpage (Sundtoft 2015a, b).

Media scholar Kathrine Duarte found a shift in Norwegian media focus towards solutions to climate change between 2009 and 2015 (Duarte 2016).47 Another media scholar, Dag Elgesem, found increased discussions of climate politics, energy policy and technology development on Norwegian climate blogs after 2010, at the same time as the climate skeptic blogs were decreasing (Elgesem 2014). A change in perspective

47 Email correspondence with Kathrine Duarte regarding her PhD in progress 09.10.2017-12.10.2017. 87 was reflected at the COPs as focus shifted slightly away from the negotiations. According to Bjørnæs, moving nearer the focus of events were “…the big pavilions where mainly countries presented their solutions, had seminars, and invited to dialogue and discussion”. This meant that “solutions to climate problems [had] become its own industry … consisting of researchers, NGOs, authorities and private actors, who meet at the climate negotiations.”48 From this perspective, COP was changing to a space where different parties met to discuss climate change outside the negotiation rooms as well as in them.

CICERO hosted a pavilion called “The Connection Point” together with the NGO Bellona Foundation at the venue for the negotiations in Paris. The initiative was funded by the Norwegian fertilization and chemistry company Yara International ASA and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Much of the Center’s public communication efforts in this period went into the work with the pavilion.49 In conjunction with the shift in focus towards solutions, the Center wanted to use the pavilion to focus on solutions in collaboration with other Norwegian actors.50

Economist Steffen Kallbekken was CICERO’s public expert on COP 21. He did not research climate negotiations, but had a broader kind of expertise and particular kind of authority as director of CICEP, a collaborative research center for international climate and energy project, established in 2011 and hosted by CICERO. Kallbekken’s work as news briefer may partially explain why he was quoted in 132 articles in November and December 2015, of which 104 were published during the negotiations.51 CICERO’s YouTube account featured his daily video blog and video recordings of his news briefs to journalists in Paris during the negotiations. The Center hosted news briefs during COP 15 in 2009 as well, but they did not make these accessible to a general audience. However, CICERO’s streaming of the briefs in 2015 had a small audience in part due to poor sound quality.52 Therefore, the increased accessibility of these briefs probably made impact on public discourse at the time.

48 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo 49 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 50 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo 51 Kallbekken was quoted 39 times in November and December 2009. 52 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. According to YouTube’s view count the videos were only watched 15 to 60 times each as of 30.09.2017. 88

According to Bjørnæs, in comparison with the negotiations in Copenhagen, the French hosted a more structured and well-organized event.53 Though the negotiations at COP 21 went to overtime, the conference concluded with a global agreement on climate change. It entered into force on November 4, 2016. The submitted INDCs in 2015 were not enough to limit warming to 2 degrees Celsius, but the agreement required all countries to increase their ambitions every fifth year. An expert committee would control whether the prospective contributions of the different nations were followed up with action. This gave some parties the hope that we could even achieve the Paris Agreement’s surprising ambition to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees.

5.3.2 Analysis of CICERO’s take on COP 21 in 2015

In this section I present a textual analysis of CICERO’s public expert commentary on COP 21, with a focus on texts that highlight how CICERO self-identified and related to other actors in public climate change discourse in November and December 2015.

In anticipation of an agreement

In mid-November 2015 CICERO gave an overview of the Center’s presence at COP 21 in the news section on their webpage. The Center’s editorial board, given as authors, emphasized the collaboration at the pavilion the Connection Point. Here they would aid action and share climate change knowledge. The banner “Connection point” was at the top of the news brief, with the logos of Bellona, CICERO, Yara and the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs beneath. According to the editorial board, as the pavilion boasted an NGO, a research center, a corporation and a government body, it was a groundbreaking collaboration in Norway and internationally, in the context of climate change. The pavilion was presented as “….a meeting place for research, civil society, business and national governments…” where they would “…bring together decision makers and civil society” (CICERO 2015a).

This collaboration bore some resemblance to the cruise ship on which accommodated most of the Norwegian NGOs attending COP 15 in 2009 (see p. 58). CICERO’s news briefs from the negotiations in 2015 were hosted at the pavilion, and much of their news

53 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. According to YouTube’s view count the videos were only watched 15 to 60 times each as of 30.09.2017. 89 briefs in 2009 were hosted on the cruise ship. However, there was an important distinction. According to CICERO communication director Bjørnæs, at COP 21 they wanted to move focus away from problems and on to solutions to climate change. That was why they created “a platform where all Norwegian actors could participate”.54

Collaboration on solutions was the keyword, not only for CICERO’s presence at COP 21, but for how they presented the negotiations, the agreement and climate change in general. For the Center, their own importance in this work seemed hard to understate: “Now more than ever, [the climate challenge] requires closer collaboration, increased emphasis on knowledge sharing and quicker industrialization of innovative solutions” (CICERO 2015a (italics added)). In contrast with when CICERO expected a confused circus at COP 15 in 2009, COP 21 seemed like something CICERO wanted to be a part of. They may have contributed to the impression that “Norwegians, state, NGOs, journalists and researchers, [were] all in the same boat” in 2009 (Ytterstad 2012, 22), but in 2015 the Center directly celebrated collaboration with state, private sector and NGO. Their use of the phrase “climate challenge”, in comparison with the more negatively charged “problem” or “crisis”, also invoked a call for action and solutions.

At the same time they kept apart from civil society, government and the private sector alike in presenting themselves as knowledge providers set apart from other actors at the negotiations. The explicit focus on knowledge sharing positioned CICERO as a public expert commentator at the focal point of the collaboration. It also served to highlight the Center’s role as a provider of policy relevant research. Who else would they refer to when they emphasized knowledge sharing in handling climate change? Others might have insights to bring to the table, but the Center focused on their own position in this collaboration. With the new collaboration they communicated the same division of responsibility as in the decisionist model (Peters 2008, 133) they used to establish boundaries in 2009, but now collaboration seemed even closer.

A few days before the COP 21 negotiations started Guri Bang summarized the history and expectations of the climate negotiations in an article in Klima. The article continued CICERO’s tradition of longer overview articles in preparation for the COPs. However, it was based on a research article by Bang published in the peer reviewed journal

54 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 90

Internasjonal politikk (Bang 2015a). Thus she gained extra authority as she combined general expert commentary with her own research.

Suggesting a dialogical attitude towards the readers, Bang asked the question “what are the powerful countries doing?” (Bang 2015b). She answered her own question with an overview of national politics in relation to the new global climate agreement. This focus matched the structure of the new agreement, which would be built from the bottom, by which is meant from nationally determined contributions, and up. According to Bang, the three main influential actors in forming national climate politics within nations were national energy resources, national institutional factors, and the interplay between supply and demand for political change within a nation. A highlighted quote in the article stated: “The people have power: Demand for political change influences how ambitious climate politicians are” (Bang 2015b). However, she followed up this phrase with a reference to surveys that showed that “most people [folk flest]” thought financial security, job security and welfare were more important than changes in climate politics. Bang’s phrase “most people” was generic and unspecified in its classification, which meant it did not need to be understood as a reference to the readers. Still, Klima’s focus group was those of the “general population” interested in the topic. If the readers of Klima did not see themselves in Bang’s phrase, it communicated an image of an indecisive populace. In addition, no connection was drawn between the three priorities of “most people” and climate politics. In this way, it appeared unlikely that citizens would make an effective contribution towards changed climate politics, on the national or international level.

On November 29, 2015, the day before the negotiations started, Steffen Kallbekken declared himself a “careful optimist” concerning an agreement in Paris in an op-ed on NRK’s news site (Kallbekken 2015). Invoking an alleged Einstein quote, Kallbekken argued that the COPs were not simply the repetitiveness of a mad world community. Each COP added to a slow accumulation of change and COP 21 represented something new and important. For Kallbekken, the most important difference with COP 21 was the new bottom-up strategy where voluntary national contributions laid the foundation for the agreement. His enthusiasm was not unguarded, as the INDCs submitted by the end of November were not enough to limit global warming to two degrees Celsius. As in the CICERO interview before COP 15 (see p. 59-66), his criticism pointed to the difference

91 between the information provided by the climate researchers and current results of politics. The research community still needed to talk about the two degrees goal.

In conclusion Kallbekken told his readers to “pay attention” during the next two weeks as the nations of the world would try to come to an agreement on questions they had argued over for two decades. He made the nations the focal point as he wrote:

Will growing economies like China, Brazil and South Africa have to take a bigger part of the responsibility for financing climate measures? Will the USA have to accept giving support to countries hit by climate change? Will China have to accept that others see all the cards in their hand…? (Kallbekken 2015 (italics added)).

By following the structure of the negotiations and the bottom-up agreement, Kallbekken presented an image defined by relations between nations. By speaking of them as actors he presented these countries as homogeneous units. Kallbekken speckled his address to the general population of Norway with leading questions and inviting “we” pronouns. Nevertheless, he did not include the diversity of civil society or the ways citizens and governments relate to each other in his discussion of international climate politics.

During the negotiations

On the fourth day of COP 21, CICERO CEO Kristin Halvorsen headlined an op-ed in the print edition of the national newspaper Dagsavisen with the announcement “The planet shall be saved” (Halvorsen 2015, 6 (italics added)). The modal verb “shall” indicated a capacity and will to act, but the passive wording did not say who would save the planet. According to Halvorsen “we” all agreed on the normative view that “something has to be done [about climate change]”, though “we” did not agree on exactly what or how much. Though she did not state who her “we” encompassed, she certainly included the Center.

Halvorsen justified CICERO’s presence at the negotiations as she asked why “we” could not stay home and hope the politicians would settle on an agreement. She made it clear in her immediate answer to this question that “we” referred to CICERO: “We work on climate research and present analysis and updates that will ensure that the knowledge that lays the foundation for the decisions that will be made is as clear and coherent as altogether possible” (Halvorsen 2015, 6). For Halvorsen, CICERO’s role

92 was to present policy relevant research and knowledge, to be an institution that spoke the empirical truth important decisions were based on. As in the overview of CICERO’s presence at COP 21, the CEO set the role-delegation of the decisionist model as a boundary and point of contact in the relationship between research and political decision-making. Their knowledge was indispensable for informed climate governance and in this way they could contribute to the saving of the planet.

Halvorsen stated that two degrees Celsius global warming was what researchers “…believed to be manageable climate change” (2015, 6). She then argued for an increase in the ambitions of the various nations. But what happened at the negotiation tables was part of a greater movement. She wrote that CICERO, along with NGOs, think tanks and representatives from the business sector “filled” the space around the negotiation rooms. Even though they did not make decisions at the negotiation table, they were all still part of a particular kind of collaborative project. According to Halvorsen, the meetings organized by CICERO and others at the negotiation site were far more action oriented than at any previous COP. She testified to the importance of collaboration:

We have to find new, green solutions together…Politicians cannot do this alone. This is about me and you, about development of technology in the business sector, about pressure from organizations and framework conditions from politicians (2015, 6)

Halvorsen’s solution was to make the negotiations and the work after into a “climate dugnad” (Halvorsen 2015, 6).

The Norwegian word dugnad describes a voluntary group activity with specific social and cultural connotations. The encyclopedia Store Norske Leksikon defines dugnad as a “…voluntary effort, without payment, to help a neighbor or other with work that is hard to achieve by oneself. Participants are often served food and drinks” (Store Norske Leksikon 2016, my translation). Dugnad thus connotes a work effort the participants might enjoy and where they achieve something beneficially to them as a group. The voluntary aspect of the effort also indicates equality between the participants without a strict structural or hierarchical organization (Aarsæther 2012, 99).

