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The Islamic History and Civilization !"#$%&' ()$ *&+"'

Editorial Board

Hinrich Biesterfeldt Sebastian Günther

Honorary Editor Wadad Kadi

,-./01 234

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/ihc The Mongols’ Middle East

Continuity and Transformation in Ilkhanid

Edited by

Bruno De Nicola and Charles Melville

.15617 | 8-!*-7 Cover illustration: A Mongol prince studying the Qur’an, Illustration of Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh. (?), 1st quarter of 14th century. Water colours on paper. Original size: 20.3 cm × 26.7 cm. Staatsbibliothek Berlin, Orientabteilung, Diez A fol. 70, p. 8 no. 1. This seems to be a tent mosque. The inscription above the arch on the left, which is either the entrance or the mihrab, reads “Allah is the ruler” (or similar). Dschingis und seine Erben (exhibition catalogue), München 2005, p. 266. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: De Nicola, Bruno. | Melville, . P. (Charles Peter), 1951– Title: The Mongols’ Middle East : continuity and transformation in Ilkhanid Iran / edited by Bruno De Nicola and Charles Melville. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2016. | Series: Islamic history and civilization : studies and texts, 5!!7 0929-2403 ; volume 127 | Includes bibliographical references and index. IdentiGHers: .II7 2016004908 (print) | .II7 2016014826 (ebook) | 5!87 9789004311992 (hardback : acid-free paper) | 5!87 9789004314726 (e-book) | 5!87 9789004314726 (E-book) Subjects: .I!J: Mongols—Iran—History—To 1500. | Ilkhanid dynasty. | Iran—History—1256–1500. | Iran—Politics and government. | Iran—Social conditions. | Iran—Relations. | Social change—Iran—History—To 1500. ClassiGHcation: .II 6!289 .M66 2016 (print) | .II 6!289 (ebook) | 66I 955/.026—dc23 .I record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016004908

Want or need Open Access? Brill Open o9fers you the choice to make your research freely accessible online in exchange for a publication charge. Review your various options on brill.com/brill-open. Typeface for the , Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. %'') :;3;-3<:= %'>) ;4?-;:-:<-=22;;-3 (hardback) %'>) ;4?-;:-:<-=2<43-@ (e-book) Copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill 7,, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill 7, incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijho9f, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill 7, provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, 0A 01923, /!A. Fees are subject to change. Brill has made all reasonable e9forts to trace all rights holders to any copyrighted material used in this work. In cases where these e9forts have not been successful the publisher welcomes communications from copyright holders, so that the appropriate acknowledgements can be made in future editions, and to settle other permission matters. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner. Contents

Acknowledgements ,55 List of Illustrations K%%% Note on Transliteration %+ Contributors +

Introduction 1 Bruno De Nicola and Charles Melville

"#$% & The Mongol Conquest of the Middle East

1 Mongol Conquest Strategy in the Middle East 13 Timothy May

2 Continuity and Change in the Mongol Army of the 38 Reuven Amitai

"#$% ' Internal Actors: Politics, Economy and

3 Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and Patron: Mediation between Ruler and Ruled in the Ilkhanate 55 Esther Ravalde

4 The Economic Role of Mongol Women: Continuity and Transformation from to Iran 79 Bruno De Nicola

5 Faith and the Law: Religious Beliefs and the Death Penalty in the Ilkhanate 106 Florence Hodous K% LM)"&)"'

"#$% ) Culture and the Arts

6 Music in the Mongol Conquest of : Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī and the Ilkhanid Circle of Musicians 133 Michal Biran

7 Historical Epic as Mongol Propaganda? Juwaynī’s Motifs and Motives 155 Judith Kolbas

8 From the Mongols to the Timurids: Re+,nement and Attrition in Persian Painting 172 Karin Rührdanz

"#$% - Relationships with Neighbouring Actors

9 Champions of the Persian : The Mongols or the Turks? 195 Aptin Khanbaghi

10 Darughachi in 216 Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog

11 The Phoenix Mosque 237 George Lane

12 and Mongol Peripheral Politics: Asserting Sovereignty in the Middle East’s ‘Kurdish Zone’ (1260–1330) 277 Boris James

Epilogue

13 The End of the Ilkhanate and After: Observations on the Collapse of the Mongol World 309 Charles Melville

Index ==4 Acknowledgements

The editors would like to express their gratitude to all those colleagues who anonymously reviewed the papers published in this volume and o9fered their advice, comments and constructive criticism to improve the quality of the chapters. Apart from the collaboration of the contributors to this volume in reviewing the papers for publication, we have beneGHted from the knowledge of Mark Dickens (University of Alberta), Ladan Akbarnia (The British Museum) and Nur Sobers Khan (The Museum of , Doha). Also, special thanks go to Daniel Rolph for copy-editing the manuscript of this book. We would like to thank the Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (University of Cambridge) for support during the period when we organized the symposium for N-I01! (World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies) and at the beginning of the preparation of this volume. We are grateful to our col- leagues for their patience over the long process of assembling and preparing the book and for their faith in its GHnal appearance. Lastly, our appreciation goes to our families and friends who have helped throughout the process of making this book available. List of Illustrations

0.1 The , c. 1294 9 0.2 The Ilkhanid territories 10 8.1 Prince being equipped with arms and armour by the king 179 8.2 A king on horseback encounters a slain warrior 180 8.3 On a terrace, courtiers take care of a man fainting in front of a ruler 182 8.4 A king on horseback is greeted by a group of people led by a man held up by a device installed between two buildings 185 8.5 Zangis in a castle attacked by warriors aiming to free captives 186 11.1 Annotated map of Qinsai based on locally produced maps from . In classical Chinese fashion, the map is south orientated with north at the bottom 242 11.2 An early 20th century depiction of the Phoenix Mosque complex before the implementation of the Town Planner’s modernisation scheme 251 11.3 The tombstone belonging to Khwāja Muḥammad bin Arslān Khānbāliqi, d.1317 271 12.1 Map of Kurdish dominated territories in the 279 Note on Transliteration

Place names have been given in their current anglicized forms where appli- cable, as have terms and names such as , , vizier, which have entered the English language. Due to the lack of academic agreement on the standardization of Mongolian names, we have followed the spelling of names used by John Andrew Boyle in both The Successors of and History of the World Conqueror, with the exception of the name of Chinggis Khan. For Persian and script, we have followed the transliteration of names, works and speciGHc terminology proposed by the Library of Congress. Finally, Chinese characters have been transcribed using pinyin system while Russian has been maintained in cyrillic script. Contributors

Prof. Reuven Amitai (Hebrew University of ) completed his 8A studies at the University of Pennsylvania and his 0A and PhD at the Hebrew University. He is Eliyahu Elath Professor of Islamic History and works on Middle Eastern and Central Asian history from 1000–1500 I1. His recent publications include Holy War and Rapprochement: Studies in the Relations between the and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260–1335) (Brepols, 2013) and Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change: The Mongols and Their Eurasian Predecessors (co-edited with Michal Biran, University of Hawai’i Press, 2015). In 2014–16, Reuven Amitai is a fel- low at the Annemarie Schimmel Kolleg for Mamluk Studies at the University of Bonn, Germany, and is engaged on a study of the southern in the Ayyubid and Mamluk periods.

Prof. Michal Biran (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) is a historian of Inner Asia and a member of the Israeli Academy of Science and Humanities. She is the Max and Sophie Mydans Foundation Professor in the Humanities, and currently (2015) the director of the Louis Frieberg Center for East Asian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where she also leads the 1PI-funded project “Mobility, Empire and Cross-Cultural Contacts in Mongol Eurasia” (http://mongol.huji .ac.il/). Together with Hodong Kim she is now editing The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire (2 volumes) for Cambridge University Press.

Dr. Bayarsaikhan Dashdondog (National University of Mongolia) holds a 8A in Philology from the State University of Erevan (Armenia), a MSt in Armenian Studies (University of Oxford, /Q) and a DPhil in Oriental Studies (University of Oxford, /Q). At pres- ent, she is a Lecturer at the National University of Mongolia, Department of History, teaching a History of Mongol Empire and . She is engaged in the research projects of the Mongols in the 13–17th century (Monsudar Grant, 2015) and History of the Mongol Il-Khans (State Grant, 2014–2016). She is a part of the international scholarly project of the Cambridge (eds. Michal Biran and Kim Hodong).

Dr. Bruno De Nicola (University of St. Andrews) holds a 8A in History from the University of Barcelona (Spain), an 0A in Middle Eastern Studies (!-A!, University of London) and a PhD in Middle Eastern History (University of Cambridge). IM)"R%>#"MR' +%

At present, he is Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies in the School of History, University of St Andrews in the United Kingdom. A specialist in Medieval History of the Middle East and Islamic manuscripts, he is now part of the project “The Islamisation of (1100–1500)” (European Research Council, grant number 284076).

Dr. Florence Hodous (Hebrew University of Jerusalem) holds a 8A in History and Development Studies (!-A!, University of London), an 0A in Historical Research Methods (!-A!), and a PhD in History (!-A!). Currently she is researching judges and legal systems of the Mongol empire as a post-doctoral fellow in the research project “Mobility, Empire and Cross-Cultural Contacts in Mongol Eurasia” at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (European Research Council, grant num- ber 312397).

Dr. Boris James (Institut Français du Proche- / ) holds an 0A in Monde Arabe Moderne from the University Aix-Marseille 5 and a PhD in History (Université -Ouest Nanterre-La Défense). He is Research Fellow at Institut Français du Proche-Orient (Ifpo) and head of its Erbil branch since 2014. He is a spe- cialist of Medieval and Early modern History of the Middle East, especially Kurdish society and History. Nowadays he is implementing a research project on the Kurdish principalities and the role of Armenian actors in the vicinity of during the 15th and 16th centuries.

Dr. Aptin Khanbaghi (5!0I— University in London) is a senior researcher at Aga Khan University. He received his doctorate from Cambridge University in . He is the series editor for the Muslim Civilisations Abstracts and the author of The Fire, the Star and the Cross: Minority in Medieval and Early Modern Iran (58 Tauris).

Dr Judith Kolbas (Miami University, Ohio, /!A) received her 8A in International Studies from George Washington University in Washington, 6.I. in 1964 and then attended the American University of Beirut for an 0A in 1966. Returning to the United States, she attended the State University of New York at Bu9falo where she began her medieval Islamic and numismatic studies. Eventually, she achieved her PhD from New York University in 1991 after ten years of forming a cata- logue of Mongol currency in Iran that required visits to museums and col- lectors around Europe and the Middle East. Since then, she has continued to +%% LM)"R%>#"MR' teach, research and publish on this topic as well as support related organiza- tions. For example, she has been a vice president of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland and then re-founded the PA! branch in in 2005. She is also currently a member of the Oriental Numismatic Society as well as the Royal Numismatic Society. She also founded and was Director of the Central Asian Numismatic Institute (Cambridge, /Q) until 2012. As soon as possible, she went to Mongolia in 1992, has lived and taught there and visited it most recently in 2014.

Dr George Lane (!-A!, University of London). After a varied career spent traveling throughout the Middle East and the Far East, George Lane joined !-A! both as a student in the History Dept and a teacher in the Academic English Dept. After receiving his PhD from the University of London in 2001 he began his career as a histo- rian teaching, researching and publishing on all aspects of the Mongol Empire and the mediaeval Islamic world. His interest in the connections between Yuan and Ilkhanid Iran led to his discovery of the tombstones in Hangzhou’s 1284 mosque and eventually to a generous grant from the British Academy’s Mid-Career Scholarship Award to further this research. A full record of the Hangzhou project with contributions from fellow scholars is currently being funded for publication by 85S!.

Dr. Timothy May (University of North ) holds a 8A in History and Anthropology from the College of William & Mary, an 0A in Central Eurasian Studies from Indiana University, and a PhD from the University of Wisconsin (Madison). He is the author of The Mongol Art of War (2007) and The Mongol Conquest in World History (2012). When not writing or teaching about the Mongols, he practices the Dark Arts of Administration as the Associate Dean of the College of Arts and Letters.

Prof. Charles Melville (University of Cambridge) holds a 8A Hons. in Oriental Studies (University of Cambridge), 0A in Islamic History (!-A!) and PhD, in Oriental Studies (University of Cambridge). At present he is Professor of Persian History at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Pembroke College. He has been a long- serving member of the Governing Council of the British Institute of Persian Studies and chairman of the Research Committee. Since 1999, he has been Director of the Shahnama Project, and since 2006 he has been President of The Islamic Manuscript Association (*50A). He has published extensively on the IM)"R%>#"MR' +%%% history and in the Mongol to Safavid periods and the illustration of Persian manuscripts as well as on the Shāhnama of Firdawsī, the illustration of the text and its reception.

Ms. Esther Ravalde (Independent Scholar) studied Persian at Wadham College, Oxford (0A Oriental Studies), and holds an 0A in Historical Research Methods from !-A!, University of London. She now teaches History at the Nelson Thomlinson School in Wigton, and trains teachers for the University of Buckingham.

Prof. Karin Rührdanz (Royal Ontario Museum-University of Toronto) obtained her PhD from Halle University in 1974. Currently she is Senior Curator of Islamic Art at the Royal Ontario Museum and Professor of Islamic Art at the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Toronto. A specialist in the arts of the book, she studies the text-image relationship in manuscripts from Iran, Central Asia and the . Recent research focuses on Central Asian min- iature paintings of the 15th–17th centuries as well as the formation of genre- speciGHc pictorial programs for lyric poetry and other genres beyond the epic.

Introduction

Bruno De Nicola and Charles Melville

The Ilkhanate is the name by which historians refer to the political entity that governed present-day Iran, and Eastern Anatolia between 1260 and 1335, with a short afterlife until 1353.! It is de"#ned by the establishment of a dynasty of Mongol rulers descended from Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) by his son (d. 1232) and especially by the descendants of Hülegü (d. 1265). The ori- gin and meaning of the term ‘’ (or īl-Khān) has been subject of some academic discussion over time. The title Ilkhan had been used among the Great Seljuqs in the eleventh century and appeared in a Uyghur of a seventh-century Chinese biography of a Buddhist pilgrim.& Although the particle ‘Il’ originally meant ‘country,’ it seems that it became used as a term to refer to ‘subservient’ or ‘submissive’ in the Mongol period. This has raised discussions about the legitimacy of the establishment of the Ilkhanate as a separate ulus of the Mongol Empire, suggesting that the Mongols of Iran were seen as the guardians of the western lands of the Empire under the rule of the Great Khan living in China rather than a realm in its own right.' Despite this, the term ‘Ilkhan’ seems to have been in use among the Mongols of Iran and the people they conquered since at least 1259, when numismatic evidence con"#rms the use of the term, but also "#nds earlier references in other Middle Eastern sources.( The arrival of the Mongols in the Middle East has been interpreted from very di)ferent angles by historians of the region since the early twentieth century. The initial approach was to see it as an example of a confrontation between Civilization and Barbarism, where the former was represented by the high culture of the ‘Abbasid and the latter by the in"#del and predatory

* Apart from the chapter in the Cambridge by Boyle, “Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khāns,” 303–421, there is remarkably little scholarly work dedicated solely to a political narrative of the Ilkhanid dynasty, the nearest modern contribution being by Bertold Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran, of which the fourth printing was made in 1985. David Morgan’s chapter, “The Ilkhanate, 1260–1335,” in the forthcoming volume of The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire, might be expected to update Boyle’s 50-year-old contribution; meanwhile, for a recent survey of the literature on the Mongol period (not exclusively con- cerned with Iran), see Morgan, The Mongols, 181–227. , Allsen, Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia, 21. - Ibid., 21–22. . Amitai-Preiss, “Evidence for the Early Use of the Title īlkhān among the Mongols,” 353–61.

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Mongols. This historiographical approach saw the Mongol-dominated Middle East merely as a dark period in Islamic history, which would gloriously revive with the rise of the Ottoman and Safavid .: This reading was based on the accounts of some Islamic (mostly Arabic) sources that saw the Mongol invasions as a divine punishment for the sins of the in the Middle East and as a purely destructive interlude. Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, this idea lost ground and the period of Mongol domination of Iran and the Levant was re-examined in a new light that identi"#ed it as a remarkable period that o)fered unique opportunities for historical enquiry.; It is in this context that new studies on the political history of the Mongols of Iran were followed by research on their economic impact, their religious transformation and gender relationships between conqueror and conquered people. Studies in the second half of the twentieth century contributed to breaking the paradigm that viewed the Mongols as mere barbarians and prepared the "#eld for a new understanding of the Mongol Empire as a period when East and West were connected and in which the Mongols were not only the mil- itary elite of this vast territory, but acted as cultural brokers, facilitating the exchange of goods, people and ideas from the Mediterranean to China.< This approach drew attention onto the variety of political, economic, social and cultural processes that were unleashed in the Middle East by the speci"#c cir- cumstances created by the conquest and settlement of the Mongols. For exam- ple, the Iranian region was under a non-Muslim sovereign for the "#rst time since the Arab conquest, o)fering a new religious scenario in the Middle East. Further, Iran’s integration into the main overland trade networks from the Mediterranean to China, freshly stimulated by the Mongols’ interest in trade, o)fered a new economic paradigm for the region. And "#nally, the interaction between nomadic rulers and sedentary subjects generated speci"#c sociopo- litical dynamics between conquerors and conquered that shaped institutions and traditions in the area. These special characteristics and many others have contributed to the expansion of the historical enquiry on the Mongols in the Middle East in the last few decades.

= This has been mainly the approach of some nationalistic history produced in Iran, China and where the period of Mongol dominion is generally regarded as a dark period or transi- tion from one glorious moment in the past to another. > See Morgan, “The Mongol Empire: A Review Article,” 120–25. ? The main promoter of this idea was Thomas Allsen with works such as “Biography of a Cultural Broker. Ch’eng-Hsiang in China and Iran,” Commodity and exchange in the Mongol Empire, and Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. 3ABCDEFGBHDA @

It is in this context that this book aims to contribute to the history of the period. It addresses various aspects of continuity and transformation in Mongol and local society in Iran in particular and the Middle East in general. The di)ferent contributions explore long- and short-term continuities and discontinuities in di)ferent layers of Iranian society. A previous attempt to explore these issues was made by A. K. S. Lambton more than a quarter of a century ago.I This pioneering work had a more comparative approach as it included sociopolitical developments in Persia during the pre-Mongol period. Lambton saw the Seljuq rulers as continuators of Islamic traditions and insti- tutions while the Mongols represented in her view “a break with the past: the nomads [Mongols] were the state and political rule was in the hands of their leaders, who formed a kind of military aristocracy. They were hostile to settled life and exploited the townspeople and the peasants.”J Over 25 years since this observation, the research produced on the Mongol domination of the Middle East has shown that the Mongol invasions did not create such a clear-cut break with the past. Recent work by David Durand-Guédy, in particular, emphasizes ways in which Seljuq practice anticipated the Mongols.!K In fact, as much of the research presented here shows, continuity prevailed in some areas while in others transformations appear clearly. Further, the present works also look at elements of continuity and transformation not only among the Persian popu- lation or Islamic institutions but also among the Mongols who came from the Far East and settled in the Middle East. We hope that this dual approach will produce a more complex and coherent view of the Ilkhanid period. This book is the result of a joint endeavour between a mentor and his disci- ple. It represents, to some extent, both a beginning and an end of an academic journey into the Mongol Empire for both editors of this volume. For one it represents the closure of a fascinating period of academic activity as a gradu- ate student at the University of Cambridge and for the other, it is something of a valedictory engagement with the Mongols while he looks ahead to exploring more fully other periods of Persian culture, history and the arts. The idea of this book began back in 2009 with the possibility of proposing a symposium on the Mongols’ Middle East for the World Congress for Middle East Studies (L5481M) in Barcelona in 2010. It took a good number of years to put together the original papers presented in the Conference and complement them with other contributions from colleagues and friends. But after an arduous

N Lambton, Continuity and Change. O Lambton, Continuity and Change, 26. *P Durand-Guédy, “Ruling from the Outside” and “The Tents of the Saljuqs.” Q 01 234567 720 81693661 editorial journey, we are very grateful that the research contained in this volume is "#nally becoming available in print. The symposium on which the present publication is based aimed to chal- lenge some pre-established concepts about the role and the legacy of the Mongols in the Middle East, where aspects of politics, religion, culture, society and gender were taken into consideration in searching for a more comprehen- sive understanding of the role of this ‘external’ ruler in the region. The sym- posium brought new ideas and concepts relating to the Mongol Empire to the forefront. Papers explored the inRSuence of Mongol dominion on the cultural, political and social life of the region in three panels, each devoted to analysing di)ferent patterns of continuity and transformation in a variety of disciplines. Not all the participants of the symposium were able to contribute to this vol- ume but fortunately, colleagues like Esther Ravalde, Florence Horus, Aptin Khanbaghi and Boris James have generously contributed papers to enhance the quality of the book and enrich the debate. The present collection is divided into four parts, each dedicated to a speci"#c area of Mongol activity in the Middle East. The arrangement aims to themati- cally cover aspects of the Mongol conquest and settlement in Iran. The ini- tial section contains chapters dealing with the conquest of the Middle East by the Mongols and the composition of the Mongol army that came to Iran in the . Timothy May explores the tactics of Mongol conquest that he describes as a “Tsunami Strategy.” In his view, this strategy can be explained simply as a pattern in which the Mongol army “invaded a neighbouring area, devastated a large region, but then receded back into the empire while retaining only a relatively small portion of the invaded region.” However, as he also points out, this tactic was more complex and required elaborate planning and coordina- tion. For that reason, the chapter also explores the tamma units of the Mongols and the fundamental role that they played in defending and expanding the Empire as border armies. In addition, May uses the conquest of Anatolia as a case study in which the Tsunami strategy seems to have been partially aban- doned, but he highlights the continuity of the Mongols’ military institutions in the region up to the arrival of Hülegü. In the second chapter, Reuven Amitai addresses the Mongol army in the Ilkhanate by exploring aspects of the seden- tarization of the Mongols and the possibility that this process would (or would not) have a)fected changes in the composition of the Mongols’ military. His chapter draws comparisons with other nomadic societies that settled in the Middle East, like the Mamluks and the Great Seljuqs, and engages in dialogue with the secondary literature on the topic. Amitai concludes that the Mongol army did not undergo substantial change in its composition, technology and 3ABCDEFGBHDA T strategy, maintaining the nomadic elements that characterize the Mongol campaigns of the thirteenth century into the fourteenth century. The second part moves the centre of the analysis to the establishment of a Mongol-controlled Middle East with chapters dealing with politics, economy and religious issues in the Ilkhanate. In chapter 3, Esther Ravalde investigates the role of the famous Iranian vizier Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī (d. 1284) in the Mongol court. She explores the way in which the Ilkhanate was governed by looking at the role of patronage that the vizier used to establish his authority across the Mongol territories. Through patron-client relationships, Ravalde claims that Juwaynī managed to “collect taxes, strengthen Ilkhan rule in Anatolia, medi- ate between the ruler and the ruled, and develop alliances with the religious classes.” She suggests that although there is a continuity in the institution of the vizierate under the Mongols, the case of Juwaynī shows that this position had limitations if compared with previous dynasties that ruled the area. In this view, the Ilkhanid vizier was not as powerful as before and had to negotiate with Mongol elites and the Ilkhanid government to administer the realm. The transformation of a political institution such as the vizierate is followed by Bruno De Nicola’s chapter on patterns of continuity and transformation in the economic status of Mongol women. He observes both continuity and transfor- mation in the way women acquired and accumulated wealth. By exploring the di)ferent ways in which women received and used their resources, he traces the evolution of these practices as the Mongols moved into the Middle East. He suggests that the economic status of women mutated and adapted when they reached Iran to the point of expanding the areas of these women’s economic activity as the resources at their disposal increased. However, he points out that faced with this economic success of Mongol women, change was triggered by Khan, who identi"#ed the resources in female hands and appropriated them for his own political bene"#t. Finally in this section, Florence Horus deals with how religious beliefs a)fected the implementation of the death penalty in Mongol territory in the Middle East. By exploring di)ferent conceptions of capital punishment among the di)ferent religions that inRSuenced the Mongols, she suggests that punishment and amnesties were connected to the di)ferent religions that coexisted in the Ilkhanate. This multi-faith environment, she argues, meant that the inRSuence of one or another religion on the applicability of the death penalty prevailed, depending on the political context in which the Mongols of Iran found themselves at a given time. The third section is dedicated to the continuity and transformation of artistic production under the Mongols in the Middle East. In the initial chapter of this section, Michal Biran explores the scarcely researched "#eld of music U 01 234567 720 81693661 in Ilkhanid Baghdad. The chapter uncovers the life of Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī (613–93/1216–94), who was the musician of the ‘Abbasid Caliph at the time of the Mongol invasion of . Providing "#rst a translation of the musician’s own account of the fall of Baghdad and then exploring the cultural life of the city after the Mongol conquest, Biran suggests that at least in the "#eld of music, the Mongols did not provoke a rupture in the artistic production of the ‘Abbasid dynasty nor did they precipitate a decline in in Baghdad. In the following chapter, Judith Kolbas proposes to look at the Tār"̄kh-i Jahāngushā, the historical work of ʿAṭā Juwaynī (d. 1283), from a literary point of view rather than the usual historiographical approach. She advocates seeing the work as an epic prose text with clear motifs that would have helped Juwaynī to explain to a Persian audience the new political order brought by the Mongols. The "#nal chapter in this section is dedicated to a di)ferent method of artis- tic representation that developed during the Mongol period. Karin Rührdanz explores the development in the illustration of manuscripts that occurred from the Mongol into the Timurid period. She notices that in the "#fteenth century there was an increasing preference for illustrating works that expressed mythi- cal ideas in the form of poetry, but also a continuity with the Mongol period in the illustration of classical Persian works such as the Shāhnāma and Kalīla wa Dimna. However, the more popular genres that she discusses, depicting sub- jects still not entirely identi"#ed, seem to have fallen out of the repertoire after the Jalayirid period. The fourth section contains chapters dedicated to the interaction of the Mongols’ Middle East with its neighbours. The "#rst chapter by Aptin Khanbaghi focuses mostly on Anatolia to explore the role played by the Mongols in ‘chang- ing the fate’ of the . By looking back at the status of Persian in the pre-Mongol period and comparing it with the impact of the Mongol conquest, Khanbaghi suggests that the Mongols provided the umbrella under which a Persianized Turkish population that was already present in Iran could expand Persian language and literature to territories further a"#eld such as Anatolia, southern Khurasan and . Continuing with territories subject to the Mongols but with a certain degree of autonomy, Dashdondog Bayarsaikhan’s contribution looks at the Mongol implementation of the military and administrative institution of the darughachi in Armenia. The institution served as a means to collect taxes and control the region newly conquered by the Mongols. Yet, in doing so, it not only fundamentally changed the status of Armenia in the Mongol Empire by directly incorporating the region into the Ilkhanate after its formation in the late 1250s but also helped the local rulers (in this case ) to adapt to Mongol command. The 3ABCDEFGBHDA Y establishment of the Ilkhanate had a clear impact on life and institutions of regions bordering Iran such as Armenia and Anatolia. However, less intuitive is the inRSuence that Ilkhanid subjects had in areas far beyond the Ilkhanid bor- ders such as Eastern China. The case discussed in the chapter by George Lane included in this section focuses our attention on the city of Hangzhou in the heart of Mongol China. Through the evidence provided mostly by inscriptions in steles and Chinese sources, the chapter explores the cultural, economic and religious activity of the Phoenix Mosque of Hangzhou, which played an impor- tant role as the place that brought together Iranian and Central Asian Muslims coming from the western parts of the Empire to China. Closing this section, the contribution of Boris James covers the relations between the Ilkhanate and the Mamluks by looking at the role that di)ferent Kurdish tribes played in the long- standing conRSict pursued by the Mongols of Iran and the Mamluks of . James argues that these tribes acted as a bu)fer in the conRSict, shifting sides and controlling bordering areas between the two major empires of the Middle East at the time. Finally, the book ends with an epilogue containing the contribution of Charles Melville. This chapter o)fers a discussion of the end of the Ilkhanate as a political entity and explores the reasons for its collapse. Melville confronts modern views and contemporary accounts of the end of Ilkhanid rule and looks at the di)ferent reasons that have been suggested to explain the fall of the Ilkhans, such as acculturation, and the ‘natural’ limitations of nomadic rule. With all these elements, he suggests that the end of the Ilkhanate might have been due to a ‘loss of identity’ and an erosion of Chinggisid legiti- macy in a realm that remained an obstinately Mongol regime caught in the “turbulence of acculturation,” which provoked its collapse from within. In sum, the contributions to this volume serve as a good example of the fertile ground that Ilkhanid rule in the Middle East provides for historians of the period. They also help us to understand di)ferent aspects of the evolution that occurred in institutions, economic conditions, military organization and civil society both among the Mongol conquerors and the native populations. The conclusion that seems to emerge from the research presented here is that patterns of both continuity and transformation can be observed depending on where we focus our attention. The interaction between the Mongols and the people of the Middle East was a dynamic and complex one which cannot be covered fully in this one volume. The editors hope, nonetheless, that these contributions will contribute to maintaining interest in this fascinating period in the history of the Middle East and encourage further research into the his- tory of the Ilkhanid dynasty of Iran. Z 01 234567 720 81693661

Bibliography

Allsen, Thomas T. “Biography of a Cultural Broker. Bolad Ch’eng-Hsiang in China and Iran.” In The Court of the Ilkhans 1290–1340, edited by Julian Raby and Teresa Fitzherbert, 7–22. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. ———. Commodity and Exchange in the Mongol Empire: A Cultural History of Islamic Textiles. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. ———. Culture and Conquest in Mongol Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. “Evidence for the Early Use of the Title īlkhān among the Mongols.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1:3 (1991): 353–61. Boyle, John Andrew. “Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khāns.” In The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 5, edited by John Andrew Boyle, 303–421. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968. Durand-Guédy, David. “Ruling from the Outside: A New Perspective on Early Turkish Kingship in Iran.” In Every Inch a King. Comparative Studies on Kings and Kingship in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds, edited by Lynette Mitchell and Charles Melville, 325–42. Leiden: Brill, 2013. ———. “The Tents of the Saljuqs.” In Turko-Mongol Rulers, Cities and City Life, edited by D. Durand-Guédy, 149–89. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Lambton, Ann K. S. Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia: Aspects of Administrative, Economic, and Social History, 11th–14th Century. Albany, 2.[.: Bibliotheca Persica, 1988. Morgan, David. “The Mongol Empire: A Review Article.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 44:1 (1981): 120–25. ———. The Mongols. 2nd ed., Oxford: Blackwell, 2007. ———. “The Ilkhanate, 1260–1335.” In The Cambridge History of the Mongol Empire, edited by Michal Biran and Kim Hodong. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming. Spuler, Bertold. Die Mongolen in Iran. Politik, Verwaltung und Kultur der Ilchanzeit 1220–1350. 4th ed. Leiden: Brill, 1985. 3ABCDEFGBHDA \ a a Se East China u outh China Se S Hangzho ) T KHAN u

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bHcFC_ `./ The Ilkhanid territories. ]CDd %&'(&)*, +,-.*, /'0 1234-*, e_Ff_A 7dHBgH gAE 8HGhgi jHCgA (_Ek.), /``T. !"#$ % The Mongol Conquest of the Middle East

!"#$%&' ( Mongol Conquest Strategy in the Middle East

Timothy May

Since the Mongols created the largest contiguous empire in history, it is impor- tant to explore the process by which the Mongols incorporated territory into this empire. Through this it becomes clear that the Mongols possessed a stan- dard strategy initiated during the reign of Ögetei, although antecedents clearly exist from the period of Chinggis Khan, whereby they invaded a region and caused considerable devastation but only intended to keep a small portion of the area they conquered. Meanwhile, the Mongols established a military force known as a tamma in this new borderland, which then used the region to control the Mongol frontier as well as to launch raids or intimidate neighbor- ing powers.) I term this strategy as the “Tsunami Strategy.”* An examination of the Mongol invasion of the Seljuq sultanate of Rūm is particularly useful in understanding this process as, at ,-rst glance, it appears to have been a devia- tion from the Tsunami Strategy. Furthermore, the resulting political relation- ship between the Mongols and the Seljuqs demonstrates the complexity of the repercussions of the use of the Tsunami Strategy as well as the role of the tamma within it. Finally, to fully appreciate the scale on which the Mongols applied this strategy, their actions within Rūm will be placed in the overall con- text of Mongol operations in the Middle East, demonstrating that the Mongols viewed it as a theatre of operations rather than haphazard conquests.

In its simplest explanation, the Tsunami Strategy meant that the Mongols invaded a neighbouring area, devastated a large region, but then receded back into the empire while retaining only a relatively small portion of the invaded

. For more on the tamma, including the term’s origins, see Aubin, “L’Ethnogenèse des Qaraunas,” 65–95; Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci People,” 41–59; Qu Dafeng, “On the Qusiqul Army,” 266–72; Ostrowski, “The tamma,” 262–77, and see below. The ,-rst detachment that appears to function in the manner of a tamma appears in 1209, when Chinggis Khan assigns Toquchar with troops to guard the western frontier of the Mongol state. 0 May, “The Mechanics of Conquest and Governance,” 131–36. My thanks to Michal Biran for her suggestion to change it from the more cumbersome “Tsunami Method of Conquest,” which I used in my dissertation, to the “Tsunami Strategy.”

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_551 (1 234 region. Of course, the strategy was more complex than this and consisted of a set number of steps. The ,-rst step involved the gathering of complete intelligence on the enemy before the invasion was made or even before war was declared. This intelli- gence originated from earlier raids and diplomatic missions, as well as reports from merchants and other travellers. The next step was planning the campaign based on the gathered intelligence. This planning was essential as the Mongol military commanders ultimately operated on a very rigid time schedule with all operations being enacted within it.5 Although the independent command- ers acted according to their own decisions, they still operated within the con- ,-nes of the master schedule. Thus columns hundreds of miles apart could still rendezvous against strongholds. These rendezvous points were decided at a quriltai or congress at the same time as the armies were called up. The next event was the invasion, which usually began with the Mongols striking at one point. This was the crashing of the wave. After this, the armies divided and created havoc on a wide front and then eventually converged upon a pre-designated region. Often, the convergence appeared as if the Mongols were retreating, but in reality this was the ebb of the tide, before it 67owed back to the frontier. By striking in many columns, the Mongols pre- vented their opponents from unifying, as each noble needed his own forces to defend his own locality. Thus, the local power could not risk assisting any- one else, thereby allowing the main Mongol force to concentrate on the prime target. Meanwhile, the surrounding regions were devastated. Again, the local forces remained on the defensive. It should be noted that this di8fered from a “scorched earth” policy. In the latter, the intent was to destroy and often lit- erally scorch the earth so that the region could not be occupied (by invader or defender). The Mongols’ intent in the Tsunami Strategy was to destroy the defensive and o8fensive capabilities—not to make it uninhabitable. This method of invasion also confused the defenders. Often, while the defend- ers thought they were being attacked, the Mongols suddenly retreated. The Mongols did not conquer all of the areas their forces invaded; however, they withdrew to a now stabilized and conquered area. Thus the Mongols did not make sweeping conquests in which they gained vast amounts of territory, but rather, they slowly and steadily incorporated territory into the empire. Once a small amount of territory was ,-rmly in their control, they moved into the next land, which was already weakened. Therefore, the Mongols appeared to have conquered rapidly, but it was because they had already undermined the defence of the next area.

9 Sinor, “On Mongol Strategy,” 239; May, The Mongol Art of War, 82–83. ;<=>

One could argue that as the Mongol forces were divided, they could be destroyed piecemeal. This is not so, as this tactic only worked if the opponent was more mobile than the Mongols. Rarely, if ever, did the Mongols meet a foe who could equal their mobility, and the individual columns were strong enough to defend themselves. Thus, unless a force was ambushed, the Mongols could always retreat faster than their opponents could advance. Furthermore, because of their sophisticated screen of scouts and signalling techniques, the Mongols were rarely surprised.I If the Mongols had remained in a single column for the entire campaign, they ran the risk of being tied down by a united force. Thus, if the army was defeated, they could not avenge it as at ʿAyn Jālūt in 1260. The success of the Mongols was not that they were invincible, but that they did not allow many opportunities for their armies to be eliminated. One force could be defeated, but it was almost guaranteed the victors would have to face another force very quickly, one which often arrived only days after its predecessor was defeated. Thus the Mongols could rely on reinforcements while the enemy, no matter how resilient, risked being worn down by the constant dispatch of new armies. Normally, the Mongols took the most heavily forti,-ed or most impor- tant strongholds last, thereby exhausting their opponents psychologically and materially. Refugees, those who were not enlisted or slaughtered, 67ed to these points, creating a strain on food supplies and most importantly, water. Furthermore, most refugees were not soldiers or even capable of assisting in the city’s defence due to their weakened condition.L The key to the success of the ‘Tsunami’ was the transition from military rule to civilian rule. Based on Mongol activities in Iran and the Jin Empire, a pat- tern of transition from military to civil government occurred. Paul Buell, in his study of the Mongol ruling establishment in China, noted that the chiliarchy or the minqan (pl. minqad) was the ,-rst ruling establishment which the Mongols utilized.M It was the basic unit of organization in the early Mongol government, both for taxes and for military levies. Over time, this changed as the empire expanded and became increasingly complex. Buell also noted that initially in China, the most important early institution through which the Mongols

N Polo, The Travels, 261. The Mamluks of Egypt are among the few who did surprise the Mongols, as they did at ‘Ayn Jalūt. While the Mongols were aware the Mamluks were in the vicinity, they did not appear to know their exact location until the Mamluks seized the better position. O Carpini, “History of the Mongols,” 36, 38; Paris, English History, P:312; Hung, Men-da bei-lu, 67. Q Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci People,” 47. (R 234 ruled was the tamma.S These forces were military in nature and situated on the frontier of the Empire, usually newly conquered lands. Indeed, the tamma was the main instrument through which territory was incorporated and held for the Mongol Empire, and the tamma often remained at its post for several years.T If possible, the tamma also was used to expand the Empire into border- ing territories. The ,-rst appearance of this term connected to a unit used in military operations appears in The Secret History of the Mongols, §273, which discusses Ögetei’s establishment of tammachin in the former Jin Empire. Igor de Rachewiltz views these as mounted garrison troops. The Chinese term is tamma or scout horse.U Although the term ,-rst appears in §273 of The Secret History of the Mongols, which is situated in 1234, the ,-rst detachment appears earlier. Buell indicates that it appeared with Muqali in 1217 or 1218 when that Mongol general received “,-ve ‘tribal’ groupings comprised of Onggirat, Ikeres, Mangqut, Uru’ut, and Jalayir, the latter belonging to his own family, to secure conquered Chinese domains in the qan’s absence. To this tamma nucleus were associated various local groupings as an ‘outer’ circle around the Mongol ‘royal’ element.”)V Evidence of units that functioned in the manner of a tamma appears even earlier. In the winter of 1211, Chinggis Khan prepared for war against the Jin. In addi- tion to gathering his army, he still maintained vigilance against Güchülüg of the Naiman in the west and the possibility of internal rebellion in his absence. To this end, he dispatched Toquchar to the west.)) Meanwhile, Temüge Otchigin remained in Mongolia to maintain order. Thus with an army of roughly

W Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci,” 45; Aubin, “L’Ethogenèse des Qaraunas,” 74–75; Ostrowski, “The tamma,” 264. X Chormaqan’s tamma remained in Iran from 1230 to 1237 before moving to the Mughan plain in Azerbaijan in 1234–1235. It remained there until Baiju moved it to Rūm with Hülegü’s campaign, as will be discussed in this paper. Also see Aubin, “L’Ethnogenèse des Qaraunas,” 65–95, on how a tamma in became a distinct group over time. Y Rachewiltz, ed., The Secret History, §273 (hereafter !"#). Also see Igor de Rachewiltz’s brief commentary on the term in Idem, !"#, 2: 1002–1003. .Z Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci People,” 46. Buell bases his dates on the Shengwu Qin Zheng Lu. See He Qiutao, Shengwu Qin Zheng Lu, 50 (Hereafter !$%&'). Muqali received a tümen from the Onggud, four minqad of Uru’ut, one mingqan of Arulat, one Mangghut minqad, The Onggirat provided three minqad, while the Ikeres and Jayilar provided two minqad each. This force was also supplemented by Khitans who joined the Mongols in 1218. .. !$%&', 49–50; Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. B. Karīmī, 320 [hereafter Rashīd/ Karīmī]. Idem ‘u’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of , translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, 1: 213 [hereafter Rashīd/Thackston]. ;<=>

100,000 men, Chinggis Khan marched south in April, 1211. Toquchar’s posi- tion placed him in position to not only protect Mongolia against the Naiman prince Güghülüg, who took refuge in after being defeated at the Battle of the Irtysh River in 1209, but also to render aid to the Uighurs and to Arslan Khan of the Qarluq, who also submmited in January or February 1211.)* Toquchar served as the ,-rst tammachi on the western border of Mongolia as a deterrent to Güchülüg, a monumental role. Although Toquchar is not speci,-- cally referred to as a tammachi in the sources, he may have been the ,-rst such person in that position. Members of the tamma were known as tammachi (pl. tammachin), although the sources usually refer speci,-cally to the commander of the tamma when using this term. Attempting to de,-ne the tamma has, nevertheless, generated a series of scholarly debates.)5 Donald Ostrowski questions whether the tamma/ tammachi refers to both the individual and the group, or whether one term refers to an individual and the other to a group, or if there is even another way of understanding the term.)I Grammatically, however, the meanings of tamma and tammachi are very distinct. The –chi ending in Middle Mongolian, as well as Classical Mongolian, is a nomen actoris su8,-x, thus making the person it refers to one who performs or is a part of the tamma.)L One would never refer to the institution of tamma as a tammachi, as that would only signify a mem- ber of it. The sources also clearly indicate that individuals were tammachi/ tammachin and that they belonged to a tamma. The tamma consisted of a main force and an advance force of scouts known as the alginchi (pl. alginchin).)M The alginchin were stationed closer to the cit- ies, while the tamma remained in better pasture lands. The tamma consisted of troops from various tribes and regions, or minqad, from across the empire,

.0 !$%&', 41; Rashīd/Karīmī, 320; Rashīd/Thackston, 1: 213. .9 For a discussion of the linguistic arguments on the origin of the word as well as its mean- ing, please refer to Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci People,” 41–59. Also see Ostrowksi, “The tamma,” 262–77. Ostrowski focuses on the non-Mongol sources beginning on page 268. In my opinion, the Mongol sources are the most relevant as they are the sources that indicate how they used the word. The Persian sources and others simply translate it or attempt to use it in conjunction with another word (e.g. lashkar tamma) so that they can better understand the meaning of the new loan word. .N Ostrowski, “The tamma,” 268. .O Refer to Poppe, Grammar of Written Mongolian, 40–41. Also see Grǿnbech and Krueger, An Introduction to Classical (Literary) Mongolian, 46. .Q Buell, “Tribe, Qan, and Ulus,” 70. (^ 234 while the commander was not necessarily of Mongolian origin.)S Despite its importance, it seems clear that the tamma was a separate unit or army from the regular forces. The Yuan Shi notes there were two distinct forces, the Meng-ku chün or Mongol army, and the Tanmachi jun or tammachi army. The distinction lay in the composition of these forces. The Mongol army was solely comprised of Mongols whereas members of various tribes or nations formed the tammachi army.)T While the antecedents of the tamma appeared in 1211 and 1218, a regular tamma system was implemented in North China in 1236. With the alginchi of the tamma established near the cities of Yidu, Jinan, Pingyang, Daiyuan, Zhenting, Da-ming, and Dongping, the tamma aided the expansion of the Mongol Empire. However, these units eventually moved forward. As Ch’i- ch’ing Hsiao noted, “Nevertheless, since the Mongols were at this stage looking for further conquest, troops were moved forward as campaigns proceeded, and no permanent garrison system was possible.”)U Another unit known as the cherig was also associated with the tamma. The term is Mongolian. In the Secret History of the Mongols, it is used to refer to a soldier.*V It can also be used to refer to many warriors in the sense of ‘troops.’*) Cherig remained in use as a word for ‘soldier,’ ‘warrior,’ and even ‘troops’ or ‘army.’ But at the same time, a distinction was recognized between cherig and tammachin. The members of the tamma are never referred to as cherig. Also, the cherig tended to be recruited from the local forces in the occupied lands. Structurally, the cherig tended to mirror the tamma; however, its primary pur- pose was to garrison locations.** The terminology of cherig and tamma may have simply been used to distinguish between the nomadic tammachi and

.W Yuan Shih (Ch’i-Ch’ing Hsiao), 72–91 (chapter 98) (hereafter _`); Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 333; Ostrowski, “The tamma,” 264. .X _`, 73 (chapter 98). Mongol in this sense should also include Turkic groups such as the Kereit, Naiman, etc., who were conquered as part of Chinggis Khan’s uni,-cation of the Mongolian steppes. .Y Ch’i-ch’ing Hsiao, The Military Establishment, 53. 0Z See !"#, §100. Here, the term is ,-rst used in reference to the warriors who attacked Temüjin’s camp and carried o8f the abandoned Börte. 0. !"#, §107. In this passage, Temüjin is bringing his troops to join Toghril and Jamuqa in order to rescue his wife Börte from the Mongols. The Mongolian passage reads “Temüjin tendece cerik e’üsgejü” or “Temüjin started from there with [his] troops.” The translation is mine. For the Mongolian transliteration see Rachewiltz, Index to the Secret History, line 2639. This usage appears again in !"# §133; Rachewiltz, Index to the Secret History, line 3613, 3619 and on multiple other occasions throughout `"2. 00 Buell, “Tribe, Qan, and Ulus,” 73–74. ;<=>Kucha. Stationed in in 1260, this tamma took part in the battle of ʿAyn Jālūt and lived up to their reputation.*L Although the tamma existed on the borders between the Mongol Empire and other realms, and thus was in a position to defend or expand the empire, the Mongols did not rebuild fortresses to defend their territory. Rather, they carried out a general policy of razing city and garrison walls.*M In general, the Mongols did not use the tamma as a means of garrisoning a region. Rather, they used auxiliaries who were more accustomed to such duties. The Mongols, however, did use tamma camps to control regions and repel hostile attacks. The camps were spread out for pasture purposes and protected by patrols while messengers maintained communications. H. Desmond Martin noted that, “As an additional precaution, in hostile or semi-hostile country, areas con- taining such camps were frequently surrounded by a belt of desolation.”*S In this manner, the tamma essentially served the same purposes as did a Western European castle, the various walls of China,*T or any fortress for that matter.

