AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ON RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO CERTAIN PERSONALITY VARIABLES •^^^^^M^puB;

ABSTRACT

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHOLOGY

BY

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh September 1979 m BXPBRlMiaiTAL SSVDY &f ^HE EFFECT OF COGHIf IVB 10 CBfCPAlH PERSOJIALOTY VARIABLBS

' i?ho Qt^dy eeposts four experlEaento the purpose ot each of wliich was tio ascertain tte effect of cogaitiv© dlssonanco upon riak-taklBd behaviour in ceiation to each one of four panrstmoXity voriablos, nanseXy* anxiety, intemal-Qsctomal Xocuo of control aoif-osteem, an

ThB effoct of co03itive diss^ianco upon risk-taking behaviour wao studied on certaiUi geounda. that attention to study the effect of cognitive dissonance upon risk-taking behaviour.

Assuming that the manner of reducing cognitive disstonance of an individual nay be related to his positioxi on adjustment^ iaalalocus of control, self, estecan, and repress ion-sensitieatic^ -•> each of which considaced to play a vital role in tto cdjuotinemt-c^ladjuetnient of an individual —- '^ero included in the present study, /

Every e«p3rJjsont employod a 2 x 2 factorial design in t^hlch thoro yo£o tw> independent variables with t\m variations of each voricble, nan^ly, (1) asousal vs. nonarousal of cognitive dissonance induced by negative feedback of losing the ^oi^lo and positive fee(SQ>ack of i^imiing the ganible xespectivolyr end (2) !ii@h scores vs. lo%7 scores on the personality diraension* Tho dependent vari^le, nanaely, the risk-taking behaviour was measured in terms of chon^ in the selection of case of two risk alternative (strategy) ctK>ices in the second of two bids as compared to the first one after winning (*nonarousal of cognitive dissonanos*} or losing (*arousal of cognitive dissGoance *} the ganoble in a risk-taking task.

The analyses of scores s^M3wed that the condition of 'arousal of co^fiitive dissonance* led to no re changes of risk strategy tbsn did the c(»tdition of 'nonarousal of cognitive disscmance'. The analyses further revealed that the *n<»iarousal ot cognitive dissonance* led to % tendency to sapeat a risk striitegy cm the part of both the *roiXdiy anxious' M«1 •highly anximis* Ss# both the • iotejmally-orientcd • and *e3etoxnally~ ori©ntQd» Ss# both th© »high selfo-esteero* and *lo«r self-^ esteeo5' ss, and also on the part of both ths 'repwisoor* aaid *6ensitia^r* ss. la the condition of 'aronsol of cogaitivo Cilosanancc, on tto otter hand, tte '©ildly Gnxio«s* B&» th© internally-offiontc^* 3B, tshQ "high self-osteea* ss* ond tho •ropuBssor* ss elwccd significantly mose choncpo of risk «3tsr;tcoy th[m did th3ir reopsctiv© coantorports in th© •hi#i ©Cores' ©roup©. \ DEPiKTMSNT OF">SYGHOLOGX, ALIGAaH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY, A L I G A R H,

September 28, 1979

This is to certify that Mr, Arurr Kumar Singh \^30 worked under the Supervision of Late Prof. Jnwar •Ansari got almost all the Chapters of his Ph.D thesis thoroughly gone through ahd corrected by him. I have read the thesis and I am fvlly satisfied that the thesis, aS presented in its final foim, is worth presenting for adjudication.

Profjgssor A.Jamil Qadri "~SfS SrCTTOW AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE ON RISK-TAKING BEHAVIOUR IN RELATION TO CERTAIN PERSONALITY VARIABLES

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PSYCHOLOGY

BY ]M[a.it>aiiiL A.x*unlcuixia.]:* Sin^H

DEPARTMENT OF PSYCHOLOGY Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh September 1979 u %^ ^m

^^^..,;.^ ^ n 0 nCR 1990?

T2040

CHECKED-200&

cn''Tr<".' /p(>-9f ACKN0WIiED(3ffiNT

I am gjreatly indebted to my supervisor, late Professor Anwar Ansari, for his invaluable guidance in conducting the present investigation. I am also indebted to Professor A. Jamil Qadri, Head of the Department of Psychology, Aligarh Muslim University, and Dr. Qamar Hasan for going through the manuscript and for giving me precious comments and suggestions.

My thanks are due to Professor (Mrs. ) G. Ansari for giving me inspiration during the course of this study. Alongwith, I express my gratitude to my teachers, research scholars, and other members of Department of PsychoJLoigy,, Adigarh Muslim university, Aligarh, and to the staff members of Maulana Azad Library, for their kind help.

Finally, I am thankful to those who served as subjects in this study, to Mr. Mashhood Alam Raz for typing the report of the study and to many others who have helped me in one way or other to complete the study.

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M. ARUN KUMAR SINGH Dept. of Psychology Aligarh Muslim Univ. Aligarh CONTENTS

Chapter I ORIENTATION OP PROBLEM 1

Chapter II SURVEY OP LITERATURE 15

Chapter III METHOD AND PROCEDURE 60

Chapter IV RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 72

Chapter V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 84

REFERENCES 87

Appendixes Chapter I

ORIENTATION OP PROBLEM

Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, which considers cognition or cognitive element as "any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the enj/ironment, about oneself, or about one's behaviour" (Pestinger, 1957, p.3), states that (a) dissonance arises when tVo cognitions are inconsistent with each other, (b) the experience of dissonance is uncomfortable, and that (c) the individual experiencing dissonance is motivated to reduce it and achieve consonance. The dissonance may be reduced either by changing one or more of the otherwise inconsistent cognitions or by adding new consonant cognitive elements. The theory has led to a substantial amount of research using varied paradigms, like 'counterattitudinal behaviour' (Pestinger and Carlsmith, 1959), 'post-decision change" (Brehm, 1956), and 'discrepant communication' (zimbardo, 1960), etc.

In many of the researches that have been done to study the effect of cognitive dissonance on opinion change there is a good deal of controversy on the question of the arousal of cognitive dissonance, specifically, in researches using the paradigms of 'counterattitudinal behaviour' and 'post-decision change' the arousal of cognitive dissonance has been questioned (Bern, 1967; Kelley, 1967; Gerard, Blevans and Malcolm, 1964). Truly speaking, in researches using these two paradigms, the arousal of cognitive dissonance is not clear, because the existence of inconsistency betvreen two cognitive elements is not concretely identifiable. It is only in the researches using the paradigm of 'discrepant communication' that the existence of inconsistency between two cognitive elements is concretely identifiable, because in these researches discrepant communication is provided by the experimenter, and hence is manipulable by him.

Certain important questions arise regarding the researches using the paradigm of 'discrepant communication' in which the inconsistency between two cognitive elements is concretely identifiable: What is a discrepant communication? Does a discrepant communication necessarily arouse cognitive dissonance? When will a discrepant communication arouse cognitive dissonance? several authors (Derlega, 1972; Zimbardo, 1960) consider involvement in the cognitive elements to be an important variable which affects the magnitude of cognitive dissonance. However, as Kiesler et al. (1969), while discussing the question of involvement in the arousal of cognitive dissonance, have pointed out, the concept of involvement has not been clearly defined in terms of the antecedent conditions which produce it, or the manner one can vary it both in degree and in type. In fact, different experimental procedures have been employed to induce involvement so that it is difficult to say which one of these procedures is more appropriate.

In order to clarify the meaning of involvement as it relates to the arousal of cognitive dissonance, it is important to note the observation made by Festinger (1957), that if two cognitive elements are dissonant with one another the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance will be a function of the importance of the cognitive elements. What Festinger seems to mean by the above mentioned observation is that cognitive dissonance would be aroused in an individual when both the cognitive elements, i.e., the one implied in his opinion that has already been accepted by him and the other implied in the discrepant information that is being communicated now are important from the point of view of the individual. Now, the question arises as to what are the conditions vmder which the two cognitive elements would asxime importance for the individual.

Empirical data seem to suggest that the importance of the two cognitive elements is contingent upon the type of involvement experienced by the individual in a given situation. If the individual is 'ego-involved' with regard to the opinion he is expressing on a particular issue, i.e., is keen to express his own personal beliefs and values, the cognitive element of the opinion he holds will certainly assume importance for him and the cognitive element of any communicated information 4

which is discrepant with the opinion he holds will be irrelevant and unimportant to him. If, on the other hand, the individual is 'task-involved' in expressing his opinion on an issue, i.e., is keen to express a correct and objective view regarding that issue, then both the cognitive element of the opinion he is holding and that of any information that is discrepant with the opinion lie is holding will be important to him. It follows from what has been stated above, that cognitive dissonance will be aroused only when the individual is 'task-involved* in expressing his opinion on an issue and not when he is 'ego-involved' in expressing his opinion.

In the light of the aforementioned analysis, it seems possible to resolve the divergence between the findings of two experiments, one carried out by Zirobardo (1960) and the other by Derlega (1972). zimbardo reports an experiment in which Ss with 'high involvement' show greater amount of change in their opinion than do Ss with 'low involvement', when an information which is discrepant with the opinion they hold is given to them, and the opinion change increases as the discrepancy between the opinion the ss hold and the communicated information increases. Contrairy to this finding, Derlega reports an experiment in which ss with 'low-involvement• show an increase in their opinion change as the discrepancy between their opinion and the commxinicated information increases. whereas Ss with 'hgh-involvement • show a decrease in their opinion change as the discrepancy between their opinion and the communicated information increases. In both the experiments, the instructions given to the ss to induce involvement are the same, namely, that 'high involvement' is induced by giving the S the instruction that the opinion he is required to express is indicative of his personality, and that 'low involvement' is induced by giving the S t>« instruction that the opinion he is required to express has nothing to do with his personality, thereby appearing to induce the same kind of involvement in the experimental Ss, i.e., 'highly involved' Ss. If one examines these instructions in the light of the specific task assigned to the Ss in the two experiments, one could immediately see that these instructions tend to induce 'ego-involvement' in the case of Derlega's Ss but in the case of zimbardo's Ss, instead of inducing 'ego-involvement', these instructions tend to induce •task-involvement', in zimbardo's experiment, the Ss axe asked to judge the locus of blame in a case study of a juvenile delinquent which obviously requires them to be objective in forming their opinion, and hence, when they are given the instructions that the opinion they are required to express is indicative of their personality they tend to express that aspect of personality which reflects the ability to do things as best as one can according to an external criterion, which may well be designated as 'task-orientation'. In contrast to this, in Derlega's experiment the Ss were asked to indicate their personal opinion, i.e., an opinion having no external criterion or frame of reference but based purely on their own scale of preference, regarding the amount of time one should spend in watching the television. Here, the same instructions obviously tend to ]?efer to that aspect of personality which has little to do with any objective frame of reference and may be defined purely in terms of subjective and personal standard and criterion involving one's own ego. Thus, the same instructions seem to have been construed differently by the 'high-involvement'Ss in the two experiments, depending on the nature of tte task assigned to them, with the result that the involvement of the zimbardo's Ss takes the fojnm of 'task-involvement• whereas the involvement of Derlega's Ss takes the form of •ego-involvement'.

When viewed in the light of this analysis, the findings of Zimbardo and Delega may be regarded as not conflicting at all. The 'high-involvement' Ss of Zimbardo's experiment who were 'task-involved' understandably changed their opinon for the sake of objectivity when some relevant information which appeared to be discrepant with their existing opinion was communicated to them, whereas the 'high-involvement' Ss of Derlega's experiment who were 'ego-involved' ignored the communication which was in conflict with their personal opinion. and hence, refused to change their personal opinion. From the above discuss ion, one is justified in concluding that when the Ss are 'task^involved', i.e., are required to be objective in expressing their opinion any communication which is discrepant with their existing opinion will, of course, arouse cognitive dissonance; when they are 'ego-involved', i.e., are required to express their personal opinion based on their own liking or dislike, without a reference to any external criterion or standard, any communication which appears to be discrepant with their existing opinion fails to arouse cognitive dissonance.

Taking a lead from this conclusion, one may propose to study, the effect of 'cognitive dissonance' upon opinion change in a risk-taking situation such as gambling in which the Ss are expected to be 'task-oriented' in so far as they are required to be objective in their choice of risk alternatives each risk alternative being based on coinmunication indicating probability of success and amount of payoff.

As it has been stated earlier, cognitive dissonance is an unpleasant state of tension and an individual experiencing it is motivated to reduce it. Cognitive dissonance may be reduced in different ways. As Alpert and Haber (I960) have stated, there are two general kinds of resjxsnses which an individual may make to stressful situations: (a) facilitative or adaptive response, and (b) debilitative or maladaptive response. An individual experiencing cognitive dissonance. 8 which is also a state full of stress, may respond to it in one of these two ways in order to reduce tension, with the source of dissonance being removed by the facilitative response involving adjustments and necessary modifications but being only glossed over by the debilitative one involving some kind of defense mechanism. Since these tv/o types of iresponses'are closely bound up with the global personality dimension-called adjustment-maladjustment, the facilitative response being used by a well-adjusted individual while the debilitative one being used by a maladjusted individual, the question of whether the individual will make this or that type of response in a situation involving cognitive dissonance understandably depends upon such personality characteristics of the individual as are related to adjustment- maladjustment.

