A Uses and Gratifications Perspective of the Relationships among
Consumption of Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media Fare,
Trust in Government, and Political Participation
A dissertation submitted to the College of Communication and Information of Kent State
University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Communication Studies
by
Rekha Sharma
August, 2017 Dissertation written by
Rekha Sharma
B.S., Kent State University, 2002
M.A., Kent State University, 2004
M.S., Kent State University, 2004
Ph.D., Kent State University, 2017
Approved by
______Paul M. Haridakis, Ph.D., Chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee
______Danielle S. Coombs, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee
______Janet R. Meyer, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee
______James D. Ponder, Ph.D., Member, Doctoral Dissertation Committee
Accepted by
______Elizabeth Graham, Ph.D., Director, School of Communication Studies
______Amy Reynolds, Ph.D., Dean, College of Communication and Information
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Table of Contents
Page TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iii
LIST OF FIGURES ...... v
LIST OF TABLES ...... vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... vii
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Problem Statement ...... 4 Rationale and Objectives ...... 10 Literature Review ...... 13 Uses and Gratifications Theory ...... 13 Uses and Gratifications: Needs Manifested in Motives ...... 13 Selecting Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media ...... 16 Individual Differences ...... 19 Media Skepticism ...... 19 Need for Cognition ...... 26 Locus of Control ...... 31 Conservatism/Liberalism ...... 33 Media Use Motives ...... 38 Exposure to Government Conspiracy Theories ...... 43 Outcome Variables ...... 44 Trust in Government ...... 44 Political Participation ...... 46 Hypotheses and Research Questions ...... 49 II. METHODOLOGY ...... 60 Sample and Sampling Procedure ...... 60 Measures ...... 64 Statistical Analyses ...... 85 III. RESULTS ...... 88 Hypotheses ...... 88 Research Questions ...... 93 IV. DISCUSSION ...... 124 Trust in Government ...... 126 Political Participation ...... 131 Other Significant Predictors ...... 134 Individuals’ Background Characteristics ...... 135 Motives for Using Media for Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Fare ...... 142 Limitations and Future Directions ...... 144 Conclusion ...... 151
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APPENDICES A. Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study Document ...... 153 B. Media Skepticism Scale ...... 155 C. Need for Cognition Scale ...... 156 D. Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Locus of Control Scales ...... 157 E. Conservatism/Liberalism Scale ...... 158 F. Motivations for Consuming Media Fare Related to Government Conspiracy Theories ...... 159 G. Media Use for Consuming Content Related to Government Conspiracy Theories ...... 161 H. Perceptions of the Federal Government Scale ...... 163 I. Political Participation Scale ...... 165 J. Demographic Characteristics ...... 167
REFERENCES ...... 168
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List of Figures
Figure Page
1. Diagram of uses and gratifications framework for studying the role of individual differences, motives for selecting government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media content, and exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare involved in determining particular attitudinal and behavioral effects ...... 12
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List of Tables
Table Page
1. Media Skepticism Means and Standard Deviations ...... 65 2. Need for Cognition Means and Standard Deviations ...... 66 3. Locus of Control Means and Standard Deviations ...... 69 4. Conservatism/Liberalism Means and Standard Deviations ...... 70 5. Factor Loadings for Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories...... 73 6. Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories: Item Means and Standard Deviations ...... 75 7. Media Use for Government Conspiracy Theories Means and Standard Deviations ...... 78 8. Perceptions of Federal Government Means and Standard Deviations ...... 80 9. Political Participation Means and Standard Deviations ...... 83 10. Correlations between Media Use for Government Conspiracy Theories and Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Dimensions of Locus of Control ...... 90 11. Correlations between Use of Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media and Trust in Government (Perceptions of the Federal Government: Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Regulatory Agencies) ...... 91 12. Correlations between Use of Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media and Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion, Interactive Political Messaging, Civic Participation, Political Participation) ...... 92 13. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Executive Branch) ...... 96 14. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Legislative Branch) ...... 99 15. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Law Enforcement Agencies) ...... 102 16. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Regulatory Agencies) ...... 105 17. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion) ...... 109 18. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interactive Political Messaging) ...... 113 19. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Civic Participation) ...... 117 20. Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Political Participation) ...... 121
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Acknowledgements
As much as this dissertation is the culmination of a long-standing dream, at times it brought to mind Penelope’s perpetual weaving or Casaubon’s interminable masterwork of mythology. But completion brings new perspective, and as I look forward to extending this research, I am reminded of many people whose support made this endeavor possible.
Thank you to my dissertation advisor, Paul Haridakis, whose enthusiasm for communication research inspired me throughout graduate school. Your guidance and reassurance have been and continue to be crucial to my development as a scholar. Gratitude also goes to my dissertation committee members; thank you for your advice and assistance.
Additional thanks go to faculty and colleagues from the School of Communication Studies and the School of Journalism and Mass Communication. If I were to list all I have learned from you,
I could fill volumes. J.D., Carol, and Margaret—thank you for enjoyable conversation, dedicated collaboration, and sincere friendship.
To my family, thank you for all the ways you have shaped and shared my interests.
Kabita, thank you for ruminating on matters of psychology and philosophy with me as we both sought to understand why. Babita, thank you for believing in the power of words and the pursuit of truth. Namita, thank you for watching The X-Files with me and for giving me academic research to read, just for fun. Manoj, thank you for loving unsolved mysteries as much as I do, if not more. Nandini, Muskaan, Aryan, and Ishaan, thank you for reminding me to play.
More than anyone, I am forever indebted to my parents, Sumitra and Ratan Lal Sharma.
Mom and Dad, thank you for instilling in me a reverence for knowledge and respect for education. You have always encouraged my curiosity, valued my opinions, and motivated me to do more than I thought I could. With deepest love and gratitude, I dedicate this to you.
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1
Chapter I
Introduction
Contemporary political discourse is rife with accusations of shadowy forces operating in secret to accomplish nefarious goals. Pfau (2005b) named just a few examples: former First
Lady Hillary Clinton’s charge that her husband’s 1998 impeachment hearings were the result of a “vast right-wing conspiracy;” filmmaker Michael Moore’s allegation that George W. Bush, his family, and his corporate and political supporters had rigged the 2000 presidential election to secure a win; and Republican Senator Trent Lott’s blaming a liberal conspiracy for trying to oust him from the majority leader position in 2002 after he made comments supporting segregationist
Strom Thurmond’s 1948 presidential bid.
More recently, a group of conservative critics known as the “Birthers” has claimed that government officials and journalists have lied about U.S. President Barack Obama’s birthplace to cover up his supposed ineligibility to be president (Farley, 2009; Norington, 2009; Robinson,
2009). Conservative talk show hosts on radio and television including Rush Limbaugh, G.
Gordon Liddy, and Sean Hannity helped to amplify this rumor (Wright, 2011). Many of the birthers have also decried Obama’s ties to Indonesia as proof of his alleged indoctrination as a radical Muslim (Roeper, 2008). Obama’s own Green Jobs Czar, Van Jones, was forced to resign because he had aligned himself with another group of liberal conspiracy theorists called the
“Truthers.” Jones signed a petition urging Congress to investigate the possibility that the George
W. Bush administration knew about the 9/11 attacks and either orchestrated them or let them happen to instigate a war (De Borchgrave, 2009; DeFrank, 2009; Franke-Ruta & Kornblut, 2009;
Holan, 2009). In 2016, Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump—who had been at the forefront of the Birther movement (Zernike, 2011)—alleged well before Election Day that 2
Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton and her unnamed accomplices had rigged the election
against him; Trump’s detractors objected that such conspiracy theories would undermine voters’
faith in American democracy (Purdum, 2016).
Such discourse has been a mainstay in U.S. politics, not only among politicians, but
among citizens as well—at both ends of the political ideological spectrum. These examples
highlight merely a portion of the wide range of conspiracy theories that characterize the way
many people in the United States think about use or abuse of governing power. But little
research has been done on the impact of government-related conspiracy theories in media and how people differ in their use of such fare. As Al-Kandari (2010) noted, most studies of conspiracy theories have centered on exploring narrative texts rather than situating conspiracy theories in a media effects framework. Therefore, in this study, I do that. Specifically, I apply uses and gratifications theory to examine whether specific individual differences (i.e., media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism or liberalism) work in tandem with individuals’ motives for and exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented fare about the government to impact individuals’ trust in government and political participation.
Keeley (1999) defined a conspiracy theory as “a proposed explanation of some historical
event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons–
the conspirators–acting in secret” (p. 116). He added that conspiracy theories share three
primary characteristics. First, they propose reasons for an event’s occurrence. Second, the
authors of conspiracy theories depict conspirators as pivotal in orchestrating events without
actually being omnipotent, since they cannot enact their plans openly for fear of obstruction or
punishment. Third, conspiracies must involve more than one person as causal agents for the
event. It should be noted that conspiracy “theories” are termed as such mainly in the vernacular 3
sense of certain people’s explanations for the interrelationships between people, occurrences, and
seemingly powerful groups.
Conspiracy theories center on the idea that “an organization made up of individuals or groups was or is acting covertly to achieve some malevolent end” (Barkun, 2003, p. 3).
According to Barkun (2003), conspiracy theories may involve secrecy of the organization and/or its activities. This dissertation focuses on exposure to media content related to conspiracy theories involving known governmental or political groups with secret activities. For instance, after the bombing of Pearl Harbor in World War II, critics of Franklin D. Roosevelt charged that he had orchestrated the attack to install a fascist regime in the United States. Many of the New
World Order conspiracy theories of the past few decades allege that the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the National Education Association are institutions of surveillance and obfuscation, even designing concentration camps for imprisoning dissident Americans who oppose a global take-over (Flynn, 2000; Pipes, 1997; Spark, 2001). These kinds of conspiracy theories implicate known government agencies or officials as the perpetrators of secret, sinister plans.
This dissertation serves as a quantitative exploration of how individual differences in media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism as well as people’s motives for selecting conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare and exposure to media sources for conspiracy-theory-oriented content might influence people’s attitudes and behaviors.
In describing a uses and gratifications model of how these individual differences and motives for consuming conspiracy theories as well as exposure to this type of media might be related to trust in government and political participation, I attempt to showcase a topic that has received little attention from empirical researchers. However, the results of this study could have profound 4
implications for the study of mass communication, political communication, and political participation. A better understanding of the uses and effects of media fare related to government conspiracy theories could provide insight into their popularity (Spark, 2001), their role in catalyzing or continuing misconceptions and conflict (Al-Kandari, 2010), the perceived authenticity of government (Krug, 2009), and the negotiation of power among groups that assert authority and those that seek to contest them (Goldberg, 2001).
Problem Statement
Individuals’ fascination with conspiracy theories in recent years has sparked concern among some scholars, who have described the popularity of conspiracy theories in the terminology of disease research, worrying about their viral propagation or cancerous effect on
American politics (Pfau, 2005b). But despite the involvement of the populace in the establishment of their own representative democracy, American history frequently has been shadowed by periods of uncertainty, conflict, and suspicions about the integrity of the government itself. For instance, in the 1790s, rumors of a cabal of Illuminati, anti-Christians,
and Freemasons infiltrating government to undermine religion caused tension in the budding
democracy of the United States (Hofstader, 1964; Johnson, 1983). These fears were manifested
in detailed government conspiracy theories. Other internal threats to the sanctity of the
American political system, economy, and culture circulated as government conspiracy theories
throughout subsequent centuries.
During the 1850s and 1860s, antebellum Republicans as well as other anti-slavery
politicians worried that southern slaveholders were engaged in a Slave Power conspiracy to turn
the United States into a slavery empire to increase their own wealth and political power. Some
abolitionists advanced more extreme theories that agents of the Slave Power had even tried to 5 poison U.S. presidents to intimidate them into supporting a pro-slavery agenda (Pfau, 2005b;
Rafuse, 2008). The Cold War Communist witch hunt of Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s and speculations about the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in the 1960s (Hofstader,
1964) have served as prominent examples of a pattern of suspicion about government figures and institutions that has continued in political communication and mass media messages through the end of the millennium and following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (e.g., Kick,
2002).
Although conspiracy theories about powerful forces intent on controlling the autonomy of the individual have been common throughout Western culture, agents of the state traditionally were assumed to safeguard American ideals from subversion by foreign enemies (Dorsey, 2002).
But beginning in the 1960s, government itself became the more prominent villain, due in part to traumatic events such as the assassinations of national political figures, as well as disclosures about misconduct at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency, military atrocities in Vietnam, and the Watergate scandal (Dorsey, 2002; Olmsted, 2009).
Hofstader (1964) described this growing suspicion of government as a kind of secular apocalypticism that would surge during times of chaos or uncertainty, but which, at the same time, was a recurrent, ineradicable aspect of political discourse in the United States.
The inclination to blame Freemasons, Catholics, Blacks, Jesuits, or any other party or group for heading a chosen conspiracy has manifested itself repeatedly in what Hofstader (1964) hyperbolically called a “paranoid style” of politics, characterized by a belief that history is molded by vast networks of nefarious forces that must be recognized and fought before they undermine the American way of life. However, Hofstader’s use of the term was an analogy meant to evoke the qualities of aggression and suspiciousness (Sagan, 1991) rather than a clinical 6
diagnosis of pathology, and it was meant to underscore the idea that conspiracy theories have
moved from the margins of political discourse into the mainstream (Fenster, 2008).
Rather than serving simply as fodder for a small number of unbalanced people, Nimmo and Combs (1980) argued that conspiracy theories often contain moral messages about leadership or explanations of complex political events, elements which help to explain their continued popularity. They explained that, “People can accept a story form of a vast and sinister international conspiracy of such proportions and illogic because it puts in story form a tale of why politics today is the way it is. Conspiracy theories are the political folk epics of our day” (p.
146).
Melley (2000) argued that the rhetoric of conspiracy theories “offers a way of conceptualizing and resisting the controlling power of mass-communication systems, bureaucracies, and regulatory discourses” (p. 202). For instance, Scott (2000) traced the evolution of conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare from the pre-Cold War films of the 1930s to similarly themed movies and television programs in the 1990s and beyond. He argued that such media fare may reflect the concern, fear, or anger of audiences about the inner workings of
American government and of surveillance technology, as well as a way to shape narratives about historic political events or the morality of political actions. Furthermore, conspiracy-theory- oriented media fare share entertaining characteristics of mystery, satire, action, and suspense
(Scott, 2000). Thus, people may consume various forms of media related to government conspiracy theories for different reasons, potentially resulting in different outcomes.
Clearly, numerous historical examples indicate that conspiracy theories related to political leaders and government organizations are nothing new. However, the modern media environment has impacted the means and rate at which they are propagated. The convenience 7 and availability of conspiracy-theory-oriented information in print, in broadcast, and online has also increased the audience for political conspiracy theories. This raises important questions about why people might seek this type of content and what effect it might have on their perceptions of government and their willingness to participate in politics.
Yet arguments about the pervasive nature of government conspiracy theories in U.S. culture also raise interesting questions. If government conspiracy theories are common, are certain people more likely to consume, create, or believe these explanations? Should researchers be concerned about the impact of conspiracy theories on the American populace and its relationship to government and politics? What factors might motivate a person to select conspiracy-theory-oriented material from the array of information and explanations available in today’s information-rich, media-saturated world? This dissertation is intended to spark a dialogue that addresses these kinds of questions. Therefore, while consideration of government- conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare is certainly important, it is also worthwhile to consider viewer attributes that might enhance or mitigate media effects.
Although Thompson (2008) stressed that purveyors of conspiracy theories do not necessarily set out to deceive the public—and in fact might sincerely believe in the veracity of their claims—he blamed the producers of such arguments for contributing to an overwhelming degradation of societal standards regarding proof, factuality, and logical argumentation. But inclusion of media skepticism as a variable in this study may help to explain why some individuals feel it is necessary to consider information from sources beyond those considered traditionally reliable. Krug (2009) argued that many individuals have become skeptical of mainstream journalistic accounts of events like the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, because they rely too heavily on government sources. Those government sources, conspiracy 8
theorists believe, have a vested interest in providing quick closure and reinforcing the legitimacy
of their own actions and administrations (Krug, 2009). To bypass what they see as the self-
serving distortions of government and mainstream media, some conspiracy theorists may seek
alternative explanations.
In doing so, Dean (1997) acknowledged, individuals would have to sort through both
quality and questionable information. Coady (2012) argued that conspiracy is intrinsic to many
political and governmental institutions, ranging from the activities of the founding fathers to the
Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, “an explanation can be, and often is, both conspiratorial
and institutional” (p. 129). Viewed from this perspective, the dissemination and consumption of
government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare are natural forms of democratic discourse, a
brand of convictions among many being sold in a mediated marketplace of ideas. Perceptions of
the government being engaged in conspiracies contribute to the range of beliefs that must be
considered by people in a democratic society as well as by communication scholars trying to
understand the mechanisms of politics and the social constructions of reality. Whether government conspiracy theories cause people to be more critical consumers of information or ultimately makes them distrusting or disengaged is a debate that can only be resolved with serious inquiry. But for individuals with a high need for cognition, the amount of information may be more important than the quality. Fenster (2008) brought up competing conspiracy theories regarding the suicide of Vince Foster (Bill Clinton’s friend and deputy White House counsel) that interpreted the same event in different ways. Fenster summarized, “There may be more to learn—new details, even new developments as the Clinton conspiracy spread more widely—but there would be nothing more to know” (p. 94). Thus, those people who are higher 9 in their need for cognition might find satisfaction or solace in contemplating conspiracy theories by piecing facts and arguments into a shifting puzzle of explanation.
As Zernike (2011) argued, “it is human nature to want to construct a narrative to resolve anxieties, to be drawn to mystery or the perception of it” (p. 3). Thus, conspiracy-theory- oriented media consumption may appeal not only to those with a high need for cognition but also to those with an external locus of control, who feel that identifying the agents of conspiracy may help to explain events in the world around them (Melley, 2000).
Melley (2000) referred to this crisis of uncertainty as “agency panic,” which is the idea that the discovery of social controls conflicts with the liberal notion of individuals as autonomous and rational. However, this revelation results in a conservative response of refusing to accept that weakened concept of individual volition. Thus, people who consume conspiracy theories may ruminate on the powerful puppetmasters exerting control while at the same time reveling in their own ability to recognize those machinations and expose their schemes.
Conservatives and liberals alike sought to assert their patriotism and avenge alleged betrayals at various points in U.S. history, deeming those opposed to World War I “un-American” and unmasking Communist sympathizers during the Red Scare of the 1950s (Goldberg, 2001).
Johnson (1983) argued that if extremist groups were the only parties to exhibit political paranoia, the danger of the paranoid style to democracy in the United States would be minimal.
However, he worried that conspiracy theories resonated in deep yet subtle ways for a large minority of the population, enough to cause concern or at least warrant notice. Goldzwig (2002) echoed these concerns, arguing that social science research has failed to account for why people choose to create or consume government conspiracy theories, consequently contributing little to the understanding of how to mobilize the politically inactive or how to prevent violent acts 10 spurred by ideological extremism on the part of conservatives or liberals. He maintained that further research on the political impact of conspiracy theories is necessary because belief in such theories could undermine trust in social systems and institutional practices.
Therefore, the uses and gratifications perspective could serve as an important theoretical foundation for research of these issues, as it acknowledges the effects of people’s media consumption while accounting for variations in the nature of those uses and effects due to individual differences in pre-existing characteristics, needs, and motives. Specifically, this study aims to parse the roles of individual differences in media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism or liberalism in concert with motives for government-conspiracy- theory-oriented media consumption and exposure to media related to government conspiracy theories in predicting people’s trust in government and willingness to participate in politics.
Rationale and Objectives
Communication literature pertaining to the consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented material has suggested that research of individual differences in media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism might prove useful for determining why certain people might consume conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Given the dearth of quantitative work on media related to conspiracy theories, empirical researchers should focus on individual differences that guide motives for consumption of this type of content. Without knowing why people seek media fare about conspiracy theories, it would be impossible to reach meaningful conclusions about their impact. Ultimately, then, research of this topic under a uses and gratifications framework could help scholars understand how conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption might help predict individuals’ trust in government and political participation. 11
In this chapter, I will first discuss the central assumptions of the uses and gratifications
perspective. I will also highlight empirical studies in which the uses and gratifications
perspective has been applied to communication research regarding media, focusing primarily on film, television, and online content, and to subsequent perceptions and behaviors pertaining to
politics.
Second, I will provide an overview of the literature pertaining to government conspiracy
theories as a form of mass communication content. In doing so, I will address the nature of
people’s conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption and the political and sociocultural
implications of widespread discourse about government conspiracy theories in mediated
environments.
Third, I will include some important individual differences that research suggests should
be salient in a study of the effects of conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Media skepticism, need
for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism are treated here as individual
differences that work in tandem with individuals’ needs and motives as well as particular
patterns of media exposure to predict attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.
Fourth, I will discuss changes in trust in government and political participation as concepts that could be influenced by consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Much of the communication literature on conspiracy theories has insinuated that conspiracy-theory- oriented media consumption might adversely affect people’s perceptions and behaviors by causing individuals to become disenfranchised and disengaged. However, quantitative research to support these allegations is lacking, and empirical studies are needed to support this idea or demonstrate the opposite. To that end, I will employ a uses and gratifications model in which individual differences, motives for selecting government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, 12 and patterns of exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented content help to predict trust in government as an attitudinal outcome and political participation as a behavioral outcome. To clarify the relationships being explored in this study, the uses and gratifications model applied in this research project is presented in Figure 1.
Individual Motives for seeking Exposure Attitudinal Behavioral Differences conspiracy-theory- to Outcome Outcome oriented content Content Media Skepticism in media (Trust in (Political Need for (Government- Government) Participation) Cognition → → → → (Consumption of media content conspiracy- Locus of Control regarding conspiracy theories in theory- Conservativism/ which the government is oriented Liberalism implicated as the perpetrator of media a malevolent, secret plan sources)
Figure 1. Diagram of uses and gratifications framework for studying the role of individual differences, motives for selecting government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media content, and exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare involved in determining particular attitudinal and behavioral effects.
Finally, I will suggest a research agenda for the application of the uses and gratifications perspective to study motives for seeking media content related to government conspiracy theories, indicating new directions for inquiry and the potential for integrating other communication theories. Researchers must examine peoples’ motives for seeking conspiracy- theory-oriented media content to clarify the range of topics and opinions that make up political dialogue in the United States. They must also attempt to show how the confluence of traditional media sources and new media technologies may have amplified the influence and reach of conspiracy theories in the contemporary political landscape. Exploring this topic could ultimately shed light on how conspiracy-theory-oriented media could play a role in the 13
involvement of individuals in the shaping of their government and their society–or in their
decision to abdicate their role in the democratic political process.
Literature Review
Uses and Gratifications Theory
The uses and gratifications perspective has informed hundreds of media effects studies,
providing important insights on the media consumption process (Krcmar & Strizhakova, 2009).
Decades of research and refinement have reinforced its status, causing many contemporary
scholars to consider it a sophisticated, comprehensive communication theory perfectly suited to
the ambiguities of the information age (Ruggiero, 2000). Uses and gratifications grew from the
work of functionalist scholars in the 1940s, who attempted to determine the functions media
might serve for individuals (Haridakis & Whitmore, 2006). For example, Klapper (1949)
researched functions and gratifications of escapist communication. Just over a decade later, he
countered concerns from other scholars about the narcotizing effects of escapist media, arguing
that such material merely reinforced feelings of social apathy in people who were already
asocially oriented (Klapper, 1960). This kind of contention eventually would serve as a basis for
uses and gratifications researchers who sought to understand why certain people chose to expose
themselves to particular kinds of media and media fare under certain circumstances.
Uses and gratifications: Needs manifested in motives. Blumler and Katz (1974) outlined the basic premises of uses and gratifications research. First, uses and gratifications researchers assume that audiences are active and that media use is purposive. Second, they argued that audience members could choose different media to gratify particular needs.
Researchers could infer needs by observing individuals’ communication behavior or studying their stated motives for choosing certain types of media (Rubin & Rubin, 1985). Third, Blumler 14 and Katz asserted that media could serve as functional alternatives to other sources of information, engagement, or activity for fulfilling needs. Fourth, uses and gratifications research has relied heavily on self-report data from audiences, based on the belief that audience members could be cognizant enough about their media habits to report their reasons for usage accurately.
In a more contemporary summary of the uses and gratifications paradigm, Rubin (2002) listed the five assumptions in a manner that took into account recent research findings, addressed some of the earlier criticisms, and most importantly, considered media users’ individual differences. First, uses and gratifications researchers hold that communication behavior is “goal- directed, purposeful, and motivated” (p. 527). Second, people select and use media to fulfill desires or interests as well as to meet needs. Third, a variety of social and psychological factors shape people’s communication behavior. These could include personality traits, demographic characteristics, opportunities for interpersonal interaction, and environmental factors. Fourth, the mass media compete with functional alternatives for selection, attention, and use by individuals attempting to gratify needs or desires. Fifth, although uses and gratifications scholars believe that media can be persuasive, they also believe that people play an important role in mediating the effects of mass media through their choices, individual characteristics, or societal structures.