With Halvorsen’s emphasis on collaboration and the assumed bottom-up approach of the agreement, dugnad was a fitting metaphor that conveyed optimism and potential. It was also a terminology she had used before, to describe climate politics in preparation for COP 21 (Halvorsen 2014). Moreover, dugnad was a metaphor that urged social action. It can be interpreted as a political word, bringing with it an echo of Halvorsen’s background in the Socialist Left Party (SV). In 2006, the Norwegian Ministry of Environment, with an SV politician as Minister, used the term to describe an action plan to identify and cut GHG emissions across government sectors (Miljøverndepartementet 2006). SV also used the term to describe climate politics in their 2013-2017 election program (SV 2013, 7), written while Halvorsen was still Minister of Education. In addition, though voluntary group activities are a part of various cultures, many Norwegians closely associate the term dugnad with Norway’s national identity.55 Therefore, climate dugnad resonated with specific Norwegian values. The Paris Agreement would require voluntary contributions from Norway. Halvorsen did not mention the contributions of the Norwegian government, but stated that “we” would have to invent effective CCS or “we” had ten years to stop our oil and gas industry. Either way, as a knowledge provider, CICERO would have an important part to play in this dugnad.

Slowly the Paris Agreement was pieced together. In a Klima article on December 4, 2015, Bjørnæs posed the question: “What in the world are they doing in Paris?” (2015a). This question was not an expression of his uncertainty, but was a way to represent the readers’ confusion at convoluted negotiations. In the first week of COP 21 professional negotiators had various parallel meetings where they discussed issues to be included in the agreement. CICERO did not have access to the negotiation rooms during COP 21, but on December 3, 2015, the different groups of negotiations started to report their progress in “report meetings” the Center had access to (CICERO 2015b).

Some public commentators persisted in their opinion that COP 21 was also a “circus” (e.g. Goldenberg 2015; Scruggs 2015). Bjørnæs, however, did not present it as such, in contrast with the description of COP 15 by former communication director Kolset in 2009. With a tone of understanding for coordinators and negotiators alike, Bjørnæs

55 The word was voted the “national word” of Norway in an NRK viewer vote by the program “Typisk Norsk” in 2004. 94 explained that COP 21 was an “extremely complex” coordination activity: In order to understand the whole and why it went so slow, the readers needed to understand the different parts and how they were organized. The main reason it went slow was that the negotiators had to shorten the agreement and every phrase was under scrutiny.

Still, Bjørnæs was not sure that the agreement, in addition to the INDCs, would be produced by a bottom-up approach. Why then was everyone at CICERO up to this point celebrating collaboration? Bjørnæs wrote: “it is important to remember that for the first time there is political will and room for action in almost all countries to reduce climate gas emissions. A week of bickering and delaying tactics does not change that” (Bjørnæs 2015a (italics added)). Bjørnæs expressed certainty on the general will of the parties at COP 21, as well as the room they created for action. The implication was that even if they did not all agree on one document, their efforts would aggregate into collaboration. Thus, Bjørnæs communicated two things with the article: He argued that though negotiations were complex, they were the beginning of important collaborative efforts; at the same time he presented the readers as confused and remaining outside political action.

Then the big announcement came: “Global climate agreement passed in Paris” on December 12, 2015. Bjørnæs announced it in the title of a Klima article (Bjørnæs 2015b) that included insights from Kallbekken and Halvorsen. Hence, the Center’s two most important directors, of CICERO and CICEP, were represented, which signaled that climate negotiations and agreements were the Center’s field of expertise. According to Halvorsen the decision at COP 21 would reverberate out to the different actors that had not been a part of the decision-making, but would share the responsibility of cutting emissions.

For the first time in history we have been given a global agreement where all nations have to set climate goals. This gives a clear signal to politicians, business sector and investors that restructuring for a low emission society starts now (Halvorsen in Bjørnæs 2015b)

For Kallbekken the agreement was also an “…important signal to all who will make decisions going forward” (Kallbekken in Bjørnæs 2015b). He referred to national and local authorities, the business sector and investors. Celebrating the various nations’ emphasis on solutions at COP 21, Halvorsen further rejoiced by stating that “it has

95 never been higher representation from the business sector, cities and civil society” (Halvorsen in Bjørnæs 2015b). Though Halvorsen listed all these stakeholders, both she and Kallbekken focused on the movers of capital who would pick up the signal world leaders had sent from COP 21.

The way these two CICERO leaders described the agreement as a unidirectional signal, echoed the structure of the agreement. The agreement was described as bottom-up, but was structured around contributions determined by national leaders with help from their designated negotiators. In this hierarchy the nations were at the bottom and representation of other actors depended on the inclusiveness of the national leaders. In this way, when Halvorsen represented the Paris Agreement as a signal sent by nations at COP 21 to other actors, she described a particular kind of power dynamic that was not necessarily in accord with a non-hierarchical understanding of dugnad. Though many would contribute after the agreement was ratified, it seemed the national leaders would be the ones deciding where to go, what to do, and, most importantly, how much to do.

The afterparty

CICERO presented six articles on the implications of the Paris Agreement within a week after the negotiations concluded. Bjørnæs said that it was “…more important to explain Paris than to explain Copenhagen”.56 Reading these articles, it seems this was the Center’s chance to show how essential their research was for international and Norwegian climate politics. Now that they knew what to aim for, work with solutions could start.

On December 16, 2015, Klima presented a “translated and simplified” overview of some of the main clauses in the agreement with commentary on what was “really” decided (Arnslett 2015).57 They did not imply a political smokescreen with use of the term “really”, the term pointed to the complexity of the language and structure of the agreement. Admitting simplification, Arnslett and Kallbekken sorted the overview into seven leading questions. Of the seven questions three used the noun “we”. The answers to questions 2: “What do we have to do to reach this [goal of limited global warming]?”

56 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 57 This was largely a republication of an overview Kallbekken presented in VG four days before, with some additional phrases from the Klima article that announced the agreement on December 12, 2015.

96 and 5: “How shall we pay for this?” (Arnslett 2015 (italics added)) referred to the parties of the agreement, the nations, as the main actors. The answer to question 3: “How do we handle the consequences of climate change?” was less specific. Here Kallbekken commented: “[O]ne will take these thoughts [on sustainable development and safe adaptation] home and attempt to make lasting changes that make us better prepared for the changes to come” (in Arnslett 2015 (italics added)). Given his emphasis on nations in the other questions and since national leaders had founded the Paris Agreement, it seemed national governments would also lead the handling of consequences of climate change. In combination with the simplistic structure of the overview, CICERO’s readers were thus addressed as if they were ignorant of international politics: They needed answers from the Center and to be guided by the national leaders in climate change mitigation and adaptation.

The last question of the overview addressed the maintenance of the goals and the increase in ambition: “Who will make sure that [the countries] do what they say?” The parties of the agreement had decided that an “expert committee” would track and evaluate the upkeep of INDCs. The committee could not sanction, they could only name and thereby shame, those who did not keep to their intended goals. With a twist of irony Kallbekken described the expert committee mechanism: “It is interesting with a sanctioning mechanism that excludes the option of punishing countries that do not fulfil the agreement” (Kallbekken in Arnslett 2015 (italics added)). It seemed Kallbekken did not have much faith in such a mechanism, but he did not clarify what sanctioning mechanism could have been possible. Perhaps he was more frustrated at the use of expertise in this context. CICERO did not say what role these experts would have in climate politics, nor what kind of experts were meant.58 Nevertheless, for them, the committee may have reflected frustration over the role of researchers as experts: They could speak of research but not make political decision-makers listen, while the latter could draw on the credibility of experts without following up on the information they provided. Where was the balance between research and politics if politics could parade the credibility of experts without backing it up with action?

58 One might expect the IPCC to contribute to this committee as they already deliver information to the UNFCCC. In a Q&A with head chair of the IPCC at the Nobel Peace Center, October 17, 2017, I was told in explicit terms that the IPCC would have nothing to do with this committee. 97

A non-CICERO researcher also contributed to Klima’s review of the implications of the Paris Agreement;59 Piers Forster, Professor of physical climate change wrote in English about the Paris Agreement as providing a new potential for collaboration. A low-carbon transition would require a major and comprehensive effort:

This is where the fun begins, because 1.5C means we will require everything in our arsenal: renewable energy, nuclear power, a dash from coal to gas, zero-carbon transport, energy efficiency, housing changes, low-carbon thermal heating and cooling systems. (Forster 2015 (italics added)).

Forster’s statement showed that CICERO was not alone in their group effort mantra. On top of that he emphasized the importance of policy relevant research, tacitly including that provided by the Center: “[W]e will need to work hard to help policy makers choose effective transition paths and better determine the impact of unavoidable further global warming” (Forster 2015 (italics added)). His conclusion was reminiscent of Halvorsen’s “climate dugnad”: “I for one can’t wait to roll up my sleeves and get started on researching and planning for this brave new world” (Forster 2015 (italics added)).60 Through nouns, metaphors and role delegation he reaffirmed boundaries and points of connection between politics and research: Politicians would make decisions and set goals based on information produced and provided by researchers.

On the whole, articles published by CICERO in connection with COP 21 had an air of optimism, even if they included criticism. Only one of the Center’s researchers was strongly critical. Senior researcher Hans Asbjørn Aaheim, who joined CICERO in 1993, did not believe the Paris Agreement signaled change (Aaheim 2015). To him the new agreement was just more of the same: symbolic politics. In Aaheim’s writing COP 21 seemed a blind and fragmented group that sent signals without following them up. He was “pessimistic” because, as he saw it, the agreement was made by political decision- makers who did not address the questions provided by economics in their planning. They did not maintain the mutual relationship of knowledge provider and decision- maker that Forster celebrated.

59 This op-ed was originally published on the climate science and policy news site “Carbon Brief”. 60 Forster also used “Brave new world” in the title of the op-ed referring to the 1.5 degree goal. Given the context the phrase seemed optimistic, but it is hard to forget Aldus Huxley’s Brave New World (1932). 98

5.4 CICERO Shuts the Gate on Climate Debate

A dugnad is all good and fine, but it is not likely to happen if the workforce does not believe that the effort is necessary or that it will achieve their goal. Consequently it is important to understand how CICERO publicly discussed the reality and science of anthropogenic climate change after 2009. Here I focus on how they gave credibility to the reality of anthropogenic climate change and made it relevant for their audience, with a specific focus on texts from November and December 2015. But let us first take a step back in time.

5.4.1 After “Climategate” and Onwards

The reverberations of “Climategate” continued through 2010. Several independent committees assessed the IPCC and their latest report. The Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency for the Dutch Minister of Environment and the InterAcademy Council, an international consortium of national academies of science, made important reviews in 2010. They found that the arguments against the Panel after the CRU hacking and the mistakes in AR4 were unimportant for the overall scientific credibility and work of the Panel. Their recommendations led to further elaboration of IPCC’s rules of procedure (Berkhout 2010, 566) (Sundqvist et al. 2015, 432). After COP 17 in Durban in 2011, there was little talk of Climategate in Norwegian media.61

In the years between 2009 and 2015 the Norwegian media generally avoided public discussion of the reality of anthropogenic climate change.62 This was in part a result of reduced coverage of climate change as controversy over the science was downplayed, making it less “newsworthy” (Ryghaug and Skjølsvold 2016). Moreover, there was little focus on climate politics in the Norwegian government election of 2013 (Høiby and Ytterstad 2014). While climate change ranked fourth in importance as a political issue among the Norwegian population in 2008, it went down to sixth place by 2010. There it remained until 2015, when it suddenly ranked second. By 2016 it was down to fourth again (Livgard 2016).