There are recurrent observations in literature, and in some cases empirical findings also, to suggest that, there are among others, four most important personality variables which play a vital role in the adjustment-maladjustment of an individual, namely, anxiety, self-esteem, internal-external locus of control, and repression-sensitization.

The personality variable called anxiety refers to the disposition which is characterized by a relatively pervasive state of emotional tension, i.e., a relatively constant apprehension and feeling of incompetence and helplessness (Cattel and scheier, 1961; Spielberger, 1966, 1972). The emotional tension characterizing anxiety plays an important role in an individual's adjustment to his environment. At low levels of anxiety the individual is alert and vigilent so that he is equipped for effective action, while at high levels his behaviour gets disorganized and he loses his ability for effective action (Basowitz et al., 1955). It has been reported that people with a high level of anxiety tend to be rigid and inflexible in their approach to a problem (Cowen, 1952 a,1952b; Jones, 1954; Longenecker, 1962).

Individuals who are afflicted with intense feelings of anxiety tend to behave in an ego-defensive manner particularly in a situation which is uncomfortable and stressful. Once they make a response however inappropriate and inadequate it may be they persist in making that response as they feel that not to do so would amount to admitting their inadequacy. They are more concerned with alleviating their anxiety by defensive methods than with solving their problem in a realistic manner. Handler and sarason (1952) consider anxiety to be the source of self-oriented and task-irrelevant responses which tend to interfere with task-relevant responses and thus make an individual maladaptive in his behaviour. Sarason (1957), on the basis of experimental evidence suggesting that Ss obtaining high scores on anxiety differ from other Ss in their behaviour under conditions of stress, makes the inference that when faced with a stressful situation an anxiety-ridden Ss performance will be disrupted on account of his inability to cope with the 10

requirements of the situation. According to Sarason, Ss with high anxiety would be emitting interfering task- irrelevant responses to a greater extent than do other Ss in the anxiety score distribution.

The personality variable of self-esteem refers to an individual's perception of his worth as measured by the extent to which his perception of his real-self approximates his perception of his ideal-self, the assumption being that, the smaller the difference between the perception of the real- self and that of the ideal-self the greater is the worth of the real-self and the higher is the self-esteem, and vice versa. High-low self-esteem may thus be conceptualized as self-evaluation in terras of an ideal. If an individual perceives himself to be measuring upto his ideal, he tends to perceive himself as being likable, worthy, and competent (Cohen, 1959; Combs and snygg, 1959). If, on the other hand, he perceives himself to be falling short of his ileal, he tends to perceive himself as being unlikable, unworthy, and incompetent (Fitch, 1970).

Evaluation of self in terms of an ideal-self constitutes an individual's self-concept which plays a dynamic role in his capacity to cope with the life situations. The individual, in his actions, tries to be consistent with how he perceives himself in relation to his ideal-self. If his self-esteem is' high and he perceives himself to be worthy, likable, and competent etc., this is bound to influence his behaviour and 11

action in so far as he will tend to exert himself to live upto these self-perceived cfualities and thus achieve better adjustment in life. There is a large body of empirical studies which can be cited in support of these formulations (Byrne, 1961; Chase, 1957; Hilson and Worchel, 1957; Moses and Duvall, I960; Rogers and Dymond, 1954).

The personality variable of internal-external locus of control, which has evolved out of the social learning theoiry of Rotter (1954), refers to tte extent to which an individual feels that he himself has and does not have control over, and consequently is and is not responsible for, the outcome of his behaviour. At one extreme end of this dimension are 'internally-oriented' individuals who believe that reinforcements are contingent upon their own actions and hence are under their own control,while at the other extreme end are 'externally-oriented' individuals who believe that they do not have control over the outcome of their action. Individuals who are 'internally-oriented', as compared to those who are 'externally-oriented', perceive themselves, as DuCette, Wolk, and Soucar (1972) have pointed out, as personally responsible for the outcome of their action, and such persons understandably tend to be more adaptive, capable of utilizing feedbacks from their environment, and, hence able to adjust themselves effectively with the demands of life. This is not only a theoretical formulation but has been bom out by empirical studies. One of such studies has, for example, demonstratec' that individuals, who are 'internally-oriented'. 12

in contrast to those who are 'externally-oriented', are less apt to demonstrate non-adaptive behaviour (Du Cette and Wo±k, 1972).

Prom what has been said above it is reasonable to conclude that 'internally-oriented' individuals are more adjusted than 'exfeernally-oriented' ones.

The personality variable designated as repression- sensitization refers to a bipolar categorization to classify individuals with respect to two characteristic modes of defensive responses to threatening stimuli (Byrne, 1961). At one extreme of the dimension are repressors, i.e., individuals who characteristically employ avoidance, denial, and repression of potential threat and conflict as the primary mode of coping with anxiety, while at the other extreme are sensitizers, i.e., individuals who predominantly employ such defense mechanisms as Intellectualization, approach, and obsession-compulsion to cope with anxiety, when first proposed by Byrne (1961) the two modes of defensive responses were conceived as a sign of maladjustment. That is, individuals who are at the extremes on the repress ion-sens it izat ion were considered to be equally maladjusted but utilizing different defense mechanisms. However, a number of studies have reported a linear relationship between this dimension and adjustment as measured by paper-pencil tests, with repressors showing better adjustment than sensitizers (Byrne, 1961; Lacky and Grigg, 1964; Joy, 1963; Byrne, Golightly, and 13

Sheffield, 1965; Byrne, Barry, and Nelson, 1963). A linear relationship between the personality dimension of repress ion- sens it izat ion and adjustment has also been reported in studies which identified adjustment-maladjustment on the basis of clinical diagnosis. Feder (1967) and Tempone and Larrib (1967) have reported that the defensive style of repression occurred with significantly higher frequency in the adjusted population, whereas the defensive style of sensitization occurred with significantly greater frequency in the maladjusted population of clinical and psychiatric patients. Besides these studies inquiring into the relationship between repress ion-sens it ization and adjustment^ in problem solving situations also repressors have been reported to be more adaptive. Cohen and Foerst (1968) reported, in an experiment, that repressors developed appropriate problem-solving systems more quickly and utilized their systems more efficiently, as compared to sensitizers.

That there is a linear relationship as bom out by empirical evidence, and not a curvilinear relationship as Byrne (1961) would have us believe, between repress ion- sen sit izat ion and adjustment-maladjustment is explicable in terms of one important ability differentiating between repressors and sensitizers, namely, the ability to control emotions. Ijsfcourt (1966) found a linear relationship between repression-sensitization and 'affect-ideation', by which he means projection of emotions,with sensitizers projectino greater amount of emotions than repressors in 14 describing TAT figures. It is quite reasonable to believe that individuals who are capable of controlling their emotions can exercise self-restraint better than those who are swayed by their emotions and with self-restraint one can deal with situation and people more adequately. Emotional control and self-iiestraint are thus among the m.ost important components of adjustment.

The above discussion of the four personality variables, namely, anxiety, self-esteem, internal-external locus of control, and repression-sensitization clearly suggests that, in a situation involving cognitive dissonance, those who are highly anxious, have low self-esteem, are externally-oriented in their attitudes towards locus of control, or are sensitizers will resort to reducing cognitive dissonance by making debilitative type of responses which are defensive and maladaptive in nature, while those who are mildly anxious, have high self-esteem, are internally-oriented in their attitudes towards locus of control, or are repressors will reduce cognitive dissonance by making facilitative type of responses which are adaptive in nature. chapter II

SURVEY OF LITERATURE

Theire are two main aspects of the problem: (1) the paradigm or the method by which cognitive dissonance can be aroused beyond any doiibt; and (2) the relevance of risk- taking situation to study the effect of cognitive dissonance upon opinion change. The present chapter is intended to examine, in the light of previous studies, these aspects of the problem in two different sections.

Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance, as mentioned in Chapter I, has provided a basis for a large number of studies using varied paradigms, like counter- attitudinal behaviour, post-decision change, and discrepant- communication. In many of these studies, the question whether cognitive dissonance was aroused or not by employing one of these above paradigms has been controversial. This controversy may be gleaned through the studies employing different paradigms or methods to produce cognitive dissonance, namely.

15 16 the method of counterattitudinal behaviour, the method of post-decision change and the method of discrepant-communication,

The method of counterattitudinal behaviour requires the individual to engage himself in an activity which is at variance with some belief held by him.

Festinger (1957) considers that engaging in a counterattitudinal behaviour leads to the arousal of cognitive dissonance because of the existence of two inconsistent cognitions, namely, the cognition about the overt behaviour, viz., "I did one thing," and the cognition about one's own belief, viz., "I believe the opposite to what I did." To be more explicit, when an individual has done something which is not consistent with his own belief he experiences two inconsistent cognitions, namely, one cognition of what he has done and another of what he actually believes. The existence of these two inconsistent cognitions, it is claimed, leads to the arousal of cognitive dissonance. To ireduce this cognitive dissonance, the individual modifies his attitude in the direction of the position represented by the counterattitudinal behaviour in order to make his attitude consistent with what he had ovetly done.

To specify the necessary conditions for the arousal of cognitive dissonance by engaging in the counterattitudinal behaviour, Festinger (1957) mentions the 'insufficient justification hypothesis' according to which cognitive dissonance will be aroused to the extent to which the 17 individual engages in the counterattitudinal act without sufficient justification or reason, like pressures, threats, and rewards to make him engage in that act, as any justification in these forms constitutes a cognition which is consonant with the cognition of engaging in that act. Thus, the stronger the justification for engaging in a counterattitudinal act, the lesser would be the cognitive dissonance between what one does and what he believes, and, conversely the weaker the justification for engaging in that act, the greater would be the cognitive dissonance.

The above position was tested in the classic experiment carried out by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959). In this experiment, the Ss were enticed to tell a waiting S (actually a confederate) that the experimental task, which they had known on the basis of their own experience as dull and boring, was interesting. The Ss were told by the experimenter that his assistant who usually performed this job of telling the S about the interesting nature of the task which was in fact dull and boring had unexpectedly failed to show up, that they would be offered sane money to perform this job of his assistant, and that they would possibly be called again to do the same job on payment in future also. HsuLf of the ss were offered $ 20 and the remaining half of them $ 1 for engaging themselves in the counterattitudinal task of telling the waiting s about the interesting nature of the experimental task which actually was dull and boring. It was found that 18 the Ss who had been offered $ 1 for performing the counter- attitudinal task showed greater attitude change in the direction of the position they had publicly advocated than did; the Ss who had been offered $ 20 for performing the same task. The finding of this experiment provided a clear evidence in support of the 'insufficient justification hypothesis'. In this experiment, those Ss who were subjected to greater amount of pressure, i.e., were offered higher reward for doing something against their belief tended to have experienced cognitive dissonance to a lesser degree than those Ss who were subjected to lesser amount of pressure, i.e., were offered smaller reward and, thus were amenable to greater amount of attitude change, as they had insufficient justification for doing the task or sufficient grounds (justification) for experiencing cognitive dissonance.

Pestinger and Carlsmith's finding was not, however, acceptable to everyone. some, like Rosenberg (1965) pointed out a procedural flaw in the methodology of the experiment carried out by them, namely, that since the experimenter himself was the source of pressure (offering large or small incentive ) as well as evaluator of possible change in the attitudes of the Ss, there was a possibility of there being less change in the attitudes of those who were exposed to greater amount of pressure than those who were exposed to lesser pressure not because the former had greater justification for doing the counterattitudinal task and, consequently. 19

lesser justification for cognitive dissonance than the latter, but because both types of Ss, those exposed to greater pressure and those exposed to lesser pressure try to appear consistent to the experimenter by putting up resistance to a change in their attitude in proportion to the amount of pressure. Thus, in the opinion of Rosenberg (1965), the finding of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) was mainly due to their failure to control the effect of what he called 'evaluation apprehension' by which he meant 'an active anxiety-toned concern (to) win a positive evaluation from the experimenter* (Rosenberg, 1965, p.29). His assertion is that if two experimenters were used,one to induce the s to engage in the counterattitudinal act and the other to test the possible change in the S's attitude after the occurrence of the counter­ attitudinal act, thereby removing the effect of 'evaluation apprehension', then they would have been justified in inter­ preting the results in the way they did, i.e., in terms of cognitive dissonance.

Rosenberg (1965) has not only suggested the correct methodological procedure but has himself performed an experiment similar to that of Festinger and Carlsmith by following what he thought to be the correct proceduire, i.e., by using tv70 experimenters, one to induce the S to engage in the counter­ attitudinal aet and the other to test the possible effect of the counterattitudinal act on attitude change. His experiment yielded results which were at variance with results reported by Festinger and Carlsmith. Thus, Rosenberg's assertion is. 20

and it is based on experimental evidence, that counter- attitudinal act does not produce cognitive dissonance.