For instance, Pinkleton, Reagan, Aaronson, and Chen (1997) said that individuals’ needs and motivations determined the perceived usefulness of mass media, online tools, and interpersonal conversations for gaining issue-specific knowledge. Pinkleton (1999) stated that individual voters’ motivations to consume certain kinds of information play a role in their use of information sources for making decisions about politics. Metzger and Flanagin (2002) found that individuals typically used new media technologies instrumentally due to their versatility but engaged in ritual use of traditional media such as television. 15
Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973) noted that uses and gratifications researchers have focused their efforts on studying different types of media. They stated that hypotheses about the cumulative effects of exposure to materials that blend fiction with realism (Altheide, 2009;
Picarelli & Gomez-Galisteo, 2013) would depend largely on whether individuals were motivated by escape or reality-exploring gratifications. Given that conspiracy-theory-oriented content often blends documented facts with fictional rationalizations or unsupported arguments, researchers hoping to understand the effects of exposure to conspiracy theories should study individuals’ reasons for selecting this form of content, which could include additional motives such as entertainment, social interaction, or passing time. Understanding why certain people seek exposure to these theories or simply to disregard them as irrational conjecture is an important impetus for scholarly inquiry, and uses and gratifications theory supplies an appropriate theoretical framework for investigation. However, almost no uses and gratifications research has been done on government-related conspiracy theories. Scholars have applied the theory to study political communication, which often overlaps considerably with media fare related to conspiracy theories about government. Specifically, they have tried to link media exposure to tangible political effects such as intention to vote or issue awareness (McLeod &
Becker, 1974). For example, Kitchens, Powell, and Williams (2003) found that information seeking had an impact on political knowledge, but that political knowledge did not influence opinion formation or willingness to make a voting decision. They surmised that people seek political information to reinforce their own views or to surveil the current political climate rather than for aid in making decisions. Hacker, Howl, Scott, and Steiner (1996) found that individuals used computer-mediated channels to assert their own opinions and validate their perceptions during a presidential election. 16
Yet Nimmo and Swanson (1990) suggested that the uses and gratifications perspective
should be used to examine “social-structural bases of processes of meaning creation” (p. 18)
during different levels of electoral activity. To fully understand why people choose to consume
conspiracy-theory-oriented media and whether that exposure truly impacts their willingness to
participate in political matters, scholars must first consider important variables that could
influence media use motivations.
Selecting Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media
Krcmar and Strizhakova (2009) suggested that uses and gratifications ought to be applied broadly to studies of media-use motives rather than any one medium specifically (e.g., television
use, Internet use, or video game use). This approach suits a scholarly investigation of
conspiracy-theory-oriented media because this type of content transcends media channels and
devices. Its availability and proliferation have evolved with new forms of media and have
therefore been made available to larger audiences. As Aaronovitch (2010) asserted, “conspiracy
theories somehow fill a need that societies, groups, or individuals feel more or less intensely at
different moments” (p. 350). Although studies of political rhetoric have shown conspiracy
theories to have been present throughout history (Miller, 2002; Pfau, 2005a; Pinaire, 2005),
Birchall (2001) argued that a technological shift has changed the role of conspiracies in
American culture. Individuals in decades past may have exchanged pamphlets or met secretly in
backyards or basements to trade their suspicions. But in recent years, developments in
technology have allowed people to peruse vast amounts of data to glean support for their claims
or to communicate their speculations to others regardless of time or place (Nasir, 2000; Pinaire,
2005). Conspiracy-theory-oriented action-thriller films addressed political corruption in the
1930s and the threat of socialism and communist infiltration of government during the Cold War 17 period for the next several decades (Scott, 2000). In the 1970s, films about government conspiracy theories proliferated, tapping into anxiety and disillusionment fostered by traumatic years filled with political assassinations, presidential and corporate misdeeds, and controversial military actions (Scott, 2000).
Beginning in the early 1980s, conspiracy theory buffs could discuss their ideas on computer-based bulletin boards. By the late 1980s and 1990s, personal computers, laser printers, and desktop publishing software allowed individuals in marginalized groups to publish “zines” about ideas outside of mainstream discourse (Birchall, 2001). Several noteworthy events occurred in the mid-1990s to enhance the American fascination with conspiracy theories.
Editors of conspiracy-theory-oriented alternative publications highlighted the government siege of the Branch Davidian compound near Waco, Texas, and the 30th anniversary of the assassination of former president John F. Kennedy as influential to the cultural resurgence of suspicion about government actions (Birchall, 2001).
During this time, conspiracy-based narratives in film and television garnered a larger audience for conspiracy theories. Morris (1997) mentioned television programs such as Twin
Peaks, The X-Files, Nowhere Man, Dark Skies, and American Gothic, noting that the shows carried themes that went beyond surface-level plots about the supernatural to deeper anxieties that normality itself was being subverted. Morris asserted, “The aliens of McCarthy era films were, like the commies, foreign (un-American)…. In 1990s body-snatcher culture, the evil emanates from Western institutions. The truth is out there, but They are right here, insidiously warping reality” (p. 368). As the media universe has expanded, the amount of conspiracy- theory-oriented fare has increased. The maker of the conspiracy-theory-oriented 9/11 18
documentary Loose Change encouraged viewers to burn and share DVDs of the film after he had
uploaded it online in 2005 (Olmsted, 2009).
The sheer availability of information in the modern media environment has raised
concerns about whether people who come across media related to government conspiracy theories possess the time, inclination, or skills to assess the credibility of claims (Nasir, 2000;
Pinaire, 2005). Goldzwig (2002) worried that media systems provide an accessible yet overwhelming amount of data to a public lacking any criteria for distinguishing information from knowledge. The resulting information overload, he argued, fostered “social and cultural amnesia” rather than critical thought as well as the potential for political disengagement (p. 504).
With a plethora of information sources from new and traditional media at their fingertips, people must learn to navigate the hazy lines between disinformation and news and between fact and fiction—boundaries made less distinct by advancements in multimedia and new communication technologies (e.g., Taylor & Kolko, 2003). Perhaps the proliferation of conspiracy theories has been enhanced by the commingling of vicarious experience through media, the seeming authenticity of fictional media accounts, and the availability of information of varying degrees of verifiability. In these ways, new media technologies may have contributed to an inability to separate fact and fiction or at least a willingness to forgive the leaps in logic used by some conspiracy theorists to connect random facts. To understand whether online or otherwise mediated conspiracy theories implicating government agencies for evil acts has augmented a paranoid style of politics, communication scholars must try to understand the impact of people’s proclivity toward conspiracy thinking and how suspicious minds and cynical behaviors could influence the functioning of democratic societies. 19
As referenced earlier, uses and gratifications is an audience-centered theoretical perspective. So it is essential to consider individual differences that might influence users’ motives for media use as well as consequent exposure patterns, attitudes, and behaviors. To reiterate, the model employed in this study of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption concentrates on four individual differences in particular: media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism.
Individual Differences
As previously stated, uses and gratifications theory begins with the premise that social and psychological circumstances influence individuals’ motives for using media and media selections, which working together ultimately explain the variance of media effects on audiences.
Literature relevant to the study of conspiracy theories suggests that certain characteristics should be particularly relevant in the study of the uses and effects of conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. A few individual differences were particularly worthy of deeper exploration in this dissertation. They are media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism. All of these individual differences are concepts that require explication and refinement, but they could serve as important antecedents to individuals’ motives for seeking conspiracy-theory-oriented media exposure.
Media skepticism. Media skepticism is defined as “a subjective feeling of alienation and mistrust toward the mainstream news media” (Tsfati, 2003b, p. 67). Tsfati (2003a) argued that despite interest in determining reasons for the distrust of news media, few media effects researchers have sought to understand the consequences of that distrust. Shermer (2016) distinguished skepticism from cynicism or nihilism, which reject notions of real knowledge or certainty altogether. Rather, he characterized skepticism as “thoughtful and reflective inquiry” 20
(p. 60) and argued that skeptics are individuals who aim toward critical thinking, guard against
errors in reasoning, seek truth, and remain open-minded. In contrast, cynicism has a more
negative connotation (Tsfati, 2003b) and has sometimes been construed as a feeling of low self-
efficacy (Lee, 2006).
Individual differences in media skepticism (Krug, 2009), when considered along with
motives for selection of conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare and exposure to such material,
could help to predict the influence of conspiracy theories on people’s trust in government and
political participation because people may believe information from a source thought to be
credible but dismiss it from a medium or media outlet deemed to be less reputable. For a person
who is not skeptical of traditional media, a daily national newspaper such as the Washington Post
may be considered reputable, while a tabloid such as the National Enquirer might seem
untrustworthy or even ridiculous. But for a person who is generally skeptical of traditional media sources, alternative publications, broadcasts, or media outlets may seem to provide important perspectives or counter-narratives that had been otherwise ignored or dismissed by
mainstream media. It is important to remember that credibility is a receiver-oriented construct
rather than an intrinsic trait of a medium or source (O’Keefe, 2002). Hovland and Weiss (1954)
framed source credibility in terms of trustworthiness. According to Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal,
Lemus, and McCann (2003), other researchers extended the study of media credibility by
measuring perceptions of the source’s or medium’s believability, accuracy, fairness, bias, ease of
use, completeness, reliability, or attractiveness. As such, perceptions of source credibility may
be seen as a component of media skepticism.
Although skepticism does deal with individuals’ perceptions of the credibility of the
media and overall media literacy, the concept “exceeds perceived credibility and includes 21
feelings of alienation and anger toward the way the media function in society” (Tsfati, 2003b, p.
68). Like many who take a dystopian view of new communication technologies, Noam (2005)
worried that the large amounts of unfiltered information in the modern media environment could
only provide an illusion of access to political figures, which could not contribute to the
cultivation of a truly involved citizenry. The more information available, the more individuals
would need to be discerning consumers of media to make decisions about how to think and act
politically. Greenspan (2009) took this argument further, warning that the reluctance of educated
individuals to question the sources of information or to believe only information that would
support their own biases could result in a dangerous level of gullibility. In the modern media
environment, individuals are bombarded with an abundance of information from many sources
and must learn to differentiate a legitimate news story from “clickbait” or otherwise questionable
information (Leach, 2016). So a certain degree of media skepticism would be a marker of
critical thinking that could predict more informational motives for seeking media content about
government conspiracy theories and exposure to a diverse range of media sources providing such
content (Leach, 2016). Miller (2005) lauded Internet users for seeking alternative sources of
information such as Web sites and blogs when trying to verify political claims of government
misdeeds they had heard through traditional print and broadcast media channels. Web sites such
as Snopes.com and FactCheck.org have earned reputations as useful resources for people trying
to debunk rumors and could contribute to keeping people motivated and informed during
political elections (Miller, 2005).
But extreme levels of skepticism toward mainstream media might predict exclusive
reliance on alternative sources of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content as well as distrust in government. This is because mainstream news outlets in the United States are 22
sometimes criticized for depending on public officials for access or definitions of developing
situations, and for reinforcing symbolic narratives that favor government, often by repeating the
information, jargon, and euphemisms strategically employed by government and military
officials (Bennett, 2001). Additionally, in neglecting to cover certain government operations,
mainstream news outlets might also be blamed for allowing—or even abetting—misconduct and
corruption to fester due to lack of scrutiny and disclosure (Berry, 2009). For example, Patkin
(2009) noted that while some individuals blamed news media outlets for hyping the Y2K hysteria about a software glitch called the Millennium Bug, other individuals interpreted the absence of widespread catastrophe as a news blackout ordered by the government.
As a consequence of media skepticism regarding traditional news outlets, other media sources that provide government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content may seem to take on more of a watchdog approach than the traditional press. For instance, McGowen (2016) found that
Twitter users criticized traditional media such as cable news channels CNN, Fox News, and
MSNBC for a supposed inability to provide unbiased information and for allowing commercial motives to dictate their coverage of alleged police misconduct and race relations in Ferguson,
Missouri, after the shooting death of an unarmed African-American teenager. As Leach (2016)
stated, individuals may become skeptical of information providers that have traditionally
enjoyed the reputation of being legitimate and reliable: “Online and digital news outlets could be
intensifying the problem of source skepticism because of the sheer volume of material that is
available and the lack of any mechanism to rank or prioritize materials’ importance” (p. 87).
Tsfati and Capella (2003) demonstrated that media skepticism was negatively associated
with exposure to mainstream news but positively associated with exposure to nonmainstream
news, regardless of political and demographic controls. From a uses and gratifications 23
perspective, they explained that “skeptics probably attend to mainstream news despite their
skepticism to gratify other needs, such as social needs or the need for entertainment” (p. 519).
Essentially, media skepticism affects media choice, and that resulting choice can have impacts as
well. Stempel, Hargrove, and Stempel (2007) found that people who reported low levels of
general media involvement and consumers of less authoritative media such as blogs or
supermarket tabloids were most likely to believe in conspiracy theories about government and
military complicity in the September 11 attacks. Further, they found that belief in 9/11
conspiracy theories aligned with mainstream political party divisions. That is, Democrats and
Independents were more likely than Republicans to believe that the Republican administration
had helped to orchestrate or had known about but failed to stop the attacks in order to start a war
in the Middle East. In a column reporting the results of this survey, Schudson and Haas (2008)
wondered if the use of less “legitimate” media such as blogs—or other forms not considered to
be traditional, mainstream forms of media like television or newspapers—for learning about and
discussing conspiracy theories would actually fuel political paranoia and speculation.
Keeley (1999) took issue with the principle that conspiracies about the government
require increasing amounts of skepticism of the institutions designated by society for establishing
reliable data and generating warranted beliefs: namely, the mainstream press. According to
Keeley (1999), “Inherent in the claim that alleged evidence against a theory should be construed
as evidence for a theory is a pervasive skepticism about our public, fact-gathering institutions and the individuals working in them” (p. 122). That is, individuals who believe conspiracy
theories about the government’s allegedly corrupt or wicked stratagems suspect not only the
government officials and agencies named in the conspiracy theories, but may also doubt the 24
traditional media outlets that purvey the government’s refutations of involvement or explanations
of events.
This skepticism of mainstream media is bolstered by the fact that these outlets are not
infallible, and that the editorial process that would seem to ensure quality information (Palser,
2004) has frequently failed. When a journalism student from the University of Montana posted
an inflammatory message meant to mimic the rhetoric of militia groups to an Internet newsgroup
after the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, several
major newspapers published the message as a real example of extremist diatribes on the Internet
(Armstrong, 1995). Likewise, Dateline NBC, Reuters news service, and some British
newspapers published a story about a message posted on America Online in which Timothy
McVeigh supposedly identified himself as the “Mad Bomber” (Armstrong, 1995). Because
journalists rushed to publish without due diligence, they neglected to uncover the truth that a
prankster posted the message after McVeigh had already been arrested (Armstrong, 1995).
Yet assessments of media skepticism regarding the Internet are a bit more puzzling, as
definitions of Web components and features have shifted along with individuals’ comfort with or
use of new media technologies. Barkun (2003) pointed out that because so many conspiracists
distrust traditional mass media outlets for furthering the agenda of the conspirators by distorting
or concealing the truth, the Internet might provide more attractive information sources. Among
the appealing factors of communicating and consuming conspiracy-theory-oriented material on
the Internet are the existence of a large audience, fewer economic barriers to entry, and the absence of gatekeepers (Barkun, 2003). Also, viewpoints that might otherwise be stigmatized in mainstream media find acceptance among like-minded Internet users, and hyperlinking provides
a form of pseudo-validity through repeated referencing (Barkun, 2003). 25
These arguments lend credence to the idea that while some individuals might be skeptical
of traditional media and go online to seek alternative information, other individuals might not
even differentiate between the online counterparts of traditional news outlets and other sources
of fact, opinion, or fabrication on the Internet. The lack of editorial scrutiny on some Internet
sites and the lack of established reputations for alternative media venues may make it difficult
for users to judge the quality of online information (Metzger, Flanagin, Eyal, Lemus, & McCann,
2003).
Despite concerns that the intriguing nature of conspiracy theories and the rapid diffusion
of disinformation could be used to mislead people about political events, some scholars (Barkun,
2003; Benoit & Nill, 1998) have defended conspiracy theorists for raising important questions
and causing people to investigate conventional explanations, delve into historical accounts, and
demand accountability. As Clarke (2002) stated:
First, the conspiracy theorist challenges us to improve our social explanations. If a
nonconspiratorial social explanation is better articulated as a result of the challenge of a
conspiracy theory then that is all to the good. Second, the conspiracy theorist
occasionally identifies a genuine conspiracy. Giving a thousand conspiracy theories
some consideration is a small price for us to pay to have one actual nefarious conspiracy,
such as the Watergate conspiracy, uncovered sooner rather than later. (p. 148)
Therefore, applying uses and gratifications theory to the study of the availability, dissemination, or interpretation of conspiracy-theory-oriented media could generate illuminating results about individuals’ political attitudes and behaviors. Pursuing this line of inquiry could not only yield quantitative information about media exposure, but also insight into whether certain precursors actually foster a paranoid approach to media consumption and to the political process. 26
Certainly, a great deal of information about government conspiracy theories exists in venues outside of the mainstream news media. Therefore, studying media skepticism might prove useful for researchers studying exposure to government conspiracy theories. An equally important variable to study is the willingness on the part of individuals to consider and intellectually elaborate on not only the credibility of the sources of conspiracy theories but also on the content of the theories themselves.
Need for cognition. Stempel, Hargrove, and Stempel (2007) described a psychological view of conspiratorial theories in which “conspiracy theorists combine close, sometimes obsessive, attention to details and documentation with great leaps of imagination through which they explain virtually all social developments and historical events in terms of concerted and conscious actions by powerful, highly organized, and secretive groups” (p. 354). They contrasted this view of adherence to conspiracy theories with a cultural sociological perspective that concentrates more on rational or justifiable beliefs in conspiracies due to societal phenomena such as government secrecy (e.g., Darsey, 2002; Olmsted, 2009). They explained that, “In this view the media do not promote conspiracy theories so much by circulating particular rumors and conspiracies, as by raising people’s awareness and cynicism about how much goes on in the backstages of governmental and corporate power” (pp. 355-356).
Keeley (1999) speculated that the negative aspects of conspiracy theories might have more to do with the people who promulgate them rather than with the theories themselves. He suggested that the “problem” might be a “psychological one of not recognizing when to stop searching for hidden causes” (p. 126). This psychological quality might be understood as “need for cognition,” a broad construct involving “individual differences in willingness to engage in thoughtful activities” (Holbrook, 2006, p. 349). Conspiracy theorists keep trying to create linear 27
connections between events that cause cognitive dissonance, even when those events are actually
unconnected, but find no resolution that satisfies or relieves them (Rushkoff, 1996).
Fenster (2008) explained that so many people bristled at Bill Clinton’s claim that rumors of foul play about Vince Foster’s suicide were false because conspiracy theorists do not recognize interpretive limits. He said:
Conspiracy theory demands continual interpretation. There is always something more to
know about an alleged conspiracy, the evidence of which is subjected to an investigative
machine that depends on the perpetual motion of signification. Further, the very attempt
to shut interpretation down is itself a suspicious act that requires interpretation. Clinton’s
declaration of a limit to interpretation thus signifies excessively. For a conspiracy
theorist, when a suspected political leader says that there is nothing more to know, he
simultaneously circulates a profound error (there is always something more to know) and
presents another statement, linked to previous ones that he and his associates have made,
that demonstrates the devious and conspiratorial nature of his power (we know that he
knows more). Conspiracy theory trapped Clinton in a circular, endless game in which
every declaration of his innocence and every piece of evidence he put forward to
exonerate himself served as further proof of his guilt. (p. 94)
Other conspiracy theories during the Clinton administration of the 1990s coincided with the
increasing accessibility of the Internet, which allowed users to seek information from a variety of
sources or share their own points of view regarding official and alternative explanations (Miller,
2002; Tyre, 1998). Those with a high need for cognition had the opportunity to meander through
a maze of reputable news and government sites along with a myriad of less credible Web pages
produced by individual users (Miller, 2002). 28
Case (2006) also posited that individuals with elitist tendencies would speculate about government conspiracies to enjoy feeling that they possessed specialized knowledge and could not be deceived as easily as the gullible or ignorant masses. Aaronovitch (2010) echoed this characterization, arguing that people who seek and ascribe to conspiracy theories believed themselves to be unusually perceptive and exercising a high-quality thought process that allowed them to recognize conspiracies and see past the official version of events advanced by news media and politicians. Yet conspiracy theorists often exaggerate the expertise of sources or witnesses and lay out their arguments in pseudo-scholarly fashion by referencing other conspiracists for symbiotic confirmation (Aaronovitch, 2010). Thus, conspiracy theories often exploit circular logic, reward ceaseless speculation or inquiry, and mimic intellectual argumentation by adopting the protocols of communication in journalism, government, and academia.
But if need for cognition manifests as elitism, this suspicion of government and lack of confidence in the public’s ability to discern fact from fiction could indicate an unhealthy level of skepticism of media and government. Case (2006) worried that zealous cynicism about mainstream politics or fear of brainwashing by an omnipotent government could cause people to disengage from the political process. With the health of democratic discourse hanging in the balance, such anxieties may be warranted. Therefore, communication scholars must investigate whether or to what extent conspiracy thinking has manifested itself in political life and the influence of traditional and new media technologies in that trend.
Cacioppo and Petty (1982) asserted that need for cognition was a dispositional factor that would help determine whether individuals would process persuasive messages via the central or peripheral route, which represent two avenues for information processing by which persuasion 29 may take place. The central route involves systematic thinking about arguments and evidence, whereas the peripheral route has traditionally been associated with cognitive shortcuts such as perceptions of the source of the message (O’Keefe, 2002). They believed that individuals with a high need for cognition would enjoy thinking about issues and making mental associations, activities linked to central route processing. Indeed, researchers have begun to note cognition as well as affect in studies of media enjoyment (Nabi & Krcmar, 2004). Conspiracy-theory- oriented media offer a sense of play associated with breaking codes or piecing together clues or puzzles as well as the seductive promise of discovering hidden treasures or amazing revelations
(Aaronovitch, 2010).
Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, and Rodriguez (1986) found that individuals exhibiting a high need for cognition did indeed elaborate on issue-relevant information, forming attitudes via central route processing. Interestingly, Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, and Gregory (1999) considered need for cognition in their study of belief in conspiracy theories. Although they did not find support for the hypothesis that belief in the existence of conspiracies would be related to a need to seek simple explanations for complex events, they did not account for the possibility that the opposite relationship could be true. Rather than believing that a lone gunman shot John
F. Kennedy, conspiracy theorists developed complex narratives about multiple assassins, links to the Mafia, Fidel Castro, or aliens, and cover-ups enacted by U.S. government officials. Instead of looking at the 9/11 attacks as the work of some extremists who crashed planes into buildings, members of the 9/11 Truth Movement made arguments about structural engineering, thermodynamics, and profiteering by the military-industrial complex.
Simply put, conspiracy theories are often more complex than the official version of events. Therefore, individuals with a high need for cognition might actually be more likely to 30
seek conspiracy-theory-oriented media or to engage in conspiracy thinking than individuals with
a low need for cognition. In their research of the popularity of conspiracy theories about
presidential assassinations, McCauley and Jacques (1979) found that in responding to
questionnaires, participants selected conspiracy explanations as more likely in fictional scenarios
in which the president was shot rather than in cases in which the bullet missed its target. That is,
participants believed that a group of conspirators would be more effective and efficient at
assassinating a president than a lone gunman, who was more likely to be blamed for an unsuccessful attempt (McCauley & Jacques, 1979). Interpreting their results, the researchers surmised that people would be more likely to associate an extreme event such as the murder of a
president with multiple necessary causes—in this case, a conspiracy.
Tsfati and Capella (2005) incorporated the need for cognition into their research of media
skepticism and the effects of news media exposure. They found both need for cognition and
media skepticism had an effect on participants’ exposure to mainstream news. Additionally,
they found that people with higher levels of skepticism reported lower levels of exposure to
mainstream news. But as need for cognition increased, the negative interaction effect on mainstream news exposure decreased. The researchers speculated that people with high cognitive needs might consume mainstream news simply because they enjoyed contemplating different points of view or for the sake of criticizing the media.
For consumers of conspiracy-theory-oriented media, rumination on the information presented by the mainstream media—often alleged to be complicit in most government conspiracy theories—might lead them to consume but scoff at traditional news sources.
However, individuals who seek conspiracy-theory-oriented media might scorn mainstream media in favor of online materials that support their particular views. To resolve this conundrum, more 31
research is needed regarding the interaction of media skepticism with need for cognition,
especially as it relates to people who seek conspiracy-theory-oriented media.
Locus of control. For the conspiracy theorist or believer, creating elaborate conspiracy theories that identify responsible parties might give meaning to tragic or confusing events or provide more solace than ascribing them to some random fluke in an irrational, uncontrollable world. Chebat, Filiatrault, and Perrien (1990) explained that locus of control is a trait that defines how individuals view their own influence over their lives. They asserted, “Internally controlled individuals feel that they are in charge of their destinies, whereas those who are externally controlled feel that they are at the whim of outside forces” (p. 159). Cantril (1966) referred to external locus of control as fatalism. Researchers have argued that locus of control is multidimensional, touching on elements of belief systems, situational factors, and issues of effort or motivation (Avtgis & Richmond, 1997). An individual’s locus of control can be linked to communication motives as well as to perceptual and behavioral effects of media exposure
(Rubin, 1993b). As Sagan (1991) explained:
The aim of all paranoid thought and action is to get a firm grip on that which controls the
world. The anxiety that one does not have such a hold is enormous and therefore all
activity, mental and actual, is directed toward obtaining a certain kind of controlling
power. (p. 16)
In their study of conspiracy theories about the involvement of the British Royal Family and the British Secret Service (MI-6) in the death of Princess Diana, Douglas and Sutton (2008) explicitly called for more research regarding the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and locus of control. The authors highlighted this variable because they thought belief in conspiracies would center on a need to explain events outside of one’s control or in response to a 32
perceived lack of power. They also pointed out the need for more research regarding the
possible negative effects of Internet-based material to see whether people realize when they are
being influenced by conspiracy theories and other kinds of persuasive messages available in new
media contexts. This dissertation addresses both of these scholarly challenges.
Locus of control has been included in other uses and gratifications studies and has been found to link with media use motives and post-exposure attitudinal and behavioral outcomes. In
a study by Haridakis (2006), locus of control was among the audience factors considered with
motivations to explain differences in aggression between male and female television viewers.