61 Email correspondence with Kathrine Duarte regarding her PhD in progress 09.10.2017-12.10.2017. 62 Email correspondence with Kathrine Duarte regarding her PhD in progress 09.10.2017-12.10.2017. 99

After the Norwegian government election of 2013, The Progress Party (FrP) became co- ruling party in government. FrP, a party that has been characterized as neoliberal populist (Widfeldt 2015, 83), were vague regarding the reality of climate change. Before the 2013 election they changed their election program from “it is too early to conclude on the causes of climate change” (FrP 2009, 23), to “FrP aligns themselves with that research shows that human activity affects the climate” (FrP 2013, 26). However, they continued to argue that great uncertainty remained regarding the importance of this effect. FrP’s leader, Siv Jensen, Minister of Finance from 2013-2017, sustained this view in later interviews (Ertzaas 2015; Ørstavik et al. 2015).63 In 2015, FrP voters ranked climate change lowest in political importance of all voters (Livgard 2016). For FrP voters, climate change was close to half as important as for the group who ranked it second lowest in this survey, voters of the other co-ruling party, the Conservative Party (Høyre). These developments may have reflected a view among Norwegian citizens that climate change was less important than previously thought.

CICERO also slowly changed their attitude and approach to climate skeptics during these years. CICERO’s guidelines on communication from 2010 stated that their researchers could only participate in public debate in their capacity as researchers if they debated within their own field of research (CICERO 2011, 3). This, however, did not apply to Pål Prestrud who was the Center’s CEO until 2013 and was a biologist by training. He continued his debate with the Climate Realists in the spring of 2010 with op-eds in the newspaper Dagbladet in direct response to Ole Henrik Ellestad, leader of the Climate Realists at the time. These two also debated in five lengthy and technical articles posted on the journal Samtiden’s webpage from 2011 to 2012. Here Prestrud got both the first and last word (Prestrud 2011; Ellestad 2011; Prestrud 2012b; Ellestad 2012; Prestrud 2012a).

The change that slowly grew forth at CICERO regarding climate skeptics began with a change in the Center’s view on the public understanding of science and their lay audience. Bjørnæs described it as a paradigm shift for the Center. They came to the realization that “people could not be convinced [of the reality of anthropogenic climate change] through facts alone”.64 This view was manifested in Bjørnæs own article in

63 In response CICERO offered to educate Jensen on anthropogenic climate change (Bjermeland 2015). 64 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 100

65 Klima 4-10 “Like talking to the wall”. There he wrote: “We often think that if only people have the correct information, then they will understand the magnitude of the climate problem. This is naïve” (Bjørnæs 2010). The rest of the article summarized research showing that egalitarian and individualistic values informed beliefs. A CICERO researcher later studied the same topic in the context of Norway (Aasen 2015).

The Center’s reference to understanding embedded in values signified a recognition that public understanding of research was not achieved through unaltered dissemination of ideas (Bucchi 2008, 58-60). However, a dialogue on values was not CICERO’s new approach to climate skeptics. According to Bjørnæs, people at the Center slowly realized that “the debates [between CICERO and skeptics] could contribute to polarization” of views and gave the latter credibility, by “elevating” them to the level of the former.66 This was not something CICERO desired and they therefore limited confrontations with climate skeptics. But not everyone wanted to deny the Climate Realists a platform. In the summer of 2015, the private foundation Fritt Ord, which supports freedom of expression, donated NOK100,000 to the Climate Realists (Fritt Ord 2015). In November and December 2015, Norwegian newspapers published at least ten op-eds from climate skeptics that referenced CICERO. This was around one third less than in the same period in 2009.

CICERO, however, had by 2015 stopped refuting claims against climate change on their own webpage. Perhaps in part due to the end of Prestrud’s period as CEO, they had also stopped writing op-eds and articles debating the Climate Realists. What debate the Center contributed to in November and December 2015 was in interviews in newspapers and similar media. Here some of the Center’s researchers commented on arguments from climate skeptics. They also contributed to a few longer articles on the science of anthropogenic climate change. Through the latter practice they addressed questions of general climate change skepticism, without directly addressing particular arguments. I will look at some of these contributions in the following analysis.

65 Also published in English on CICERO’s webpage as “It’s like talking to the wall” on 27.09.2010. 66 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. 101

5.4.2 The defense of climate change research

In a long interview published in the online magazine Harvest, CICERO physicist Bjørn

Samset provided information on the physics of CO2 and anthropogenic climate change. Samset communicated that climate change was anthropogenic as he drew on the basics of photosynthesis and discussed the causal chains of global warming. He metaphorically equated increased GHG in the atmosphere with wearing a coat. As he acknowledged that this metaphor was a simplification, he implied that his readers needed the simple version of the science due to their ignorance. Samset further stated that Earth’s climate had been stable for the last 10,000 years, up until the 20th century. Since, it had warmed by nearly one degree Celsius, which, with a one third increase in CO2 in the atmosphere since the 19th century, meant “we have to adapt” (Samset in Ekelund 2015).

Samset argued that solutions to climate change included realizing that there was “no future” for long term oil extraction in the Arctic and that “we” needed to “…think out new solutions…” for renewable energy (Samset in Ekelund 2015). When the interviewer asked him what private individuals could do, Samset made a simple list that spoke to consumer values. His three main points were: cut down on meat, buy quality products and buy an electric car. Individuals could thus cut their carbon footprint, but most importantly, they could inspire change in industry and policy that would make the big difference. In this way he framed the solution to climate change by centering on state leaders and the business sector, much as the news program NRK Dagsrevyen had done during COP 15 in 2009 (Ytterstad 2010, 65).

The day after the interview with Samset, CICERO climatologist and research director Fuglestvedt was interviewed by Framtida.no, an online newspaper, on his new position as vice chair of Working Group I in the IPCC. Fuglestvedt used the interview to describe his position as a researcher and the research and communicative merits of the IPCC. He stated that “a researcher must be clear and neutral, and not mix own values into their work” (Fuglestvedt in Hope 2015). This statement invoked the scientific merit of disinterestedness (Merton 1973, 275-277). On questions on the IPCC’s Summary for Policymakers (SPM) he said that the Panel accepted feedback from politicians because this could “…create a common ownership of the knowledge and lead to that ruling powers, to a greater extent, make knowledge based policies” (Fuglestvedt in Hope 2015). Shaw and Robinson show how the SPM is a hybrid document, “intended to be

102 both scientifically credible and politically approved or authorized” (2004, 94). Fuglestvedt’s statement indicated that some CICERO researchers valued hybridity in communication of research outside of the research community.

At the beginning of the interview Fuglestvedt said that uncertainty about climate change solutions was connected to how we thought of people in the future and in other parts of the world. He used the reality of anthropogenic climate change as a springboard to argue for restrictive emission policies and the hope of an agreement at COP 21. The journalist challenged Fuglestvedt to give his personal opinion, and not just speak from his position as a climate researcher, which legitimized Fuglestvedt’s advocate response. According to Fuglestvedt, if “we” were to limit global warming we had to realize the knowledge we already possessed and combine it with an appreciation of international collaboration and interdependence. Thus reflecting the sentiment that had grown forth at CICERO since 2009, he argued that understanding the consequences of climate change was not only about an understanding of facts, it connected to values and how people saw themselves in society.

The reality of climate change was a salient topic in Norwegian media towards the end of November 2015. By this time CICERO was exposed to more direct confrontation with the Climate Realists. In the NRK article “[They] Do not believe in the UN’s climate panel” Ellestad, chemistry professor and former leader of the Climate Realists, was interviewed, as was CICERO’s Samset. Taking the stance of a scientist critical to modelling, Ellestad stated that IPCC findings could not be used as a basis for arguments for anthropogenic climate change, as their model was not adequate. Samset countered by stating that the uncertainties that remained in climate research only meant a risk of more severe climate change, an argument that resembled Prestrud’s in 2009. For Samset there was no question of the uncertainty of anthropogenic climate change in itself, only its severity. He argued directly, with use of adjectives, adverbs and a lack of modal verbs:

Climate researchers have done a complete review of all the factors that influence Earth’s climate, and natural variations cannot explain the climate changes we see now … [T]he uncertainty pertains to exactly how sensitive the climate is to climate gas emissions (Samset in Drefvelin 2015 (italics added)).

103

Thus Samset, in contrast to Prestrud (see p.78), seemed to lean on Lakatos. Lakatos’ argument was that the “research programme” developed as its central theoretical assumptions remained unrefuted, while more auxiliary hypotheses, for instance an exact estimate of the sensitivity of the climate, could be abandoned (Lakatos 1978, 110-112). In his final words, Samset even presented the acknowledgement of uncertainty as a scientific merit, as he underscored the transparency and honesty of the IPCC: “The Climate Panel tries to be honest about this uncertainty, by specifying how likely something is” (Samset in Drefvelin 2015). Samset’s use of “tries to be” here appeared more as an expression of academic modesty than an admittance of fallibility.

The following day, the NRK news site had another interview titled “The Skeptics” (Solbu 2015). This centered on Climate Realist and glaciologist Ole Humlum, who rejected the 2013 meta-study that showed that 97 percent of climate researchers found that climate change was anthropogenic (Cook et al. 2013). According to Humlum, many academics shared his sentiment, but were silenced. He also rejected the general idea of scientific consensus as a standard for empirical truth. Knut H. Alfsen, introduced in the interview as a senior researcher at “Norway’s foremost institute for interdisciplinary climate research”, responded to Humlum’s arguments. He acknowledged the uncertainty of predictions, but argued that as climate science covered many disciplines the more time went by without a refutation of the theory that climate change was anthropogenic, the more likely it became. In countering Humlum, Alfsen thus drew on Popper’s argument for falsification as the solution to the problem of induction (Popper 1972, 6-13) in a way that moved focus from the consensus of researchers and onto the science behind it.

Alfsen made a distinction between climate researchers and climate skeptics in two ways. First he stated: “climate skeptics … have often based their arguments on mistaken facts and poor research which time and again has been refuted by climate researchers” (Alfsen in Solbu 2015). For Alfsen this was part of the reason why skeptics did not get media coverage. But the press had to take some blame as well: As he saw it, in a bid for balanced news, they gave the Climate Realists and their type more airtime than they deserved. Alfsen’s argument may seem somewhat ironic considering that this interview used Alfsen to balance out the “Skeptics”. In the second argument, Alfsen made a clear distinction between skeptics and researchers by ridiculing both climate skeptics and the

104 media: He stated that to include climate skeptics in a discussion of the impact of GHG emissions on the climate was “a bit like including The Flat Earth Society in a discussion of how round the Earth is” (Alfsen in Solbu 2015). In other words, while the Climate Realists continued to discuss whether climate change was real, climate researchers knew this as true and had moved on to a more detailed discussion. Therefore, if skeptics felt they were silenced it was only because the media finally realized what CICERO had known a long time: skeptics and their viewpoints did not belong in the debate.

The day after NRK’s interview with Alfsen, and as if in response to Alfsen’s description of the media, the news agency NTB presented an interview with Samset where they did not focus on whether climate change was real. Instead Samset and the NTB journalist discussed details of uncertainty in climate sensitivity. Samset admitted that a minority of “serious” researchers thought the effects of GHGs was minimal, but repeated his argument from the NRK interview on November 22, 2015. For Samset, the real uncertainty issue was not whether climate change was anthropogenic, because it was. The harsh uncertainty was the lack of knowledge about how dangerous it would be. He curtailed even this admittance through modality: “There is a small uncomfortable chance that we may have misunderstood something … Have the researchers miscalculated, then the effect of CO2 emissions can be stronger than expected” (Samset in Føli 2015a). His association with a wider research community minimized possible implications of such uncertainty on his own position as a researcher. It was not Samset who may have misunderstood something; it was “we” and “the researchers”.