The conflict between the findings of the experiments carrried out by Festinger and Carlsmith and by Rosenberg stimulated many investigators to repeat these experiments with a view to resolving the conflict. The most intriguing outcome of the experimental endeavours of these investigators was that many of them reported findings confirming the findings obtained by Festinger and Carlsmith and by Rosenberg. Thus, the conflict in the original findings could not be resolved, and as Collins and BDyt (1972) pointed out, it could be resolved only by scrutinizing the specific conditions under which the sxibsequent experiments for the verification of the findings of the original experiments were conducted.

A close examination of these confirmatory experiments shows that the experimental conditions varied from experiment to experiment. For instance, there were different types of counterattitudinal act, and to perform the counterattitudinal act was in some experiments obligatory (with no-choice) while in others it was voluntary (with choice). Carlsmith, Collins and Ifelmreich (1966) reported two experiments in one of which the counterattitudinal act required the Ss to describe a boring task as interesting, while in the other the Ss were required to write a counterattitudinal essay. The first experiment confirmee? the resuJ.ts of Festinger and Carlsmith's experiment, whereas, the second one confirm.ed the results of Rosenberg's 21 experiment. In one set of experiments (Linder, Cooper and Jones, 1967; Holmes and Strickland, 1970; Sherman, 1970), which used the counterattitudinal act requiring to write a counteratiitudinal essay, half of the ss were given a chance to make a choice either to serve or not to serve as Ss in the experiment, and no such chance was given to the remaining half of the ss. The interesting findings of these experiments were that the results under the first condition were consistent with the findings of Festinger and Carlsmith, whereas, the results under the second condition were in line with the findings of Rosenberg.

The results of these experiments indicate that types of counterattitudinal act, and 'choice' vs. 'no-choice' to perform the counterattitudinal act are mainly responsible for the conflicting results, i.e., greater monetary incentives bringing about greater change in attitude and vice versa (showing a direct relationship between incentive and attitude change) in some conditions, and greater monetary incentives bringing about lesser change in attitude and vice versa (showing an inverse relationship between incentive and attitude change) in some other conditions.

The inverse relationship between incentive and attitude change in the condition of describing a boring task as interesting, an act which is not only unpleasant but also definitely taxing in so far as it requires the Ss to tell a lie, may be explained in terms of insufficient justification hypothesis which holds 22 that when a counterattitudinal act is perfoirmed with a greater amount of incentive (sufficient justification) the incentive is perceived as a pressure, and consequently, the act produces lesser change in the attitude, but when it is performed with a less amount of of incentive (insufficient justification) the incentive is not perceived as a pressure, and consequently, the act tends to produce greater change in the attitude. The direct relationship between incentive and attitude change in the condition of writing an essay in support of something against one's own conviction, a task which though not a pleasant one is definitely not undesirable and taxing as it merely requires the Ss to engage themselves in some sort of an intellectual exercise, on the other hand, seems to be explicable in simple terms of reinforcement, i.e., since the task is somewhat interesting the incentive works as a reward and not as a pressure so that the greater amount of incentive works as a greater amount of reward producing greater amount of change in the attitude, and the lesser araotint of incentive, as a lesser amount of reward producing lesser amount of change in the attitude. When a choice is given to engage or not to engage in this kind of act the relationship between incentive and attitude change is, again, reversed, i.e., the greater the amount of incentive the lesser the attitude change, and vice versa. This might well be due to the fact that when the Ss perfoirm the act out of their free will a new psychological factor comes into operation namely, the "need for freedom*, This need interacts inversely with the incentive to determine the attitude change. 23

in the same way In which under the condition of describing a boring task as interesting the incentive becomes a justification for doing an undesirable task, and hence, works as a pressure, with the result that a greater amount of incentive works as a greater amount of pressure and, consequently, the need for freedom aroused by choosing to perform the act builds up a greater amount of resistance to attitude change, and conversely, a lesser amount of incentive works as a lesser amount of pressure which, in turn, reduces the amount of resistance to attitude change.

From what has been said abouve one can draw cer1:ain conclusions which are as follows. If there is a positive relationship between attitude change and incentive or, in other words, if an attitude is changed as a result of incentive, i.e., reinforcement, it is difficult to explain this change in terms of cognitive dissonance, this being so when one writes, under compulsion, an essay in support of something which is against one's own conviction. If, however, there is an inverse relationship between attitude change and incentive or reinforcement, i.e., if high incentive results in lesser attitude change while low incentive results in greater attitude change, this change cannot be explained in terms of reinforcement, and one is justified in assuming that it is due prim.arily to the intervening condition called cognitive dissonance which is created by doing something against one's o\m conviction (counterattitudinal act). 24

Thus, the attitude change under the first condition, namely, describing a boring task as interesting (telling a lie) under compulsion and the last condition, namely, writing an essay voluntarily in support of something which is against one's own conviction cannot be explained in terms of reinforcement, as an incentive acts as a pressure and is resisted against, so that a change in the attitude is minimized. In these two conditions when the incentive is low or when there is no 'sufficient justification' the maximization of attitude change may well be regarded as a direct outcome of cognitive dissonance created by a conflict between what one believes and what one does.

To sum up, and this applies to the first and the last condition, wten there is a low incentive or no 'sufficient justification' for doing something against one's own conviction, the absence of any pressure in the form of incentive leaves one in relative freedom to be exposed to the effect of the counterattitudinal act in the form of cognitive dissonance produced by a cleavage between one's attitude and one's act, and this cleavage is reduced with a minimum or no resistance by an appropriate change in the attitude.

Apart from using counterattitudinal act as a method for indue into cognitive dissonance, another im.portant method used for this purpose is to require the s to make a decision in a task involving alternative choices. Festinger (1957) states that coonitive dissonance is aroused after a decision has been 25

made in favour of an alternative. His underlying assunption is that the cognitive dissonance would occur when the decision in favour of the chosen alternative is contrary to the beliefs which favour the unchosen alternatives. It is argued that after an individual has taken a decision in favour of one of the two alternatives, he is confronted with the real,ity of certain undesirable behavioural consequence?, i.e., the decision may stand in his way of enjoying the benefits of desirable features of unchosen alternative and may force him to suffer the consequences associated with the undesirable features of the chosen alternative. The two unpleasant experiences follow inevitably from any decision as both the chosen and unchosen alternatives have positive as well as negative features (c.f. Gerard, 1967). The cognition of unfavourable aspects of the chosen alternative and the cognition of favourable aspects of the rejected alternative are dissonant with the cognition of the actual choice made by the individual with a view to attaining maximum benefit from the decision. To reduce the cognitive dissonance that inevitably arises from his decision, the individual tends to stabilize or freeze the decision by changing his cognitions of the alternatives in such a way that the relative attractiveness of the chosen as connpared to the unchosen alternative and the relative unattractiveness of the unchosen as compared to the chosen alternative are enhanced. The individual, thus, tends to increase the liking of the chosen alternative and concomitantly decrease the liking of the unchosen alternative. Through this change in the 26 cognitions of the two alternatives, the individual is able to justify his decision and thus minimize the regret associated with the rejection of the desirable features of the unchosen alternative and the acceptance of the undesirable features of the chosen alternative. A number of studies (Brehm and Cohen, 1962, p. 303; Pestinger, 1964) have supported the above position, m a typical experiment, the Ss are first i?equired to rate two alternatives in terms of degrees of liking, and then they are required to make a choice between the two, after which they are required to rate them again in terms of degrees of liking. The finding of this experiment is that there is an increase in the liking of the chosen alternative and a decrease in the liking of the unchosen one.

An important question that has been raised in this context by a group of investigators (Gerard, Blevans, and Malcolm, 1964) is whether the increase in the relative liking of the chosen as compared to the unchosen alternative is due to the arousal of cognitive dissonance or to something else. These investigators raised the doiobt that it is due to cognitive dissonance implied in the act of choosing one of the two alternatives, which is aroused by a conflict between the cognition that chosen alternative is desirable and the unchosen one is undesirable on the one hand, and the cognition of the possibility that some features of the chosen alternative might be unfavourable on the other. They suspected that the increase in the liking of the chosen alternative and a decrease in the 27

liking of the unchosen one might be due to confirmation, on the part of the s, of what they designated as his 'self-ability estimate'. What they meant by 'self-ability estimate' is the tendency to evaluate positively one's own ability to make a choice. According to these investigators, the decision of the individual tends to confirm his awareness about his ability to weigh the relative value of the alternatives and make a sound choice. They hypothesized that in those Ss who have a positive self-evaluation this tendency will be stronger than in those Ss who have a negative self-evaluation. They also hypothesized that, the more difficult or the more important the decision, the more pronounced this tendency would be, as under these conditions, the ability to make a choice would be put to a more stringent test. In order to verify the first hypothesis, these investigators carried out an experiment in which the ss were devided into three groups, one designated as superior, one as average, and the third one as inferior in their ability to make a judgment. All the Ss of the three groups were required to express their judgement regarding the artistic quality of a series of designs. Subsequently, the Ss of the 'superior' group were told that their judgment was superior to that of others, the ss in the 'average' group were told that their judgment was as good as that of others, while the ss in the 'inferior' group were told that their judgment was inferior to that of the others. In this way, the ss in the three groups were experimentally led to believe that they had high, average, anc^. low ability, respectively to make a sound judgment 28

regarding the designs. The ss of the three groups were presented with two paintings one by one and they were required to rate the quality of each of them on a rating scale, then they were asked to choose between the two, and were then again asked to rate the quality of each of them on the same rating scale. With this before-and-after design, the experiment showed that the tendency to overrate the quality of the preferred painting and to underrate the quality of the unpreferred painting was present in all the three groups, but that this tendency was highest in the 'superior' group, followed by the 'average' group and was lowest in the 'inferior' group. Thus, the findings of the experiment confirmed the hypothesis, namely, that those who consider themselves to be superior in their ability to judge, or have a 'positive self-evaluation' manifest this tendency in greater degree than those who consider themselves to be average in this ability, and similarly, those who consider themselves to be average manifest this tendency in greater degree than those who consider themselves to be inferior, or have a •negative self-evaluation'.

To put it in more plain terms, once the Ss make a choice between two alternatives, the 'superior' Ss who have a 'positive self-evaluation' tend to overrate the preferred alternative and to underrate the nonpreferred one in greater degree than do the 'inferior' Ss who have a 'negative self-evaluation'.

In order to verify the second hypothesis, namely, the more difficult and the more important the decision, the more 29 pronounced the tendency to increase the liking of the chosen alternative and to decrease the liking of the unchosen one would be, the difficulty and the importance of the decision were induced in the experiment. For half of the ss the choice was made a 'difficult' one by making the two paintings presented to them close in value, while for the remaining half of the Ss the choice was made an 'easy' one by making the two paintings disparate in value. Again, for half of the ss making either a 'difficult' choice or an 'easy' choice the importance of tJie decision was made high while for the remaining half it was made low. The 'high' importance of the decision was induced by telling the S that he would be given a very good and large print of the painting he chose, and the 'low' importance of the decision, by telling the s that he was merely required to state a preference between the two paintings. The results of the experiment showed that the tendency to increase the liking of the chosen alternative and to decrease the liking of the unchosen one was highest in the case of those Ss for whom the choice was difficult as well as was of 'high' importance, and was lowest in the case of those Ss for whom the choice was easy as well as was of 'low' impoartance. Thus, the hypothesis was confirmed.

From the findings of the above experiment, it seems ireasonable to conclude that the tendency to increase the liking of the chosen alternative and to decrease the liking of the unchosen one as a result ot a choice making is better explained in terms 30

of 'confirmation of self-ability estimate' rather than in terms of the arousal of cognitive dissonance, and hence, the doubt that the tendency might not be due to the arousal of cognitive dissonance is strengthened. One important led inference which one is inevitably^to draw from this conclusion and which has a direct bearing upon the procedure to be adopted for the study of our problem, is that the method which requires the s to make a decision in a task involving alternative choices is not a proper method for inducing cognitive dissonance.

Another important method that has been employed to induce cognitive dissonance is one in which an individual is provided with a discrepant information, i.e., an information which is contrary to the opinion he holds. Festinger (1957) says that, an individual experiences cognitive dissonance when he receives an information which is contrary to the opinion he holds. The cognitions that 'I hold an opinion' and that 'I come across an information which is contrary to the opinion I hold' are dissonant with each other. To reduce the cognitive dissonance, the individual will either change his own opinion or change (i.e., distort) the discrepant information. If, hov/ever, the discrepant information is so authoritative or convincing that one cannot do without accepting it, one will tend to reduce the cognitive dissonance by modifying one's own opinion in such a way that it would appear consistent with the information received. 31

In a typical experiment using this method, the s is first required to express his opinion, and then, he is provided with an information which is discirepant with the opinion he holds, after which he is again required to express his opinion. A number of experiments have been performed with this procedure in order to study the effect of discrepant information upon opinion change, but the findings are conflicting (Derlega, 1972; Zimbardo, i960).

In the light of these conflicting findings, a number of questions may be raised: (a) what is a discrepant infoirmation? (b) Does a discrepant information necessarily arouse cognitive dissonance; if not, under what condition will a discrepant information arouse cognitive dissonance? Regarding the first question, .it is important to note the observation made by Kiesler, Collins, and Miller (1969), that the concept of discrepancy as used in several experiments is insufficiently defined. As the concept of discrepancy is not clearly defined, there may be situations in which what is considred to be a discrepant information by the experimenter may not be cognized as such by the S.