He found that locus of control was a negative predictor of total aggression and anger for women
and of hostility for men. Lam and Mizerski (2005) found that people who reported a high internal locus of control were more likely to engage in word-of-mouth discussions with people with whom they had weak ties, whereas people with a highly externalized locus of control were more likely to engage in word-of-mouth discussions with close friends and family. With regard
to Internet use, Hoffman, Novak, and Schlosser (2003) found that people with an internal locus
of control were less likely than people with an external locus of control to use the Web for goal-
directed activities such as shopping or research and were also less likely to use the Internet as a
functional alternative to socializing or leisure tasks such as reading. Haridakis and Rubin (2005)
found that locus of control was positively related to third-person perceptions in that viewers with
an internal locus of control felt that television news stories about terrorism would affect other
people more than themselves.
It is necessary to reconcile these findings in the context of conspiracy-theory-oriented media. If, as Douglas and Sutton (2008) speculated, conspiracy theories result from a feeling of powerlessness, individuals with an external locus of control might be more likely to seek 33 conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. They might try to learn more about the extent of the conspiracy and the myriad ways in which it threatens their livelihood, even if they can devise no cohesive narrative of events of solution for combating the agencies behind the conspiracy. Using an analysis of the “controlled demolition” conspiracy theory related to the collapse of the World
Trade Center on September 11, Clarke (2007) noted that conspiracy buffs on the Internet had yet to name the orchestrators of the supposed plot to bring down the towers or to uncover their motives for taking part in such a plan. This is because the complexity of assessing information on the Internet made it difficult for people to agree on facts and pinpoint anomalies in the received view of why the towers collapsed (i.e., that Al Qaeda terrorists crashed airplanes into the World Trade Center, destroying their structural integrity) (Clarke, 2007).
But if conspiracy theory enthusiasts constantly fear calamity yet believe that something may be done to resist powerful agencies and avert disaster (Hofstader, 1964), communication scholars must clarify whether that reflects an internal or external locus of control. Placing such seemingly anomalous attitudes on a spectrum of locus of control could help researchers understand how such a characteristic might impact consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Moreover, scholars could learn how those patterns of consumption might help individuals philosophically situate themselves in the world and organize their beliefs.
Conservatism/liberalism. Studies of conspiracy-theory-oriented media effects as they relate to trust in government and political participation could also benefit from the inclusion of factors that describe the intensity of individuals’ political beliefs. Conspiracy theories that can be tested and perhaps even disconfirmed have been categorized as part of a dialogical process of considering facts and arguments in their context (Goertzel, 1994). But wide-ranging, continuing conspiracy thinking also has been described as part of a monological belief system in which one 34 belief serves as evidence of other beliefs (Goertzel, 1994). More specifically, an individual’s belief in one conspiracy would likely be associated with believing in other conspiracy theories because they provide useful explanations for new events that threaten a person’s belief system
(Eichenwald, 2014; Goertzel, 1994). It makes sense, then, that conspiracy theories are not confined to one party or perspective; instead, they appeal to people with a range of political viewpoints (Eichenwald, 2014).
Welch (2008) associated conservatism and liberalism with conspiracy-theory-oriented fare by arguing that the contemporary media environment allows people to consume content that reinforces their own views, encouraging them to demonize those with alternative points of view, and labeling media outlets as “biased” when they provide contradictory opinions or information.
However, Mehrabian (1996) found no relationships between conservatism or liberalism with desirable/undesirable personality traits such as arousability or dominance, nor with measures of adjustment/maladjustment such as depression, panic, or trait anxiety. Therefore, attempts by individuals on one end of the political spectrum to paint opponents in a negative light are largely unfounded. Right-wing conspiracy theories have often been criticized by those on the left as simplistic and distracting from brainstorming solutions to complex problems, although leftist conspiracy theories related to the Kennedy assassination or the events of 9/11 have circulated widely as well (Fenster, 2008; Getlein, 1969). Fusion conspiracism narratives in film such as
Oliver Stone’s JFK and a CBS made-for-TV movie about the siege at Ruby Ridge appealed to those on the left and the right because the conspiracy theories blamed the government for being in cahoots with enemies of liberals and conservatives (Olmsted, 2009).
Yet Goertzel (1994) noted that there has been little psychological research on belief in conspiracies with regard to authoritarianism, and that most of the political psychology measures 35
designed to tap dogmatism, authoritarianism, and other belief systems have displayed a right- wing bias. That is, researchers have ignored the possibility of “left-wing” authoritarianism and the ways in which conspiratorial thinking could be associated with both ends of the political orientation spectrum. Conspiracy theories disseminated by left-wing individuals have centered on acts that threaten to quash political speech and dissent or endanger civil liberties, whereas right-wing conspiracy theories frequently deal with the risk of personal incarceration (Barkun,
2003).
But Pipes (1997) noted that left-wing extremists have created conspiracy theories that are communicated in sophisticated, convincing ways as compared to the error-laden, preposterous claims of some right-wing conspiracists. The result has been that right-wing conspiracy theories have been scrutinized and scoffed at, while conspiracy theories originating from the left have escaped criticism (Pipes, 1997). For example, Lyndon LaRouche, a left-wing activist and frequent presidential candidate, developed the October Surprise theory that Ronald Reagan allegedly struck a deal with Iranian mullahs to keep American hostages in Iran until after the
1980 election to sabotage Jimmy Carter’s campaign (Pipes, 1997). The theory initially received extensive media coverage, but after a Congressional investigation proved the claim to be false, the issue simply fell off the public radar (Pipes, 1997).
Because conspiracy theories have flourished at both ends of this ideological spectrum, research of government conspiracy theories must also take into account conservatism and liberalism as important constructs that could work in tandem with motives for selection of conspiracy-theory-oriented material and exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented media sources to influence attitudinal and behavioral outcome variables. However, the dichotomy of liberalism and conservatism has been inconsistent in mass communication literature regarding marketing, 36 politics, and news. Schoenberger (1968) differentiated political conservatives from psychological conservatives because individuals with conservative political views shared beliefs about the role of government but did not align with the beliefs of more extremist groups such as the John Birch Society that were concerned with leftist subversion and Communist infiltration of government. But Noble (1978) explained that conservatives in the 1950s supported
McCarthyism and carried a populist bias against liberals who were supposedly decadent and without values. Both opinions reflected an anti-intellectual, uncompromising, conspiratorial view of history (Noble, 1978). Smith (1990) conducted a time-series analysis of 455 survey trends and reported that liberal growth was strongest during the 1960s and 1970s but reached a plateau thereafter without shifting toward conservatism. But in comparing the survey items, he noted that there has been no single authoritative definition to reference regarding either concept.
Researchers have instead chosen to describe components of conservatism and liberalism, most of which have changed over time (Smith, 1990). For example, Hise (1972) tested liberalism and conservatism in an advertising context, both as orientations of the participants and as attributes of the media message. He considered the themes of egalitarianism/inegalitarianism and tradition/change, as well as the reputation of the magazine and of the testimonial of one of two U.S. senators as liberal or conservative. His results did not support the hypothesis that liberal and conservative stimuli would alter the perceptions of liberal or conservative participants. But in a study of conspiracy theories involving exposure to the movie JFK, Butler,
Koopman, and Zimbardo (1995) included political orientation as a demographic variable. They noted that exposure to the film led to a broader conspiracy view, but that respondents with a conservative political orientation reported a decrease in confidence that parties such as Lyndon
B. Johnson and the CIA or Pentagon officials had orchestrated the assassination of President 37
Kennedy. Respondents with other political orientations reported an increase in confidence that
these parties engaged in a conspiracy.
While the bulk of scholarship on government conspiracy theories suggests that such
narratives flourish among conservatives and liberals alike, some evidence about the
contemporary political climate might suggest that conservatism in particular may lead to certain
patterns of media consumption, trust in government, and political participation. Knight (2003)
stated that right-wing commentators have espoused narratives in which the government
conspired to carry out the Oklahoma City bombings and the 9/11 attacks to convince Americans
to give up individual liberties. He also noted that conspiracy theories about the New World
Order and globalist groups such as the Bilderbergers have also proliferated in right-wing conspiracy circles, perhaps as a response to fears about borderless threats such as globalization, terrorism, and disease. Lee (2005) found that conservatives were more likely to distrust mainstream media and to be vocal about their distrust of the press. This is at least in part due to
Republican and conservative leaders encouraging their followers to disdain the supposedly
“liberal media” or “the media elite” (Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Watts, Domke, Shah, &
Fan, 1999). These scholars have argued that such characterizations are partially strategic and may have substantial rhetorical influence, as they have been employed at least since the 1980s
(Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Watts, Domke, Shah, & Fan, 1999).
Thus, some studies have reinforced the notion that conservatism and liberalism may play an important role in understanding political involvement in attitudinal and behavioral dimensions, especially when considering the influence of media exposure. Although communication researchers will need to conceptualize and operationalize conservatism and 38 liberalism consistently and as comprehensively as possible, the constructs could serve as important antecedents to consider along with the influence of media use motives.
Media Use Motives
Uses and gratifications suggests that individuals can consciously or unconsciously choose particular media or content to satisfy distinct needs (Ruggiero, 2000). Rubin (1993a) explained that uses and gratifications research hinges on the subjective choices of audience members.
According to Rubin: “Personality and social context affect initiative, choice, and interpretation.
This initiative mediates communication motivation, behavior, and outcomes” (p. 99). Although
Elliott (1974) criticized uses and gratifications scholars for focusing on internal characteristics of audience members to the exclusion of external factors such as the availability of certain kinds of information or access to a particular medium, McGuire (1974) responded that individuals’ needs could also be an important part of media use because they lead to motives for media use.
Furthermore, he argued, data from uses and gratifications studies indicated that people still made choices among available media in patterns that could not be statistically random. Therefore, it is important for researchers to determine particular motives for individuals’ use of media related to conspiracy theories about the government.
In line with the emphasis of uses and gratifications research on personality and communication motivation, scholars have been able to link psychological antecedents to specific motives for use of a particular medium (e.g., Conway & Rubin, 1991; Kaye, 2005; Papacharissi
& Rubin, 2000; Peled & Katz, 1974; Weaver, 2003) and for use of particular types of content
(e.g., Johnson & Kaye, 2003; Rubin, Haridakis, Hullman, Sun, Chikombero, & Pornsakulvanich,
2003). For example, Earnhardt (2013) found that instrumental use of television led to political 39 participation, and that for Internet use, need for cognition as well as gratification of social needs helped to predict political participation.
Some users prefer informational content and dramatic media fare to fulfill eudaimonic motivations related to sadness, empathy, and contemplativeness (Bartsch, 2012). Motives for watching medical dramas on television included “information, social interaction, habitual pastime/companionship, entertainment, and relaxation,” motives which were similar to motives for viewing other TV genres (Lee & Taylor, 2014, p. 19). Greene and Krcmar (2005) found that sensation-seeking positively predicted exposure to violent films and horror movies but not to watching or liking violent television programs. Verbal aggressiveness was positively related to exposure to violent movies and horror films, whereas argumentativeness related positively with exposure to violent films, violent television, and real crime TV shows.
Similarly, Oliver and Sanders (2004) stated that horror and suspense films have spiked in popularity during times of conflict and trauma (e.g., World War II, Vietnam, 9/11), perhaps allowing viewers to cope with fears triggered by war (Oliver & Sanders, 2004). This is somewhat ironic in that viewers have rated psychological thrillers as “significantly more frightening, disturbing, scary, anxiety-provoking, suspenseful, and upsetting” while at the same time ascribing the genre with positive adjectives such as “interesting, enjoyable, absorbing, and fun” (p. 255). Suspense films were rated as most enjoyable when the protagonist would be likely to suffer yet ultimately escape from a dangerous situation (Oliver & Sanders, 2004). Many conspiracy-theory-oriented works of fiction (i.e., books, TV shows, or movies as compared to news) fit into the suspense/psychological thriller genre and fulfill this trope of an individual fighting against a vast government conspiracy. Therefore, this duality of positive and negative 40
characterizations of suspense/psychological thriller films suggests the idea that viewers gravitate
toward this type of content for different reasons.
Peled and Katz (1974) investigated individuals’ use of electronic and print media during
a time of crisis, when the need for information and interpretation were expected to be especially
high. Their findings affirmed the notion of an active audience and the ability of people to assess
the relative utility of different types of media to satisfy different needs. In a study of exposure to
television coverage of the terrorist attacks of September 11, Rubin et al. (2003) found that
intentionally watching terrorism-related stories to gain information and to be with other people,
perceiving the stories to be realistic, and being involved with the stories correlated with higher
levels of fear and lower levels of feeling safe. Overall, the results indicated that active television
use helped predict social attitudes more successfully than mere exposure to television coverage.
In a study measuring the uses and gratifications of five Arab news networks in Kuwait,
Al-Kandari (2010) found that gender, the free marketplace of information gratification (i.e., comparing opinions and noticing diverse political orientations), and viewing Arabic BBC negatively predicted viewers’ general belief in conspiracies about the United States as well as theories related to the 9/11 attacks catalyzing a war on Islam. The author concluded that news networks were not influencing people to believe in conspiracy theories about the U.S. government, but that political and ideological rhetoric from other sources could contribute to the high levels of belief in such conspiracy theories reported by Kuwaiti youth. In studying the motives for using computer-mediated communication channels, Papacharissi and Rubin (2000) identified five motives: interpersonal utility, pass time, information seeking, convenience, and entertainment. They interpreted their results to indicate primarily instrumental use of the Internet for seeking information, with elements of ritualistic use of the Internet to fill time. Johnson and 41
Kaye (2003) identified four motives for obtaining political information on the Internet: guidance,
entertainment/social utility, convenience, and information seeking.
Kaye (2005) identified six motives for using Weblogs: information seeking and media
checking, convenience, personal fulfillment, political surveillance, social surveillance, and
expression and affiliation. Additionally, data showed that political attitudes, interest in politics
and general news, political involvement, online experience, Weblog participation, and
demographics were predictors of motivations for using Weblogs (Kaye, 2005). People interested
in politics use blogs for “political surveillance/guidance, expression and affiliation,
convenience/information-seeking, and entertainment” (Kim & Johnson, 2012, p. 105). Greuling
and Kilian (2014) also found that social interaction and the exchange of information/analysis
were prominent motives for use of political blogs. However, Ponder and Haridakis (2015) found
that use of blogs and microblogs negatively predicted political discussion with outgroup
members.
Separating Internet use into interactive features such as bulletin boards/electronic mailing
lists and chat forums, Kaye and Johnson (2004) reported that use factors for each component
were correlated with political attitudes, which were measured in terms of party affiliation,
likelihood of voting, political interest, political involvement, trust in government, and political
self-efficacy. The authors compared individuals’ Internet use in seeking political information
during the presidential election in 2000 with data from 1996 and noted that scholars will
continue to discern changing patterns as more people become accustomed to using the Internet
and its component technologies.
But while reading or viewing conspiracy-theory-oriented fare on the Internet might parallel other types of media usage or Web-related activity, it is an area of research that remains 42 largely unexplored. Spark (2001) argued that individuals might visit conspiracy-theory-oriented
Web pages or watch films and television shows with conspiracy themes not necessarily out of devotion to a particular conspiracy belief or because they claim membership to a militia or activist group. To the contrary, he asserted that being aware of conspiracy theories “no longer signals being individually certain of a hidden plot or a secret order, but more of entertaining doubts … and the feeling that in a contingent world, there is some truth, somehow, in certain elements of conspiracy’s imaginations” (p. 59).
Some people will gravitate toward government conspiracy theories in media as a hobby, while others will allow the conspiracy arguments to guide their political beliefs (Spark, 2001).
Yet existing uses and gratifications research has not addressed such distinctions. For example,
Albarran et al. (2007) found that users preferred terrestrial radio for access to news and information, and Gerlich, Drumheller, and Sollosy (2012) found that reading books fulfills motives of relaxation, escape, passing time, and sharing/learning. However, these were general studies of the uses and gratifications of particular media, without specific consideration of government-conspiracy-related content that may be found in these sources. Recent uses and gratifications research has shown that entertainment, escape, enlightenment, and content- congruent exposure needs predict media migration patterns (i.e., following an entertainment text into different media), but more inquiry is needed into other types of content and for texts that originate in channels other than television (Shade, Kornfield, & Oliver, 2015). Such scholarship may inform research of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption, as this type of content is diverse and available in myriad media channels. Therefore, a uses and gratifications study on the topic of government conspiracy theories requires the identification of motives specific to this type of content. 43
Exposure to Government Conspiracy Theories
Scholarship regarding political communication in the United States has often centered on the persuasive strategies of government agencies and politicians (Pfau, Kenski, Nitz, &
Sorenson, 1990), the framing of news stories about issues and elections (Huxford, 2000;
Parmelee, 2002; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007), and the effects of rhetoric on the voting public
(Gronbeck, 2004; Hart, 1988; Hart, Jarvis, Jennings, & Smith-Howell, 2005). However, little theory-based, empirical research has been devoted to the topic of government conspiracy theories (Al-Kandari, 2010).
Rather, people who read, view, or advocate conspiracy theories often have been derided as illogical or paranoid, especially when placed within pejorative stereotypes of the Internet as a milieu for unbalanced people and dodgy sources of information (Birchall, 2001; Bradley, 2005;
Dean, 1997; Pinaire, 2005). Olmsted (2009) argued that scholars do not need to psychoanalyze those who create and consume conspiracy theories but should instead seek to understand why some people turn to conspiracy theories and how the theories impact individuals’ views of government.
Pigden (2007) also contradicted the conventional wisdom that conspiracy theories should be dismissed as intellectually suspect or epistemologically unclean, pointing out that with enough credible substantiation, it is permissible, rational, and even obligatory to believe them.
Although Keeley (2003) conceded that several government conspiracy theories have proved to be credible, he argued that some of the more extreme theories ought to be discounted after investigations fail to yield sufficient evidence. Admitting that the argument from ignorance that conspiracy theories are automatically false if they have not been shown to be true is a logical 44
fallacy, Keeley (2003) stipulated that a theory’s credibility must suffer if serious efforts to
determine its veracity produce no proof.
Case (2006) stated that conspiracy theories are generally appealing because of their aura
of mystery, citing examples such as the supposed fabrication of the U.S. moon landing,
allegations that the U.S. government spread AIDS as a form of genocide, or suspicions that the
Military-Industrial Complex covered up the landing of an alien spacecraft in Roswell, New
Mexico, and perpetuated the Cold War. According to Goodnight and Poulakos (1981), unusual
events such as crimes, accidents, or significant mistakes tend to trigger interest in conspiracy
theories because they represent tragic or comic anomalies.
Outcome Variables
Trust in government. Sweeney (2006) documented efforts to sustain public morale
after a series of rumors about alleged government cover-ups during World War I. Otherwise, little scholarly communication research exists about the precise impact of government conspiracy theories on individuals’ attitudes toward their government, perhaps because it is so difficult to classify certain rumors as paranoid fantasies or believable disclosures. To that end, several scholars have reiterated the importance of truthful disclosures from government and media in cultivating audiences’ trust (Apple, 1988; Gaber, 2004; Sullivan, 1978). But understanding why people seek conspiracy-theory-oriented content and how they evaluate that content will be crucial to assessing its influence on their levels of trust.
Perceptions of media and trust in government are often a function of the national
government structure (Chaffee, Nass, & Yang, 1991; Gunther, Hong, & Rodriguez, 1994;
McIntyre, 1993) or the current political climate (Kuzma, 2000; McLeod, Eveland, & Signorielli,
1994). Researchers have also pointed out that disclosures of actual government conspiracies 45 have been linked to distrust of government among various groups (Goertzel, 1994; Molé, 2006;
Olmsted, 2009; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster, & Kilburn, 1999). This would justify conceptualizing trust in government as an outcome variable (rather than an antecedent) because government structures, political messages, and media reports have been shown to impact how people perceive their government.
Still, media remain important to people’s assessments of their government. Gildea
(1977) noted that as many news outlets began to shift away from professional tenets of objectivity, they established a new norm of advocacy journalism in response to growing public cynicism toward government, business, education, and the military. But the media’s adoption of an adversarial role toward government institutions resulted in public animosity toward these institutions and mainstream news media (Gildea, 1977). The popularity of many government conspiracy theories might be explained by the high degree of skepticism and suspicion on the part of their adherents, resulting in widespread mistrust of public institutions (Keeley, 1999).
Interestingly, Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) wanted to expand the research about attitudes toward government based on news coverage to address exposure to prime-time television programming. Their results were mixed, but they did find that confidence in the federal government decreased with increased viewing of science fiction shows such as The X-Files and
Millennium. Political satire TV programs such as Politically Incorrect with Bill Maher or The
Daily Show with Jon Stewart utilized parody and discussion stemming from a viewpoint that the
U.S. government and media colluded in the creation of deceptive messages about government responses to the 9/11 attacks, and this gave viewers a forum for the public assessment of these perspectives (Jones, 2005). If government conspiracy theories would be better classified as “soft 46 media,” or nonnews content, then researchers must delve more deeply into a variety of narrative styles that convey conspiratorial themes.
To more successfully investigate the “apparent collapse of trust in government,” Spark
(2001) suggested that researchers avoid dwelling on the views of conspiracy theory believers and redirect their focus to the dissemination of the theories by examining what makes them attractive to certain people and how those individuals use them (p. 57). This dissertation attempts to determine why individuals select government conspiracy theories in media, and the outcomes of that usage.
Political participation. According to Pfau (2005b), conspiracy theories may be categorized as fringe or centrist in terms of their appeal, the former reflecting a paranoid style of rhetoric resulting in alienation from the political system, and the latter reflecting a political style that could motivate people to monitor and direct the processes of their government. To understand whether conspiracy theories empower or estrange individuals from political life, researchers must investigate differences among those individuals and their motives for consuming conspiracy theories.
As Klapper (1954) noted, researchers must distinguish between civic attitudes that receive verbal sanction from participants and those that truly produce active involvement. Of course, the accuracy of data gathered through surveys will hinge on the honesty of the participants in reporting their likelihood to engage in behaviors such as voting, donating money or time to campaigns, attending rallies, signing petitions, engaging in protests, writing letters to government officials, or communicating electronically about their political opinions.
However, Jones (2005) argued that much of contemporary citizenship centers on selecting and engaging fictional and non-fiction texts about government and political entities. 47
People may consume not just information but also images, slogans, and ideas that are useful for
organizing and adjudicating illusion and reality in mediated and public life (Jones, 2005). Media
consumption drives opinion formation, spurs conversations, and catalyzes discursive
participation (Jones, 2005) and perhaps other forms of mobilization as well.
In laying the groundwork for his analysis of the conspiracy theories in former President
Abraham Lincoln’s “House Divided” speech, Pfau (2005a) pointed out the dual nature of conspiracy theories in American politics. On one hand, Pfau argued, conspiracy theories could
cause people to be distrustful of government and corporate institutions, and either less likely to
participate in civic life or more likely to align themselves with extremist movements. On the
other hand, Pfau (2005a) suggested, some conspiracy theories “may contain a grain of truth and
help unmask the machinations of the powerful” (p. 57), leading to better oversight of the
government by the people. Indeed, many strategic political acts have taken place in secrecy and
could be described denotatively as conspiratorial (Altheide, 2009; Hofstader, 1964).
Technically, one of the first American conspiracies occurred when the founding fathers met in
secret to plan their opposition to British rule and draft the Declaration of Independence (Jeffers,
2004). During World War I, the U.S. federal government drafted citizens for military service,
established a central bank to let the president control the flow of American money, criminalized
dissent via the Espionage and Sedition Acts, and encouraged the Justice Department to surveil
and harass individuals protesting the war (Olmsted, 2009). Coady (2012) noted the involvement
of the Central Intelligence Agency in overthrowing foreign governments and cited events such as
the Gulf of Tonkin incident being used as a pretext to escalate the Vietnam War, the Watergate
scandal during the Nixon administration, or the Iran-Contra scandal during the Reagan
administration. In light of verified examples of clandestine activity by the government, it is 48
necessary to study why certain individuals seek conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare to determine whether conspiracy theories are helpful or hurtful to democratic participation.
Butler, et al. (1995) reported that after watching the movie JFK, respondents not only
expressed emotional changes such as higher levels of anger and lower levels of hope, but
expressed differences in behavioral intentions as well. Specifically, 20% fewer intended to vote,
15% fewer intended to donate money, and 10% fewer intended to volunteer for political actions
(p. 248). These statistics reinforce concerns that consuming conspiracy-theory-oriented media
may lead to apathy borne of a sense of inevitability about political events (Kelley-Romano,
2008). Scodari and Felder (2000) argued that viewers of entertainment media about conspiracy
theories could read texts resistively, negotiating controversy through the creation of alternate
narratives. But Kelley-Romano worried that even fictional conspiracy narratives encourage
negative attitudes and critical thinking processes that discourage individuals from taking real
political action. According to Kelley-Romano, “Instead of participation in the public sphere,
conspiracy believers can ‘participate’ by trying to uncover the evil cabal, essentially alienating
themselves from mainstream politics” (p. 118).
In their study of a notoriously disengaged sector of the American population—14- to 22- year-olds—Pasek, Kenski, Romer, and Hall Jamieson (2006) found that use of informational or entertainment-oriented media facilitated civic engagement and resulted in higher levels of political awareness. However, McLeod and McDonald (1985) found that television viewing was associated with lower participation. McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy (1999) found that newspaper readership was strongly associated with institutional political participation such as voting in local elections or contacting political officials. Interpersonal discussion of political information interacted with hard news media use on participatory behavior (Scheufele, 2002), and Kim, 49
Wyatt, and Katz (1999) noted that the combination of news media use and political conversation
resulted in campaigning activities rather than mere complaints.