09 Allsen, Mongol , 192–93. 0N Martin, The Rise of Chinggis Khan, 11. 0O Allsen, “The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan,” 243–79; Rossabi, ed., China Among Equals, 265–66. 0Q ʿUmar Ibn Ibrāhīm al-Ansī al-Anṣārī, Tafrīj al-kurūb fī tadbīr al-ḥurūb, 119. 0W Martin, Chinggis Khan, 32–33. 0X Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies, 139, according to whom, “These walls e8fectively inaugurated a new type of defensive system, possibly, as a consequence of the creation of cd 234

Defensively, the castle might serve to guard borders, as did the tamma. Like the castles in the , however, the tamma was also an o8fensive force that gave the Mongols a base of operations and a means of intimidating neigh- bouring realms.*U Although the tamma functioned much as fortresses in other kingdoms and empires, the Mongols themselves (or most nomads for that mat- ter) did not construct fortresses. The Mongols viewed ,-xed forti,-cations with disdain and razed them.5V The importance of the tamma cannot be overstated and examples of it are numerous: Muqali’s army in Northern China, Toquchar’s forces in Western Mongolia, Chormaqan and Baiju in Azerbaijan, the forces under Köketei and Sönitei in the Volga-Ural region prior to Batu’s invasion of the Rus’. Buell fur- ther demonstrates that the tamma was always established on the fringes of the empire, literally on the border between nomadic and sedentary cultures.5)

infantry armies whose maneuverability required more extensive use of, and control over, natural features. The ‘long’ walls appear also to have been strategic forti,-cations aimed at asserting a state’s political and military control over a given area. Those areas could be strategically important not just defensively but also o8fensively, in as much as control over a mountain pass or a river ford could either block an advancing army or secure pas- sage to one’s own troops. Moreover, like roads, walls provide the logistic infrastructure to facilitate communication and transportation, vital elements, for armies employed in the occupation or invasion of a foreign territory. Thus military walls could be an inte- gral part of an expansionist ‘o8fensive’ project, and we can assess their function properly only in their historical context.” Comparable examples would be the Norman castles built immediately after 1066 by William the Conqueror in England, and later in Scotland in the thirteenth century. A more modern comparison is with the forts built by Americans along their Western frontier from the eighteenth century through the nineteenth century. 0Y France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 1000–1300, 105; Di Cosmo, Ancient China and its Enemies, 143. The use of the castle as an o8fensive device was particularly common in and in the Latin East. In these cases, the castle served as a base from which to attack as well as a source of intimidation and domination for neigh- bouring lands. The walls of ancient China are commonly thought to have been built to repel nomadic attacks. However, Cosmo points out that the walls were built usually after the Chinese had conquered formerly nomadic territory: “after a substantial drive into for- eign lands. The building of forti,-cations proceeded in tandem with the acquisition of new territory and the establishment of new administrative units. In other words, the state of Ch’in, Chao, and Yen needed to protect themselves only after they had taken large por- tions of territory from people and had chased the nomads away from their homelands. Surely at some point the forti,-cations did acquire a ‘defensive’ function, but the context suggests strongly that this defensive role was subordinate to a grander strategy, one that was militarily o8fensive and territorially expansionist, pursued by all three Chinese states.” 9Z Matthew Paris, English History, 312; al-Anṣārī, Tafrīj al-kurūb fī tadbīr al-ḥurūb, 119, fn. 7. 9. Buell, “Kalmyk Tanggaci,” 45. ;<=>

Typically pasture determined the exact location of the tamma. When Batu invaded Hungary, he left thirty thousand men with the herds to support them to control the Rus’ and Qipchaq lands. These had to be stationed at intervals between steppes and sedentary areas primarily to provide enough pasture. This left the Mongols with an e8fective force to maintain control in both zones. Over the course of time, the governance structures of the conquered lands changed. Thus, darughachi or governors would be sent in accompanied by bichikchi or secretaries.5* The darughachi or basqaq “controlled the activities of [the local elite], collected taxes and was endowed with military might.”55 Eventually, an administrator known as the yeke jarquchi (great or high lawgiver, one who decrees) gradually replaced the tammachin.5I While the Mongols did manipulate local administrative structures for their own use, in the newly con- quered lands the Mongols had to apply their own system in order to main- tain order after the armies advanced into unconquered areas. In doing so, the various local and native systems of governance were integrated into a Mongol administrative framework. This is what allows for the ‘Tsunami’ form of conquest. While an advance force created the political vacuum in the neighbouring regions, the tammachin ruled the core of the recently conquered area. Gradually, it was converted to civil and bureaucratic government along the lines that Buell suggests. The power vacuum and disturbances which the advance force created in the out- lying regions allowed this transition to occur. To simplify, the advance force disrupts everything in the neighbouring regions, thus allowing the tammachin to rule and pacify without interference. Thus when the Mongols invaded the lands across their border, the territory behind them was being prepared for civil authority. Eventually, a civil government controlled by the darughachin replaced the tamma, thus allowing the tammachin to move forward into new territory. This is not to say that the military governors of the tamma enjoyed the reduction of their power in those regions. By the time the darughachin were

90 Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 220. The darughachi were also known as basqaq in Turkic or shahna in Persian. See also István Vásáry, “The Golden Horde Term Daruġa and its Survival in Russia,” 187–97; idem, “The Origin of the Institution of basqaqs,” 201–206. This may also be found as chapters f and fPP in Vásáry, Turks, and in the 13th–16th Centuries. On the darughachi see also Dashdondog’s article in this volume. 99 Petrushevsky, “Socio-Economic Conditions of Īrān,” 530. 9N For a detailed analysis see May, “The Conquest and Rule of ,” 142–49; see also the article by Dashdondog, “Darughachi in Armenia” in the present volume. Also see the following primary sources: Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, PP:221–23; Juwaynī/Boyle, 485–86. cc 234 in position, there was no need for a regular military unit as each darughachi possessed a force of troops in order to maintain control of his region.5L Because these forms of government moved in behind the armies, the Mongols could continue to advance as the main armies were not needed to put down revolts. Furthermore, the military and the civil government extracted material support from the populace, which the main armies needed in order to continue the war e8fort. Finally, although the Mongols appeared to be over- extended, they were not because of the Tsunami Strategy. They expanded at a rate they could maintain. To garrison the newly conquered areas, it required more resources than the Mongols possessed, whether in terms of manpower or livestock. By keeping their troops mobile in the steppe, they easily moved to trouble spots rather than trying to rule directly. The transition from mili- tary to civil control impacted the empire in two ways. Firstly, the conquests moved forward. Secondly, it prevented the generals from becoming too ,-rmly entrenched in one area. The Mongols implemented this strategy in all instances. During the invasion of Khwārazm, the Mongol forces conquered Māwarānnahr, then Tolui devas- tated Khurasan, and Chinggis Khan campaigned in Afghanistan and pushed forward into India. Meanwhile, Sübedei and entered Iran. However, at the end of the campaign the armies withdrew, leaving a holding force in Māwarānnahr. While this was happening, the former state of Qara Khitai was annexed into the empire. Māwarānnahr was then annexed at a later date. In Chormaqan’s subsequent invasion of Iran, that region quickly succumbed. However, the latter sent a 67ying column led by Taimaz into Azerbaijan, , and Armenia in pursuit of Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazmshah. Thus while Chormaqan laid the foundations for Mongol rule, the only e8fective resistance was by the Khwārazmians far to the west and then it too was destroyed, upon which Taimaz withdrew from Armenia. Only after a few years had passed did Chormaqan invade Armenia and Georgia in full force, simultaneously sending a few probes towards Baghdad.

If one compares the borders of the empire with territories actually occu- pied and garrisoned by Mongols, a clear pattern develops. First, by devas- tating Khurasan, , and , the new Mongol territory of Māwarānnahr was protected by a broad belt of destruction. The inhabitants of this belt were either dead or dispersed, the rulers were in 67ight, and there was simply no organized military to threaten Mongol control. Furthermore, the land that had been cultivated could be occupied by nomads, and thus serve

9O Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia, 70. ;<=>Buqa and Baidar’s positions in Syria and .

War with the Seljuqs

Prior to 1240 the Mongols expressed little interest in the Seljuq Sultanate of Rūm. The tammachi in the region at the time, Chormaqan , spent most of the decade consolidating Mongol power in Iran and Transcaucasia after his

9Q Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 7. c1 234 forces defeated Jalāl al-Dīn. After his death in 1240 the Mongols stationed in Transcaucasia, now commanded by Baiju Noyan, renewed their expansion. This is notable for several reasons with the ,-rst being that it is one of the few instances in which Mongol armies conquered territory during a period in which a Great Khan (Khaghan) did not sit on the throne. Secondly, the cam- paign was a departure from the steady use of the Tsunami method of conquest. This, however, raises the question of whether the latter was an aberration or an intentional departure. During the reign of Sultan ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Kayqubād ibn al-sulṭān Kaykhusraw (1219–37), hostilities between the Seljuqs and the Mongols did not amount to anything more than a few raids.5S After Kayqubād’s death, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw (1237–45) came to the throne. During the initial years of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s reign, his rule coincided with that of Chormaqan Noyan. Upon the death of Chormaqan Noyan, a new tammachi and a lieutenant of Chormaqan’s, Baiju Noyan, altered the existing status quo between the Mongols and the Seljuqs.5T It appears that the Seljuqs believed there was little indication the Mongols might invade Rūm as they carried out their own military campaigns close to Mongol territory. In 638 H./1240–41 the Seljuqs laid seige to ʿAmid but withdrew after obtaining a peace treaty.5U Only a year later in 639 H./1242, a Mongol force accompanied by contingents of Georgian and Armenian troops invaded Rūm. Their forces raided up to the fortress of Zārīd, thus engaging the Mongols and Seljuqs in war.IV Grigor of Akner wrote that Baiju, along with Armenian and Georgian troops, attacked the town of Karin, besieging it for two months. Upon capturing the city, they sacked it and even ransacked churches; notably, the Christian Armenians and took part in the church looting as well.I)

9W al-Dhahab ī, Kitab Duwal al-, 233; al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, 81; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 405; Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab, 348. The incursion took place in 634 H./1236–37, although Bar Hebraeus lists a date of 1240. Nuwayrī and al-Ḥadīd agree on the date. 9X See Melville, “Anatolia under the Mongols,” 51–54. 9Y al-Dhahab ī, Kitab Duwal al-Islam, 242; Golden, An Introduction, 290. Golden believes that by the time of Köse Dāgh, the Saljūqs had been weakened by the 1240 revolt of Turkmen tribes under Baba Isḥāq. NZ Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 406. N. Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 307; Brosset and Chubinov, Histoire de la Géorgie, 518. Grigor indicates this took place in 1239; however, as no other sources corroborate this, it seems likely that this took place in 1242 at the earliest. ;<=>

The Seljuq Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn assembled his army, including a sizeable force of mercenaries, in 1243.I* The mercenaries comprised a variety of sol- diers including troops from , as well as and Franks.I5 The Seljuq army met the Mongols at Köse Dāgh, located between Karin and Erzincan, in 641 H./1243. Many of the Seljuq forces 67ed after Aghbagha, a Georgian prince of Gag, defeated the right wing of the Seljuq army; the Sultan himself 67ed to Ankara. In addition to the defeat, Ghiyāth al-Dīn was also concerned that some of his amirs were considering submitting to the Mongols.II The com- plete withdrawal occurred during the night. Thus on the second day of the battle, the Mongols discovered a deserted Seljuq camp. Initially, the Mongols believed the Seljuqs’ 67ight to be a trap, but once they realized the Seljuqs truly had abandoned the ,-eld of battle they advanced and conquered the rest of the sultanate.IL During the course of their conquests the Mongols sacked and destroyed much of the city wall. Then they attacked Kayseri, using engines.IM In addition, and Ankara fell to the Mongols.IS On their return to Armenia, they attacked Erzincan after it refused to pay tribute. Furthermore, they installed a darughachi to govern Rūm.IT With his realm conquered, Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn submitted and agreed to pay tribute in gold, horses, cattle,

N0 Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309. Grigor puts the Sultan’s force at a highly improbable 160,000 men. N9 Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 407–409; Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, 1:313; Idem, (Raverty), 162. Jūzjānī viewed Ghiyāth al-Dīn as a great . He also wrote that rather than simply hiring Frankish mercenaries, Ghiyāth al-Dīn entered into an alliance with them against the Mongols. NN Ibn Bībī, Saljūq Nāmah, 205; Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309. NO Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 407–9; al-Dhahabī, Kitab Duwal al-Islam, 243; Jūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, 1: 313; Idem, (Raverty), 162–63; Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309. According to Grigor, Aghbagha’s victory over the Seljuqid right wing was the turning point of the battle, as prior to it the Mongols had been hard pressed. He also notes that the Georgians and Armenians formed the vanguard of Baiju’s army. NQ Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 407–9; al-Dhahabī, Kitab Duwal al-Islam, 246; Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309; al-Ḥadīd, Sharḥ nahj al-balāghah, 82. NW Ibn Bībī, Saljūq Nāmah, 205–6; Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309. NX Grigor of Akanc, “The History of the Nation of the Archers,” 309. cR 234 sheep, and slaves.IU Al-Dhahabī noted that the tribute amounted to 400,000 dinars in value.LV In addition to the Seljuq sultanate, the Mongols acquired other territory and otherwise impacted the various powers in Anatolia. , who wrote in the 1250s, noted that Trebizond was subject to the Mongols.L) Mongols initially attacked Trebizond in 1240, setting ,-re to the citadel, but they did not conquer it.L* Trebizond probably submitted to the Mongols after 1243. It is not mentioned at Güyük’s coronation, at least not by that name, but this is not unusual. Manuel Comnenus I was the ruler. As Trebizond was small and isolated it is rarely mentioned in the Latin, Arab or Persian sources. Lippard, however, thinks that Juwaynm̄ made a mistake concerning the identi,-cation of the sultan of Takavor who attended the ceremony.L5 Juwaynī and Boyle thought that the name was Armenian. Boyle took Takavor to be the Armenian word T’aghavor or King, and so he thought it referred to Haithon or Smpad. However, Takavor could refer to Armenia, Nicea, or Trebizond. Furthermore, since Haithon never went to Güyük’s enthronement in 1246, nor was John Vatatzes PPP of Nicea present, Manuel P Comnenus of Trebizond seems the likely attendee.LI Nicea feared either Turkmen or Mongol invasion, or both. Indeed, John Vatatzes PPP met with Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Kaykhusraw’s envoys and made a treaty. Neither wanted a war as the Greeks were busy in Europe and Ghiyāth al-Dīn was too occupied with the Mongols to enter a second front. John also

NY Ibn Bībī, Saljūq Nāmah, 205–6; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 407–9; Cahen, “The Turks in Iran and Anatolia Before the Mongol Invasions,” 691–92. The treaty and terms came through the e8forts of the Salūq wazīr Muhadhdhib al-Dīn. OZ al-Dhahab ī, Kitab Duwal al-Islam, 246. O. William of Rubruck, “The Mission of William of Rubruck,” 91; Idem, The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck (Jackson), 65. O0 Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 179; Miller, Trebizond, the Last Greek Empire of the Byzantine Era, 1204–1461, 23–24. Trebizond was also friendly with the Sultan of Erzerum and Jalāl al-Dīn before, all enemies of the Mongols, thus giving the Mongols plenty of reason to attack it if the general incentive of plunder was not su8,-cient. Trebizond provided a haven for Jalāl al-Dīn’s army after it was defeated by the Seljuqs and Ayyubids near Erzinjan in 8/1230. Jalāl al-Dīn’s army at that battle may have also been originally from Trebizond. Afterwards Andronicus Gidon, the ruler of Trebizond, submit- ted to Kaykhusraw and sent troops. O9 Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 1:207; Juwaynī/Boyle, 250. ON Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 179–80; Het’um, “The Journey of Het’um P,” 178–79. Smbat did attend Güyük’s coronation, but it is unlikely that he would have presented himself as the King of . ;<=>

A Second Seljuq-Mongol War

Hostilities 67ared anew in Rūm during the reign of ʿIzz al-Dīn. In 1251, after Baiju went to Iraq, ʿIzz al-Dīn, accompanied by Turkmen, Arabs and , attacked Mongol detachments and the city of Tokat. The Seljuq prince accomplished little, however, as his brother, Rukn al-Dīn Qilij Arslān, counter-attacked him and liberated Tokat.LU Rūm’s status as a client state or appendage of the Mongol

OO Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 176. OQ Fine, The Late Medieval Balkans, 134. OW Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 177. OX Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 163; Cahen, “The Turks in Iran and Anatolia,” 691–92. OY Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 277. c^ 234

Empire changed with the arrival of Hülegü in the Middle East. Accompanied by a large army and as the new overlord of the south-western portion of the Mongol Empire, Hülegü positioned himself in the traditional headquarters of the tammachi, the lush Mughan plain. Thus, when Hülegü came to the Mughan plain to winter in 1256, Baiju had little choice but to seek pasture land for his troops in Rūm.MV Contrary to the way the Mongol commanders have often been portrayed, Baiju in this instance did not simply move his forces into the region and take over the territory by the sword. As Rūm was now a part of the Mongol Empire, he requested pastures where his troops and horses could winter from Sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn in August 1256. ʿIzz al-Dīn, however, viewed the arrival of Hülegü as a diminishment of Baiju’s power and in67uence. Therefore, Sultan ʿIzz al-Dīn did not desire to assist Baiju, viewing the noyan’s status as below that of a tribute- paying client of the Great Khan.M) Baiju quickly corrected this impression by defeating the Seljuqs in battle at Aksaray. As he advanced, towns surrendered to the Mongols and some allies deserted the Seljuqs.M* ʿIzz al-Dīn did perhaps have some justi,-cation for denying pasture to Baiju. Baiju’s army hurt the local economy as the Seljuq sultan could not tax the Mongol army. Furthermore, he risked losing in67uence in the region, as Baiju would be viewed as the real power in Rūm.M5 There was some discussion among ʿIzz al-Dīn’s court about whether to attack Baiju. Some simply wished to comply with Baiju’s request, while others who had the most to lose in terms of status and privilege, argued for war.MI Of course, in hindsight, not only did ʿIzz al-Dīn lose considerable in67uence with Baiju’s victory, but he possibly laid himself open to the possibil- ity of losing considerably more power. After the battle of Aksaray (14 October 1256/23 Ramadan 654 H.), Baiju remained in Rūm, pasturing the herds of his armies. He also spent four months at the Byzantine frontiers. He camped in the north, in Paphlagonia or near Ilgin, ,-fty kilometres west of Akşehir in central Anatolia. Besütei, Baiju’s uncle, advanced to Denizli in November 1256.ML

QZ Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 424–25; Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, P, 93; Juwaynī/Boyle, 608–609. Q. Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 424–25. Q0 Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 424–25; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-arab fī funūn al-adab, 349–50; Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 276. Michael Palaeologus deserted and returned to Nicea. Q9 Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 275–76. One may wonder whether, if he had simply granted Baiju’s request, the Mongols may have lessened his tribute or granted certain favours in appreciation for his cooperation. QN Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey, 275–76. QO Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 23. ;<=>

Perhaps as a rami,-cation of ʿIzz al-Dīn’s actions and disrespect for the Mongol military, Hülegü summoned ‛Izz al-Dīn and Rukn al-Dīn to him. During his meeting with them, the Mongol prince divided Rūm between the two rivals. Rukn al-Dīn received the territory from Caesarea to Armenia and ruled from his capital at Sivas. Meanwhile, ʿIzz al-Dīn received Aksaray to the sea coast and ruled from Konya to the frontier of the Greeks.MM Although his power diminished with the division of Rūm, ʿIzz al-Dīn still challenged the Mongols. According to Bar Hebraeus, out of fear of Baiju, ‛Izz al-Dīn attempted to assemble an army as well as form an alliance with the polity of Melitene or against Baiju. Again, Baiju’s response was swift and decisive. Baiju’s forces spread out in April 1257/655 into Galatia and Cappadocia, wreaking destruction upon ʿIzz al-Dīn’s domains. As a further punishment, Baiju gave forts that his troops captured to Rukn al-Dīn. Melitene did not escape his notice either. For its part in the rebellion, Baiju forced Melitene to swear fealty to Rukn al-Dīn, e8fectively giving Rukn al-Dīn control of Seljuqid Rūm. Perhaps fortunately for ʿIzz al-Dīn, Baiju then left Rūm to join Hülegü.MS Somewhat oddly, ʿIzz al-Dīn sent his younger brother Rukn al-Dīn to Möngke to ward o8f further Mongol attacks. Rukn al-Dīn, instead of assisting his brother, attempted to gain Mongol backing. In support of Rukn al-Dīn, Möngke gave the Seljuq prince the daughter of Aljaktu and sent Aljaktu to assist him.MT Rukn al-Dīn, with help from Aljaktu, forced ʿIzz al-Dīn to 67ee so that Rukn al-Dīn Qilij Arslān became the ruler of Rūm. ʿIzz al-Dīn 67ed to Aor Khan who then assisted him in defeating the Mongols. They also captured Rukn al-Dīn and imprisoned him, thus restoring some territory to ʿIzz al-Dīn.MU The Byzantine prince, Michael Palaeologus, lived with the Seljuqs and fought the Mongols alongside the Seljuqs at Aksaray. He realized the importance of the Mongols and made an alliance with them once he usurped the throne of Nicea. Being a small military power, the focus of his rule was on securing Greek Orthodoxy and he sought sympathy from Hülegü and Doquz . This may have included submitting to the Mongols. In 1260 Hülegü had Bohemund, Prince of and Mongol vassal, install Euthymius, an Orthodox bishop, as the Patriarch of Antioch. Bohemund did so reluctantly, but nonetheless was

QQ Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 434–35; Melville, “Anatolia under the Mongols,” 55. QW Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 426; al-Dhahabī, Kitab Duwal al-Islam, 264. Dhahabī indicated that Baiju carried this out on Hülegü’s orders in 654 H. QX J ūzjāni, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, 1: 314; Idem, tr. Raverty, 164. This may have been Eljigedei, the former tammaci, or another Eljigedei. QY J ūzjāni, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, P, 314; Idem, tr. Raverty, 164. hd 234 excommunicated for this by the Bishop of Bethlehem. In 1263 Bohemund and Hethum kidnapped Euthymius and sent him to Armenia. Hülegü chastised them for this, but does not appear to have taken further action.SV In 1259, Mehmed Beg al-Ūji founded the ,-rst Turkmen emirate around Denizli, and included Khūnās and Dalaman. In 1261, Mehmed Beg, his brother Ilyās Beg, son-in-law ʿAlī Beg, and relative Sevinch rebelled against ʿIzz al-Dīn and did not recognize Rukn al-Dīn as a legitimate ruler as well. Mehmed Beg wrote to Hülegü and wanted to submit. Hülegü ordered him to come in per- son, but Mehmed Beg declined. Hülegü then sent an army of Rūm to the Uj. In 1262, Mehmed Beg was defeated by the Seljuq–Mongol army on the plain of Tālamānī or Dalaman. Mehmed Beg’s son-in-law ʿAlī Beg switched sides and was named ruler over that area, thus dividing Turkic Anatolia into three Mongol controlled spheres. Two were Seljuqid and the other was Turkmen.S) The remaining independent state was Nicea, which may or may not have been a client of the Mongols. With their dominance in Anatolia now complete, Mongol activities in the region declined. They did distribute ʿiqṭas in Rūm, and this may have assisted in later diminishing their control over Rūm, but the silence in the chronicles on other activities indicates a level stability.S* Their declining interest in Anatolia a8fected border states as well. After the Greeks took Constantinople in 1261, the Byzantines’ eastern frontier defences were neglected and Turkmen raids, and often settlement, increased in these areas. Although not as successful as the Cilicians in the 1250s, the Byzantines could occasionally get the Mongols to rein in the Turkmen attacks.S5

The Tsunami Method of Conquest

The was a curious decade for the expansion of the Mongol Empire. The reign of Ögetei served as a driving force for expansion as he introduced the concept of divine right to rule the world, which remained a primary rationale for the Mongols from this point on. Indeed, in a letter to Innocent Pf, the Great Khan Güyük sent the following message after the Pope chastised him for killing :

WZ Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 159. W. Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 24. W0 Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 25. W9 Lippard, “The Mongols and Byzantium, 1243–1341,” 34–35. ;<=>

God ordered us to destroy them and gave them up to our hands. For otherwise if God had not done this, what could man do to man? But you men of the West believe that you alone are Christians and despise others. But how can you know to whom God deigns to confer His grace? But we worshipping God have destroyed the whole earth from the East to the West in the power of God. And if this were not the power of God, what could men have done? . . . But if you should not believe our letters and the command of God nor hearken to our counsel then we shall know for certain that you wish to have war. After that we do not know what will happen, God alone knows.SI

Thus, while the divine right of conquest remained from the Ögeteid era, the sustained drives of conquest did not occur. The most notable actions took place in Anatolia under the command of Baiju. It is not clear whether he attempted to follow the process of Tsunami conquests, as the Seljuqs collapsed after the battle of Köse Dāgh. Quite simply, the Mongols acquired the entire Sultanate after one battle. Despite this, they still adhered to the principle of the Tsunami Strategy. With the collapse of the Seljuq Sultanate of Rūm, the rest of Anatolia lay open. Trebizond fell quickly and Cilicia saw the wisdom in submitting. With only Nicea and perhaps a few remaining unruly Turkmen tribes, it seemed likely that the Mongols would conquer all of Anatolia. Yet they did not, primarily because it did not ,-t into the Tsunami Strategy at that time. While Baiju’s army defeated the Seljuqs in 1243, another force led by Yassur conquered the Diyar Bakr region and raided Aleppo and Antioch. Although both cities had formidable forti,-cations, the Mongols convinced the cit- ies in the Jazīra to submit through a combination of force and diplomacy. While Aleppo, and perhaps Antioch, paid tribute, the Mongols did not leave a darughachi in either city as they did in the other cities. Furthermore, they did not extend their raids further south. Meanwhile, Mongol forces marched against a number of towns that sought protection from the Caliph in Baghdad. The Mongol forces fared well in most encounters in this region; however, they do not appear to have sought to estab- lish themselves there. They only raided and plundered. When a larger enemy force appeared, the Mongols left, whereas in Rūm the Mongols fought at Köse Dāgh.

WN John de Plano Carpini, “History of the Mongols,” 83–84. hc 234

Thus, when viewed at the microcosmic level, the Mongols of Baiju’s tamma did not carry out the Tsunami Strategy. Yet at the macrocosmic level they did. In Rūm, Jazīra, and even in Iraq, the Mongols used the Tsunami Strategy. They conquered Rūm, the cities of the Jazīra, Trebizond, added Cilicia through sub- mission, and forced Aleppo and Antioch to pay tribute. Nicea, the rest of Syria, and Iraq were not conquered, although they were placed on guard or actually su8fered invasions, but in Rūm and Jazīra, the Mongols conquered some ter- ritory and made e8forts to incorporate it by placing darughachin to adminis- ter the new territory. Meanwhile, the tammachin returned to the pastures of Azerbaijan. The Mongols did not overextend their armies. It is apparent that Baiju did not have su8,-cient forces to continue a campaign of conquest. He did, however, ensure that the states that bordered his territory were aware the Mongols could strike them. Some, such as Aleppo and Antioch, merely paid them to stay away. Baghdad remained de,-ant while Nicea prepared its defences. Meanwhile in the east, the Mongols continued their protracted war with the Song. Their armies there accomplished little other than demonstrating that the Song armies were no match for the Mongols in the ,-eld. Only through an intricate system of forti,-cations could the Song slow the Mongol advance. The ascension of Güyük should have allowed the Mongols to devote more troops to both theatres. Although armies were dispatched, Eljigedei appears to have accomplished virtually nothing. In the eastern theatre the Mongols con- tinued to raid and probe the forti,-cations of the Song and Koryŏ, but without any substantial gain. The campaigns in the Middle East during the reign of Möngke marked a substantial divergence in the operational strategies of the Mongols. Whereas they had previously operated on a broad and far-ranging front, the armies under Hülegü’s command adopted a di8ferent strategy: overwhelming force. Against their main targets, the Assassins, the Caliphate, and Ayyubid Syria, the Mongols attacked their enemies one at a time. The conquest of the Isma’ilis and ʿAbbasid Caliphate were essentially cam- paigns of . During the course of these, the Mongols isolated the main target by taking the outlying cities, fortresses, and towns. Then with the full weight of their military they captured the ,-nal target. Finally, mop-up opera- tions then occurred to destroy any remaining resistance. In Rūm and the Jazīra, the Mongols encountered some rebellions. These were dealt with promptly. Meanwhile in Ghur, the Mongols secured their hold over the territory and annexed . Forays into India produced little other than plunder. The remained vigilant and could prevent the tamma forces in ;<=>

Ghur from acquiring any of its own territory.SL Nonetheless, it could do little to prevent the Mongols from raiding and even sacking towns such as Lahore. Furthermore, the presence of the tamma in Ghur served as a beacon of resis- tance to those unsatis,-ed with the Sultan of Delhi. Of course these were other princes who vied for the Delhi throne, but they did establish client principali- ties on the border with the Delhi Sultanate, thus providing the Mongols with a potential entrepôt into Indian politics and conquest at a future date should the possibility arise.SM During the conquest of Syria, the main force destroyed a politically and militarily important target, Aleppo, decimating it before any attempt at relief could be made. Most of the remaining cities decided that resistance was futile, and submission was preferable to destruction. The only thing which the Syrian campaign lacked was a ,-eld battle. Traditionally, the Mongols ,-rst defeated any armies in the ,-eld, leaving forces behind to lay siege to cities. The ,-eld army of the enemy was attacked until it was destroyed. Once it was defeated, the Mongols could then reduce the main fortresses at their leisure without fear of relief armies or their lines of communication being cut. As this never hap- pened in Syria, the conquest was made easier. The death of Möngke and the subsequent civil wars altered the course of the history of the Mongol Empire. It is uncertain what the Mongols’ intentions towards the Latin States or Egypt were; however, considering their other opera- tions in which those who had not submitted were eliminated one at a time, it is likely that Hülegü would have invaded the ‘rebellious’ Mamluk Sultanate had circumstances been di8ferent. The method of governance did not change substantially. The Mongols still used the tamma system to control their borders as demonstrated in Ghur. The possibility of the Mongols invading the as well as the Mamluk Sultanate was enhanced by the establishment of Baidar and Ket-Buqa’s tammas in Gaza and the Biqāʿ Valley respectively. The Mongols meanwhile created a rudimentary administration to control their newly acquired territories. Ket-Buqa stationed himself in the Biqāʿ Valley, which pro- vided the pasture his troops needed. Maqrīzī believed him to be the gover- nor of Aleppo, while Baidar, who was stationed in Gaza, was the governor of

WO Aḥmad, “Mongol Pressure in an Alien Land,” 182; Digby, War-Horse and Elephant in the Delhi Sultanate, 21. Digby wrote that Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban apparently limited his military operations against the rest of India because of the threat of Mongol raids and invasions. This kept his army close to Delhi and the north. WQ Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, 49. h1 234

Damascus. The prince of Homs, Malik al-Ashraf Mūsā, served as the viceroy.SS Considering where their armies were stationed, neither Baidar nor Ket-Buqa should be considered governors. As both were stationed on the western fron- tiers of the Mongol Syrian holdings, they were probably tammachin. Ket-Buqa, in the northern part of Syria and stationed in the Biqāʿ Valley, could defend against the Kingdom of Jerusalem, which stretched to Beirut, and impose his will over the northern territories. Baidar, meanwhile, could do the same to the southern borders of Jerusalem and also guard against the Mamluk Sultanate in Egypt. Additionally, one must ask if Baiju’s tamma that was once stationed in the Mughan also marked the establishment of a tamma in Rūm. With the defeat of the Isma’ilis, Baghdad, and the complete conquest of the Jazīra, there was no rationale to keep a tamma in an area now surrounded by conquered areas. It was time to move to the new borderlands in Rūm. While Rūm was conquered in 1243, other areas surrounding the Mughan were not, thus there was cause to maintain it there. Although Baiju moved there in 1256, before Hülegü attacked the Isma’ilis, the Mongols, particularly during Möngke’s reign, did not operate under the assumption that they might not be victorious. It was simply a matter of how quickly they would win. Thus, it was proper for Baiju to re-establish the tamma in Rūm.

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Reuven Amitai

One of the important trends of late medieval societies in much of the Islamic world is that the military elite became increasingly identi)*ed with the political ruling class. This tendency possibly reached its height in the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt and Syria. One cannot go quite so far when describing the nature of Mongol rule in Iran and the surrounding countries, but it would be fair to state that the army was the most important institution in the Ilkhanid state (and Mongol states as a whole). It is thus not surprising that the study of mili- tary aspects of the Ilkhanate (and the Mongol armies that preceded it) have received some serious attention in modern scholarship. Mention can be made of the important studies on the Mongol armies in the Middle East (some of them parts of larger works) by Bertold Spuler,+ David Morgan,, C. E. Bosworth,- John M. Smith, Jr.. and Arsenio Martinez./ To this can be added very useful studies on the Mongol army as a whole by H. Desmond Martin,0 S. R. Turnbull,1 Robert Reid,2 Witold Świętosławski,6 Timothy May,+7 and others, which help us understand the background of much of the Mongol military activity in the countries today known as the Middle East. My own contributions to the study of the Mongol military machine have generally been in connection with the ongoing Ilkhanid war with the Mamluks, and I have tried to put this war in

8 Spuler, Die Mongolen in Iran, 330–48. : Morgan, “The Mongol Armies in Iran,” 81–96. ; Bosworth, “Army <<,” 2, 499–503. = Smith, Jr., “ ‘Ayn Jālūt,” 307–44. A Martinez, “Some Notes on the Īl-Xānid Army,” 129–242. C Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan, 11–47. D Turnbull, The Mongols, 105. E Reid, “Mongolian Weaponry,” 85–96. F Ś więtosławski, Arms and Armour of the Nomads of the Great Steppe, 103–10. I am thankful to Kate Raphael for bringing this work to my attention. 8G May, The Mongol Art of War.