With regard to the second question, several investigators, like Derlega (1972) and Zimbardo (I960) consiser involvement in the cognitive elements to be an important variable which affects the magnitude of cognitive dissonance. However, the question of involvement in the cognitive elements, as pointed out by Kiesler, Collins, and Miller (1969), has not been clearly 32 defined in terms of the antecedent conditions that produce it or the manner in which it may vary in both degree and type. In fact, different experimental procedures have been used in order to induce involvement so that it is difficult to say which one of the variety of experimental procedures is more appropriate. Then, in several experiments in which discrepancy and involvement are considered to have been induced in order to arouse cognitive dissonance, it is doubtful whether cognitive dissonance has actually been aroused.

In order to resolve the above mentioned doubt, one has to keep in mind what Pestinger (1957) has stated, that if two cognitive elements are dissonant with one another the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance would be a function of the importance of these cognitive elements. What Festinger meant seems to be that the experience of cognitive dissonance by an individual depends upon tte importance of both the opinion held by him and the information presented to him as discrepant with the opinion he holds, and when either of the tvro elements fails to be important to the individual cognitive dissonance will not be experienced by him.

Empirical data suggest that a crucial condition in which both the opinion an individual holds and tte information presented to him as discrepant with his opinion will be important is the nature of the involvement the individual has in the situation, i.e., the question of whether he is 'ego-involved' or 'task- involved* in the situation. If the individual is 'ego-invooved' in the situation, i.e., is mainly concerned with expressing an 33

opinion reflecting his own personal likes and dislikes, he will surely consider the opinion he holds as something important, and will tend to consider any information which is contrary to the opinion he holds as scxnething unimportant, and consequently, will be least susceptible to experiencing any cognitive dissonance. If, on the other hand, the individual is 'task-involved' in the situation, i.e., isi mainly concerned with giving an opinion not reflecting his own personal likes and dislikes but directed towards solving a problem, he will surely consider the opinion he holds as something important, and also will not consider any information which is contrary to the opinion he holds as something unimportant. That is, when an individual is in a situation in which he is 'task- involved', he will tend to consider both the opinion he holds and the information that is communicated to him as discrepant with the opinion he holds to be important, and will, thus, tend to experience cognitive dissonance. In brief, we can say that in the condition of 'ego-involvement' the chances of arousal of cognitive dissonance and, consequently, of any opinion change in favour of the discrepant information would be low, whereas, in the condition of 'task-involvement' the chances of arousal of cognitive dissonance and, consequently, of an opinion change in favour of the discrepant information would be high.

What has been stated above has actually been empirically demonstrated in two experiments, one carried out by Derlega (1972) and the other, by Zimbardo (I960). The two experiments which used a before-and-after paradigm in which the Ss were first required to give their opinions on an issue, and then were exposed to a 34 discrepant information after which they were again required to give their opinions on the issue, studied the effect of discrepant information upon opinion change by employing a two into two factorial design in which two levels regarding the degrees of discrepancy of the discrepant information and two levels regarding the degrees of involvement of the ss were experimentally induced. In both the experiments/ half of the Ss were required to express their opinions under high degree of involvement which was induced by telling them that their opinions would reflect their personality, and the remaining half of the Ss, under low degree of involvement which was induced by telling them that their opinions on the issue had nothing to do with their personality. Further, in both the experiments for half of the ss who expressed their opinions under either high degree of involvement or low degree of involvement the degree of discrepancy between their opinions and the discrepant information communicated to them was high, and for the remaining half of the Ss it was low. The two experiments, though they employed identical experimental designs and procedures, differed in one crucial respect, namely, in the nature of the opinions the Ss were required to express. The ss in Derlega's experiment were required to express 'ego-oriented' opinions,' i.e., their own opinions based on their personal liking as to tte number of hours one should spend in watching television. The Ss in Zimbardo's experiment, on the other hand, were required to express 'task-oriented' judgements, i.e., their unbiased and objective assessment regarding the locus of blame in a case study of a juvenile delinquent. Thus, the opinions that the Ss in the former experiment were required to express had a personal frame of 35

reference involving one's own interests, attitudes, and preferences, whereas the opinions that the Ss in the later experiment ware required to express had an externally defined frame of reference involving actual facts responsible for making an adolescent a delinquent. As the purpose of both the experiments was to study the effect of the degree of the respective type of involvement, •ego-involvement' in one case and 'task-involvement' in the other, upon opinion change, the ss in each experiment were devided into two groups of equal number, one serving as an experimental and the other as a control group. In the ss of the experimental group in each experiment, the degree of involvement was experimentally enhanced in the manner stated earlier. The experiment of Derlega revealed that the ss who expressed their opinions under enhanced 'ego-involvement' showed lesser amount of opinion change than did the ss who expressed their opinions under normal 'ego-involvement', whereas the experiment of zimbardo revealed that the ss who expressed their opinions under enhanced ' task-involvement' showed greater amount of opinion change than did the ss who expressed their opinions under normal 'task-involvement'. The Ss in Derlega's experim.ent, as they are basically 'ego-involved' in their opinions are presumably more prone to resist any information that appears to be contrary to their own personal opinions, thereby experiencing less cognitive dissonance and also showing less amount of opinion change as compared to those who are 'task-involved' in their oponions. This tendency to disregard and reject any discrepant information as irrelevant and unacceptable is, understandably, further increased when the 'ego-involvement' of the Ss is enhanced. 36

In contrast, the Ss in Zimbardo's experiment, as they are basically 'task-involved* in their opinions, are more receptive to an information which is not consistent with their judgmental opinions, and consequently, experience greater amount of cognitive dissonance and also show greater amount of opinion change as compared to those who are 'ego-involved' in their opinions. This tendency to consider a discrepant information as relevant and worth-accepting in further increased when the 'task- involvement' of the Ss is enhanced.

On the basis of the above review one can make certain broad formulations regarding the conditions leading to the arousal of cognitive dissonance and the methods and procedures by which these conditions maybe produced. Pestinger (1957) originally conceived cognitive dissonance as a psychological phenomenon which is aroused when an individual comes across a cognition of something which is inconsistent with the opinion he holds, either by engaging in an act which contradicts his opinion or by being provided with an information which is incompatible with that opinion. The experimental evidence furnished by the studies reviewed here, however, seem to lay down certain conditions for the occurrence of this phenomenon.

One important condition for the arousal of cognitive dissonance is that the Individual should be left free to engage in the counterattitudinal act. In other words, if the individual himself does not choose to engage in the counterattitudinal act but engages in the act without his choice, the chances are that 37

he would not experience any cognitive dissonance.

Another important condition for the arousal of cognitive dissonance is that the opinion the individual is required to express should involve some kind of judgment with an external and objective frame of reference ('task-orientation') ratlier than his own preference based on his personal and subjective scale of liking or dislike ('ego-orientation'), when tte individual is 'task-oriented', i.e., is recfuiired to express an opinion involving a judgpnent, he is likely to be receptive to any information which is inconsistent with his 'judgnent- based-opinion', and consequently experience cognitive dissonance On the other hand, when the individual is 'ego-oriented', i.e., is required to express an opinion based on his own preference, he is likely to disregard or resist any information which is contrary to his 'preference-based-opinion' as irrelevant, and will consequently not experience cognitive dissonance.

Of the two methods used for the arousal of cognitive dissonance one to engage the s in a counterattitudinal act and the other to expose him to a contradictory information communicated to him verbally the latter is simpler and more convenient than the former. This is so because in the method using verbal communication of contradictory information the inconsistency between the opinion the individual holds and the information that is communicated to him is more easily and precisely discernible not only by the s but also by the experimente r. 38

m view of the above generalization, the technique of inducing cognitive dissonance used in the present study consists of first requiring the s to eaqpress a judgement-based or 'task- oriented' opinion and then exposing him to a verbal coromvmication of an information which contradicts his opinion.

There has been a large amount of researches on risk-taking behaviour. Broadly speaking, these researches are mainly of two types, one dealing with individual differences in risk- taking behaviour, and the other, with the effect of situational factors on risk-taking behaviour. The first type of researches have dealt with the question of a general risk-taking trait upon which individuals differ, or with the problem of relationship of risk-taking behaviour with personality variables. The importance of the question of consistency in an individual's

inclination for risk across situations has been emphasized by Kogan and Wallach (1967) in their extensive review of the risk-taking literature. The first study dealing with this question was reported by slovic (1962). He argued that the existence of a risk-taking disposition would be established if 39

different measures of risk-taking behaviour demonstrated what Campbell and Fiske (1959) call convergent validity. Administering a battery of nine different measures of risk-taking behaviour on a sample of eighty-two Ss, Slovic attempted to find out correlations among different measures of risk-taking. The findings did not establish the existence of a general risk- taking disposition. Kogan and Wallach (1964), who adopted Slovic's procedures, also arrived at the same conclusion. The failure to find a transsituational generality in risk-taking has been reported by several other investigators (Brichacek, 1968; Flanders, 1970; Goodman, 1970; Greene, 1963, 1964> Heilizer and Cutter, 1971; Highbee, 1971; Johnson, 1963; Slovic, 1972; Weinstein, 1969; Weinstein and Martin, 1969). On the basis of the findings of these studies one is easily led to conclude that empirical evidence argues against the existence of risk-taking propensity as a generalized characteristic of individuals, and situational determinants seem much more important than organismic ones.

As pointed out above, the question of individual differences in risk-taking behaviour in terms of its relationship with personality variables also received attention of several investigators. The bulk of research dealing with this question has been generated by the Atkinson's risk-taking model (1957). This model explains risk-taking on the basis of joint action of two motives, namely, motiveto approach success and motive to avoid failure. It predicts that individuals in whom the 40

foimer motive is stronger than the later one prefer intermediate risks, while those in whom the later one is stronger prefer either very high risks or very lov; risks. The basis for this model came from the relationship that McClelland (195 5) obtained between need for achievement and preference for alternatives having moderate probabilities of success in ring toss, level of aspiration, and vocation choice. Several studies have confirmed the predictions of the model. For example, Litwin (1958) found that Ss with a high need for achievement and a low need for avoiding failure preferred intermediate risks significantly more often than did ss with a low need for achievement and a high need for avoiding failure in a game of chance. Atkinson et al. (1960) also got similar results in a study using a shuffle board game which involves skill and a bet preference task which involves chance. Scodel, Ratoosh and Minas (1959) related achievement motivation to risk-taking behaviour. m their study, risk-taking behaviour was measured by the probability preferences in the choice of bets in a real gambling task. They found that Ss with a 'high need for achievement' tended to prefer bets with 'intermediate' probabilities of success (1/4, 1/3, 1/2), while Ss with a 'low need for achievement' tended to prefer bets with 'extreme' probabilities of success (1/36, 1/18, 1/9, 3/4). Using a task involving outcomes of chance, Hancock and Teevan (1964) conducted a study to determine relationship between achievement motivation and risk-taking behaviour. They found that Ss with 41

'high motive to avoid failure' chose risk alternatives with low probabilities of success (1/6, 2/6) in the initial trial, while Ss with 'high motive to approach success' chose risk alternatives having high probabilities of success (4/6, 5/6).

Although these studies lend support to the predictions of the Atkinson's risk-taking model, several other investigators in this area found that support to these predictions were subject to certain situational conditions. Littig (1959) reported that Ss with a high motive to avoid failure preferred bets having 'extreme' probabilities of outcome in a game of chance, but, contrary to the prediction of the model, Ss with a high motive to approach success did not prefer bets having 'intermediate' probabilities of outcome to ones having 'extreme' probabilities. The investigator explained the latter finding by suggesting that a chance situation did not arouse achievement motivation in Ss with a high motive to approach success. Raynor and smith (1966),using two types of risk-taking situation, one involving skill and the other involving chance, and two types of orientation condition, namely 'achievement-oriented' condition and 'relaxed' condition, studied the relationship of achievement-related motives to risk-taking behaviour. They found relationship between achievement motive and preference for intermediate risks in a situation involving skill but not in a situation involving chance, and this relationship was found to be stronger under 'achievement-oriented' conditions than under 'relaxed' conditions. 42

It is, now, quite evident that the results indicating relationship of achievement motive to risk-taking behaviour are consistently obtained when the risk situations involve skill, and inconsistent when the risk situations involve chance. Several investigators (Kogan and Wallach, 1967; Slovic, 1964) arrived at the same conclusion in their respective review of the risk-taking research.

A host of studies have attempted to relate risk-taking behaviour with other personality variables. For example, Liverant and Scodel (1960) related preference of risk level to scores on a test designed to assess the personality dimension of internal-external locus of control. Their findings showed that Ss with external locus of contix>l preferred extreme risks as compared to Ss with internal locus of control. HDwever, Strickland et al. (1966), in a study, obtained results which were opposite to the finding of Liverant and Scodel. In a subsequent study. Baron (1968) also studied the relationship between the risk-taking behaviour and scores on a scale measuring internal-external locus of control. The correlations obtained were quite low in absolute terms, thereby leading the investigator to conclude that the personality dimension of internal-external locus of control is of little importance in predicting risk-taking behaviour.