These findings establish a connection between media use and political participation, but
they refer mostly to traditional forms of media. Given that the Internet combines attributes of
print and broadcast, researchers have studied whether the associations made with newspaper or television use patterns would more successfully predict political participation. Just as with other traditional media studies, Kaye and Johnson (2002) found that political attitudes were linked to information-seeking, surveillance, and guidance motives for Internet use. Kaye and Johnson
(2002) found that seeking political information online to satisfy entertainment motives was positively associated with trust in government. But Internet use involves different gratifications than other forms of media such as television (Kaye & Johnson, 2002; Johnson & Kaye, 2003).
More intriguing still will be research of the nature of the government conspiracy theories themselves, as such content represents a clear departure from studies of hard news exposure or conventional forms of political information. As Keeley (1999) pointed out, conspiracy theories are necessarily about events that can be manipulated, providing “some hope that humans can understand, predict, and conceivably control the course of human events” (p. 124) by taking the reins out of the hands of the conspirators and reclaiming power through political participation.
Hypotheses and Research Questions
The study of conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption could ultimately reveal how much or to what extent consumers of such fare trust their government and are willing to participate in the political processes that are intrinsic to that government. But to avoid the simplistic notion that exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented media alone could cause powerful attitudinal and behavioral effects, a more sophisticated model undergirded by the uses and 50
gratifications perspective is used. According to Haridakis and Rubin (2005), the perspective
assumes that “social and psychological circumstances influence one’s needs and desires, which
are manifested in motives to communicate via mediated or interpersonal channels to satisfy those
needs” (p. 42).
In this dissertation, I describe a model in which certain individual differences, media use
motives, and patterns of media exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented content could influence
attitudes (trust in government) and behaviors (political participation). As Rubin (1993a) argued:
“We need to examine elaborated models of media effects that consider social and psychological
attributes, motivation, attitudes, behavior, and outcomes. Media effects don’t typically occur just
from media exposure” (p. 103). The model proposed in this dissertation, as illustrated in Figure
1, is a response to this call to action that recognizes the complexity of media effects research.
Initial stages of research should center on identifying a typology of motives specific to consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented media. That is, uses and gratifications research exists regarding motives for selecting particular content as well as motives for using specific
media technology. Building on this research, in this dissertation I strive to understand why
individuals choose to consume film, TV, radio, online, or print media for information about
government conspiracy theories, as there is an abundance of this type of media fare in realistic
(e.g., news, documentary, political media such as advertising or commentary) as well as fictional
(e.g., popular suspense thrillers in film and television) narrative formats, and conspiracy-theory- oriented media texts often blend elements of realism and fiction, fact and conjecture. For some users, this type of media consumption may only be a matter of entertainment or passing time.
But for other users, investigating government conspiracy theories could be a matter of seeking
information about topics they believe to be legitimate political issues. This is similar to research 51
of political satire programs in that whether viewers consider such shows to be primarily news-
oriented or purely entertainment will influence how they engage with the material and what
outcomes could result from that exposure (Feldman, 2013). Based on the review of the literature
detailed earlier in this dissertation, it is clear that while scholars have devoted attention to the epistemological value of conspiracy theory narratives (Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014;
Pigden, 2007) and have made attempts to link personality traits and cognitive styles to
conspiracy ideation (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013), little has been done regarding
studying consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented media from a uses and gratifications
perspective.
Once motives have been identified, however, researchers must consider how media
exposure contributes to users’ attitudes and behaviors. While conspiracy-theory-oriented media
exposure could lead to a range of outcomes, studies could begin by considering the effect on
individuals’ trust in government and their likelihood of participating in the political process.
Research of government conspiracy theories is a nascent area of communication scholarship, but
the existing literature on the topic does suggest a few hypotheses worthy of testing.
In one of the few studies of conspiracy theories to consider media use, Stempel,
Hargrove, and Stempel (2007) found “robust positive associations between belief in conspiracy
theories and higher consumption of non-mainstream media (blogs and tabloids)” (p. 366).
Because individuals who are skeptical of traditional media sources may select non-traditional
media sources for information about government conspiracy theories, individuals higher in
media skepticism might use a more diverse array of media more to locate information about such
conspiracies. That is, they may doubt the mainstream print and broadcast narratives presented
from official sources and seek details to corroborate or debunk information from those channels 52
by turning to alternative sources of information such as television shows, documentaries,
tabloids, Web sites, or books about government conspiracy theories (Clarke, 2007). Altheide
(2009) listed several conspiracy-theory-oriented popular culture texts, adding that “counter- narratives are offered today in bits and pieces through electronic media, including the Internet, but are also available for purchase or free distribution on CDs, DVDs, and podcasts” (p. 39).
Tsfati and Capella (2003) also found that individuals who were highly skeptical of media turned away from mainstream news but gravitated toward other media. Explaining this result within the
context of uses and gratifications, they reasoned that skeptics have more diverse information
sources, perhaps because they seek content to satisfy entertainment or social needs rather than to
fulfill a need for information. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H1: Media skepticism will relate positively to increased use of government-conspiracy-
theory-oriented media fare.
Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, and Furnham (2014) and Lobato Mendoza, Sims, and
Chin (2014) found that belief in conspiracy theories was associated with particular thinking
dispositions (namely, intuitive more than analytical thinking). McCauley and Jacques (1979)
conducted four studies designed to test the idea that people irrationally ascribe conspiratorial
explanations for major events such as presidential assassinations; their results disputed this
notion, as did the results of Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, and Gregory (1999). Instead,
McCauley and Jacques (1979) found that people reasoned that groups of conspirators would
have a greater chance of successfully carrying out a presidential assassination than would a lone
assassin. Thus, the researchers suggested a certain amount of logical argumentation engaged in
by those who consume material related to conspiracy theories. They further suggested that
public fascination with conspiracy theories such as the JFK assassination might illustrate that 53
Americans see the event as an unresolved issue that remains salient in memory and demands further attention and mental involvement.
Although Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) found that high need for cognition was positively associated with information-seeking, Tsfati and Capella (2005) argued that individuals with a high need for cognition may seek media content to fulfill paraorientational gratifications characterized by ritualistic use, playing with information, or thinking about complex realities. People with high cognitive needs not only enjoy deliberation, they argued, but also require “ample challenging, even conflicting information. This is probably why they expose themselves to all they can find” (p. 267). This suggests the following hypothesis:
H2: Need for cognition will relate positively to selection of government-conspiracy-
theory-oriented media.
Although patterns of thinking may be important to consider, emotions may also play into the needs that drive communication motivations. Several scholars have argued that conspiracy theories originate from a feeling of powerlessness, fear, and anxiety (Chebat & Filiatrault, 1984;
Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Hofstader, 1964; Sagan, 1991). Because external locus of control has been defined in terms of a feeling of powerlessness or defenselessness (Chebat, Filiatrault, &
Perrien, 1990; Cantril, 1966), and because Rubin (1993b) situated locus of control within a uses and gratifications framework linking motives for media use, media exposure, and perceptual and behavioral effects, it would make sense to examine the role of an individual’s locus of control with regard to consumption of conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare.
Clarke (2002) argued that in contrast to situational explanations, conspiracy theories have unifying power in that a conspiracy theory about one issue or event can easily be stretched to encompass other issues or events. Thus, conspiracy theories may link nameless-yet-powerful 54
entities or groups to a variety of occurrences that provoke uncertainty, fear, or feelings of
vulnerability. But because many conspiracy theories do not always specifically name the
responsible actors or clarify their motives (Clarke, 2007), they may reinforce notions that
powerful others control world events. This lack of agency or efficacy may resonate with
individuals who possess an external locus of control and attract them to conspiracy-theory-
oriented fare. This leads to a third hypothesis:
H3: External locus of control will relate positively to increased use of government-
conspiracy-theory-oriented media.
Labeling a counter-narrative a “conspiracy theory” has often been characterized as an
attempt by one faction to discredit the opposition by dismissing them as crazy or unintelligent
(Altheide, 2009). Although Pipes (1997) tried to distinguish between the factual merits and
quality of argumentation in left-wing versus right-wing conspiracy theories, Eichenwald (2014)
underscored the appeal of conspiracy narratives generally for people adhering to various political
ideologies. Individuals across the spectrum of conservatism-liberalism find such counter-
narratives compelling. For instance, in their study of the film JFK, Butler, Koopman, and
Zimbardo (1995) found that after viewing the movie, conservatives became less confident about their judgments of the involvement of particular parties in the presidential assassination than did
individuals with other political orientations. Conspiracy theories have proliferated in left-wing
and right-wing circles, and many conspiracy-theory-oriented media narratives attract conservatives and liberals because enemies of both groups might jointly comprise the cabal of conspirators being implicated for secretive, evil plots (Fenster, 2008; Getlein, 1969; Olmsted,
2009). 55
However, research has suggested a concerted effort on the part of Republican and
conservative leaders to perpetuate a myth of biased news coverage from the supposedly “liberal
media elite,” despite a lack of empirical evidence of actual bias in press coverage of presidential
elections since the 1980s (Domke, Watts, Shah, & Fan, 1999; Lee, 2005; Watts, Domke, Shah, &
Fan, 1999). Lin, Haridakis, and Hanson (2016) found that conservatives were more likely to
exhibit a hostile media bias. Ladd (2010) argued that the hostile media effect would lead to
changes in people’s patterns of media exposure, perhaps causing them to turn to partisan media
sources rather than mainstream news. Negative attitudes about mainstream media have been
linked to increased use of the Internet as a functional alternative to traditional media (Muhtaseb
& Frey, 2008; Rains, 2007). Scholars have found evidence that people who were skeptical of mainstream media would consume more nonmainstream information, even eschewing the online counterparts of traditional media to seek alternative narratives in online environments (Tsfati,
2010; Yamamoto & Kushin, 2014).
This suggests the following hypothesis:
H4: Conservatism will relate positively to media skepticism.
In their study of prime-time television genres, Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) found that conspiracy-theory-oriented television shows in the science fiction genre frequently painted government agencies and officials in a negative light, and that consumption of such programming was linked to negative perceptions of the federal government. McGowen (2016) noted that individuals turned to Twitter not only to criticize mainstream media outlets but also to express distrust of national, state, and local government officials, indicating a link between media skepticism and people’s trust in government. Keeley (1999) argued that conspiracy theory narratives require a high degree of skepticism and often result in distrust of government. Some 56 of these suspicions have been warranted, as disclosures of actual conspiracies perpetrated by government entities have led to public animosity and distrust of government (Goertzel, 1994;
Molé, 2006; Olmsted, 2009; Parsons, Simmons, Shinhoster, & Kilburn, 1999). This reasonably suggests the following hypothesis:
H5: Increased use of media about conspiracy theories concerning government will be
negatively related to trust in government.
According to Barkun (2003), the persuasive role of online conspiracy discourse would be limited to repositioning conspiracy theories as nonpartisan, ushering conspiracy discourse out of the fringes of intellectual thought and into more mainstream forms of media, and bridging conspiracy theories with more familiar and accepted types of political expression. According to
Pinkleton, Austin, Zhou, Willoughby, and Reiser (2012), skeptics might seek information to answer questions or to learn more; the authors guessed that this information-seeking might translate to increased political engagement. However, Barkun argued that advocates of conspiracy theories may publish sophisticated Web sites and share a common perspective but share no other hallmarks of a structured virtual community: leadership, formalized organizational structures, and concrete avenues for mobilization. This would imply that seeking information is not always connected to participatory behaviors. In a health context, Jolley and Douglas (2014) found that exposure to anti-vaccine conspiracy theories negatively influenced vaccination intentions. Furthermore, Butler, Koopman, and Zimbardo (1995) found that exposure to government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media negatively impacted individuals’ intentions to vote, donate money, or volunteer for political causes. This suggests the following hypothesis:
H6: Consumption of government-conspiracy-theory-related media fare concerning
government will be negatively related to political participation. 57
Given the dearth of quantitative research on consumption of media fare related to government conspiracy theories and the lack of consistency in the findings related to the impact of conspiracy theories generally, this is a promising if not byzantine field of inquiry. Not much is known about significant relationships in this area, except that belief in one conspiracy theory is often linked with belief in other conspiracy theories; any relationships that have emerged in empirical research have been weak and difficult to replicate (Brotherton, French, & Pickering,
2013; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2014). Although an abundance of research into the effects of conspiracy-theory-oriented media exposure could be conducted in this uses and gratifications framework, several specific research questions could serve as a basis for investigation.
Although previous research grounded in uses and gratifications has addressed motives for use of particular media channels or even content (e.g., political information, news, horror films), not much is known about the motives that may be distinctly tied to media fare about government conspiracy theories. This type of content shares characteristics with other types of media fare and is available via many different media channels. So it is important to determine whether motives for consuming media about government conspiracy theories resembles motives for other types of media use or whether important differences exist for this type of content.
Conspiracy-themed television shows and movies have treated those endeavoring to uncover conspiracies as heroes and government conspirators as villains or monsters, and audiences found such formulas riveting for decades (Pfau, Moy, & Szabo, 2001; Picarelli &
Gomez-Galisteo, 2013; Scott, 2000). Scholars have found links between sensation-seeking and suspense films (Greene & Krcmar, 2005; Oliver & Sanders, 2004). Tsfati and Capella (2003) argued that individuals may select and attend to mainstream news despite higher levels of media skepticism to gratify non-informational needs such as entertainment. Tsfati and Capella (2005) 58
argued that individuals with high need for cognition might enjoy consuming mainstream news
for the pleasure of contemplating various perspectives or for engaging in critique.
As stated earlier, Rubin et al. (2003) found that people consumed television coverage of
the 9/11 attacks and terrorism-related stories to gain information and be with other people. Peled
and Katz (1974) also found an increased need for information during time of crisis. Some of that
post-crisis information might take the form of conspiracy-theory-oriented narratives about
government, such as theories that the U.S. government perpetrated the Oklahoma City bombings
or the 9/11 attacks (Knight, 2003). Al-Kandari (2010) elucidated a free marketplace of
information gratification in which people might consume conspiracy-theory-oriented content to
note the diversity of political orientations and opinions in society. Jones (2005) noted that
political satire/talk shows contained elements not only of comedy, but also served as a forum for
commentary and dialogue. Spark (2001) argued that people might consume conspiracy-theory- oriented fare as a hobby or to generally recognize that they have doubts about how the world is governed. Taken together, this research suggests that there may be diverse motives for consuming media related to government conspiracy theories:
This leads to the first research question:
RQ1: What are the motives for seeking government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media
fare?
Because government conspiracy theory narratives are circulated in so many media
channels, it is important to know which sources people turn to when they consume this type of
fare. Some government conspiracy theories are communicated in fictional contexts (e.g.,
movies, non-news TV programs), while others are presented in the context of news and
commentary about current political affairs (e.g., radio news, TV news, newspapers, news 59
magazines). Still other conspiratorial narratives blur the boundaries between fact and fiction, as
is the case with some books, television shows, documentaries, or even tabloids. Thus, answering
the second research question may provide insight into the popularity or the relative prominence
of particular sources of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare:
RQ2: What kinds of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content do people consume?
Because the uses and gratifications model (see Figure 1) used in this study considers
particular individual differences of users, a third research question necessarily addresses their
ability, in concert with motives for media use and consumption of government-conspiracy-
theory-oriented media fare, to predict trust in government as an attitudinal outcome variable:
RQ3: What is the relative contribution of media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of
control, conservatism/liberalism, motives, and consumption of media fare about
government conspiracy theories to predicting trust in government?
The complexity of the overall model (see Figure 1) requires a final research question assessing the ability of individual differences, motives for media use, consumption of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, and trust in government to predict political
participation as a behavioral outcome variable:
RQ4: What is the relative contribution of media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of
control, conservatism, liberalism, motives, consumption of media fare about government
conspiracy theories, and trust in government to predicting political participation?
Because empirical research of the uses and effects of media related to government conspiracy theories is nascent, a great deal of curiosity and rigor will be required to clarify the impact of this type of content. Hopefully, this research project will be an initial advancement toward elucidating this fascinating and important area of scholarship. 60
Chapter II
Methodology
The primary purpose of this study was to examine the impact of specific individual differences among audience members, motives for selecting government-conspiracy-theory- oriented media fare, and consumption of such media fare on trust in government and on political participation within a uses and gratifications theoretical framework. I have employed an online
survey methodology to gather information from respondents about their media skepticism, need
for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism as well as asking them to indicate
their answers regarding standard demographic variables. I then asked them about their motives
for attending to government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. Additionally, I asked participants about the frequency of their consumption of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare by asking a general exposure question and also by providing a range of content available via different media channels. I also measured outcome variables by asking respondents about their levels of trust in different entities within the United States government and about the nature and frequency of their political participation. The following sections explicate my research methods with regard to sampling, instruments, and analytical tests used to gather data for this study.
Sample and Sampling Procedure
My intention was to gather data that could provide insight regarding the role of consuming conspiracy-theory-oriented media as it pertains to people’s perceptions of and involvement in the governing processes of the United States. Therefore, it seemed prudent to try to assess these relationships within a sample of respondents drawn from the larger population of 61 the United States, rather than those of a particular age group (e.g., college students) or from a particular region of the country (e.g., a Midwestern state such as Ohio).
Another advantage of this approach was that it would allow me to administer an online survey with a better chance of obtaining a sufficient number of responses. Trying to target only people who frequent conspiracy-theory-oriented Web sites would limit me to people who seek such content online, perhaps at the expense of those who consume similar content from other media sources. Also, such specific targeting might raise suspicions of individuals who doubt my affiliations or reasons for gathering data. To avoid these problems and to increase the chances of validity, gathering data from a national sample seemed to be the optimal approach. However, it is important to note that all sampling methods have limitations. So, unfortunately, this method may have excluded people who do not have access to or who do not use the Internet. It also hinged on self-selection; though this was not ideal, it provided for more diversity than would convenience sampling or snowball sampling commonly undertaken for media research in a university setting.
Power analysis calculations (Cohen & Cohen, 1983) suggested a sample size of roughly
200 participants for this study. However, because of the large number of items in the motives scale and the need to conduct a factor analysis, more participants were needed. Specifically, it has been suggested that five to 10 participants per item are needed to conduct an exploratory factor analysis (Child, 2006; Gorsuch, 1983). Because I used 66 motive items, that would require between 330 and 660 participants. I aimed for a smaller sample size within this range because I did not want the study to be overpowered and because Gorsuch (1997) explained that
10 participants per item typically results in a larger sample size than is necessary. Therefore, I aimed for an initial sample size of 500. Response/completion rates are rarely equal to the 62
intended sample size, so an initial attempt to gather data from this many respondents allowed me
to gather an adequate amount of information to use inferential statistics appropriately and avoid
response bias even if fewer than 500 people were to provide usable data (Babbie, 2004). I also
took into account that the sample needed to be large enough that I could run statistical tests and be confident that the results would accurately reflect the population, while at the same time, recognizing the constraints of time and money as limiting resources (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000;
Poindexter & McCombs, 2000).
The sample was drawn from a national pool of respondents using the online survey system Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com). Qualtrics is an online panel aggregator that partners with vendors of research panels to gather respondents. Qualtrics initially oversamples and allows researchers to screen the data set at various points during the collection period to assess the quality of responses. Within a finite time period, researchers are able to delete and replace a limited number of questionnaire responses, thereby eliminating responses that were obviously straightlined or incomplete. Thus, data collection yielded 500 usable survey responses.
Potential respondents were contacted via e-mail and given the choice to participate in a particular survey. They were also given an estimate of how long it would take to complete the survey (approximately 20 minutes, based on Qualtrics survey testing) and a general statement of
the nature of the research. Potential respondents were notified that their participation would be
voluntary and that they would not be penalized if they were to decline to participate. Those individuals who did decide to participate would receive a modest incentive to encourage participation without unduly influencing recruitment or responses. According to information provided by Qualtrics, incentives are based on length of survey, specific panelist profile, and target acquisition difficulty. Specific types of rewards vary but may include redeemable points 63
or vouchers. Potential respondents were also provided with the contact information for the
investigators if they desired additional details about the study, and they were presented with a
consent form prior to beginning the survey. The recruitment method, consent form (Appendix
A), survey questionnaire, and data collection/storage protocols all received approval from Kent
State University’s Human Subjects Review Board.
Data collection took place February 13–16, 2017. The sample consisted of people in the
United States who consume government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare (N = 500). The
mean response time for filling out the survey was approximately 31 minutes, with a median duration of 17 minutes and 7 seconds. The minimum age was 18 years, and the maximum age reported was 77 years (M = 39.27, SD = 14.83). There were more females (n = 272) than males
(n = 227). Only one respondent reported a gender identification of “Other.”
In terms of education level, 19.2% reported high school or less (n = 96); 29.6% reported completing some college (n = 148); 33.2% reported completing college (n = 166); and 18% reported graduate/professional-level education (n = 90). The sample was more highly educated
in comparison to U.S. population statistics. The U.S. Census Bureau (2015a) reported
educational attainment for the national population as 41.1% indicating high school or less, 29.2%
indicating some college, 18.5% having a college degree, and 11.2% having a graduate or
professional degree. With regard to political affiliation, 34.6% were Democrat (n = 173); 32.2%
were Republican (n = 161); 27.4% reported being Independent (n = 137); and 5.8% indicated
“Other” (n = 29). While 8.6% of respondents were not registered to vote (n = 43), the majority
(91.4%) of the sample indicated that they were registered voters (n = 457). Thus, this was considerably higher than the 59.35% of U.S. adults in the general population who reported being registered to vote in the 2014 elections (U.S. Census Bureau, 2015b). 64
Measures
In this study, I utilized or adapted several scales and indices to gather data regarding
individual differences and demographic characteristics, motives for consuming government-
conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, exposure to sources of such media content, and on the
outcome variables of trust in government and political participation. These measures included a
Media Skepticism Scale (Appendix B), the Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale
(Appendix C), the Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Locus of Control Scales (Appendix D),
a Conservatism/Liberalism Scale (Appendix E), an index measuring Motives for Consuming
Media Fare Related to Government Conspiracies (Appendix F), an exposure measure of Media
Use for Consuming Content Related to Government Conspiracy Theories (Appendix G), a
Perceptions of the Federal Government Index (Appendix H), and a cluster of indices related to
Political Participation (Appendix I). I also asked respondents to answer items regarding
demographic variables (Appendix J). I prefaced the survey with an Informed Consent to
Participate in a Research Study document (Appendix A) specifying the purpose of the
questionnaire, the voluntary nature of participation, and the confidentiality of the responses.
Media Skepticism Scale
To measure media skepticism, I employed survey items used by Tsfati (2010), which were refinements of earlier measures used by Tsfati (2003b) and Tsfati and Capella (2003). In their studies of media skepticism and exposure to news content, they adapted the News
Credibility Scale developed by Gaziano and McGrath (1986) by adding questions addressing other elements of media skepticism.
The five items on the Media Skepticism Scale (see Appendix B) address feelings toward news credibility such as fairness, accuracy, and completeness as well as items that ask 65 respondents to think about whether media are unbiased and trustworthy (Tsfati & Capella, 2010).
Tsfati (2010) administered the scale in a study of skepticism toward Israeli media (Cronbach α =
.86) and in a study of perceptions of online news sources (Cronbach α = .84).
In the present study, items were coded so that 1 would indicate “never” and that 5 would indicate “always.” The five items were then summed and averaged, with lower scores reflecting a greater level of media skepticism (M = 2.90, SD = 0.87, α = .90). See Table 1 for the means and standard deviations for each item.
Table 1
Media Skepticism Means and Standard Deviations
Items M SD In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are fair? 3.03 0.96
In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are 3.09 0.89 accurate? In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are 2.67 1.17 unbiased? In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they tell the 2.75 1.11 whole story? In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they can be 2.94 1.03 trusted?
Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Never) to 5 (Always). N = 500.
Need for Cognition Scale
I measured need for cognition with the Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). The Cronbach α was .90 for the short form, indicating high internal consistency (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). Lobato,
Mendoza, Sims, and Chin (2014) utilized this measure (α = .91) in their study of correlations between categories of epistemically unwarranted beliefs (i.e., conspiracy theories, paranormal 66 beliefs, and pseudoscience). Using British samples, Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, and
Furnham (2014) also used this scale (α = .84) in their studies of associations between various thinking dispositions and belief in conspiracy theories.
The Short Form of the Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis,
1996) consists of 18 statements regarding preferences for tasks or situations that require thinking about complex ideas, solving problems, engaging in deliberation, or exerting mental effort (see
Appendix C). Respondents were asked to report whether each statement was characteristic of themselves on a five-point Likert-type scale (where 1 indicates that the statement is “extremely uncharacteristic” of the respondent, and 5 indicates that the statement is “extremely characteristic” of the respondent). Half of the statements are reverse coded. Thus, higher scores on this scale indicate a greater need for cognition (Swami et al., 2014).
In the present study, participants’ scores for the 18 items were summed and averaged to create a single score of need for cognition (M = 3.36, SD = 0.61, α = .84). See Table 2 for item means and standard deviations.
Table 2
Need for Cognition Means and Standard Deviations
Items M SD I would prefer complex to simple problems. 3.31 1.11 I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of 3.62 1.07 thinking. Thinking is not my idea of fun. * 3.42 1.33 I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure 3.25 1.32 to challenge my thinking abilities? * I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to 3.34 1.30 think in depth about something.* I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 3.36 1.10 I only think as hard as I have to. * 3.12 1.28
(continued) 67
Table 2 (continued) Need for Cognition Means and Standard Deviations Items M SD I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones? * 2.98 1.19 I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them? * 2.86 1.23 The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 3.76 1.02 I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 3.94 0.96 Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much? * 3.44 1.29 I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 3.43 1.14 The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 3.65 1.01 I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is 3.58 1.09 somewhat important but does not require much thought. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of 2.76 1.22 mental effort. * It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it 3.14 1.25 works. * I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me 3.57 1.05 personally. Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Extremely Uncharacteristic) to 5 (Extremely Characteristic). N = 500. * = Reverse coded item.