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_556 !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

88 Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, esp. chapter 10; Amitai, The Mongols in the Islamic Lands, esp. part 3. 8: Raphael, “Mongol Siege Warfare,” 355–70. Cf. Khan, “The Coming of Gunpowder,” 27–45. The forthcoming work of Stephen J. Haw may shed further light on this matter. ^_ #XMLRM

Much of the evidence for this present paper is derived from the Arabic sources emanating from the Mamluk Sultanate, which have been read in tan- dem with the sources (written in Persian, Syriac, Armenian and Arabic) deriv- ing from the Ilkhanate. There are several reasons why the Mamluk sources are so important in both the present context and the whole study of the Ilkhanate. Firstly, there was a phenomenal `aowering of historical writing under the Mamluks, the cause for which has not yet been satisfactorily explained.+- Secondly, as be)*tting a state ruled by a military elite, military abfairs—not only local ones—play a notable role in this corpus. Thirdly, as the main enemies of the Sultanate in the )*rst generations of its existence, the Mongols received plenty of attention, not only in the military sphere. Fourthly, much notice was given to battles with this enemy, where usually the Mamluks held the upper hand. The latter aspect is of particular signi)*cance in trying to understand the nature of the Mongol military. The British military historian John Keegan correctly stated that military history must ultimately deal with battles, since that is where armies )*nally prove their mettle, and where we can learn much about their preparedness, equipment, tactics, command structure, morale and other important matters.+. The descriptions of battles between the Mongols and the Mamluks—where most details are provided from sources composed in the Sultanate—can also be a source of information about the changes—if any—in the nature of the Ilkhanid army. My position is that on the whole the Ilkhanid armies did not undergo a mas- sive transformation in their basic nature, equipment and tactics, certainly into the early fourteenth century; for the )*rst decades of the Ilkhanate we have relatively good evidence, although subsequently we are on less )*rm ground. This does not mean that in this early period there were no changes among the Mongol society elites and common tribesmen: Islamization is clearly one of them,+/ and another would be the growing connections with the Iranian cul- tural and administrative elite among the Mongol upper classes.+0 This paper,

8; See the concise but comprehensive survey by Little, “Historiography of the Ayyūbid and Mamlūk Epochs,” 412–44. For the importance of Arabic sources—mostly written in the Mamluk Sultanate—for the study of Mongol history, see Amitai and Biran, “Arabic Sources.” 8= Keegen, The Face of Battle, 15–36. 8A Melville, “Pādshāh-i Islām,” 159–77; Pfeibfer, “Conversion Versions,” 35–67; Amitai, “Su)*s and Shamans,” 27–46; Amitai, “The Conversion of Tegü der Ilkhan to Islam,” 15–43; Amitai- Preiss, “Ghazan, Islam and Mongol Tradition,” 1–10. (The last three studies are republished in Amitai, The Mongols in the Islamic Lands, part 2). 8C See Aubin, Émirs mongols, as well as Lane, “Persian Notables and the Families,” 182–213. This latter study argues that there was a virtual merging of the Mongolian and Iranian !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

In order to trace the development of the Mongol army in Iran and the sur- rounding countries, one should )*rst ascertain its original state. Actually I was perhaps too quick above when stating that there is a consensus among scholars regarding the fact that the early Mongol army was composed over- whelmingly of light cavalry, i.e. lightly armed and armoured mounted archers

elite in the Ilkhanate from quite early on, which to my mind is a somewhat exaggerated position. 8D For a brief comparison between the two states, see the discussion in Amitai, Holy War and Rapprochement, 87, 108. ^( #XMLRM

)*ghting on steppe ponies.+2 Some popular books suggest that “heavy” cavalry, better armoured and carrying a lance of some type, was interspersed with the mounted archers, and their main task was to assault the enemy directly.+6 This seems to go back to Martin’s early study, whose reasoning was that if the Jurchens (i.e., the , 1115–1234 !&) in China had such a system of inte- grated light and heavier cavalry, the Mongols must have had one too.,7 Why a Chinese dynasty of Manchurian provenance should provide an automatic precedent for the Mongols on the steppe is not clear to me. In any event, as far as I am aware, there is no evidence that the Mongol armies who entered the Islamic world from Inner Asia were on the whole anything else but light archers, as described by the papal envoy John of Plano Carpini who visited the Mongol capital of Qaraqorum in the mid-1240s.,+ Carpini, however, notes that these archers could at times also carry other weapons too: lances, swords, axes, etc., and some of them also wore rudimentary armour.,, The only possible exception might be the royal guard unit, known as the keshig, which was recently investigated in the Ilkhanate by Charles Melville.,- However, in this important article, there is little discussion of the military aspect of this formation, whose members were known as baghatut/ba’atut (singular ), literally ‘heroes.’ The Arabic sources mention at times bahāduriyya,. and bahāduriyyat al-mughul,,/ and it is reasonable that these can be identi- )*ed as members of the local royal guard unit that probably entered Iran with Hülegü in the 1250s. Such a unit is also mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn at the end

8E For these ponies, see Smith Jr., “ ‘Ayn Jālūt,” 336–40. 8F Turnbull, The Mongols, 23; James Chambers, The Devil’s Horsemen, 69–71, 78; Marshall, Storm from the East, 40. :G Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan, 33. See also Martin, “The Mongol Army,” 69. :8 John of Plano Carpini, “History of the Mongols,” 36–37; the Latin original is found in Anastaas van den Wyngaert, ed., Sinica Franciscana, vol. 1: Itinera et Relationes Fratrum Minorum saeculi #$$ et #$% (Quaracchi-Firenze, 1929), 81–82. See the comments of Świętosławski, Arms and Armour of the Nomads, 104, which express a similar opinion, as well as Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 216; Biran, “The Battle of Herat,” 204–5. :: John of Plano Carpini, (Dawson), 33–35 (Latin original in Wyngaret, Sinica Franciscana, 77–80). :; Melville, “The Keshig in Iran,” 135–64. := Ibn ‘Abd al-Ẓāhir, al-Rawḍ al-zāhir fī sīrat al-malik al-ẓāhir, 177; al-Maqrizi, Kitāb al-sulūk li-ma‘rifat al-duwal wa’l-mulūk, <, 500. A translation of the latter passage is found in Quatremère, Histoire des sultans mamlouks, 1; 221. :A Al-Y ūnūnī, Dhayl mir’āt al-zamān, 2: 115; cf. the parallel passage in Ibn Wāṣil, Mufarrij al-kurūb fī akhbār banī ayyūb, (Rahim), 224: dhurriyyat al-mughul (“descendants of the Mongols”). !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

:C Rash īd al-Dīn, Geschichte Ġāzān Ḫān’s, 125–26 (describing the events before the battle of Wādī al-Khanzadār in 1299); see also 127. :D For these in the Mongol Empire as a whole, particularly in the east, see: Hsiao Ch’i-ch’ing, The Military Establishment of the Yuan Dynasty, 36; Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 21–22 and fn. 14; Allsen, “Guard and Government,” 495–521; Martin, “The Rise of Chingis Khan,” 23–24, 36. :E Wa ṣṣāf, Ta’rīkh i Waṣṣāf, 75; see the discussion in Biran, “The Battle of Herat,” 204–5; cf. Martinez, “Īl-Xānid Army,” 152–56. :F “Did the Mongols in the Middle East Remain Nomadic Pastoralists?”, found at https:// www.academia.edu/21768134/Did_the_Mongols_in_the_Middle_East_Remain_Pastoral_ Nomads. ^^ #XMLRM

Every tribe has land to reside in and the descendant inherits it from the forefathers since Hülegü conquered the country. Their abodes (manāziluhum) are in it. They have in it crops for their substance, but they do not live by tilling and sowing.-7

Here we learn that the Mongols have not adopted sedentary forms of econ- omy. In other words, they have remained pastoral nomads into the , when al-‘Umarī composed his work, receiving information from many informants who had left the Ilkhanate in previous years. Perhaps, the objection can be raised: what about the famous passage in Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, in which the author describes Ghazan Ilkhan’s promulgation of the iqṭā‘ system? This passage, discussed in the pre- viously mentioned paper and at greater length in an article published some )*fteen years ago,-+ goes as follows:

At this time [ca. 1300 or later], most of the soldiers had the desire for estates (amlāk) and agriculture. Upon acquiring iqṭā‘ land (milkī iqṭā‘ī), they will have reached their goal.-,

The basic arguments presented in the article just mentioned were that iqṭā‘ here is referring to a dibferent conception than usually understood by this term in both Iran and countries bordering the eastern Mediterranean; the farmān (“order”) commanding this change was issued late in Ghazan’s reign and therefore was probably not widely executed, if at all; and, there is little actual evidence of such iqṭā‘āt. Finally, it should be added that a desire for landed property did not entail the adoption of agriculture by the Mongols per se, but probably more likely only the desire to enjoy its fruits, i.e. the sur- plus extracted by taxes. By the same reasoning, we can see that the contempo- rary Mamluks of Egypt and Syria did not practise agriculture (or have a desire to do so) just because they possessed iqṭā‘āt, which was the basis of their per- sonal wealth, and by which they also maintained their military units. In short, there is no reason to assume that the adoption of some type of iqṭā‘ system by

;G al-‘Umar ī, Masālik al-abṣār, in Lech, ed. and trans., Das Mongolische Weltreich, 95. ;8 Amitai,“Turco-Mongolian Nomads,” 152–71. ;: Rash īd al-Dīn, Geschichte Ġāzān Ḫān’s, 302. Cf. Morgan, “The Mongol Armies in Persia,” 92–93, who suggested that before the word “agriculture” we should add “the practice of,” implying therefore that indeed the Mongols were intent on settling down and changing their lifestyle. !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

;; Bosworth, “Army,” 503. There is a short discussion in Amitai, “Armies and their Economic Basis,” 558–60. ;= Amitai, “Whither the Ilkhanid Army?” 221–64. ;A Wa ṣṣāf, Ta’rīkh i Waṣṣāf, 373, lines 20–23 (discussed by Smith, “ ‘Ayn Jālūt,” 329). ^i #XMLRM practice re`aecting the use of relatively small steppe horses, which needed to be rotated on campaign and during the battle.-0 While originally the Mongols in the Centre had met the initial Mamluk attack dismounted, so as inter alia to improve the accuracy of their archery, they eventually remounted, and “they attacked [the Mamluks] in the Turkish fashion” (bar ishān turk tāz kardand).-1 This I take as an allusion to the traditional Steppe tactic of launching a uni- )*ed assault of mounted archers in a concerted manner.-2 At an apparent later stage, when fresh Mongol troops came up, the Mongols—according to the con- temporary Mamluk historian and senior ob)*cer Baybars al-Manṣūrī, who was not at the battle—used archery ebfectively against the Mamluk horses,-6 indi- cating the continued importance of this traditional nomadic mainstay. There is thus some clear evidence that leads to the conclusion that two gen- erations after Hülegü’s arrival in the region, the Mongol troops on the whole still maintained the military techniques that had been employed by their fore- fathers. This further implies that generally the Mongol army of circa 1300 was one of light cavalry. If this was indeed the case, we would expect that a couple of years later, when Ghazan launched his third campaign into Syria, there would not be a marked change. (As an aside, the his second campaign, of 1300, was cancelled due to particularly harsh weather, and the Mongol army withdrew back over the frontier from north Syria without confronting the Mamluks). I have only partially reviewed the sources for the campaign of 1302–3, in preparation for a full-`aedged study of the battle of Marj al-Ṣubfar, which was a humiliating defeat for the Mongols. So far, I have found nothing which hints at any major paradig- matic shift in the Mongol military. This, of course, is not very satisfactory, and it would be desirable to have more explicit evidence. There is information about how the Mongol mounts subfered terribly from thirst during the )*ghting,.7

;C Smith, “ ‘Ayn Jālūt,” 331, fn. 75; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 215; Amitai, “Whither the Ilkhanid Army?” 253, fn. 129. ;D Rashīd al-Dīn, Geschichte Ġāzān Ḫān’s, 128. ;E See May, The Mongol Art of War, 71–74; Smail, Crusading Warfare, 75–83; as well as the discussion in Amitai, “Whither the Ilkhanid Army?” 247, fn. 108. ;F al-Man ṣūrī, Zubdat al-./kra, 331. =G Rash īd al-Dīn, Geschichte Ġāzān Ḫān’s, 148; Het‘um, “La Flor des estories de la Terre d’Orient,” <<, 202; Smith Jr., “ ‘Ayn Jālūt,” 343. Incidentally, but not without relevance, I have found evidence that contradicts Smith’s suggestion that the Mongols had only three tümens (units theoretically of 10,000 men) at this battle (ibid., 341). See al-Manṣūrī, Zubdat, 372, who states categorically that the Mongols had twelve tümens; on 276, 12 senior ob)*cers are mentioned, all of them evidently tümen commanders. All told, this army had 100,000 men, composed of Mongols (al-mughul), Georgians, Armenians, and !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

There remains at this point the question of the comparison between the Ilkhanids and the Seljuqs, or rather, the armies of these two dynasties. The researches of Claude Cahen, A. K. S. Lambton and David Morgan, and more recently those of Andrew Peacock and David Durand-Guédy have shown clearly that fairly early on, the Seljuq sultans began to rely less and less on the nomads. In their place a relatively large corps of slave soldiers was created, and this remained the backbone of the Seljuq army.., The ghilmān/ mamlūks certainly help to save the day at Manzikert in 1071..- The Mongols, on the other hand, never adopted the institution of military slavery. (We can assume that Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s use of the word ‘Mamluk’ to describe soldiers in the Ilkhan’s entourage is based on ignorance compounded by memories of Egypt and Syria)... This may be due to the fact that unlike the Seljuqs, the Ilkhans came into the Middle East not as Muslims and without any commit- ment to Muslim administrative culture, while the former adopted this rela- tively quickly, including those aspects dealing with the army and its payment

others. The majority of these would have been Mongols, and if I am right, still )*ghting as light cavalry. =8 This is the position suggested by Raphael, in private conversations and in her article, “Mongol Siege Warfare,” 367–70. =: Cahen, “The Turkish Invasions,” 158; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 240–43; Morgan, Medieval Persia, 28–29; Peacock, Early Seljūq History; Durand-Guédy, “Goodbye to the Türkmen?”. The last two mentioned provide a nuanced and detailed analysis of this process, showing that this was a somewhat drawn out matter, and emphasizing that the Turkomans were never fully eliminated from Seljuq service. In any case, the growing and decisive role of the military slaves is clearly presented by all authors. =; al-Jawz ī, Mir’āt al-zamān, 147–52, cited in Ayalon, “From Ayyūbids to Mamlūks,” 44 (reprinted in Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War). == Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages d’Ibn Batoutah, <<, 119, 127; English translation in H. A. R. Gibb, The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, 338, 343. An indication of the in`auence of the nomenclature from the Mamluk Sultanate on Ibn Baṭṭūṭa’s description of the Ilkhanate is seen in his use of khāṣṣikiyya to describe the Ilkhan’s bodyguard (Arabic text, 2: 119; tr. Gibb, 2: 338). ^m #XMLRM

(I am referring, of course, to the iqṭā‘). Secondly, it may be that the royal fam- ily and elite of the Ilkhanate had more of a personal commitment to pastoral nomadism, therefore creating a cultural and political atmosphere conducive to the continuation of this lifestyle among the Mongol tribesmen. The work of Charles Melville has shown that the Ilkhan and his court remained nomads,./ although obviously their nomadism was not that of their forefathers in the pre- imperial period, and certainly was conducted now with a great deal of pomp and luxury..0 The impression gained is that the Ilkhanid elite did a better job of keeping their nomads under control than their Seljuq predecessors (although the former surely had to deal with much larger numbers spread over a wider area). Nostalgia for the nomadic past may have played a part in maintaining an army essentially based on pastoral nomads. Finally, it may be that the Ilkhans and their senior commanders were sincerely convinced that their army was superior to those of their enemies, including the hated Mamluks, and thus continuity was a wise strategic move. In short, I am suggesting here a great deal of continuity of the military sys- tem of the Ilkhanid army, implying and based on continuity of the lifestyle of the majority of its troopers. This is in spite of the great changes that took place in the nomadic society of the Ilkhanate: Turki)*cation, Islamization, the nature of the state, relations with the Iranian elite and surely in other areas. I think that in general we should be looking for continuity in Iran and the surround- ing areas in the sphere of military abfairs from the beginning of the Mongol period into the early Safavid era, although further research will be necessary to con)*rm this statement.

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=A Melville, “The Itineraries of Sultan Öljeitü,” 55–70. =C George Lane has brought this point home to me in several conversations. !JKLMKNMLO #KP !QRKST

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!"#$%&' ( Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Vizier and Patron: Mediation between Ruler and Ruled in the Ilkhanate

Esther Ravalde*

This paper aims to establish the political position and role of the vizier Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ (d. 1284) by looking at his relationships as patron and client, and at how he used these relationships to govern. The upheaval of the Mongol invasions of Iran initially left a power vacuum because many of the former members of the administrative class had been dispersed and the continuity of the tradition of Persian political administration by a vizier was by no means inevitable., In the Seljuq period, the vizier was head of the bureaucracy and of the supreme dīwān (dīwān-i aʿlā).. His duties included supervising a/fairs on behalf of the Sultan: in particular, increasing agricultural production and populousness so as to maximize revenue, and managing state 01nances. He also had general supervision of the religious institutions and conducted relations with other rulers on behalf of the Sultan.2 Lambton argues that the role of the vizier temporarily contracted during the Mongol period,3 while Lane suggests that, with the gradual return to stabil- ity under Hülegü and his successors, Juwayn*̄ brought about “a recognisable continuity.4 This paper will argue that there is insu/01cient evidence to claim that the temporary contraction had eased by the end of Juwayn*̄’s life, and that what continuity there was by 1284 was limited. While his skilful negotiation of patronage networks did allow him to achieve much, this does not mean he restored the role of vizier. Lane says that Juwayn*̄ served the o/01ce and not the

* This article is based upon an 5# dissertation which was made possible by the generous support of the Soudavar Memorial Foundation. 6 Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 72. See also May’s article in this volume, which argues that the Mongols created a power vacuum. 8 Lambton, “Wazīr,” 192. While there were also other who were the heads of other estab- lishments, this essay is concerned with the head of the supreme dīwān, sometimes known as the grand vizier. 9 Lambton, Continuity and Change, 29. : Lambton, Continuity and Change, 50. ; Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 211.

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_557 <= '>?>@AB person of the Ilkhan.C However, the o/01ce was of DEuctuating value, and the power of a vizier was determined at the discretion of the Ilkhan.F Aigle goes further than Lambton and Lane, arguing that there was a funda- mental change to the role of vizier. He was no longer ‘prime minister,’ respon- sible for supervising all administration. At times he was not even in charge of 01nances: occasionally this role was given to an vizier. The vizier always operated in collaboration with a Mongol o/01cial and required their patronage.G This paper examines Juwayn*̄’s use of patronage ties to collect taxes, strengthen Ilkhan rule in Anatolia, mediate between the ruler and the ruled, and develop alliances with the religious classes. To a certain extent, patronage enabled Juwayn*̄ to reconcile the seemingly incommensurable demands placed upon the vizier by the ruler and the ruled. It allowed a degree of negotiation to take place between Mongol and local elites, and also enabled him to project a suc- cessful image (which may explain why he is often seen as having restored the traditional role of the vizier). However, his position in the network of patron- age suggests that Juwayn*̄ was dependent upon, and shared responsibility for administration with, Mongol elites. Furthermore, the personal and DEuctuating nature of Juwayn*̄’s patronage means we cannot claim that in his lifetime the traditional roles of the vizier were regained. Rather, the evidence suggests—as Aigle argues—that the vizier’s norms and functions were circumscribed.H

I Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 178. J Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 73. K Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 72. L This study is based on eight letters and documents in the Safīna-yi Tabrīz, including a hith- erto unknown testament (vaṣīyatnāma), which is a rare act of confession in the medieval world, written by Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ near the end of his life. Other letters and docu- ments by Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ can be found in later narrative chronicles, including in the Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh, and Mujmal-i Faṣīḥī (Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. M. Raushan and M. Mūsavī, 2: 158–59 [hereafter Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī]) 158–59/Rashīd al-Dīn, Jami‘u’t- tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, 3: 564–65 [hereafter Rashīd/Thackston]; Faṣīḥ, Mujmal, 2: 354–56). Yet more can be found in two scribal anthologies in St. Petersburg and Istanbul (St Petersburg, Asiatic Museum, C 816 (P$) and Istanbul University, Farsça Yazmalar, 552). While, unfortunately, I have not been able to see these two manuscripts, versions of some of these texts are preserved in the Safīna and in narrative chronicles (for instance a letter to 01ve shaykhs of Tabriz in Safīna, 76, 205a is also found in Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1158–59; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 564–65; and in the Safīna, 414). Others from these two manuscript collections have been published over the years, including three letters in Humām al-Dīn, Dīwān, Introduction, 47–49; and two let- ters published anonymously (neither of which give a precise reference to their sources) in PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V

The precise role of the vizier in 01nancial administration in the Ilkhanid period is unclear. In part this is due to a lack of evidence,,a but this problem also reveals the complex relationship between local and Mongol practices and responsibilities. However, Juwayn*̄ did play a part in taxation. He used the proceeds both to rebuild the economy and to develop ties of loyalty in a way that would have consolidated both his own position and that of the Ilkhanid rulers. Although Lambton claims that the vizier’s “fundamental and most impor- tant duty was to oversee the 01nances of the state,”,, in the Ilkhanid period he nevertheless shared this duty with several other o/01cials whose roles remain to be fully examined. It is not known, for instance, how the vizier related to the ulugh bitikchi, a secretarial position established by the Mongols,,. nor is it entirely clear how duties were divided between the mustawfī (revenue accoun- tant) and the mushrif-i mamālik (head of the dīwān-i ishrāf, the o/01ce charged with audit).,2 Indeed, since power was highly personal in nature, positions shifted according to force of personality.,3 After having waged a bitter cam- paign against Juwayn*̄, Majd al-Mulk, the mustawfī, was, for a time, made joint vizier with Juwayn*̄—again, how responsibilities were divided is not made clear.,4 At times there was an assistant vizier in charge of 01nance, meaning that the vizier sometimes lost his traditional main function.,C

Armagh ān, v, 1923, 284–87 and xiii, 1932, 379–81. Jürgen Paul has also helpfully written an introductory article to the Juwayn*̄ letters, in which he provides a brief synopsis of the content of many of the ‘business’ letters found in the manuscript (Paul, “The Juvayni Letters,” 277–85). As I hope to demonstrate, the published letters and documents are of immense value for the study of Juwayn*̄’s career and his patronage, yet up until now they have been rarely used. At the time of writing only Aubin, Émirs mongols, and Koprülü, “Cüveynî,” had used the letters. 6b Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 529. 66 Lambton, “Wazīr,” 193. 68 Lambton, “Wazīr,” 193; see also Dashdondog Bayarsaikhan’s article in the present volume. 69 Lambton, Continuity and Change, 60. 6: Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 73. 6; Rash īd al-Dīn, Jāmiʿ, 2:1114/tr. Rashiduddin, Compendium, 3: 543. Rashīd al-Dīn does, how- ever, say that when Abaqa decreed that the two were to govern jointly the area from the Oxus to the Gates of Egypt, the Mongol princesses and amirs were struck by how much power a Mongol ruler had given to . 6I Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 73. ?>@AB

The stereotypical view is that the Mongol rulers were somewhat distant, ruling with the sword and leaving Persian elites to run the administration.,F This view suggests that there was continuity in administration. However, Aigle argues this is not the case. Under the Mongols, there was a break with the Iranian sedentary tradition and unlike the Seljuqs, the Mongols made struc- tural changes.,G For example, the Chinese practice of dual administration was introduced into Iran.,H On the whole this consisted of local civilian governors and Mongol military governors. The two roles overlapped and coexisted, and each had their own sta/f. The level of paci01cation of the land determined which of the two had precedence..a Mongols did not always leave adminis- tration to the locals., and sometimes there was a Mongol military 01gure in charge of 01nance... Martinez argues that capable Ilkhans and Mongol com- manders pursued successful economic policies such as agricultural coloniza- tion, the restoration of debased currency and the consolidation of tax farms..2 Juwayn*̄’s contributions should be seen in this context. The role of vizier was shifting rather than clear-cut, and his relationships with both local and Mongol elites, while not fully clear, were close. He played a part in a new style of gov- ernment which was Mongol-led, and which incorporated elements of Mongol and Persian practice. Ruined land combined with high, inexact tax rates and arbitrary methods of tax collection meant that taxation under the Ilkhans was more onerous than before..3 Lambton writes that Mongol taxation no longer remained within the bounds of the “traditional” or the “tolerable” and that “the restraints on the arbitrary and innovative use of power were minimal.”.4 However, our only sources are from conquered peoples,.C and Rashīd al-Dīn’s evidence of extor- tions, mismanagement and corruption were intended to highlight his own achievements and therefore cannot be counted on as reliable evidence..F The practical advice Rashīd al-Dīn puts into the mouth of Ghazan may, however,

6J Morgan, “Mongol Empire,” 135. 6K Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 72. 6L Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, 36 and 41. 8b Ostrowski, Muscovy and the Mongols, 40–42. 86 Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 73. 88 Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 72. 89 Martinez, “Institutional Development,” 90. 8: Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 529–30. 8; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 199. 8I Lambton, Continuity and Change, 200. 8J Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1349; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 672. English are by Thackston. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V

8K Ghazan Khan to his Mongol amirs. Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmiʿ, I2: 1443/tr. Rashiduddin, Compendium, 3: 714. 8L Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 530–32. 9b Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 530. 96 Lambton, Continuity and Change, 219–20. 98 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1567; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 756. 99 Morgan, The Mongols, 81–82. 9: Nakhchiv ānī, Dastūr, 2: 52. 9; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 199. 9I Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1104; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 538. =f '>?>@AB

Yazdī to conduct a census and to collect taxes in and Diyarbakır.2F That Juwayn*̄ had the power to spend the proceeds is also clear. From the revenue of Anatolia, he provided a stipend of an annual one thousand dinars to Humām al-Dīn’s khānaqāh.2G By doing so, Juwayn*̄ was attempting to gain the loyalty of Humām al-Dīn, and by extension his followers, by giving them some of the pro- ceeds of taxation. More than simply a just and legitimate use of revenue, this cemented the community’s loyalty to Juwayn*̄ and established their depen- dence upon the Ilkhan taxation system. Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s personal patronage in Anatolia was, as Melville notes, probably due to his “private interest alert to the need to develop this important nodal point in the regional trade network.”2H It also coincided with, and may have smoothed, Ilkhanid annexation of the area. Prior to imposing the tamgha on Anatolia in 1277 and arranging the unprecedented submission of the tribes of Caucasus and Lagzistān, which may have been accompanied by a tribute, Juwayn*̄ attempted to “placate the peasantry” and he “restored the cities to habitation.”3a He had attempted intercession (shifāʿat) on behalf of Anatolia following a defection to the Mamluks and had ransomed several towns (chand pāra shahr-rā bāz kharīd).3, He built a hospital in Tokat, three in Sivas,3. and two in Nakhchivān.32 Juwayn*̄’s restoration, building works, and intercession may have been intended as a means of procuring the loyalty of the populace, for whom obedience and the payment of taxation may well have been a just exchange for protection. The fact that Juwayn*̄’s patron- age and taxes coincided suggests this was the case. The practical e/fects of his patronage further reinforce this view. Some of Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s patronage was designed to raise produc- tivity, and thus, tax revenues. Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī writes that the irriga- tion of Āveh and Sāveh was dependent upon the dam Juwayn*̄ built on the Gāvmāsā river.33 In one letter, Juwayn*̄ calls on a certain Muḥyī al-Dīn34 to jus- tify his name by reclaiming wastelands and repairing irrigation works.3C These

9J Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 542, fn. 1. 9K Humām al-Dīn, Dīwān, 48. 9L Melville, “Anatolia under the Mongols,” 72. :b Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1104–5; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 38–39. :6 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1102; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 537. :8 Togan, “Economic and Cultural Life,” 102. :9 Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 412. :: Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Nuzhat, 221. :; This may be the same Muḥyī al-Dīn who was chief qāḍī (judge) of Tabriz in 1295. Rashīd/ Thackston, 3: 628 (not in Raushan and Mūsavī’s version of the Persian text). :I Paul, “Inshāʾ,” 281. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V =j projects were not merely for the bene01t of the peasants. The tradition of “no kharāj on land in a bad condition” meant that uncultivated land was often untaxed,3F whereas land irrigated by running water was liable to twice the taxation of land irrigated by carried water or a water wheel.3G This looks like an attempt to create a symbiotic relationship between Ilkhanid rule and local prosperity. Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s building projects made Anatolia more accessible, and hence, more open to trade and taxation. He and his son Hārūn oversaw the construction of two branches of a highway between Sivas and Istanbul, part of the ‘Shāhrāh,’ a trade route which extended from to Byzantium and the Mediterranean.3H He also built bridges, including one over the Hasht river in Mīānīj.4a Greater communications, and the likely increase in acces- sible trade along the route, not only provided a justi01cation for taxation but the possibility of the stable and long-term collection of revenue. While one may not wish to go as far as Zeki Velidi Togan, who argues that this was part of an ‘Islamist’ colonization of Anatolia,4, the coincidence of increased build- ing activity, in particular road building, which extended beyond Ilkhanid terri- tory and the introduction of a new tax, are signs of a successful, and relatively peaceful, Ilkhan annexation of Anatolia. Although complaints about Ilkhanid taxes are not reliable, criticisms of Juwayn*̄’s methods of taxation are notably limited. Indeed, as Lane points out, the stark contrast between how Juwayn*̄ and his son Bahāʾ al-Dīn4. are remem- bered suggests that Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ was widely regarded as a fair admin- istrator. He raised taxes in Anatolia and also invested in the infrastructure, agriculture, trade and accessibility of the area. He also took care to use patron- age to develop ties of loyalty. In doing so, Juwayn*̄ was acting in the manner of a traditional Persian vizier, and others after him were to continue this. While some accredit Rashīd al-Dīn with focusing on agricultural prosperity,42 it is worth noting that Juwayn*̄ anticipated this, and this reminds us of the danger of taking Rashīd al-Dīn’s self-propaganda too seriously. However, the evidence does not allow us to argue that Juwayn*̄ consolidated or regained the functions of the Persian vizier. Although he played a part, he was operating within a new

:J Lambton, Continuity and Change, 185. :K Lambton, Continuity and Change, 187. :L Togan, “Economic and Cultural Life,” 102. ;b Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Nuzhat, 224. ;6 Togan, “Economic and Cultural Life,” 96. ;8 Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 211. ;9 Lambton, Continuity and Change, 65. =k '>?>@AB context. As May argues, the local system of government was integrated into a Mongol framework, and not the other way around.43 Furthermore, Juwayn*̄’s actions in Anatolia were part of the Ilkhanid colonization of the area. He had to maintain the patronage of Mongol elites in order to survive, and his success rested less on his occupation of the o/01ce than on his personal relationships. Juwayn*̄’s actions in Anatolia reveal that his patronage was not purely per- sonal, but functioned to gain the loyalty of the community, both to himself and to Ilkhan rule. Juwayn*̄’s patronage in Anatolia operated alongside the use of force and was part of the colonization of the region. Juwayn*̄’s patronage and its links to Ilkhanid consolidation also reveal the complex boundaries between public and private actions for the vizier. His relationship to the Ilkhans sug- gests that they, at least, saw him and his possessions as ultimately belonging to them and that they made little distinction between public and private. The hegemony of the Ilkhans was yet to be established in Anatolia, and their rule was often challenged, particularly by the Mamluks. The Mamluks repeatedly attacked and they also had allies within the region.44 In response, the Ilkhans used force to maintain control: Abaqa went in person with the army to subdue a rebellion and defection to the Mamluks.4C Abaqa also sent Juwayn*̄ there to pacify the tribes and to collect taxes.4F Juwayn*̄ was therefore closely associated with the actions of the military in Anatolia. Furthermore, he was also known to use force himself, burning a notorious criminal in a forest.4G Juwayn*̄’s patronage was part of the process of state building.4H After the use of force came attempts to gain the loyalty of elites within the community. In this context, Juwayn*̄’s patronage appears to support and consolidate Ilkhanid policy rather than being personally motivated. We see this particularly in his use of funds from the Ilkhan to support Humām al-Dīn’s khānaqāh. The nature of Juwayn*̄’s patronage in this area raises a question about the distinction between public and private. That there was a distinction between private and o/01cial, albeit a disputed one, may be inferred from the prevalence

;: May, “Mongol Conquest Strategy in the Middle East,” p. 21 of this volume. ;; Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1115; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 544. ;I Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1102; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 537. ;J Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1104; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 538. ;K Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1104; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 538. ;L By state I mean daulat, the kingdom or realm, and not the modern idea of the nation state. It is worth noting, however, that Bert Fragner argues that the conception of the geographical and political entity of Iran, Irānzamīn, stretching from the Nile to the Oxus, came into being in the Ilkhan period. Fragner, “Ilkhanid Rule,” 80. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V =( of corruption cases. Majd al-Mulk Yazdī alleged to Prince (r. 1284–91) that Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ had paid out large bribes to the amirs and courtiers to prevent them from criticizing him. His brother, the historian ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAṭā Malik Juwayn*̄, was also repeatedly accused of embezzlement.Ca This suggests that there was a distinction between private and public funds and correspond- ing expectations about how such money was used. Lambton goes further by saying that the Ilkhans went to great lengths to obtain money from their min- isters, part of which was their private wealth.C, Equally, this could suggest that the Ilkhans di/fered from the Persian commentators and considered their min- isters and their property to be legitimately theirs. The vizier’s inDEuence in the Ilkhanid period was invested more in his person than in the o/01ce itself, and this challenges the idea of there being a 01rm divi- sion between private and o/01cial. An illustration of this is Juwayn*̄’s patron- age in Yazd. In his commission of a hospital there, we see the interweaving of private initiative and public funds. Juwayn*̄ neither saw the hospital during construction, nor paid for all of it, but sent his deputy, Shams al-Dīn Tāzīgūī, to draw up plans and to oversee the construction in his stead. Part of the cost was borne by the dīwān. Of course he took an active, if distant role, taking the initiative, overseeing plans, and converting private wealth into waqf. Despite the involvement of others, however, the hospital was most clearly recognized as having been Juwayn*̄’s project. The historians of Yazd make a distinction between this project and projects Shams al-Dīn Tāzīgūī made under his own initiative, and the poet Imāmī of Herat gives Juwayn*̄ full credit for it.C. What this episode reinforces is the fact that the distinction between private and o/01- cial is an anachronistic one to make. As vizier, Juwayn*̄ could legitimately use a combination of state and private resources for projects in the public good. Rather than an example of corruption, this was an expected part of his job, and in his job he used patronage. Thus, many accusations of corruption may have been cynical and opportunistic attacks on practices which were not only the norm, but which tended to support Ilkhanid consolidation of power. As such, 01nes and con01scations demonstrate not so much a distinction between pri- vate and o/01cial, but that the Ilkhans considered the vizier’s life and property to belong to them, and that what distinction there was between private and public was fragile at best.

Ib E.g. Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1115; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 544. I6 Lambton, Continuity and Change, 65. I8 Aḥmad b. Ḥusain, Tārīkh, 131–33; Ja‘far b. Muḥammad, Tārīkh, 89–91. See also Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 197, for an anecdote about Tāzīgūī’s oversight of building projects. =n '>?>@AB

Although Juwayn*̄’s independence and inDEuence were limited by his depen- dence upon the Mongol military amirs, his position as a Persian administra- tor within Ilkhanid government gave him a role as arbitrator and mediator. Through his patronage relationships, he could administer justice, and, to a degree, protect the local population. The dynamics of his relationships with the rulers and the ruled also demonstrate his position within the system. Thus Aubin’s dim view of many Persian o/01cials, “destined by nature to work with any regime,”C2 who sided with the Mongols against their compatriots and co- religionists, can be re01ned. Rather than the agent of rapacious tyrants, Juwayn*̄ was able to ful01l an important role in society: that of arbitrator. Mongol rule was alien and had little legitimacy in the eyes of many Muslim subjects. Unlike the Seljuq Turks, who took power as Muslims and who ruled under the theoretical sovereignty of the ʿAbbasid Caliph, the Mongols in the Islamic lands were largely non-Muslim from their arrival in 1220 to Ghazan’s conversion in 1295 (r. 1295–1304). Hülegü, who established the Ilkhanate, a Mongol subservient to the Great Khan in China, killed the Caliph in 1258, thus extinguishing a convenient source of legitimation for Turkish mili- tary commanders in the Persian and . The Ilkhans’ claims to legit- imacy rested on their belonging to the Toluid branch of the Chinggisid family, and from having been sent to the Islamic lands by the Great Khan Möngke.C3 While the Chinggisid line was to become a central tenet of the legitimation narrative of future rulers in the Islamic lands, and of the Timurids in particu- lar, initially, this claim made little sense to the Ilkhan’s subjects. In addition to this, their predatory attitude to their subjects was felt, although it may have been exaggerated. As we have already seen, even the most ‘cultured’C4 and Persianized of the Ilkhans, the Muslim Ghazan Khan, shared little sympathy with his subjects and instead saw them as a source of revenue.CC However, Mottahedeh argues that it was precisely in that predatory lack of identi01cation with their subjects that the potential for impartial arbitration lay. Like the Shīʿī Buyids, who ruled over predominantly Sunni Muslims, the

I9 Aubin, Émirs mongols, 81. The translation is the author’s own. I: However, whether Möngke intended Hülegü to set up a Khanate is not clear. Some have also argued that the establishment of the Ilkhanate by the Toluids was contested by another branch of the family, the Jochids. Morgan, The Mongols, 148–49. I; According to Rashīd al-Dīn, who describes the many branches of learning with which Ghazan Khan is familiar. Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1331–41; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 663–69. II Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1443; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 714. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V =<

Mongol ruler may have had the “role of arbiter, distant from the society for which it arbitrated, known to live largely for its own interest and not for any particular interest in society [. . .]. The king who ful01lled this role and saw that each interest got its due, but no more than its due, was ‘just.’ ”CF As representative of the Ilkhans, and object of personal loyalty to many groups in society, Juwayn*̄ occupied a pivotal position between the ruler and the ruled. Both the poet Humām al-Dīn and Juwayn*̄ himself saw it as the vizier’s role to administer justice, to protect from oppression, and to provide stability and strength to the realm and the faith. Humām al-Dīn writes that Juwayn*̄ was the “lion of justice” (shīr-i ʿadl) who protected the people from the “jackal of oppression” (shiqāl-i ẓulm), that he gave the world security, and that he made “the foundation of the kingdom and the faith prosperous and 01rm” (asās-i mulk va dīn maʿmūr va muḥkam). After his death, the whole world fears injustice.CG Of course Humām al-Dīn idealizes Juwayn*̄ and the concept of jus- tice, as used by both Humām al-Dīn and Juwayn*̄ himself, function in part as literary topoi. However, the symbolic value of justice would have meant little if it had not been, at least to a certain extent, acted upon. At the end of his life, Juwayn*̄ recognised this. He apologizes, should he have oppressed anyone. He writes that if he has, his sons are to o/fer compensation.CH Throughout Juwayn*̄’s career we see him attempting to apply justice—often in relatively small but practical ways through his patronage. While direct access to the Ilkhan was limited, even to the vizier, the vizier’s court was to be open to all petitioners. Dawlatshāh tells us that Juwayn*̄ held court, seated on a throne where he received both high and low (dar ṣadr-i jāh qabūl-i ʿavāmm va khāṣṣ bar masnad-i khwājagī mutamakkin būd).Fa His correspondence supports this: Dawlatshāh preserves a petition and reply written in verse.F, Juwayn*̄’s letters sometimes appear to have been written in response to a particular request, such as his grant to Humām al-Dīn’s khānaqāh. Many of Juwayn*̄’s arbitrations may have been small token gestures, such as the granting of three hundred sheep from his special DEock,F. but the fact it was remembered suggests the symbolic act of justice was appreciated.

IJ Mottahedeh, Loyalty, 175. Ghazan Khan’s comment about the Persians is a good illustra- tion of this (see fn. 29). IK Humām al-Dīn, Dīwān, 168–70. IL Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. Jb Daulatsh āh, Tadhkirat, 105. J6 Daulatsh āh, Tadhkirat, 105–6. J8 Daulatsh āh, Tadhkirat, 106. == '>?>@AB

Juwayn*̄’s position and use of patronage and intercession enabled him to mediate between the ruler and the ruled. On numerous occasions he mediated on behalf of provinces and villages. He wrote to Abaqa on behalf of Tabriz, saying that the city su/fered in his absence.F2 When Abaqa wanted to send an army to Khurasan to seize the ruler of Herat, Juwayn*̄ argued that Khurasan was already in ruins and could not bear the arrival of the army.F3 When parts of Anatolia defected to the Mamluks, under the governorship of Muʿīn al-Dīn Parvāna, Juwayn*̄ attempted to stop Abaqa wreaking revenge on the province, arguing that it was unjust to punish a community for the crime of an individ- ual. While this intercession did not entirely succeed, as we have seen, Juwayn*̄ did manage to ransom several villages, thereby protecting them.F4 As an inter- mediary, communicating the wishes of each party to the other, Juwayn*̄ may have played a part in the gradual synthesis and accommodation of locals to Mongol rule and of Ilkhans to their subjects. However, it is important to remember the limits to what Juwayn*̄ could achieve. He himself was the client of Mongol amirs and princesses and he needed their intercession to gain access to the Ilkhan. The dual nature of administration meant that Mongol elites may have played at least as important a part in mediation as Persian elites. In order to survive, Juwayn*̄’s loyalty ulti- mately rested with his masters. In the Safīna-yi Tabrīz, Juwayn*̄ writes that he never attacked the life or property of any Muslim, except under the orders of his masters, and that he carried out such orders with a heavy heart: “tā ghāyat qaṣd-i khūn va māl-i hīch musulmān nakarda bāsham va agar vaqtī az ḥukmī khārijī az īn nawʿ ṣādir shuda bi dil-i rāḍī nabūda va bi-dān nimīpayvasta.”FC While he may have regretted these actions in later life, it is clear that in the course of his career, his loyalty to his masters took precedence over his loyalties to the people. Nevertheless, while Mongol government may have been seen as tyrannical, we must not overlook the fact that many poets and contemporary historians viewed Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ in a positive light. To a certain extent, this was the result of successful propaganda; after all, he fostered many poets, who acted as publicists. Yet it also points to the fact that Juwayn*̄, while constrained and con- ditioned by his loyalties to his masters, did provide a level of both arbitration among the people and mediation between the ruler and the ruled. Juwayn*̄’s ambiguous position, which meant people showed loyalty to his person and

J9 Anon., “Makātib,” 285–86. J: Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1105; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:539. J; Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1102; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:537. JI Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V =Q that he was closely, but conditionally, connected to the Ilkhans, enabled him to transcend the distance between distant rulers and the local popula- tion. Through his patronage, which often produced mutual bene01ts, such as revenue for the ruler and security and prosperity for the ruled, Juwayn*̄ was able, to a degree, to reconcile the demands of the ruler and the ruled. In the Seljuq period, one of the functions of the vizier was the supervision of the religious institutions.FF Because of the growing inDEuence of Su01 groups, particularly among the Mongol elites, Juwayn*̄ was not in a position to ‘super- vise’ them. Juwayn*̄’s patronage of religious institutions is interesting because although he and his family tend to be remembered as orthodox Sunnis, he sometimes supported Shīʿī shrines. This tells us little about Juwayn*̄’s beliefs and personal piety—beyond his tolerance and willingness to adapt—and more about the shifting realities of power. Su01 groups were growing in inDEuence, particularly among Mongol and Turkic groups.FG Denominational boundaries were increasingly blurred and Su01 groups often incorporated Shīʿī elements.FH Juwayn*̄’s patronage in this area suggests that he needed the support of these institutions. As well as projecting his good name, support of these institutions may have made it easier for Juwayn*̄ to justify taxes, given him powerful sup- porters, and also indirect access to Mongol elites. Much evidence does suggest that Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ was a staunch Sunni and “strictly Muslim,” and that he pursued Islamic policies, such as alliance with the Mamluks, to the extent that he was able.Ga His brother ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAṭā Malik Juwayn*̄ ended his history with the glorious Mongol conquest of the Shīʿī Isma’ilis, a triumph for orthodox Islam, but omitted to mention (according to most manuscripts) the death of the ʿAbbasid Caliph.G, In his history, he also goes to great lengths to reconcile Mongol custom with Shariʿa law. One could take this as an indication of the brothers’ traditional orthodox Sunni stance, which Spuler suggests contributed to Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ falling out of favour with Abaqa later in his reign.G. Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ founded schools, gave support to khānaqāhs, shaykhs, and the ʿulamā (orthodox Sunni clerics),

JJ Lambton, Continuity and Change, 29. JK Melville, “Pādshāh,” 161, argues that Ghazan converted to Islam to secure the support of the Mongol military. Bausani, “Religion under the Mongols,” 543, argues that Ghazan, like other Ilkhans, leant towards Shi‘ism. JL Bausani, “Religion under the Mongols,” 543 and 545–46. Kb Spuler, “Djuwaynī,” 607. K6 G. M. Wickens argues that the additional text was written by Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī. Wickens, “Nasir ad-Din Tusi,” 23–35. K8 Spuler, “Djuwaynī,” 607. =c '>?>@AB and converted much wealth into awqāf (charitable endowments). He also fol- lowed Quranic injunctions as to the use of wealth. When asked to pay a 01ne of 20,000,000 dinars, in accordance with the , which condemns hoard- ing but encourages the use of wealth,G2 Juwayn*̄ replied “I have not stashed gold away under the earth like some fools (jāhilān).”G3 The Quran frequently exhorts Muslims to care for the poor and needy, for orphans and for slaves.G4 Juwayn*̄ ful01lled these requirements, freeing a slave,GC permitting his family’s slaves to leave should they wish and stressing the importance of treating them humanely.GF He also ensured beggars and travellers would be provided for at Humām al-Dīn’s khānaqāh.GG However, while his patronage was pious, it did not always tend to repre- sent the traditional, orthodox Sunni, religious elite. Although Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ built madrasas, which would usually have included mosques, there is a notable absence of mosque building in the sources to which I have access, which reDEects a general trend that Rashīd al-Dīn remarks upon during his time as vizier.GH The role of the ʿulamā in Juwayn*̄’s projects appears to have been restricted to administering awqāf, appointments of qāḍīs (judges) and to teaching positions.Ha In contrast, Juwayn*̄ appeared to have particularly close relations with several shaykhs, including the poet Saʿdī, Humām al-Dīn and Fakhr al-Dīn, and his support of khānaqāhs outweighs his interest in schools and mosques. In addition to this, and perhaps surprisingly, were we to accept Spuler’s analysis, Juwayn*̄ also supported the “mashāhid-i ṭūs va jurjān,” the tomb of Imām Riḍā, in , and a Shīʿī shrine in Jurjān. Part of the explanation for Juwayn*̄’s support of Shīʿī shrines is that a recent blurring and softening of religious boundaries made such support acceptable.H,

K9 Sura 104. K: Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1158; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 564. Jāhilān refers to those who lived in ‘ignorance’ before the coming of Islam. K; For example Sura 2:43, 83 and 177 and Suras 90 and 107. KI Paul, “Inshāʾ,” 280. KJ Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. KK Humām al-Dīn, Dīwān, Introduction, 47–48. KL Rashīd al-Dīn complains that upon the accession of Ghazan Khan, many towns and villages did not have their own mosque. Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1502; Rashīd/ Thackston, 3: 743. Lb For example Paul, “Inshāʾ,” 281 on the appointment of a qāḍī, Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 412–13 on the appointment of a teacher, and 414, the Qāḍī Muḥyī al-Dīn is made overseer of Juwayn*̄’s awqāf in Tabriz. L6 Bausani, “Religion under the Mongols,” 543–49. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V =d

The Shīʿī Fatimids had been replaced by the Sunnī Ayyubids and then the Mamluks, while in Persia, the Isma’ilis had been destroyed. Political reasons for the suppression of Shiʿism had therefore become less pressing. In addition to this, following the extinction of the caliphate and the works of two inDEuen- tial Shīʿīs, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d. 1274) and ʿAlāma Ḥillī (d. 1326), Shiʿism gained new con01dence. At the same time, the relative status of the ʿulamā declined, while that of Su01 shaykhs increased. Under the auspices of more heterodox (but still Sunni) Su01 movements, pro-Shīʿī beliefs became more widespread. In this climate, the distinction between Shiʿism and Sunnism could become blurred.H. Indeed, many of the inhabitants of Tus, who no doubt venerated the tomb there, were “orthodox of belief.”H2 In this intellectual climate, Shīʿī and other non-orthodox groups could be supported without incurring disapproval. In addition to the blurring of denominational boundaries, the leaders of khānaqāhs and other heterodox, particularly Su01, groups were becoming increasingly powerful, and Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ needed their support in order to maintain control and to collect tax. Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ writes in a letter that Humām al-Dīn’s khānaqāh was thronging with people, high and low.H3 Nuzhat al-qulūb tells us the shrine at Tus was highly venerated and that a small town had grown up around it.H4 In the Timurid period, Su01 leaders were to become powerful protectors of the local population and mediators between the ruler and the people. Khwāja Aḥrār, a Naqshbandī shaykh in Timurid Central Asia, was able to negotiate tax bene01ts for his followers.HC The Safavids were powerful enough to wrest land from the Juwayn*̄ family in the .HF If Juwayn*̄ was to successfully negotiate settlements and collect taxes from the local populace, it was necessary to establish good relationships with the leaders of those communities, in particular relationships of patronage, which estab- lished the dependence of the community upon the good will of the patron. Su01 groups were particularly popular among Turko-Mongol converts, and especially, among members of the military. Indeed, Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī writes that “the Mongols are utterly devoted to him [Shaykh Ṣafī al-Dīn Ardabīlī]; many of that tribe have ceased to oppress people and this is a great