At the end of November 2009, CICERO responded to a different sort of criticism of climate research and politics as Danish climate research critic and statistician Bjørn Lomborg and CICERO’s Fuglestvedt were interviewed on the Norwegian edition of MSN’s news site. Prompting the interview was an earlier article by Lomborg in the peer reviewed journal Global Policy (Lomborg 2016). Acknowledging that climate change was anthropogenic, Lomborg persisted that attempts to change its consequences were futile. As he described a landscape of political machinations and symbolic policies he stated that the INDC’s would only limit temperature increase by 0.05 degrees Celsius.

The journalist introduced Fuglestvedt as a “climate expert” and board member of the IPCC. However, Fuglestvedt did not point to his academic credentials or experience in the field of climate change research in his response to Lomborg. According to 105

Fuglestvedt, no exact degree reduction could be predicted from the INDCs. At best scientists could present a temperature spectrum. Broadening his critique, he problematized both Lomborg’s projections and the notion presented by the UNFCCC leader Figueres that INDCs would lead to a 2.7 degrees Celsius temperature increase. Instead he focused on uncertainty: “…I will take a third standpoint, and that is that the INDCs do not give enough information to evaluate whether we will reach the two degrees goal” (Fuglestvedt in Paust 2015). He used the modal verb “will” and the acknowledgement that his perspective was a standpoint he “took”. This allowed him to convey the factual statement, “the INDCs do not give enough information”, as well as a more diplomatic position in regard to other perspectives on the matter. In the end it seemed his acceptance of uncertainty was the most truthful and sincere position given the data available so far. As Edward’s points out, the best representation of climate research is as “…shimmering data, shimmering futures, and convergence rather than certainty” (Edwards 2010, 398). Thus Lomborg’s argument, in the company of Figueres notion of the INDCs, seemed like that of a less serious researcher.

At the close of the year, Dagsavisen interviewed billionaire and investor Jens Ulltveit- Moe on his appointment as board leader for CICERO. They titled the interview “[Ulltveit-Moe] Wants to eradicate the skepticism”, though this phrase was not repeated in the interview. Ulltveit-Moe pointed to polarization of views on climate change:

The paradox is that research results work convincingly on those who already believe, while the skeptics just dismiss them. But I hope, in the end, it will be possible to convince some people, even if it is almost impossible to convince someone if their income depends on that they do not believe in it (Ulltveit-Moe in Sandberg 2015).

He elaborated on this by accusing especially the American oil industry of financially biased skepticism. According to Ulltveit-Moe it was in part because of them that there were so many climate skeptics among politicians and the general population in the U.S. In this way, for Ulltveit-Moe, as for Bjørnæs in Klima 4-10, climate skepticism had little to do with the veracity of the research and a lot to do with the values of the skeptic.

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5.5 Comparative analysis of 2015

In this section I discuss trends in CICERO’s public communication in 2015. I focus on boundaries and connections between the Center and climate change research, on the one hand, and the Center’s lay audience, civil society and politics, on the other.

5.5.1 CICERO made themselves relevant

While the media and the negotiations shifted focus away from problems and towards solutions from 2009 to 2015 (Elgesem 2014),67 this topic was only a part of CICERO’s focus in their own public commentary in November and December 2015. In the Center’s spotlight was what to expect from a potential Paris Agreement and, after an agreement was reached, what it could mean for the future. The style of the commentary resembled most of their writings in 2009. According to Bjørnæs, the difference between CICERO’s commentary practices and that of media reports in Paris at the time, was that the Center got to be more “nerdy” and that they were interested in “creating more understanding of interrelationships” at the negotiations.68 With references to researchers, CICERO, and the wider research community, the Center made clear that their perspectives had a foundation in research, according them an authority different from that of other news commentators. At the same time, Kallbekken’s active contributions took the form of broad expertise commentary on the field of climate politics (Nilsen 2001, 178), not from a professional specialization, as he did not research climate negotiations.

Two weeks before COP 21 started on November 30, 2015, CICERO made it clear that they wanted to connect with society and political decision-makers through the pavilion Connection Point at COP 21. Bjørnæs said: “CICERO wanted to use their pavilion to focus on solutions in collaboration with all Norwegian actors.”69 If solutions to climate change had become an industry at COP 21, CICERO presented that industry as all about collaboration. In 2009, they presented the complexity of COP 15 as in part due to political machinations. In contrast with Copenhagen 2009, the Center did not present COP 21 in 2015 as a “circus”, instead they argued for the necessity of such complexity

67 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo. Email correspondence with Kathrine Duarte regarding her PhD in progress 09.10.2017-12.10.2017. 68 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo 69 Interview with Christian Bjørnæs, 06.10.2017, CICERO offices, Oslo 107

(Bjørnæs 2015a). A phrase that stood out was CEO Halvorsen’s “climate dugnad” (Halvorsen 2015). Of people from CICERO only Halvorsen used the phrase, but it was a fitting metaphor for the view expressed in other CICERO articles that discussed COP 21 and what would come after. All but one article celebrated future collaboration between research and the national leaders who made the agreement, as well as the other actors, such as the business sector. In addition, it seemed the bottom-up structure of the agreement fit with the non-hierarchical, semi-structured effort of a dugnad, as did the hope that all the nations of the agreement would benefit from mitigation of and adaptation to climate change. Indeed, the Center’s optimism and motivation for dugnad seemed colored by a general shift in perspectives towards solutions.

CICERO used the identifying pronoun “we” to a large extent in the various texts. In some references, “we” comprised all who would in one way or another contribute to mitigation of and adaptation to climate change; from decision-makers of all stripes, including business and policy makers, to NGOs and those who did research on climate change. Halvorsen’s call to save the planet left the issue of actors open by its passive phrasing, though she also indicated that there was a capacity and will to do something about climate change. In general, CICERO delegated decisive agency to the nations of the agreement, though Halvorsen and Kallbekken recognized investors and the business sector as important contributors after the agreement was solidified.

However, for CICERO their part was at least equally important. Often their use of “we” indicated that the Center identified with their role in the collaborative project beginning once the agreement was solidified. CICERO joined the throng around the negotiations at COP 21. They discussed solutions with other groups present and, through their news channel, presented themselves to their readers as more policy relevant than ever. With CICEP, established in 2011, and led by Kallbekken, they solidified their expertise on climate negotiations. After the negotiations, the Center attuned their self-presented increase in relevance through discussion of the meaning of the Paris Agreement. Thus they maintained their own, and the wider climate research community’s role as knowledge providers for political decision-makers.

Hence, CICERO’s strongest point of connection was with politics and governance. Forster (2015) was perhaps the most explicit, but all CICERO’s COP 21 articles that I analyzed echoed a view described by Gieryn (1995): 108

A key to the legitimation of scientists’ cultural authority is the perceived pertinence of science for political decisions … Too great a distance between science and politics threatens a critically important route for scientists’ legitimation via their perceived political utility (Gieryn 1995, 436)

For CICERO, COP 21 and the Paris Agreement was a chance for stronger ties between politics and research in the face of climate change. Collaboration across boundaries, as represented by Halvorsen’s climate dugnad, required something else of the Center than the traditional community of professional researchers: a closer connection with the users of research, political decision-makers on a state level. It was perhaps a chance for them to be part of a "problem-solving community” (Nilsen 2001, 22, 151) (see p.35 and 39).

Perhaps CICERO’s focus on collaboration with politics represented a view that knowledge production and application were integrated processes (Shaw and Robinson 2004). Nevertheless, the Center still had to appear a credible, not just legitimate, partner to political decision-makers. Gieryn continues his description of the relationship between science and politics in democracies in this way:

Scientists also need to keep the fence on their “politics” frontier well mended. After all, what makes scientific knowledge useful for politics is not just its content but its putative objectivity or neutrality. Science can legitimate policy only if scientists are not treated as just another interest group and their technical input is not defined as just another opinion (Gieryn 1995, 436)

The Center signaled that they could be close enough to politics to be useful and far enough away to provide something objective. In addition their role and authority, as part of the climate research community, had to be set apart from contributions from other kinds of actors: Researchers provided the knowledge rational decisions were based on. This stance fit with the decisionist model of decision-making (see p. 22, 76 and Peters 2008, 133) and spoke to the intent of the Langslet doctrine (see p. 36): Research had to be produced separate from politics to be useful.

If CICERO appeared critical to politics, they focused on whether the above relationship would be maintained after the Paris Agreement. Only Aaheim was directly pessimistic as he assessed that the Paris Agreement would, in the same way as its precursors, ignore the findings of applied social economics. Kallbekken (in Arnslett 2015) implied

109 criticism when he pointed out that the expert committee the UNFCCC would appoint to oversee the maintenance of the NDCs would have no sanctioning power. Describing this as “interesting” he signaled a similar critique to Aaheim: over the use of expertise to add credibility to politics, but without politicians following up on its implications. Of the CICERO articles here analyzed, Kallbekken and Aaheim came closest to what Jackson describes as a liberal and progressive separation of research and politics. By this Jackson means to “ hold science apart from politics for the ultimate purpose of gaining political authority and thus the ability to advance particular programs of progressive reform under the banner of a nonpartisan scientific rationality” (Jackson 2014, 274-275).

5.5.2 But what about Norwegian climate politics?

CICERO had long studied how Norway could cut GHG emissions abroad: International collaboration mechanisms for emission cuts such as joint implementation and CDMs was a part of the Center’s research field since Hanisch first presented his policy note in 1992 (see p. 40). The RCN pushed for more research on flexible mechanisms at the Center (see p. 43), and many CICERO researchers wrote on these and similar mechanisms (CICERO 2008) (Torvanger et al. 2013). At a press brief at COP 15 Kallbekken spoke of REDD (Jakobsen 2009, 15), an initiative to reduce deforestation in the Global South, which Norway had invested in with the hope of beginning a credits system to justify domestic GHG emissions (Howell 2014, 256). In other words, CICERO had the expertise to publicly discuss Norwegian contributions to the Paris

Agreement.

In the months I studied, CICERO only addressed Norwegian politics in relation to the Paris Agreement in passing remarks, such as when Halvorsen said Norway would have to stop handing out oil concessions or invent CCS to keep their part of the agreement (2015). Several of the articles referenced CICERO’s short YouTube-hit from 2012 (CICERO 2012b), which described with simple graphics how the different nations had discussed climate change since the UNFCCC was founded in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. In the video, Norway was a nation that wanted to pay others to cut so “so we don’t have to”. Still, even this video only hinted at a possible route for Norway after COP 21.

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It might be that CICERO did not use November and December 2015 to discuss Norwegian climate politics in light of the Paris Agreement because things remained uncertain regarding what Norway would do. However, the Center had discussed political uncertainties before, for instance during COP 15. Perhaps they did not make predictions about Norwegian politics because they did not want to appear to as if the Center took a progressive stance towards Norwegian politics when state leaders had yet to decide on what to do. However, not addressing such issues at a time when climate politics were in the Norwegian media spotlight also sent a signal. Ytterstad argued that Bang’s participation in the Norwegian negotiation delegation to COP 15 showed CICERO’s acquiescence to the Norwegian government (see p. 48 and Ytterstad 2012, 21). The Center was no longer part of the delegation, but their limited focus on Norwegian politics meant the possible contributions of the Norwegian government were overshadowed by everything else the Center reported regarding COP 21.