Utilizer and Cutter (1971) made a comprehensive study of personality correlates of risk-taking behaviour by using 43

personality variables for which there is some expectation of relevance to risk-taking. The personality variables were test anxiety, extroversion and neuroticism,and internal- external locus of control, which were measured by Handler Sarason Test Anxiety Questionnaire, Eysenck Personality Inventory, and Rotter's Scale of Internal-External Locus of Control respectively. Also included were five more personality variables, namely psychopathic deviate, anxiety, social desirability, dominance, and control which were measured by the MMPI scales. The theoretical rational which Hsilizer and Cutter used for hypothesizing personality correlates of risk- taking was with reference to the Americanized version of the Protestant Ethics and the Good person: good adjustment (low on test anxiety, neuroticism, anxiety, and control; high on social desirability), good impulse control (low on extraversion and psychopathic deviate) a belief in one^^s own effectiveness (low in external locus of control), and assertive (high on dominance).

The investigation was carried out on two samples of Ss — one 'primary sample' comprising one hundred and forty-four SS and one 'replication sample' comprising fifty-four Ss. The •replication sample' was included to verify the results that were obtained from the 'prim.ary sample'. The risk-taking task was presented in an open and complete format in which the Ss could easily expect the risk alternatives to be presented to them. However, the procedures that were used in the experiment 44

with the 'replication sample' appeared to have added uncertainty and complexity in the risk-taking situation. The results showed linear relationships between risk-taking and certain personality variables. However, the relationships that were obtained were of modest magnitude, and at the same time, the confirmation from the replication sample of the results obtained from the primary sample is inadequate. While discussing their findings, Bfeilizer and Cutter pointed out that the data presented the appearance of fragile personality correlates of risk-taking, easily dissipated by incidental variations in sampling or induction. In their opinion, it is possible that the added uncertainty and complexity of the risk-taking situations of the replication sample were responsible to annihilate the fragile relationships observed in the primary sample.

The most important point that can be made out from the findings of Hfeilizer and Cutter is the importance of situational factors in the risk-taking behaviour.

The foregoing discussion shows that studies of individual differences in risk-taking behaviour in terms of a general risk-taking tendency have failed to establish risk-taking as a general trait or propensity. Similarly, researches carried out to study individual differences in risk-taking behaviour on the basis of personality correlates of risk-taking behaviour have also led to inconsistent results. Rather, results of several studies suggest the importance of situational factors 45

in risk-taking behaviour. Several investigators have undertaken researches to study the effect of situational factors on risk-taking behaviour. An important situational factor the effect of which on risk-taking behaviour has been extensively studied is group influence. Most of the researches carried out on this problem have used 'Kogan-Wallach choice dilemma problems' (Wallach and Kogan* 1959). The typical paradigm in these researches is as follows: The Ss are first required to express their choices of risk levels on these 'choice dilemma problems'. In each problem, a person is depicted as being in a dilemma to make a choice between two alternatives. One of the two alternatives is quite safe, and the other, though more desirable than the first, involves certain difficulties. The S is required to indicate the minimum odds or probabilities of success he would need before choosing the more desirable alternative. After having served individually in the experiment all the ss are required to participate in a group discussion of these 'choice dilemma problems'. The Ss are again required, after the group discussion, to express their choices of risk- levels on the same 'choice dilemma problems'. The first study to investigate the effect of group influence upon risk-taking behaviour was done by stoner (1961). It was found that individuals became riskier after the group influence. The finding attracted the attention of a large number of investigators because it v/as contrary to the well-established tradition, in 46

social psychology,of convergence phenomenon, i.e., individuals in a social situation avoid extireme opinions or judgments and the consensus represents an averaging or a compromise among individual positions. The general expectation on the basis of convergence phenomenon was that individuals would converge towards moderate position in their choices of risk levels under group influence. As stated by Pruitt (1971), a host of studies was undertaken to verify Stoner's finding. Most of the earlier studies confirmed the finding, with the result that they were subsumed under the notion of 'risky shift* research signifying the study of the phenomenon of an individual's becoming riskier after group influence. However, many later studies (Blitz and Dansereau, 1972; Fraser, Gouge and Billig, 1970; Rabow, Fowler, Bradford, Hofeller, and Shibuya, 1966; Stoner, 1968; Vidmar and Burdeny, 1969) reported results indicating that an individual became more cautious after group influence. This later finding brought about a change in the trend of studies in which the earlier notion of 'risky shift' was replaced by a new one called 'choice shift on risk dimension' which covers both types of shift, i.e., the shift towards greater risk' and the shift towards greater caution. Most of the sxobsequent studies directed their attention towards providing an explanation of the phenomenon of 'choice shift on risk dimension'in general without considering the type of choice shift. m their studies, Rabow et al. (1966) and Stoner (1968) showed that, under group 47

influence an individual became riskier while solving certain 'choice dilemma problems' and more cautious in case of other problems, indicating a possibility that the properties of the 'choice dilemma problem' are responsible for the type of •choice shift on the risk dimension' which an individual shows under group influence. Blitz and Dansereau (1972) recognized this possibility and attempted to identify properties of 'choice dilemma problems' which make an individual either riskier or more cautious under group influence. They successfully identified three such properties, namely, (a) the importance of the consequences of the decision, (b) the control the individual has over the success or the failure of the decision, and (c ) the effect of the decision on others. This state of affair in the research dealing with the problem of risk-taking under group influence leads one to agree with Cecil (1972) who asserts that more research is needed to identify other situational factors which may affect an individual's risk-taking behaviour. Thus, instead of studying the effect of group influence upon risk-taking behaviour, it will be worthwhile if we direct our attention to investigate the effect of other situational factors on risk-taking behaviour.

Another situational factor which has been extensively studied is the nature of the risk-taking situation varied on the basis of whether it involves skill or it involves chance. A risk-taking situation involving skill is one in which the 48

outcomes are contingent upon skill, whereas a risk-taking situation involving chance is one in which the outcomes are controlled only by chance factors. The two types of risk- taking situations may be said to differ along the dimension of cognitive control, i.e., the feeling of control an individual has over the outcome. A skill risk-taking situation involves maximum cognitive control and a chance risk-taking situation, the least cognitive control.

several investigators (Cohen, 1960; tfeilizer and Cutter, 1971; Kogan and Wallach, 1964; Littig, 1962) have studied the difference between the skill risk-taking and the chance risk-taking. These studies reported conflicting findings. For example, Kogan and wallach reported that a skill context produced moderate risk-taking and a chance context, extreme strategies, i.e., very high or very low risk-taking, while Heilizer and Cutter found no difference between the skill risk- taking and the chance risk-taking.

Another important situational factor the effect of which has been studied is the nature of risk-taking situation induced through the kinds of consequences — real or imaginary gain or loss — involved in it. A risk-taking situation involving real gain or loss is known as a 'real risk-taking situation', and a risk-taking situation involving imaginary gain or loss is known as a 'hypothetical risk-taking situation', There has been a large number of studies (Edwards, 1953; Heilizer and Cutter, 1971; Slovic, 1969) dealing with the 49

question of difference bet\^;een a real risk-taking and a hypothetical risk-taking. These studies reported conflicting findings. Edwards reported that 'real risk-taking situation* produced more extreme risk-taking than did a 'hypothetical risk-taking situation. slovic reported that a 'real risk- taking situation' produced choices of more caution than did a 'hypothetical risk-taking situation'. Contrary to this finding, Heilizer and cutter got results indicating that a 'real risk-taking situation' produced choices of greater risk than did a 'hypothetical risk-taking situation'. The studies which we have discussed so far are concerned with the question of static risk-taking behaviour in which the Ss are required just to express their preferences of risk level from certain risk alternatives signifying different risk levels. There has been a number of studies dealing with the question of the effect of outcomes of previous risk preferences upon subsequent risk preferences, several investigators (Edwards, 1962; Slovic et al., 1965; Lichtenstein, 1965; Greenberg, and Vteiner, 1966) showed that choice of risk levels was independent of actual amount of money won or lost. However, as reported by a number of investigators, the experience of win or loss has been found to affect the choice of risk level. Greenberg and Weiner (1966), for example, got results indicating that the relative frequency of the experience of winning in relation to the experience of losing, i.e., the ratio of number of wins to number of losses, affected 50

the choice of risk level. They found that the Ss who had experienced either very high or very low ratios of winnings showed preferences for high risk, whereas the ss who had experienced both wins and losses in equal proportion showed preferences for low risk. Thus, they found a curvilinear relationship between the proportion of the experience of wins and the preference for risk level.Contrary to this finding. Miller, Meyer and lanzetta (1969) reported direct relationship that between the two. In their study, they found/when the ratio of winnings increased the preference for relatively more risky alternatives increased. The effect was not apparent in the beginning but became increasingly marked in later part of the experiment, which showed that the effect might be attributed to the frequency of winnings which the Ss experienced in the course of trials.

It may be observed that these studies deal with the choice of risk level after the experience of different ratios of wins to losses and not with the change in the choice of risk alternative after the experience of winning or losing. Kogan and Wallach (1964) reported a study investigating the effect of the experience of outcome upon the change of risk alternative. In their experiment, the S is presented with a pair of two risk alternatives. His task is to select one risk alternative from the pair. When the s chooses risk alternatives in a series of trials there is an opportunity to study his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the outcomes of the choices 51

of the previous trials. His choice in the sxibsequent trial may reflect his satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the postdecisional outcome of the choice of the pireceding trial. Kogan and Wallach investigated this question in the context of Festinger's (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance. According to this theory, an individual, who ccxnes across a cognition of something which is discrepant with a cognition of holding a position, will experience cognitive dissonance which is an unpleasant state, and will tiry to reduce it either by changing his position or by distorting the discrepant experience. Assuming that the choice of the same risk strategy or the change of the risk strategy an individual makes after the experience of postdecisional outcome will depend upon the mode of dissonance reduction he prefers, the Ss used in the experiment were varied on the personality variables of test anxiety and defensiveness. The expectation was that individuals varying on these personality variables may differ in their mode of dissonance reduction and thus in the tendency to choose the same risk strategy or to change the risk strategy after the experience of postdecisional outcome. The two investigators used five types of risk strategy, and the s's score on each strategy represented the number of times he selected the risk alternative keyed for the strategy in question in all appropriate pairs. A score indicates degree of adherence to a particular strategy. It was found that Ss low in test anxiety and defensiveness showed 52

fewer changes of risk strategy after winnings. On the other hand, ss high in test anxiety and defensiveness were either consistently risky or consistently cautious irrespective of the nature of postdecisional outcome.

The study has got certain methodological limitations, which makes it difficult to accept the interpretation of the results given by the investigators. As the postdecisional outcomes aire not experimentally induced, it is very difficult to assess the effect of the nature of postdecisional outcome upon the change of risk alternative. Furthermore, the study fails to control the effect of risk level upon the change of risk alternative after the experience of postdecisional outcome. Further research is, therefore, called for to clarify the uncertainty that rem.ains.

Summing up the section, it may be pointed out that in spite of a large amount of researches on risk-taking behaviour there have been only a few studies dealing with the question of the effect of postdecisional outcome upon risk-taking behaviour, and furthermore, these studies are concerned with the choice of risk level after the experience of different ratios of winnings to losings. There has been only one study (Kogan and Wallach, 1964), worth to mention, in which the question of the chan^ of risk alternative after the experience of a postdecisional outccame has been investigated. The tv/o investigators made their study on the basis of Festinger's 53

(1957) theory of cognitive dissonance which maintains that an individual who comes across an information which is discrepant with the opinion he holes will experience cognitive dissonance which he will try to reduce by changing his opinion. The study has got certain methodological limitations, which makes it difficult to accept the results. Thus, it is pertinent to make some study in which these methodological limitations are removed.

Aim and Import;ance of the Present study

As mentioned earlier, there has been a number of studies investigating the effect of cognitive dissonance upon the change of opinion, by using different paradigms, namely, counteratti- tudinal behaviour, choice between alternatives, and discrepant information. Studies using the method of discrepant information report conflicting findings; some reporting a greater opinion chcnge as the discrepancy betv/een the opinion an individual holes and the discrepant information given to him increases, ana some, a lesser opinion change as the discrepancy increases. In the lirht of these conflicting findings it is reasonable to cisk v/hether a discrepcint information necessarily arouses cognitivu dissonance or ir. other words, in what condition a discrepant information v/ill arouse cognitive dissonance. Several investigators (Derlega, 1972; Zirrtoardo, 19 60) consider 54

involvement in the cognitive elements to be an important variable which affects the magnitude of cognitive dissonance. However, as Kiesler et al. (1969) have pointed out, the concept of involvement relating to the arousal of cognitive dissonance has not been clearly defined in terms of antecedent conditions which produce it, or the manner one can vary it both in degree and tn type.