L8 Bausani, “Religion under the Mongols,” 545 and 549. L9 Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Nuzhat, 151. L: Humām al-Dīn, Dīwān, Introduction, 47–48. L; Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Nuzhat, 151. LI Paul, “Forming a Faction,” 540. LJ Gronke, Derwische, 306–308 and 323. Qf '>?>@AB deed.”HG Rather than a conversion of the heart, as Rashīd al-Dīn tells us it was, Melville has argued that Ghazan’s conversion in 1295 was engineered to appeal to Muslim converts in the military.HH ReDEecting the inclinations of key sup- porters, although Ghazan converted to Sunnism, his conversion included a Su01 element,,aa and he took care to pay his respects to the shrine at Tus,,a, and to ʿAlids and Sayyids.,a. Bearing this in mind, much of Juwayn*̄’s patronage of the religious classes may have had the similar aim of gaining the support of the military, and an aura of popular legitimacy among Turco-Mongol elites. It does seem to have been the case that Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ cultivated friendships with the religious classes in order to gain their blessing and the support of parts of the military, and Mongol elites, including women. During the civil war between Aḥmad, who was Muslim, and Arghun, who was not, Aḥmad and his entourage visited the Ṣafavī Shaykhs at . The author of Ṣafwat al-ṣafā tells us that Juwayn*̄, who was present, greeted one of the Su01s with an embrace. Following this, Aḥmad went to meet Arghun in battle.,a2 Just as Ghazan later attempted to appeal to the Muslim element in the army by converting (in contrast to his non-Muslim rival Baidu), so, it seems, did Aḥmad. Mongol women also supported Su01 shaykhs. Öljei built a khānaqāh over the place where her father, Hülegü’s, grave stood, and Būlūghān, the wife of Abaqa and Arghun, supported shaykhs and their communities.,a3 Juwayn*̄’s patronage mirrored the preferences of his own patrons, showing the relative lack of inDEuence of the vizier in the period and his need to maintain the sup- port of local elites who did have the ear of Mongol elites. We should not, however, entirely overlook personal piety as a motive for religious patronage. Prior to his death, Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ wrote a letter to 01ve great shaykhs of Tabriz, including Humām al-Dīn and Fakhr al-Dīn, as well as Muḥyī al-Dīn, who may have been the chief qāḍī of Tabriz, reminding them of the good news (bashārat) of Islam and asking them to pray for him when he is gone.,a4 At a time of crisis, while his friends may not have been able to help materially (he had been unable to raise the 01ne of 20,000,000 dinars), he

LK Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Guzīda, 675. LL Melville, “Pādshāh,” 159–77. 6bb Ḥamd Allāh Mustawfī, Guzīda, 675. 6b6 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1376; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 685. 6b8 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1358; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 676–77. 6b9 Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat, 218. 6b: De Nicola, “Unveiling the ,” 249. 6b; Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1157; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 565. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V Qj did look to his friends for spiritual support, perhaps in return for his support of their khānaqāhs. “Rašīddadīn 01rmly believed, that whosoever inaugurates a perpetual charity or pious institution will rise in the other world’s hierarchy step by step as long as this institution exists.”,aC A similar belief may explain why Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ went to such great pains to provide for the perpetuation of the institutions he founded. Just before his death, he constituted many schools, hospitals and khānaqāhs he had built into waqf.,aF Waqf was in theory exempt from taxation and could not be con01scated. While in practice the inalien- able status of waqf land was often not respected in the Ilkhanid period,,aG the increase in waqfs over the Mongol period suggests that this arrangement was considered more secure than other options. Nevertheless, while Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ was a believing Muslim, for most of his life he was certainly not a strict Muslim, as Spuler would have us believe. Ful01lling pious duties was secondary to his career as vizier. In addi- tion to molesting fellow Muslims, while he writes that he committed no major sins (makrūhī-yi kullī), he does confess to having drunk , committed sins of the DEesh and committed usury (shurb-i khamr va maḥrumāt-i shahvānī va ribāʾ). He also asks his sons to employ several people to say the prayers he has missed. The confessional tone of this testament, written at the end of his life, should not be considered representative of his life. It suggests rather that he now regrets some of the aims he pursued throughout much of his life. He for- bids his sons to work in government service and instructs them to be content with limited wealth, all of which has a rather regretful air.,aH While Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s patronage of religious institutions may have been motivated by piety to an extent, by far the greater reason was that shrines and khānaqāhs were becoming popular, and that their leaders were becom- ing powerful 01gures, especially among the Turko-Mongol population and the military. This, rather than personal conviction, may well explain why Juwayn*̄ gave greater attention to these groups, including to the Shīʿī shrines, rather than to traditional forms of orthodox . Good relationships with the shaykhs may have given Juwayn*̄ greater access to taxation, the loyalty of their followers, and therefore a level of popularly granted legitimacy. It also gave him access to some parts of the military and to some Mongol women, and

6bI Ho/fmann, “Perfect Organiser,” 288. 6bJ Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. 6bK Nakhchivānī, Dastūr, t/1: 175. 6bL Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. Qk '>?>@AB through them he could sometimes gain access to the Ilkhans. Thus, in this area, rather than consolidating the role of the vizier, Juwayn*̄ was adapting to a new trend and following the inclinations of the powerful. Juwayn*̄ was from a long line of administrators and one of his aims was 01rstly to use patronage to secure his good name for posterity and secondly to secure an inheritance for his sons. The degree to which contemporaries praised him suggests he succeeded in his 01rst aim.,,a This issue is worth considering because his successful self-propaganda means we have to be cautious about using contemporary sources, which may suggest that Juwayn*̄ had more inDEu- ence than he really did. Juwayn*̄ is remembered as being more than the servant of the Ilkhans, even though much of his patronage was intended to further his political role. He was less successful in his second aim. The Safīna-yi Tabrīz suggests that Juwayn*̄ was intent on providing an inheritance for his sons. When he converted many of his schools, hospitals and khānaqāhs into waqf, he made his son Hārūn (mutavallī-yi dīgar awqāf farzand hārūn), and after him, his sons who were worthy and learned (ki bi ʿilm va dīyānat makhṣūṣ bāshand), the administrators of much of his waqf land.,,, While waqf property was a charitable endowment and was therefore not owned by the founder or his descendants, the founder had the power to appoint the administrators. In turn the administrator could take a large pay- ment from the proceeds of the endowment. In the case of Rashīd al-Dīn’s endowment in Tabriz, for example, the administrator, who was to be a son, was paid half the endowment’s income.,,. The constitution of awqāf, then, was a relatively secure means of securing inheritance for nominated members of his family. At the time of his death, Juwayn*̄ probably believed his e/forts to accumu- late vast family wealth had failed. He thus converted much land to waqf at the last minute and warned his sons to accept any con01scation of land.,,2 To an extent, his concern was justi01ed: much of his land was con01scated by Amīr Buqa.,,3 However, despite the Ilkhan’s purge of the Juwayn*̄ family and con01scation of land, as mentioned earlier, one of Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s grandsons, Shams al-Dīn, son of Nawruz, lived to contest, and lose, claims for land with the Safavids in the 1350s. Despite falling from political favour, it is worthy of note that the Juwayn*̄ family managed to hold on to land for a

66b Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 211. 666 Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. 668 Sheila Blair, “Endowment Deed,” 79; Lambton, “Mongol Fiscal Administration,” 79–99. 669 Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. 66: Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1160; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 565. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V Q( further sixty years: in the face of adversity, Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ did succeed in passing down some wealth and inheritance to two generations. Charity was central to providing an inheritance: while also providing insti- tutions for public bene01t, such as schools and hospitals, waqf also gave the founder’s family a greater chance of retaining some control of family land and wealth, albeit not ownership. This type of patronage not only bridged the gap between the ruler and the ruled, as we have seen, but it also gave great bene01t to its founder and his heirs. Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ believed that through good works, his name could be immortalized. At the start of the document appointing a teacher to the schools he founded is written: the Ṣāḥib Dīwān “deserves great praise and he had stored up for himself great rewards,” and “indeed our works point to us, so when we are gone, look to our contribution.”,,4 He wanted his contribution to be remembered and so places he founded were named after him, such as the “new Ṣāḥibābād garden of Charandāb.”,,C One of his 01nal charitable acts was to commemorate his own life: in the testament, he gives detailed stipulations for the provision of all kinds of sweets, tallow and oil for his “shab-i ghurbat,” the night of his death.,,F Commemoration was not a legacy that could be achieved by force. More important was to establish the good will of poets, who operated as publicists and propagandists. This he did, establishing close friendships with Humām al-Dīn and Saʿdī,,,G and by paying poets generously to commemorate his patronage.,,H Despite being dependent on the patronage of Mongol amirs and princesses and needing the support of religious institutions, Juwayn*̄ never- theless succeeded in projecting an image as a patron in his own right. When assessing his real power and inDEuence, therefore, we have to be aware of this bias in the sources. Despite the image Juwayn*̄ projected, his real power and inDEuence were limited. Although he developed networks of patronage which included Persian and Turko-Mongol elites, ultimately Juwayn*̄ remained at the mercy of higher networks of patronage. His ability to govern by using patronage was there- fore limited. He often did not have direct access to the Ilkhan. On at least two occasions when Abaqa was displeased with him, he had to write to plead his

66; Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 412. 66I Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. Ṣāḥib referring to his title, Ṣāḥib dīwān. 66J Abū al-Majd Muḥammad, Safīna, 414. 66K Daulatshāh, Tadhkirat, 106. 66L Aḥmad b. Ḥusain, Tārīkh, 131–33; Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, Tārīkh, 89–91. Imāmī was paid 1,000 dinars to commemorate the new hospital. Qn '>?>@AB loyalty and innocence and to request an audience. He was only able to go to Arghun’s court under the protection of Amīr Buqa. More successful than his own protestations were the intercessions of the Mongol princesses. When Majd al-Mulk accused Juwayn*̄ of corruption and bribery, he sought the aid of Öljei who “wrote a petition for him” which “rescued him from the brink of disaster.”,.a Later, when the same accusations were raised again, Juwayn*̄ sought protection with “Armini Khatun, under whose patronage he DEourished as before” (bi Armini Khatun iltijāʾ namūd va bi tarbiyat-i ū bar qarār-i sābiq muʿtabar-i tamām shud).,., When Arghun, whose accession Juwayn*̄ had not supported, gained the throne, Juwayn*̄ hoped that he might have intercession through Amīr Buqa, “who is an old friend” (dūst-i dīrīna). This failed and so did his attempts to raise the required cash 01ne from friends and family.,.. These events reveal the limitations of Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄’s position. The networks of alliances he had created through ‘downward’ patronage, especially with the inDEuential religious classes, may have ensured the smooth running of government, but they were not enough to release him from his debt, nor to defend him against accusations of corruption and treachery. Even his down- ward relationships revealed his need for acceptance among the growing Su01 groups. Whatever power and inDEuence Juwayn*̄ may have wielded among his allies was irrelevant in the face of the fact that he was the Ilkhan’s man—in this case, he had allied himself to the losing side, and as Aḥmad was defeated, so must he be. The only factions that could have saved him, as they had before, were the Mongol elite—the princesses and the amirs and they did not save him this time. The land, connections and wealth he had accumulated through patronage proved to be a double-edged sword. Vulnerable to accusations of embezzle- ment and bribery, Juwayn*̄’s wealth was also coveted by others. None other than Amīr Buqa, in whom Juwayn*̄ had placed the last vestiges of hope, (and who also became vizier) took possession of a large part of Juwayn*̄’s property.,.2 Lambton suggests that by the end of the Ilkhanid period the vizierate had mostly regained the functions it had had in the Seljuq period.,.3 By the time of

68b Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1112; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 543. Mongol princesses often acted as protectors of inDEuential characters. For example, see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 126. 686 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1127; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 549 688 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1157; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 564. 689 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2: 1160; Rashīd/Thackston, 3: 565. 68: Lambton, Continuity and Change, 67–68. PR>ST #@-AUV WXY>ZVU, [\]\B^ #VA $>_^`V Q<

Juwayn*̄’s death in 1284 few signs of this could be seen. It was true that he had some responsibility for collecting tax and for state expenditure. However, this role was shared with Mongol amirs and occasionally with other Persian 01gures. The ambiguity surrounding the role of the vizier in the dual system of admin- istration also means that we cannot say Juwayn*̄ or the o/01ce of the vizirate had 01rmly regained its position. That was liable to change, at the discretion of the Ilkhan. Despite this, Shams al-Dīn Juwayn*̄ did use patronage to achieve a great deal. Through patronage he not only organized and collected taxes but devel- oped agriculture and trade, supported the religious classes and acted as nego- tiator, moderating some of the harshness of Ilkhan rule. To a degree, patronage made possible the reconciliation of the demands of the ruler and the ruled: to the ruler Juwayn*̄ could present tax receipts and prosperous, loyal, subjects. To the ruled Juwayn*̄ could o/fer negotiation, prosperity, and justice. Because power was invested in his person by the Ilkhan and because simultaneously, thorough patronage, he had developed ties of loyalty among certain sectors of society, Juwayn*̄ could o/fer a degree of real dialogue, mediation, and synthesis between the ruler and the ruled. However, rather than Ilkhans adapting to Persian practice, Juwayn*̄ adapted to the Ilkhans. He deferred to Mongol amirs and princesses and he followed the trend in supporting Su01 groups, Shīʿī causes and the consolidation of power in Anatolia. His position in the network of patronage reveals that he was not particularly powerful. Although he spent his money in a way which would project a pious, cultured and inDEuential image, this was illusory. He did succeed in creating a legacy for his sons but his life and power remained precarious. While Juwayn*̄ succeeded in gaining some inDEuence, he did not revive the institution of the vizier. The role of the vizier remained unresolved and much less inDEuential than it had been under the Seljuqs.

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Bruno De Nicola

Introduction

The economic history of the Mongol Empire has puzzled historians for decades. The information we have on the subject for the di)ferent parts of the vast ter- ritory conquered by the Mongols varies radically. This becomes apparent if we compare, for example, the fair amount of data available for the territories of the Mongol Yuan Dynasty of China (1279–1368) with the almost non-existent information we have on how these nomadic rulers administered the econ- omy of, for example, Central Asia.* For the territories of the Ilkhanate, that is Iran, Khurasan and West Asia, it is important to highlight the relevance of the studies carried out by Lambton and Petrushevsky some time ago.+ More recently, a more comprehensive framework for understanding the develop- ment of the Mongols’ role in the economy of the territories they conquered was provided by Allsen, who suggested a more nuanced view of the Mongols as rulers and administrators of a multicultural empire., The Mongol Empire underwent a bi-directional cultural and economic transformation whereby di)ferent territories had to accommodate their economies to the needs not only of the new rulers, but also of the conquered populations. Consequently, the di)ferent Mongol rulers had to adapt, with the help of the local elites, to di)ferent circumstances and economic opportunities presented by the newly conquered territories. Because the Mongol conquest was not only a military enterprise but also a migration of people, women were not excluded from the economic activity of the empire. Further, the relatively high status enjoyed by Mongol Khatuns

- Schurmann, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty; Endicott-west, “Merchants Associations in Yüan China,” 127–54. / Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia; Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 483–537. 0 Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 83–126; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 17–56.

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_55/ 12 34 56789: across the empire made them, at times, important actors in the empire’s econ- omy. This article will focus on how the role of Mongol women in the econ- omy of the empire was transformed when these ladies settled in Iran after the conquest of Hülegü during the 1250s. I will use Allsen’s ideas on the economic activity of the Mongols in the early empire and contrast it with the informa- tion we have on female economic activity in Ilkhanid Iran.; The ultimate aim is to show that women played a signi<=cant role in the economic life of the empire and that this role was transformed and adapted depending on the dif- ferent circumstances faced during the territorial expansion of the empire.

Female Economic Activity from the Steppe to World Empire

Although recent archaeological research has documented the existence of agricultural practices in the steppe at the time of Chinggis Khan, in pre- imperial Mongolia wealth was based on two basic resources: cattle and people.> As Chinggis Khan was subduing his rivals in the steppe, a process of systematized plunder, characteristic of this early stage, was carried out by his followers and relatives.? In the Secret History, this process is especially vigor- ous when Temüjin (the original name of Chinggis Khan) conquers a rival fac- tion. For example, immediately after he “crushed and despoiled” the Kereits, Chinggis Khan started “distributing them on all sides,” giving to some of his allies a full sub-group of the conquered people.@ He also took the nieces of his defeated rival from him, marrying one of them and giving the other to his son Tolui.A He was merciful to the father of the two women, allowing him to keep his subordinates but placing under his control all the resources (mostly cattle) belonging to him and his daughters. The Secret History goes on to detail how the Kereit people were distributed among Chinggis’ allies according to their merit in battle, attesting not only to a system of plunder but also to one of distribution of human and material resources.B

C I would also like to thank Timothy May for sharing with me an early version of his forthcom- ing paper. See May, “Commercial Queens.” D Allsen, “The Princes of the Left Hand,” 27. E Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 27. F It is mentioned that he gave to the Suldus Taqai the Jirgin branch of the Kereit people. Anonymous, The Secret History of the Mongols, §186 [hereafter G"H]. I These women are Ibaqa Beki and Sorghaghtani Beki respectively. J G"H, §187. Similar examples can be observed during the defeat of other steppe factions such as the ; see G"H, §198; on the Tatars’ extermination and the inKLuence of women in saving some of their relatives, see Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. M. Raushan and %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P 1N

In this strategy of plunder and distribution, women were part of the booty and had a share in it.*V During this early period, one woman who received a considerable amount of wealth in this manner was Chinggis Khan’s mother Hö’elün. She was always a bene<=ciary in the allocation of people conquered by Chinggis Khan. Sources disagree about her share of the booty, a subject that has generated a certain amount of discussion among scholars.** However, despite di)ferences of opinion regarding the number of people received, she certainly was a bene<=ciary of this allocation practice. Her position as mother of the ruler was the determining factor in her always receiving more people than the rest of the family. Further, having all these people under their com- mand lent a military capability to members of the royal family, and an eco- nomic one too, because herds and KLocks came with the conquered people and were incorporated into the Chinggisid family’s ordos (Mongol camps including properties and people).*+ Other women in Chinggis Khan’s family also received people who had been seized in war. His wife Börte had an ordo and at least occasionally was the recipient of such people.*, She is not mentioned in either the Chinese, Persian or Mongolian sources that refer to the Khan’s distribution of people, but Rashīd al-Dīn comments on the fate of a Tangut boy who was brought to her, presumably after a raid against the Xi-Xia Kingdom.*; Generals from di)ferent backgrounds from across the steppe are mentioned as being part of Börte’s personal , con<=rming that she also received a share of the

M. Mūsavī, -:I0 [hereafter Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī]; Rashīd al-Dīn, Jami‘u’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, -: CE–CF [hereafter Rashīd/Thackston]. -X Another appropriation of women by the victorious side after a battle occurred when the Mongols defeated the Tumat people; see G"H, §241. -- The Secret History says that she received 10,000 people while Rashīd al-Dīn reduces this to 5,000 with another 3,000 going to the youngest son Otegin; these, however, remain within the mother’s control, taking her tally to 8,000 people. See G"H, §242; Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:611; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:281. -/ On the inKLuence of women in the Mongol army see De Nicola, “Women’s Role and Participation in Warfare,” 95–112. For an introduction to female ordos in the Mongol empire see De Nicola, “Ruling from Tents,” 126–36. -0 The incorporation of people into Börte’s ordo is not presented in quantitive but in ‘quali- tative’ terms, meaning that is the background of the people she received (for example Buda Noyan) that matters for Rashīd al-Dīn rather than the number of people given to her. See Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī 1:137; Rashīd/Thackston, 1:74. -C Dunnel, “The Hsi Hsia,” 206–14. 1Y 34 56789: steppe people who submitted to her husband.*> Other wives (Qulān Khatun) and some of Chinggis Khan’s daughters (Tümälün Khatun and Chächäyigän) are also reported to have received people.*? This suggests that, though it may only be Hö’elün who is mentioned in the major distribution of people carried out by the Khan among his male relatives, other women in the royal family participated in the system of conquest and distribution during the formative period of the empire. A story concerning another of Chinggis’ wives gives us not only further evi- dence of the existence of ladies’ ordos and the share Khatuns had in the reve- nues produced by the consolidation of the empire, but also some details about what the wealth in their camps consisted of. There is a famous anecdote in the Secret History of the Mongols and the Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh about Chinggis Khan giving away one of his chief wives, the Kereit Ibaqa Beki, to one of his generals.*@ The story di)fers signi<=cantly between the two versions but there are certainly correspondences in the two renditions with regard to the wealth of this lady.*A The story is useful to us for a number of reasons but here it is important to obtain a clearer idea of the property which these ladies had at their disposal.*B The economic structure of the empire changed as it expanded and so too did the nature of women’s involvement in economic activity. In Iran, at least until the fourteenth century, most of their economic activity was concentrated in and around their ordo. Military campaigns to capture booty a)fected women in di)ferent ways. On the one hand, it increased patrimony among the Mongol Khatuns, as they shared in the fruits of conquest. On the other, the expan- sion of the empire deeply a)fected the lives of women in the conquered coun- tries, since those who were not killed were generally considered part of the loot and distributed as slaves among members of the royal family (both men

-D Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:593; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:272–73. -E There is a famous reference in Juwaynī to a daughter of Chinggis Khan (Tümälün) enter- ing the city of Nishapur after the Mongol conquest; after massacring the majority of the prisoners she took four hundred of them for their craftsmanship skills and brought them to . See Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 1:139–40; Juwaynī/Boyle, 1:177. On the veracity and the confusion generated in the sources about this event see the commentary in Boyle’s translation (174–75, fn. 1); De Nicola, “Women’s Role and Participation in Warfare,” 101–2. -F Her case is also mentioned by Sneath, The Headless State, 175. -I Ibaqa had people under her command (at least two hundred), given to her by her father; she also possessed horses, slaves and cattle, which would have generated revenue. See Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:197; Rashīd/Thackston, 1:104. Jagambo was the father of Ibaqa Beki and the brother of the Ong Khan of the Kereits. He was pardoned when Chinggis Khan conquered his people, but he later rebelled and was destroyed. See G"H, §208. -J For a more detailed analysis of the story see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 156–57. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P 1[ and women). If the captive women were of noble stock they were married to princes and generals.+V The search for booty was the driving force which kept the Mongol military machine en marche, and the early Mongol thirst for booty continued into the fourteenth century. During the time of Ghazan Khan in Iran, pillage was still important as a source of income among princes and generals.+* However, this direct exaction of resources by military conquest was not the only way in which the Mongols expanded their wealth. Trade is stressed by modern historians as one of the most valuable economic activities favoured by nomadic empires in general and by the Mongols in particular.++ Yet views vary about how this trade was articulated and what its implications were for the Mongols.+, Some scholars have observed that the development of Mongol involvement in trade varied, depending on the region they occupied, but overall the nomadic pro- motion of trade has generally been regarded as ‘bene<=cial’ for those seden- tary societies that fell under the control of the Mongols.+; Trade expanded not only beyond their frontiers but also beyond their political control. Commercial centres were established that connected China, Iran, India, and Europe allow- ing, by the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, many foreign traders (such as Italians) to operate across Asia.+> Those in charge of carrying out commer- cial transactions were the ortaqs or merchants who had close relationships with the royal family. However, the relationship between these commercial agents and the Mongols went through di)ferent stages as the empire expanded and divided and as its economic policies and resources came under more

/X Lambon, Continuity and Change, 289. /- It is mentioned that during their <=rst campaign into Syria in 1299, the Mongols cap- tured the treasury of the and distributed it among the o)<=cials. See Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. B. Karīmī, 2:940 [hereafter Rashīd/Karīmī]; Rashīd/ Thackston, 3:646. // Khazanov distinguishes between two di)ferent kinds of trade among pastoral societies: one in which there is direct exchange of goods between nomadic and sedentary people and another in which the nomads act as mediators in exchanges between sedentary soci- eties. See Khazanov, Nomads and the Outside World, 202. /0 Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization,” 11. /C Halperin, “Russia in the Mongol Empire,” 243; see, for example, the study on the pro- motion of the fur trade in the Golden Horde by Martin, “The Land of Darkness and the Golden Horde,” 401–21; see also Noonan, “Russia’s Eastern Trade, 1150–1350,” 201–64. /D See, for example, the commercial importance of the in the Mongol period for international trade in Aubin, “Les Princes d’Ormuz du \]]] au \^ siècle,” 77–137. See also Allsen, “Ever Closer Encounters,” 22; Kauz, “Bengali Textiles as Tribute items to Ming China,” 39–55; Aigle, Le Fars sous la domination mongole, 71–77. 1( 34 56789: centralized control.+? Just as women had shared in the riches gained through plunder, so they played a role in trade. The expanding wealth of the new Mongol nobility in the early Empire meant that women occupied a new role in the economy. As Allsen has noted,

The Mongols, heretofore a society with limited purchasing power, now suddenly found themselves with vast and unaccustomed wealth, and the ruling strata, the main bene<=ciaries of the booty and tribute, were prone to an extravagance typical of the nouveau riche.+@

Hence, Mongol women sought expensive goods which stimulated trade. Objects of luxury had been present in the steppe before the empire,+A but con- sumption rapidly increased as more and more resources found their way into the hands of the Khatuns, promoting trade and the movement of goods across Eurasia.+B Demand for such goods seems to have been especially strong in the early period of the empire when massive amounts of money were at the dis- posal of the royal family. The accumulation of such highly elaborate artefacts seems to have increased in the Khatuns’ ordos as the empire expanded, eventu- ally reaching the levels of opulence described by Ibn Baṭṭūṭa among the ladies of the ulus of in the fourteenth century.,V Despite this, Khatuns were not only interested in luxury artefacts. Chinese sources describe the purchase of KLour by Mongol women. It was necessary to transport it over a distance of up to 1,150 kilometres, but the Khatuns had no problems in paying the bill.,* In order to satisfy increasing demand among Mongol princes and princesses, some kind of structure was needed which would enable trade to KLourish and merchants to bring their products safely to their customers. Accounts of the relationship between the Mongols and the merchants in this early period are not very clear. It seems that both parties actively collaborated, the new empire stimulated and protected trade, and Mongolia became a new market for Inner Asian traders.,+ The presence of

/E On this phenomenon see especially Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 83–126. /F Ibid., 93. /I See for example the present given by Chotan (the mother of Börte) to Chinggis Khan’s mother when the marriage between their sons was arranged in G"H, §96. /J Especially textiles and gold brocades were demanded by Mongol women; see Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 16. 0X Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, 485–86. 0- See Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 93. 0/ Ibid., 94; Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty,” 260–61. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P 1` commercial agents from Central Asia before the rise of Chinggis Khan,,, and according to Juwaynī, the Mongol lifestyle and the scarcity of well-established merchants meant that those traders who did reach the camps could expect high pro<=ts. Citing the pro<=ts made by a particular entrepreneur called Aḥmad of Khojend, Juwaynī highlights the fortunes that it was possible to make by bringing “gold embroidered fabrics, cottons, zandanichi and whatever else they thought suitable” to be sold to the Khan and his family.,; Whilst the khans dealt with merchants, references to women doing the same thing in this period are not abundant. However, women’s capital was repre- sented in the commercial expedition sent by Chinggis Khan to the neighbour- ing Khwarazmshah kingdom in 1218 (this expedition became the catalyst for the Mongol invasion of Central Asia). The Khan gathered the merchants together and “ordered his sons, daughters, wives, and military commanders to select Muslims from their respective retinues and to supply each with gold and silver ingots (balish) so that they might trade in the land of the Khwarazmshah.”,> This suggests that even at the time of Chinggis Khan, women were investing in long-distance trade in accordance with the Mongol policy of engaging in commerce. However, it seems that when Chinggis Khan died in 1227, trade was still in its infancy. Guards were appointed at the borders of Mongol domains to secure the unhindered entry of merchants,,? but this only happened when Chinggis Khan had consolidated his power in the steppe.

Towards a Mercantile Economy: Mongol Women in the United Empire

The accumulation of wealth through the exaction of resources continued after the death of Chinggis Khan, with the Khatuns garnering riches when the

00 G"H, §§182 and 657. For the presence of merchants from in the court of Chinggis Khan mentioned in the Yuanshi, see Pelliot, “Une ville musulmane,” 264–68. 0C Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 1:59; Juwaynī/Boyle, 77–78. Rashīd al-Dīn also mentions Chinggis Khan dealing with Muslim merchants. See Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:472–73; Rashīd/ Thackston, 1:233–34. 0D Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 88. He refers to Juwaynī/ Qazwīnī, 1:60; Juwaynī/Boyle, 78, but in this account, only the sons (pesarān), the (nūyanān) and the amirs (āmirān) are mentioned and no speci<=c reference to women is made. The Khatun is mentioned in Rashīd al-Dīn’s version, see Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:473; Rashīd/Thackston, 1:234. 0E Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 1:59; Juwaynī/Boyle, 77–78. 1b 34 56789:

Mongols conquered Northern China and Russia.,@ Wealth exaction quickly adopted a more ‘imperial form’ whereby not only cattle and soldiers but also skilled artisans were captured and brought to Mongolia to begin the construc- tion of the imperial city of Qaraqorum in the heart of the steppe.,A Juwaynī comments that the building of the new Mongol capital was an enterprise in which:

artisans of every kind were brought from Khitai, and likewise craftsmen from the lands of Islam; and they began to till the ground. And because of Qa’an’s great bounty and muni<=cence people turned their faces hither- ward from every side, and in a short space of time it became a city.,B

Ögetei abandoned his <=ef in eastern Turkestan and moved towards the new city, where resources could be accumulated easily and economic activity centralized.;V In the two decades following the death of the founder of the empire, new ways of extracting and maximising resources developed as the empire grew. For example, Ögetei Khan expanded the network of relay stations created by Chinggis Khan. It was actually the second emperor of the Mongol Empire who made the <=nancial e)fort to transform the famous system from a military function into a commercial enterprise.;* The consolidation of this system of provision posts greatly stimulated merchants, who also bene<=ted from Mongol investment in <=xing the roads that connected di)ferent parts of the empire.;+ The period of Ögetei’s reign (r. 1229–41) seems to have been a golden period for trade in the Mongol empire. Infrastructures, bene<=ts and an easy-spending nobility secured pro<=ts for those who ventured into the north-eastern parts of

0F See for example how in 1236 Ögetei granted Sorghaghtani Beki those areas in Northern China conquered by Tolui. See Abramowski, “Die Chinesischen Annalen von Ögödei und Güyük,” 131–32; Abramowski, “Die Chinesischen Annalen des Möngke,” 16. 0I Although the artisans were already being taken to the Mongol court at the time of Chinggis Khan, this practice appears to be more extensive under his successor. For a description of the city of Qaraqorum and the diversity of origin of its inhabitants see Dawson, The Mongol Mission, 177–80. See also Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 34–35; Allsen, “Biography of a Cultural Broker,” 130. 0J Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 1:192; Juwaynī/Boyle, 236. CX Barthold, Four Studies on the , 1: 45. C- On the yam system see Morgan, The Mongols, 91–94; Silverstein, Postal Systems in the Pre- Modern Islamic World, 141–64; Allsen, “Imperial Posts, West, East and North,” 237–76. C/ Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 96. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P 1c

Asia.;, However, towards the end of Ögetei’s reign some new measures were implemented in order to further bene<=t from all this commercial activity. Prominent o)<=cials such as Yelü Chucai and Maḥmūd Yalavach made the <=rst attempts to establish a taxation system in order to regulate and tax trade.;; Nonetheless, after the death of Ögetei and during the regency of his wife Töregene Khatun (r. 1241–46), Yalavach was replaced by a certain ʿAbd al-Raḥmān and the stimulus for commercial activities became a priority once again, diminishing the political interest in centralizing measures and control of land taxation carried out before the Khans’ death. As Allsen puts it, “the regent was well disposed toward the merchants, who quickly resumed their former position at court. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, a personal favourite of Töregene, received an imperial that gave him administrative as well as <=scal con- trol over north China.”;> This transfer of attribution from the empress to her subordinates (including a woman like Fāṭima Khatun) and her commitment to a system less keen on central taxation and more open to ‘free trade’ could be interpreted as weakness in Töregene’s government.;? But it seems that this strategy was in accordance with a certain idea of what the Mongol Empire should be, which was opposed to that of the Persian sources of the period. In her defence though, we can add that the system considerably bene<=ted the Khatun’s treasury.;@ But the organisation of commerce and the distribution of pro<=t were not as smooth as the sources suggest. As the empire grew, so too did competition between members of the royal family. At stake was the assignment of mer- chants, who became increasingly sought after as more and more members of the royal family acquired wealth and became involved in trade. Powerful and wealthy women were able to claim particular merchants (ortaqs) even if they belonged to the Khan.;A Khatuns with less inKLuence at the court had to force “people of the provinces” to give their sons up not only for - tic service but also to become ortoy [merchants] in the service of Mongol

C0 For the taxation organized to maintain the yam system see Smith, “Mongol and Nomadic Taxation,” 52. CC Rachewiltz, “Yeh-Lü Ch’u-Ts’ai (1189–1243),” 189–216; Allsen, “Mahmud Yalavach,” 122–27. CD Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 103. CE This is the interpretation given by the Persian sources, which are generally more sympa- thetic to the Toluid branch of the Chinggisid family. On Fāṭima Khatun see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 73–75. CF Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty,” 267–68. CI Sorghaghtani speci<=cally asked Ögetei to give her a merchant, but the Khan was opposed to the request. She used the name of her husband to change his mind. See Rashīd/ Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:789; Rashīd al-Dīn, The Successors of Genghis Khan, 168. 11 34 56789: princesses for a small remuneration.;B The involvement of women in trade was not restricted to granting authorizations to merchants, however. Although references to women are not abundant, some of them sent members of their personal ordos on expeditions to seek trade beyond the frontiers of their <=efs. Sorghaghtani Beki (d. 1252), wife of Tolui,>V being wealthy and favoured by the Persian sources, received much attention in matters of the economy. Rashīd al-Dīn recalls a particular occasion when she sent a thousand men in a ship to sail northward along the Angara River into deep Siberia.>* Three commanders of the lady’s ordo were in charge of the expedition which had the objective of reaching “a province near which is a sea of silver.” The group accomplished their mission and obtained so much silver that they were not able to put it all in the ship.>+ There are no other descriptions of women ordering expeditions for raw materials in the sources. However, this is not to say that other Khatuns who had important in this period did not also <=nance exploration, con- sidering the men and resources they had at their disposal. It is interesting to see how the same sources dealing with similar topics can change their per- ception depending on their political outlook.>, Sorghaghtani was praised for the expedition that found so much silver, but when referring to the regency of Oghul Ghaimish, Rashīd al-Dīn says the latter’s relationship with merchants was the reason she neglected the empire’s governance. The reference indicates the direct involvement of Khatuns in the commercial life of the empire. The regent is described as spending most of her time with shamans (qams), which provoked the remark that in her reign “Little was done, however, except for dealings with merchants,” referring to her role as a consumer but probably also to her role as a promoter of trade.>; Thus it appears that during the reign of Güyük and his wife Oghul Ghaimish, trade KLourished with the Silk Roads con- necting the Far East and Europe via the Russian steppes, Central Asia, Iran and Anatolia. Nevertheless, the hugely pro<=table unregulated trade system

CJ See Rashīd/Karīmī, 2:1045. Allsen also mentions this fact; see Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 103. On the term “ortoy” or “ortaq” see Doerfer, Turkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen, 2:25–27. DX On Sorghaghtani Beki see Rossabi, “Khubilai Khan and the Women in His Family,” 158–62; Lane, Daily Life in the Mongol Empire, 239–43. D- Today, the Angara River is located in Russia, and is the only river KLowing out of Lake Baikal to join the Yensei River and thence into the Kara Sea, which is part of the Arctic Ocean. D/ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 1:76–77; Rashīd/Thackston, 1:43. D0 Morgan, “Persian Historians and the Mongols,” 109–24. DC Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:810; Rashīd al-Dīn, The Successors of Genghis Khan, 186. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P 1e supported by Töregene and afterwards by her son and daughter-in-law seems to have clashed with the necessity, by the end of 1240, to have a more central- ized economic administration. The relationship between the royal family and the merchant commu- nity functioned in this period at a personal level, with presumably lax cen- tral control over expenditure and the issuing of drafts based on anticipated revenues.>> The over-issuing of these drafts and the inadequacy of the resources to pay for them may have provoked a cycle of speculation and inKLation leading to what was seen as a chaotic economic period.>? At this point in the historical narrative of the Mongol Empire, Persian sources present the reign of Möngke Khan as a return to economic stability. While prior to the death of Chinggis Khan, economy was marked by a system based on the exaction and distribution of wealth via conquest, the rule of the Ögeteids and the regencies of their women can arguably be seen as a golden age in the expansion of trade across the empire.>@ The consolidation of the yam system led to rapid and lucrative commerce that not only enriched the multinational merchant com- munity of Eurasia but allowed Mongol women to invest in commercial expedi- tions, establish commercial enterprises with traders and satisfy their personal desire for luxury products, which in itself helped to stimulate the economy. However, this model depended upon the constant exaction of wealth through military means and complete freedom of action for the ortaqs.>A By 1250, the model which had been proposed ten years earlier by Yelü Chucai and discarded by Töregene was recovered. Möngke Khan (r. 1251–59) assumed control with a new set of advisors who were more in tune with the policies developed by his mother Sorghaghtani in her sedentary dominions in Northern China.>B The new Khan implemented a series of measures to bet- ter control the imperial treasury, to establish a more settled economy based on taxation, to promote farming and control the merchants.?V This did not mean that trade was out of favour or that business with merchants had to stop. On the contrary, Rashīd al-Dīn says that debts owing to traders were paid by

DD There is evidence in Chinese sources of <=nancial ruin among the peasantry in Northern China due to the speculation of these courtly merchants. Farmers had to sell their prop- erty and even their wives and children to pay their debts to the ortaqs. See Endicott-West, “Merchant Associations in Yüan China,” 149. DE Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 108–9. DF Ibid., 104–5; Rossabi, “The Muslims in the Early Yüan Dynasty,” 269–70. DI For trading conditions prior to the reign of Möngke Khan, see Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 104–5. DJ The most complete account of Möngke’s reign is Allsen, Mongol Imperialism. EX Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 3;79; Juwaynī/Boyle, 2:600. e2 34 56789:

Möngke and the KLow of entrepreneurs continued in Eurasia.?* The Franciscan missionary Rubruck, who travelled to the court of Möngke in the early 1250s, constantly relied on the advice of merchants of various origins on his trip to the court of the Khan.?+ Yet a new model was implemented and it aimed to tidy up the imperial accounts and produce a more e)<=cient revenue system which would favour the rulers. In 1251, Möngke Khan and his administrators introduced a ‘Mongol taxation system’ for the conquered population, and it was brought by Hülegü into Iran when he settled in the area after the fall of Baghdad in 1258. While women had their share of the booty in the early period and were active in the period of ‘free trade’ during the uni<=ed Mongol empire, the Mongol conquest of Iran would prove a new land of opportunity for the rapidly transforming economic status of Mongol Khatuns.