Currently it seems CICERO’s YouTube hit from 2012 got it right. After the agreement in Paris, the Norwegian government hoped to continue their 20 year old practice of cutting emission in projects outside of Norway through collaboration with the EU. When this was revealed in August 2016, political scientist Elin Lerum Boasson at CICERO argued that it was uncertain whether the Norwegian government would get what they bargained for when joining this EU framework (Boasson 2016). Consequently, the Center eventually had the capacity to publicly and critically address Norwegian climate politics in relation to the Paris Agreement.

5.5.3 Public communication towards their lay audience

In general CICERO kept their communication formal and distant in 2015. There was nothing of Westskog and Kalvig’s musings (2009) or Prestrud’s familiarity with American presidents (2009b). While the Center showed some enthusiasm for COP 21, they framed this view within a commentary that made it seem more a scholarly prediction than a passionate expression. When they discussed the reality of climate change they mostly kept a neutral tone without polemics. In 2009, CICERO’s communication department seemed to filter out the more personal perspectives from their webpage articles. Given the Center’s increasingly formal style it seems telling that there were far fewer op-eds by people form the Center in November and December

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2015. This, in combination with their collective orientation when using pronouns, signaled a change towards a more disinterested position in 2015. Again it seemed CICERO’s communication practices were in part a response to the dilemmas of the public expert (Peters 2008, 143). Through formalized language and collective orientation they could maintain their research credentials and perhaps limit criticism and perception that their expertise was equal to that of non-researchers.

CICERO took on a commentator role, regarding both COP 21 and climate skepticism. While they offered commentary on the negotiations without encouragement, they only commented on arguments presented by climate skeptics when interviewed by other news media. Their change in tactic from 2009’s more confrontational attitude, made them appear increasingly reactive to climate skepticism. Furthermore, what contributions they made were now even more framed by other actors in public discourse, which made it appear as if the newspapers brought them in to balance the arguments of skeptics and not the other way around. At least in part this worked to their benefit, as they appeared as neutral expert commentators on an mixture of arguments.

CICERO’s focus on the nations and on solution orientation of dugnad seemed to echo the sentiment of the time. As climate skeptics generally saw decreased visibility in the media from 2009 to 2015 the Center followed the trend here as well. However, CICERO’s complete exclusion of skeptical arguments from their communication platform and their reduced contributions to such debate in general showed a change in the way they did boundary work. They did not present arguments that could undermine the Center’s credibility and therefore reduced the credibility accorded to groups such as the Climate Realists, who did not get to debate alongside the Center’s researchers anymore. In 2015 CICERO’s best line of defense was to ignore the skeptics and wait for their arguments to go away. Refusing to debate an issue seemed to be a different kind of boundary work than the direct vocal defense.

The increased visibility of CICERO and climate change in the period of COP 21 was an opportunity to discuss the details behind the reality of climate change. Perhaps especially as debates had died down, public discourse was less polarized and climate skeptics were given less space in the media. However, the Center’s exclusion of skeptical arguments may have thrown the baby out with the bath water in regard to constructive communication on climate change. As they defended their credibility by 112 cutting off debates with climate skeptics, they also removed a channel for dialogue with their lay audience and thus limited their role as communicators of climate knowledge.

When they did not enter debates to the same extent, how did CICERO discuss certainties and uncertainties in climate change? Regarding climate politics, CICERO seemed to have left behind the uncertainty of 2009, as they used the Paris Agreement to proclaim that “the green shift will come” (Bjørnæs 2015b; Arnslett 2015). Concerning arguments against climate change, they seemed more open to admit uncertainty. The CICERO commentators that balanced out the climate skeptics, with physicist Bjørn Samset in the front, generally did not address the skeptics and spoke of scientific consensus and the credibility of the IPCC and the wider climate science community they identified with. They made it clear that uncertain climate research did not regard whether climate change was real or anthropogenic, it was about the finer details of the science. They also admitted uncertainty as a way to underscore the merit of the IPCC and CICERO, who were willing to admit that not everything was set in stone. These admittances may also have served to underscore that CICERO were at the forefront of climate science, not only communicating on tried and tested, established facts, but on questions that were still being researched, such as the exact sensitivity of the climate to particular GHGs.

In a broader context, the CICERO’s focus on the risks that come with uncertainty presented not just an argument for the credibility of the research, but also for its legitimacy. To reduce the risks to society, research units such as the Center would have to continue researching that which remained uncertain. However, CICERO did not go into a detailed discussion on risk assessment in connection with social values and politics. Perhaps this was in part due to the limitations of their commentary, as they only spoke in interviews controlled by parties outside of the Center. Still, leaving risk out excluded a broader discussion of the role of climate research in society as an insurance against future risk. But there was a dilemma here: Jasanoff show that risk assessment in society represents a challenge to scientific boundaries, as it involves social evaluations and value-judgements (Jasanoff 1987, 214). Perhaps CICERO did not address risk in this context in order to maintain their boundaries towards society.

CICERO’s new view on research communication, which saw values as a challenge to understanding climate research, was perhaps not as beneficial for the readers as it was 113 for the Center’s self-image. They could continue their communication of climate research and at the same time not stand to blame for people’s lack of conviction. As values informed public understanding of research, climate skepticism was not a matter of CICERO’s failure to publicly present research, nor for that matter an issue of the veracity of the research itself. This perspective, which was perhaps most explicitly communicated in Bjørnæs’ article in Klima from 2010, seemed to put a distance between the Center and some readers. Even excluding risk assessment, there was indeed little discussion of the relationship between values in society and climate change. Samset’s presentation in Harvest of three things you could do to mitigate climate change even seemed to imply that the value judgments of civil society meant little because we had to wait for politicians and the industry to make the big impact. Only Fuglestvedt and, at the close of the year, soon-to-be board leader Ulltveit-Moe directly addressed how values informed understanding. Furthermore, they framed these remarks as their personal opinions and they were presented on media platforms where room for discussion was limited. In this way, CICERO’s maintenance of their own credibility was kept separate from their legitimizing practices. In addition, their legitimizing practices focused on a contribution of knowledge to political decision-makers and did not give much attention to their relevance for other groups in society.

5.5.1 Civil society, still out in the cold?

One might take it as slightly ironic that while CICERO hosted a “Connection Point” in Paris they did not connect with their lay audience at home. As the Center mostly discussed how state leaders could use climate research, those of their lay audience who were not political leaders, such as civil society, appeared especially left out. The Center presented themselves as active at COP 21 and actively disseminating simplified information to their uninvolved lay audience in Norway. Furthermore, their admitted simplification of anything from GHG to what was “really” agreed upon in Paris, as well as their continued ambiguous representation of their readers by way of questions posed and answered by CICERO (see p. 81), indicated that the Center took a paternalistic stance towards those of their readers not negotiating at COP 21. Hence, the Center addressed civil society as if they had a quantitatively poorer understanding compared to the Center, instead of a qualitatively different kind of understanding defined by elements such as value judgements and subjective applicability of the information

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(Bucchi 2008, 58-60). This approach to public communication created distance between CICERO and civil society.

The way CICERO presented the “bottom-up” aspect of the agreement put focus on national responsibility. There are many ways of interpreting a bottom-up approach, including an emphasis on local community contributions, (e.g. Rayner (2010)), but the way the Center presented it, it was the national leaders that was building the agreement. They were, so to speak, the bottom, and their decisions would be taken home and implemented. People at the Center referenced other parties that could contribute to upholding the Paris Agreement, but these actors were not presented as relevant for the agreement itself, nor for state level political decision-making. The planned agreement in Copenhagen had been “top-down”, meaning that a target was set internationally and then contributions divided among the nations. When CICERO presented Paris as a signal sent home by state leaders, it appeared as if the new agreement would play a similar role on a domestic level: The target would be set at the national level and the government would delegate tasks among the different groups in society.

As mentioned, CICERO had repeated references to nations as actors throughout their writings in this period. On the one hand, it made sense to generalize in this way as politicians and professional negotiators at COP 21 represented the citizens of their respective countries. On the other hand, such phrasing served to erase dissenting voices within the nations as well as other ways the people of these countries could act on the negotiations and the agreement. Consequently, the Center delegated control over anthropogenic climate change to national governments. CICERO had made room for the vocal statement of the “People’s climate panel” in 2009. However, they did not use their own communication platform to discuss the between 60,000 and 100,000 strong Climate Justice March in Copenhagen on December 12, 2009, nor the People’s Climate march, which according to the BBC (2014) mustered 600,000 people across the globe on September 21, 2014. Due to a terrorist attack in Paris in November 2015, there was a ban on demonstrations in the capital during COP 21. Though Kallbekken pointed out in an interview with NTB that this might have implications for civil society influence over the negotiations (Føli 2015b), CICERO did not present any detailed commentary on this issue. As the Center presented potential for future collaboration between the research community and those in the negotiation room, they did not seem as connected with civil

115 society outside of the negotiation rooms as they had in 2009. CICERO might have been cheering for a Paris Agreement, but they were not even talking about an independent people’s movement.

CICERO did indicate that they wanted civil society and private citizens to join in on the dugnad in their collaboration with the Bellona Foundation at COP 21 and when Halvorsen’s announced that climate change was “about me and you” (Halvorsen 2015). The Bellona Foundation is an advisory environmental NGO that does not focus on activism and that does not rely on a large member-base for funding, their orientation is towards policy and the business sector. In some ways, the pavilion at COP 21 may have been taken as a lobbying arena for government, industry and NGOs alike.

However, CICERO did not use their own public communication platform to discuss the solutions and perspectives of NGOs at COP 21, not even those of their pavilion partner Bellona whose work may be closer to the Center than that of other environment NGOs. CICERO represented civil society to a greater extent in 2009 with the Klima 6-09 article on the People’s Climate Panel (Lamvik 2009). In 2015, they mostly represented civil society as passive recipients of their research dissemination. In addition, their co- dependent relationship with political decision-makers appeared exclusive to the extent that similar relationships between research and, for instance civil society, seemed inconceivable. Moreover the Center’s lack of dialogue with their lay audience in their expert commentary and their presentation of the Paris Agreement as a hierarchical, unidirectional signal from state leaders to other groups in society, made it seem as if civil society was without influence. Even though dugnad appealed to Norwegian and collective values, CICERO left the Norwegians civil society out of decision-making on climate change. If they were included it was as generic citizens, members of the nations whose leaders had agreed to the Paris Agreement. Thus CICERO’s collaborative focus made actors that did not fit within the structures established at COP 21, invisible.

Of course, civil society was not negotiating in the negotiation rooms in Paris. However, it did not necessarily mean that they could not influence international or national climate politics (Røkkum 2015), lacked useful expertise (Bucchi 2008, 60), or were uninvolved in climate change. According to Wynne “‘understanding’ is a function, inter alia, of social identification with scientific institutions” (Wynne 1995, 364) and not just a matter of technical information that takes trust for granted (Wynne 1995, 377). 116

CICERO’s boundary work may have established the credibility of climate research among their lay audience. Yet their communication of the relevance of research for civil society, as well as the relevance of civil society for climate change, was limited, with subsequent implications for the reliance such groups had on that information. As shown in chapter 3, CICERO’s first CEO Ted Hanisch worked to establish a technological, economic and political expertise network, with a total exclusion of the Norwegian environmental movement (Nilsen 2001, 139). With the Paris Agreement it seemed that CICERO was returning to a focus on such expertise, to the exclusion of civil society.