With a\d.ew to clarifying the meaning of involvement as it relates to the aiousal of cognitive dissonance, it is important to note the observation made by Festinger (1957), that if two cognitive elements are dissonant with one another the magnitude of the cognitive dissonance will be a function of the importance of the cognitive elements. What Festinger has meant by this observation seems to be that cognitive dissonance would be aroused in an individual when both cognitive element, i.e., the one implied in his opinion that has already been accepted by him and the other implied in the discrepant information that is being communicated now, are important from the point of view of the individual.

Empirical data obtained by Derlega (1972) and Zinibardo (I960) seem to suggest that the importance of the two cognitive elements is contingent upon the type of involvement experienced by the individual in a given situation. If the individual is 'ego-involved' with regard to the opinion he is expressing on a particular issue, i.e., is required to express his own personal 55

beliefs and values, the cognitive element of the opinion he holds will certainly assume importance for him but the cognitive element of any information which is discrepant with the opinion he holds will be irrelevant and unimportant to him. If, on the other hand, the individual is 'task-involved' in expressing his opinion on an issue, i.e., is reouired to express a correct and objective view regarding that issue, then both the cognitive eleirent of the opinion he is holding, and that of any inform.ation that is discrepant with the opinion he is holding will be important to him. From what has been stated above it follows that cognitive dissonance is likely to tie aroused only when the individual is 'task-involved' in express in c his opinion on an issue and not when he is 'ego- involved' in expressing his opinion.

It was in the context of the above conclusion that the present investigation was undertaken with a view to studying the effect of cognitive dissonance upon opinion change in a guirbling type of risk-taking situation in v/hich the Ss, are expected to be 'task-involved' in so far as they are required to be objective in their choice of risk alternatives, each risk alternative being based on communication indicating probability of success and amount of payoff.

An inj,iortant factor which has not been taken into account in earlier studies of cocritive dissonance is the role of indivir.'ucil differences in reducing cocnitive dissonance. It is. 56

therefore, worthwhile to study how individual differences with respect to certain personality characteristics affect the v/ays in which the individual reduces cognitive dissonance. As pointed out in Chapter I, Alpert and Haber (1960) maintain that there are two general kinds of responses which an individual may make to stressful situations: (a) facilitative or adaptive response, and (b) debilitative or maladaptive response. An individual experiencing cognitive dissonance, which is also a state full of stress, may respond to it in one of these two ways in order to reduce tension, with the source of dissonance being removed by the facilitative response involving adjustments and necessary modifications but being only glossed over by debilitative one involving some kind of defence mechanism. Since these two types of responses are closely bound up with the global personality dimension called adjustment-maladjustment, the facilitative response being used by a well-adjusted individual while the debilitative one being used by a maladjusted individual, the question of whether the individual will make this or that type of response in a situation involving cognitive dissonance understandably depends upon such personality characteristics of the individual as are related to adjustm.ent-maladjustraent. Recurrent observations in literature, and in some cases empirical findings suggest that certain personality variables, like anxiety, internal- external locus of control, self-esteem, and repression- sensitization play a vital role in the adjustment-maladjustment of 57

an individual. As it has been seen in the survey of literature on risk- taking given in section (2), very scant attention has been paid to study the effect of postdecisional outcome upon risk- taking behaviour. There has been only one study, i.e., by Kogan and Wallach (1964) in which the question of change of risk alternative after the experience of a' postdecisional outcone has been investigated. However, in this study the postdecisional outcomes are not experimentally induced, and thus it is very difficult to assess the effect of the nature of outcome upon the change of risk alternative. Further, the study fails to control the effect of risk level upon the change of risk alternative after the experience of a postdecisional outcome. A change from a high risk alternative to a low risk alternative after the experience of a postdecisional outcome of losing and a change from a low risk alternative to a high risk alternative after the same type of experience are not equal. At the same time, a no-change from a high risk alternative to a low risk alternative after the experience of a postdecisional outcome of winning and a no-change from a low risk alternative to a high risk alternative after the same type of experience are not equal. In short, to study the effect of postdecisional outcor.e upon the change of risk alternative it is necessary to control the effect of risk level.

In the context of what have been discussed above, the present study wds undertaken with a view to ascertaining experirr.entally 58

the effect of cognitive dissonance upon the risk-taking behaviour in relation to each one of the four personality variables, namely, anxiety, internal-external locus of control self-esteem, and repression-sensitization. Pour different experiments each one using Ss who vary on one different personality variable were performed. Since each one of the four personality variables is considered to play a vital role in the adjustment-maladjustment of an individual, the results of one experiment will be varified in the remaining three experiments.

The present study attempts to make an improvement over previous studies in so far as the arousal of cognitive dissonsince in a risk-taking situation is experimentally induced by giving the s a discrepant information of losing the gamble and as the possible effect of risk level is removed by makino the two risk alternatives, presented to the s in a pair, of the same risk level.

The specific hypotheses to be tested in the present study are as follows:

1. In a risk-ta^

2. Under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance both hiohly and mildly anxiors Ss will be equally lackinc the 59

tendency to chance risk alternative, whereas under the condition of arousal of coonitive dissonance mildly anxious Ss will show a greater tendency to chan^ risk alternative than do highly anxious Ss.

3. Under the condition of nonarousal of coonitive dissonance both externally-oriented and internally-oriented Ss will be equally lacking the tendency to change risk alternative, whereas under the condition of arousal of coonitive dissonance internally- oriented Ss will show a greater tendency to change risk alternative than do externally-oriented Ss.

4. Under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance both high self-esteeiti and low self-esteem Ss will be equally lacking the tendency to change risk alternative, whereas under the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance high self- esteem Ss will show a greater tendency to change risk alternative than do low self-esteem Ss.

5. Under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance both repressor and sensitizer Ss will be equally lacking the tendency to change risk alternative, whereas under the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance repressor Ss will show a greater tendency to chance risk alternative than do sensitizer ss. Chapter III

METHOD AND PROCEDURE

The purpose of the present study is to ascertain experimentally the effect of cognitive dissonance upon risk- taking behaviour in relation to four personality variables. In order to clarify the various variables that are involved in the present experiment, it is important to delineate them.

Independent variables

The independent variables involved are cognitive dissonance, and four personality variables, namely, anxiety, internal-external locus of control, repression-sensitization, and self-esteem. Their operational definitisions are given below:

(i) Cognitive dissonance is varied into: (a) 'arousal of cognitive dissonance', and (b) 'nonarousal of cognitive dissonance'. 'Arousal of cognitive dissonance' is induced in a gambling type of risk-taking situation by giving the s 'a negative feedback of losing the gamble', i.e., by declaring that he has lost the gamble, and 'nonarousal of cognitive dissonance' by giving the s a 'positive feedback of winning the gamble', i.e., by declaring that he has won the gamble.

60 61

(ii) In order to study the effect of each one of the four personality variables upon opinion change in response to cognitive dissonance induced in a risk-taking situation, 400 Ss are devided into four groups of 100 Ss each and the ss in each group are dichotomized into two extreme groups, 'High* and 'Low', on the basis of their scores on the scale measuring each of the different personality variables. That is, the Ss in the first group are dichotomized into 'highly anxious' and •mildly anxious' Ss on the basis of their scores on sinha W-A self-Analysis Form (1968), the Ss in the second group are dichotomized into 'externally-oriented' and 'internally- oriented' Ss on the basis of their scores on Rotter's I.E. Scale (1966), the Ss in the third group are dichotomized into •sensitizer' and 'repressor' Ss on the basis of their scores on Prasad's Indian Adaptation of Byrne's Repression- Sensitization scale (1967), while the Ss in the fourth group are dichotomized into 'low self-esteem' and 'high self-esteem' Ss on the basis of their scores derived from the difference between the 'real self and the 'ideal self ratings for a nvuiiber of adjectives. For dichotomization, P75 and P25 are used as cutting points.

Dependent variable

The dependent variable namely, risk-taking behaviour is operationally defined as a change in the selection of one of two risk alternative choices in the second of two bids as 62

compared to the first one after winning ('nonarousal of cognitive dissonance*) or losing Carousal of cognitive dissonance') a gamble in a risk-taking task. A detailed account of the risk-taking task used in the present study is givenbbelow:

Risk-taking Task - The risk-taking task consists of a gaiiible in a guessing game involving solution of ten anagrams. The anagrams included in the gatte can be solved easily by any undergraduate student of average intelligence. Each anagram is amenable to two different solutions of meaningful words. The S is mainly required to ganible in guessing which of tl^ two solutions is correct. Ha is considered to win the gamble if he is able to guess the correct solutions of at least a specified number of anagrams which he intends to guess correctly.

The task is spread over several trials, m each trials first, the s is presented with a pair of two risk alternatives from which he is required to select any one as a bid for the gamble. When he tries the bid he is given a feedback, either a positive one of winning the gamble or a negative one of losing the gamble, after which he is presented with the same pair of the two risk alternatives for him to choose one risk alternative as a bid for the gamble a second time.

A risk alternative is expressed in terms of the chances of losing the gamble and the complementary chances of winning it, 63

The risk alternative determines the number of anagrams the s is required to guess correctly, in order to win the gamble, from a number of anagrams he is allowed to try. For example, a risk alternative indicating 2/5 chances of losing the gamble implies that the s will be required to guess at least two anagrams correctly in order to win the gamble from a total of five anagrams he is allowed to try. Similarly, a risk alternative indicating 4/10 chances of lowing the gamble implies that the S will be required to guess at least four anagrams correctly, in order to the gamble, from a total of ten anagrams he is allowed to try.

It is to be noted that earlier studies investigating the effect of outcome upon the risk-taking behaviour (cf. Chapter II) failed to control the effect of risk level upon the change of risk alternative. Kogan and Wallach (1964) reported that an experience of losing a gamble with a risk alternative having higher risk level often led to a selection of a risk alternative having lower risk level in a subsequent choice of risk alternative, whereas the experience of losing a gamble with a risk alternative having lower risk level seldom led to a selection of a risk alternative having higher risk level in a subsequent choice of risk alternative. Along with, an experience of winning a gamble with a risk alternative of low risk level often led to a change to a risk alternative of high risk level in a subsequent choice of risk alternative, m this context, it is considered necessary to control the effect of 64

risk level upon the choice of risk alternative after the experience of winning or losing the garrible.

Keeping this in mind/ the two risk alternatives in a pair are made proportionately equal in terms of the chances of losing the gamble. For example, if one risk alternative in a pair has 2/10 chances of losing the gamble, the other one will have 1/5 chances of losing it. Though the two risk alternatives in a pair are proportionately equal in terms of the chances of losing the gamble, they may be said to represent two different risk strategies, the first one representing a 'wide risk-strategy' and the later one, a 'narrow risk-strategy' .

According to several authors (Coaribs, 1967; Edwards, 1962) the choice of a risk alternative is affected by its expected value (EV), i.e., by the sum of the product of the chances of winning and the amount to be won and the product of the chances of losing and the amount to be lost. It is, therefore, considered necessary to equalize the EVs of two risk alternatives in a pair by taking equal amounts to be won and equal amounts to be lost. The pairs of risk alternatives used in the present experiment are given in Table A. In each trial one of the three pairs will be presented to an S in a random order, each pair of risk alternatives being presented to him four times in a series of twelve trials. 65

TABLE A

Pairs of Risk Alternatives Used in the Experiment

Amount to be lost or to Alternative I Alternative II be won Pair Chances Chances Chances Chances Amount to be Amount to be of of of of lost (Rs.) won (Rs.) Losing Winning Losing Winning 1 1/5 4/5 2/10 8/10 0.05 0.10 2 2/5 3/5 4/10 6/10 0.05 0.15 3 3/5 2/5 6/10 4/10 0.05 0.25

Research Design

Four different experiments were performed in order to determine the effect of cognitive dissonance on risk-taking behaviour in relation to each one of the four personality- variables separately, with two values of cognitive dissonance, •arousal' and 'nonarousal', and two values of each one of the personality variables, high and low a 2x2 factorial design of experiment was employed.

Personality Measures

The four personality variables, namely, anxiety, internal- external locus of control, repressing-sensitization, and self- esteem were measured by the sinha W-A Self-Anal ys is Form (19 68), the Rotter's I-E scale (1966), the Prasad's Indian Adaptation of Byrne's R-S Scale (1967), and the self-Ideal-Self Discrepancy on a Trait Adjectives Rating scale, respectively. Kach scale was translated from English to Hanipuri. In 66

translating the scale all items were translated literally. Popular sayings whenever applicable were not used to avoid social desirability. The principle of translation was comparable to that of Gough and Sandhu (1964) who translated the socialization scale of California Personality Inventory for cross-validation in India and that of Hsieh, Shybut and Lotsof (1969) who translated the Rotter's I-E Scale into Chinese. To test the Manipuri translation, three judges who knew both English and Manipuri were asked to translate index^ndently the Manipuri version into English. Their versions were very similar to each other and to the original English version. The Manipuri version of the scale was administered to 2 0 students. Nearly three weeks later, they were given the English version of the scale in order to determine the reliability of the translated version of the scale.