Locus of Control Scale
To measure locus of control, I used Levenson’s (1974) index. This scale was a
refinement of the Internal-External Locus of Control scale developed by Rotter (1966), which was designed to measure whether respondents feel that people themselves or external forces such as fate, luck, or powerful others are responsible for events, their behavior, and the future
(Abramowitz & Nassi, 1981; Lupfer & Wald, 1985). People who score highly on the Rotter scale feel that they control their own lives, and those with low scores feel that their actions are dictated by external sources (e.g., others, fate) (Browne, 1983). Rotter’s I-E scale has been widely used for measuring locus of control in a variety of contexts. Bergsma and Bergsma
(1978) used it in their study of college students’ belief or disbelief of the Warren Commission’s report on the JFK assassination, noting a correlation between external locus of control and distrust of the report’s veracity (despite students admitting they did not know very much about 68 the assassination investigation). Jaeger, Anthony, and Rosnow (1980) employed the scale in their exploration of rumor transmission.
Despite widespread use of Rotter’s I-E scale, it failed to predict social activism
(Levenson & Miller, 1976), and it did not differentiate between external control as a perception that destiny or chance would dictate events (i.e., fatalism) versus the notion that powerful others were actually pulling the strings (Levenson, 1974). This distinction might be meaningful for studies of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media, since narratives about conspiracies inevitably make reference to the influence of powerful others who orchestrate elaborate schemes.
To refine Rotter’s attempt to measure locus of control, Levenson (1974) devised a 24-item index of items addressing locus of control in three dimensions: internal, powerful others, or chance. As
I have used the scale here, respondents were asked to rate their agreement with statements pertaining to each of these dimensions on a five-point Likert scale, with 1 meaning “strongly disagree” and 5 meaning “strongly agree” (see Appendix D). Levenson and Miller (1976) reported Cronbach α values between .71 and .77. More recently, Hanson and Haridakis (2008) employed an abbreviated version of the scale (α = .72), and Hanson, Haridakis, Cunningham,
Sharma, and Ponder (2010) used the same measure, again finding the abbreviated version to be fairly reliable (α = .74).
In the present study, participants responded to all 24 items, and items were categorized into internal, powerful others, or chance scales. For each scale, the items were summed and averaged to create three separate indices of locus of control (i.e., internal, powerful others, and chance) with higher scores reflecting greater internal and external control, respectively. Eight items comprised the internal locus of control scale (M = 3.69, SD = 0.57, α = .73). The powerful others scale also consisted of eight items (M = 3.00, SD = 0.76, α = .85). The chance locus of 69
control scale contained eight items as well (M = 2.96, SD = 0.78, α = .85). See Table 3 for a complete list of locus of control item means and standard deviations, with notations delineating items pertaining to internal, powerful others, and chance specifically.
Table 3
Locus of Control Means and Standard Deviations
Items M SD Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. * 3.76 0.99 To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. † 2.81 1.13 I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. + 2.96 1.17 Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I 3.28 1.12 am. * When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. * 3.88 0.87 Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interest from bad luck 3.08 1.11 happenings. † When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. † 2.78 1.18 Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility 3.33 1.01 without appealing to those in positions of power. + How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. * 3.33 1.16 I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. † 3.64 0.95 My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. + 2.67 1.17 Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. † 2.72 1.16 People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests 3.05 1.11 when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups. + It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things may turn 2.90 1.08 out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. † Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. + 3.03 1.11 Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in 2.99 1.11 the right place at the right time. † If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make 2.80 1.19 many friends. + I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. * 3.41 1.00 I am usually able to protect my personal interests. * 3.81 0.82 Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. + 3.16 0.94 When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. * 4.07 0.84 In order to have my plans work, I make sure they fit in with the desires of people 3.03 1.12 who have power over me. + My life is determined by my own actions. * 3.96 0.92 It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends. † 2.74 1.14 Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). N = 500. * = Internal Locus of Control. + = Powerful Others Locus of Control. † = Chance Locus of Control. 70
Conservatism/Liberalism Scale
I used Mehrabian’s (1996) Conservatism/Liberalism Scale (see Appendix E) to measure
these left- or right-leaning political orientations, as opposed to asking respondents about their political party affiliations. (I have asked respondents’ about their formal party affiliation as a demographic characteristic in a separate item in case it would be useful as a control variable; See
Appendix J.) This approach was intended to yield more insight into the ideological leanings
pertinent to this study. The instrument contains seven items; scoring was adapted to a five-point
Likert scale allowing respondents to rate their agreement with each item, ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). This scale has been utilized in studies of the use of
Facebook, MySpace, and YouTube during the 2008 presidential election (Hanson et al., 2010),
media use during the 2012 election (Lin et al., 2016), general distrust of corporations (Adams,
Highhouse, & Zickar, 2010), and commitment to the U.S. war on terrorism (Agnew, 2007).
In the present study, four of the seven items used to measure conservatism/liberalism
were reverse coded so that higher scores indicated a more conservative political leaning.
Respondents’ scores on the seven items were then summed and averaged, (M = 3.15, SD = 0.80,
α = .78). Table 4 displays the items, their means, and their standard deviations.
Table 4 Conservatism/Liberalism Means and Standard Deviations Items M SD I am politically more liberal than conservative. * 2.82 1.36 In any election, given a choice between a Republican and a Democratic candidate, I 3.02 1.35 will select the Republican over the Democrat. Communism has been proven to be a failed political ideology. 3.76 1.00 I cannot see myself ever voting to elect conservative candidates. * 3.18 1.27 The major national media are too left-wing for my taste. 3.32 1.18 Socialism has many advantages over capitalism. * 3.06 1.15 On balance, I lean politically more to the left than to the right. * 2.90 1.23
Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 5 (Strongly Agree). N = 500. * = Reverse coded item. 71
Motives
I measured motivation for consuming media fare related to government conspiracy
theories with an adapted index (see Appendix F) consisting of 66 items culled from research of
television-, online-, and other media-use motives, use of the Web for political information, and
interpersonal communication motives (Hanson & Haridakis, 2008; Hanson et al., 2010; Hanson,
Haridakis, & Sharma, 2011; Haridakis & Hanson, 2009; Johnson & Kaye, 2003; Kaye, 2005;
Kaye & Johnson, 2004; Kim & Haridakis, 2009; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Rubin, 1983).
Using this type of measure has been typical in uses and gratifications research. Because no
specific scale has measured motives for consumption of media fare related to government
conspiracy theories, it was necessary to adapt existing measures of motives for media use and
selection of political information, which is a close corollary to the type of content being studied
in this project. Ultimately, these measures seemed to be pertinent to linking media use motives
to the outcome variables (i.e., trust in government, political participation) in this project as well.
Respondents were asked to use a scale of 1 (not at all) to 5 (exactly) to indicate how
much each motive-item statement reflected their own reasons for using media related to government conspiracy theories. The 66 items were subjected to a principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation to identify motive factors. Those factors that loaded with an eigenvalue of 1.0 or greater, using a 60-40 rule as a rough guide, were retained. This resulted in
38 motive items that loaded onto four factors.
These four motive factors explained 68.01% of the variance after rotation. The factors were (1) social utility/relaxing recreation, (2) political evaluation, (3) pass time, and (4) general information seeking. Results of the factor analysis are reported in Table 5. 72
Factor 1, social utility/relaxing recreation, included 19 items. Some items related to
interpersonal utility (“Because I want someone to do something for me,” “To meet new people,”
“To help others,” “To belong to a group with the same interests as mine”), interpersonal
connection (“To let others know I care about their feelings,” “To communicate with family and friends”), companionship (“So I won’t have to be alone,” “Because it makes me feel less lonely,”
“When there is no one else to talk to or be with”), social interaction (“Because it’s something to do when friends come over,” “So I can be with other members of the family who are consuming media with me”), or control (“To get something I don’t have,” To tell others what to watch or see”). Other items related to relaxation (“Because it relaxes me,” “Because it is a pleasant rest”), convenience (“Because it’s convenient,” “To access information from work”), habit (“Because it’s just a habit”), or escape (“So I can get away from family, friends, or others”).
Factor 2, political evaluation, contained 10 items. Three items related to guidance (“To see what a candidate would do if elected,” “To help me make up my mind about how to vote in an election,” “To make up my mind on important issues”). Two items related to entertainment/social utility (“To remind me of my candidate’s strong points,” “To enjoy the excitement of an election race”). Two items related to political surveillance (“To judge what political leaders are like,” “To judge who is likely to win an election”). Three items pertained to information seeking and media check (“To check accuracy of media,” “To keep up with the main issues of the day,” “To compare online accounts to traditional media”). In total, the items indicated an engagement with political information and current events, often with the intent to gather and appraise information for decision-making purposes and to predict outcomes.
Although one item (“To compare online accounts to traditional media”) diverged slightly from 73 the 60-40 rule (.59 primary loading), it was retained due to its conceptual consistency with other items and because of the clear distinctions between factor loadings.
Factor 3, pass time, included three pass time items (“When I have nothing better to do,”
“Because it passes the time away, particularly when I am bored,” and “Because it gives me something to occupy my time”), one entertainment item (“Because it amuses me”) and one habit item (“Just because it is there”). Together, these items indicate an attempt to relieve ennui or experience mild diversion in the absence of other activities.
Factor 4, general information seeking, included three items related to information seeking
(“To search for information,” “To see what is out there,” “Because it provides a new and interesting way to do research”) and one interpersonal utility item (“To get more points of view”). These four items reflect a sense of broad curiosity and a desire to gather various perspectives.
Table 5
Factor Loadings for Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories
Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories
Motives/Items SUR PE PT GIS Social Utility/Relaxing Recreation Because I want someone to do something for me. .81 .26 .18 .07 So I won’t have to be alone. .79 .24 .29 .08 To meet new people. .78 .24 .13 .14 Because it makes me feel less lonely. .77 .21 .29 .11 To access information from work. .75 .32 .15 .12 Because it is something to do when friends come .75 .30 .25 .11 over. So I can get away from family, friends, or others. .74 .14 .27 .20 To get something I don’t have. .69 .32 .28 .08 To let others know I care about their feelings. .69 .36 .14 .23 To tell others what to watch or see. .69 .38 .20 .18 To communicate with family and friends. .68 .30 .14 .24 (continued)
74
Table 5 (continued)
Factor Loadings for Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories
Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories
Motives/Items SUR PE PT GIS So I can be with other members of the family .65 .44 .24 .12 or friends who are consuming media with me. To help others. .65 .33 .11 .34 When there is no one else to talk to or be with. .64 .24 .38 .22 Because it is a pleasant rest. .62 .40 .35 .13 Because it’s just a habit. .62 .21 .35 .25 To belong to a group with the same interests .61 .41 .23 .24 as mine. Because it’s convenient. .61 .28 .28 .29 Because it relaxes me. .60 .38 .40 .19 Political Evaluation To remind me of my candidate’s strong points. .33 .76 .21 .13 To see what a candidate would do if elected. .24 .75 .20 .24 To judge what political leaders are like. .33 .73 .17 .21 To help make up my mind about how to vote .38 .72 .19 .11 in an election. To check accuracy of media. .23 .71 .05 .25 To enjoy the excitement of an election race. .38 .70 .25 .11 To make up my mind on important issues. .30 .70 .09 .32 To judge who is likely to win an election. .44 .69 .21 .13 To keep up with the main issues of the day. .24 .67 .21 .33 To compare online accounts to traditional media. .31 .59 .12 .32 Pass Time Because it amuses me. .14 .20 .76 .14 When I have nothing better to do. .32 .14 .75 .04 Because it passes the time away, particularly .36 .11 .70 .25 when I’m bored. Because it gives me something to occupy my .35 .23 .65 .23 time. Just because it is there. .38 .22 .65 .11 General Information Seeking To search for information. .36 .28 .06 .71 To see what is out there. .11 .26 .31 .68 Because it provides a new and interesting way .27 .34 .23 .68 to do research. To get more points of view. .16 .43 .14 .65
(continued)
75
Table 5 (continued)
Factor Loadings for Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories
Eigenvalue 10.93 7.43 4.25 3.24 Variance Explained 28.76 19.54 11.18 8.53 Cronbach alpha .97 .95 .87 .84 M 2.60 3.05 3.09 3.39 SD 1.08 1.02 0.98 0.92
Note. N = 500. SUR = Social Utility/Relaxing Recreation, PE = Political Evaluation, PT = Pass Time, GIS = General Information Seeking.
For the items that loaded on each factor, responses were summed and averaged to create
an index for each motive for choosing media fare related to government conspiracy theories.
Means and standard deviations for each factor and its associated items are listed in Table 6.
Table 6 Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories: Item Means and Standard Deviations
Motives/Items M SD Social Utility/Relaxing Recreation 2.60 1.08 Because I want someone to do something for me. 2.32 1.34 So I won’t have to be alone. 2.37 1.34 To meet new people. 2.20 1.38 Because it makes me feel less lonely. 2.43 1.32 To access information from work. 2.49 1.38 Because it is something to do when friends come over. 2.47 1.35 So I can get away from family, friends, or others. 2.37 1.32 To get something I don’t have. 2.57 1.30 To let others know I care about their feelings. 2.83 1.32 To tell others what to watch or see. 2.63 1.36 To communicate with family and friends. 2.70 1.34 So I can be with other members of the family or friends 2.67 1.35 who are consuming media with me. To help others. 2.84 1.30 When there is no one else to talk to or be with. 2.74 1.33 Because it is a pleasant rest. 2.77 1.31 Because it’s just a habit. 2.69 1.28 To belong to a group with the same interests as mine. 2.78 1.33 Because it’s convenient. 2.83 1.30 Because it relaxes me. 2.74 1.30 (continued) 76
Table 6 (continued) Motives for Choosing Media Fare about Government Conspiracy Theories: Item Means and Standard Deviations
Motives/Items M SD Political Evaluation 3.05 1.02 To remind me of my candidate’s strong points. 3.01 1.26 To see what a candidate would do if elected. 3.13 1.24 To judge what political leaders are like. 3.02 1.24 To help make up my mind about how to vote in an election. 2.93 1.30 To check accuracy of media. 3.25 1.20 To enjoy the excitement of an election race. 2.88 1.26 To make up my mind on important issues. 3.12 1.24 To judge who is likely to win an election. 2.82 1.23 To keep up with the main issues of the day. 3.25 1.20 To compare online accounts to traditional media. 3.07 1.23
Pass Time 3.09 0.98 Because it amuses me. 3.27 1.16 When I have nothing better to do. 3.01 1.24 Because it passes the time away, particularly when I’m bored. 2.94 1.24 Because it gives me something to occupy my time. 3.20 1.20 Just because it is there. 3.02 1.21
General Information Seeking 3.39 0.92 To search for information. 3.30 1.15 To see what is out there. 3.46 1.04 Because it provides a new and interesting way to do research. 3.32 1.18 To get more points of view. 3.48 1.09
Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Not at All) to 5 (Exactly). N = 500.
Exposure
Although scales exist regarding belief in particular conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-
Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2014) or in conspiracy ideation generically (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013), there is no generally accepted scale
measuring exposure to conspiracy-theory-oriented media specifically. Therefore, I used a scale
adapted from research by Brotherton, French, and Pickering (2013) on generic conspiracy beliefs 77 and by Stempel, Hargrove, and Stemple (2007) in their study of media use and belief in 9/11 conspiracies.
To provide respondents with examples of the types of topics or assertions addressed by government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, I took items from a scale originally developed to study beliefs in common conspiracy theories (Brotherton, French, & Pickering,
2013). To be clear, I am not studying belief in conspiracy theories per se in the present research project. However, these items help to define the particular type of content or themes I wanted respondents to consider when answering questions about their media exposure. After listing several types of conspiracy theories commonly portrayed in media, I asked a general question about how frequently respondents look at or listen to media related to conspiracy theories involving government (Appendix G), using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5
(very often). This question was phrased broadly because conspiracy-theory-oriented media often include multiple conspiracy theories. For example, many conspiracy-theory-oriented books or
TV shows address a range of conspiracy theories in an episodic or serialized fashion or via a single complex narrative weaving many conspiracy theories together. All 500 people in the sample answered this general exposure question (M = 3.24, SD = 1.02).
Then I listed several media sources, adapting a list used by Stempel, Hargrove, and
Stemple (2007). Although the authors asked how many times each week respondents got news from a variety of sources (i.e., radio news sources, talk radio, local and network TV news, TV news Web sites, daily newspapers, newspaper Web sites, blogs, other Web sites, newsmagazines, and tabloids), several important media categories were missing from the list of possible media channels. These included movies, non-news television shows, and books, for instance. While these additional sources may not have been relevant to a study of news media, they were thought 78
to be pertinent to a study of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, as this type of content transcends channels and genres (e.g., news, entertainment, educational content). A more complete list of media choices with some relevant examples of conspiratorial content portrayed in each channel is provided in Appendix G. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they
use each media source for material about government conspiracy theories on a scale of 1 (never)
to 5 (very often). See Table 7 for the means and standard deviations of use of each medium for
material related to government conspiracy theories.
Table 7
Media Use for Government Conspiracy Theories Means and Standard Deviations
Medium M SD Radio News (For example: National Public Radio) 2.77 1.26 Talk Radio (For example: Rush Limbaugh) 2.68 1.30 TV News (For example: CNN, Fox News, NBC Nightly News, CBS Evening News, 3.43 1.19 ABC World News Tonight) Television non-news programs (For example: The X-Files, Codes and 2.87 1.30 Conspiracies, Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura, Brad Meltzer’s Decoded) Political satire programs (For example: The Daily Show, Saturday Night Live, 2.89 1.30 Last Week Tonight) Political Talk Programs (For example: The O’Reilly Factor, Washington Week) 2.87 1.30 Movies (For example: JFK, Conspiracy Theory, All the President’s Men, The 3.12 1.20 International, Loose Change) Advertisements (For example: Political campaign ads regarding candidates or 2.79 1.19 issues) Books (For example: Counterknowledge; Everything you know is wrong: The 2.72 1.26 disinformation guide to secrets and lies) Daily Newspaper (For example: USA Today, The New York Times, The 2.89 1.21 Washington Post) News Magazines (For example: Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report) 2.81 1.24 Tabloids (For example: The National Enquirer, Globe, The New York Post) 2.42 1.34 Internet homepages (For example: MSN.com, Yahoo!, AOL. com) 3.16 1.20 Social Media/Video sharing sites (For example: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) 3.29 1.25 Other Web sites (For example: sites devoted to a particular conspiracy or topic; 2.88 1.25 Web sites of government agencies) Discussions with Others (For example: conversations with friends, family, co- 3.15 1.16 workers, or other individuals)
Note. Means are based on a 5-point scale. Scores ranged from 1 (Never) to 5 (Very Often). N = 500. 79
The inclusion of a general question about exposure to government-conspiracy-theory- oriented media as well as questions about the frequency of specific media channels for this type of content served two purposes. First, I had two different ways of measuring exposure in this study, providing a safeguard through purposeful redundancy. Second, the broad question about exposure to conspiratorial content reinforced to respondents that I wanted them to think about how often they use each channel for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare specifically as opposed to thinking about how frequently they use each media channel for information in general. This approach, coupled with clearly emphasized instructions, aimed to stimulate respondents to consider their media exposure habits with more accuracy and precision.
Trust in Government Scale
I measured trust in government with the Perceptions of the Federal Government Scale
(Pfau, Moy, & Szabo, 2001) (see Appendix H). This instrument is composed of a dozen seven- point semantic differential items for four branches of the federal government, many of which are named in media related to government conspiracy theories. For each segment of the federal government (i.e., executive branch, legislative branch, domestic law enforcement arm, and the regulatory arm), respondents were asked to select a number between a series of adjective pairs addressing their global attitude toward each arm of the federal government. When implemented by Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001), Cronbach α values were .94 for the executive branch and .95 for the other branches. The researchers also asked respondents to rate each government entity in terms of perceptions of source credibility dimensions of character (Cronbach α values ranged from .82 to .85) and competence (Cronbach α values ranged from .85 to .93).
Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001) used this measurement instrument in their study of the influence of prime-time television programming on perceptions of the federal government. A 80
shorter version was employed in a study of media use and public confidence in democratic
institutions including the presidency, Congress, and the criminal court system (Moy, Pfau, &
Kahlor, 1999). Neither article listed the specific instructions, but Pfau, Moy, and Szabo (2001)
referenced the McCrosky (1966) source credibility semantic differential scale items as having
informed their measure; therefore, I adapted the wording of the instructions for the measure of
perceptions of the federal government from the McCrosky measure (as cited in Rubin,
Palmgreen, & Sypher, 2004).
In the present study, respondents’ scores on each seven-point semantic differential scale were summed and averaged to indicate perceptions about a particular entity within the federal government. Respondents appraised the executive branch (M = 4.07, SD = 1.78, α = .98), the legislative branch (M = 4.12, SD = 1.53, α = .98), law enforcement agencies (M = 4.74, SD =
1.44, α = .97), and regulatory agencies (M = 4.57, SD = 1.47, α = .98). These four indices provide specific insight into respondents’ levels of trust in government. See Table 8 for item means and standard deviations.
Table 8 Perceptions of Federal Government Means and Standard Deviations Items M SD Executive branch (e.g., president, vice president, and cabinet) Foolish—Wise 4.12 1.97 Unacceptable—Acceptable 4.12 1.95 Negative—Positive 4.04 1.98 Unfavorable—Favorable 4.07 1.96 Unvaluable—Valuable 4.28 1.91 Bad—Good 4.15 1.94 Unqualified—Qualified 4.08 2.03 Unintelligent—Intelligent 4.34 1.94 Incompetent—Competent 4.15 1.95 Dishonest—Honest 3.84 1.95 Selfish—Unselfish 3.76 1.96 Unsympathetic—Sympathetic 3.89 1.97 (continued) 81
Table 8 (continued) Perceptions of Federal Government Means and Standard Deviations Items M SD Legislative branch (e.g., House of Representatives and Senate) Foolish—Wise 4.17 1.80 Unacceptable—Acceptable 4.09 1.67 Negative—Positive 4.05 1.73 Unfavorable—Favorable 4.02 1.68 Unvaluable—Valuable 4.32 1.73 Bad—Good 4.22 1.69 Unqualified—Qualified 4.32 1.75 Unintelligent—Intelligent 4.43 1.70 Incompetent—Competent 4.23 1.72 Dishonest—Honest 3.89 1.77 Selfish—Unselfish 3.73 1.78 Unsympathetic—Sympathetic 3.95 1.76
Law enforcement agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) Foolish—Wise 4.80 1.71 Unacceptable—Acceptable 4.72 1.63 Negative—Positive 4.65 1.62 Unfavorable—Favorable 4.72 1.63 Unvaluable—Valuable 4.97 1.68 Bad—Good 4.76 1.63 Unqualified—Qualified 4.92 1.64 Unintelligent—Intelligent 4.93 1.63 Incompetent—Competent 4.88 1.62 Dishonest—Honest 4.51 1.66 Selfish—Unselfish 4.52 1.68 Unsympathetic—Sympathetic 4.46 1.69
Regulatory agencies (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Trade Commission) Foolish—Wise 4.58 1.73 Unacceptable—Acceptable 4.55 1.63 Negative—Positive 4.52 1.63 Unfavorable—Favorable 4.57 1.61 Unvaluable—Valuable 4.73 1.63 Bad—Good 4.59 1.62 Unqualified—Qualified 4.71 1.65 Unintelligent—Intelligent 4.74 1.61 Incompetent—Competent 4.61 1.65 Dishonest—Honest 4.46 1.66 Selfish—Unselfish 4.37 1.65 Unsympathetic—Sympathetic 4.39 1.74 Note. Means are based on 7-point scales. N = 500. 82
Political Participation Scale
To gather information regarding respondents’ political participation, I used a cluster of behavioral indices of interpersonal and interactive expression as well as of civic and political participation (see Appendix I) created by Shah and colleagues (2007). In their study, an interpersonal political discussion index was created by averaging the scores of six items
(Cronbach’s α = .89). An interactive political messaging index was created by averaging scores of five items (Cronbach’s α = .67). The civic participation index was created by averaging the scores of four items (Cronbach’s α =.77), and the political participation index was created by averaging the scores of seven items (Cronbach’s α =.76).
Several researchers have suggested that the increasing use of newer communication technologies have blurred the boundaries between communicative practices such as online discussion with other behavioral outcomes traditionally associated with political participation.
Yamamoto and Kushin (2014) argued that “social media are characterized by the principles of
Web 2.0 that embrace the participation of users, and thus it is important to examine online expression, behavioral aspects of social media such as posting political comments and sharing news stories” (pp. 434-435). The increasing role of the Internet in politics and democratic processes around the world may require that discussion, interaction, and mobilization via blogs also be considered a form of political participation (Greuling & Kilian, 2014; Kim & Johnson,
2012). As Lariscy, Tinkham, and Sweetser (2011) found, “young people perceive political participation differently than their older counterparts. To this group, more solitary activities, such as searching for political information or reading blog content, do constitute political participation” (p. 760). 83
Collectively, then, the measures used in this study include items related to interpersonal political discussion, interactive political messaging (i.e., via e-mail or chatroom), civic participation, and political participation. Thus, the indices tap into participation in a more comprehensive sense, addressing communicative activities in various contexts and actions taken within a community or social group as well as traditional forms of political participation such as voting, contributing money to a campaign, or attending a political speech. Respondents were asked to answer how often they had engaged in a list of activities within the previous three months. Frequency options were provided in a nine-point scale, starting with zero times per month, and increasing to one time, two times, three times, four to six times, seven to 12 times, 13 to 24 times, 25 or more times, and including a final option of “not specified.” These unspecified responses were deleted from further analysis.