5.6 A summary of the chapter

In this chapter I have shown that there was a marked increase in the presence of CICERO in public discourse in Norway in correlation with the visibility of COP 21 in 2015. Thus it is likely that their public communication in this period had a larger impact than at other times. I find that their communication practices regarding the climate negotiations and arguments against the reality of climate change, took the form of a delegation of role. They presented themselves as part of the research community and as producers and providers of key expert knowledge for climate change. Furthermore, they celebrated collaboration at COP 21 and its potential in the Paris agreement. They excluded climate skeptics from a discussion on climate change and focused their attention on collaboration with key decision-makers, namely state leaders and governments. However, they presented little discussion on possible contributions of the Norwegian government with regard to mitigation of and adaptation to climate change, a topic that might have been of interest to voters in Norway. They also maintained a paternalistic relationship with their readers, whom they seemed to perceive as lacking agency and expertise. In the end, they gave a simplistic presentation of national leaders representing the nations at the negotiation tables, which led to an exclusion of civil society from any relevant impact on climate change and climate politics. Thus CICERO’s research and communication appeared both credible and relevant for political decision-makers, but not as relevant for the society in general.

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6 Conclusion

6.1 Conclusions of the study

CICERO is a hybrid constantly evolving with developments in the Norwegian and international society. I set out to interpret how CICERO presented the relationship between climate research and social actors. This led to a study of how the Center communicated their various roles as separate from their lay audience, civil society and political decision-makers. My main research question was:

 What roles has CICERO had as a research center in Norwegian public discourse on climate change?

This overall perspective was specified by three sub-questions:

 How has CICERO constituted their identity in public discourse by setting boundaries between themselves and other social actors such as political decision-makers and civil society?  How has CICERO established connection with their readers and other sectors of society in communicating around or through these boundaries?  What are the implications of CICERO’s communication practices for other actors in the Norwegian climate change discourse?

I answered these questions guided by Gieryn’s theorization of “boundary work”, meaning the communicative demarcation of science from other parts of society (1995, 1983, 1999). In addition I drew on studies from the public communication of science and technology. Particularly important here was a conceptualization of expertise from Bucchi (2008) and the role of the public expert from Peters (2008). My methodology was based on Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis (2003, 1992, 2001)

My focus on CICERO’s communication in the months around COP 15 and 21 were guided by explorative interviews with staff at the Center, as well as the increased visibility of the Center in this period. The two themes, climate negotiations and the reality of anthropogenic climate change were chosen for their potential for interaction between CICERO and other groups in society. Specific articles for close textual analysis

118 were chosen on the basis that they were written, distributed by or had extensive contributions from people from CICERO, focused on one of the two topics, were published in the period of the Center’s increased visibility (November and December of the respective years), and presented a meeting between CICERO and other actors.

CICERO was established in part to provide a discourse for the Norwegian position on global climate negotiations. Through my findings, it appears that this was not all CICERO did. As they moved away from their hidden work on governance and policy, they began to contribute to and organize the public discourse on climate change in Norway. It therefore seems fitting that their first public communication platform, Cicerone, was launched in 1992, the same year as the UNFCCC was negotiated.

As CICERO moved into a more academic role in the early 2000s, they also took on the role of rational commentator on the climate negotiations. CICERO appeared detached from international climate politics during the negotiations in 2009, in a way that implied that some of the separation was a consequence of world politics. The Center maintained that climate research continued to be relevant, and that it was up to world leaders to take heed, something they did not do as they did not establish an effective climate regime. In this way, the Center implied that such politics were irrational. Furthermore, they presented the balance of researchers and political decision-makers as skewed, as the latter would draw on the credibility of the former, without following this up with action.

By 2015, CICERO had taken a different role towards political governance. They still gave commentary on the COPs, but as the Paris Agreement slowly came into place they joined in the celebrations of collaboration and thereby appeared to give the rational stamp of approval for the proposed climate regime. As the Center did not discuss Norwegian politics in this period they also made it appear as if the decisions of Norwegian state leaders in light of the Paris Agreement did not require critical analysis. Moreover, they presented themselves, and the climate research community, as more policy relevant than ever. As they now generally approved of international climate politics their criticism had diminished and they no longer appeared as the rational commentator from afar, but more as a voice of reason within the planned climate regime.

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In the Center’s early days the CEO excluded the environmental movement from the CICERO network’s development of arguments the Norwegian delegation could bring to climate negotiations. Though the Center had moved out of the corridors of power by the turn of the millennium, they appear to have maintained their indifferent position towards civil society. NGOs and other groups may have used their public communication for advocacy, but the Center appeared in periods I studied to regard civil society as of little relevance for climate research and climate politics. In connection with the Center’s apparent distance from international climate politics in 2009 they recognized public opinion via discussion of the People’s Climate Panel. However, CICERO did not give credence to civil society as a force apart from political decision-making and governance and they maintained that state leaders would handle climate change, with the help of climate researchers.

CICERO’s new collaborative perspective in 2015 seemed, by default to include civil society and the business sector, but only as subordinates that would follow up the decisions of world leaders. Though they collaborated with the advisory NGO Bellona at the COP 21 venue, they did not discuss the possible influence of civil society on climate negotiations and appeared especially dismissive of activism, which they scarcely mentioned. Thus it might seem as if the Center did not have a role towards civil society, but that would be too one-dimensional. Their role towards civil society was one that legitimized established power and electoral representation. In other words, they took at a stance that made the environmental movement within civil society appear useful only as an extension of government plans and superfluous as a watchdog for successful climate change governance. In this way, CICERO signaled the environmental movement did not require direct association with research as the movement was not relevant in the handling of climate change apart from through government institutions.

There was one group within civil society, towards which CICERO took a more direct stance: climate skeptics. When debating climate skeptics the Center leaned to a large degree on the same premises in 2009 and 2015. These were: scientific consensus, certainty through modelling and testing of hypotheses, accumulation of tested theories of anthropogenic climate change that had not been falsified so far, and an upkeep of Merton’s scientific values of organized skepticism and disinterestedness. In 2009 the Center largely took the role of “defender of climate science”, an advocate role that may

120 have polarized opinions on climate change in the public. Paradoxically, the Center’s willingness to debate climate skeptics and their way of addressing them with an appeal to scientific merits also legitimized the arguments of said skeptics. In this way, in 2009, climate skeptics were the group in civil society CICERO presented as most important for the Center’s own work.

By 2015, CICERO cut back on their role as defender of climate science and inadvertent legitimizer of climate skeptics. They stopped responding to claims on their own webpage and there were no op-ed debates on other platforms. They still commented on arguments against climate change in interviews on other platforms in November and December 2015, where they had less control over the presentation of their argument. However, this served to the Cente’s benefit as they appeared as commentators balancing the views of the skeptics, instead of vice versa.

Furthermore, CICERO did not seem to take a dialogical stance towards their target lay audience, the general public. Though Westskog and Kalvig had opened up for a combination of research and personal perspectives in their 2009 op-ed, this seemed more the exception than the trend. In addition was the collaboration on Kongelig polartokt (Frederik et al. 2009), which connected climate change with the people’s non- political representatives, the royal heirs of Scandinavia. However, CICERO kept this book separate from their other public communication practices and with the royal heirs as mediary representation of the public was kept within established power institutions.

In comparison with COP 15 in 2009, the Center’s communication in the months around COP 21 in 2015 was more formalized and with decreased focus on individual experience of climate change. This, in conjunction with explicit reference to simplification in communication in 2015 and a top-down pretense at representation of the readers both in 2009 and 2015, reflected a view of their lay audience as passive, non-experts who needed a simplified version of climate change knowledge. This perspective matched the unidirectional “deficiency model” of public understanding of science (Bucchi 2008). By implication, in the political context, it was civil society that was represented as passive receivers of CICERO’s knowledge dissemination given the Center’s recognition of the power of state leaders and political decision-makers in their commentary on the climate negotiations. In other words, from 2009 to 2015 CICERO changed their communicative practices slightly. This strengthened the impression that 121 the relationship between research bodies, such as the Center and lay people is one where the former is an active provider of knowledge, and the latter is a passive receiver who does not contribute anything useful to knowledge production or its application.

From 2010 onwards, CICERO shifted the way they viewed public understanding of research to encompass recognition of the role of values. This change was in part what legitimized that the Center ignored arguments against anthropogenic climate change, as these were seen as entrenched in values. Only researchers and CICERO’s own staff were invited to join the conversation on the Center’s webpage. Therefore, it seemed that this recognition of the relevance of values in reality led to an exclusion of their lay audience from a conversation on the implications of climate change. Moreover, though they allowed for more discussion of uncertainty than in 2009, which may have been a product of a less polarized debate, they still limited their risk assessments in public, perhaps, also to limit a discussion of values. Combined in this way, CICERO still communicated information on climate change, but their role was rather that of a disperser of technical information and updates on political activities, than one of making climate change knowledge socially relevant in the lives of their readers.

6.1.1 Additional remarks

This study is a combination of a broader historical overview of climate research and a closer analysis of texts produced within a few months. Though it is always a task to balance synchrony and diachrony in historic writing, the intertextual aspect of discourse analysis allows for some bridging of the two. As history can be seen as stratified, with layers in time from a historic moment to the geological ages (Jordheim 2017), I find it appropriate to review some of CICERO’s current research and communication in this concluding chapter. This ties my research to the present, but also to CICERO’s past, as this review, together with chapter 3, integrates chapter 4 and 5 in a broader discussion of what a research center communicating on climate change was, is and can be.

For one thing, as discussed on page 17-18, it is somewhat complicated to define CICERO as an actor. This is not only because they take on a plethora of roles in public discourse and society, but, as I found in all of my interviews, because people at the Center take pride in their diverse opinions and perspectives, seeing the diversity of opinions as a token of the academic credentials of the Center. They are not shy to 122 discuss their disagreements in public either. In 2010, senior researcher Kristin Aunan went up against research director Knut H. Alfsen regarding Chinese climate politics on NRK radio (Kristiansen 2010). Just recently, they showed their disagreement on their own webpage, over how to interpret a new report with contributions from two CICERO researchers, which showed that we might still limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius. CICERO discussed the findings with articles and op-eds on their webpage when debate over GHG emission politics ensued (Millar et al. 2017; Bjørnæs 2017; CICERO 2017b; Peters 2017b, a). Though these debates signify the pioneering level of research performed at CICERO, with a willingness to admit the uncertain frontier ahead, they also signal that disagreement is only of interest to the Center if it is among those they recognize as climate researchers. Given the extended public debates over data and method we have seen in climate research this appears reasonable. However, unusual critique may also give real benefits for research (Edwards 2010, 426). Furthermore, such exclusiveness signals the exclusivity of the research community that might make their information seem of little applicable relevance to their lay readers.

People at CICERO have researched the implications of culture for understanding and practices concerning climate change since at least 2010. In 2010, Westskog and Kallbekken, together with a third CICERO researcher, demonstrated in a research article in 2010 that social norms may in some cases better guide consumption than taxation does (Kallbekken et al. 2010). Moreover, CICERO researcher Marianne Aasen has studied the polarization of public concern about climate change in Norway with a focus on the implications of values (Aasen 2015). In addition, CICERO has started at least one research project within the framework of co-production of knowledge (CICERO 2017a). It therefore seems somewhat striking that they did not apply these perspectives in their own public communication during significant moments such as COP 15 and 21. An explanation may be that though the Center saw the research of such issues as relevant, they found its application in communication problematic for a purportedly neutral and academic research center. However, as I have shown in this study, they influence public discourse regardless of their alleged neutrality. The challenge that remains is to publicly address the role of culture and values, without undermining their epistemic authority in the eyes of the public.