The Khatuns’ Economic Participation in Ilkhanid Iran: Continuity and Transformation

The economic development of the Ilkhanate has been generally described as evolving in two stages, divided by the reign of Ghazan Khan.?, The economic reforms he and his vizier Rashīd al-Dīn introduced have been regarded as a turning point in the government of Mongol Iran. New economic policies were introduced which focused on land productivity and new modes of taxation, abandoning the Mongol exaction model of the early empire. Despite this, doubts have been raised as to whether these measures were actually imple- mented and the degree to which the sedentary Persian population really bene<=ted from them.?; Those reforms begun under Möngke Khan and were continued by Hülegü when he conquered Iran, as the <=nancial notes left by

E- Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:861; Rashīd al-Dīn, The Successors of Genghis Khan, 236; Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 89. However, under Möngke some restrictions were intro- duced in the use of the yam system by merchants, ibid., 80. E/ These merchants were mostly Christian; the clerics were more trusting of coreligion- ists—Byzantines or Ruthenians, for example. See Allsen, “Mongolian Princes and their Merchant Partners,” 108–9. E0 For a description of Ghazan’s reforms see Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 83–92; Petrushevsky, “Rashid al-Din’s Conception of the State,” 148–62. EC While Rashīd al-Dīn tends to exaggerate the bene<=ts of Ghazan’s reforms, Waṣṣaf and Mustawfī for example are more cautious in their description of the bene<=ts of the new economic policies. See Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 494–500; Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 92. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P eN his advisor Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī suggest.?> However, the conquest of Iran and the further campaigns carried out by the Mongols in the Middle East under the Ilkhans brought with them the opportunity for more booty, and women were once again among the bene<=ciaries. Hülegü’s conquest produced enormous booty. Great amounts of gold, silver, horses and slaves were taken, for example, during the fall of Baghdad in 1258, and further tributes were received from the Caliph when he capitulated.?? Furthermore, the continuation of the military campaigns in the Mamluk ter- ritories in Syria and Palestine in 1260 yielded substantial riches, some of which were distributed among Hülegü’s family members and some sent back to the court of Möngke in Mongolia.?@ There is evidence that at least part of this booty accumulated during Hülegü’s conquests was set aside for the women’s personal treasuries in their ordos. An example of this phenomenon happened when the <=rst Ilkhan died in 1265. His successor Abaqa (d. 1282) informed his widows of his passing. Among them was one of his principal wives (Qutui Khatun), who was on her way from Mongolia to Iran to meet her husband. The news surprised the Khatun in the area of Badakhshan in modern day southern and north-eastern Afghanistan. When she and her party arrived they were received by the new Ilkhan. The interesting part of this story is that Rashīd al-Dīn not only says that Abaqa “enriched with money and goods” the wife of his father, but adds that a concubine called Arighan who had attended Hülegü also belonged to Qutui Khatun now.?A Her actual role in the court of the Ilkhan is made clear when Rashīd al-Dīn mentions:

Qutui Khatun’s share of booty and plunder had been turned over to her [a woman called Arighan]. She had accumulated vast amounts of valu- able items and property, so when Qutui Khatun arrived in the ordu she found it well stocked with all sorts of things.?B

First, this story shows that women still had a share in the revenues produced by conquest during the invasion of Iran and after the establishment of the

ED For a transcription and translation of this document see Minovi and Minorsky, “Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī on Finance,” 755–89. EE Anonymous, Histoire de la Géorgie, 519–20; on the fall of Baghdad and the appropriation of the Caliph’s treasury by the Mongols see Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, al-Ḥawādith al-jāmiʻa, 325–28. EF Amitai, “Mongol Raids into Palestine,” 236–55. EI Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:967–68, 1051–52; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:474; 3:514. EJ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1064–65; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:520. eY 34 56789:

Ilkhanate. Secondly, it underlines once again the di)ference between the status of wife and concubine among the Khatuns, since the properties belonged to the chief consort of the khan while the concubine played a role in accumulat- ing and administrating the Khatun’s revenues if she was absent. Gifts were important in maintaining alliances between di)ferent members of the royal family and this can be documented from the very beginning of the Mongol Empire. Empresses in the 1240s distributed gifts among their political allies, whether they were members of the royal family or the local nobility.@V Other women were among the bene<=ciaries of this wealth distribution. Whenever a new Ilkhan ascended the throne the ladies of the court would receive gifts. Hülegü gave gifts to his sisters, sons and generals immediately after appointing a man to oversee the treasury in Iran.@* His two immediate successors Abaqa and Tegüder also made gifts to the Khatuns when they took the throne.@+ Similarly Geikhatu and especially Ghazan Khan, whose generos- ity was remarked upon by Rashīd al-Dīn, gave money to the women on several occasions.@, It is not easy to be precise about the quantity of riches transferred from the treasury to the ladies’ ordos. Such gifts generally included money and luxury goods such as goblets, jewels and especially expensive textiles.@; In their turn the women bestowed gifts of money on local nobles and religious leaders, con- tributing in this way to a further distribution of wealth in ways similar to the male members of the royal family.@> These personal gifts and presents need to be distinguished from the other sources of income which noble women had in Iran. In the Ilkhanate there was a larger sedentary population than among uluses such as the Golden Horde or the Chaghatai Khanate. The taxation of Mongol Iran is confusing and has

FX See for example Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 3:7; Juwaynī/Boyle, 551; Dunlop, “The Kereits of Eastern Asia,” 285. F- Ward, “Ẓafarnāmah of Mustawfī,” 17. F/ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1060, 1126; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:517, 549. F0 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1195, 1331; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:582, 660. The local adminis- trators and the Ṣāḥib Dīwān also o)fered gifts to the ladies; see Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1323–24; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:661. FC Allsen, Commodity and Exchange, 56. See also the allocation of money given to Ābesh Khatun by Hülegü in Waṣṣāf, Taḥr)̄r-i tār)̄kh-i Waṣṣāf, 113. FD See for example the money given by Konchak Khatun, wife of Amir Irinjīn, to the Nestorian church in the early fourteenth century. See Budge, The Monks of , 304–5. Terken Qutlugh Khatun provided gifts to inKLuential personalities such as Arghun, Anonymous, Tārīkh-i Shāhī-i Qarākhitāi᾿yān, 183. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P e[ generated a considerable amount of literature.@? Generally speaking, the Ilkhanate functioned with a dual administration system which maintained the existing Islamic-Persian system and incorporated mainly three new <=scal measures of Mongol origin. The di)ference in the Mongol taxation system appears to rest on the fact that it was irregular in its timetable and was based on the census to determine the amounts to be paid. In contrast, the Islamic- Persian system was based on land productivity. This di)ference between the two systems allowed for their coexistence but doubled the <=nancial pressure on the conquered population.@@ Three new taxes were introduced by the Mongols with the clear purpose of generating income for the royal family.@A The taxation system helped the Ilkhanate to accumulate resources that were distributed among the inKLuen- tial Mongol women of Iran. However, noble women participated more directly in the Ilkhanate economy through “estate taxes,” which were divided between those lands under the supervision of the dīwān and those which were the direct property of the royal family.@B These included land con<=scated by the Mongols from the conquered Persian nobility, with its revenues being used in the maintenance of the khan, the khatuns, the o)fspring of the royal family and members of the ordos.AV Consequently, when references are made in the sources to Mongol being allocated land to hold in usufruct we should not understand that they governed such land, but that they enjoyed its productivity.A* The practice of allotting land to women took place from the very beginning. Abaqa distrib- uted the resources of sedentary populations among the Khatuns. He gave:

FE On the taxation system of the Mongols see among many others Lambton, Continuity and Change, 79–99; Smith, “Mongol and Nomadic Taxation,” 46–85; Schurmann, Economic Structure of the Yuan Dynasty, 304–89; Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 483–537; Morgan, The Mongols, 87–90; Ostrowski, “The “Tamma,” 262–77. FF Lambton, Continuity and Change, 84; Aigle, “Iran under Mongol Domination,” 65–78. FI These taxes are generally known as qubchur, qalān and tamghā. See Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, 77–99; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 199–220; Petrushevsky, “The Socio- Economic Condition of Iran,” 533; Morgan, The Mongols, 88; Allsen, “The Yüan Dynasty and the Uighurs of Turfan,” 263; Smith, “Mongol and Nomadic Taxation,” 46–85. FJ Mostly those known as ḵāṣṣa and injü, see Paul, “Fiscal System ]]].” IX The revenues produced from the implementation of these taxes varied and are di)<=cult to assess; for an interpretation of the numbers see Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 499. I- For the allocation of lands and shares across the Mongol Empire see Allsen, “Sharing out the Empire,” 172–90. e( 34 56789:

a portion of Mayyafariqin [in Syria] to Qutui Khatun, part of Diyarbekir and the province of Jazīra [Iraq] to Oljäi Khatun, Salmas [North-western Iran] to Jumghur’s wife Tolun Khatun and his sons Jüshkab and Kingshü. He also gave some territories to his sons and concubines.A+

Nonetheless, from the end of Abaqa’s reign, the allocation of estate taxes for Khatuns’ ordos was replaced by a system whereby regions of the Ilkhanate had to pay a tax to contribute to the ordo’s wealth, and the women’s servants were charged with collecting these revenues from the assigned territories.A, According to Rashīd al-Dīn, funds were squandered and corruption among those servants and the governors of the provinces soared, leading to an ever- increasing loss of revenue that culminated in the <=nancial chaos of Geikhatu’s reign (1291–95).A; This situation prepared the way for the Persian vizier to jus- tify the reforms of his patron Ghazan Khan when he assumed control of the realm. It is said that trials were held to punish corrupt servants and provin- cial deputies, whilst the administration of the ladies’ ordos was reformed and their autonomy restricted.A> Despite the corruption and the possible impov- erishment of the Khatuns’ ordos during the period of <=nancial chaos, women retained control over property—attested to by the fact that Ghazan Khan gained the support of many women’s injü to <=nance his claim to the throne in 1294.A? Further, women having land revenues under their command seems to have persisted up to the reign of Abū Saʿīd (1316–35).A@ Apart from the novelty of land-taxes allocation, in the Ilkhanate trade continued to play a pivotal role in the economy as it did in the period of the united empire.AA Opening trade routes had been a clear policy from the time

I/ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1110; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:541. On Qutui Khatun see also Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1064–65; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:520. I0 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1507; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. IC There is as yet no in-depth analysis of Geikhatu’s reign available, and so far, Boyle’s description of the political history of his reign remains the best account of his years in o)<=ce. See Boyle, “Dynastic and Political History of the Il-Khans,” 372–79. ID On this see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 173–85; speci<=c reference to the appro- priation of ordos can be seen in Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1509; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. IE Aubin, Émirs mongols et vizirs persans, 58. According to Mustawfī, Ghazan’s reforms maintained the economic wellbeing of the Khatuns by rearranging the injü system. See Ward, “Ẓafarnāmah of Mustawfī,” 429. IF Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, 340. II See the reference to the transit of merchants from Iran to China and vice versa in Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 456; Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1339–40; Rashīd/ %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P e` of Möngke, and this remained so under Hülegü.AB The immense booty gained by the conquest of Alamūt and the sacking of Baghdad might have acted like a magnet, drawing merchants to the Ilkhanate.BV This interest in keeping com- merce KLowing in Iran is seen from the beginning of the Mongol conquest of Iran. When Hülegü occupied Baghdad after defeating the last Abbasid Caliph, he sent two of his commanders to begin the reconstruction of the city. The Ilkhan commanded that once the dead had been buried the markets of the city were to be restored as quickly as possible.B* There are other examples of this determination to restore trade after military conKLict. During Ghazan Khan’s campaign to repel the Golden Horde incursion into Azerbaijan, the area was “obliterated” according to Rashīd al-Dīn, but merchants returned to the region of Tabriz to continue trading.B+ In the <=rst period of the Ilkhanate, Mongol women in Iran appear to have managed to maintain their lifestyle with the revenues produced in their ordos. With booty, land and gifts pouring in from the khan and the amirs, the Khatuns seem to have been well provided for. In this period of plenty, Rashīd al-Dīn notes, merchants were a common feature in female camps, where they moved goods to bene<=t the Khatuns and were depositaries of the ladies’ revenues.B, Marco Polo observed that Mongol women were constantly involved in trad- ing activities, selling and buying all that they and their dependants needed.B; These women, who belonged to the highest strata of the Ilkhanid nobility, shared their

Thackston, 3:668. On long-distance trade in this period see Lopez, “Les méthodes com- merciales des marchands occidentaux,” 343–48; Delumeau and Richard, “Sociétés et compagnies de commerce en Orient,” 823–43; for the fourteenth century see Jackson, The Delhi Sultanate, 252–53; Di Cosmo, “State Formation and Periodization,” 1–40; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 41–50; Yasuhiro, “Horses in the East-West Trade,” 87–98; in a later period, textiles also circulated between China and India; see Kauz, “Bengali Textiles,” 39–55. IJ Mustawfī suggests that one of the reasons why Möngke sent Hülegü against the Isma’ilis was because they were cutting the trading routes between Persia and Mongolia. See Ward, “Ẓafarnāmah of Mustawfī,” 12–13. JX Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1349; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:672. J- Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1069; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:499. J/ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1303; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:651. J0 From Rashīd al-Dīn we can interpret that gifts and cattle were included among the resources that women invested in trade through the mediation of merchants; Rashīd/ Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1507; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. JC Marco Polo, The Description of the World, 1:, 169. eb 34 56789:

connexion with the great commercial companies and with big wholesale and transit trade. They invested a part of their income in the companies of the great wholesale merchants, called usually urtaq (ortaq) [. . .] who returned the feudal lords [or ladies] their share of the pro<=t in goods, mostly textiles.B>

However, the growing dependence of the nobility upon the merchant com- munity led to corruption and <=nancial speculation, and the manipulation of the currency to the bene<=t of the merchants themselves, which led inevitably to the draining of treasuries and economic instability.B? One of the areas where trade became especially pro<=table and women very active in the Ilkhanate was the Persian Gulf and the provinces of Southern Iran that connected the , the Levant and India.B@ Ruled up to the early fourteenth century by di)ferent women of the Salghurid and Qutlughkhanid dynasties, these areas were autonomous entities under Mongol rule with special control over trade revenues in the Gulf.BA Ābesh Khatun (d. 1286), the ruler of Fars, or later Bībī Maryam (d. early fourteenth century) are some examples of women being mentioned in the sources as being implicated in the lucrative trade of the region.BB Thus, when Ghazan Khan ascended to the throne of the Ilkhanate, female economic activity in the Ilkhanate had already passed through several phases.

JD Petrushevsky, “The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran,” 509–10. Among these nobles was also Rashīd al-Dīn himself, who owned an impressive fortune and used to invest in trade as did his Persian and Mongol counterparts. See Rashīd al-Dīn, Kitāb-i Mukātibāt-i Rash)̄d)̄, 220–40 (letter 36) or 183–207 (letter 34). Although there has been debate about the authenticity of these letters, it seems to me that either Rashīd al-Dīn traded with the goods mentioned in the book, or those who produced the letters in the Timurid period considered the participation of these personalities in trading activities common practice. On the debate see Morton, “The Letters of Rashīd al-Dīn,” 155–99; Soudavar, “In Defence of Rashid,” 77–122. JE See Martinez, “Regional Mint Outputs,” 147–73; Allsen, “Ever Closer Encounters,” 21. JF On the trade in the region of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf in this period see Aubin, “Les Princes d’Ormuz du \666 au \n siècle,” 77–137; Yasuhiro, “Horses in the East-West Trade,” 87–98; for the <=fteenth and sixteenth century see Kauz, “Trade and Commerce on the after the End of Mongol Rule in China, Seen from Chinese Texts,” 54–59. JI Wa ṣṣāf, Taḥr)̄r-i tār)̄kh-i Vaṣṣāf, 100. JJ On Bībī Maryam see Spuler’s entry “Ābeš Ḵātūn” in Encyclopaedia Iranica; Rashīd/ Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:936–37; Rashīd al-Dīn, The Successors of Genghis Khan, 307; Shabānkāra’ī, Majma‛ al-ansāb, 215–16. It is not clear if this is the same Bībī Maryam who had a mausoleum built in the Omani city of Qalhat, see Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, The Travels of Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, 396. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P ec

Initially, women continued to bene<=t from the distribution of wealth carried out by the rulers as gifts and presents coming from the conquest of Iran and west Asia. The sedentary nature of Iran and the implementation of Möngke’s new approach to the land gradually made way for women to be allocated a share in the dual taxation system. Finally, the constant interest of the Mongol nobility in trade and commercial exchange allowed women to invest at least part of their income with the merchants of their camps, in order to <=nance the increasing demands of their lifestyle. Speculation and corruption appear to have been widespread due to the uncontrolled KLood of money into these activities. The economic situation of the Ilkhanate in the early propitiated the attempt for an economic transformation under Ghazan that would have a direct e)fect on women’s autonomy, marking a clear distinction in the attitude of the rulers towards queenly ordos before and after his reign.*VV In the period that began with the struggle for power between Baidu (d. 1295) and Ghazan Khan (r. 1295–1304) and the subsequent conversion of the latter to Islam, noblewomen in the Mongol court maintained certain privileges and their prominent role in society. For example, their involvement in religion, partic- ularly with Islam, became more notorious.*V* Similarly, as mentioned above, some women continued their economic participation in trade and to enjoy revenues coming from taxation into the fourteenth century. However, the rise of Ghazan Khan to power initiated a centralizing process that a)fected the autonomy and economic independence of women by changing the way the ordos, which represented the core of the ladies’wealth, were controlled.*V+ This essay is not the place to delve deeper into the particularities of this appropriation process. However, it is worth mentioning an example of how this process was articulated. Rashīd al-Dīn claims in his Jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh a sup- posed inheritance right held by Ghazan over the ordo of the powerful Būlūghān Khatun Buzurg.*V, To what extent the claim was legitimate or whether it was all part of Ghazan’s strategy, supported by the historical narrative of his vizier Rashīd al-Dīn, is di)<=cult to tell.*V; Yet, it seems clear that Ghazan bene<=ted greatly from the ladies’ revenues when he had to confront his cousin Baidu for the throne of the Ilkhanate in 1295.

-XX On this process of appropriation see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 172–84. -X- Se De Nicola, “Patrons or murids?” -X/ For a detailed description of this phenomenon see De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 172–84. -X0 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1213; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:593. -XC De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 137–8. e1 34 56789:

The use of female ordos’ resources to <=nance and support his claims to the throne might have helped Ghazan to realize, if he did not know it already, just how extensive were the resources accumulated by Khatuns in previous decades. He and his administrators saw quickly how useful these resources could be in overcoming the economic crisis the new khan found in the realm and in undertaking some of the centralizing measures in the Ilkhanate admin- istration that were already underway. Accompanied by a narrative of chaos and corruption, Rashīd al-Dīn mentions that the newly appointed Ilkhan issued a decree whereby the revenues and maintenance of queenly ordos would be from that moment onwards under the jurisdiction of the Dīwān.*V> Without questioning the veracity of the accusations of corruption among the ladies’ servants and administrators which certainly existed, this order also removed the autonomy of the ladies over their resources by placing these resources under the control of a royal administrator. This meant that the revenues of the female ordos obtained from the mechanisms explained above were to be dedicated, under the supervision of the dīwān, only to the maintenance of the supply of horses and camels, cloth and food, and if there was extra money available from the revenues, it was to be locked in the Khatun’s treasury to be used only in case of emergency.*V? In addition to this control of the revenues, the system of inheritance of female ordos were also modi<=ed. A tradition of maintaining female ordos among women was changed by Ghazan, who decreed that a lady must endow her male o)fspring with the properties of her ordo after her death instead of her female descendants.*V@ There have always been justi<=ed doubts about the real implementation of Rashid al-Dīn and Ghazan’s reforms to the economy of the Ilkhanate.*VA Yet it appears that although some ladies kept their ordos and autonomy into the fourteenth century, the intervention of the state in the properties of the majority of female members of the royal family increased and was present even into the reign of Abū Saʿīd (r. 1317–35).*VB Women continued to be politically inKLuential in fourteenth-century Iran as the cases of Baghdad Khatun and others demonstrate. However, their economic autonomy and wealth had grown so much by the end of the thirteenth century that Ghazan and his advisers targeted their rich encampments as sources for resources that

-XD Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1508; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. -XE Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1508; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. -XF Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1509; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:745. -XI Amitai, “Turko-Mongolian Nomads,” 153; Morgan, Medieval Persia, 75–76; Lambton, Continuity and Change, 115–29; Miller, “Local History,” 78. -XJ De Nicola, “Unveiling the Khatuns,” 189; Mustawfī, The Ta’r)́kh-i-Guz)́da, 148–49. %O4 &78P8Q67 '894 RS H8PT89 U8Q4P ee could help the depleted Ilkhanid treasury. The exact degree to which resources were drained from the ladies into the royal treasury is not possible to estimate, but the direct intervention on the women’s properties and the limitations imposed on the expansion of queenly ordos mark a clear transformation from the late thirteenth century onwards in the economic activity and status of the Khatuns of Iran.

Conclusion

From late twelfth-century Mongolia all the way to fourteenth-century Iran, noble Mongol women received a share of the resources that the hordes of Chinggis Khan and his successor were taking from conquest across Asia. Initially, the nomadic tradition of taking into account the female members of the royal family in the distribution of booty exacted by military conquest was maintained as the empire began to expand. The resultant accumulation of wealth in the camps stimulated the KLow of merchants into the Mongol ter- ritories who were attracted by the high prices which these nomadic “nouveau riche” were prepared to pay for goods. In this process, women participated both as consumers of luxury products and as investors in the commercial enterprises of Eurasian and European traders. However, this system carried within itself speculation and instability when the KLow of resources from con- quest diminished or stopped. The reign of Möngke Khan seems to have marked the implementation (or the intention) of reform in the economic model of the Mongols with the newly conquered territories of Iran being an interesting laboratory for these new measures. Evidence suggests that the process of distribution of wealth among Mongol women continued in the early years of the Ilkhanate but added into their attribution other sources of income apart from the direct exaction of booty and the bene<=ts from trade. Three speci<=c areas of revenue can be identi<=ed in which women had a share in Ilkhanid Iran. Firstly, as in the united empire, there were the customary presents received by the Khatun from the royal camp every time a new ruler took control of the realm. This was a two- way distribution system: Khatuns received gifts, but they also gave them to members of the royal family and important members of the Persian aristoc- racy. Secondly, settlement in Iran gave the Mongols control over the resources of sedentary populations, with urban districts and cultivated lands being a source of income for both royal female and male camps. Finally, when a new system of taxation was implemented in Iran, women continued to bene<=t as recipients of certain taxes imposed on lands allocated to them. N22 34 56789:

The economic status of Mongol Khatuns can be seen as a journey of trans- formation in which noblewomen increased their wealth by incorporating into their original economic attribution of “booty-share” di)ferent sources of rev- enue as the empire expanded and settled. The Khatuns’ involvement in the economic activity of the empire (be it booty, trade or taxation) was comple- mented by their capacity—grounded in the ordos which they commanded— to assume a degree of <=nancial autonomy. In the territories of the Ilkhanate, prior to the ascension of Ghazan Khan, Mongol women appear to have main- tained their income from booty and trade but added to their resources the revenues obtained from the productivity of the lands allocated to them for taxation. The political, economic and social circumstances of Iran from the reign of Ghazan Khan onwards triggered a set of reforms by the Mongol Ilkhan under the supervision of Persian dignitaries that particularly a)fected female property. This new process is beyond the scope of this article, but serves as a new reminder of the constant transformation that Mongol women experi- enced in economic terms in their passage from their original homeland in the Mongolian steppe into the Middle East.

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Florence Hodous*

Religious developments during the period of Mongol rule in Persia are par- ticularly complex due to the multitude of in)*uences a+fecting Persia at this time. While the Mongols were originally shamanist, they were tolerant of various faiths, showing what has been described as either openmindedness, indi+ference, or the subsuming of other religious in)*uences into their own worldview., While the in)*uence of Islam was strong within the Ilkhanate, as a faith it no longer enjoyed undisputed primacy. Rather, faiths such as , Judaism and gained increased prominence, and occa- sionally, political in)*uence. This paper will consider some aspects of how religious beliefs a+fected the death penalty in the Ilkhanate. In such a prosaic matter as the death penalty and the manner of its implementation, practical considerations of course played a role, as did political calculations. Nevertheless, the death penalty also sometimes re)*ected religious beliefs. The method of execution could indicate allegiance to a particular religion; it was also sometimes held to in)*uence the afterlife of the executed person, and was adjusted accordingly. For example, elite -.gures could be executed di+ferently from ordinary people. In addition, religious beliefs could inspire, or provide justi-.cation for, amnesties which meant that the death penalty was annulled. The beliefs that in)*uenced execution methods and amnesties, sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly, were manifold. It should be noted that it will not be possible here to make a categorical distinction between ‘religious beliefs,’ such as the doctrines of world religions, and ideas that could be de-.ned as ‘superstitions.’ Rather, any in)*uence which derives from some kind of a belief in the supernatural will be included in the analysis.

* This paper has grown out of my PhD research under Dr. George Lane, and has been supported by funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Program (/$/2007–2013) / !"# Grant Agreement 312397. 0 Atwood, “Validation by Holiness or Sovereignty,” 237–56.

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_553 /5678 #9: %8; <5= 234

Re)*ecting the role of the Mongols as cultural mediators between West and East Asia, this paper will identify three di+ferent sources of religious in)*uence on executions in the Ilkhanate: , Islam and -.nally Confucianism and Buddhism. The diversity of these in)*uences sheds light on the lively cul- tural and religious exchange which took place in the Ilkhanate. Not only did Mongols interact with Persian culture, but in)*uences from the Yuan dynasty with which the Ilkhans were closely linked also played a part.

The In$%uence of Shamanism

The belief system which the Mongols brought with them when they invaded Persia was shamanism.> This involved seeing a numinous quality in many natural elements, including in the sky (Tengri, which can also be translated as ‘heaven’ and which was thought to in)*uence the destinies of man), mountains, rivers, and other natural features.? In addition, the supernatural realm included spirits representing animals or ancestors, which frequently interacted with humans and the natural world.@ The wellbeing of the community depended on their relationship with the spirits. The interactions were often mediated by a religious specialist, the shaman,A in public ceremonies. In the Mongol case, the belief that the soul can leave the body, thus enabling the shaman’s soul to reach distant places to interact with the spirits, was crucial.B The role of the shaman is to enable and, wherever possible, in)*uence exchanges between the natural world and the human world, to the good of his community.C

D As shamanism is the better-known term for the Mongols’ belief system, it will be used here, although ‘animism’ may be more accurate, as the shaman is merely the ritual specialist deal- ing with the spirits which the Mongols believed ‘animated’ nature. Thanks to Prof. Veronika Veit for pointing out this distinction. Eliade, Shamanism, 4–8. See also DeWeese, Islamization and Native Religion, 32–39. E Tucci and Heissig, Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei, 350–51; Be+fa, “Le concept de täng- gäri,” 218; Even, “L’Au-delà dans les représentations religieuses des Mongols,” 166. F Roux, La religion des Turcs et des Mongoles, 62. G The precise de-.nition of ‘shaman,’ and the method of di+ferentiating shamans from other specialists employing altered states of consciousness, is disputed. A characteristic of the sha- man may be that he is able to control the spirits, his personality not being displaced while he is interacting with spirits. Sidky, “Ethnographic perspectives,” 231. H Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols, 26; Roux, La religion, 157–58; this aspect may not be true of all forms of shamanism, see Humphrey, “Shamanic Practices and the State in Northern Asia,” 197–200. I Ruotsala, Europeans and Mongols, 26. 23J "K:KLM

Roberte Hamayon, who has researched Siberian (including Mongol) sha- manism in depth, describes how in forest shamanism, the (super)natural world and the human world were perceived to be in a constant exchange of “life- force” (force de vie): humans took life-force from nature when hunting, and gave life-force back when people fell ill or died.N This “life-force” was believed to be primarily found in several important elements: in particular the blood,O the respiratory apparatus,,P and some of the bones.,, Because of this, great care was taken not to break or damage certain bones of the animals, and forest Mongol tribes would leave the skull, and sometimes the respiratory organs, in the forest in order to symbolically permit a new animal to appear in nature.,> Due to the sacred nature and “magical” properties,? of blood, the blood of ani- mals should also not be “lost” by shedding it on the ground. For this reason, animals were put to death in a way which avoided the shedding of blood, often through slitting open the belly and squeezing the heart.,@ These beliefs applied not only to the blood, respiratory organs and bones of animals, but in the case of humans the same beliefs, at least in regards to blood and bones, can be observed. This is because humans were considered to be part of the same exchange with the supernatural world as animals. Their blood should not be “lost” by being shed on the ground but should rather return to nature. If humans were killed, their afterlife depended on the manner in which they had been killed. Souls of people who had died were held to be able to pro- tect and help, or they could harm the living,,A and the souls of those who had died badly were considered to be particularly dangerous. Therefore, these beliefs were of primary concern in carrying out executions. It is for this reason that Mongol execution methods can be divided into those where blood is shed, and those which avoid the shedding of blood. A ‘regular’

Q Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 397–402; see also Roux, La religion, 157. R Anonymous, Secret History of the Mongols (hereafter !"#), 754. The blood was thus considered a seat of the soul. 0S The ‘respiratory system’ consisted of “the head, the trachea, the heart and the lungs, bear- ing the ‘vital breath,’ ” Aigle, “Le ‘grand jasaq’ de Gengis-Khan,” 66. 00 Roux, La religion, 163; see also Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 548. 0D Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 397–400. 0E Thanks to Prof. Veronika Veit for pointing this out; see Uray-Köhalmi, “Sibirische Parallelen,” 260; Roux, La mort, 80. 0F Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 162; Juwaynī/Boyle, 206; al-ʿUmarī, Das mongolische Weltreich, 8–9 (Arabic), 96 (German translation); Polo, The book of Ser Marco Polo, W, 420; Aigle, “Le grand jasaq de Gengis-Khan,” 66. 0G Ibid., 575–82. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 23X death (where the blood was not spilt and bones were not burnt) allowed the person in question to still become an ancestor, their lineage to be continued, and clan identity to be transmitted.,B Other execution methods, including all those in which blood was shed, and also boiling to death,,C did not allow the person to become an ancestor. The cremation of bodies was occasionally prac- tised as a particular insult.,N The ‘privilege’ of being allowed to ‘survive’ and become an ancestor, even after having committed a transgression, was usually accorded to nobles, not commoners.,O The privilege was ostensibly extended to Jamuqa, Chinggis Khan’s anda (blood-brother), and the belief is expressed that the soul of a powerful, dead enemy could exert a powerful favourable in)*uence on the one who had conquered him.>P In Jamuqa’s speech in the Secret History, he promises to be a blessing if his blood is not spilt:

If you want to show favour to me, let me die swiftly and your heart will be at rest. And if you condescend to have me put to death, let them kill me without shedding my blood. When I lie dead, my bones buried in a high place, for ever and ever I shall protect you and be a blessing to the o+f- spring of your o+fspring.>,

However, in reality, Jamuqa was probably not so honoured. Rashīd al-Dīn says that Jamuqa was in fact hacked to death,>> although publicly he had been assured that he would be put to death without shedding his blood. Therefore, publicly the principle of not shedding the blood of nobles was upheld and its importance thereby rea+-.rmed.

0H Aigle, “Le grand jasaq de Gengis-Khan,” 63. 0I Y"Z, 54 (§129). 0Q The rulers Mahmud of Ghazna and the Khwarazmshah ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Muḥammad were cremated. Al-Nasaw]̄, Histoire du sultan Djelal ed-Din, 193 (Arabic), 319–21 (French trans- lation). The burning of executed people’s bodies had been on occasion practised in pre- Mongol Persia: Lange, Justice, Punishment and the Medieval Islamic Imagination, 69. 0R The exact ranks of those considered ‘noble’ in steppe society were of course )*uid, but included the leaders of ‘tribes’ or political groupings and their relatives. For a criticism of the concept of ‘tribe’, see Atwood, “How the Mongols Got a Word for Tribe,” 63–89. DS Y"Z, 754. D0 Y"Z, 132 (§201). DD Rash īd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. M. Raushan and M. Mūsavī, 1:204 [hereafter Rashīd/ Raushan & Mūsavī]; Rashīd al-Dīn, Jami‘u’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, 1:108 [hereafter Rashīd/Thackston]. 223 "K:KLM

It should be noted that these beliefs were not unique to the Mongols but were shared by Turks as well. Thus, long before the Mongols came on the scene, the principle of not shedding the blood of nobles already had an impact. An early example is Caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 847–61) putting the Turkish army leader Itakh to death by weighing him down with iron chains and possibly making him die of thirst. Then he summoned the judges of Baghdad and the head of the postal service to examine the corpse and witness that Itakh had not been beaten or marked in any way.>? In addition, bloodless execution methods were regularly used in the Seljuq Empire for members of the ruling family.>@ Because of the centuries-long rule of Turks and Mongols in the Persian realm, the in)*uence of the shamanistic belief system on execution methods in Persia both predated Mongol rule and outlived it. The Mongols used various execution methods speci-.cally to avoid shedding blood, but the principle of not shedding the blood of nobles was more enduring than particular execution methods. Several execution methods used by the Mongols in pre-imperial days stopped being used, while others continued in use. Looking at the methods of execution that were commonly used to avoid the spilling of blood, one that seems to have disappeared quickly is execution by ordeal through wrestling. Though in theory this meant establishing right and wrong through appealing to a heavenly power, both cases recorded in the Secret History seem to have been ‘rigged’ in advance; they were in fact thinly disguised executions.>A For the losing party, the -.ction of a wrestling match may have been a more honourable way to die than being executed in another manner.>B In practice, executions in the context of wrestling matches ended in the loser’s back being broken.>C Breaking the back continued to be used as an execution method in the Ilkhanate throughout the thirteenth century, at least until the reign of the Muslim Ilkhan Ghazan, though not necessarily in the context of a wrestling match. The Ilkhan Aḥmad Tegüder was put to death by breaking his back in 683/1284.>N The last instance of breaking the back was during Ghazan’s reign, when Süge, a rebel general, had his back broken by the leaders of the army.

DE Kennedy, The Court of the Caliphs, 238. DF Köprülü, “La proibizione di versare il sangue,” 18–19; Lange, Justice, 27. DG Y"Z, 61–62 (§140), 172–73 (§245). DH Roux, La religion, 249–50. DI Y"Z, 61–62 (§140), 172–73 (§245). DQ Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 13; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 80. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 222

[Ghazan Khan] said to Horqudaq: “Go from here and remove Süge from the face of the kingdom of the world, lest he suddenly escape.” [. . .] There was a famous amir, by name, a brave leader of a thousand, who had always hated Süge. Horqudaq said to him, “Go and take his soul from his body in retribution, but do not let his blood )*ow on the ground, for Chingiz Khan said, ‘when blood of a king )*ows on the ground, that is a crime.’ Sati left his presence, to put Süge to death, but when Süge saw the face of his enemy, he pulled a dagger from his boot and struck Sati so that the blow pierced his heart. [. . .] There and then, the leaders of the army broke [Süge]’s back, and he died as a result.>O

The reason for the rapid disappearance of breaking the back as an execution method may be its connection with wrestling, which was integral to Mongol culture but not necessarily so for the peoples conquered by the Mongols. It is signi-.cant that the last instance of breaking the back took place within the army among Mongol amirs, who may have maintained the tradition of wrestling. Another bloodless execution method that disappeared quickly was tram- pling to death; it was a ‘bloodless’ execution method because the victim was wrapped in a felt -.rst. A very famous example is Hülegü Khan granting the Caliph al-Mustaʿṣim to be sewn in a piece of cloth and trampled to death rather than su+fering beheading or another ignominious penalty. Following the conquest of Baghdad in 1258, Hülegü had been warned that killing the caliph could lead to natural disasters,?P although others assured him that there would be no supernatural consequences.?, In any case, Hülegü decided to give him the treatment of a noble by not letting his blood be shed: “they put him on a piece of sackcloth and then sewed it up round about him, and with kicks of their feet they killed him.”?> This execution method was not used after this by the Ilkhans, although in 1287, Prince Nayan was given a similar treatment by Qubilai who had him “wrapt in a carpet, and tossed to and fro so mercilessly that he died.”??

DR Mustawf ī, Ẓafarnāmah, 1354; Ward, “The Zafar-Namah of Hamdallah Mustau-.,” 399–400. ES Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abū’l Faraj, 431. E0 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1007; Rashīd/Thackston, 2: 492–93. ED Bar Hebreaus, The Chronography of Gregory Abū’l Faraj, 431. Other sources, such as Grigor of Akanc‘, History of the Nation of the Archers, 333–34, say that he was starved to death; but not a single source implies that his blood was shed. EE Polo, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, W, 343. 22c "K:KLM

Despite the bloody nature of this execution method, in the Mongol belief system it still counted as bloodless, since no blood was shed on the ground. The use of a carpet or piece of cloth was therefore crucial. It appears that the key was to avoid blood being shed on the ground—where the “life-force” would be lost?@—or which could cause the executed person’s spirit to be particularly dangerous for the living.?A A further bloodless execution method was drowning, though this was used mainly for women. This was the fate of Fāṭima, the regent Töregene’s con- -.dant, who was executed by Güyük Khan after Töregene’s own death. Rashīd al-Dīn says that: “Her bodily ori-.ces sewn closed, she was wrapped in felt and thrown into the river.”?B The purpose of sewing her bodily ori-.ces closed may have been to prevent her soul from exiting her body and seeking vengeance;?C or it may simply be due to a desire not to pollute the ‘sacred’ water.?N Shera, a Central Asian and one of Fāṭima’s accusers, later su+fered nearly the same fate: “he too was detained until he confessed to a crime he had not committed and was thrown into the river, and his women and children were put to the sword.”?O During the Ilkhanate, drowning was used as an execution method in the cases of Gontsa, the wife of the Georgian king David, who was executed at Hülegü’s command;@P for Toghachaq Khatun and other women who were put to death for allegedly causing Arghun’s illness in 1291;@, and, later, for Baghdad Khatun.@> However, wrapping in carpet is not mentioned in the later references, nor is sewing closed the bodily ori-.ces. The disappearance of breaking the back and trampling to death as execu- tion methods did not mean that the principle of not shedding the blood of nobles disappeared. The principle was in)*uential throughout the Ilkhanate, although the precise ranks of those who were considered eligible for treatment as a ‘noble’ in case they were executed did shift. As for the Ilkhans themselves, there are no accounts of their blood being shed. In 1284, the Ilkhan Tegüder

EF Roux, La religion, 162, 261–62. EG Shirokogoro+f, “Versuch einer Erforschung der Grundlagen,” 53–54. EH Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:803; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:391. Felt was an everyday material used by the Mongols for yurts and countless utensils, but felt were also associ- ated with funerary practices as well as enthronements, although their precise signi-.cance remains di+-.cult to determine. Olschki, The Myth of Felt, 13–20, 23–34. EI Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 421. EQ Thanks to Charles Melville for this suggestion. ER Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:803; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:391. FS Orbélian, Histoire de la Siounie, 1 :, 234. F0 Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1180; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:575. FD Shab ānkāra´ī, Majmaʿ al-ansāb, 299. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 22e

Aḥmad had his back broken.@? Even such a late source as Ibn Bazzāz, who gives an erroneous account of his death (he says that Aḥmad Tegüder was wrapped in felt and kicked to death),@@ still re)*ects the Mongol concern for not shed- ding royals’ blood. In 1295, the Ilkhan Geikhatu was strangled with a bowstring, according to Waṣṣāf.@A This not only re)*ected concern for not shedding any blood, but also indicated considerations of power and status through the use of a very symbolic item—the bowstring—to perform the operation. It must have been considered a very ‘honourable’ dispatch. Baidu was also strangled.@B For the remaining Ilkhans, either the execution method is not mentioned or they died natural deaths. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that none of the sources even suggests that the blood of any Ilkhan was shed. Other members of the royal family were not necessarily accorded the same privilege. While Qonqurtai, a son of Hülegü, was accorded a bloodless execu- tion method, breaking the back, in 682/1283–4,@C in the year 703/1303–4 prince Horqudaq was beheaded.@N What this shows is that the boundaries of privilege and status were )*exible and could be rede-.ned. Some subordinate rulers in the Ilkhanate also knew the principle of not shedding the blood of nobles and used it. Ironically, while some speci-.cally Mongol bloodless execution methods were disappearing from use, the princi- ple itself only gained in in)*uence. This can be seen in further bloodless execu- tions reported from the Mongol period. One of these is the case of Sayf al-Dīn Gharjistānī, who refused to recognize Shams al-Dīn, the ruler of Herat and founder of the . When in 647/1249–50 Shams al-Dīn wanted to force him to surrender, Sayf al-Dīn took refuge with the Mongol governor Arghun Aqa; however, “Arghun Aqa with- out hesitation handed the tied up Malik Sayf al-Dīn over to the Malik Shams al-Dīn’s messenger so that he be brought to Herat. Malik Shams al-Dīn ordered that he be trampled at the gate of Khosh.”@O Although this source does not give much detail, it is possible that there was Mongol in)*uence here because tram- pling to death was only rarely used in the Persian world.AP

FE Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 136; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 80. FF Ibn Bazzāz, Ṣafwat al-ṣafā, 219. FG Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 279; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 169–70. FH Brosset, Histoire de la Géorgie, 615. FI Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 125; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 74. FQ Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 465; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 273. FR Zamch ī Is-.zārī, Rawz̤āt al-jannāt, 412. The second source recording this event, the Tār.̄khnāmah-yi Harāt, says that he was beaten to death; al-Harav]̄, Tār.̄khnāmah-yi Harāt, 188–89. GS Lange, Justice, 66, 70–71. 22f "K:KLM

In addition, strangulation, a bloodless execution method already in use for members of the royal family under the Seljuqs,A, became a well-established execution method for people of status during the Ilkhanate, perhaps because it was already somewhat familiar to the subjects of the Mongols. The ruler of Kirman Terken Khatun had Soyurghatmish, the son of her husband who had been challenging her position, put to death by strangulation.A> In 1327, Ghiyath al-Dīn, the ruler of Herat, had Amir Chūpān put to death with a bowstring.A? Later, Arpa Khan had Malik Sharaf al-Dīn Maḥmūd Shāh Inju, Shahzade and other descendents of Hülegü put to death by strangulation.A@ This shows how the Turko-Mongol concern with bloodless execution methods was an impor- tant factor in Persia during the Ilkhanate and beyond. However, the wider use of bloodless execution methods did not necessar- ily entail an understanding of the shamanistic belief system underlying them. As Jean-Paul Roux has pointed out, the use of bloodless execution methods was based on the belief that all blood (including that of non-nobles and of animals)AA is sacred, or a seat of the soul or “life-force,” though there is little evidence that Persian commentators understood this. The Persian sources give various justi-.cations for the use of bloodless execution methods, but they usu- ally focus only on the idea that the blood of nobles should not be shed, rather than on the belief that all blood is sacred. For example, Mustawfī says merely that shedding the blood of a noble on the ground is “a crime,” and attributes the principle to Chinggis Khan, as if it were a new law rather than an ancient principle. In describing the execution of Süge, Mustawfī implies that Chinggis Khan himself forbade the shedding of royal blood on the ground.AB Bar Hebraeus links a bloody execution with lack of rain and “coals of -.re” bursting from the earth.AC Jūzjānī also links the spilling of blood on the ground with natural disasters, reporting the astrono- mer Husām al-Dīn’s words to Hülegü as: “if [the Khalifah] is slain, with the sword, when his blood falls upon the ground, an earthquake will take place, and people will be destroyed.”AN While Bar Hebraeus and Jūzjānī correctly cap- ture the idea that blood has magical properties and will bring about negative

G0 Ibid., 27. GD Shab ānkāra’ī, Majmaʿ al-ansāb, 201. GE Ibid., 284. GF Ḥā-.ẓ-i Abrū, Ẕayl jāmiʿ al-tawārīkh Rashīdī, 192. GG Roux, La mort, 77–79. GH Mustawf ī, Ẓafarnāmah, 1354; Ward, “The Zafar-Namah of Hamdallah Mustau-.,” 399–400. GI Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography of Gregory Abū’l Faraj, 431. GQ J ūzjānī, Ṭabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, 2:1252. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 22( consequences if it is shed on the ground, neither they nor Mustawfī show evi- dence of any deeper understanding of blood as one of the seats of the soul. Therefore, the Mongol and Turkish conception of the magical quality of blood had an important in)*uence on execution methods during the Ilkhanate, as the Ilkhans and others used bloodless execution methods for people of high status. Despite some typically Mongol execution methods such as trampling to death and breaking the back falling into disuse, the idea that people of high status should be executed without shedding their blood remained in)*uential.

The In$%uence of Islam

The executions carried out in the Ilkhanate were also in)*uenced by Islamic execution methods and their underpinning beliefs. Such execution meth- ods were used not only by Muslims in the Ilkhanate but also occasionally by Mongols. Here I will discuss relevant execution methods that can be de-.ned as Islamic and how they were used in the Ilkhanate. Executions in Persia in the pre-Mongol period included penalties speci-.cally advocated in the religious literature for various o+fenses, as well as a variety of execution methods which had developed over time and become custom- ary. A large number of executions both before and during the Ilkhanate were carried out by the sword—usually through beheading or cutting in two.AO For example, among the viziers, Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī was beheaded after torture and Saʿd al-Dawla Yahūdī was also beheaded, whereas Ṣadr al-Dīn Aḥmad Zanjān]̄, Rashīd al-Dīn, and Malik Nuṣrat al-Dīn ʿĀdīl were cut in two.BP Many amirs were beheaded, and such executions were also very frequent at the regional level.B, These execution methods, because of their frequency and because they were shared by di+ferent cultures, are not a very useful object of analysis. On the other hand, less frequently imposed execution methods which can nonetheless be identi-.ed as ‘Islamic’ will be more useful for the present analysis.