In the present study, six items related to interpersonal discussion (M = 4.38, SD = 1.71, α
= .89), five items related to interactive political messaging (M = 2.61, SD = 1.73, α = .90), four items related to civic participation (M = 2.54, SD = 1.76, α = .92), and seven items related to traditional forms of political participation (M = 2.29, SD = 1.61, α = .94). See Table 9 for item means and standard deviations.
Table 9
Political Participation Means and Standard Deviations
Items M SD Interpersonal Political Discussion Talked about politics with co-workers. 3.97 2.38 Talked about politics with people who disagree with me. 4.16 2.02 Talked about politics with ethnic minorities. 3.67 2.16 Talked about politics with friends. 4.73 2.06 Talked about politics with family. 5.01 2.11 Talked about politics with people who agree with me. 4.91 2.12 (continued)
84
Table 9 (continued)
Political Participation Means and Standard Deviations
Items M SD Interactive Political Messaging Used e-mail to organize community activities. 2.46 2.00 Discussed politics or news events using e-mail. 2.68 2.01 E-mailed a politician or editor to express my views. 2.42 1.96 Expressed my political opinion in chat rooms or online polls. 2.98 2.22 Participated in a chat room or online forum. 2.64 2.17
Civic Participation Went to a club meeting. 2.39 2.00 Did volunteer work. 2.81 2.08 Worked on a community project. 2.52 1.93 Worked on behalf of a social group or cause. 2.45 1.88
Political Participation Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech. 2.20 1.73 Encouraged someone to register to vote. 2.86 1.95 Wore a campaign button or candidate t-shirt. 2.34 1.94 Displayed a campaign bumper sticker or yard sign. 2.31 1.98 Worked for a political party or candidate. 2.07 1.85 Circulated a petition for a candidate or issue. 2.17 1.87 Contributed money to a political campaign. 2.15 1.81
Note. Means are based on 8-point scales. A ninth option (“Not specified”) was provided to respondents, but responses of “9” were deleted from statistical analysis. N = 458 for interpersonal political discussion; N = 477 for interactive political messaging; N = 484 for civic participation; N = 480 for political participation.
Demographic Variables
The survey concluded with a short list of demographic measures (Appendix J).
Respondents were asked to provide information about their age, education level, political party affiliation, voter registration status, and gender. These variables were useful in describing the survey sample. Age and gender were used in the statistical analyses in this study as well, as prior research has uncovered age (e.g., Hofer, Allemand, & Martin, 2014; Holt, Shehata, Strömbäck, 85
& Ljungberg, 2013) and gender (e.g., Barriga, Shapiro, & Fernandez, 2010; Benesch, 2012)
differences in use of various media.
Statistical Analyses
The model (see Figure 1) used in this study rests on a uses and gratifications theoretical
framework. In this model, specific individual differences (i.e., media skepticism, need for
cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism) work together with individuals’ motives
for selection and exposure to government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare to influence individuals’ trust in government and political participation. To begin statistical analysis of the data, I first created a codebook containing the name of each variable addressed in the questionnaire, the range of items on the survey instrument pertaining to each variable, how each variable was operationalized, and the possible values for responses. It was essential to organize the information about each element of the model as it was measured on the survey instrument to be able to interpret the data accurately and meaningfully.
Upon the completion of the data collection period, I exported the data from Qualtrics, an online survey panel aggregator, into an SPSS file for review and analysis. I checked the data for any errors, problems with validity, missing responses, or any questionnaires that appeared to have been filled out without actual thought or genuine feedback. I proceeded to assess demographic characteristics of the sample with descriptive statistics, and I tested my measures for reliability. I have reported the Cronbach alpha values to determine the internal consistency of all scales used in the survey instrument. I also calculated means and standard deviations for the variables in the study.
To analyze data regarding motive statements, I employed principal components factor analysis with varimax rotation. As stated previously, factors that loaded with an eigenvalue of 86
1.0 or greater and using a 60-40 rule as a rough guide were retained. I summed and averaged the responses to items that loaded on each factor to create an index of each motive for selecting government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare.
To report the results of respondents’ stated exposure to government-conspiracy-theory- oriented media fare, I calculated means and standard deviations for the frequency of reported use of each source of such content. I summed and averaged the responses for each of the outcome variables to create an index for trust in government and an index for political participation. I also reported means, standard deviations, and Cronbach alpha values for each index.
Based on the aforementioned review of relevant literature, I have proposed several hypotheses. First, I hypothesized that media skepticism would relate positively to increased use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. Second, I postulated that need for cognition would relate positively to use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Third,
I hypothesized that external locus of control would relate positively to consumption of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media. Fourth, I reasoned that conservatism would relate positively to media skepticism. A fifth hypothesis assumed that increased use of media about conspiracy theories concerning government would be negatively related to trust in government. A sixth hypothesis assumed that selecting information about government conspiracy theories would be negatively related to political participation. To test each bivariate relationship being posed in my hypotheses, I used Pearson’s Product Moment correlation analysis.
Because there is so little research directly related to the uses and effects of government- conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare, I posed several research questions. First, I inquired about the motives for seeking government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. Second, I asked 87
what kinds of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media content people consume. Third, I
wanted to understand the relative contribution of media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of
control, conservatism, liberalism, motives, and consumption of media fare about government
conspiracy theories to predicting trust in government. Finally, I wanted to understand more
completely the relative contributions of media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control,
conservatism/liberalism, motives, exposure to government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media
fare, and trust in government to predicting political participation.
To test my research questions, I used multiple regression, relying on the uses and
gratifications model (see Figure 1) I have proposed to guide the entry of variables into the
regression analysis. As has been the case in a number of prior uses and gratifications studies
(e.g., Belcher & Haridakis, 2013; Hanson, Haridakis, Cunningham, Sharma, & Ponder, 2010;
Ponder & Haridakis, 2015; Rubin et al., 2003) the model suggests that predictors that come later in the model should add to the variance explained by predictors that come earlier in the model, and together, these antecedents help to predict particular outcomes. Accordingly, I entered demographic variables (e.g., age, gender) and individual differences (i.e., media skepticism, need
for cognition, locus of control, and conservatism/liberalism) on the first step. On the second
step, I entered motives for using media for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare. I entered media use for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material on the third step. Those individual differences, motives, and selection of media for government-conspiracy-theory- oriented fare helped predict trust in government as an attitudinal effect. I then entered trust in government variables on a fourth step to predict political participation as a behavioral outcome.
Results of the statistical analyses employed to investigate the hypotheses and research questions are specified in the next chapter. 88
Chapter III
Results
This study was intended to explore possible predictors of levels of trust in government and the extent of political participation among users of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media content. In this section, I present results of the statistical analyses employed to test the hypotheses and investigate the research questions.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 posited that media skepticism would relate positively to increased use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. H1 was not supported. In fact, the relationship was in the opposite direction. There were significant correlations between lower
levels of media skepticism and general exposure to media fare related to government conspiracy
theories (r = .29, p < .01) as well as each of the specific media sources for material related to
government conspiracy theories. Those who were less skeptical of media consumed more
conspiracy-theory-oriented fare across media. A less skeptical view of media was positively
related to use of radio news (r = .41, p < .01), talk radio (r = .27, p < .01), TV news (r = .33, p <
.01), television non-news programs (r = .25, p < .01), political satire programs (r = .41, p < .01), political talk programs (r = .28, p < .01), movies (r = .33, p < .01), advertisements (r = .45, p <
.01), books (r = .30, p < .01), daily newspapers (r = .39, p < .01), news magazines (r = .43, p <
.01), tabloids (r = .37, p < .01), Internet homepages (r = .36, p < .01), social media/video sharing
sites (r = .20, p < .01), other Web sites (r = .23, p < .01), and discussions with others (r = .24, p <
.01).
Hypothesis 2 stated that need for cognition would relate positively to selection of
government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media. This hypothesis was not supported. In fact, 89
there were some significant but negative relationships. Need for cognition was related
negatively to use of conspiracy-theory-oriented radio news (r = -.14, p < .01), talk radio (r = -.12,
p < .01), TV news (r = -.16, p < .01), tabloids (r = -.20, p < .01), and Internet homepages (r = -
.14, p < .01). Need for cognition was also related negatively to use of advertisements (r = -.10, p
< .05) and daily newspapers (r = -.09, p < .05), though these latter correlations were very small.
There were no significant relationships between need for cognition and media exposure related to government conspiracy theories in general (r = -.00, p = .94), nor between need for
cognition and use of television non-news programs (r = -.02, p = .62), political satire programs (r
= .02, p = .73), political talk programs (r = -.05, p = .30), movies (r = -.08, p = .06), books (r =
.01, p = .79), news magazines (r = -.07, p = .10), social media/video sharing sites (r = -.02, p =
.65), other Web sites (r = .05, p = .29), and discussions with others (r = .06, p = .17).
Hypothesis 3 asserted that external locus of control would relate positively to increased
use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media. This hypothesis was supported. Use of
media pertaining to government conspiracy theories did relate positively to both of the external
forms of locus of control (i.e., believing powerful others or chance would be responsible for
events and behaviors). However, it is important to note that significant positive relationships
were shown to exist between government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media exposure and all
forms of locus of control measured in this study (i.e., powerful others, chance, and internal locus
of control). This was the case for the general media exposure item as well as for all of the
specific media sources of information pertaining to government conspiracy theories. Table 10
displays the strengths of these relationships and their significance levels.
90
Table 10
Correlations between Media Use for Government Conspiracy Theories and Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Dimensions of Locus of Control
Medium Internal Powerful Chance LoC Others LoC LoC General Use of Media for Government Conspiracy Theories .32** .38** .40** Radio News .32** .40** .41** Talk Radio .28** .34** .38** TV News .29** .16** .22** Television non-news programs .21** .35** .38** Political satire programs .20** .39** .39** Political Talk Programs .26** .26** .31** Movies .29** .33** .37** Advertisements .33** .37** .41** Books .23** .42** .41** Daily Newspaper .27** .30** .36** News Magazines .26** .39** .42** Tabloids .20** .43** .50** Internet homepages .27** .24** .31** Social Media/Video sharing sites .19** .22** .24** Other Web sites .23** .35** .37** Discussions with Others .23** .26** .30**
Note. N = 500. ** p < .01
Hypothesis 4 posited that conservatism would relate to media skepticism. H4 was supported. Conservatism was negatively related to media skepticism (r = -.36, p < .01). In the measure of media skepticism used in this study, higher scores reflected lower levels of skepticism and a more favorable impression of media. So a negative correlation indicates that individuals with a more conservative political leaning reported a greater degree of media skepticism.
Hypothesis 5 stated that increased use of media about conspiracy theories concerning government would be negatively related to trust in government. This hypothesis was not 91
supported. In fact, there were several significant positive correlations between trust in federal
government entities (i.e., the executive branch, the legislative branch, law enforcement agencies,
and regulatory agencies) and general as well as specific media use for material related to
government conspiracy theories. See Table 11.
Table 11
Correlations between Use of Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media and Trust in Government (Perceptions of the Federal Government: Executive Branch, Legislative Branch, Law Enforcement Agencies, and Regulatory Agencies)
Trust in: Executive Legislative Law Regulatory Branch Branch Enforcement Agencies General Use of Media for .22** .27** .12** .27** Government Conspiracy Theories Medium Radio News .40** .40** .25** .24** Talk Radio .43** .33** .23** .14** TV News .24** .26** .20** .22** Television non-news programs .17** .26** .08 .21** Political satire programs .02 .24** .08 .38** Political Talk Programs .29** .29** .23** .22** Movies .19** .27** .13** .23** Advertisements .36** .44** .27** .34** Books .23** .28** .08 .20** Daily Newspaper .24** .32** .16** .28** News Magazines .26** .35** .18** .30** Tabloids .34** .39** .13** .25** Internet homepages .22** .24** .20** .24** Social Media/Video sharing sites .14** .18** .11* .23** Other Web sites .22** .22** .03 .20** Discussions with Others .19** .23** .10* .19**
Note. N = 500. ** p < .01 *p < .05
There were no significant correlations between use of political satire programs for
material pertaining to government conspiracy theories and trust in the executive branch (r = .02, p = .65) or trust in law enforcement agencies (r = .08, p = .06). There were also no significant 92 correlations between use of either television non-news programs (r = .08, p = .06), books (r =
.08, p = .08), or other Web sites (r = .03, p = .49) with trust in law enforcement agencies.
Hypothesis 6 stated that consumption of conspiracy-theory-related media fare concerning government would be negatively related to political participation. This hypothesis was not supported. Once more, instead of negative correlations, there were many significant positive correlations between use of media for material pertaining to government conspiracy theories and four types of political participation (i.e., interpersonal political discussions, interactive political messaging, civic participation, and traditional political participation behaviors). See Table 12.
Table 12
Correlations between Use of Government-Conspiracy-Theory-Oriented Media and Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion, Interactive Political Messaging, Civic Participation, Political Participation)
Medium Interpersonal Interactive Civic Political Political Political Participation Participation Discussion Messaging General Use of Media for .15** .33** .23** .34** Government Conspiracy Theories Radio News .09 .41** .37** .42** Talk Radio .12** .44** .38** .44** TV News .12** .23** .16** .28** Television non-news programs .12** .30** .29** .37** Political satire programs .20** .33** .27** .31** Political Talk Programs .21** .34** .24** .35** Movies .09* .35** .27** .32** Advertisements .12* .42** .41** .42** Books .14** .40** .33** .37** Daily Newspaper .18** .38** .31** .35** News Magazines .15** .41** .37** .40** Tabloids .04 .41** .41** .43** Internet homepages .06 .29** .18** .26** Social Media/Video sharing sites .19** .35** .27** .29** Other Web sites .16** .42** .33** .37** Discussions with Others .23** .37** .27** .31**
Note. N = 458 for interpersonal political discussion; N = 477 for interactive political messaging; N = 484 for civic participation; N = 480 for political participation. ** p < .01 *p < .05 93
As Table 12 indicates, nearly all of the positive correlations were significant at the p <
.01 level. However, two types of specific media use were positively correlated with
interpersonal political discussion at the p < .05 level. Viewing conspiracy-theory-oriented
movies and advertisements (e.g., political campaign ads about a candidate or issue) related
positively with interpersonal political discussion at the p < .05 level.
There were no significant correlations between interpersonal political discussion and use
of either radio news (r = .09, p = .06), tabloids (r = .04, p = .35), or Internet homepages (r = .06,
p = .18) for information pertaining to government conspiracy theories.
Research Questions
Research question 1 inquired about the motives for seeking media fare pertaining to government conspiracy theories. This research question was answered with the factor analysis described in Chapter II. As noted previously, the factor analysis provided a four-factor solution.
These factors represented (1) social utility/relaxing recreation, (2) political evaluation, (3) pass time, and (4) general information seeking motivations for choosing media fare about government conspiracy theories. Results of the factor analysis were reported in Table 5, and the means and standard deviations for each item that loaded onto the four factors were reported in Table 6.
Research question 2 inquired about what kinds of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content people would consume. This question was addressed indirectly by asking participants to think about various types of conspiracy-theory-oriented media content they sought from various media. Respondents were given a list of media sources and examples of government-conspiracy- theory-oriented content available in each source. Respondents were asked to indicate how often they used those specific media sources for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material. The instructions were phrased and typed (using bold, underlined text) so as to underscore the idea 94
that respondents were being asked to think about their media use in terms of government-
conspiracy-theory-oriented material specifically as opposed to their general use of each medium.
Respondents reported using TV news programs (e.g., CNN, Fox News, NBC Nightly
News, CBS Evening News, ABC World News Tonight) most frequently (M = 3.43, SD = 1.19).
Social media and video sharing sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube (M = 3.29, SD =
1.25) were the next most frequently used media, followed by Internet homepages (e.g.,
MSN.com, Yahoo!, AOL.com) (M = 3.16, SD = 1.20), discussions with other people about government conspiracy theories (M = 3.15, SD = 1.16), and movies (M = 3.12, SD = 1.20).
Somewhat less frequently, respondents said they used political satire programs (M = 2.89,
SD = 1.30), daily newspapers (M = 2.89, SD = 1.21), and Other Web sites (e.g., sites devoted to a particular conspiracy theory or topic as well as the official Web sites of government agencies)
(M = 2.88, SD = 1.25). TV non-news programs (e.g., fictional/investigative shows) (M = 2.87,
SD = 1.30) and political talk programs (M = 2.87, SD = 1.30) were used with identical regularity.
Next, respondents said they used news magazines (M = 2.81, SD = 1.24), advertisements
(e.g., political campaign ads regarding candidates or issues) (M = 2.79, SD = 1.19), radio news
(e.g., National Public Radio) (M = 2.77, SD = 1.26), and books (M = 2.72, SD = 1.26) for
government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content. The least utilized media were talk radio shows
(e.g., The Rush Limbaugh Show) (M = 2.68, SD = 1.30) and tabloids such as the National
Enquirer (M = 2.42, SD = 1.34).
Trust in Government: An Attitudinal Outcome
Research question 3 explored the relative contributions of background characteristics
(i.e., media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, conservatism/liberalism); motives
for media use; and consumption of media fare about government conspiracy theories to 95
predicting trust in government as an attitudinal outcome. Because trust in government was
measured for four different government entities (i.e., the executive branch, the legislative branch,
law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies), each government entity was treated as a
dependent variable in four distinct regression analyses.
In each regression analysis, individual differences (i.e., age, gender, media skepticism,
need for cognition, internal locus of control, powerful others locus of control, chance locus of
control, conservatism/liberalism) were entered on the first step. Motives (i.e., social
utility/relaxing recreation, political evaluation, pass time, general information seeking) were
entered on the second step. On the third step, I entered exposure to government-conspiracy- theory-oriented media, using the list of specific media sources. This order was consistent with the uses and gratifications framework (see Figure 1) that guided this study.
Executive branch. Table 13 displays each step of the regression analysis regarding trust in the executive branch of the federal government. Individual differences entered on the first step accounted for 37.3% of the variance in perceptions of the executive branch of the federal government. Age (β = -.10, p < .05) and need for cognition (β = -.17, p < .001) were both significant, negative predictors. Media skepticism (β = .19, p < .001), internal locus of control (β
= .18, p < .001), chance locus of control (β = .25, p < .001), and conservatism (β = .47, p < .001) were all significant, positive predictors. Gender and powerful others locus of control were not significant predictors. 96
Table 13
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Executive Branch)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age -.01 .01 -.10* Gender -.13 .13 -.04 Media skepticism .40 .10 .19*** Need for cognition -.49 .12 -.17*** Internal locus of control .57 .13 .18*** Powerful others locus of control -.05 .13 -.02 Chance locus of control .56 .14 .25*** Conservatism/liberalism 1.05 .09 .47*** Step 2 Age -.01 .01 -.07 Gender -.11 .13 -.03 Media skepticism .29 .10 .14** Need for cognition -.44 .12 -.15*** Internal locus of control .44 .13 .14** Powerful others locus of control -.21 .13 -.09 Chance locus of control .41 .14 .18** Conservatism/liberalism 1.04 .09 .47*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .41 .12 .25** Political evaluation .06 .11 .04 Pass time -.07 .09 -.04 General information seeking .06 .10 .03 Step 3 Age -.01 .01 -.07 Gender -.14 .13 -.04 Media skepticism .23 .10 .11* Need for cognition -.41 .12 -.14** Internal locus of control .38 .13 .12** Powerful others locus of control -.16 .13 -.07 Chance locus of control .35 .14 .15* Conservatism/liberalism .89 .10 .40*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .16 .14 .10 Political evaluation -.03 .12 -.02 Pass time .06 .10 .03 General information seeking .04 .11 .02 Radio news .16 .08 .11* Talk radio .08 .07 .06 (continued)
97
Table 13 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Executive Branch)
Variable B SE B Β TV news .06 .07 .04 Television non-news programs -.06 .06 -.05 Political satire programs -.19 .07 -.14** Political talk programs .06 .07 .04 Movies -.05 .07 -.04 Advertisements .17 .08 .12* Books -.01 .07 -.01 Daily newspaper -.05 .08 -.03 News magazines .03 .09 .02 Tabloids .12 .07 .09 Internet homepages -.07 .07 -.05 Social media/Video sharing sites -.03 .07 -.02 Other Web sites .08 .08 .06 Discussions with others .03 .07 .02
Note. R = .61, R2 = .37, F (8, 490) = 36.37, p < .001 for step 1, R = .64, R2 = .41, ∆ R2 = .04, F (12, 486) = 28.27, p < .001 for step 2, R = .68, R2 = .46, ∆ R2 = .05, F (28, 470) = 14.05, p < .001 for step 3. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 3.9% of the variance, and the F
change was significant (p < .001). Social utility/relaxing recreation was the only significant
motive (β = .25, p < .01). Need for cognition remained a significant, negative predictor, but age ceased to be a significant predictor at this step. Media skepticism, internal locus of control, chance locus of control, and conservatism remained significant predictors.
The specific media sources of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material entered on the third step accounted for another 4.5% of the variance in trust of the executive branch of the federal government. The F change was significant (p < .01). Use of radio news was a significant, positive predictor (β = .11, p < .05), as was use of advertisements (β = -.12, p < .05).
Use of political satire programs was a significant, negative predictor (β = -.14, p < .01). Need for cognition remained a significant, negative predictor. Media skepticism, internal locus of control, 98
chance locus of control, and conservatism remained significant predictors. The social
utility/relaxing recreation motive ceased to be a predictor at this step.
Thus, the final model accounted for 45.6% of the variance in trust in the executive branch
of the federal government. The results suggest that conservative people who were less skeptical
of media and lower in need for cognition, who attribute events to one’s own control or to chance,
and who used radio news and advertisements but not political satire programs for material related
to government conspiracy theories held a more favorable impression of the executive branch of
the federal government than their counterparts.
Legislative branch. Table 14 shows the results of the regression analysis regarding trust
in the legislative branch of the federal government. Individual differences entered on the first
step accounted for 33.8% of the variance in perceptions of the legislative branch of the federal
government. Age (β = -.17, p < .001) and need for cognition (β = -.13, p < .01) were both significant, negative predictors. Media skepticism (β = .40, p < .001), internal locus of control (β
= .19, p < .001), chance locus of control (β = .17, p < .01), and conservatism (β = .21, p < .001) were all significant predictors. Gender and powerful others locus of control were not significant predictors.
Motives added on the second step explained another 2.8% of the variance in trust in the legislative branch of the federal government. The F change was significant (p < .001). The social utility/relaxing recreation motive emerged as a significant, positive predictor (β = .17, p <
.05). Age and need for cognition remained significant, negative predictors. Additionally, powerful others locus of control became a significant, negative predictor at this step (β = -.15, p
< .05). However, chance locus of control ceased to be a significant predictor. Media skepticism, internal locus of control, and conservatism remained significant predictors. 99
Table 14
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Legislative Branch)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age -.02 .00 -.17*** Gender .07 .12 .02 Media skepticism .71 .08 .40*** Need for cognition -.34 .10 -.13** Internal locus of control .50 .12 .19*** Powerful others locus of control -.19 .12 -.10 Chance locus of control .34 .13 .17** Conservatism/liberalism .40 .08 .21*** Step 2 Age -.02 .00 -.15*** Gender .08 .12 .03 Media skepticism .65 .09 .37*** Need for cognition -.33 .10 -.13** Internal locus of control .40 .12 .15** Powerful others locus of control -.30 .12 -.15* Chance locus of control .24 .13 .12 Conservatism/liberalism .40 .08 .21*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .24 .11 .17* Political evaluation .03 .10 .02 Pass time -.08 .08 -.05 General information seeking .15 .09 .09 Step 3 Age -.01 .01 -.14** Gender .04 .12 .01 Media skepticism .54 .09 .31*** Need for cognition -.33 .11 -.13** Internal locus of control .38 .12 .14** Powerful others locus of control -.31 .12 -.16* Chance locus of control .19 .13 .10 Conservatism/liberalism .37 .09 .19*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .09 .12 .06 Political evaluation -.07 .10 -.05 Pass time .02 .09 .01 General information seeking .17 .10 .10 Radio news .09 .07 .08 Talk radio -.03 .07 -.02 (continued)
100
Table 14 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Legislative Branch)
Variable B SE B β TV news -.01 .07 -.01 Television non-news programs .00 .06 .00 Political satire programs .02 .06 .02 Political talk programs .03 .06 .03 Movies -.04 .06 -.03 Advertisements .26 .07 .20*** Books -.01 .07 -.01 Daily newspaper -.01 .07 -.01 News magazines .03 .08 .02 Tabloids .14 .07 .12* Internet homepages -.09 .06 -.07 Social media/Video sharing sites -.09 .06 -.07 Other Web sites -.07 .07 -.06 Discussions with others .04 .07 .03
Note. R = .58, R2 = .34, F (8, 490) = 31.34, p < .001 for step 1, R = .61, R2 = .37, ∆ R2 = .03, F (12, 486) = 23.45, p < .001 for step 2, R = .64, R2 = .41, ∆ R2 = .04, F (28, 470) = 11.45, p < .001 for step 3. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
The introduction of specific media sources of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented
material on the third step accounted for another 3.9% of the variance in trust in the legislative
branch of the federal government. The F change was significant (p < .05). Use of
advertisements (β = .20, p < .001) and tabloids (β = .12, p < .05) for government-conspiracy- theory-oriented material emerged as significant, positive predictors. Age, need for cognition, and powerful others locus of control remained significant, negative predictors. Media skepticism, internal locus of control, and conservatism were significant predictors. Social utility/relaxing recreation ceased to be a significant predictor at this step.
The final equation accounted for 40.5% of the variance in trust in the legislative branch of the federal government. The results suggest that younger conservatives lower in need for 101
cognition and less skeptical of media, who are less likely to attribute events to powerful others
and more likely to attribute events to their own control, and who consume government-
conspiracy-theory-related material in advertisements and tabloids place more trust in the legislative branch of the federal government than do their counterparts.
Law enforcement agencies. Individual differences entered on the first step accounted for 24.2% of the variance in perceptions of law enforcement agencies as a government entity.