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6.2 Explanatory value and analytical implications

In the analyzed periods, CICERO carved out their own field in the order of climate change discourse (see p. 45 and Jørgensen and Phillips 2002, 141-143) and they adapted this territory to the Center’s different roles. By extension they also charted the roles of other actors in relation to their own research. This fits with Cozzens and Woodhouse’s description of government-funded science as political in the sense that it exerts “…symbolic authority by directly or indirectly shaping the way people think about who they are and what is real and important” (Cozzens and Woodhouse 1995, 540). Through their boundary work, the Center delegates different roles, different kinds of agency and different degrees of capacity to discuss climate change. They map the discourses of political governance and civil society in their representations of these groups and by how they address their lay audience. This bears implication on three issues.

6.2.1 The knowledge of CICERO and their lay audience

Lay knowledge is not an impoverished or quantitatively inferior version of expert knowledge; it is qualitatively different. Factual information is only one ingredient of lay knowledge, in which it interweaves with other elements … to form a corpus no less sophisticated than specialist expertise (Bucchi 2008, 60)

In 2015, CICERO made climate research appear fairly exclusive and less open for democratic evaluation and confirmation (Gieryn 1983, 792) with their increased emphasis on simplification and a view that saw values as obstructive for understanding. The way the Center publicly communicated on climate change and climate policy thus bespoke a specific view of the kind of knowledge and understanding relevant in the face of climate change: that which is first and foremost grounded in research. Shotter (1993), Jackson (2015) and Wynne (1995) discuss the kind of knowledge a person can have as embedded in society and culture. There seemed little room for such knowledge in CICERO’s view of how their lay audience could best understand climate change and climate politics. Lay understanding appeared at best as an approximation to the understanding of experts. However, lay readers achieve in part understanding through recognition of how the information provided relates to their everyday lives (Ryghaug et al. 2011). Therefore, CICERO’s communication practices in the periods I studied may have posed a challenge to a socially embedded understanding.

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CICERO has had several channels for communicating climate knowledge, including Klimaforum, a paid subscription-based series of seminars for academics and decision- makers in the business and governing sectors (discontinued in 2014). Still, Klima and the webpage are the Center’s main communication channels with civil society. These appear more or less fluid configurations of communication, from the at times dialogical attitude to the generally more deficiency oriented approach (Bucchi 2008, 72). CICERO is not an educational institution and it may not be financially feasible to communicate through broader channels given the funding the Center receives. However, their main communication channel seems to particularly facilitate the appearance of a unidirectional dissemination of knowledge, from the Center to the readers in a way that makes the information provided seem of lesser social relevance. If the Norwegian Government truly desires the Center to be a public knowledge provider (Miljøverndepartementet 2007, 58), they may want to allocate more funding to other forms of communication. On the other hand, op-eds such as Westskog and Kalvig’s musings on private action on climate change (2009) represent a less top-down kind of communication on climate change in a format that could fit Klima. Though this kind of communication may make the researcher vulnerable and liable to the same criticism as other people in society, it may also open a more socially relevant dialogue between researchers and lay audiences (Peters 2008, 143). Therefore, there are many ways CICERO can go towards more open-ended knowledge-sharing.

6.2.2 Relating to policy and civil society

The territories of science and politics converge not as a matter of structural necessity or faceless rationality but because insiders to both have good reason to keep the other near at hand (Gieryn 1995, 436).

CICERO is an example of how research bodies build relevance of climate research for different actors, not only in the way they communicate, but also in the content of their texts. This is shown in their presentation of a relevant, but not prescriptive relationship to politics, which can be described by the decisionist model (Peters 2008). In general, they represented research as neutral in relation to political decision-making. However, there were some rational progressive tendencies in CICERO’s commentary, perhaps more so in 2009 than in 2015. Thus, there was some ambiguity in CICERO’s relationship to political decision-making, though with the Paris Agreement they moved

125 towards a purportedly more neutral role. On the one hand, it may be that with the failed negotiations in 2009, the Center benefitted from taking a progressive and rational position that demarcated distance from the irrationality of international climate politics. In 2015, on the other hand, as the UNFCCC closed in on an international agreement, such politics appeared less irrational and policy after the agreement might require closer collaboration with research. In this situation CICERO may have benefitted from appearing less rationalizing in their position on climate politics. All the same, both the Center’s more critical and progressive position in 2009 and their more accepting position in 2015 conveyed a high degree of agency to political decision-makers.

My research shows that boundary work not only regards discussion of the roles of different parts of society, but also the exclusion of certain groups from representation. CICERO’s role towards civil society in their public commentary on the two COPs was perhaps best shown by their absence from reference. In contrast to their discussion of the relationship between research and policy, CICERO gave little discussion of what NGOs, people’s movements, activists or even private individuals meant for climate research, negotiations and policy. For Gieryn, science is a cultural space, “as part of enduring cartographic classifications of cultural territories that people use to make sense out of the world about them” (1995, 415). In the process of classifying research in relation to other domains on the map, the Center also took part in classifying these domains, such as policy and civil society, and contributed to defining what kind of territories, and thereby agency, they had at their disposal. If research units such as CICERO identified a relationship of mutual dependence at an arm’s length distance not only with politics (Gieryn 1995, 439), but also with civil society, they might increase representation and relevance of this latter group in the face of climate change.

Høiby and Ytterstad pointed out that Norwegian climate journalists were more likely “to look for the next ‘climate billionaire’ than the next people’s movement in Norway, when our elected government does not deliver” (my translation, Høiby and Ytterstad 2014, 76). Perhaps the same can be said for CICERO, who did not give any in-depth commentary of large protests like the Climate Justice March in Copenhagen December 12, 2009, or the ban on demonstrations in Paris during COP 21. When they did not discuss political decision-makers in the months around COP 15 and 21, they wrote about investors and the movement of capital. The Center’s COP commentary excluded

126 those who did not fit into a broader collaborative project guided by world leaders. Collective value perspectives with Kongelig polartokt (Frederik et al. 2009) and the term dugnad appealed to Norwegian identity, but when CICERO did not follow up with reference to alternative views, they served to solidify the impression of one united front on climate policy, thus downplaying critique and alternative perspectives. This was particularly striking when the Paris Agreement was presented as a unidirectional signal from world leaders to local society. One can therefore ask if CICERO’s communicative practices serve to uphold a hegemonic view on climate politics as the domain of world leaders.

6.2.3 Research PR: Credible, legitimate and interdisciplinary communication

… the best explanatory concepts for understanding public responses to scientific knowledge and advice are not trust and credibility per se, but the social relationships, networks and identities from which these are derived (Wynne 1992, 282).

My findings can also contribute to an understanding of how research units such as CICERO present themselves in public, as their reputation may be as important for public understanding as the technical information they disseminate (Edwards 2010, 397) (Wynne 1995, 377). CICERO’s boundary work included their debates and eventual refusal to debate with climate skeptics, delegation of roles to themselves and political decision-makers in climate politics, and their exclusion of civil society, and particularly activism, from their COP commentary.

However, boundary work risks excluding more than is intended. In going from directly debating climate skeptics on the Center’s own platforms in 2009, to generally avoiding such debate in 2015, CICERO cut off a possible channel for dialogue with their readers. It is understandable that they did not want to elevate those who argued against climate change to the level of their own expertise, as this would undercut the premise that gave legitimacy to the Center’s research. Furthermore, discussions of climate research with lay audience can take important time and resources away of furthering this research (Edwards 2010, 426-430). However, willingness to discuss the uncertainties and development of climate research may still engage stakeholders in a way that mere dissemination of information does not (Shaw and Robinson 2004). Furthermore,

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Christopher Shaw points out that a recognition of uncertainty may in fact spur political deliberation and action among civil society (Shaw 2014, 351).

CICERO’s debates with the Climate Realists may have been a continuation of scientific debate by other means, which reached a larger number of colleagues quickly (Bucchi 2008, 63). Prestrud did not so much communicate climate research as he defended it. In doing so, he focused not only on what the facts were, but more so on what communities had the credentials to discuss them. His focus on the merits of climate change research came to the forefront when he faced other people with academic credentials, in a mix of Popperian and Mertonian argumentation. Such philosophy of science perspectives may have been a better appeal to credibility in the academic community than among a lay audience. At the same time, they may have educated a lay audience about organized skepticism, scientific consensus and falsifiability. It can therefore be useful to consider such boundary work as an overlap of different discourses on climate change that communicate on many levels, to different audiences, at the same time.

In another way, public communication on research positions and results may facilitate interdisciplinary perspectives across academic fields, something Bucchi also points to (2008, 63). With help from their communication department, CICERO seems to excel in interdisciplinary expert commentary and research communication. Bergrem argues that this also enabled interdisciplinary research at the Center (2005, 105). However, at closer examination, in commenting on COP 15 and 21, CICERO did not appear extensively interdisciplinary even within the bounds of social science, as most of their commentary came from political scientists and economists. In international relations there is a tendency to emphasize nation states over relations within states or for that matter, between actors within different nation states (Jackson and Nexon 1999, 293). This may be what led CICERO to focus on nation states as ordered units represented by state leaders, to the exclusion of civil society. However, CICERO was not only guided by research specialization in their choice of public experts. Both CEO Pål Prestrud and Steffen Kallbekken commented extensively on subjects they did not research. In diversifying their commentary with perspectives from for instance anthropologists or sociologists, who also exist among CICERO’s research base, the Center’s commentary may have looked quite different.

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6.3 Suggestions for further research and concluding remarks

In some ways, CICERO appears as Norway’s flag ship when it comes to climate research. Norway’s involvement in such research goes back to Vilhelm Bjerknes, who was world leading on weather research in the early 20th Century. Norway has other climate research institutes, such as the Bjerknes Centre, but CICERO was the only independent research institute included in the Norwegian government’s delegation to COP 15. In 2015, an RCN evaluation committee of Norwegians, Swedes, Danes and Finns commented that the Center was the Nordic institute that contributed most to IPCC assessments (Norges forskningsråd 2015, 30). Furthermore, there is some national awareness in CICERO’s public treatment of climate research and politics. This was exemplified for instance in Halvorsen’s use of the word dugnad (Halvorsen 2014, 2015) and the book Kongelig polartokt (Frederik et al. 2009) with its focus on climate change at the North Pole as a Scandinavian issue. One may ask, from an international relations perspective, to what extent these kinds of communication and research practices reflect beneficially on Norway as a whole, and thus help in Norwegian reputation politics regarding climate change. Furthermore, given the CICERO’s close connection with the IPCC, the Center may also build credibility for the Panel in Norwegian public discourse. Therefore, there may be cause to study the Center from the perspective of a crossing of scientific nationalism and internationalism (Edwards 2010, 55-56).

On an additional topic, there may be another reason why CICERO focused so heavily on states as actors in the months around COP 15 and 21. The COPs as media events may have guided the Center’s public focus. Rödder and Schäfer argue that researchers lose their agenda-building authority during such events (2010, 260). If the media focused on state actors or cast civil society in a less than favorable light, which Ytterstad argues was the case for COP 15 (2010), CICERO was perhaps urged to follow suit. The crossing of media and climate researchers may be interesting to explore further for an explanation of whether, and if so, why civil society see little representation in public expert commentary on climate negotiations and agreements.