GR On the Seljuq period see Lange, Justice, 61–22; many of the accounts of executions ordered by the Ilkhans are collected in Ma‘dan’kan, Bih yāsā rasīdagān dar ‘aṣr-i Īlkhānī. HS Ma‘dan’kan, Bih yāsā rasīdagān, 25–35. H0 Thus many executions reported by the major sources such as Rashīd are beheadings, and local sources such as Is-.zārī’s history of Herat or pseudo-Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄’s al-Ḥawādith al-jāmiʿa concentrating on Baghdad also mention many executions carried out by the sword. 22k "K:KLM

Although diverse, the Shariʿa includes the following categories of o+fenses: qiṣāṣ, taʿzīr and ḥudūd.B> Qiṣāṣ (or talio) concerns o+fenses of murder and bodily harm, which are meant to be punished like for like.B? Taʿzīr are discre- tionary penalties for lesser crimes, which are discussed more in manuals of statecraft than in Islamic theological works.B@ Ḥudūd are o+fenses the punish- ment for which is stated in the Qurʾan.BA While punishments in the qiṣāṣ and taʿzīr categories are of necessity diverse, punishments in the ḥudūd category are relatively -.xed, though by no means universally practised. Among the ḥudūd punishments of interest here are stoning, cruci-.xion,BB and the cutting o+f of hands and feet which sometimes preceded the actual execution.BC These punishment methods were not used at all, traditionally, by Mongols; the Secret History of the Mongols mentions neither stoning, cruci-.xion nor the cutting o+f of hands and feet. In addition, with regards to cruci-.xion, the pen- alty would seem unsuitable for nomads: since it takes time (usually several days), and requires a -.xed place, it seems a more attractive option for use in crowded urban public spaces rather than among mobile nomads.BN Although the Mongols in the Ilkhanate did adopt some of these execution methods that can be de-.ned as ‘Islamic,’ their adoption of such methods was sporadic rather than systematic. ‘Islamic’ execution methods were used a few times by the Ilkhans, and once, according to [pseudo]-Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄, by a Mongol who had settled in Baghdad. Even in Ghazan’s time and afterwards, such execution methods were employed rarely by Mongols, and there is no evidence they were used because they were considered ‘Islamic,’ rather they may have been seen as simply another alternative to execution methods already in use. The -.rst report of a Mongol imposing cruci-.xion regards the activities of Küchlüg, leader of the Naiman Mongols who had )*ed from Chinggis Khan and usurped power in . Juwaynī reports that after getting into a theological

HD Tellenbach, “Die Strafe im islamischen Strafrecht,” 10. HE Ibid., 10. HF Ibid., 11. HG Except for zinā (fornication), the punishment for which is mentioned in the ḥadīth but not the Qur’an; ibid., 10. HH ‘Cruci-.xion’ took a variety of forms in Persia, and it is not always possible to determine whether nailing to a cross or gibbeting is meant. Lange, Justice, 62–63. HI Seidensticker, “Responses to Cruci-.xion in the Islamic World,” 206; Kennedy, The Court of the Caliphs, 238–39. HQ Ibn ‘Arabshāh’s allegation that among the Mongols “Thieves may be cruci-.ed [. . .] on the evidence of a single witness . . . ” mentioned by Irwin in his article: “What the Partridge Told the Eagle,” 8–9, is unfounded according to the other sources. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 224 dispute with an imām, he had the imām cruci-.ed. However, Michal Biran has rightly drawn attention to the questionable nature of Küchlüg’s anti-Muslim persecution, which is reported only by the Muslim historians Juwaynī and Rashīd al-Dīn, and not supported by the Chinese sources.BO It was only in 689/1290–91 that the Ilkhan Arghun (or possibly his vizier Saʿd al-Dawla) ordered a cruci-.xion. As a scapegoat for the alleged misdeeds of some important Muslims, the order was given that “Jamāl al-Dīn ibn Halavī, who was in charge of the tamghas of Baghdad, should be cruci-.ed. They cruci- -.ed him on the al-Nubi gate. He was still wearing his garment when they gave his corpse to his family.”CP Although Arghun himself was Buddhist, by the time of his rule Mongol amirs were increasingly becoming Muslims.C, Another cru- ci-.xion took place in 711/1311 when Zayn al-Dīn ʿAlī Kīmīāchī was among those accused of earlier plotting against the vizier Ṣadr al-Dīn. He was cruci-.ed and died on the second day.C> Stoning was used infrequently by Muslims in the Ilkhanate, although it was used occasionally as a penalty for adultery. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn, the governor of Iraq and brother of the vizier and historian Shams al-Dīn, imposed this penalty in 1276 in Baghdad.

In the month of Ramadan, a woman and a man were found in the hammam who had committed the crime of zinā (adultery). ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn gave the order that they should be stoned. They were stoned outside the city of Baghdad and up to this time, there is nothing recorded in the his- tories with regards to anyone having been stoned in Baghdad.C?

This incident happened during the governorship in Baghdad of ʿAlẚ̄ al-Dīn Juwaynī, acting on behalf of the Ilkhans. It shows the freedom which Mongol governors had in legal matters, even when they may have consciously attempted to revive ‘Islamic’ punishments. Another case of stoning for adul- tery occurred in Baghdad in 1289.C@ Nevertheless, the use of stoning by an Ilkhan only occurred much later, perhaps because it was so rarely used among Muslims themselves. The only record of an Ilkhan ordering a stoning is from

HR Biran, The Empire of the Qara Khitai, 195. IS Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄, al-Ḥawādith al-jāmiʿa, 461–62 [year 689]. I0 Pfei+fer, “Re)*ections on a ‘Double Rapprochement,’ ” 374–75. ID Q āshānī, Tārīkh-i Uljāytū, 132; Waṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 538; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 278. IE Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄, al-Ḥawādith al- jāmiʿa, 386. IF Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄, al-Ḥawādith al- jāmiʿa, 486–87; Gilli-Elewy, Bagdad nach dem Sturz des Kalifats, 179. 22J "K:KLM near the end of the dynasty, when Abū Saʿīd ordered Konjak, the daughter of Aḥmad Tegüder and wife of Amir Irinjīn, to be stoned to death in the year 719/1319.CA A further example regards the cutting o+f of hands and feet before the exe- cution. An example of a Mongol who had settled in Baghdad is reported by Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄. When the Mongol was assassinated his son took revenge by ordering the assassin’s hands and feet to be cut o+f before he was executed:

In this year [i.e. 692/1292–93], a bāţinī attacked Neqājū, the leader of the converts in al-ʿIrāq, at the beginning of the ʿAz̤udi bridge in Baghdad and struck [him] with a stone repeatedly and killed [him]. The killer )*ed. An Isfahani man caught him on the road. The killer fell to the ground and was captured. He kept saying, ‘Fidā’ī al-Malik al-Ashraf, ‘Fidā’ī al-Malik al-Ashraf.’CB They handed him over to the son of the Mongol Neqājū. They made an example of him and cut o+f his hands and feet. He was still alive. Then they [. . .] back and he did not utter a sigh. Then the bāṭinī said, ‘Aye, you old e+feminates, whatever you have done is less than what I have in my heart so do whatever you are able.’ Then they killed him and buried him in the place where Neqājū had been murdered.CC

Although it is possible that Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄ exaggerated the report, the men- tion of this particular punishment in the context of an execution ordered by a Mongol is nonetheless remarkable. It seems to be a rare glimpse into the assimilation of a Mongol who had settled locally with his family. The cutting o+f of hands and/or feet was used occasionally in the Islamic world and is referred to occasionally in medieval Arabic poems; it was not a Mongol practice.CN However, the Ilkhans’ use of these execution methods seems to -.t more into a general pattern of )*exibility rather than a progressive adaptation to Islamic execution methods. Some of this )*exibility can be explained by the concept of talio, where the execution method was related to the o+fense committed by the person being executed. Talio is seen for example in the execution of Körgüz, an

IG Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 645; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 370. Other sources say she was tram- pled to death (presumably without being -.rst wrapped in carpet), Melville, “Abu Sa⁠’īd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319,” 109 n. 118. IH See Atwood, Encyclopedia of Mongolia, 255. The murderer would seem to be an Isma’ili ‘self-sacri-.cer’. II Ibn al-Fuwaṭ]̄, al-Ḥawādith al-jāmiʿa, 475. Thanks to George Lane and Konrad Hirschler for helping with the translation. IQ Seidensticker, “Responses to Cruci-.xion,” 6. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 22X administrator in Persia who was put to death in Chaghatai’s court. His execu- tion was linked to the words he had spoken: “The order was given that since Körgüz had been arrested on account of words spoken in the ordu of Ulugh-Ef he should be taken back thither and tried upon the spot. As usual he had spo- ken hard words without considering the outcome. Qara Oghul ordered his men to -.ll his mouth with stones and so put him to death.”CO In other cases too, the Ilkhans used varied execution methods, some appar- ently suggested by the circumstances and others in)*uenced by execution methods practised in Persia, including ones that were not Islamic as such. Ghazan Khan ordered Pīr Yaʿqūb Bāghbān]̄, who was held responsible for lead- ing prince Alafrang to rebel, to be “thrown o+f the top of the mountain they were on.”NP This example resembles execution methods from the Seljuq period such as throwing people from minarets or citadels or putting them into pits.N, The Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd also employed a form of gibbeting, usually more fre- quently used among Persians:N> “They hung them [, Tuqumaq and Isbuqa, amirs who had fought with prince Irinjīn against Abū Saʿīd] up on hooks, and from this, their blood )*owed painfully. Then they put -.re beneath them; such was the order of their execution.”N? Therefore, the Ilkhans’ occasional use of ‘Islamic’ execution methods can be explained by their )*exibility, and does not show that they had any deep understanding of Islamic execution methods or the religious principles under- lying them. On the local level, ‘Islamic’ as well as other execution methods continued to be used and even in)*uence Mongols, as can be seen from the example of Neqājū.

The In$%uence of Confucianism and Buddhism

A third source of religious in)*uence on executions during the Ilkhanate was through Confucianism and Buddhism. A notable feature of the early Ilkhanate were some amnesties of criminals, which the Ilkhans were encouraged by several o+-.cials and advisors to issue. While the numbers of those amnes- tied in this way is unknown and likely very small, the issuing of amnesties is

IR Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 242; Juwaynī/Boyle, 505. QS Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:958–9; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:659. Q0 Lange, Justice, 69–70. QD Wa ṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 62; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 42–43. QE Mustawf ī, Ẓafarnāmah, 1459; Ward, “The Zafar-Namah of Hamdallah Mustau-.,” 641; see Melville, “Abu Sa’īd and the Revolt of the Amirs in 1319,” 109. 2c3 "K:KLM nonetheless signi-.cant as it points to the ties of the Ilkhans with China, where amnesties were a long-standing tradition, promoted by both Confucians and Buddhists. The importance of the entourage of the khans, namely, the people who surrounded them every day and provided practical and spiritual counsel, really comes to the fore in the case of the amnesties. Unlike bloodless execu- tion methods which may have been adopted simply to distinguish ‘nobles’ from common people, and Islamic execution methods which were used by the Mongols apparently without a religious purpose, the ‘religious’ signi-.cance of amnesties was important. The in)*uence of advisors over the Ilkhans may have been partly channelled through the Mongol religious worldview and more spe- ci-.cally through the shamans, but the impetus for the issuance of amnesties came from Confucianism and Buddhism, and to a lesser extent also from other religions.N@ Amnesties were not originally a Mongol practice, not only because there were never large numbers of criminals imprisoned at any one time on the Mongol steppe, but also because the Mongol legal system was based on the concept of vengeance, which sits uneasily with the idea of commuting penalties.NA Some of the personnel serving the early Mongol Empire and its administra- tion in Central Asia and Persia came from the former Qara Khitai Empire or from China, and thus from Buddhist or Confucian-in)*uenced backgrounds. In addition, the Ilkhans speci-.cally summoned Buddhists, according to Rashīd al-Dīn, from “India, Kashmir, , and Uighur lands,”NB and Buddhists from all four of these regions were involved in shaping Buddhism in the Ilkhanate.NC also appointed bakhshis (Buddhist monks) to educate Ghazan when he was a child.NN Buddhist monks were present at the court of Arghun

QF Talking about omens was often a good way to approach the Ilkhans: al-Ṣafad]̄ and al- Kutub]̄ report that Hülegü Khan’s Shi‘a advisor Naṣīr al-D]̄n Ṭūsī used this tactic to get ʻAlāʼ al-Dīn Juwaynī released from prison. Sayılı, The Observatory in Islam, 202–3. The Muslim Ilkhan Aḥmad Tegüder also mentioned forgiving those who had done evil deeds in his -.rst letter to Qalawun. Bar Hebraeus, Tārīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal, 508; Waṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaz̤rat, 113–18. QG But good actions could be used to remedy illness. Roux, La religion, 82. QH Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1331–32; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:664; see also Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1356, Rashīd/Thackston, 3:676, where Rashīd indicates that the native coun- tries of Buddhist bakhshis included India, Kashmir and Tibet; Bulliet, “Naw Bahar and the Survival of Iranian Buddhism,” 144; Melikian-Chirvani, “The Buddhist Ritual in the Literature of Early Islamic Iran,” 272–79. QI Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road, 157–62. QQ Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1331–32; Rashīd/Thackston, 3:591, 664. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 2c2

(who was a devout Buddhist), and debated with Muslims at the Ilkhan’s command.NO Rashīd al-Din received information about Buddhism from the Kashmiri monk Kamalashri,OP as well as from two other Chinese collaborators, Litaji and Kamsun.O, While the origins of these Buddhists and Confucians were diverse, they or people like them may have promoted amnesties in the Ilkhanate. In the Yuan dynasty too Confucians and Buddhists were promoting amnesties. Amnesties had been a feature of Chinese political life since the Qin and Han dynasties. In this context, they were connected with (though perhaps not caused by)O> Confucian ideas, in particular the belief that the human and natural worlds are interlinked and a+fect each other.O? Amnesties, as acts of mercy, were held to have positive e+fects in the natural world and beyond, and were thus often deployed at times of unpropitious events or natural disasters such as omens, earthquakes, and eclipses,O@ and even on occasions of rebellion or unrest.OA Many were issued in the spring or summer,OB since it was believed that the emperor’s acts should be appropriate to the season, and unseasonal acts could “disturb the natural rhythm of the world and bring on natural calamities.”OC These beliefs are re)*ected in the Book of Changes, in hexagram 40, (‘loosen- ing’), where natural phenomena are brought into relation with the pardoning of crimes: “Thunder and rain perform their roles: this is the image of Release. In the same way, the noble man forgives misdeeds and pardons wrongdoing.”ON Throughout imperial Chinese history, amnesties continued to be framed in Confucian terms.OO However, during the Yuan dynasty, some of the staunchest promoters of this practice were Buddhists. This is connected with the great in)*uence of Buddhists at the Yuan court. Rashīd al-Dīn relates how Tanba the Tibetan bakhshi was successful in in)*uencing the emperor Temür Khan () to give an amnesty for 100 prisoners, after previous attempts to con- vince him to free the prisoners had failed.,PP Buddhists promoted amnesties so

QR Lane, “Persian Notables and the Families,” 38, 43. RS Schopen, “Hinayana Texts in a 14th Century Persian Chronicle,” 226–35. R0 Elverskog, Buddhism and Islam on the Silk Road, 149; Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 92. RD McKnight, The Quality of Mercy, 18. RE Ibid., 21. RF Ibid., 16. RG Ibid., 16. RH Ibid., 22. RI Ibid., 21. RQ Ibid., 21. RR Ibid., 45 and 140 n. 14. 0SS Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:958–59; Rashīd/Thackston, 2:469. 2cc "K:KLM zealously that people such as Chen Tianxiang (1237–1316) complained about them and said that “amnesties are good fortune for vile people, and a mis- fortune for noble people,” arguing that if amnesties are given too frequently, people would not be afraid of the law.,P, The eminent o+-.cial and advisor Yelü Chucai, of syncretist Confucian and Buddhist leanings,,P> was instrumental in getting Ögetei to issue amnesties; the -.rst was in 1229 when he obtained “a decree to the e+fect that crimes com- mitted before the -.rst month of 1229 should not be punished.”,P? This was the -.rst time that an amnesty had been granted by the Mongols.,P@ Later, in 1241, Yelü Chucai recommended another amnesty which was accepted, as Ögetei’s health was not that good.,PA Yelü Chucai had earlier used the Buddhist pre- cepts of non-killing, compassion and forbearance as justi-.cations for pre- venting Buddhist monks from being drafted in the army;,PB whether or not he recommended the amnesties from genuine religious feeling, these precepts were part of his thinking and could be drawn on to justify acts of mercy. An ‘almsgiving’ amnesty was issued by Sorqaqtani Beki while she was ill: “But Beki being ill and her illness having grown worse, as an almsgiving for her long life those who had that day been condemned to death all received their pardon.”,PC Since Sorqaqtani was a Christian, perhaps she was in)*uenced by Christian practices of charity, although religious specialists of many faiths were all active at the court. What is certain is that some illnesses were consid- ered troubling in shamanistic culture, a sign of spiritual attack,,PN so that it is not surprising that Ögetei and Sorqaqtani adopted this new measure in the time of their need. Arghun, who was the most devout Buddhist among the Ilkhans, is con- nected with two amnesties. He declared his -.rst amnesty when he ascended the throne: “Since God the eternal has shown me favour and awarded me my late father’s crown and throne, I hereby pardon all criminals’ crimes. If the Ṣaḥib Dīwān [Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī] comes to court, I will receive him with

0S0 Yuan Shi , juan 168, 3947; Langlois, “Law, Statecraft and the Spring and Autumn,” 105. 0SD Rachewiltz, “Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai,” 157, 166, 169; Jan Yün-hua, “Chinese Buddhism in Ta-tu,” 380–84. 0SE Rachewiltz, “Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai,” 149. 0SF Ibid., 149. 0SG Ibid., 161. 0SH Jan Yün-hua, “Chinese Buddhism in Ta-tu,” 382. For the in)*uence of Buddhism on law in later Mongol history see Aubin, “Some Characteristics of Penal Legislation,” 140. 0SI Juwaynī/Qazwīnī, 38; Juwaynī/Boyle, 52. 0SQ Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 581. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 2ce honour.”,PO It should be noted that amnesties in China also often accompa- nied enthronements.,,P Although Rashīd al-Dīn mentions this amnesty in particular because it a+fected the vizier Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, there is noth- ing to show that it was not intended to be a general amnesty; though to what extent it was implemented is another question. Another amnesty was issued by Arghun shortly before his death in 1292, the reason for which is described in some detail by Riccoldo di Monte Croce:

When [. . .] Argon had shed much blood and had killed many innocent women and children, he became gravely ill. A terrible, awe-inspiring lady appeared to him in a dream. Growling, she took him by the chest and said: ‘Come, answer to the Lord about the blood you have spilled.’ And he said: ‘What Lord? Am I not the Lord of the world?’ (For he was generally called so by everyone, even the Christians, namely the lord of the world.) She said, ‘There is another Lord.’ Terri-.ed, he remained awake, and quickly summoned a baxitas and his high priests and asked them who is this lord who had called him with such authority, and how could he be free of him? They told him that there is someone in particular who has a blood vengeance and wishes to investigate him about the blood of the many innocents he had shed, and that it is not possible to evade him except through many alms. And then he wrote to all the eastern cities that he would be freeing all the captives, and sent great treasures to them and gave the greatest alms. Soon after, he died.,,,

Baxita are described elsewhere in Riccoldo’s text as coming from India and working various kinds of magic. Thus, it is most likely that Buddhist monks are meant.,,> On the other hand, the word ponti56ces is less clearly de-.ned,,? and could possibly refer to shamans. In any case, it seems that both Buddhists and other religious specialists were involved in recommending amnesties. Buddhists were still in)*uential at the enthronement of the following Ilkhan Geikhatu. At the enthronement ceremony, in which Buddhist bakhshis took a visible part and which was held in “relative proximity” to Labnasagut, where

0SR Rashīd/Raushan & Mūsavī, 2:1158; Rashīd/Thackston, 3 :564. 00S McKnight, The Quality of Mercy, 14. 000 Rita George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim, p. 198. 00D Ricoldo de Monte Croce, Pérégrination en Terre Sainte et au Proche Orient, 92–93 and fn. 141, Ricoldo de Monte Croce, translated by Rita George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim, 192. 00E Rita George-Tvrtković, A Christian Pilgrim, 192. 2cf "K:KLM

Hülegü had founded a Buddhist sanctuary,,,@ Geikhatu was given a Buddhist name, Irinjīn Dorji, from the Tibetan Rin-ch’en Do-rje (“Jewel Diamond”).,,A It is not surprising therefore that one of the acts of the newly enthroned Geikhatu was to issue an amnesty: he granted alms and support to ʿulamāʾ and sayyids and also ordered prisoners freed.,,B The particular resonance of the concept of an amnesty seems to have been due to the fact that amnesties were held to solve a very practical problem, namely illness. In shamanistic culture, some illnesses were considered a sign of spiritual attack by other people,,,C and thus susceptible to being in)*uenced by human action, in particular the ritual actions of the shaman in shamanis- tic culture. While shamans became less in)*uential with the expansion of the empire and the growth of the imperial ideology of the Mandate of Heaven, the belief that illnesses could be caused by other humans does not seem to have faded quickly, if at all.,,N Therefore, this was an area in which shamanist and Buddhist belief coincided, and the healing of illnesses was an area of perceived need which Buddhist monks and other advisors could seek to ful-.l by o+fer- ing the issuance of amnesties as an e+fective remedy. This is why many of the occasions for issuing an amnesty involved illness. Amnesties were employed because they were perceived as powerful means to in)*uence the spiritual world and to obtain healing from illness. In addition, it is interesting to note the importance given to blood in Riccoldo di Monte Croce’s account of Arghun’s amnesty. As in Mongol belief the blood is one of the seats of the soul, it does not seem coincidental that it is not just any kind of killing or oppression, but speci-.cally the blood that has been shed which cries out for vengeance. The amnesty is seen here as an e+fective means of forestalling such vengeance. Thus, Confucian and Buddhist in)*uence connected with Mongol shamanist ideas about the importance of blood. In this cultural exchange the Mongols were not merely passive trans- mitters of concepts and beliefs but rather active agents in furthering ideas and practices which speci-.cally appealed to them.,,O

00F Grupper, “The Buddhist Sanctuary,” 51, see also 58–61. 00G Rashīd/Thackston, 3:579 n. 3. 00H Waṣṣāf, Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al- Ḥaz̤rat, 264; Aayat]̄, Taḥrīr, 159. 00I Hamayon, La chasse à l’âme, 581. 00Q Accusations of witchcraft, whether real or politically motivated, were frequent in the Ilkhanate. 00R Allsen, Culture and Conquest, 193–97, 207. /5678 #9: %8; <5= 2c(

Conclusions

The death penalty in the Ilkhanate was in)*uenced by diverse strands of belief, re)*ecting the cultural exchange brought about by the Mongol conquest. This does not mean that every execution method was decided purely based on religious principles—on the contrary, practical and governance matters also played a role in the decision-making. But religious principles were able to have concrete in)*uence, even without those religious principles themselves being fully understood by those who were in)*uenced by them. This was the case with the Mongol principle of not shedding the blood of nobles, based on the sacred- ness of blood as one of the seats of the soul. It also seems to have been the case with the ‘Islamic’ execution methods which were used by Ilkhans, perhaps without a clear perception of these execution methods as ‘Islamic.’ With amnesties on the other hand, it is likely that Ilkhans declared them precisely because they understood their religious or supernatural justi-.ca- tions. Thus the law was in)*uenced not directly through legal arguments or policies but through religious belief, whether this was genuine or simply used as a justi-.cation for some of the amnesties. The possibility for this cultural transfer was given by the presence of Confucians and Buddhists who were able to have personal contact with Mongols and even with the Ilkhans themselves. These in)*uences re)*ect the changes and transformation which Mongol rule brought to Persia. In fact, the diversity of the in)*uences re)*ects the political position of the Ilkhanate, as well as the composition of the elite. The early Ilkhanate’s strong ties with Yuan China are re)*ected in the presence and in)*u- ence of Buddhists and Confucians at the Ilkhanid court. And while their in)*u- ence waned with the Islamization of the Ilkhanate, the Mongol (and Turkish) in)*uence from shamanism on the other hand was much more enduring.

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———. La religion des Turcs et des Mongols. Paris: Payot, 1984. Ruotsala, Antti. Europeans and Mongols in the Middle of the Thirteenth Century: Encountering the Other. Helsinki: Finnish Academy of Science and letters, 2001. Sayf ibn Muḥammad ibn Ya‘qūb al-Haravī. Tārīkhnāma-yi Harāt. Edited by Muḥammad Zubayr al-Ṣiddīqī. Calcutta: Khan Bahadur K. M. Asadullah, 1944. Sayılı, Aydın, The Observatory in Islam and its Place in the General History of the Observatory, Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1988. Schopen, Gregory. “Hinayana Texts in a 14th Century Persian Chronicle.” Central Asiatic Journal 26 (1982): 226–35. Seidensticker, Tilman. “Responses to Cruci-.xion in the Islamic World (1st–7th/7th– 13th Centuries).” In Public Violence in Islamic Societies, edited by Christian Lange and Maribel Fierro, 203–16. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Shabānkāra’ī, Muḥammad ibn ʿAlī ibn Muḥammad. Majma‘ al-ansāb. Edited by Mīr Hāshim Muḥaddith. Tehran: Amīr Kabīr, 1376/1997. Shirokogoro+f, Sergei M. “Versuch einer Erforschung der Grundlagen des Schamanismus bei den Tungusen.” Baessler-Archiv 18:2 (1935): 41–96. Sidky, H. “Ethnographic Perspectives on Di+ferentiating Shamans from Other Ritual Intercessors.” Asian Ethnology 69:2 (2010): 213–40. Tellenbach, Silvia. “Die Strafe im islamischen Strafrecht.” In La Peine/ Punishment, 4th part, 9–40. Bruxelles: De Boeck-Wesmael, 1991. Tucci, Giuseppe and Walther Heissig. Die Religionen Tibets und der Mongolei. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1970. al-ʿUmarī. Das mongolische Weltreich: Al-‘Umarī’s Darstellung der mongolischen Reiche in seinem Werk Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār. Edited and translated by Klaus Lech. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1968. Uray-Köhalmi, Käthe. “Sibirische Parallelen zur Ethnographie der Geheimen Geschichte der Mongolen.” In Mongolian Studies, edited by Louis Ligeti, 247–64. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1970. Ward, L. J. “The Zafar-Namah of Hamdallah Mustau-. and the Il-Khan Dynasty of Iran.” PhD diss., Manchester University, 1983. Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaz̤rat, ʿAbd Allāh ibn Faz̤l Allah. Kitāb-i Waṣṣāf al-Ḥaz̤rat. Bombay: Muḥammad Mahdī Iṣfahānī, 1852/1853. Yuan Shi , edited by Song Lian . Beijing : Zhong hua shu ju , 1976. Zamchī Is-.zārī, Mu‘īn al-Dīn Muḥammad. Rawz̤āt al-jannāt fī awṣāf madīnat Harāt. Edited by Muḥammad Kāẓim Imām. Tehran: Dānishgāh-i Tihrān, 1959.

!"#$ % Culture and the Arts

"#$%&'( ) Music in the Mongol Conquest of Baghdad: Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī and the Ilkhanid Circle of Musicians

Michal Biran*

Thinking about music in the context of the Mongol conquest of Baghdad (656/1258) usually brings to mind elegies lamenting the fall of the city, the caliphate, and occasionally the whole of Islamic civilization.* This article, how- ever, examines a di+ferent kind of music; it introduces the story of Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī (613–93/1216–94), the master musician and singer of the last ‘Abbasid caliph. By dint of his virtuosity and ingenuity, Urmawī managed to save both himself and his neighbourhood from the conqueror’s wrath and secure an important post in the Ilkhanid regime. In the ./rst section of this work, I will translate and analyze the court musician’s personal account of the takeover, which is preserved in the Mamluk encyclopedia of Shihāb al-Dīn al-ʿUmarī (d. 749/1349). The second part consists of a preliminary examination of the fate of Urmawī and his circle of musicians after the fall.2 Their experiences comprise a case study for assessing the fortunes of ‘Abbasid culture under Mongol rule. At least in this particular ./eld, my ./ndings suggest that the termination of the ‘Abbasid regime neither eviscerated nor triggered a decline in Islamic culture. On the contrary: the Mongols’ ascension led to the continued 34ourishing of the ‘Abbasid musical school and to its further enrichment.

* The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (5%/2007–13) /'(" Grant Agreement n. 312397. I would like to thank Reuven Amitai for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of this article. 6 For poems lamenting the fall of Baghdad, see Hassan, “Loss of Caliphate,” 41–49; and Abū Rukun [sic], “The Fall of Abbasid Baghdad,” 81–101. 9 Ilkhanid musicians were deftly described in both ʿAzzāwī, al-Mūsīqā al-ʻIrāqīyah, 22–49 and Neubauer, “Musik zur Mongolenzeit in Iran,” 233–60, esp. fn. on 245. I will eschew rehashing their contributions, from which I bene./ted greatly. Instead, I will examine the material from a slightly di+ferent vantage point.

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Ṣafī al- Dīn al-Urmawī’s AccountB

ʿAbd al-Muʾmin b. Yūsuf b. Fākhir Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī was one of the more illus- trious musical artists and theoreticians in the Muslim world.D Born in Urmiya (a city in modern-day Azerbaijan province in Iran), he arrived in Baghdad as a young boy. Urmawī launched a career in jurisprudence at the newly estab- lished Mustanṣiriyya College (opened 631/1234), which would soon become the city’s most renowned . Like many scholars of his time, Urmawī was a polymath. In addition to his expertise in Sha./‘ite and comparative law, he was well versed in calligraphy, Arabic, poetry, history, mathematics, and of course music. By the age of 21, he had already completed his magnum opus, Kitāb al-adwār (The book of cycles), a systematic exposition on the modal sys- tem, which was one of the most in34uential works on Islamic music theory.F Like its author, who was also an accomplished singer and lute player, the book combines musical theory with practice. At one and the same time, Urmawī made a name for himself in the dis- cipline of calligraphy. When the last ‘Abbasid caliph, al-Mustaʿṣim bi-Allāh (r. 640–656/1242–58), set up his own library and looked for copyists, Ṣafī al-Dīn was hired due to his excellent penmanship. He was elevated to court musi- cian relatively late in al-Mustaʿṣim’s reign, thanks to the recommendation of his former student, the caliph’s songstress Luḥāẓ. Soon after, he became one of the emperor’s closest companions, even tutoring his sons. Moreover, Urmawī had the ear of the Caliph’s top o+./cials. In the process, he acquired consider- able wealth, as his musical talents netted him a generous annual pension of 5,000 dinars.I Urmawī’s experiences during the Mongol conquest of Baghdad are recorded in the volume on musicians (vol. 10) of the encyclopedia Masālik al-abṣār fī mamālik al-amṣār (Paths of discernment into the kingdoms of the lands),

J Long after this article was sent to the editor, I found out that this part was translated by G. J. V. Gelder. See his “Sing Me to Sleep,” 1–9. His focus is, however, much narrower than mine, nor was he interested in the Mongol facet of this story. K On Urmawī’s stature in the ./eld of Islamic music, see e.g., Shiloah, Music in the World of Islam, 55–58, 111–23; and Neubauer, E. “Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition; online version at http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/entry?entry=islam_SIM-6447. L For a recent description and evaluation of sundry versions, see Wright, “The Modal System”; Idem, “A Preliminary Version of the ‘Kitāb al-Adwār,’” 455–78; and below. M Neubauer, “Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī,” and the references therein. See above all al-Kutubī, Fawāt al-wafayāt, 2:31–32; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī bi’l-wafayāt, 19:342–43; al-ʿUmarī, Masālik al-abṣār, 10:350–51; Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, al-Fakhrī fī al-ādāb al-sulṭāniyya, 74, 449–50; and al-Fakhrī/ Whitting, 49, 317. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?@] which was compiled by the Mamluk historian and administrator Shihāb al-Dīn al-ʿUmarī, one of the most knowledgeable Mamluk historians on the subject of the Mongols.^ ʿUmarī’s account is based on the testimony of al-ʿIzz al-Irbilī, alias al-Ḥasan b. Aḥmad b. Ẓafar (d. 726/1326), a physician and teacher who migrated to Damascus from the Ilkhanate. Al-Irbilī was also described as a his- torian who penned, inter alia, many “unique biographies” (tarājim gharība).a Furthermore, he is cited in Mamluk histories on the Ilkhan Ghazan (r. 695– 704/1295–1304) and his famous vizier, Rashīd al-Dīn (d. 718/1318),b thus he probably left the Ilkhanate after Ghazan’s reign. With this short survey behind us, let us now turn to al-Irbilī’s account of Urmawī’s fortunes in the midst of the Mongol takeover of Baghdad:*c al-ʿIzz al-Irbilī mentioned in his History:

I was sitting with ʿAbd al-Mu’min [i.e., Urmawī] in the Mustanṣiriyya College and [the topic of] the fall of Baghdad (wāqiʿat-Baghdād) came up. He told me that Hülegü summoned the city’s leaders and notables (ru’asā’ al-balad wa-ʿurafā’ahu) and asked them to divide the gated quar- ters (durūb)** of Baghdad and its neighborhoods (maḥālihā) and the houses of its people of means (buyūt dhawī yasārihā) between the com- manders of his dynasty. They divided them and allotted every neighbor- hood or two or every two markets to a great amir. The quarter (darab) in which I lived was allotted to a commander of 10,000 riders, named

d The whole third volume of ʿUmarī’s encyclopedia is devoted to the Chinggisids. This part had been edited, annotated and translated into German by Lech. See al-ʿUmarī, Das Mongolische Weltreich. e al- Ṣafadī, A‘yān al-‘aṣr wa-a‘wān al-naṣr, 2:188–89; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 12:239; Ibn Ḥajar, al-Durar al-kāmina, 2:92; and Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya wa-l-nihāya, 14:144. f For example, see al-Ṣafadī, A‘yān, 4: 9, 14, 43; and ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:193. 6g ʿ Umarī, Masālik, 10:353–56 (or the facsimile edition: ed. F. Sezgin with A. Jolhosha, E. Neubauer, 10:311–15). ʿUmarī’s text is quoted, with minor changes, in al-Ḥamawī, Thamarāt al-awrāq, 461–66 (I would like to thank Prof. Michael Lecker for referring me to this source). The story is cited in ‘Azzāwī, al- Mūsīqā, 27–31; and Nājī Maʿrūf, Tārīkh ʿulamāʾ al-Mustanṣirīya, 1:270–74. A Hebrew summary, based on ‘Azzāwī’s work, is included in Abū Rukun [sic], “The Fall,” 117–20. The latter dates al-ʿIzz al-Irbilī’s death to 660/1262 and claims that the story is found in Urjūzat al-anghām (p. 117 and n. 514)—a treatise of music by another person with a nearly identical name: Badr al-Dīn Irbilī (686–755/1287– 1354). However, the Urjūza, which is included in ‘Azzāwī’s book (106–17), does not contain this story. 66 For a discussion on darab (pl. durūb) and its meanings, see Eickelman, “Is there an Islamic City?,” 274–94, esp. 283. Dr. Nimrod Luz graciously brought this source to my attention. ?@) :;<=>

Bānū Noyan.*2 Hülegü allowed some of the commanders to kill, capture, and loot for three days, some for two days, and others for only one day, according to their ranks. When the commanders entered Baghdad’s ./rst gated neighborhood, namely the one where I was living, quite a few peo- ple of means were gathered there. And at my place, around ./fty of the notable singers (a‘yān al-mughānī), who had property and beauty, were assembled. Bānū Noyan stopped*B at the gate of the quarter, which was barricaded*D with wood and earth. They knocked on the gate and said: ‘Open the gate and obey us, and we will give you safe conduct (amān). And if not, we will burn the gate and kill you.’ Accompanying him [Baiju] were the naptha throwers [zarrāqūn], the carpenters [najjārūn],*F and his armed followers. ʿAbd al-Mu’min said: ‘I’ll go out to him in submission and obedience.’ I opened the gate and went out to him on my own, wearing dirty clothes and awaiting death. I kissed the ground in front of him and he told the interpreter: ‘Ask him: Who are you? Are you the leader of the quarter’s residents?’ I said: ‘Yes.’ He said: ‘If you want to save your life, bring us this and that’—and he asked for quite a lot. I kissed the ground for the second time and said: ‘All that the amīr asked for will be brought, and everyone in this neighborhood will be under your rule. Order your armies to loot the other neighborhoods assigned to them and stay [here] so I can host you along with anyone you want from your retinue. I will collect all that you have asked for.’ He [the commander] consulted with his followers and came with thirty people. I brought him to my house and spread out the precious caliphal carpets and the silk covers (sutūr) embroidered with gold. I immediately served him food—fried and roasted dishes and

69 I assume that this is referring to Baiju Noyan (often rendered Bājū in Arabic sources). Baiju (34. 625–57/1228–59) was the Mongol general and military governor in northwestern Iran. When Hülegü advanced westward, Baiju was among the generals under his com- mand. He distinguished himself in the Baghdad campaign, as his forces subdued the western part of the city. See P. Jackson, “Bāyjū” in Encyclopædia Iranica. 6J While the facsimile and Ibn Ḥijja’s version read waqafa, ʿUmarī’s 2010 edition reads waqata. 6K ʿUmarī’s edition reads mudabbas/mudbis, which can be understood as ‘chained’ (deriving from dabbūs or chain); see Piamenta, Dictionary of Post-Classical Yemeni Arabic, 143. Ibn Ḥijja’s version employs the more suitable “mutattaris,” a derivative of : barricade, barrier, or rampart. Hans Wehr’s dictionary, 93, http://ejtaal.net/m/ aa/#HW=111,LL=1_339,LS=2,HA=76. 6L During the campaign, the carpenters probably built siege machines. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?@h

sweets—and ate a sample [of the dish] in his presence.*I When he ./n- ished eating, I arranged a royal assembly (majlisan mulūkiyan) for him and brought him gilded dishes from Aleppo [and] glass and silver dishes ./lled with distilled beverages (sharāb murawwaq). When the drinking cups had made a round and he got a little tipsy, I brought ten singers, all of them women, each of whom sang a di+ferent delightful tune (malhāt). I gave them an order, and they all sang in unison. The assembly was ani- mated. He [Baiju] was excited by the music and his soul was satis./ed. He hugged a singer he liked and had intercourse with her (wāqaʿahā) during the assembly, while we were watching. His day came to a close in the best possible way. By the time of the evening prayer, his men arrived with the loot and the prisoners [from other neighbourhoods]. Apart from the food (ʿalīq)*^ and the gifts of wine (hibāt al-ʿawāniyya) that were before him, I brought them wonderful presents of gold and silver dishes and coins, cash, and splendid cloths; I apologized for the dearth [of gifts] and told him: ‘The commander came without notice, but tomorrow, God willing, I will invite the commander to a better feast than this.’ He rode and I kissed his mount, whereupon I returned [to the neighbours]. I gathered the rich people of the quarter and told them: ‘Look out for yourselves; this man will be here tomorrow and the day after as well. Each day, I want to dou- ble [the volume of the gifts from] the previous day.’ They collected from their houses all kinds of gold, precious cloths, and arms worth 50,000 dinars. He already came to me before sunrise the next day, and what he saw left him astonished. On this day, he [Bānū] arrived with his wives, and I gave him and his wives precious gifts, gold, and cash worth 20,000 dinars. On the third day, I gave him precious , expensive gems, and a beautiful jennet with caliphal gear, saying: ‘This is the caliph’s mount.’ I served all those who were with him and said: ‘This quarter is already under your command; and if you grant its people their lives, he [i.e., Hülegü] will be blameless in the eyes of God and men, for all that is left to them is their souls.’ He said: ‘I know this. From the ./rst day I gave them their souls, and my soul did not tell me to kill or capture them. But before doing anything else, you

6M The purpose behind this action was probably to demonstrate that the food was not poisoned. 6d While the principal meaning of ʿalīq is ‘fodder,’ it is also used as a metaphor for wine or anything eaten; Lane’s dictionary, 10:421 http://ejtaal.net/m/aa/#HW=652,LL=5_421,LS=2, HA=506,HW_HIDE. ?@i :;<=>

should come with me to see the Qan. I already mentioned you to him and I brought him one of the objects you gave me during the ./rst [few] days. He liked it and ordered [me] to summon you.’ I feared for my life and for the people of the quarter, and I said [to myself]: ‘He will take me out of Baghdad, kill me, and loot the quarter.’ I became apprehensive and said: ‘Oh, khūnad [lord], Hülegü is a great king and I am a lowly man, a singer; I am afraid and in awe of him.’ He said: ‘Don’t be scared, only good things will befall you; he [the Qan] is a man who likes the gifted (ahl al-faḍā’il).’ I said: ‘Can you guarantee that nothing bad will happen to me?’ He said: ‘Yes.’ So I told the people of the quarter: ‘Bring your precious things and give me all you have: splendid singers and a substantial amount of money in gold and silver.’ I brought from my place loads of good food, plenty of wine—old and excellent—and beautiful dishes—all of it from gold and inscribed silver. I took with me three of the most beautiful singers and the best [lute] players. I wore a suit of caliphal cloth and rode on a beautiful jennet, which I used to ride on when I went to the caliph. When Bānū Noyan saw me in this [out./t], he said: ‘You’re a minister!’ And I said: ‘Indeed, I am the caliph’s singer and his companion, but so long as I feared you, I wore those tattered and ./lthy clothes. When I became [one of] your subjects, my status was restored and I felt secure. Hülegü is a great king, greater than the caliph, and I can only enter his presence with courtliness and dignity. He liked my response, and I went with him to Hülegü’s camp. He entered his presence, brought me with him, and said to Hülegü: ‘This is the man I mentioned’ and pointed at me. When Hülegü’s eyes fell on me, I kissed the ground and knelt as is the Tatars’ custom. Bā[nū] Noyan told him: ‘This [man] was the caliph’s singer and did so and so for me; he [already] brought you presents.’ He [Hülegü] said: “Raise him!” and they raised me. I kissed the ground for the second time and wished him well. I o+fered him and his retinue the gifts that I took with me. And whenever I gave him something, he asked about it, then left it. Thereafter, he did the same with the food before asking me: ‘You were the singer of the caliph?’ I said: ‘Yes.’ And he asked: ‘What is the best thing you know in the science of music (ʿilm al-ṭarab)?’ I said: ‘The best is a song that I sing which causes the listener to fall asleep.’ He said: ‘Sing to me for a while, until I fall asleep.’ I regretted [my words], saying [to myself]: If I sang for him and he does not fall asleep he would say: ‘This one is a liar,’ and he may kill me. I must accomplish this with a ruse. And I said: ‘Oh Lord, striking the lute’s chords is only good while drinking wine. Let the king drink two or three cups so that the music will fall into place.’ He said: ‘I don’t want the wine, PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?@j

[for] it takes my mind away from the interests of my kingship; I’m impressed with your who forbade it’; whereupon he imbibed three large cups. When his face turned red, I asked for his permission and sang to him. I had with me a singer called Ṣabā. In [all of] Baghdad there was not [a singer] more beautiful than her or with a better voice. She excelled at playing the lute, picking out gentle melodies that lulled him to sleep. She sang, and before I ./nished the piece I saw him drowsing o+f already. I stopped the singing abruptly and struck a strong note, which woke him up. I kissed the ground and said: ‘Did the king fall asleep?’ And he said: ‘You were right, I fell asleep; now what do you wish from me?’ I said: ‘I request that the king give me a sumayka [tri34e].’*a He asked: ‘And what tri34e would you like?’ I said: ‘A garden that belonged to the caliph.’ He smiled and said to his retinue: ‘This poor singer is short-sighted.’ He then said to the interpreter: ‘Why didn’t you ask for a fortress or a town; what is a garden?’ I kissed the ground and said: ‘Oh King, this garden will su+./ce. What me—the governor of a castle or town?!’ So he allotted me the garden and the full bene./ts that I had when the caliph reigned and added a pension that included bread, meat, and two dinars worth of fod- der for my mount. Accordingly, he issued a signed and sealed order (+,rmān mukmil al-ʿalāʾim) on my behalf and I departed. Bānū Noyan chose a commander with ./fty riders, who [bore] a black standard that was Hülegü’s special standard, to protect my quarter. The commander sat at the quarter’s gate. He hung the black standard at the top of the quar- ter’s gate, and it stayed this way until Hülegü left Baghdad. Al-Irbilī asked: ‘How much did you lose in the process?’ He [ʿAbd al- Mu’min] replied: ‘Over 60,000 dinars of gold, the majority of which was brought to my quarter by the rich people and the rest from various luxu- ries (na‘am) that the caliph had bestowed unto me.’ I [al-Irbilī] asked him about the salary and the garden. He said: ‘The caliph’s children took it [the garden] from me, saying: ‘This was an inheritance from our father. And the pension was cut o+f by Ṣāḥib Shams al-Dīn al-Juwaynī, but he compensated me for it and for the garden with 60,000 dirhams.’