Media skepticism (β = .29, p < .001), internal locus of control (β = .27, p < .001), and conservatism (β = .25, p < .001) were significant predictors.
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 1.6% of the variance. The F change was significant (p < .05), though none of the motives were significant predictors of trust in law enforcement agencies. Media skepticism, internal locus of control, and conservatism remained significant predictors.
The inclusion of specific media choices for material related to government conspiracy theories on the third step accounted for another 3.2% of the variance in trust in law enforcement agencies. The F change was not significant (p = .18). However, use of Other Web sites was a significant, negative predictor (β = -.16, p < .01). Media skepticism, internal locus of control, and conservatism remained significant, positive predictors. The general information seeking motive emerged as a significant, positive predictor as well (β = .15, p < .05).
The final equation accounted for 29% of the variance in trust in law enforcement
agencies (see Table 15).
102
Table 15
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Law Enforcement Agencies)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age .00 .00 .01 Gender .08 .12 .03 Media skepticism .48 .09 .29*** Need for cognition -.06 .10 -.03 Internal locus of control .68 .12 .27*** Powerful others locus of control .03 .12 .02 Chance locus of control .02 .13 .01 Conservatism/liberalism .46 .08 .25*** Step 2 Age .00 .00 .01 Gender .08 .12 .03 Media skepticism .50 .09 .30*** Need for cognition -.11 .11 -.05 Internal locus of control .59 .12 .23*** Powerful others locus of control .01 .12 .00 Chance locus of control .01 .13 .01 Conservatism/liberalism .47 .08 .26*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.18 .11 -.13 Political evaluation .15 .10 .10 Pass time .09 .08 .06 General information seeking .14 .09 .09 Step 3 Age -.00 .01 -.02 Gender .05 .12 .02 Media skepticism .43 .09 .26*** Need for cognition -.05 .11 -.02 Internal locus of control .58 .12 .23*** Powerful others locus of control .04 .12 .02 Chance locus of control .01 .13 .01 Conservatism/liberalism .43 .09 .24*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.17 .13 -.13 Political evaluation .06 .11 .04 Pass time .11 .09 .07 General information seeking .23 .10 .15* Radio news .08 .07 .07 (continued)
103
Table 15 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Law Enforcement Agencies)
Variable B SE B β Talk radio .01 .07 .00 TV news -.02 .07 -.02 Television non-news programs -.03 .06 -.03 Political satire programs -.01 .06 -.01 Political talk programs .08 .06 .07 Movies -.01 .07 -.01 Advertisements .12 .07 .10 Books -.10 .07 -.08 Daily newspaper -.06 .07 -.05 News magazines .06 .08 .05 Tabloids .00 .07 .00 Internet homepages .02 .07 .02 Social media/Video sharing sites .04 .07 .03 Other Web sites -.19 .07 -.16** Discussions with others -.00 .07 -.00
Note. R = .49, R2 = .24, F (8, 490) = 19.57, p < .001 for step 1, R = .51, R2 = .26, ∆ R2 = .02, F (12, 486) = 14.09, p < .001 for step 2, R = .54, R2 = .29, ∆ R2 = .03, F (28, 470) = 6.86, p < .001 for step 3. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
The results suggest that conservative individuals who tend to be less skeptical of media, who attribute events to an individual’s own volition, and who seek government-conspiracy- theory-oriented material to fulfill a general information motive—but not on Web sites devoted to particular conspiracy theories and/or sites of government agencies—would be more likely to view law enforcement agencies as trustworthy than their counterparts.
Regulatory agencies. Individual differences entered on the first step accounted for
31.8% of the variance in perceptions of government regulatory agencies. Gender (β = .08, p <
.05), media skepticism (β = .27, p < .001), internal locus of control (β = .20, p < .001) were significant predictors. Conservatism was a significant, negative predictor (β = -.24, p < .001). 104
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 0.60% of the variance in trust
in regulatory agencies. The F change was not significant (p = .37), and none of the motives were
significant predictors. Media skepticism and internal locus of control remained significant predictors. Conservatism remained a significant, negative predictor.
The addition of media sources for material related to government conspiracy theories on the third step explained an additional 3% of the variance. The F change was not significant (p =
.15). However, use of political satire programs (β = .11, p < .05) and advertisements (β = .12, p
< .05) for material related to government conspiracy theories were significant, positive predictors. Media skepticism, internal locus of control remained significant predictors.
Conservatism remained a significant, negative predictor. The general information seeking motive became a significant, positive predictor (β = .14, p < .05) on this step.
The final equation accounted for 35.4% of the variance in trust in regulatory agencies
(see Table 16). The results suggest that liberal individuals who tended to be less skeptical of media, who attributed events to individuals’ own volition, and who seek material related to government conspiracy theories from political satire programs and advertisements to fulfill a general information seeking motive were more likely to trust regulatory agencies than were their counterparts.
105
Table 16
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Regulatory Agencies)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age -.01 .00 -.05 Gender .22 .11 .08* Media skepticism .45 .08 .27*** Need for cognition .05 .10 .02 Internal locus of control .51 .11 .20*** Powerful others locus of control .19 .11 .10 Chance locus of control .02 .12 .01 Conservatism/liberalism -.44 .08 -.24*** Step 2 Age -.00 .00 -.04 Gender .22 .11 .07 Media skepticism .45 .09 .27*** Need for cognition .02 .10 .01 Internal locus of control .46 .12 .18*** Powerful others locus of control .18 .12 .09 Chance locus of control .00 .12 .00 Conservatism/liberalism -.42 .08 -.23*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.03 .11 -.03 Political evaluation .00 .10 .00 Pass time .00 .08 .00 General information seeking .15 .09 .10 Step 3 Age -.01 .01 -.06 Gender .20 .12 .07 Media skepticism .38 .09 .22*** Need for cognition .04 .11 .02 Internal locus of control .46 .12 .18*** Powerful others locus of control .21 .12 .11 Chance locus of control -.01 .13 -.00 Conservatism/liberalism -.38 .09 -.20*** Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .01 .12 .01 Political evaluation -.09 .10 -.06 Pass time -.03 .09 -.02 General information seeking .22 .10 .14* Radio news -.05 .07 -.05 (continued)
106
Table 16 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Trust in Government (Regulatory Agencies)
Variable B SE B β Talk radio -.02 .07 -.02 TV news -.00 .07 -.00 Television non-news programs -.03 .06 -.02 Political satire programs .13 .06 .11* Political talk programs .05 .06 .04 Movies -.05 .06 -.04 Advertisements .15 .07 .12* Books -.11 .07 -.09 Daily newspaper .05 .07 .04 News magazines .01 .08 .01 Tabloids -.02 .06 -.02 Internet homepages .04 .06 .03 Social media/Video sharing sites .05 .06 .04 Other Web sites -.08 .07 -.07 Discussions with others -.04 .07 -.03
Note. R = .56, R2 = .32, F (8, 490) = 28.54, p < .001 for step 1, R = .57, R2 = .32, ∆ R2 = .01, F (12, 486) = 19.40, p < .001 for step 2, R = .60, R2 = .35, ∆ R2 =.03, F (28, 470) = 9.20, p < .001 for step 3. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Political Participation: A Behavioral Outcome
The fourth and final research question explored the relative contributions of individual differences in media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, conservatism/liberalism; motives for media use; consumption of media fare about government conspiracy theories; and trust in government (an attitudinal outcome) to predicting political participation as a behavioral outcome. Because political participation was measured in terms of four types of participation
(i.e., interpersonal political discussion, interactive political messaging, civic participation, and political participation), each type of participation was treated as a dependent variable in four distinct regression analyses. 107
In each regression analysis, variables were entered in accordance with the theoretical
assumptions of the uses and gratifications framework that guided this study. Again, individual differences (i.e., age, gender, media skepticism, need for cognition, internal locus of control, powerful others locus of control, chance locus of control, conservatism/liberalism) were entered
on the first step. On the second step, I entered the four motives (i.e., social utility/relaxing recreation, political evaluation, pass time, general information seeking) that emerged from the factor analysis. On the third step, I entered media exposure, using the list of specific media sources for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare. Trust in government variables (i.e.,
perceptions of the executive branch, the legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and
regulatory agencies) were entered on the fourth step. To reiterate, this conceptual order reflects
the complete model (see Figure 1) used in this study.
Interpersonal political discussion. Individual differences entered on the first step
accounted for 10.6% of the variance in interpersonal political discussion as a form of political
participation. Need for cognition (β = .29, p < .001) was a significant, positive predictor.
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 3.5% of the variance in
interpersonal political discussion. The F change was significant (p < .01). The political
evaluation motive emerged as a significant, positive predictor (β = .27, p < .01). Need for
cognition remained a significant, positive predictor.
The addition of media sources for material related to government conspiracy theories on
the third step explained an additional 9.4% of the variance. The F change was significant (p <
.001). The political evaluation motive ceased to be significant at this step, but the social
utility/relaxing recreation motive became a significant, negative predictor (β = -.34, p < .01). 108
Use of social media/video sharing sites (β = .17, p < .01) was a significant, positive predictor.
Need for cognition (β = .22, p < .001) remained a significant, positive predictor as well.
The inclusion of trust in government variables (i.e., perceptions of the executive branch, legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies) on the fourth step contributed another 0.7% of the variance in interpersonal political discussion. The F change was not significant (p = .41). None of the trust in government variables were significant predictors.
The social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a significant, negative predictor (β = -.33, p < .01). Use of social media/video sharing sites remained a significant, positive predictor.
Need for cognition remained a significant, positive predictor (β = .20, p < .001).
The final equation accounted for 24.1% of the variance in interpersonal political discussion as a form of political participation (see Table 17). The results suggest that individuals who were higher in need for cognition, who used social media/video sharing sites for material related to government conspiracy theories—but not to fulfill a social utility/relaxing recreation motive—tended to engage in interpersonal political discussions generally as a form of political participation. 109
Table 17
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age .01 .01 .08 Gender -.09 .16 -.03 Media skepticism -.17 .12 -.09 Need for cognition .83 .14 .29*** Internal locus of control .19 .16 .06 Powerful others locus of control .16 .16 .07 Chance locus of control .07 .17 .03 Conservatism/liberalism -.21 .11 -.10 Step 2 Age .01 .01 .07 Gender -.11 .16 -.03 Media skepticism -.14 .12 -.07 Need for cognition .76 .14 .27*** Internal locus of control .03 .16 .01 Powerful others locus of control .08 .16 .04 Chance locus of control .07 .17 .03 Conservatism/liberalism -.20 .11 -.09 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.27 .15 -.17 Political evaluation .46 .14 .27** Pass time -.03 .11 -.02 General information seeking .08 .13 .04 Step 3 Age .01 .01 .09 Gender -.04 .16 -.01 Media skepticism -.15 .12 -.08 Need for cognition .61 .14 .22*** Internal locus of control -.02 .16 -.01 Powerful others locus of control .16 .16 .07 Chance locus of control -.01 .17 -.01 Conservatism/liberalism -.12 .12 -.06 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.54 .16 -.34** Political evaluation .27 .14 .16 Pass time -.02 .11 -.01 General information seeking -.01 .13 -.00 Radio news -.03 .09 -.02 (continued)
110
Table 17 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion)
Variable B SE B Β Talk radio .13 .09 .10 TV news .04 .09 .03 Television non-news programs .09 .08 .07 Political satire programs .13 .08 .10 Political talk programs .14 .08 .10 Movies -.08 .09 -.05 Advertisements -.03 .09 -.02 Books .01 .09 .01 Daily newspaper .18 .10 .13 News magazines .05 .11 .03 Tabloids -.05 .09 -.04 Internet homepages -.16 .08 -.11 Social media/Video sharing sites .23 .08 .17** Other Web sites .01 .09 .01 Discussions with others .15 .09 .10 Step 4 Age .01 .01 .09 Gender -.05 .16 -.01 Media skepticism -.13 .13 -.06 Need for cognition .57 .15 .20*** Internal locus of control .04 .16 .01 Powerful others locus of control .14 .16 .07 Chance locus of control .02 .17 .01 Conservatism/liberalism -.02 .13 -.01 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation -.52 .17 -.33** Political evaluation .26 .14 .15 Pass time -.01 .11 -.00 General information seeking .01 .13 .00 Radio news -.01 .10 -.01 Talk radio .14 .09 .11 TV news .04 .09 .03 Television non-news programs .08 .08 .06 Political satire programs .11 .08 .08 Political talk programs .14 .08 .11 Movies -.08 .09 -.06 Advertisements -.02 .09 -.01 Books .01 .09 .01 (continued)
111
Table 17 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interpersonal Political Discussion)
Variable B SE B Β Daily newspaper .18 .10 .13 News magazines .05 .11 .04 Tabloids -.04 .09 -.03 Internet homepages -.17 .08 -.12 Social media/Video sharing sites .23 .08 .17** Other Web sites .01 .09 .01 Discussions with others .16 .09 .11 Trust in Government Executive branch -.11 .06 -.11 Legislative branch .01 .08 .00 Law enforcement agencies -.01 .08 -.01 Regulatory agencies -.01 .08 -.01
Note. R = .33, R2 = .11, F (8, 448) = 6.62, p < .001 for step 1, R = .38, R2 = .14, ∆ R2 = .04, F (12, 444) = 6.05, p < .001 for step 2, R = .48, R2 = .23, ∆ R2 = .09, F (28, 428) = 4.68, p < .001 for step 3, R = .49, R2 = .24, ∆ R2 = .01, F (32, 424) = 4.22, p < .001 for step 4. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Interactive political messaging. Individual differences entered on the first step
accounted for 14.1% of the variance in interactive political messaging as a form of political participation. Powerful Others locus of control (β = .17, p < .05) and Chance locus of control (β
= .18, p < .05) were significant, positive predictors.
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 12.4% of the variance in
interactive political messaging. The F change was significant (p < .001). The social
utility/relaxing recreation motive was a significant, positive predictor (β = .50, p < .001), and the
pass time motive was a significant, negative predictor (β = -.16, p < .01). Powerful Others locus
of control and Chance locus of control ceased to be significant predictors at this step, but need
for cognition became a significant predictor (β = .11, p < .05). 112
The addition of media sources for material related to government conspiracy theories on
the third step explained an additional 9.8% of the variance. The F change was significant (p <
.001). Use of talk radio (β = .18, p < .01), advertisements (β = .16, p < .01), and Other Web sites
(β = .12, p < .05) for material related to government conspiracy theories were significant,
positive predictors. Internal locus of control became a significant, negative predictor (β = -.10, p
< .05), but need for cognition ceased to be a significant predictor. The social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a significant, positive predictor (β = .30, p < .01), but the Pass time motive ceased to be a significant predictor.
The inclusion of trust in government variables (i.e., perceptions of the executive branch, legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies) on the fourth step contributed another 1.9% of the variance in interactive political messaging. The F change was significant (p < .05). Trust in law enforcement agencies was a significant, negative predictor (β
= -.18, p < .01). Internal locus of control ceased to be a significant predictor at this step, as did the Pass time motive, but the social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a significant, positive predictor (β = .27, p < .01). Use of talk radio and advertisements for material related to government conspiracy theories remained significant, positive predictors, but use of Other Web sites ceased to be a significant predictor.
The final equation accounted for 38.1% of the variance in interactive political messaging as a form of political participation (see Table 18). 113
Table 18
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interactive Political Messaging)
Variable B SE B β Step 1 Age -.01 .01 -.05 Gender -.19 .15 -.05 Media skepticism .12 .11 .06 Need for cognition .21 .13 .08 Internal locus of control .02 .15 .01 Powerful others locus of control .38 .15 .17* Chance locus of control .40 .17 .18* Conservatism/liberalism .00 .11 .00 Step 2 Age -.00 .01 -.03 Gender -.16 .14 -.05 Media skepticism -.08 .11 -.04 Need for cognition .32 .13 .11* Internal locus of control -.16 .15 -.05 Powerful others locus of control .10 .15 .04 Chance locus of control .16 .16 .07 Conservatism/liberalism -.03 .10 -.02 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .80 .14 .50*** Political evaluation .20 .12 .12 Pass time -.29 .10 -.16** General information seeking -.06 .11 -.03 Step 3 Age .00 .01 .03 Gender -.13 .14 -.04 Media skepticism -.17 .11 -.09 Need for cognition .20 .13 .07 Internal locus of control -.30 .14 -.10* Powerful others locus of control .13 .14 .06 Chance locus of control .02 .15 .01 Conservatism/liberalism -.06 .10 -.03 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .48 .15 .30** Political evaluation .02 .12 .01 Pass time -.17 .10 -.10 General information seeking -.17 .12 -.09 Radio news .02 .08 .02 (continued)
114
Table 18 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interactive Political Messaging)
Variable B SE B β Talk radio .24 .08 .18** TV news -.09 .08 -.06 Television non-news programs -.09 .07 -.07 Political satire programs .09 .07 .07 Political talk programs -.03 .07 -.02 Movies .05 .08 .04 Advertisements .23 .08 .16** Books .04 .08 .03 Daily newspaper .12 .09 .08 News magazines -.02 .10 -.01 Tabloids .00 .08 .00 Internet homepages -.04 .08 -.03 Social media/Video sharing sites .10 .08 .07 Other Web sites .17 .08 .12* Discussions with others .08 .08 .06 Step 4 Age .00 .01 .04 Gender -.13 .14 -.04 Media skepticism -.12 .11 -.06 Need for cognition .21 .13 .08 Internal locus of control -.21 .15 -.07 Powerful others locus of control .17 .14 .08 Chance locus of control .01 .15 .00 Conservatism/liberalism -.01 .12 -.00 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .43 .15 .27** Political evaluation .04 .12 .02 Pass time -.15 .10 -.09 General information seeking -.14 .12 -.07 Radio news .04 .08 .03 Talk radio .25 .08 .19** TV news -.09 .08 -.06 Television non-news programs -.10 .07 -.08 Political satire programs .09 .08 .07 Political talk programs -.01 .07 -.01 Movies .05 .08 .04 Advertisements .24 .08 .16** Books .01 .08 .01 (continued)
115
Table 18 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Interactive Political Messaging)
Variable B SE B β Daily newspaper .11 .09 .08 News magazines -.00 .10 -.00 Tabloids -.01 .08 -.01 Internet homepages -.03 .08 -.02 Social media/Video sharing sites .12 .08 .09 Other Web sites .14 .08 .10 Discussions with others .08 .08 .05 Trust in Government Executive branch -.01 .06 -.01 Legislative branch .09 .07 .08 Law enforcement agencies -.21 .07 -.18** Regulatory agencies -.01 .07 -.01
Note. R = .38, R2 = .14, F (8, 467) = 9.54, p < .001 for step 1, R = .51, R2 = .26, ∆ R2 = .12, F (12, 463) = 13.865, p < .001 for step 2, R = .60, R2 = .36, ∆ R2 = .10, F (28, 447) = 9.07, p < .001 for step 3, R = .62, R2 = .38, ∆ R2 = .02, F (32, 443) = 8.53, p < .001 for step 4. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
The results suggest that individuals who used talk radio and advertisements specifically for material related to government conspiracy theories to fulfill a social utility/relaxing recreation motive and who tended to mistrust law enforcement agencies tended to engage in interactive political messaging as a form of political participation.
Civic participation. Individual differences entered on the first step accounted for 12.8% of the variance in civic participation as a form of political participation. Age (β = -.13, p < .01) and media skepticism (β = .14, p < .05) were significant predictors.
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 7.9% of the variance in civic participation. The F change was significant (p < .001). The social utility/relaxing recreation motive was a significant, positive predictor (β = .49, p < .001). The pass time motive was a 116 significant, negative predictor (β = -.16, p < .01). Age was still a significant, negative predictor, but media skepticism ceased to be a significant predictor at this step.
The addition of media sources for material related to government conspiracy theories on the third step explained an additional 9.1% of the variance in civic participation. The F change was significant (p < .001). Use of talk radio (β = .15, p < .05) and advertisements (β = .23, p <
.001) for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were significant, positive predictors. Use of Internet homepages (β = -.13, p < .05) was a significant, negative predictor. The social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a significant, positive predictor (β = .27, p < .01), but the pass time motive ceased to be a significant predictor. Age also ceased to be a significant predictor.
The inclusion of trust in government variables (i.e., perceptions of the executive branch, legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies) on the fourth step contributed another 0.9% of the variance in civic participation. The F change was not significant
(p = .21). None of the trust in government variables were significant predictors. The social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a significant, positive predictor. Use of talk radio and advertisements for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material remained significant, positive predictors. Use of Internet homepages for this type of material remained a significant, negative predictor.
The final equation accounted for 30.7% of the variance in civic participation as a form of political participation (see Table 19). The results suggest that individuals who used government- conspiracy-theory-oriented media generally to fulfill a social utility/relaxing recreation motive and those who used talk radio and advertisements—but not Internet homepages—specifically for material related to government conspiracy theories tended to engage in civic participation as a form of political participation. 117
Table 19
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Civic Participation)
Variable B SE B Β Step 1 Age -.02 .01 -.13** Gender -.09 .16 -.03 Media skepticism .29 .11 .14* Need for cognition .09 .13 .03 Internal locus of control .13 .16 .04 Powerful others locus of control .29 .16 .13 Chance locus of control .24 .17 .10 Conservatism/liberalism .11 .11 .05 Step 2 Age -.01 .01 -.12* Gender -.06 .15 -.02 Media skepticism .11 .11 .05 Need for cognition .20 .13 .07 Internal locus of control .06 .16 .02 Powerful others locus of control .08 .15 .03 Chance locus of control .03 .16 .01 Conservatism/liberalism .06 .11 .03 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .79 .15 .49*** Political evaluation .08 .13 .04 Pass time -.28 .11 -.16** General information seeking -.18 .12 -.09 Step 3 Age -.00 .01 -.02 Gender -.08 .15 -.02 Media skepticism .00 .11 .00 Need for cognition .09 .13 .03 Internal locus of control -.03 .15 -.01 Powerful others locus of control .04 .15 .02 Chance locus of control -.05 .16 -.02 Conservatism/liberalism .03 .11 .01 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .43 .16 .27** Political evaluation -.06 .13 -.04 Pass time -.17 .11 -.10 General information seeking -.23 .12 -.12 Radio news .06 .09 .05 (continued)
118
Table 19 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Civic Participation)
Variable B SE B Β Talk radio .20 .08 .15* TV news -.11 .08 -.07 Television non-news programs .03 .07 .02 Political satire programs .07 .08 .06 Political talk programs -.10 .08 -.07 Movies -.05 .08 -.03 Advertisements .34 .09 .23*** Books -.00 .08 -.00 Daily newspaper -.01 .09 -.00 News magazines .15 .10 .10 Tabloids .12 .08 .09 Internet homepages -.19 .08 -.13* Social media/Video sharing sites .10 .08 .07 Other Web sites .09 .09 .06 Discussions with others .04 .08 .03 Step 4 Age -.00 .01 -.02 Gender -.06 .15 -.02 Media skepticism .03 .12 .02 Need for cognition .12 .14 .04 Internal locus of control .04 .16 .01 Powerful others locus of control .09 .15 .04 Chance locus of control -.06 .16 -.03 Conservatism/liberalism .02 .13 .01 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .41 .16 .25* Political evaluation -.06 .13 -.03 Pass time -.17 .11 -.09 General information seeking -.21 .12 -.11 Radio news .06 .09 .04 Talk radio .20 .08 .15* TV news -.11 .08 -.07 Television non-news programs .02 .07 .01 Political satire programs .08 .08 .06 Political talk programs -.09 .08 -.07 Movies -.05 .08 -.03 Advertisements .34 .09 .23*** Books -.02 .08 -.01 (continued)
119
Table 19 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Civic Participation)
Variable B SE B β Daily newspaper -.01 .09 -.00 News magazines .15 .10 .11 Tabloids .10 .08 .08 Internet homepages -.18 .08 -.12* Social media/Video sharing sites .12 .08 .08 Other Web sites .07 .09 .05 Discussions with others .03 .08 .02 Trust in Government Executive branch .00 .06 .00 Legislative branch .08 .07 .07 Law enforcement agencies -.11 .07 -.09 Regulatory agencies -.06 .07 -.05
Note. R = .36, R2 = .13, F (8, 474) = 8.74, p < .001 for step 1, R = .46, R2 = .21, ∆ R2 = .08, F (12, 470) = 10.23, p < .001 for step 2, R = .55, R2 = .30, ∆ R2 = .09, F (28, 454) = 6.88, p < .001 for step 3, R = .55, R2 = .31, ∆ R2 = .01, F (32, 450) = 6.23, p < .001 for step 4. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
Political participation. Individual differences entered on the first step accounted for
20% of the variance in traditional forms of political participation. Media skepticism (β = .13, p <
.05), Powerful Others locus of control (β = .16, p < .05), and Chance locus of control (β = .16, p
< .05) were significant predictors. Age was a significant, negative predictor (β = -.10, p < .05).
Motives added on the second step explained an additional 11.6% of the variance in
political participation. The F change was significant (p < .001). The social utility/relaxing
recreation motive was a significant, positive predictor (β = .54, p < .001). The pass time motive
was as a significant, negative predictor (β = -.14, p < .05). Age, media skepticism, Powerful
Others locus of control, and Chance locus of control all ceased to be significant predictors.
The addition of media sources for material related to government conspiracy theories on
the third step explained an additional 5.7% of the variance in political participation. The F 120
change was significant (p < .01). The social utility/relaxing recreation motive remained a
significant, positive predictor (β = .35, p < .001). However, the pass time motive ceased to be a
significant predictor, and the general information seeking motive emerged as a significant,
negative predictor (β = -.13, p < .05). Use of talk radio (β = .17, p < .01) and advertisements (β =
.14, p < .05) for material related to government conspiracy theories were significant, positive
predictors.