A brief description of the four personality measures is given below:

(a) The Sinha W-A Self-Analysis Form (1968); It consists of one hundred questions, each provided with 'yes' and 'no' alternative responses. Each 'yes' response is scored one, and the 'no' response. Zero. The total number of the 'yes' responses provides the anxiety score, with a high total score indicating low anxiety. Sinha ( 1961 ) has ireported that this form correlates 0.73 with the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale and has a split half reliability of 0.94. The Manipuri translation of the form is found to be correlated 0.84 with 67

the original English version.

^^^ The Rotter's I-E Scale (1966); it is a widely used scale to measure the personality dimension of internal- external locus of control. Throop and Macdonald (1971) consider it to be the best scale for measuring internal- exteinial locus of control with adult population. It has 29 forced-choice items including 6 filler ones, in each of which the S is required to make a choice between two alternatives, one indicating external-orientation and the other, internal orientation. Each choice of the alternative indicating external-orient at ion is scored, and thus, a high total score indicates external-orientation while a low total score indicates internal-orientation. The translated version is found to be correlated 0.87 with the original English version.

(*=) The Prasad's Indian Adaptation of Byrne's R-S Scale(1967 ); It consists of 90 items in which 13 items are scored with 'false' answer and the rest with 'true' answer, with a high total score indicating 'sensitization'while a low total score indicating 'repression'. Prasad (in press) reported that the corrected split-half reliability of the scale on a sample (N = 100) of Patna University students is 0.91 and coefficient of stability after 7 weeks is found to be 0.87. The construct validity Coefficient of the scale found by correlating it with Ullmann's 12-item Facil it at ion-inhibit ion Scale is as high as 0.80. The translated version is found to be correlated 0.86 68 with the original version.

(d) A Triat Adjectives Rating Scale : It is of the type which Murstein (1971) used. It consists of 20 adjectives each of which the s is required to rate, first in respect of 'as he really is' (real self) and then in respect of 'as he would like himself to be' (ideal self), on a seven-point scale ranging fron 'most like me' to 'least like me'. After the S has rated all the adjectives both 'as he really is' and 'as he would like himself to be', the discrepancy between the two ratings for each adjective is calculated, and all the differences between the two ratings are totalled without alzebraic sign. The total of the differences between the two ratings gives the discrepancy score. If the discrepancy score is high, the real self is perceived to be falling short of the ideal self, while if the discrepancy score is low the real self is perceived to be closer to the ideal self, the former indicating 'low self-esteem' while the later indicating 'high self-esteem'.

Procedures

(i) Selection of ss

Four samples of 100 Ss each were randomly selected from the male Arts undergraduate students of degree colleges in limphal. All the ss came from middle class families, and their age range was 17 to 20 years. 69

The four personality measures were administered on the four samples of Ss; each personality measure being administered on a different sample. The administration of each personality measure was carried out in small groups of 5/6 Ss. For each personality variable, two groups were formed one scoring above P75 and the other scoring below P25. In this manner, eight groups of Ss were formed. The groups were designated as 'Highly Anxious' (HA) and 'Mildly Anxious' (MA), 'Internally- Oriented' (10), and 'Externally-Oriented (EO), 'Repressors' (R) and 'Sensitizers' (S), and 'High Self-Esteem' (HSE) and 'Low Self-Esteem' (LSE) groups.

For each experiment using one different personality variable, 20 high scorers and 20 low scorers for the personality variable were randomly selected.

(ii) Experimental Procedures

The experiment was performed on each S individually. He was given instructions regarding what he was required to do. When it was clear that he had understood What he had to do, the experiment proper started.

The S was required to make a bid for a gamble in a guessing game. He was presented with a pair of two risk alternatives (strategies)^ and was required to select one alternative (strategy) as a bid for a gamble in the game. Whenever he tried out the bid, he was given a positive feedback (i.e., was told that he won the gamble) or a negative feedback (i.e., was told that he 70

lost the gainble) according to tte design of the experiment, after which he was, once again, presented with the sarpe pair of the two risk alternatives (stretegies) and was required to select one alternative (strategy) ao as to use it as a bid in the garrible second time. This whole procedure constituted one trial. The san» procedure was repeated twelve times, so that the S would select one risk strategy from a pair of two risk strategies in a gambling risk-taking two times, first before the feedback and second after the feedback, in each one of twelve trials.

The experimental condition of the 'arousal of cognitive dissonance' was Induced in half of the ss randomly selected from the total Ss constituting each one of the two dichotomised groups for each personality variable , and the control condition of the 'nonarousal of cognitive dissonance', in the remaining half of the Ss. In order to make the situation appear real, the ss in the 'arousal of cognitive dissonance' condition were given a few trials of 'positive feedback of winning the gamble' which were filler ones (i.e., trials which would not be scored), and in the similar manner, the ss in the 'nonarousal' of cognitive dissonance' condition were given a few trials of 'negative feedback of losing the gamble' which were filler ones. Further, in order to equalize the effect of filler trials, their number was same in both the conditions (i.e., 25 per cent of the total trials). Filler trials were randomly mixed with the trials which would be scored. 71

Scores

The score is concerned with the change in the selection of a risk alternative (strategy) from a pair of two risk alternative (strategy) choices in the second of two bids as compared to the first one after receiving the feedback either of winning the garoble (positive feedback) or of losing the gaxrible (negative feedback). A score of one is given if the s selects in the second bid the risk strategy that has not been selected in the first bid, while a score of zero is given if he selects in the second bid the risk strategy that has been selected in the first bid. In this way, a score of one or aero is given to the s for each trial, and all the scores are summed to get the total scores of him.

It is to be pointed out that, according to Harris (1969), the reduction of cognitive dissonance is probabilistic in nature, i.e., arousal of cognitive dissonance does not always lead to opinion change. He has experimentally shown this. In his opinion, the effect of cognitive dissonance may be studied in a better way, in terms of frequency of opinion change, by inducing cognitive dissonance and taking the measure of opinion change in several trials. In the present experiment, the effect of cognitive dissonance upon the risk-taking behaviour was studied by inducing cognitive dissonance in the risk-taking situation and taking its effect upon the choice of risk strategy over a nvuiiber of trials. Chapter IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Results

The mean scores of change of risk strategy under the arousal and nonarousal of cognitive dissonance conditions are given in Table B.

TABLE B Mean Scores of Change of Risk Strategy shown by Ss of different Personality Groups under the Arousal and Nonarousal of Cognitive Dissonance Conditions

Personality Arousal of Nonarousal Cognitive of Cognitive Groups Dissonance Dissonance Mildly anxious 6.6 3.6 Highly anxious 3.8 3.5 Internally-oriented 6.9 3.5 Externally-oriented 3.7 3.4 High self-esteem 6.5 3.8 Low self-esteem 3.9 3.6 Repressor 6.8 3.7 Sensitizer 3.8 3.5

The analyses of variance applied to the scores representing change of risk strategy (Tables C, D, E and F) show that the effect of the arousal and the nonarousal of cognitive dissonance is

72 73

significant beyond .001 level of confidence. As expected, the arousal of cognitive dissonance leads to nnore changes of risk strategy when compared with the nonarousal of cognitive of dissonance. Further, the results indicate that the effect of each one of four personality variables, namely, anxiety, internal- external locus of control, self-esteem, and repression- sensitization upon change of risk strategy as shown in Tables C, D, E and F respectively is significant beyond .001 level of confidence. 'Mildly anxious* Ss show more changes of risk strategy than do 'highly anxious* Ss. Similarly, * internally-oriented* Ss show more changes of risk strategy than do 'externally- oriented* Ss. Further, 'high self-esteem* Ss show more changes of risk strategy than do *low self-estem' Ss, and 'repressor* ss show more changes of risk strategy than do 'sensitizer' Ss.

As evident from the relevant tables, the interaction between cognitive dissonance and each one of the four personality variables in affecting change of risk strategy is significant beyond .001 level of confidence. 'Mildly anxious' Ss placed under the conditio of arousal of cognifitive dissonance, as seen in Table C, show significantly more changes of risk strategy than do 'mildly anxious* Ss placed under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, 'highly anxious* Ss placed xinder th two conditions of arousal and nonarousal of cognitive dissonance do not show any significant difference in their change of risk 74

TABLE C

Summary of Analysis of Variance of the effects of Personality Dimension of Anxiety and the Arousal and Nonarousal of Cognitive Dissonance Conditions on the Change of Risk Strategy Sums of Source df. squares Variance F. P. Cognitive 1 27.225 27.225 28.09 6 Dissonance (A) .001 Anxiety (B) 1 21.025 21.025" 21.698 .001 A X B 1 22.225 22.225 22.936 .001 Error 36 34.900 00.969 - - Total 39 105.375 strategy. That is, for the 'highly anxious' Ss, the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance when compared with the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance does not lead to greater change of risk strategy.

From the interaction between cognitive dissonance and personality variable of internal-external locus of control in affecting change of risk strategy, as Table D shows, it is clear that'internally-oriented' Ss placed under the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance show significantly more changes of risk strategy than do 'internally-oriented' ss placed under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance, On the other hand, 'externally-oriented' Ss placed under the two conditions of arousal and nonarousal of cognitive dissonance do not shov/ any significant difference in their change of risk strategy. That is, for the 'externally-oriented' Ss, the 75

TABLE D

Sumnary of Analysis of Variance of the effects of Personality Dimension of Internal-External Locus of Control and the Arousal and Nonarousal of Cognitive Dissonance Conditions on the Change of Risk Strategy

source df. ^"^f^^^ Variance F. P. sguares

Diss^ancfcA) ^ ^^'^^^ 34.225 30.889 .001 Internal-External Locus of Control 1 24.660 24.660 22.256 .001 (B) A X B 1 26.590 26.590 23.998 .001 Error 36 39.900 1.108 Total 39 125.375 condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance as compared to the the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance does not lead to significantly more changes of risk strategy.

Regarding the interaction between the personality variable of self-esteem and cognitive dissonance in affecting the change of risk strategy^ the results, as seen in Table E, show that 'high self-esteem' Ss placed under the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance show significantly more changes of risk strategy than do 'low self-esteem' Ss placed under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive, dissonance. On the other hand, 'low self-esteem' Ss placed under the two conditions of arousal and nonarousal of cognitive dissonance do not show any significant difference in their change of risk strategy. That is, for the 'low self-esteem Ss, the condition of arousal of 76

TABLE E

Sumrrary of Analysis of Variance of the effects of Personality Dimension of Self-Esteem and the Arousal and Nonarousal of Coqnitive Dissonance Conditions on the Change of Risk Strategy

source df. ^""^f °^ Variance F. P. sc?uares Cognitive 1 22.500 22.500 22.889 . .001 Dissonance (A) Self-Esteem(B) 1 19.600 19.600 19.939 .001 A X B 1 14.400 14.400 14.649' .001 Error 36 35.400 00.983

Total 39 91.900 cognitive dissonance as compared to the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance does not lead to significantly more changes of risk strategy.

As for the interaction between the personality variable of repression-sensitization and cognitive dissonance in affecting the change of risk strategy, the results, as given in Table F, show that 'repressor' Ss placed under the condition of arousal of

TABLE F

Summary of Analysis of variance of the effects of Personality Dimension of Repression-sensitization and the Arousal and Nonarousal of Cognitive Dissonance Conditions on the Change of Risk Strategy

Sums of Source df. Variance F. P. squares Cognitive Dissonance (A) 1 28.900 28.900 23.739 .001 Repression- sensitization (B) 1 25.600 25.600 21.035 .001 A X B 1 19.600 19.600 16.105 .001 Error 36 43.800 1.217

Total 39 117.900 cognitive dissonance show significantly more changes of risk strategy than do 'repressor' Ss placed under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, 'sensitizer' Ss placed under the two conditions of arousal and nonarousal of cognitive dissonance do not show any significant difference in their change of risk strategy. That is, for the 'sensitizer' Ss, the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance as compared to the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance does not lead to significantly more changes of risk strategy.

In summary, the main findings of the present study are as follows:

1. The arousal of cognitive dissonance leads to significantly more changes of risk strategy than does the nonarousal of cognitive dissonance.

2. The 'mildly anxious' and 'highj.y anxious' Ss equally lack the tendency to change risk strategy when there is nonarousal of cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, when there is arousal of cognitive dissonance the 'mildly anxious' Ss show a significantly greater tendency to change risk strategy than do the 'highly anxious• Ss,

3. The nonarousal of cognitive dissonance produces a tendency to repeat risk strategy for both the 'internally-oriented' and 'externally-oriented' Ss. On the other hand, the 'inteimally oriented' Ss show a significantly greater tendency to change risk 78

strategy than do the 'externally-oriented' Ss, when there is arousal of cognitive dissonance.

4. Both the 'high self-esteon' and 'low self-esteem' Ss show a tendency to repeat risk strategy when there is nonarousal of cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, the 'high self- esteem' Ss show a significantly greater tendency to change risk strategy than do the 'low self-esteem' Ss,when there is arousal of cognitive dissonance.

5. For both the 'repressor' and 'sensitizer' Ss, the non- arousal of cognitive dissonance leads to a tendency to repeat risk strategy. On the other hand, when there is arousal of cognitive dissonance the 'repressor' Ss show a significantly greater tendency to change risk strategy than do the 'sensitizer' Ss.