While it is di+./cult to verify the details in Urmawī’s vivid account, its main con- tours seem plausible enough, as they echo Ilkhanid sources; in addition, many of the elements dovetail neatly with other contemporaneous descriptions of Baghdad’s fall. The much less heroic Persian version of this story appears in the history of Waṣṣāf (d. 729/1329), who describes Urmawī as an unequalled

6e Sumayka is literally a small ./sh. ?Ak :;<=> master in the science of music, a second Pythagoras.*b According to Waṣṣāf, as the Mongols were occupying the city, Urmawī appeared on the threshold of Hülegü’s tent and began playing music. Amid the chaos, he performed from morning to evening, but nobody paid any attention. When Hülegü was informed of the situation, he summoned the musician before him, praised his performance and took him under his aegis. More speci./cally, Urmawī was granted an annual pension of 10,000 dinars (twice the amount of his caliphal stipend) from the government revenues of Baghdad. Additionally, the pay- ment would accrue to his progeny.2c Urmawī’s version strengthens the impression made by other sources that the sack of Baghdad was a meticulously organized campaign in which the troops fully adhered to Hülegü’s orders,2* rather than a sudden outburst of bar- barism. Moreover, this story o+fers a di+ferent picture from the regular descrip- tions of total massacre. The ability of both a local commander and Hülegü himself to enjoy a concert before the city was fully secured (according to most descriptions the Caliph was still alive by the time of the city’s pillage), certainly manifest the con./dence of the Mongols in the result of their campaign.22 This is also reminiscent of Chinggis Khan’s conquest of Bukhara in around 1220, when the assailants appropriated singing girls and wine from the defeated

6f Wa ṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh-i Waṣṣāf, 55; Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 32. In the Muslim world, Pythagoras was as renowned for his musical exploits as his mathematical prowess, and music was deemed to be a science that is close to mathematics. 9g Wa ṣṣāf, Tarīkh, 42–43; Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 23; Khwāndamīr, Tẚrīkh-i ḥabīb al-siyar, 3:107; Idem, (Thackston), 3:60. According to the latter, during the massacre and plunder of Baghdad, Urmawī “crept into a corner and one day presented himself in the vicinity of Hülegü’s tent.” Citing Ḥabīb al-siyar as his source, Ḥājjī Khalīfa claims that Urmawī simply pre- sented himself to Hülegü when the Ilkhan triumphantly entered the city. Impressed by his lute playing, Hülegü forbade his troops from touching the musician’s property. Ḥajji Khalīfa, Kashf al-ẓunūn, m:874. 96 E.g. Boyle, “The Death of the Last ʿAbbāsid Caliph,” 160 (retrieving Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī’s account); Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Kitāb al-ḥawādith, 360, and Gilli-Ellevy, “Al-Ḥawādit al-ğāmi‘a,” 367; Rashīd al-Dīn, Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, ed. B. Karīmī , 2:713 [hereafter Rashīd/Karīmī] and Jamiʿu’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, 3:498 [hereafter Rashīd/Thackston]; al-Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-arab, 23;234; Waṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh, 43; and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 23. 99 Mustawfī also states that Hülegü arranged a banquet, which included wine, singing girls, and Mongolian music after the capture of Baghdad and before the caliph’s execu- tion (L. J. Ward, Ẓafarnāmah of Mustawfī, 2:122). However, his version of the conquest is so far-fetched that it calls into question the tenability of this particular anecdote as well. Mustawfī also claims that singers and musicians entertained Hülegü in Samarqand, before the army penetrated the Middle East; ibid., 2:118. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?A? populace.2B As we shall see, the Mongols’ documented a+./nity for vinous feasts that were enlivened with music lends credence to these two stories. Urmawī provides much more information on the looting—a phase that was practically ignored by contemporaneous accounts, but described in apoca- lyptic terms by other, mostly later, sources.2D To my knowledge, none of the other versions refer to the notables dividing up their city into plunder zones or to Hülegü’s premeditated assignment of di+ferent looting spans for various ranks. In any event, these periods—ranging from one to three days—support the contention that the sack of Baghdad lasted for a week, as opposed to those sources claiming that it dragged on for 30 to 40 days.2F Although the tactic of foisting a ‘pay or die’ proposition on the defeated populace was not alien to the Mongols, Urmawī is the only one to note that it was imposed on the residents of Baghdad after the conquest: if the Mongols proposed such an option it was usually before they attacked the city and only if the city o+fered no opposition.2I That said, certain other Baghdadi groups are known to have received safe conduct (amān) from Hülegü, often in return for exorbitant sums of money. While the details vary from source to source, most of them agree that amān was granted to the city’s Christians, the Shi‘ites from Ḥilla, merchants from Khurasan (who already had relations with the Mongols), and several Muslim notables.2^ The Shi‘ites, merchants, and

9J Juwaynī/Qazwīnī 1:80–81; Juwaynī/Boyle, 207; cited in Allsen, “Command Performances,” 38. 9K For laconic descriptions or complete omissions, see Boyle, “Death,” 160; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 1:431; Kāzarūnī, Mukhtaṣar al-tẚrīkh, 270–74; Rashīd/Karīmī, 1:713 and Rashīd/Thackston, 2:498; Shīrāzī, Akhbār-i Mughūlān, 34; and Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-arab, 27:383, 23:234–35, among others. For apocalyptic descriptions, see, e.g., al-Subkī, Ṭabaqāt al-sha+,ʿiyya al-kubrā, 8:261–77; Waṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh, 38–39; and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 20. 9L The sources according to which the plunder lasted a week are, e.g., Boyle, “Death,” 160; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 431; Rashīd/Karīmī, 1:713 and Rashīd/Thackston, 2:498; Nuwayrī, Nihāyat al-arab, 27:383; those citing a period ranging from 30 to 40 days include, among others, Kitāb al-ḥawādith, 359; Ibn al-Sāʿī [Pseudo], Kitāb? mukhtaṣar akhbār al-khulafā, 136; Ibn al-Kathīr, al-Bidāya, 13:236; Waṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh, 42; and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 23. 9M Further on this issue see ʿUmarī/Lech, 102, and the discussion in Biran, “Violence and Non-Violence.” 9d For example, see Kitāb al-Ḥawādith, 359, 360 and Gilli-Elewy, “Al-Ḥawādit,” 367, 368; Boyle, “Death,” 159. According to Ṭūsī, scholars, shaykhs, and whoever o+fered no resis- tance to the Mongols were o+fered amān. He also claims that this option was suggested at the early stages of the conquest. Such an option is also mentioned by Rashīd al-Dīn (Rashīd/Karīmī, 1:710, and Rashīd/Thackston, 2:496) as o+fered to Qāḍis (judges), scholars, shaykhs, ʿAlīds, Nestorian priests and “persons who do not combat against us.” Christians were spared according to Bar Hebraeus, Chronography, 1:431, and according to the Arabic version of his work, Christians, Shi‘ites, and scholars avoided the sword: Ibn al-‘Ibrī (Bar ?Ap :;<=> perhaps others indeed secured their lives at considerable cost.2a As in the case of Urmawī’s quarter, Mongol guards were dispatched to guarantee the safety of the Christians and merchants.2b In all these instances, neighbours 34ocked to those who received protection, in the hopes of saving their own lives. Bc Another interesting element of this narrative is the singers’ prosperity. Urmawī’s description of the ./fty singers in his upscale neighbourhood is indeed commensurate with the last ‘Abbasid Caliph’s well-established inter- est in, or obsession for, music. In fact, his zealous patronage of this art form is often cited as one of the reasons that he neglected his duties and com- promised his ability to cope with the Mongol threat.B* The riches that these singers were able to fork over to their captors following the two-week siege that the city had just endured are quite impressive. Urmawī’s reputation as a hedonist notwithstanding,B2 viewing the luxuries that he amassed in jux- taposition to the oft-repeated descriptions of the unpaid troops of Baghdad before the Mongol attackBB lends credence to the complaints as to the deca- dence of the city’s upper class.BD It also calls to mind the famous, apocryphal meeting between Hülegü and al-Mustaʿṣim in the defeated sultan’s treasury, at which the former asked his counterpart why he had refrained from using his ample holdings to build a capable army.BF Urmawī’s description indeed high- lights the huge economic disparities in the city as well as the lack of city-wide solidarity. While the musician is deeply concerned about his quarter’s fate,

Hebraeus), Tẚrīkh mukhtaṣar al-duwal, 271. Ibn Kathīr notes that the Jews were saved as well; idem, al-Bidāya, 13:235. 9e The following sources refer to the Shi‘ites: Kitāb al-ḥawādith, 360 and Gilly-Elewy, 368; and Ibn Ṭāwūs, Iqbāl al-a‘māl, 63, 65. For the payment exacted from the merchants, see Ibn Kathīr, al-Bidāya, 13:235. 9f Kitāb al-ḥawādith, 359 and Gilli-Elewy, 367. Jg Ibid.; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 1:431. J6 See, above all, Ibn al-Ţiqṭaqā, al-Fakhrī, 63–65; al-Fakhrī/Whitting, 42–43. The most beau- tiful story cited herein involves a letter that the caliph wrote to Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, Atabeg of Mawṣil, asking him for a company of musicians. While writing the letter, Hülegü’s mes- senger arrived with a request for catapults and siege machines. This coincidence moved Badr al-Dīn to utter the following words: “Look at the two requests, and weep for Islam and its people!” For more on Mustaṣim’s fondness for music, see Ibn Junayd, al-Mustaʻṣim billāh al-‘Abbāsī, 51–53. J9 E.g., Kutubī, Fawāt, 2: 32. JJ E.g., Kitāb al-ḥawādith, 304, 321, 331, 350 and Gilly-Elevy, 359, 361; Subkī, Ṭabaqāt, 8:262. JK E.g., Ibn al-Ṭiqṭaqā, al-Fakhrī, 63; al-Fakhrī/Whitting, 42. JL E.g., Waṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh, 39 and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 21; Le Strange, “The Story of the Death of the Last Abbasid Caliph,” 293–300, including the references therein. According to some sources, like Marco Polo (cited in Le Strange), the Caliph is left to starve in his treasury as punish- ment for his malfeasance. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?A@ he has no compunction about advising the Mongols to loot other neighbour- hoods. Similarly, he does not condemn the rape that was perpetrated at his home. In all likelihood, these factors contributed to the city’s defeat. While there is no doubt that Urmawī was terri./ed by the Mongol onslaught, which may very well account for his above-mentioned behaviour, he considered the Mongols’ actions as a hateful but legitimate prerogative of the conquerors, and they did not prevent him from throwing in his lot with them. Moreover, his description falls under the heading of the relatively mundane accounts of the fall of Baghdad. In fact, it stands in stark contradistinction to the more apocalyptic versions that inform some Mamluk sources and many contempo- rary Arabic works.BI What is more, Hülegü’s interest in ‘gifted’ people, not least his generosity towards the musician in question, are incompatible with the (exceedingly modern) myth that the ‘Tatars’ destroyed Islamic culture.B^ They ./t well, however, with Rashīd al-Dīn’s description of Hülegü as “A great lover of wisdom, [Hülegü] encouraged the learned to debate the basic sciences and rewarded them with stipends and salaries. His court was adorned by the pres- ence of scholars and wise men (‘ulamā’ wa ḥukamā’).”Ba Interestingly, the other ‘man of talent’ known to receive Hülegü’s auspice during the conquest—a com- mander and scribe (amīr kātib) who excelled in calligraphy, belles-letters and horsemanship, and was famed for his beauty—was also closely connected to the Caliph’s court.Bb It can be argued that Hülegü sought to enhance his kingly reputation by employing representatives of ‘Abbasid glory at his court. At the very least, the Mongols embraced those cultural elements of the ‘Abbasid court that suited their own norms or bolstered their legitimacy. The fate of Urmawī in Ilkhanid Baghdad reinforces this vantage point.

JM See above; Gilly-Elevy, 371 and e.g. al-Sarjānī, Qiṣṣat al-Tatār min al-bidāya ilā ‘Ayn Jālūt, 101–70, 271–76; Manṣūr, Qiṣṣat suqūṭ Baghdād, 96–98. The American conquest of Baghdad in 2003 revived the memory of the Mongol conquest but in a rather distorted way. See Biran, “Violence.” Jd While the cultural rami./cations of Baghdad’s fall are among the most lamented devel- opments in modern Muslim literature, the treatment of this topic in contemporaneous sources is rather scanty. See Biran, “Violence.” Je Rashīd/Karīmī, 2:734 and Rashīd/Thackston, 2:513 (though he translates ʿulamā’ wa ḥukamā’ as “philosophers and scientists”). For more on this issue see Reuven Amitai, “Hülegü and his Wise Men.” For Hülegü as a humanist and patron of scholars see also Lane, Early Mongol Rule. Jf This is Falak al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Sayf al-Dīn Aydamir al-Musta‘ṣimī (639–710/1240– 1310), whom Hülegü appointed “the supervisor (shiḥna) of the wise men (ḥukama’) who found refuge in his court and were dealing with chemistry.” Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ majmaʿ al-ādāb, 3:281; and see the discussion in Biran, “Violence.” ?AA :;<=>

Urmawī’s Circle of Musicians in the Mongol World

After the conquest, Urmawī remained in Baghdad, but apparently stayed in touch with Hülegü. The polymath wrote a scroll (darj) on the Ilkhan’s behalf, which the latter was quite pleased with, and it seems as though he paid his sponsor a visit in Azerbaijan. Moreover, Hülegü appointed him inspector of endowments in Iraq, a position he held until Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, an even more acclaimed scholar, took over in 665/1267. Urmawī was a highly respected and very popular inspector. He is even said to have attained “the status of Hülegü himself” among the Iraqi population.Dc In Baghdad itself, the polymath became a companion and bene./ciary of the Juwaynī brothers: ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAṭā Malik (623–81/1226–83), the famous historian and Mongol governor of Baghdad (657–680/1259–81) and Shams al-Dīn (d. 682/1284), the chief minister of Hülegü and his successor, Abaqa (r. 663–681/1265–82). The Juwaynīs appointed Urmawī to head the Baghdad Inshāʾ (chancellery), most likely on account of his calligraphic skills. In addition, he taught music and calligraphy to the sons of the city’s notables, including those of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, Bahā’ al-Dīn and Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn. The latter showed great interest in music and subsequently became his teacher’s patron. In turn, Urmawī dedicated al-Risāla al-Shara+,yya +,’l-nisab al-taʾlī+,yya (The Shara./an treatise on musical proportions, c. 665/1267)—his most acclaimed work on music theory aside from the Kitāb al-adwār—to Sharaf al-Dīn Hārūn (put to death in 685/1285).D* Following the Juwaynīs’ ouster in the early–mid , Urmawī lost his administrative post and fell into poverty. He therefore tried his luck in Tabriz, where he met al-ʿIzz al-Irbilī in 689/1290.D2 Moreover, he received some ./nancial assistance from Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, another distinguished Ilkhanid polymath, who wrote extensive commentaries on Ṣafī al-Dīn’s works.DB The musician eventually returned to Baghdad, where he died in 693/1294 while imprisoned for a debt of 300 dirhams.DD Two of his three sons were employed as scribes (kātib) in the Baghdad administration, and the third was a member of the city’s

Kg ʿ Umarī, Masālik, 10:351–52; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 3:319–20. K6 Ibid.; Kutubī, Fawāt, 2:31; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 19:342–43; see also Waṣṣāf, Tẚrīkh, 66 and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 36. For more on the Juwaynīs and their support of the arts, see, e.g., Lane, Early Mongol Rule, 177–212. K9 Kutub ī, Fawāt, 2:31; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 19:342. KJ Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 5:108–9. KK Kutub ī, Fawāt, 2:32; al-Ṣafadī, al-Wāfī, 19:343. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?A] intellectual community.DF Despite his ultimate fall from grace, Urmawī became synonymous with music in both the Muslim and Mongol worlds. Waṣṣāf con- sidered him one of the four leading scholars of the Abaqa era, sharing this hon- our with his close associates: Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī, the astrologer and philosopher; the minister Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and Yāqūt al-Mustaʿṣimī, the calligrapher.DI Urmawī’s theoretical works were extremely well received in the Ilkhanate and would continue to serve as lynchpins of music scholarship for generations to come. The most popular of these texts was Kitāb al-adwār, which merited an extensive commentary (as did al-Risāla al-Shara+,yya) from Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī.D^ The ruler of Fars, Jamāl al-Dīn Abū Isḥāq Īnjū (r. 742–756/1342–56), commissioned ‘Imād al-Dīn Yaḥyā b. Aḥmad Kāshī to render Kitāb al-adwār into Persian and write an extensive commentary on this treatise. It continued to be translated, interpreted, and disseminated for hundreds of years in the Jalayirid, Timurid, Ottoman, and Safavid realms. In the early eighteenth cen- tury, the book was rendered into French by Pétis de la Croix, in what was the ./rst of several Western translations.Da As we can see, the ‘Abbasid theory of music continued to evolve long after the empire’s demise. During his heyday under the Juwaynīs, Ṣafī al-Dīn Urmawī was the centre of a wide circle of students and colleagues. His most renowned protégés (apart from the Juwaynīs) were Yāqūt al-Mustaʿṣimī (ca. 618–98/1221–98), who stud- ied both calligraphy and music with Urmawī at the caliph’s court and earned

KL Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 1: 260 (ʿIzz al-Dīn ʿAlī), 4:105–6 (Kamāl al-Dīn Aḥmad). For the third son, Jalāl al-Dīn, see Neubauer, “Ṣafī al-Dīn.” KM Wa ṣṣāf, Tarīkh, 55; and Āyatī, Taḥrīr, 32. As discussed below, Yāqūṭ was Urmawī’s student in ‘Abbasid Baghdad. Urmawī enjoyed the patronage of Shams al-Dīn Juwaynī, and in 661/1262 he delivered Ṭūsī’s disquisition (or letter) on the history of Chinggis Khan to Baghdad; Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 3:319–20. Khwāndamīr also considers Urmawī as one of the leading scholars of Abaqa’s reign, but o+fers a di+ferent and more extensive list of notables; Khwāndamīr, Ḥabib al-siyar, 3:107; Idem (Thackston), 3:60. Kd Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 5:108–9. Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī’s commentary on Urmawī’s works is dis- cussed in Fallāhzadeh, Persian Writing, 102–7. Ke For the impact of Kitāb al-adwār, see Fallāhzadeh, Persian Writing, 33–35, 102, 107, 133– 34, 145–46, 149, 201–2, 207–10; and Neubauer, “Safī al-Dīn,” among others. An example of Urmawī’s continued popularity is the recent recording of several notations from Kitāb al-adwār along with the publication of attendant French and English commentaries in Lebanon; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Migo5Wm4QK8; http://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=G7DY4V9cO_8 and Abou Mrad, Musique, and see its review by Wright in Yearbook, 197–98. Last but not least, Ṣafī al-Dīn has merited a Facebook page: http://www .facebook.com/pages/Sa./-al-Dīn-al-Urmawi/115898865087179, accessed August 2, 2012. ?A) :;<=> lasting fame in Ilkhanid Iran;Db Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Suhrawardī (654– 741/1256–1340), also a noted calligrapher and musician;Fc and al-Jamāl al-Mashriqī (b. 661/1262), the famous singer.F* In addition, a bevy of less acclaimed students are enumerated in the sources.F2 Urmawī was also in con- tact with a wide range of peers. More speci./cally, his circle was on close terms with the Mawṣil singers (some of whom moved to Baghdad after the passing of the well-known patron of their profession, Badr al-Dīn Lu’lu’, the Atabeg of Mawṣil, in 657/1259);FB and other accomplished musicians from al-Jazīra, Anatolia, and Khurasan. The Juwaynīs’ largesse facilitated artistic and scholarly exchanges, and enabled the invitation of prominent musicians to Baghdad.FD Urmawī’s students also trained a new generation of musicians who then continued to teach and play his works. The renowned singer Kutayla (34. 750–60/ 1350–60 in and Cairo) is said to have memorized dozens of Urmawī’s suites (nawba), which by some counts numbered 130.FF Furthermore, Niẓām al-Dīn al-Ṭayyārī, the most acclaimed student of al-Suhrawardī, maintained

Kf On Yaqūt, see ʿUmarī, 10:348; al-Dhahabī, Tẚrīkh al-Islām, 60:373–74; Kutubī, 2:592–93; and Canby, “Yāḳūt al-Musta‘ṣimī,” Brill Online, 2012 accessed August 2, 2012, http://reference- works.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/yakut-al-mustasimi-SIM_7972, inter alios. Lg Al- Ṣafadī, Aʿyān, 1: 414–16; Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 1: 335; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:390–94. L6 ʿ Umarī, Masālik, 10:395–406; Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3:240. L9 Among these ./gures are the ‘Abbasid Baghdadi singer Luḥāẓ (ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:356); the 34autist Ḥasan al-Nāy, alias al-Zāmir (ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:402; and Neubauer, “Musik,” 255); Sa‘d al-Dīn al-Sīlkū (ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:402); Zaytūn (ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:402); and Fakhr the musician (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 3:62), who might be identical to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Shahrabānī (Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 3:234). Two others, ʿAlī al-Sitāhī (or Sītā’ī) and Ḥusām al-Dīn Quṭlugh Būqā, are mentioned in ‘Azzāwī and Neubauer’s works on the basis of the works of ʿAbd al-Qādir Marāghī (d. 838/1435), the most accomplished Persian writer in the ./eld of music, who was raised in Baghdad and wrote a lengthy com- mentary on Kitāb al-adwār. Unfortunately, I did not have access to his work and have thus far been unable to identify the people mentioned therein. (Farmer, “ʿAbd al-Ḳādir b. Ghaybī,” Brill Online, accessed August 3, 2012. http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/ entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/abd-al-kadir-b-ghaybi-SIM_0091); ‘Azzāwī, al-Mūsīqā, 33–34; and Neubauer, “Musik,” 254–55. LJ The most prominent of these singers was Ibn al-Dahān al-Mawṣilī (d. 687/1287), whose fame approached that of Urmawī; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:346–48. For others, see ibid., 10:405, 409; Bar Hebraeus, The Chronography, 1:443; and Neubauer, “Musik,” 236. LK Ibn al-Fuwaṭī, Talkhīṣ, 4:299; and ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:396–406. LL Umar ī, Masālik, 10:377. At the very least, Kutayla was acquainted with Jamal al-Mashriqī and might have been his student (ibid., 380); for a discussion on nawba, see Wright, “Nawba,” Brill Online, accessed August 3, 2012 http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/ entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nawba-SIM_5859. PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?Ah close ties with Abū Saʿīd, the last Ilkhan (r. 717–736/1317–35), who was a distin- guished musician in his own right.FI The 34ourishing of music under the Ilkhans owed a great deal to the Juwaynīs’ patronage, but another factor was the Mongols’ a+./nity for this art form. From the Mongols’ perspective, music was a valued form of entertainment, which complimented another of their favourite pastimes—drinking. Furthermore, it was part and parcel of their Shamanic rites and a royal status symbol. While possessing their own venerable musical traditions, the Mongols consistently displayed a great deal of interest in the entertainment of other cultures.F^ Consequently, expert musicians from various backgrounds were highly appre- ciated and generously rewarded in Mongol lands. Partaking in their lords’ feasts, the musicians had ample opportunity to forge bonds and in34uence the Mongol elite. A case in point was Ilkhan Öljeitü’s marriage to a singer by the name of Najma Khatun, who, however, was bribed to ‘lobby’ or manipu- late her husband into retreating from Raḥba.Fa Some musicians became their lord’s con./dants. For example, in several cases a singer served as the ruler’s envoy to a neighbouring country.Fb These relations also fostered acculturation. Descriptions of, say, Abū Saʿīd studying music and composing his own Persian verses and lyrics certainly suggest a high degree of royal assimilation into local culture.Ic Musicians also ./lled a variety of other duties, especially in all that concerned ceremonies of state: for instance, they performed at events marking the arrival or departure of the ordu (the ruler’s camp), and they entertained at receptions in honour of visiting delegations.I* Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, who accompanied Abū Saʿīd’s ordu en route from Baghdad to Sultaniyya in the 1320s, reports that there were a hundred of the royal musicians—both singers and players—in the entou- rage; and this number does not include their counterparts who were a+./liated

LM Al-Ṭayyārī was also a distinguished calligrapher; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:406–9. After the fall of the Ilkhanate, he temporally migrated to the Mamluk Sultanate. ʿUmarī draws heav- ily on al-Ṭayyārī by virtue of the latter’s knowledge on the House of Hülegü. For a dis- cussion on Abū Saʿīd’s musical career, see ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:370–72. While the centre of the music world appears to have shifted from Baghdad to the royal court in the later Ilkhanate, famous singers—both male and female—were still to be found in Baghdad; see, e.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:381, 382; and Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 5:65. Ld Allsen, “Entertainers,” 37–38, 41–42, and the references therein. Le Ibn al-Dawādārī, Kanz al-durar wa-jāmi‘ al-ghurar, 9:261, 268; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 3:185. Lf For musicians who served as envoys, see ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10: 403; and al-Ṣafadī, Aʿyān, 5:563. For singers who were on close terms with the non-Mongol rulers of that era, see, e.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:346, 375. Mg ʿ Umarī, Masālik, 10:371–73. M6 Allsen, “Entertainers,” 41. ?Ai :;<=> with the amīrs, the vizier, and the khatuns (queens).I2 It also bears noting that the ruler customarily provided his princes, amīrs, and even some civilian o+./- cials, such as the naqīb al-ashrāf (the head of the ʿAlids), with drums, as part of their insignia. The drums were often augmented by other instruments for the purpose of helping these notables form bands.IB Musicians also accompa- nied Mongol troops to the front lines, where string instruments were played and kettledrums beaten to signify the start of battle.ID One contemporaneous report of the Mongol attack on Baghdad notes that the invading force took up its positions “happily with songs and trumpets.”IF Similarly, when the Ilkhanid naqīb al-ashrāf took 34ight from Abū Saʿīd, he sounded his drums and trum- pets. As a result, startled villagers who believed that it was a “Tatar raid” 34ed in panic.II In light of the above, it is evident that there was a healthy demand for musicians in the Mongol Empire. These roles and the leadership’s fondness for music were also mirrored in neighbouring lands.I^ In consequence, talented musicians were often wooed by several rulers,Ia but it appears as though the Mongols o+fered them the best conditions: when al-Jamāl al-Mashriqī migrated to Egypt, he complained of

M9 Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages, 2:125–57; Idem (Gibb), The Travels of , 2:342–44. MJ E.g., Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages, 1:421–22, 2:126–27; Idem, (Gibb), 1:259–60, 2:344; and Ḥā./ẓ Ābrū, Dhayl Jāmi‘ al-tawārīkh, 102. According to Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, it was rather commonplace in Yuan China, Mamluk Egypt, and the Delhi sultanate for commanders to have their own bands; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages, 1:138–39, 3:273–77, 4:223; Idem (Gibb), 1:89; 3:686–88; 4:872, inter alios. MK E.g., Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, 1:337–38. ML Igeret Ya’kov b. Eliyahu (ca. 1263), as cited in Arnon, “The Mongols and the Jews,” 64 [In Hebrew]. MM Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages, 2:422–23, and Idem (Gibb), 2:260–61. Md As in the Mongol Empire, the primary functions of music in the Muslim world were entertainment and strengthening royal bona ./des; Ibn Khaldūn, al-Muqaddima, in his Kitāb al-ʿibar, 1:763–67; Idem (Rosenthal), The Muqaddimah, 2:401, 404. In Ibn Khaldūn’s estimation, however, music is a product of sedentary civilization. He also notes that it has been immensely popular among Persians from antiquity onwards, and, despite the Arabs’ initial reservations about music, the prospering caliphate welcomed singers from Persia and Byzantium. During the ‘Abbasid period, the Arabs indeed developed a re./ned and glorious musical tradition, which was still admired in the venerated historian’s own time. That said, in citing examples, he referred to the halcyon days of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170–193/786–809), and to singers like Ibrāhīm al-Mawṣilī (125/742–188/804) and his sons, and not the later ‘Abbasids (ibid., 1:765–66, idem (Rosenthal), The Muqaddimah, 2:404). Me E.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:364, 367, 373, 375, 408; and Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3:240. These sources describe how the rulers of India, Egypt, and Yemen sought to attract leading Ilkhanid PQR;S ;> TUV PW>XWY SW>ZQVRT W[ :=XU\=\ ?Aj settling for crumbs after having grown accustomed to bread in the Ilkhanate.Ib It is also worth noting that Chinese musicians performed in Iran during Ghazan’s tenure and perhaps other periods as well. Likewise, many Muslim musicians, some of whom were probably from the Ilkhanate, found their way to Yuan China, the Delhi Sultanate, and Egypt. In fact, the Mamluks welcomed members of Urmawī’s circle, especially after the Ilkhanate’s fall.^c Yet another channel for musical exchange was imperial presents, as singing slave girls were often included in the bountiful gift packages that were exchanged between rulers.^* Since it was common for rulers and amīrs to have top-notch musicians instruct their slave girls,^2 these sorts of exchanges were bound to enhance the transfer of ‘high music’ across the Eurasian continent. The massive 34ow of people that informed the Mongol era naturally led to the dissemination of musical instruments. For example, miniatures attest to the presence of Chinese and European instruments in the Ilkhanate.^B Moreover, Rashīd al-Dīn informs us that the Chinese system of notation also made its way into this realm.^D Since Urmawī does not mention this phenomenon in the Risāla, it is di+./cult to ascertain whether he was aware of these transfers. The second generation of his circle was probably more cognizant of this devel- opment, as these musicians often jumped from one court to the next.^F This sort of diversity probably nourished the continued blossoming of music and musicology throughout the borders of the Ilkhanate.

players. For contemporaneous musicians in the Mamluk sultanate, see Neubauer, “Musik,” 238–40. Mf ʿ Umarī, Masālik, 10:396. dg E.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:408; and Allsen, “Entertainers,” 42–45. d6 E.g., Ibn Baṭṭūṭa mentions that the sultan of Delhi sent Hindu singing girls to the Yuan emperor; Ibn Baṭṭūṭa, Voyages, 4:773; Idem (Gibb), 4:1; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:396, 375. For discussion of the gifts exchanged between Mongol and Mamluk dignitaries see Little, “Diplomatic Missions,” 39. d9 E.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:396; and Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3:240. dJ Farmer, “Reciprocal In34uences,” 334–35, 340–42; Allsen, “Entertainers,” 45; and ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:402. For a discussion of Chinese interest in foreign musical instruments and their medical functions, see Chang De, in Li You, Xishiji, 2:141. dK Rash īd al-Dīn, Tanksūq-nāmah, 38–39. For a full English translation of this passage, see Jahn, “Some Ideas of Rashīd al-Dīn,” 146–47; cited in Allsen, “Entertainers,” 44. dL E.g., ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:396, 392, 402, 407; Ibn Ḥajar, Durar, 3:240; Ṣafadī, Aʿyān, 1:414–15. Of special interest is al-Jamāl al-Mashriqī’s reference to an urdhul (a sort of reed pipe) that, in his estimation, was used by the Franks; ʿUmarī, Masālik, 10:407. For the in34uence of Chinese and Indian music on their Persian counterpart during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, see Fallāhzadeh, Persian Writing, 206, 209, 216. The Chinese nota- tion system, however, was not included in the Islamic theoretical musical literature. ?]k :;<=>

Conclusion

As opposed to those writers who emphasize the catastrophic dimensions of the fall of Baghdad, Urmawī’s personal account reinforces the more mundane perspectives on this watershed event. The fate of this polymath, his oeuvre, and students in the post-conquest Ilkhanate also demonstrates that, at the very least, the Mongol triumph did not close the curtain on ‘Abbasid musi- cal culture. In fact, due to its compatibility with the new regime’s indigenous norms and the open world that the empire created, this musical tradition con- tinued to evolve, spread, and thrive under Mongol rule. What is more, it would have a tremendous impact on the later development of Islamic music in the Arab, Persian, and Turkish world.

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———. “A Preliminary Version of the ‘Kitāb al-Adwār.’” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 58/3 (1995): 455–78. ———. Review of Musique de l’époque abbaside: Le legs de Ṣa+,y a-d-Dīn al-Urmawī / Music of the Abbasid Era:The Legacy of Ṣa+,y a-d-Dīn al-Urmawī by Nidaa Abou Mrad. Yearbook for Traditional Music, 39 (2007): 197–98. ———. “Nawba.” In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition; online version at http:// referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nawba-SIM_ 5859. !"#$%&' ( Historical Epic as Mongol Propaganda? Juwaynī’s Motifs and Motives

Judith Kolbas*

Overview

It is often said that history is written by the conquerors. If so, steppe groups are the exception. It is the conquered people of the Middle East who have pro- vided the most information about Mongol origins and successes there. One author, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAṭā Malik Juwaynī (1226–83) has been particularly impor- tant since he was involved in some of the contemporary events and consciously re./ected on history. As a result, his knowledge and skillful writing have greatly a0fected understanding of the Mongols. His work, Tār"̄kh-i jahān gushā,1 which has been translated into English by John Andrew Boyle as Genghis Khan: the History of the World-Conqueror,2 can be considered not only a history but also a literary masterpiece. As such, it merits critical analysis, which a number of scholars have provided. Melville has carefully reviewed a number of these scholars;3 but, so far, none have approached the work as representing the transformation of two strong cultures. For example, Rypka simply held that “Juvaini’s style alternates between a greater and lesser degree of ornamental rhetoric.”4 On the other hand, Morgan noted that “the Persian sources have remained much the same . . . ,” thereby identifying a good deal of the problem since the sources have been reviewed over and over again. Nevertheless in some respects, as he observed, there has been a shift from an overwhelming emphasis on the Mongol invasions and mass destruction to the demographic,

* I am indebted to several people who have helped me to understand my originally rather inarticulate concerns about the text. They are Bruno De Nicola as editor for his careful and encouraging comments, Barbara Brend for her exploration with me of literary matters and James Clark for his help with rhetoric. Literary analysis is completely removed from my nor- mal 67eld of economic history, so their assistance has been crucial. 8 Juwaynī/Qazwīnī. : Juwaynī/Boyle. ; Melville, “Jahangosha,” 378–82. < Rypka, “Poets and Prose Writers,” 550–625, 623.

© !"#$#!%$&!' ()$%% #*, %'$+'#, ,-./ | +"$ .-.../1/23425561.63,/_552 CDE =>?@AB cultural and political changes the Mongols brought to the Middle East.F A few people have given more detailed comments such as Boyle: “Juvaini was master of what was already the traditional style of Persian prose literature. It is a style which disposes of all the rhetorical devices known . . . Word-plays are indulged in, whenever possible . . . However, Juvaini was a man of taste: he had his rheto- ric under some measure of control and could, when the occasion demanded it, tell his tale in the most plain and straightforward language” (xi–xii). More recently, Jackson has provided another evaluation by contrasting the moral and religious positions of Rashīd al-Dīn and Juwaynī, both high-level admin- istrators for the Mongols, and observed that Juwaynī issued almost immedi- ately in “one early passage . . . nothing less than an unabashed plea for political quiescence.”G Jackson’s attention to an emotional and moral tone could be fol- lowed much further since Juwaynī’s book, in this author’s opinion, interpreted some immense philosophical and social changes in Iranian culture.H On the other hand, a number of these critical assessments of literary developments during Mongol ruleI would also bene67t from a comparison with the new artis- tic types of personal and introspective painting, poetry, prose novel and partic- ularly popular theatre that arose in Mongol China.J Thus although the period in Iran saw “the 67nal triumph of New Persian over Arabic,”1K actual styles and methods continue to deserve identi67cation and de67nition. In Juwayni’s case, no study has yet addressed his work as a whole from both the literary and his- torical angles since his message was full of contradictions with many height- ened images and allusions that go far beyond immediate historical interest. This project would be a challenging task, but perhaps the following discussion can indicate some paths to follow, especially for historians.

L Morgan, “The Mongols in Iran,” 131–36, 132. M Jackson, “Mongol Khans,” 109–22, 110. N Many of the arguments in the following pages have been put forward before, in particular very convincingly by Boyle, Grousset and Jackson in the works cited. This paper can only add another lens to their insights. O For example, Poliakova in “Literary Canon,” 237–56, 244, has reviewed several Persian chroniclers from the eleventh to the 67fteenth centuries and considers that in Juwaynī’s work “literary etiquette predetermines the author’s selection of facts.” Although she makes important points about stylistic aspects, the following discussion suggests that Juwaynī had a much broader agenda on which to base his chronicle than evolving but standard images and phrases. P Rossabi, “The reign of Kubilai Khan,” 414–89, 476–79. 8Q Morgan, “The Mongols in Iran,” 135. "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CD(

Textual Development

As di067cult as it is to deal with this complicated material, it can provide signi67- cantly more information to the 67eld of history if it is also considered by way of literary themes, variations, rhetoric, motifs and motives. To do this, literary histories such as Juwaynī’s should 67rst be re-evaluated in light of an histori- cal process in itself, namely the stages during which two completely distinct but extremely sophisticated cultures impose themselves on each other with or without awareness of the process. Such an approach to social and cultural modi67cations was 67rst introduced by Richard Ettinghausen in 1935 for artis- tic in./uences on the Islamic world.11 He proposed three stages consisting of transfer, adoption and integration. The initial confrontation led to wholesale movements or transfers of the entire form. In Juwaynī’s case, it was the plain and rather detailed reports of Mongol battles, the conquerors’ physical appear- ance, strange customs and other direct observations without much comment. The second stage, that of adoption, in which one accepts and learns to live with new ideas and social contexts, is re./ected by his comments, for exam- ple, that the Mongols were not as pompous as previous Islamic rulers. He also suggested a reversal of the process by providing numerous anecdotes about the Mongols accepting the Persians as the best group in their entire empire. Finally in the integration phase, during which two cultures meld and bene- 67t each other, he made the plea that Jackson noted. He supported that idea throughout the text by giving speci67c incidents to show that he understood a good deal of Mongol culture and that life had improved for both. Presumably, he did not write his book in one period but re-worked passages many times and continued to insert items and delete others as his manuscript took shape. As a result, the three stages often appear in conjunction with each other. An analysis of this three-fold process and his rhetorical style is at a very early stage, but hopefully the following discussion will encourage scholars to open the book again.

88 The topic is discussed in greater detail by Marina Whitman. She examined the images and contexts of Chinese landscapes of contemplation, sages and symbols of spring that moved into Persian culture, noting that often they eventually came to emphasize power and pleasure, themes not at all related to the original scenes. Her study is instructive and suggests that Ettinghausen’s method for assessing artistic activity can also be useful for literature: Marina D. Whitman, “The Scholar,” 255–61, 256. CD\ =>?@AB

Motives and Motifs

To begin, it is important to realize that Juwaynī was not a chronicler, nor did he incorporate decrees or o067cial speeches. Rather, Juwaynī’s style was extremely ./owery but clear enough, and he provided dramatic intensity to otherwise dry facts. As a consummate writer of both prose and poetry, he had some literary devices and favourite themes which in./uenced the accuracy of his statements and the spin on some important events. His 67nal comments of integration, however, appear regularly within his motives, motifs and rhetoric. Two motifs are the most striking and illustrate the incremental develop- ment of his message. However, others deserve at least quick recognition as well and will be noted at various points. The salient motifs are contrasts of , namely the physical destruction of Persian urban culture and its pop- ulace and the remarkable bene67cence of Chinggis Khan’s successor, Ögetei. Destruction and kindness are chosen here because Juwaynī expended consid- erable e0fort on them, carefully selecting his material to make his points more powerful. Moreover, the themes clearly illustrate some of his major rhetorical schemas, tropes and sentence euphony.

Negative Motif To start with the theme of destruction, the reader should take into account cultural di0ferences and Juwaynī’s personal viewpoints. Juwaynī carefully and convincingly covered the Mongol invasion of Khurasan so that the reader is left in no doubt about its terrible e0fect on the area. Nevertheless, it is necessary to remember that this region was his homeland, giving him a personal reaction to as well as invaluable knowledge about events. His eloquent details re./ected his own and his family’s intrinsic and immediate involvement in them. As a result, historians take away from this section the overall impression of total warfare. Due to emotional, social and psychological divergences between traditional Persian and Mongol cultures, Juwaynī did not often present these di0ferences. Rather, he generally transferred the bald facts quickly without any interpreta- tion or explanation. Since he did not provide the motivation or strategy of the Mongols, the many examples that describe the invasion of Khurasan exhibit the initial form of literary development. The text is straightforward; but regard- less, it was shaped by the Persian perspective of much structural obliteration accompanied by shocking levels of massacres. On the other hand, to under- stand it from a balanced point of view, the historian is required to look beyond Juwaynī’s position as a prominent Persian resident of Khurasan. This has been achieved by Grousset, who explained the Mongol behaviour of massacring, "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CD] looting and burning as bewilderment about sedentary life.12 The destruction followed nomadic practice on the wide steppe. Parties had raided constantly for centuries, taking away with them moveable material. Dwellings were easily made and carried away whereas permanent cities and urban economies were quite beyond their experience. Therefore, the military treated sedentary civili- zations as they had their own in terms of both people and goods. Thus, towns were not sources of continuous and consistent wealth creation but short-term infusions of it. Nevertheless, there is more to the di0ference in Mongol and Persian cultural experience; there was a signi67cant psychological aspect as well. Cities enclosed by constraining walls were forbidding places to Mongols, trapping people within their supposedly defensive walls like sheep. Even today, this author’s extended living with herders in Mongolia provided many dem- onstrations that walls enclose livestock, never people. As a result, the purpose of walls is the opposite for settled and nomadic communities, protection for urban people and imprisonment for nomads. Finally, regarding strategic reali- ties, if an entire group were at war or on the move evading contact with the winner of the last battle, scattered groups could re-gather and often quickly rebound in population numbers.13 If directed by strong leaders, they could regain prominence. That made it necessary to attempt to slaughter enemies completely as the only e0fective way of eliminating reprisal. Therefore, the Mongol method was not wanton cruelty according to them but a traditional defence strategy, which they applied at the initial conquests. These social and strategic factors are not expressed by Juwaynī, only the blanket destruction. Since the basic reports are almost a listing, he presumably wrote this section during the early phase of the composition and added ./ourishes later. The main tone is negative. In contrast with deploring such barbarity, Juwaynī often gave a subtle but consistent impression that he approved of Mongol behaviour. This situation could be considered the second stage, that of adoption in literary terms, since he showed that he understood Mongol culture well and tried to explain it. One example is his observation about the lack of grandiose titles for Mongol rulers: “It is one of their laudable customs that they have closed the doors of cere- mony, and preoccupation with titles, and excessive aloofness and inaccessibil- ity; which things are customary with the fortunate and the mighty” (26–27).