A third perspective of interest is on research centers as hybrids. In Norway, there was a peak in establishment of centers and similar institutions in the late 1980s to early 1990s,

129 and the intent was in part to more closely connect research with other parts of society (Knain 1994, 34-35). At a basic level, CICERO’s hybridity as a research center comes down to their problem- and user-oriented interdisciplinary research, intended to be relevant for society (Bergrem 2005, 25-27). However, CICERO does not seem to identify with the title “research center”. My interviewees repeatedly referred to the Center as an “institute” and this is also the term used by RCN. There is not a conflict here as it seems RCN sorts a “center” as a subcategory within the “institute sector”. However, CICERO’s repeated identification as a research institute may reflect a desire to hold a less ambiguous role that reflects a stronger connection to the research community. Thus, the term “center” may have become somewhat redundant within the institute sector. Conversely, the Centre for Development and the Environment (SUM) emphasizes “center”. However, SUM is a part of the University of Oslo and an “institute” at a Norwegian university is a different kind of research unit than a center. This leads me to ask more generally, where and what are research centers today? A comparison of contemporary research centers may answer this question.

A final question, which I have not directly addressed in this study, regards CICERO’s lay audience. I have presented a discursive analysis that provides some insight into how the Center’s public expert commentary and debate practices can be interpreted. However, equally interesting is how their communication is received by others. This relates both to their target audience, which is “the general public”, and the use of the Center as a source in the media. A study into either of these perspectives may shed further light on how a research center such as CICERO participates in public discourse and builds credibility and legitimacy as a provider of public climate change knowledge.

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In general, I believe that my study shows the importance of a relational perspective in analysis of public expert commentary and public debate on climate change research. Research centers do not exist in pre-given spaces with defined boundaries, closed off from other social practices and actors. They fluctuate and move on the map, defining other actors as much as they define themselves through their public communication. Thus, CICERO may have bound off a territory for themselves in public climate change discourse, but through communication of these boundaries the Center is both changed by, and changes public discourse. 130

Primary sources

Articles from newspapers, webpages and in popular periodicals and other popular publications

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Appendix 1

Overview of public communication written and/or published by CICERO in November and December 2009

Op-eds from CICERO on other platforms Date: Title: Medium: Author: 27.11.2017 Langeruds desinformasjon om klimaet ABC nyheter Pål Prestrud 02.12.2017 Kortsiktige klimamål vil hjelpe Forskning.no Silje Pileberg 04.12.2017 Desinformasjon om klima VG Pål Prestrud 05.12.2009 Lang vei til København Klassekampen Tora Skodvin 07.12.2009 Slik vil verden løse klima-krisa Klar Tale Erlend Berge 08.12.2009 Reinare luft, men varmare klode Forskning.no Silje Pileberg Teknisk 11.12.2009 Klimadebatten hardner til Ukeblad Pål Prestrud Hege Westskog, Siri 24.12.2017 Lær av storesøster Dagbladet Kalvig 29.12.2017 Dokumenter dine påstander, Segalstad! Aftenposten Pål Prestrud 29.12.2017 Temperaturtall ikke til å stole på Aftenposten Hans Martin Seip

Articles from cicero.uio.no Date: Title: Medium: Author: 30.10.2009 Kven blir pådrivar i København cicero.uio.no CICERO 05.11.2009 CO2 -utslepp opp, trass finanskrise cicero.uio.no CICERO Nuclear power revolution a distant 06.11.2009 prospect cicero.uio.no Jorunn Gran TEMPO: Forskning på miljøvennlig 09.11.2009 transport cicero.uio.no CICERO Hvorfor må Obama ha klimalov på plass 11.11.2009 før København? cicero.uio.no CICERO 12.11.2009 Klimaforum om Nordområdene cicero.uio.no CICERO Klimaforhandlinger i København - hva 15.11.2009 skjer? cicero.uio.no CICERO 15.11.2009 Arctic is warming faster than thought cicero.uio.no CICERO 16.11.2009 Lite har skjedd på 20 år cicero.uio.no CICERO 18.11.2009 Nye globale utsleppstrendar cicero.uio.no CICERO 19.11.2009 Presseseminar før COP15 cicero.uio.no CICERO How understanding the human mind 19.11.2009 might save the world from CO2 cicero.uio.no CICERO An agreement on emission reductions Jorun Gran, Silje 20.11.2009 must be reached cicero.uio.no Pileberg Vulkanutbrudd bidrar minimalt til 23.11.2009 atmosfærens CO2-konsentrasjon cicero.uio.no CICERO 25.11.2009 Milepæl uten bindende avtale cicero.uio.no Jorunn Gran

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Obama announces 2020 emission target, 25.11.2009 Dec. 9 Copenhagen visit cicero.uio.no CICERO Sola forklarer ikke den globale 26.11.2009 oppvarmingen cicero.uio.no Jorunn Gran 27.11.2009 Kina inviterer USA til global klimaavtale cicero.uio.no CICERO 28.11.2009 Klimaseilas til København cicero.uio.no CICERO 30.10.2009 Kan få tilpasningsproblemer cicero.uio.no CICERO 01.12.2009 Landbruket i Norge og klimaendringene cicero.uio.no CICERO Kortsiktighet mer miljøfarlig enn 04.12.2009 biodiesel cicero.uio.no CICERO 07.12.2009 Uenige om kinesiske løfter cicero.uio.no Christian Bjørnæs 08.12.2009 Rajendra Pachauri til Oslo cicero.uio.no CICERO 08.12.2009 Shipping vil varme opp meir cicero.uio.no CICERO Foreslår karbonhåndtering som Kyoto- 09.12.2009 mekanisme cicero.uio.no Jorunn Gran Følg med på CICEROs aktiviteter under 09.12.2009 COP15 cicero.uio.no CICERO 10.12.2009 Styrker Obamas truverde cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg 11.12.2009 Dansk tekst bedre enn sitt rykte cicero.uio.no CICERO 11.12.2009 Kor store er CO2 -utsleppa dine? cicero.uio.no CICERO 11.12.2009 Rike land må betale cicero.uio.no Christian Bjørnæs 11.12.2009 Trege forhandlinger i København cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg Vil ha menneskerettigheter inn i 11.12.2009 klimaavtale cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg 14.12.2009 Nye rapporter om issmelting cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg 14.12.2009 Oppjusterer havnivåstigningen cicero.uio.no Petter Haugneland København viktig for amerikansk 16.12.2009 klimalov cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg Forvirring og usikkerhet i 17.12.2009 klimaforhandlingene cicero.uio.no CICERO 17.12.2009 Kyoto-løsningen vil øke utslippene cicero.uio.no CICERO 18.12.2009 Endrede livsvilkår for mennesker i Arktis cicero.uio.no CICERO 18.12.2009 Mulige veier videre cicero.uio.no Jorunn Gran 22.12.2009 Fleire lyspunkt etter København cicero.uio.no Silje Pileberg Globalt har de ti varmeste årene vært fra 29.12.2009 1998 og utover cicero.uio.no CICERO

Articles from Klima 6-09 Hva skjer i København? Date: Title: Issue Author:

The LEDER: Den gode viljen Klima 6-09 Tove Kolset editorial Hva skjer i København? Klima 6-09 Andreas Tjernshaugen board Framtida til den grøne concluded utviklingsmekanismen Klima 6-09 Asbjørn Torvanger 23.11.2009 Folkepanel ga ambisiøse klimaråd Klima 6-09 Hild Lamvik På veg mot nullutsleppshus? Klima 6-09 Silje Pileberg 147

Mindre utslippsreduksjon fra regnskogstiltak Klima 6-09 Hans Martin Seip Biodrivstoff ga økte matvarepriser Klima 6-09 Sofie Waage Skjeflo Klimaendringer tærer på bygninger Klima 6-09 Terje Grøntoft Tropeværet påvirkes av små endringer i sola Klima 6-09 Hans Martin Seip Klima forklart - rett og slett Klima 6-09 Jorunn Gran Lesetips fra Klima (not in table of contents) Klima 6-09 CICERO Ingen fiasko i København – ennå Klima 6-09 Pål Prestrud Klimaskepsis? Klima 6-09 Jørgen Løvland Fornøyde lesere av Klima (not in table of contents) Klima 6-09 CICERO Effektiv holdningspåvirkning Klima 6-09 Nina Dessau Hvordan ta miljøvennlige transportvalg Klima 6-09 Silje Pileberg Mange fag sammen for klimaet Klima 6-09 Jorunn Gran Når får vi høre mer fra IPCC? (not in table of contents) Klima 6-09 CICERO Kongsfjorden på Svalbard – forbi tippepunktet Klima 6-09 Jorunn Gran Klimaendringer kan gi krafteksport fra Norge Klima 6-09 Kristin Linnerud Abdirahman Omar, Ingunn Skjelvan, Are Forsuring påvist i havene rundt Norge Klima 6-09 Olsen Klimaendringene påvirker økosystemer Geir Wing Gabrielsen, på Svalbard Klima 6-09 Haakon Hop Arne Melsom, Vidar S. Modellering av havklima i Barentshavet Klima 6-09 Lien, Paul W. Budgell Solas rolle overdrevet Klima 6-09 Rasmus Benestad På baksiden (not in table of contents) Klima 6-09 Jorunn Gran Grafs (not in table of contents) Klima 6-09 CICERO

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Appendix 2

Overview of public communication written and/or published by CICERO in November and December 2015

Op-eds from CICERO on other platforms Date Title Medium Author 12.11.2015 Ekstra normalt ekstremvêr Framtida Borgar Aamaas 29.11.2015 Forsiktig optimist NRK Steffen Kallbekken 03.12.2015 Kloden skal reddes Dagsavisen Kristin Halvorsen 08.12.2015 Når ekstremvêr blir normalen Forskning.no Borgar Aamaas

Articles from the news section of cicero.uio.no Date Title Medium Author 13.11.2015 CICERO til stede under COP21 CICERO Editorial board Christian Bjørnæs 30.11.2015 Asia varmer Arktis CICERO (later removed) 01.12.2015 Pressebriefer COP21 CICERO Steffen Kallbekken Talfesting av norsk klimafinansiering til u- 04.12.2015 land CICERO Elisabeth Lannoo 12.12.2015 Global klimaavtale vedtatt i Paris CICERO/Klima Christian Bjørnæs

Klima November and December 2015 Date Title Medium Author 27.10.2015 Ekstremt normalt Klima Borgar Aamaas Paris 2015: Prosessen like viktig som 27.10.2015 avtalen Klima Steffen Kallbekken 18.11.2015 COP-begreper som høres ut som band Klima Eilif Ursin Reed 24.11.2015 Klimaendringer og konflikt i Syria Klima Hans Martin Seip 24.11.2015 Korallrev - sårbare eller motstandsdyktige? Klima Hans Martin Seip 24.11.2015 Mot en mer omfattende klimaavtale Klima Guri Bang 24.11.2015 Nye energier, nye muligheter Klima Monica Bjermeland 04.12.2015 En avtale blir til Klima Christian Bjørnæs Eilif Ursin Reed, 11.12.2015 Utslippene har stagnert, men vil det vare? Klima Monica Bjermeland 12.12.2015 Global klimaavtale vedtatt i Paris Klima Christian Bjørnæs 16.12.2017 How Paris will get the cash rolling Klima Elisabeth Lanloo 16.12.2015 Parisavtalen - hva ble egentlig vedtatt? Klima Astrid Arnslett 18.12.2015 What the Ocean would have said @ COP21 Klima Cecilie Mauritzen 18.12.2015 Forsker fra en flåte i Stillehavet Klima Cecilie Mauritzen 18.12.2015 Paris-avtalen skreddersydd USA Klima Guri Bang 18.12.2015 1,5 is a brave new world Klima Piers Forster Hans Asbjørn 18.12.2015 Ubesvarte spørsmål etter Paris Klima Aaheim

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