2. Discussion

The findings of significantly greater changes of risk strategy under the condition of arousal of cognitive dissonance than under the condition of nonarousal of cognitive dissonance, as shown in Tables C, D, E and F, confirm the first hypothesis. When the choice of a risk strategy is positively reinforced by a feedback of winning the gamble, it is natural for the Ss to have satisfaction with the risk strategy, and thus to have a tendency not to change the risk strategy in the subsequent trial. Conversely, if the choice of a risk strategy is negatively reinforced by a feedback of losing the gamble, it is obvious 79

that the ss will have dissatisfaction with the strategy a.nc' will have a tendency to change it in the subsequent trial. Kogan and Wallach (1964) report in their study that the ss show a tendency to have satisfaction with the risk strategy that has been chosen in the previous trial. However, they do not mention any thing about the difference betv?een the positive feedback of winning the gamble and the negative feedback of losing the gamble in their effects upon the choice of risk strategy.

As expected^ 'mildly anxious' Ss, 'internally-oriented' ss, 'high self-esteem' Ss as well as 'rep3:?essor' Ss are found to be affected by the arousal of cognitive dissonance, while 'highly anxious' Ss, 'externally-oriented' ss, 'low self-esteem' Ss, as well as 'sensitizer' Ss are found to be less affected by it in their choice of risk strategy.

The finding shows that 'mildly anxious' Ss are realistic in their choice of risk strategy. Their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a risk strategy depends upon whether a choice of it is followed by a positive or a negative reinforcement. If a choice of a risk stragety is followed by a positive feedback of winnina the gamble the strategy is more likely to be repeated, and if, on the other hand, the choice is followed by a negative feedback of losing the gamble the strategy is more likely to be dropped in favour of another strategy. 'Highly anxious' Ss, on the other hand, are found to be maladaptive in dealing 80

with cognitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation. That they have a tendency to choose the same risk strategy irrespective of the nature of reinforcement indicates that they are indifferent to the reality of the situation. That is, in dealing with cognitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation they behave in an ego-defensive manner. m other words, they seem to be not so much concerned with an achievement of a goal, as they are with defence of their ego. It appears that for them change of strategy after receiving negative information of losing a gamble is a sign of their admitting failure. By not changing the strategy they appear to protect themselves from having to recognize that they have lost the gamble. It may be recalled from Chapter I that Handler and Sarason (1952) consider anxiety to be the source of self- oriented and task-irrelevant responses which tend to interfere with task-relevant responses and thus make an individual maladaptive in his behaviour. Further, it has been reported that people with a high level of anxiety tend to be rigid and inflexible in their approach to a problem (Cowen, 1952a, 1952b; Jones, 1954; Longenecker, 19 62).

Regarding the behaviour of the 'internally-oriented' Ss in dealing with cognitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation, it is found from Table D that, they have a tendency to repeat a risk strategy after a positive feedback of winndLng the gamble and to change the strategy after a negative feedback of losing 81

the gamble. This tendency can very well be explained by the simple principle of reinforcement. It is quite obvious that when a chosen strategy is positively reinforced by giving the Ss a positive feedback they tend to repeat the strategy, and when it is negatively reinforced by giving the Ss a negative feedback they tend to change it. That is, in dealing with cognitive dissonance in risk-taking situation these Ss make changes in their responses according to the demand of the situation. This adjustment to the positive and the negative feedback indicates that these Ss try to exercise control over the outcome of their action. This finding is, thus, consistent with the belief of 'internally-oriented' Ss that, reinforcements are contingent upon their own actions and hence are under their own control.

As may be observed from Table D, the striking finding concerning the behaviour of 'externally-oriented' Ss in dealing with cognitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation is the lack of proper adjustment to a feedback. They show a tendency to repeat a choice of a risk strategy regardless of whether the choice is reinforced by a positive feedback of winning the gamble or by a negative feedback of losing the gamble. This tendency may be interpreted to mean that these Ss believe the outcome of their action being determined by factors over which they have no control. It appears, they are convinced that v/inning the gamble does not depend on whether one chooses this strategy or that, and it depends entirely on chance. It is this 82

belief in the external locus of control itself which prevents the 'externally-oriented' Ss from making necessary adjustment to negative feedback of losing the gamble.

From the results obtained in Table E, it is found that 'high self-esteem' Ss and 'low self-esteem' Ss differ in their approach to cognitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation. 'High self-esteem' Ss have a tendency to repeat a risk strategy in a condition where there is an arousal of cognitive dissonance whereas, 'low self-esteem' Ss, on the other hand, show a tendency to repeat a choice of a risk strategy regardless of whether the choice is reinforced by a positive feedback of winning the gamble or by a negative feedback of losing the gamble. The behaviour of these ss may be explained in the light of what has been mentioned in Chapter I.that the individual in his actions, tries to be consistent with how he perceives himself in relation to his ideal-self. If his self-esteem is high and he perceives himself to be worthy, likeable, competent, etc., this is bound to influence his action, in so far as he will tend to exert himself to live upto these self-perceived qualities and thus achieve better adjustment in life situations. On the other hand, if his self-esteem is low and he perceives himself to be unworthy, unlikeable,incompetent, etc., he tends to behave in a way which is consistent with these self- perceived qualities, and this will likely make him fail to achieve better adjustment in life situations.

As the 3?esults in Table P indicate, 'repressor' 3s show 83

proper adjustment in dealing with cocnitive dissonance in a risk-taking situation, while 'sensitizer' Ss show a lack of adjustment in such a situation. The former Ss have a tendency to repeat choice of a risk strategy when it is reinforced by a positive feedback of winning the gamble and to change the strategy when it is reinforfed by a negative feedback of losing the gamble, whereas the later Ss have a tendency to repeat the choice irrespective of whether it is reinforced by a positive feedback or by a negative feedback. This finding is consistent with what has been mentioned in Chapter I that repressors show better adjustment than do sensitizers (Byrne, 1961; Byrne, Barry, and Nelson, 1963; Byrne, Golightly, and Sheffield, 1965; Cohen and Foerst, 1968; Peder, 1967; Joy, 1963; Lucky and Grigg, 1964; Tempone and Lamb, 1967). As it has been mentioned in that chapter, Lefcourt (1966), in a study obtained results indicating that repressors had greater ability to control emotions than did sensitizers. Individuals who are capable of controlling their emotions are expected to exercise self-restraint better than those who are swayed by thair emotions and with self-restraint one can deal with situations more adequately. Chapte r V

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The present study was undertaken with the sole purpose of ascertaining experimentally the effect of cognitive dissonance upon risk-taking behaviour in relation to four personality variables, namely, anxiety, internal-external locus of control, self-esteem, and repression-sensitization.

A risk-taking situation was used in the present study on certain grounds that, (i) when the Ss are 'task-involved', i.e., are required to be objective in expressing their opinion, any coiranunication which is discrepant with their existing opinion will arouse cognitive dissonance, and in a risk-taking situation the Ss are expected to be 'task-oriented' in so far as they are required to be objective in their choice of risk alternatives each risk alternative being based on informations indicating probability of success and amoxint of payoff> and (ii) there has been scant attention to study the effect of cognitive dissonance upon risk-taking behaviour. The present study is an improvement over the sole study (Kogan and Wallach, 1964) investigating the effect of cognitive dissonance upon risk-taking behaviour in so far as the arousal of cognitive dissonance was induced experimentally by giving the s the

84 85

discrepant information of losing a gamble and as the possible effect of risk level upon the change of risk alternative was removed by making the two risk alternatives presented to the S in a pair, of the same risk level.

Assuming that the manner of reducing cognitive dissonance of an individual may be related to his position on adjustment- maladjustment dimension in such a way that a facilitative response involving adjustments and necessary modifications being used by a well-adjusted individual and a debilitative one involving some kind of defense mechanism being used by a maladjusted individual, the four personality variables, namely, anxiety, intemal-extennal locus of control, self-esteem, and repression-sensitization — each of which considered to play a vital irole in the adjustment-maladjustment of an individual — were included in the present study.

Four experiments, each one using Ss varying on one different personality dimension, were perfoimed so that the results obtained in one experiment may be verified in the remaining three experiments.

All the hypotheses were confirmed. The striking similarity in the findings of the four experiments justifies the performing of four different experiments, and it implies that the four personality variables are related to each other and to one common dimension which may be known as adjustment-maladjustment. Had the measures of the four personality variables been applied to one single sample of Ss, it would have been possible to 86

determine intercorrelations among the four personality variables and also to do factor analysis of the measures with a view to developing a measure of adjustment-maladjustment.

It is to be pointed out that, in the study by Kogan and Wallach (1964) since positive and negative feedbacks were not experimentally induced it was difficult to find out the difference of their effects upon the change of risk strategy. Of course, it is difficult to induce experimentally feedbacks in a gambling risk-taking situation. The present study attempted to induce feedbacks experimentally by giving the s verbal communication of declaring him as to have won or as to have lost the gamble. The study may be repeated by using a risk-taking task in which a mechanical device giving preprogrammed feedbacks as desired by the experimenter may be employed. Feedback given by a mechanical device may be taken as more trustworthy than that provided by the 'experimenter' who may be regarded as the 'manipulator' of conditions at least by some enlightened subjects. REFERENCES

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Anagrams used in the Risk-Taking Task

A W S U T B A \'} R O G D E N T O N T ADM A P L A N P A N B ii

APPENDIX 'B'

INSTRUCTIONS

There are ten anagrams. Each anagram is amenable to two different solutions of meaningful words, and which one of the two solutions is to be regarded as correct in a given trial has been determined earlier in a table. You are required to gamble in guessing which of the two solutions is correct. You are considered to win the gamble if you are able to guess the correct solutions of at least a specified number of anagrams which you intend to guess correctly.

The gambling will be spread over several trials. In each trial, you will be presented with a pair of two risk alternatives from which you are required to select any one as a bid for the gamble. A risk alternative is expressed in terras of the chances of losing the gamble and the complementary chances of winning it. It determines the number of anagrams you are required to guess correctly, in order to win the gamble, from a number of anagrams you are allowed to try. For example, a risk alternative indicating 2/5 chances of losing the gamble implies that you will be required to guess at least two anagrams correctly, in order to win the gamble, from a total of five anagrams you are allowed to try. Similarly, a risk alternative indicating 4/10 chances of losing the gaKible implies that you will be required to guess at least four anagrams correctly, in order to win the camble, from a total of ten anagrams you are allowed to try. iii

'.Then you choose a risk alternative as a bid and try it out in the gamble by guessing the correct solutions of the anagrams, you will be declared either as to have won the gamble in case you are able, or as to have lost the gamble in case you are not able, to guess the correct solutions of at least a specified number of anagrams which you propose to guess correctly. IV

APPENDIX 'C*

Adjectives included in the Trait Adjectives Rating Scale used for the measure of self-Esteem

Active Individualistic Anxious Intelligent Competent Lax Conceited Lethargic Conforming Mediocre Creative Modest Firm Pragmatic Flexible Relaxed Imitative Rigid Incompetent Unrealistic APPENDIX »n'D«

Pairs of Risk Alternatives as Presented to the s in the Experiment

AMOUNT TO BE LOST OR ALTERNATIVE I ALTSRIVIATIVE II Trial TO BE WON No. Chances Chances Chances Chances Amount of Amount of of of of of be lost be won losing winning losing winning (Rs. ) (Rs.)

1 2/5 3/5 4/10 6/10 0.05 0.15 2 1/5 4/5 2/10 8/10 0.05 0.10 3 3/5 2/5 6/10 4/10 0.05 0.25 4 2/5 3/5 4/10 6/10 0.05 0.15 5 1/5 4/5 2/10 8/10 0.05 0.10 6 1/5 4/5 2/10 8/10 0.05 0.10 7 2/5 3/5 4/10 6/10 0.05 0.15 8 1/5 4/5 2/10 8/10 0.05 0.10 9 3/5 2/5 6/10 4/10 0.05 0.25 10 3/5 2/5 6/10 4/10 0.05 0.25 11 3/5 2/5 6/10 4/10 0.05 0.25 12 2/5 3/5 4/10 6/10 0.05 0.15 vi

APPENDIX

Programme of Feecibacks under the Condition of Arousal of Cognitive Dissonance

Trial No. Nature of Feedback

1 Negative Feedback 2 Negative Feedback 3 Negative Feedback f4 Positive Feedback 5 Negative Feedback 6 Negative Feedback 7 Negative Feedback f8 Positive Feedback 9 Negative Feedback 10 Negative Feedback fll Positive Feedback 12 Negative Feedback f Filler trial. VIX

APPENDIX 'P'

Programme of Feedbacks under the Condition of Nonarousal of Cognitive Dissonance

Trial No. Nature of Feedback

1 Positive Feedback 2 Positive Feedback 3 Positive Feedback f4 Negative Feedback 5 Positive Feedback 6 Positive Feedback 7 Positive Feedback f8 Negative Feedback 9 Positive Feedback 10 Positive Feedback fll Negative Feedback 12 Positive Feedback

f Filler trial.