8: Grousset, The Empire of the Steppes, 249–52. 8; was the 67rst to appreciate this pattern, which more recent observations and statistics have corroborated, suggesting the possibility of up to a 40 per cent growth rate: See Buell, “Central Eurasia.” CE^ =>?@AB

In another illustration of adoption, in this case of the Mongols adapting to Iranian ways, he addressed Persian identity by noting the distinction between his region and that of other Mongol domains. That di0ference consisted not only of religious rectitude but also of artistic and personal qualities. Perhaps he also responded to some uneasiness in Iran of the presence of so many Chinese and Buddhists involved with the Mongols. Few authors expressed it as clearly as he did as a problem of acculturation. He allayed these challenges to his society, for example, with an anecdote about Ögetei: “Qa’an ordered his attendants to fetch from the treasury all sorts of jewels from the lands of Khorasan and the two Iraqs . . . and arms from Bokhara and Tabriz . . . and likewise what was imported from Khitai, being . . . inferior to the others . . . All these things he ordered to be laid side-by-side so that it might be seen how great the di0ference was. And he said: ‘the poorest Moslem has many Khitayan slaves while the great emirs of Khitai have not one Moslem captive. And the reason for this can only be the bene67cence of the Creator, Who knoweth the station and rank of every nation. It is also in conformity with the ancient yasa of Chinggis Khan, according to which the blood-money for a Moslem is forty14 balish (silver ingots) and for a Khitayan a donkey” (207).1F Juwaynī left his readers in no doubt that Persian culture was the best in the empire. As for religious superiority, he cited the fate of Küchlüg (d. 1218), who apostatized and converted to Christianity.1G Küchlüg then persecuted Muslims, which was one reason the Mongols defeated him. In comparison with Küchlüg, the Mongols acquiesced to the local Muslim reli- gion. Juwaynī concluded with the admonition: “And be it remarked that who- ever molests the faith and law of Muhammed never triumphs, while whoever fosters it, even though it not be his own religion, advances day by day in pros- perity and consideration” (68). He provided the same sentiment to Möngke Khan: “Of all the people and religious communities, he showed most honour and respect to the Moslems. It was upon them that he bestowed the largest amount of gifts and alms and it was they who enjoyed the greatest rights” (600). Juwaynī then proceeded to give an example of a Muslim celebration in the Mongol capital, Qara Qorum, in 1252 (600). There are many other examples

8< The rhetorical use of the number four will be discussed shortly. 8L Rashīd al-Dīn followed Juwaynī’s lead with many similar anecdotes about Ögetei. See Rashīd al-Dīn, Jami‘u’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles, translated by Wheeler M. Thackston, 334–45. 8M Juwaynī blames Küchlüg’s new wife for converting him. This is another motif, Juwaynī’s aversion to women in politics. He often ascribed dire consequences to their behaviour. His Persian viewpoint is in marked contrast to that of steppe society. An historian who has noted Juwaynī’s bias is Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 161. "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CEC of Juwaynī’s attempt to infuse the Mongols with a sophisticated understand- ing of the religion and culture of . Not only did he reassure his audience but he also re-enforced the adoption process by showing that the Mongols were undergoing the same changes.

Psychological and Philosophical Undercurrents The 67nal stage of his literary development, that of integration, is exhibited by a psychological approach of acceptance to the invasion. In one aspect, it presented itself through his e0fusive discussion of Mongol military e067ciency and success which indicated that there was no alternative to the ultimate winner. As a result, since Iran joined the champion and was active within the Mongol Empire, its status gave it power especially in political contexts. Besides accepting events as they stood, which Juwaynī espoused, there was a highly developed concept in his society of the hierarchy of authority. It was a basic philosophical foundation for the theory of the state at that time, most bril- liantly expounded by al-Fārābī (./. about 870–950) but based on Aristotelian concepts. Al-Fārābī stated: “The heart comes to be 67rst and becomes the cause of the existence of the other organs and limbs of the body . . . This applies to all existents. [In particular] the excellent city resembles the perfect and healthy body, all of whose limbs co-operate to make the life of the animal perfect and to preserve it in this state.”1H Juwaynī explained the concept more vividly and practically at the outset of his book: “it is necessary and essential that (if) the threat of the sword . . . were to remain in abeyance and men were content with that which is promised in the next world everything would be confused; the common people, whose feet are bound with What is restrained by authority [Sura _`: 65] would have their hands freed. . . . ”(17). “He should prepare a cer- tain person [Chinggis Khan] and make his nature the receptacle of all manner of power and daring, and ruthlessness, and vengeance, and then by means of praiseworthy qualities and laudable properties bring it into a position of equi- librium”(19). The body politic theory of the state and its subsequent hierarchy was con67rmed by religion. For example, the Qur’an states in Sura ```: 25: “Say, O God: Master of the kingdom. Thou givest the kingdom to whom Thou wilt and seizest the kingdom from whom thou wilt . . . ” The idea was so entrenched in the culture that this statement appeared in 1258 on Hülagü’s initial gold and sil- ver coinage at his conquest of Baghdad.1I Therefore, there were philosophical, political and religious foundations that promoted the view that military power

8N al-F ārābī, al-Fārābī, 231. 8O Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 156. CEa =>?@AB provided a strong leader and was in itself a legitimatizing factor for a political system. Juwaynī had good grounds for accepting Mongol rule.

Techniques in Presenting Facts Within this overall context of integrating the Mongols into an Islamic world- view, Juwaynī stressed their God-given superiority by providing impressive details of the conquests; there are names, numbers and precise actions, most of which would have been derived from the transfer phase and re-employed for his later purpose. Nevertheless, even these facts do not tell the full story since they were sometimes telescoped or ignored. At this juncture in the study, Juwaynī’s rhetorical style can also be examined, a style that allowed him to cre- ate truly impressive e0fects. An excellent example is his description of the con- quests of two major commercial, political and cultural centres of Khurasan, those of Marv and Nishapur. In each case, the city voluntarily submitted at the arrival of the 67rst Mongol contingent. Indeed, Mongol coinage from the inhab- itants of both places was struck to pay tribute.1J Juwaynī limited the initial submission almost to a passing remark because he had a di0ferent intention in relating the details, that of stressing the power of the new state. Once the army left, however, the cities ‘revolted.’ Then the Mongols returned and wreaked ‘vengeance.’ Thus, for the 67rst Marv revolt, he wrote: “the Mongols now entered the town and drove all the inhabitants . . . out on to the plain. For four days and nights, the people continued to come out . . . The Mongols ordered that, apart from 400 artisans . . . the whole population, including women and chil- dren, should be killed . . . ” with each Mongol soldier responsible for executing 400 people (161–62). Nevertheless, the city revolted again, according to him. Whereupon, “Torbei arrived with 67ve thousand men . . . They took the town within an hour; and putting camel halters on believers, they led them out in strings of ten and twenty and cast them into a trough of blood. In this manner, they martyred a hundred thousand persons” (166). This description, although ghastly, used Persian culture to enhance the pathos since Mongols use nose toggles on camels instead of halters. Nevertheless, the purpose of the hyper- bole was not to actually describe the scene but to illustrate the abject humilia- tion and su0fering of people if they revolted. The story continued: the Mongol army then left Marv and regrouped, leav- ing a small contingent to 67nish killing whoever remained in the city. It took forty-one days to accomplish that, and then the contingent also left. He wrote further: “In the whole town, there remained not four persons alive.” A neigh- bouring Turkoman chief rallied whoever was left in the villages around the city

8P Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 42–43; also Grachev and Petrov, “Klad mednih poserebrennih.” "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CEb and repopulated the town: “ten thousand people gathered around him and he was emir for six months . . . ” (167). The Mongols returned again, this time with one hundred thousand men, and again tortured and tormented the townsfolk. They spent forty days this time doing the job. “In the town and the villages, there remained not a hundred souls alive . . . ” (168). It is apparent that the 67rst repression left more than four people alive in Marv since it is inconceiv- able that 10,000 villagers and tribal people could have gathered in the place or region so soon afterwards. The number is undoubtedly exaggerated for e0fect, yet Juwaynī acknowledged the continuing challenge to Mongol rule.2K Meanwhile, as continued in the next chapter, the army pressed on to Nishapur, for which Juwaynī wrote: “It was commanded that the town should be laid waste in such a manner that the site should be ploughed upon . . .” (177). Only 400 craftsmen were saved and marched o0f to Turkestan. The rest, he implied, were slain, with separate piles for the bodies of men and women. As before, a contingent was left behind to round up and kill any who had suc- ceeded in hiding (178). Here, he gave no number of days for the task. However, the event could hardly have taken place as described since Nishapur was a major city ten years later in which Juwaynī’s father was a leading 67gure.

Rhetoric The numbers and sentiment but not the names in the descriptions of Marv and Nishapur match so closely that the real facts are obscured. Instead of taking them at face value, scholars should recognize some distinct rhetorical devices connected with schemas and tropes. A schema alters ordinary sentence struc- ture to give something larger scale, while a trope is a 67gure of speech that enhances the e0fect of a word, such as a simile, metaphor or hyperbole. Here, it was a schema of connection, that of parallelism. That device was a similarity of structure in a pair or series of related words, phrases or clauses which bal- anced the construction with ornamentation. It can also add coherence to an argument.21 Juwaynī did not dispense with the main events but repeated almost the same exaggerated details about Marv and Nishapur in order to make

:Q Juwaynī was not alone in in./ating 67gures. A near contemporary, Ibn Khaldūn, writing in Egypt in the late fourteenth century, recognized this tendency and thoroughly demol- ished any faith in such reporting: The Muqaddimah, 16, and continuing for many more pages of examples. A more recent disclaimer relates to the second battle of Homs in 1281. Contemporary sources gave 67gures for the Mamluk army at 100,000 or half that at 50,000 men. Amitai-Preiss doubted both 67gures and preferred not to depend on any particular number. Amitai-Priess, Mongols and Mamluks, 193–94. :8 Corbett, Classical Rhetoric, 447. CEd =>?@AB a point. By doing so, he re./ected or transferred in a wholesale manner infor- mation about the Mongol war machine and then put a highly emotional twist to it. The narrative related direct if controlled history, but the literary touches propelled the pace and explosion of events. Thus although historians have so far generally discredited the accuracy of the actual numbers, they should also be critical of the reliability of the skewed statements because they stress cer- tain events and almost ignore others. It is necessary, therefore, to be aware that Juwaynī’s agenda dealt with more than the basic actions of the Mongols. He was also imposing his 67nal message, notably that the old order had been smashed. Nevertheless, even though Juwaynī transferred the Mongol message of intimidation with these stories of atrocities, he provided various means for understanding the newcomers. The methods were often simple, but they were the beginning of adoption, the second phase of literary development. In par- ticular, he glossed the motif of utter destruction and other events with a num- ber that seems to have been agreeable to him and his contemporaries. The round number four appeared continuously; four itself, forty and four hundred.22 It is clearly a case of another rhetorical schema, in this situation of polyptoton or the repetition of words derived from the same root. His love of euphony, however, in this instance, apparently overrode his knowledge of Mongol cul- ture. This round number contrasted with the Mongol preference for the odd number three and its multiples. Steppe tradition, going back at least to the sev- enth century in the of Central Mongolia, had exhibited numer- ous uses of it in ceremonies and building layouts.23 The legacy still exists with many customs such as the circumambulation three times around sacred cairns or processions led by Chinggis Khan’s standard of nine horsetails. Once again, small details indicate that rhetoric and cultural divergence between Iranian and Mongol aesthetics and practices sometimes informed the text more than reality did. It seems that Juwaynī ignored this minor di0ference in order to frame the Mongol invasion in a capsule of eloquent Persian language and cul- tural norms that could lead to adoption.

Positive Motif In the 67nal step of integration, the most telling and clear case is the positive motif of the glori67cation of the noble ruler: here Ögetei Khan (1229–41) is the speci67c example. In a remarkable series of extended anecdotes, Juwaynī

:: The number appears regularly throughout the text. Another example is his report about the festivities that preceded Ögetei’s quriltai: “When the forty days had come to an end . . .” (186). :; Kolbas, “Khukh Ordung,” 303–28, 318. "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CED showed the integration of the two completely diverse cultures. For a full chap- ter entitled “On the Deeds and Actions of Qa’an,” which runs for 35 pages in the English translation (201–35), the theme is magisterial bene67cence. He introduced his many tales that often included speci67c individuals with the comment: “Those in need that came to him from every side speedily returned with their wishes unexpectedly ful67lled and o067ce-seekers and petitioners straight-away with whatever each of them had desired. . . . Upon those that came from distant and rebellious lands he bestowed presents in the same way as upon those that were from near and subject countries. And no one went away from his presence disappointed or frustrated” (203). Numerous stories follow of lowly individuals highly rewarded 67nancially or honoured by being admitted to Ögetei’s presence. The anecdotes are quite wonderful and rather inventive, but each has a clear message of bene67cence. One expressly had the khan saying: “How long must I ask you (a courtier) not to deny my bounty and begrudge petitioners my property?” (223). Indeed, the apocryphal tales resounded so well that Rashīd al-Dīn repeated similar ones in Part Three of his history of Ögetei.24 The khan received special attention because Juwaynī loved words. He was aware of the Mongol language, in which the in67nitive ög, meaning ‘to give,’ formed the basis of the khan’s name. The prepositional ending of dei or tei indicates ‘with’ so that the word Ögetei can be expressed as ‘generosity.’ The meanings of many other Mongol names are known, such as Möngke, ‘enduring,’2F and Hülagü, ‘a loyal and clever horse’;2G but Juwaynī did not even hint at the meanings of these names. It seems he chose to elaborate so extensively on Ögetei because the name symbolized the Persian as well as the steppe sense of a great ruler, and Ögetei personi67ed just such a ruler. In spite of that, Ögetei had lived in the past, even though the recent past; so the idealization had the motif of a Golden Era. Since modern scholars have not been aware of this word play nor its signi67cance, they have generally depicted Ögetei as a pro./igate at worst and too generous at best. Neither characteristic can be veri67ed from a better understanding of Juwaynī’s word-play. It was part of a positive spin for the integration of two cultures.

:< They require twelve pages in the English translation, 2:334–45. :L The word is usually translated as ‘eternal’ but is better understood as ‘enduring’; Jackson, “Mongol Khans,” 113. :M There has been no general analysis of the culture around Mongol names, especially the manner and point at which they changed. Although most names were probably given at birth, it is obvious that some common ones, for example, Buqa, a good wrestler, were given or granted to the individual as an adult to note his physical prowess. CEE =>?@AB

To further the theme of the just and noble ruler, in the next chapter, Juwaynī dealt with Ögetei’s buildings and palaces for three pages in the English trans- lation (236–38). As with Ögetei’s name, Juwaynī’s treatment was a complete break from descriptions of any other ruler, whether pre-Mongol or Mongol. This chapter established that the Mongols were not rough nomads wander- ing around the steppe or, in fact, wanton destroyers of cities. Indeed, Ögetei’s policy to stabilize the empire had a large component of urbanization. It was implemented across the empire and can be attested by numismatic evidence for revised tax policies.2H In addition, Ögetei established Qaraqorum, which became the ceremonial centre of the empire, especially during Möngke’s reign (1251–59). This theme was not wishful thinking since urbanisation continued even after Juwaynī’s time as other khans also saw bene67ts to urbanization. Qubilai (1260–94) founded Daidu and Arghun (1284–91) Sultaniyya. Moreover, various khans of the Golden Horde, especially Özbeg (1312–41), established a string of cities along the eastern bank of the Volga River, the 67rst time this region had any urban centres. For this early period then, Juwaynī captured in a speci67c chapter a major transition in imperial administration that started in the middle of Ögetei’s reign. Tellingly for historical context and accuracy, these two chapters immediately follow the one on the second quriltai or congress that established the important reforms.2I

Propaganda This brief survey of negative and positive motifs may have created the impres- sion that Juwaynī was helping the Mongols with their propaganda. Most com- mentators have been more sympathetic by implying that he could hardly have condemned the rulers for whom he worked,2J yet the motifs and reasons for them would have been apparent to Persian readers. In that respect, his work interpreted historical events according to the new fabric of society and daily life. The 67rst motif emphasized that the Mongol conquest did slaughter many,

:N Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 97–98; regarding taxation and urbanization. Further, the pro- gramme was e0fective since numismatic evidence shows that Khurasan was returning to normal by 1242 at the end of Ögetei’s reign: Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 109. :O On Möngke’s accession to the throne, the khan revitalized the empire with strong, cen- tralizing reforms that followed the original outlines set by Ögetei especially with the taxation policies of Yalavach. Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 97, 100, 140; and Allsen, Mongol Imperialism, 79–80, and fn. 4. :P For example, Boyle explains that “it was not su067cient to record the good qualities of the Mongol invaders; as an o067cial in that service, Juvaini had to justify the invasion itself. This he has done by representing the Mongols as the instrument of divine will.” Juwaynī/ Boyle, xlv. "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CE( but those operations were mainly due to rebellion or resistance. The actual numbers did not matter: the spirit of revolt was crushed. In Juwaynī’s time, Iran was united; and since the had general sway across Asia, he seemed to say that there were substantial bene67ts from peace and stabil- ity. The second motif suggested that the Mongols reigned with wisdom and bene67cence; at least the ideal could be found in one khan. Juwayni probably re./ected the view of many since, once again, Rashīd al-Dīn followed this stance in his later comments extolling the reforms of Ghazan Khan (1295–1304).3K Thus although the text could be viewed as serving Mongol interests, it seems that he expounded or even assisted in clarifying the prevailing opinions held by an elite Persian audience. That group was well versed in the arts of litera- ture and prevailing philosophical concepts, none of which particularly con- cerned the Mongols. Instead, their culture used a di0ferent calendar, language, script and symbols of royalty which distinctly separated them from the subject peoples. The internal evidence from Juwaynī’s text, such as his constant allu- sions to Islamic and recent dynasties like the Khwarazmshahs for whom his grandfather had worked, leads to this interpretation of Persian acceptance and integration. With his compositional development and chosen events, Juwaynī ended by providing a vision of security and good governance;31 and he did so by depicting much of Mongol activity in Persian cultural terms.

Stylistic In!luences Ultimately though, this analysis cannot ignore in./uences Juwaynī received from previous masterpieces.32 To observe these only brie./y, Juwaynī was per- haps inspired thematically by the epic confrontation of tragic 67gures found in the Shāhnāma. Stylistically, the great epic did a0fect his poetry as a num- ber of distiches mirrored the tone and intensity of the equivalent kinds of con./ict in the poem.33 Moreover, in some limited cases such as praising Jalāl al-Dīn, Juwaynī even borrowed a few verses from the Shāhnāma.34 For prose

;Q For example, Rashīd al-Dīn stated in Chapter 20: “These several important matters, which not one of the former caliphs or sultans managed, is easy for the Ruler of Islam, may his reign be eternal. It is so well accepted that it (the reform) is the cause of the general tran- quility.” Kolbas, The Mongols in Iran, 317. ;8 Boyle’s last comment shadows such an interpretation: “their object is clearly to reconcile the author and his readers to the inevitable.” Juwaynī/Boyle, xlviii. ;: Melville has supplied a more detailed and helpful look as well as the analyses of sources and in./uences by others, “Jahangosha”, 380, followed by an extensive bibliography. ;; Melikian-Chirvani, “Conscience du passé,” 135–77. For thematic in./uence, 137; for dis- tiches 139, 141 and following. ;< Juwaynī/Boyle, xliv. CE\ =>?@AB

in./uences, he built on the dramatic but naturalistic style already well devel- oped by Abū al-Faẓl Bayhaqī, who wrote in 1187, an historian of the . Both authors worked in the chancellery for the new conquerors but wrote exciting episodes and anecdotes for the public. Their primary focus was orga- nizing and interpreting their readers’ perceptions of the impact of warlords and nomads upon urban culture.3F Unlike Bayhaqī, however, Juwaynī also incorporated other literary developments to full advantage. He also wrote in a period of somewhat related developments amongst the Mongols themselves as recognized by Igor de Rachewiltz. He considers that The Secret History was also an epic, especially an epic chronicle rather than a heroic epic.3G Moreover, Juwaynī was not the 67rst to travel this road of amalgamating the strong foundations of one culture into another. Even preceding the works dis- cussed above, the process had also occurred after the Islamic conquest of Iran, 67rst being absorbed slowly but then ingrained at least by the eleventh century. Later during the Seljuq period, for example, new rulers often created their gene- alogy to re./ect descent from both ’s circle and that of the mythi- cal forebears of Iranian nobility. This dual integration is especially evident in the genre of the Mirrors for Princes.3H In e0fect then, Juwaynī reacted in much the same way to invaders as had his forbears, only he created a di0ferent and broader genre that included all educated Persians, not just rulers and their courts.

Conclusion

His conclusion was hard-won since he had initially deplored so much loss in the abrupt and devastating clashes of empire-building. Eloquent metaphors underscored his concern: “the land of Khorasan in particular, . . . the location of desirable things and good works, the font of learned men, the rendezvous of the accomplished, the spring-abode of the learned, the meadow of the wise, the thoroughfare of the pro67cient and the drinking place of the inge- nious . . . To-day, I say, the earth hath been divested of the adornment of those clad in the gown of science and those decked in the jewels of learning and letters. . . . ”(6).3I Even this lament with its many rhetorical tropes of metaphor,

;L Hardy, “Review of Marilyn Waldman,” 334–44; 336, 342. ;M de Rachewiltz, The Secret History of the Mongols, 1. ;N Tor, “The Islamisation of Iranian Kingly Ideals in the Persianate fürstenspiegel,” 115–22. ;O He continued to thoroughly lament the state of a0fairs, giving no credit in the slightest to the Mongols, a tirade that could be considered the beginning of his transition to the later stages and chapters. "RBS>TRUA? VWRU AB X>YZ>? WT>WAZAY[A? CE] hyperbole and presumably paronomasia3J in the Persian original was prob- ably meant to encourage others to revive intellectual activity in a stable realm. It was also a call, it seems, to reinstate his own formative training that might have derived from Aristotle’s Rhetoric as the canon for good writing. The train- ing would have stressed the 67ve basic tenets of rhetorical exposition, those of invention, arrangement, style, memory and delivery.4K Juwaynī’s entire work incorporated all these points. Furthermore, a reliable study of the original Persian text would better uncover his full style. He would have exercised his own method of sentence articulation and in particular maximized sentence euphony. That would include rhyming prose or sajʿ.41 Moreover, he probably surrounded important words that had strong stress by ones with weak stress to enhance his choice of words by contrast. Indeed, euphony and rhythm com- municate as much as the formal word.42 It seems that Juwaynī was extremely conscious of the aural cadence, bite or soothing nature of his phrases. As a result, in a variety of ways, Juwaynī employed a literary style that used detailed factual history to create epic prose. His motifs were well-developed, not clichés, and his motives were to explain in Persian terms the new order. He was able to depict seismic shifts in world history and cultural patterns, but historians should be cognizant of his artistic methods and social motives. It is worth considering that he may have been a spokesman for the entire soci- ety. The Mongols, too, were adapting and integrating to produce a “strikingly atypical evolution” of a steppe empire.43 Juwaynī created a masterpiece for a Persian memory of the period, and as he constructed his work over the three stages that were later intermingled which interpreted his time, he chose speci67c directions and selected the impact of his narrative. He composed a vast lyrical tapestry full of rhetorical devices and human emotions through de67nite themes and variations, poetic allusions and dramatic intensity. Juwaynī ended with the belief that order could emerge from so much chaos and was able to present his own epic struggle almost forty years after the Mongols 67rst appeared in Iran.

;P Paronomasia is the use of words alike in sound but di0ferent in meaning. ?@AB

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Poliakova, E. A. “The Development of a Literary Canon in Medieval Persian Chronicles: The Triumph of Etiquette.” Iranian Studies 17 (1984): 237–56. de Rachewiltz, Igor. The Secret History of the Mongols: a Mongolian Epic Chronicle of the Thirteenth Century. Translated with a Historical and Philological Commentary. Volume 1. Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2004. Rashīd al-Dīn. Jami‘u’t-tawarikh [sic] Compendium of Chronicles. Translated by Wheeler M. Thackston. Vol 2. Cambridge, j#: Department of Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard University, 1998–99. Rossabi, Morris. “The Reign of Kubilai Khan.” In The Cambridge History of China. Volume 6. Alien Regimes and Border States: 907–1368. Edited by Herbert Franke and Denis Twitchett, 414–89. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. Rypka, J. “Poets and Prose Writers of the Late Saljuq and Mongol periods.” In The Cambridge History of Iran. Volume 5. The Saljuq and Mongol Periods. Edited by J. A. Boyle, 550–625. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968. Tor, D. G. “The Islamisation of Iranian Kingly Ideals in the Persianate fürstenspiegel.” Iran 49 (2011): 115–22. Weatherford, Jack. Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World. Three Rivers Press, New York, 2004. Whitman, Marina D. “The Scholar, the Drinker, and the Ceramic Pot-Painter.” In Content and Context of Visual Art in the Islamic World. Edited by Priscilla P. Soucek, 255–61. College Art Association, Pennsylvania State University Press, London, 1988. !"#$%&' ( From the Mongols to the Timurids: Re!"nement and Attrition in Persian Painting

Karin Rührdanz

In 1544/45, the calligrapher Dūst Muḥammad compiled and interpreted an album (Topkapı Sarayı Müzesi, H. 2154) for Prince Bahrām Mīrzā, the brother of Shāh Ṭahmāsp (r. 1524–76). His introduction contains the now famous statement that during the reign of the Ilkhan Abū Saʿīd, “Master Ahmad Musa . . . lifted the veil from the face of depiction, and the [style of] depiction that is now current was invented by him.”0 Starting with Aḥmad Mūsā, Dūst Muḥammad constructed a history of Persian painting, building upon a chain of biographical notes stressing the master–disciple relationship leading up to his time in the mid sixteenth century. His narrative was originally supported by a selection of pictorial examples, some of which are still in the album and allow us to follow his reasoning. A mi‘rāj painting1 that he attributed to Aḥmad Mūsā represents the beginning of the transformation process. A late fourteenth-century miniature2 ascribed by Dūst Muḥammad to ʿAbd al-Ḥayy marks its completion. The latter picture once illustrated a manuscript (, Add. 18113) which contains three of Khwājū-yi Kirmānī’s mathnavīs copied in 1396 for the Jalayirid Sultan Aḥmad in Baghdad. Together with nine more miniatures still preserved in the manuscript they exemplify the degree of re45nement Persian painting had reached within seven decades:

Their densely organized scenes, with subtle rhythms and colors, have a fairy-tale quality that transcends their narrative function. Minute details and delicately rendered 45gures add to the intensity of these illustrations, which depict the turbulent romance of the Persian prince and princess Humay and Humayun.6

7 Thackston, A Century of Princes, 345. 9 H. 2154, fol. 31b, for colour reproduction see Çağman and Tanındı, The Topkapı Saray Museum, no. 45. ; H. 2154, fol. 20b, for colour reproduction see Sims, Peerless Images, 262–63, no. 179; for the identi45cation as part of a Jalayirid manuscript see Prentice, “A Detached Miniature,” 60–66. < Lentz and Lowry, Timur and the Princely Vision, 53.

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The Khwājū-yi Kirmānī miniatures perfectly demonstrate the skilful exploi- tation of the newly developed stylistic means—the emphasis on the vertical combined with a view from above to the horizon; the larger space accom- modating smaller 45gures and the opening to the other world on the margin; and the ideal landscape or an architectural background, in this case a pala- tial structure worthy of paradise—for the visualization of mystical ideas.N In the century that followed, interpretation and paraphrasing of the romantic mathnavī with strong mystical connotations largely determined the develop- ment of Persian manuscript illustration.O Analysis of the development of Persian painting from c. 1330 to c. 1400 has mostly focused on the formation of the late Jalayirid style as represented by the miniatures in the Khwājū-yi Kirmānī manuscript and its Timurid continuation in and Herat in the early 45fteenth century.P Since very few illustrated manuscripts are preserved from the Jalayirid period, a hypothetical chronol- ogy of artistic evolution has been constructed, mainly by using the miniatures cut from manuscripts and mounted in albums.Q Inevitably, this reconstruction had to be carried out with the starting and the end point in view, and, conse- quently, sidelined those paintings which did not 45t a straight line of stylistic development. Also, research largely focused on those pictures in the Istanbul albums that were identi45ed as having belonged to Kalīla wa Dimna and Shāhnāma manuscripts.R This has created the impression that Persian minia- ture painting started with a very narrow range of texts to be illustrated which was expanded over time. In fact, the second half of the fourteenth century seems to have seen the most open-minded approach to the visualization of literary subjects.0S Building on the artistic experience acquired during the late Ilkhanid period, painters boldly took on a variety of genres and topics before

T On the technical side, the relationship between text and image was built upon a grid which served the arrangement of the lines of poetry on the written surface as well as the structuring of the painting’s composition, see Porter, “The Illustrations,” 359–74. U Fitzherbert, “Khwājū Kirmānī,” 137–51; Barry, Figurative Art, 121–31. V Most detailed Gray, ed., The Arts of the Book. W Duda, “Die Buchmalerei der Ğala’iriden,” (1972), 28–76 and (1973), 153–220. Y Cowen, Kalila wa Dimna; Grube, “The Istanbul University Library,” 52–77; O’Kane, Early Persian Painting; Atasoy, “Four Istanbul Albums,” 19–49; Idem, “Illustrations Prepared,” 262–72. 7Z Dealing primarily with a di[ferent group of material from the Istanbul albums, the so- called Siyah Qalam works, and attributing it to Jalayirid Tabriz and Baghdad, an article by Bernard O’Kane, “Siyah Qalam,” 2–18, points in the same direction: The ‘window of opportunities’ opened by the Mongol conquest was fully exploited in the later half of the fourteenth century, and then closed step by step. =>\ ']DAM^G_ a streamlining process started which eventually made Persian manuscript illustration the perfect companion to mathnavīs and dīwāns. Since the path of development leading up to the point of re45nement reached in the last decade of the fourteenth and the 45rst decades of the 45fteenth century in Jalayirid and Timurid painting is well known, attention is directed, here, to those promising beginnings that fell victim to the 45ltering. What follows is an attempt to sug- gest a literary context for several groups of album miniatures that, stylistically, belong to the main stream of artistic development from the late Ilkhanid to the Jalayirid periods but stand out because of their enigmatic subjects. This paper is only the 45rst step of a work in progress and looks for pre- liminary answers among the material in one of the two relevant groups of albums, the Diez albums Diez A Fol. 70–72, bequeathed to the now Berlin State Library by Freiherr von Diez, Prussian envoy to the Ottomans until 1790.00 In these albums, a number of paintings taken from the Topkapi Saray albums H. 2152 and H. 2153 were rearranged, together with material from other sources.01 Therefore, this research cannot be completed before the preliminary conclusions are checked against information contained in the relevant Istanbul albums.02 One must also take into account that Diez’s personal approach led him to acquire a selection which would not adequately re`aect the original content of the Topkapi Saray albums. One of the Istanbul albums, H. 2152, has been analyzed as a “Timurid work- shop album,”06 and it seems highly possible that H. 2153 (and probably H. 2160) played a similar role, although not in a Timurid but rather in an Āq Qoyūnlū or Ottoman court atelier. The court artists themselves were obviously inclined to preserve manifold material for reference and inspiration even if it were far removed from what they were commissioned to produce at that time. Relying on the scant information available about the current content of the Istanbul albums, it seems that Diez acquired a fair share of the Jalayirid material. In Ipşiroğlu’s catalogue of the Diez albums, it is described under Group ddd: Post-Ilkhanid miniatures.0N Conservation work, which included removing the pictures from the albums and taking apart those miniatures that had been glued together back to back, established that almost none of them had text on the back.0O Although how and

77 Ip şiroğlu, Saray-Alben. 79 On the genesis of the Diez albums, see Roxburgh, “Heinrich Friedrich von Diez,” 112–36. 7; For an overview, see Çağman, “On the Contents of Four Istanbul Albums,” 31–36. 7< Roxburgh, The Persian Album, chapter 3, 93–106 in particular. 7T Ip şiroğlu, Saray-Alben, 35–57. 7U Appel and Dieter, “Die Saray-Alben,” 227–32. @ABC %DE FBGHBIJ %B %DE %KCLAKMJ =>e when the texts ‘disappeared’ remains an enigma, a recent 45nding con45rms that the cut-out pictures were parts of manuscripts.0P Concerning literary genres and topics illustrated by those context-deprived miniatures, Ipşiroğlu men- tioned the Shāhnāma, Oriental versions of the Alexander romance, popular lit- erature or adventure and seafaring stories.0Q He did not try to be more speci45c when dealing with the individual miniatures. However, even this general state- ment is signi45cant: it contains highly unusual genres and topics if compared to the output of illustrated manuscripts over the following two centuries. Referring to the assumed literary context of the miniatures, Ipşiroğlu claimed elsewhere “that cultural life was reduced to a popular level” in post-Ilkhanid times.0R This seems a one-dimensional judgment if we take into account, for instance, Browne’s evaluation of the fourteenth century as “remarkable alike for the quantity and the quality of the poets and writers which it produced.”1S However, the album material testi45es not to the production, but to the con- sumption of literature and, more speci45cally, to that part of literature that was deemed appropriate and worthy to be visualized. As we shall see, this part is barely connected to the literary production of the fourteenth century. Mystical poetry written before and after the Mongol conquest obviously had not yet cast its spell over patrons and ateliers. It was another kind of text which proved most attractive, as the more or less preserved manuscripts of the Shāhnāma and Kalīla wa Dimna show. The following is an attempt to categorize material from Ipşiroğlu’s “Post-Ilkhanid miniatures” group with respect to its connec- tion to certain genres and texts. One miniature, correctly identi45ed for the 45rst time by Nora Titley, is “Bahman visiting the mausoleum of Rustam’s family.”10 She based her identi45- cation on an early Timurid miniature illustrating the Bahman-nāma in a col- lection of post-Shāhnāma epics.11 This manuscript (British Library, Or. 2780)

7V Sims, “Bilder zu Ferdausis Schahname,” 30–31. Interestingly, two pages (103b and 100b) in the album H. 2153 with text on the miniature side, preserved and to be read continuously (see Khaleghi-Motlagh edition, 2:31), constitute the two sides of the same leaf. See Atasoy, “Four Istanbul Albums,” 45gs. 23 and 24. Should we take into account the splitting of pages at an early stage? 7W Ip şiroğlu, Saray-Alben, 36. 7Y Ipsiroglu, Painting and Culture, 55. 9Z Browne, A History of Persian, 159. 97 Diez A Fol. 72, 29, see Ipşiroğlu, Saray-Alben, ddd/7 (p. 40), Taf. fgddd, Abb. 24; for a colour reproduction see Komaro[f and Carboni, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, 54, 45g. 52; or Gonnella and Rauch, Heroische Zeiten, 117, no. 37. 99 British Library Or. 2780, fol. 171b; see Titley, , 45–47, pl.3. =>h ']DAM^G_ is dated 1398,12 but was only provided with inserted miniatures about 20 years later, in early Timurid Shiraz.16 Together with an illustrated Garshāsp-nāma, dated 1354,1N this compendium of post-Shāhnāma epics supports the hypoth- esis that some of the Jalayirid paintings once illustrated post-Shāhnāma epics. These epics belong to the texts that were sidelined in the transforma- tion described earlier. When they later received the attention of painters once again, they were no longer treated as separate texts but as interpolations in the Shāhnāma.1O It may well be that a number of miniatures so far identi- 45ed as Shāhnāma illustrations come, in fact, from those epics, because well- known Shāhnāma topics reappear in them, with other heroes performing the same deeds. On the one hand, the iconography concerning the appearance of Rustam does not appear to have been 45xed for the most part of the four- teenth century. Apart from being dressed in his famous tiger skin, he might be depicted undistinguished or with a leopard skin.1P On the other hand, in the above-mentioned collection of epics transcribed in 1398 and illustrated most probably under the Timurid prince Iskandar Sultan, Garshāsp is twice shown in an attire that resembles that of Rustam.1Q This demonstrates that a leopard, and probably even a tiger skin garment, often combined with the related head- dress, was sometimes used to identify other members of Rustam’s family who became protagonists in the post-Shāhnāma epics. Some album miniatures featuring heroes dressed in this way1R may, therefore, originate from post- Shāhnāma epics. So far, however, neither a review of the Garshāsp-nāma2S nor of the Bahman-nāma20 has produced reliable identi45cations, i.e., descriptions

9; Rieu, Supplement, 133; Titley, Miniatures, 39–40, no. 99. 9< Wright, “Firdausi and More,” 65–84. 9T Topkapi Saray Museum, H. 674, see Ettinghausen, “On Some Mongol Miniatures,” 59–65. 9U Rührdanz, “About a Group of Truncated Shahnamas,” 118–19. 9V In a characteristic Rustam episode, the hero is dressed in leopard skin in the miniature Diez A Fol. 71, p. 26, no. 2, see Gonnella and Rauch, Heroische Zeiten, 124, no. 47. 9W Or. 2780, fol. 18a, see Stchoukine, Les peintures des manuscrits timurides, pl. fd; fol. 29b, see Robinson, Persian Miniatures, pl. dd. An album miniature (Diez A Fol. 71, 46) repre- sents Sām, father of Zāl, dressed like Rustam, see Gonnella and Rauch, Heroische Zeiten, 125–26, no. 48, in the same way as Zāl is set apart from other heroes and courtiers sur- rounding King Zāv on a miniature from the Great Ilkhanid Shāhnāma, Sackler Gallery, Washington, S1986.107, see Komaro[f and Carboni, The Legacy of Genghis Khan, 41, 45g. 37. 9Y Diez A Fol. 72, p. 26, see Ipşiroğlu, Saray-Alben, ddd/23, p. 45; for a reproduction, see Gonnella and Rauch, Heroische Zeiten, 114, no. 35. ;Z Ṭū sī, Le livre de Gerchāsp. ;7 Irānshāh ibn Abī ’l-Khayr, Bahman-nāma. I would like to thank Shabnam Rahimi- Golkhandan for checking the text in detail. @ABC %DE FBGHBIJ %B %DE %KCLAKMJ =>> of events other than the above-mentioned episode that are su[45ciently speci45c to be 45rmly recognized as illustrated by Diez album miniatures. Two miniatures, which belong to a series of four pictures extant from a story about a man and a female ape, are related to a completely di[ferent genre. While the picture showing the white-bearded man approached by a group of gesticulating monkeys21 is in a Topkapi album together with a second one, Diez acquired the two more interesting miniatures that tell us the story.22 Although not 45tting the pictures in detail, a story in the ʿAjāʾib al-Hind by Buzurg ibn Shahriyār comes close.26 Taking the multiplicity of illustrations in some fourteenth-century manuscripts into account,2N it is not unlikely that this story was provided with four miniatures, although one would prefer to think of a more elaborated text.2O Such a text could have been part of a collec- tion of several seafaring tales. A few miniatures representing adventures at sea in the Diez albums could also have belonged to such tales.2P There is, however, another possibility. A monkey story, as well as stories about journeys or `aights by sea, shipwrecks and encounters with horrible sea monsters are also part of several popular romances. The late sixteenth-century illustrations of the Dārābnāma made for the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556– 1605) include not only a number of 45ghts and adventures at sea, but also the encounter of a heroine’s brother with a female ape.2Q Moreover, even in some post-Shāhnāma epics, journeys by sea play a role.2R The romances, however,

;9 H. 2153, p. 155b, see Ipşiroğlu, Painting and Culture, 58 and 100, no. 15. ;; Diez A Fol. 71, p. 12, and Diez A Fol. 72, p. 19, see Ipşiroğlu, Saray-Alben, ddd/62 and ddd/63 (pp. 52–53, Taf. fgd, Abb. 22). ;< Buzurg ibn Shahriyār, The Book of the Marvels of India, 58–61. In this account, a sailor staying behind on a ship enjoyed visits of a she-monkey and eventually had sex with her. Having noticed her pregnancy he abandoned the ship and left in a small boat. Only much later he heard that his returning comrades met his o[fspring on the ship. ;T This was, for instance, established for the Great Ilkhanid Shāhnāma, see Blair, “On the Track of the ‘Demotte,’ ” 128; and the less sumptuous and smaller in size Kalīla wa Dimna in the BnF, suppl. pers. 913, see O’Kane, Early Persian Painting, 283. ;U Because of their size (for instance, for the published miniature Diez A Fol. 72, p. 19: 24.5 x 24 cm), it does not seem likely that the four paintings were made to accompany an oral presentation of the story. ;V Diez A Fol. 71, pp. 17, 36, 39, and Diez A Fol. 73, p. 29, see Ipşiroğlu, Saray-Alben, ddd/67, ddd/66, ddd/65, and ddd/68 (respectively, pp. 54–55, Taf. fg, Abb. 20, Taf. fgd, Abb. 21). ;W Compare an illustration in the Dārābnāma made for Akbar, now British Library Or. 4615, fol. 41a; see Titley, Miniatures from Persian Manuscripts, 8–11, no. 18. ;Y When the hero goes by ship to confront an enemy, or undertakes a kind of sightseeing journey to remote islands, the battles and adventures are commonly located on land, =>( ']DAM^G_ seem the most promising choice because of the range of subjects they o[fer to narrative painting:

Thematically, popular literature displays elements common to both polite and folk literature. [. . .] the popular romances are derived by and large from the national legend, with exceptions [. . .] In like manner, the romances contain numerous motifs common in folklore, travel literature and popular religion.6S

There are seven pictures in the Diez albums which cannot but derive from popular romances. These miniatures show princes and warriors in action while a strange, usually smaller 45gure, is present, dressed in a short garment, his naked legs in light shoes, and on his head a conical cap or hat (45gs. 8.1– 8.5).60 Ipşiroğlu calls him a jester (“Hofnarr”).61 What part, however, may a jester play on the battle45eld, in connection with the storming of a prison, or in providing a prince with the proper out45t for war? The proximity to the court of this seemingly non-heroic 45gure and the activities he is engaged in lead to the conclusion that he must be an ʿayyār. The multifaceted term ʿayyār is used here in the ‘positive sense,’ meaning “a noble-minded highwayman, or a generous, clever, brave, modest, pious, chaste, hospitable, generally upright person. This last image is found mostly in poetry, in adab and Su45 texts, and popular romances.”62 In the popular romances, it is the principal ʿayyār, sometimes helped by his ʿayyār friends, who, with unfail- ing loyalty, tackles the seemingly hopeless situations the prince had put him- self in; who 45nds the way into the secret enemy prison to rescue the abducted princess; who risks his life many times while acting in disguise; and who does all the dirty work to enable the prince to become victorious at the end. He gives advice to the prince, delivers his , and spies on the enemy troops, but never 45ghts in battle or engages in single combat with a warrior. Therefore, an ʿayyār would never be represented acting and dressed like a warrior hero.

while the crossing of the sea is only mentioned as a means to get there; see, for instance, the second part of the Garshāsp-nāma: Asadī Ṭūsī, Le livre de Gerchâsp, 2. j

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His appearance should re`aect his lower social background and his particular function. One way to check whether the peculiar 45gure on those seven album pictures might be an ʿayyār is through visual comparison with such heroes in extant illustrations from popular romances. Some information can be extracted from the only preserved manuscript of the ʿayyār-centred romance Kitāb-i Samak-i ʿAyyār,66 which was transcribed and illustrated in the period immediately pre- ceding the Jalayirid paintings. Its three volumes6N prove that the subject had been deemed appropriate for illustration, at least at the provincial court of the Inju dynasty in Shiraz between 1330 and 1350. The illustrations, however, are

<< Gaillard, “Samak-e ʿAyyār.”

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not overly helpful. Figure drawing in Inju style does not di[ferentiate much between courtiers and servants, women and beardless men, warriors and ʿayyārs. Nevertheless, Samak is distinguished by his attire, if only slightly. Like some other 45gures, for instance a vizier, he appears in a kind of civil servant dress. In contrast to those other non-warrior 45gures, however, he is character- ized by one dress element which identi45es him with some consistency: a coni- cal cap with some turban cloth slung around.6O From descriptions in the text of the Kitāb-i Samak-i ʿAyyār and some other popular romances, Hanaway concluded “that there was more or less a standard