The inclusion of trust in government variables (i.e., perceptions of the executive branch,
legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies) on the fourth step
contributed another 1% of the variance in political participation. The F change was not
significant, but trust in the legislative branch of the federal government (β = .13, p < .05)
emerged as a significant, positive predictor of political participation. The social utility/relaxing
recreation motive remained a significant, positive predictor, but the general information seeking
motive ceased to be a significant predictor. Use of talk radio and advertisements for material related to government conspiracy theories remained significant, positive predictors.
The final equation accounted for 38.4% of the variance in traditional forms of political
participation (see Table 20). The results suggest that individuals who use talk radio and
advertisements specifically for material related to government conspiracy theories to fulfill a
social utility/relaxing recreation motive and who tend to trust at least the legislative branch of the
federal government, tend to engage in traditional forms of political participation.
121
Table 20
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Political Participation)
Variable B SE B Β Step 1 Age -.01 .01 -.10* Gender -.09 .14 -.03 Media skepticism .23 .10 .13* Need for cognition -.19 .12 -.07 Internal locus of control .02 .14 .01 Powerful others locus of control .32 .14 .16* Chance locus of control .33 .15 .16* Conservatism/liberalism -.06 .10 -.03 Step 2 Age -.01 .01 -.07 Gender -.06 .13 -.02 Media skepticism .03 .10 .02 Need for cognition -.08 .11 -.03 Internal locus of control -.11 .13 -.04 Powerful others locus of control .07 .13 .03 Chance locus of control .09 .14 .04 Conservatism/liberalism -.11 .09 -.05 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .79 .12 .54*** Political evaluation .14 .11 .09 Pass time -.23 .09 -.14* General information seeking -.15 .10 -.09 Step 3 Age -.01 .01 -.05 Gender -.04 .13 -.01 Media skepticism -.02 .10 -.01 Need for cognition -.16 .12 -.06 Internal locus of control -.20 .13 -.07 Powerful others locus of control .11 .13 .06 Chance locus of control -.01 .14 -.01 Conservatism/liberalism -.19 .10 -.10 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .53 .14 .35*** Political evaluation .01 .11 .01 Pass time -.14 .09 -.09 General information seeking -.22 .11 -.13* Radio news -.00 .08 -.00 (continued)
122
Table 20 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Political Participation)
Variable B SE B Β Talk radio .20 .07 .17** TV news .04 .07 .03 Television non-news programs .07 .07 .06 Political satire programs -.02 .07 -.02 Political talk programs .07 .07 .06 Movies -.03 .07 -.02 Advertisements .19 .07 .14* Books -.00 .07 -.00 Daily newspaper -.00 .08 -.00 News magazines .01 .09 .01 Tabloids -.00 .07 -.00 Internet homepages -.09 .07 -.07 Social media/Video sharing sites .02 .07 .02 Other Web sites .12 .07 .10 Discussions with others .03 .07 .02 Step 4 Age -.00 .01 -.03 Gender -.04 .13 -.01 Media skepticism -.03 .10 -.02 Need for cognition -.12 .12 -.05 Internal locus of control -.17 .14 -.06 Powerful others locus of control .16 .13 .08 Chance locus of control -.03 .14 -.02 Conservatism/liberalism -.20 .11 -.10 Motives Social utility/relaxing recreation .50 .14 .33*** Political evaluation .02 .11 .02 Pass time -.13 .09 -.08 General information seeking -.21 .11 -.12 Radio news -.01 .08 -.005 Talk radio .21 .07 .17** TV news .04 .07 .03 Television non-news programs .07 .07 .05 Political satire programs -.02 .07 -.02 Political talk programs .08 .07 .07 Movies -.03 .07 -.02 Advertisements .17 .08 .13* Books -.02 .07 -.01 (continued)
123
Table 20 (continued)
Summary of Regression Analysis for Predicting Political Participation (Political Participation)
Variable B SE B β Daily newspaper -.00 .08 -.00 News magazines .01 .09 .01 Tabloids -.02 .07 -.02 Internet homepages -.07 .07 -.06 Social media/Video sharing sites .04 .07 .03 Other Web sites .11 .08 .09 Discussions with others .02 .07 .02 Trust in Government Executive branch -.01 .05 -.01 Legislative branch .13 .06 .13* Law enforcement agencies -.11 .06 -.10 Regulatory agencies -.03 .06 -.02
Note. R = .45, R2 = .20, F (8, 470) = 14.71, p < .001 for step 1, R = .56, R2 = .32, ∆ R2 = .12, F (12, 466) = 17.97, p < .001 for step 2, R = .61, R2 = .37, ∆ R2 = .06, F (28, 450) = 9.60, p < .001 for step 3, R = .62, R2 = .38, ∆ R2 = .01, F (32, 446) = 8.69, p < .001 for step 4. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
124
Chapter IV
Discussion
Government conspiracy theories have been a prevalent and persistent topic of political discourse in the United States since the nation’s inception (Goldberg, 2003), and the popularity and accessibility of conspiracy theories in media have only increased due to the explosive growth of media choices in recent decades (Birchall, 2001; Nasir, 2000; Pinaire, 2005). Yet Hofstader’s use of the term “paranoid style” in 1964 to describe government conspiracy theories captured the disdain and derision with which many have viewed this type of political discourse, even today.
Those who create and consume this type of fare have often been dismissed or disparaged as irrational (Gulyas, 2016), even despite revelations that some conspiracy theories turn out to be true.
In formulating this study, I argued that rather than denigrating conspiracy theories as mindless ramblings among the lunatic fringe, communication scholars needed to understand better the audience for this form of content, their reasons for selecting this type of fare, and which media sources they go to for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content.
Furthermore, I argued that it would be important to examine use of government conspiracy theories broadly to comprehend the scope of their potential influence on individuals’ perceptions of U.S. government and perhaps their participation in the political process. To that end, this study has served as a crucial exploration into an expansive and complex but often disregarded subject.
This study is noteworthy in that it helps to fill a void in empirical research on this topic.
Prior to this study, most of the scholarly work on conspiracy theories centered on epistemological analyses of conspiratorial thinking (e.g., Basham, 2006; Coady, 2006; Clarke, 125
2002; Keeley, 1999; Keeley, 2003; Pigden, 2006; Popper, 2006), rhetorical, historical, and journalistic analyses focusing on thematic categorization and chronological or socio-cultural context for particular narratives (e.g., Goldzwig, 2002; Goodnight & Poulakos, 1981; Gulyas,
2016; Olmsted, 2009; Pfau, 2005a; Rafuse, 2008), or psychological studies of belief in conspiracy theories (e.g., Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Brotherton, French,
& Pickering, 2013; Goertzel, 1994). This study is one of the few to look at conspiracy theories quantitatively, and it is the first to use a uses and gratifications model that accounts for the role of individuals’ background characteristics, motives for media use related to government conspiracy theories, and exposure to an array of media sources for this type of fare in explaining trust in government and political participation. The results affirm the suitability of the uses and gratifications model for studying the uses and effects of this type of media fare and suggest that background characteristics, motives, and media selectivity do indeed matter in assessing the impact of conspiracy theories on certain forms of trust in government and certain forms of political participation.
In this chapter, I will first discuss the results of this study with regard to the outcome variables under analysis (i.e., trust in government and political participation). Then I will highlight and interpret some of the more notable results regarding the significant predictors of those outcomes. These include the contributions of individuals’ background characteristics (i.e., media skepticism, need for cognition, locus of control, conservatism/liberalism), the identification and prominence of individuals’ reported motives for selecting government- conspiracy-theory-oriented content, and respondents’ exposure to media sources for this type of fare. Finally, I will address limitations of the current study and conclude with recommendations for future research. 126
Trust in Government
The uses and gratifications model undergirding this study posits that background
characteristics would work in concert with motivations for media use for government-
conspiracy-theory-oriented material and exposure to such fare to predict trust in government as
an attitudinal outcome. As Goode (2012) explained: “A substantial proportion of the public
believe that there is an evil, shadowy group of persons operating in league against the rest of
society. Many of these conspiracies entail government operations” (p. 255). Thus, it seemed
sensible to investigate whether government conspiracy theories in media would in any way
impact people’s views of the individuals and entities so often implicated in these types of
political narratives.
In examining correlations between use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media and trust in government, one interesting finding was that the relationships between trust in law enforcement and media use (overall media selection as well as specific media sources) for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were weaker than relationships between media use for such fare and trust in other areas of government. A reason for this might be due to the spike in negative media depictions of police around the period of data collection. Around this time, the issues of police brutality and racial inequalities in the justice system were on the public agenda, following incidents of police involvement in the deaths of African-American civilians in U.S. cities such as
Ferguson, Missouri; New York City, New York; and Cleveland, Ohio. Incidents such as these sparked protests nationwide and outrage on social media (McGowen, 2016; Phillips, 2016;
Ponder & Sharma, 2016). It makes sense to assume that the ubiquitous media coverage of these stories might have had some impact on respondents’ perceptions of law enforcement. It is also noteworthy that those respondents who did have a more favorable impression of law 127 enforcement were less likely to visit Web sites devoted to a particular conspiracy theory or sites of government agencies, were internally controlled, tended to be conservative, had a favorable impression of media, and used media to satisfy a general information seeking motive. This reinforces the notion put forth in the conceptual model that background characteristics, motives, and media use are all important considerations in predicting trust in government.
In this study, trust in government was measured for four divisions of the federal government: the executive branch, the legislative branch, law enforcement agencies, and regulatory agencies. Rather than collapsing four measurements of trust in government into one attitudinal outcome variable, it seemed prudent to preserve granularity at the expense of convenience rather than simplify and lose valuable detail. It is important to note that despite the level of nuance achieved from assessing respondents’ levels of trust in four distinct components of the federal government (i.e., the executive and legislative branches as well as law enforcement and regulatory agencies), the measure used in this study did not address perceptions about the judicial branch of the federal government, nor did it address attitudes toward the military or intelligence agencies. While it was outside the purview of this study, government policies are also influenced by nongovernmental institutions, private citizens, lobbyists, and multinational corporations (Loewen, 1995). So it may be necessary in future research to consider other political forces that may be associated with government conspiracy theories and to determine levels of trust expressed about those entities.
Although conspiracy theories have been part of U.S. political discourse for centuries, the second half of the 20th century saw exponentiation in the creation and dissemination of conspiracy theories due to increased access to media sources including but not limited to print, television channels, and the Internet (Gulyas, 2016). Carter (2012) noted that while conspiracy- 128
theory-oriented radio call-in shows, magazines, newsletters, and books initially catered to
smaller audiences for decades, conspiracy theories eventually found a much larger audience
thanks to movies such as Oliver Stone’s JFK or Dylan Avery’s Loose Change documentary
about 9/11, TV shows such as The X-Files, Usenet discussion boards such as alt.conspiracy, or
America Online’s keyword site Parascope. Since Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, newspapers, magazines, and even late-night comedians have investigated a
flurry of conspiracy theories emanating from talk radio, TV news channels, and Twitter related
to or relayed by the Trump administration, its supporters, and its detractors alike (Baker &
Haberman, 2017; Dreyfuss, 2017; Landler, 2017; Zareva, 2017). Clearly, the contemporary
media landscape is lush with sources of material related to government conspiracy theories.
Gulyas (2016) expressed concern about the impact of government-conspiracy-theory-
oriented media sources—particularly radio programs, the Internet, and cable television
documentaries—that would twist historical facts to provide weak support for convoluted conspiracy narratives:
Documentary programs which present conspiratorial conjecture about history as
established fact have emerged across several cable networks in recent years. Shows like
Ancient Aliens and America Unearthed often have the same production standards as more
conventional history and scientific documentary programs. They feature talking-head
interviews that, superficially, provide expert content. They use well-crafted and
convincing graphics to bolster the views these experts present. (p. 15)
This hints at the complexity of media exposure to content related to government conspiracy
theories. Government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare encompasses a range of content available 129 in a plethora of media sources, and this type of fare is often presented in a way that blends the characteristics of traditional genres.
The respondents in this study did report using a variety of media for material related to government conspiracy theories. But in several instances, the media sources respondents said they used more frequently tended to be less useful (in conjunction with background characteristics and motives) in predicting trust in government or political participation. TV news, movies, and discussions with others were among the more frequently used media sources, but they were not significant predictors of either outcome variable. Although used slightly less frequently, TV non-news shows, political talk programs, books, daily newspapers, and news magazines were not significant predictors of the outcome variables either. This result may be due to the outcome variables at issue in this study. That is, although use of these sources of media for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material did not predict trust in government or political participation, they could be relevant to predicting other outcomes in future studies.
However, it is important to note that in the present study, half of the media sources listed in the study did have some bearing on trust in government or political participation, indicating that some sources of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were more influential than others in predicting the outcomes studied here.
Respondents who used political satire for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were less likely to trust the executive branch but more likely to trust regulatory agencies. This aligns with previous research indicating that the humor on late-night comedy shows tends to target presidents, presidential candidates, presidential advisors, cabinet officials, and the first family
(Niven, Lichter, & Amundson, 2003). This is also consistent with research that political satire can lead audiences to form positive opinions of government entities being criticized in such fare, 130
perhaps due to the ambiguity of this type of content (e.g., Stephen Colbert’s comedic,
conservative persona taking on Federal Election Commission rules regarding campaign finance)
(LaMarre, 2013).
Those who used radio news for conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare were more likely
to trust the executive branch. This may be because they are more likely to encounter
uninterrupted messages advancing the executive agenda, such as presidential radio addresses
(Horvit, Schiffer, & Wright, 2008). Tabloid users were more likely to trust the legislative branch. Moy, Pfau, and Kahlor (1999) were unable to detect any influence of media on their respondents’ confidence in Congress, so the findings in the present study suggest that certain media do impact people’s perceptions of federal legislators. This medium is characterized by entertaining—often exaggerated or salacious—human-interest stories that many readers find personal and relatable (Miller, 2012). So if conspiracy-theory-oriented content in tabloids centers on the private lives (e.g., marriages, divorces, relationships, bereavements) or disclosures of senators and representatives, tabloid readers may perceive legislators to be honest, sympathetic, or otherwise positive.
Moy, Pfau, and Kahlor (1999) did find that people who used television tabloids, entertainment talk shows, and television political talk shows were more likely to evaluate police in negative ways. Although they did not consider Web site usage, respondents in the present
study who visited Web sites of particular government agencies for conspiracy-theory-oriented
fare or sites devoted to specific conspiracy theories reported less trust in law enforcement. This
finding is somewhat novel, then, but as law enforcement agencies embrace the Internet to build
social capital, improve transparency, and engage with the public, future research may uncover
different results (Warren, Sulaiman, & Jaafar, 2014). 131
Overall, use of advertising for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare seemed to have been the
most consistently influential media predictor of trust in government and political participation.
In this study, advertising referred primarily to political campaign ads regarding candidates or
issues. Research has shown that in conjunction with individuals’ background characteristics and
motivations for viewing ads, political campaign advertising may contribute to positive
evaluations of candidates, may increase potential voters’ perceived political knowledge and
efficacy, and may be essential to appreciation for the electoral process (Kaid, 2004; Kaid,
Fernandes, & Painter, 2011; Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). This lends support to the findings that
use of advertising in this study yielded positive attitudes toward government and politically
participatory behaviors.
With regard to media use, the findings suggest that although there are indeed many
sources of material related to government conspiracy theories and although people do consume
fare from many of these sources, only some sources actually had an impact on how participants
in this study perceived government or the extent to which they wished to participate in politics.
Political Participation
Sunstein and Vermeule (2009) stated that “conspiracy theories have had large effects on
behavior” (p. 220). While they were not referring to effect size in an empirical sense, they noted
occasions where a small fraction of individuals did carry out catastrophic acts of violence and
terrorism because of their adherence to conspiracy-theory-oriented narratives (e.g., the
Oklahoma City bombing) (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009). Even if most people do not translate
their beliefs in government conspiracy theories into violent attacks, “such theories can still have
pernicious effects from the government’s point of view, either by inducing unjustifiably widespread public skepticism about the government’s assertions, or by dampening public 132
mobilization and participation in government-led efforts, or both” (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009, p. 220).
In this study, four different types of political participation were measured: interpersonal political discussion, interactive political messaging, civic participation, as well as traditional forms of political participation. Once more, rather than amalgamating four types of participation into a single behavioral outcome, it seemed wise to preserve as much detail as possible to determine not merely whether people engaged in political participation but also in what ways they chose to participate.
Trust in government as an attitudinal outcome helped to predict two forms of participation: interactive political messaging and traditional political participation. Trust in law enforcement was a negative predictor of interactive political messaging (e.g., communication via e-mail, chat rooms, online forums). As mentioned previously, the anger and protests on social media regarding alleged police brutality and racism may have caused people with more favorable attitudes toward law enforcement to avoid communicating with others online. Trust in the legislative branch was a positive predictor of traditional forms of political participation (e.g., displaying campaign buttons, bumper stickers, yard signs; contributing money to or working for a campaign; circulating petitions). This may be because people feel more invested in the political process when they can see their locally elected representatives to Congress work at the federal level to secure benefits and assistance for their home districts. If people feel that their legislators are working directly for their constituents, people in these communities might wish to endorse candidates for those legislative offices and support campaign efforts because they expect to enjoy the fruits of their labor. Taken together, these results reinforce the decision to preserve granularity in measurements of trust in government as well as in political participation, as there 133
are clearly differences in how people view different parts of government and how those
viewpoints may lead to variations in participatory behaviors.
In examining correlations between use of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media
and political participation, one interesting finding was that the relationships between media use
(overall media selection as well as specific media sources) and interpersonal political discussion were consistently weaker than relationships between media use and other forms of participation.
Harrington (1998) observed a multidisciplinary conference in which individuals met to discuss recovered memory therapy in conjunction with conspiracy theories linking President Bill
Clinton, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the United Nations to the Illuminati, the
Freemasons, satanic cults, and mind control. As he described it, “The word dialogue [in the conference title] is misleading because there were no skeptics or critics among the speakers and
…any dissension from the audience was strongly discouraged—it was essentially a monologue”
(p. 325). While this was an anecdotal reflection, and the correlations did not account for the possible influence of other factors, this result may suggest that some people avoid political conversations about government conspiracy theories, perhaps fearing confrontation, judgment, or not being able to terminate the conversation when desired. Use of government-conspiracy- theory-oriented media use might provide fodder for interactive political messaging, civic participation, and political participation in ways that may allow individuals to express beliefs and preferences without having to deal with immediate feedback in an intimate exchange.
Individuals who used advertising for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare also tended to engage in interactive political messaging, civic participation, and traditional political participation behaviors, perhaps because political ad viewing increased their sense of efficacy
(Kaid, 2004; Kaid, Fernandes, & Painter, 2011; Trent & Friedenberg, 2000). Similarly, people 134
in the study who listened to talk radio for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were also more likely to engage in interactive political messaging, civic participation, and traditional political participation activities. This aligns with research suggesting that individuals who perceive talk radio to be an important medium express higher levels of political self-efficacy, meaning that they “feel they can make a difference in the political system” (Pinkleton & Austin, 2001, p. 330).
Additionally, people in the study who used social media/video sharing sites for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare also tended to engage in interpersonal political discussion, which supports a somewhat stronger link between use of these forms of media and interpersonal political discussions than has been asserted in previous research (e.g., Hanson, Haridakis, &
Sharma, 2011; Jang, Lee, & Park, 2014; Ponder & Haridakis, 2015). Individuals who used
Internet homepages for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare were more likely to engage in civic participation. Internet homepages aggregate information from a variety of sources, allowing for regular exposure to a range of material, the ability to compare sources, and the option to personalize content (Beam & Kosicki, 2014; Van Horn, 2004). This allows people not only to enhance their political knowledge and self-efficacy, but also to monitor grassroots movements and causes that are personally meaningful to them and engage in related civic collaborations and activities (Wilhelm, 2002).
Other Significant Predictors
Although the primary intention of this study was to explore the impact of government- conspiracy-theory-oriented media consumption on trust in government as an attitudinal outcome and on political participation as a behavioral outcome, uses and gratifications—the theoretical framework for this study—demands consideration of other variables that may predict the 135 outcomes in question. These potential predictors include individuals’ background characteristics and motives for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media use.
Individuals’ background characteristics. While conspiracy theories still carry the odor of stigma for associations with supposedly paranoid people, faulty logic, or extremism, scholars have begun to recognize that there are certain background characteristics that may provide insight into individuals’ predispositions to accept conspiracy theories (Bruder, Haffke, Neave,
Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Sunstein, 2014). While it must be underscored that the current study does not attempt to address respondents’ belief in conspiracy theories but rather their use of media related to government conspiracy theories (which does not necessarily indicate acceptance of said theories), this acknowledgement of the importance of background characteristics lends credence to their inclusion in this study.
The inclusion of media skepticism as a background characteristic in this model yielded some interesting results. Lower skepticism was correlated with use of all media sources for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare, suggesting that those who were less skeptical of “mainstream media” consumed more conspiracy-theory-oriented fare across media sources. These findings regarding media skepticism are striking because they suggest a useful perspective of skepticism as it may relate to media literacy in that less skeptical individuals who consumed more conspiracy-theory-oriented fare may have been demonstrating astute media literacy skills.
Kurtz (1998) framed skepticism as “an essential part of objective scientific inquiry and the search for reliable knowledge” (p. 35) and stated that skeptics question all claims, definitions, logical inconsistencies, and presentations of evidence. However, Leach (2016) said information overload and source skepticism could lead people to disregard most news sources as untrustworthy and select only those sources that reinforced their own views or that entertained 136 them. Silverblatt (1995) echoed this point, noting that selective exposure, perception, and retention interfere with audiences’ reception and interpretation of media information. So while a certain degree of media skepticism is often warranted, consuming and evaluating media messages from a variety of sources may require more sophisticated literacy skills than making blanket statements about the believability of any one outlet or communicator.
Donald Trump, himself a reality TV star prior to beginning a career in politics, serves as an illustration of this concern. Trump, who won the presidency after running on the Republican ticket, has advanced several provably false conspiracy theories about previous administrations, political opponents in the Republican and Democratic parties, federal government institutions, and mainstream news media (Maheshwari, 2017). Trump has cited unsubstantiated conspiracy- theory-oriented material from sources such as Breitbart News, YouTube, The National Enquirer, right-wing blogs, and Twitter as evidence for his assertions, defending his actions by saying,
“All I know is what’s on the Internet” (Maheshwari, 2017, para. 8). If this statement were to be taken at face value, it would illustrate Trump’s general lack of media literacy, over and above his consistent disparagement of mainstream news media professionals and outlets. He exemplifies the conundrum of those who form critical opinions of certain media sources while blindly accepting material from other media sources without question.
Trump and others who malign mainstream media yet uncritically endorse information and opinions circulated in nonmainstream sources rely on generalizations rather than actual contemplations of source or message quality. Avowals of skepticism are not the same as actual skepticism. Individuals who tend to be conservative may claim to be more skeptical of media and avoid media exposure broadly. Liberals may hesitate to express a general suspicion of media and prefer to remain open-minded, asking questions and evaluating specific claims. Thus, 137
the less skeptical respondents in this sample who consumed more media related to government
conspiracy theories might have been exhibiting more proficient media literacy skills.
For all measures of trust in government (i.e., executive branch, legislative branch, law
enforcement, regulatory agencies), individuals who were less skeptical of media had a more
favorable impression of the federal government. That is, individuals who tended to see the
mainstream media as fair, accurate, unbiased, thorough, and trustworthy also tended to think of
government entities in generally positive ways (e.g., honest, good, competent, unselfish). So
rather than interpreting these results as less skeptical people adopting a naïve and gullible
perspective of government, it may be more appropriate to construe these findings as indicating
the potential for open-minded consideration to lead to a view of government as generally trustworthy. From this perspective, less skeptical people may think that although government conspiracy theories may abound in media, many may be disconfirmed, and even the proven conspiracies are probably the exception rather than the rule. As Silverblatt (1995) argued:
“Media literacy can enable citizens to become aware of how the channels of mass communication can be used to discourage debate, conceal information, and mislead the public.
At the same time, media literacy can enhance public discourse on our political system” (p. 266).
Thus, an appropriate level of skepticism may encourage diversified media consumption regulated by questioning and assessment, which could lead to a more complete understanding of the political media environment.
Contrary to Hypothesis 2, which posited that higher need for cognition would relate positively to selection of media for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare, the relationship was actually a negative correlation, indicating that people who expressed a higher need for cognition were less likely to use several forms of media for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare (i.e., radio news, 138
talk radio TV news, tabloids, Internet homepages, advertisements, and daily newspapers). They
were also less likely to trust the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.
However, need for cognition was a positive predictor of interpersonal political discussion as a form of political participation.
As measured in this study, need for cognition addresses an enjoyment of contemplating complex issues and a preference for mentally stimulating or demanding tasks. Therefore, people who enjoy in-depth thinking may prefer to talk about politics with others rather than turn to media sources for information about government conspiracy theories. They may find interpersonal political discussion to be more stimulating and challenging, as they not only have to absorb and evaluate information and arguments from other people but also recall messages and respond to them in real time. In contrast, viewing, listening to, or even reading mediated content might offer a lesser degree of challenge or stimulation because there is no expectation or pressure to engage or respond; one may merely consume the content without having to contribute additional information or viewpoints as would be expected in normal conversation. Nimmo
(1970) explained this from a uses and gratifications perspective: “While deep concentration requires the motivation of those who are highly interested and involved in the real world, quiet absorption in the news is much less demanding” (p. 185).
People with a lower need for cognition, however, were more likely to use some media sources (i.e., radio news, talk radio, TV news, tabloids, Internet homepages, ads, and daily newspapers) for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare and to have more favorable impressions of the executive and legislative branches of government. One reason for this could have been that during the time of data collection, the conspiracy theories being circulated in the media sources they selected were critical of political figures who served as opponents or foils to 139 the president or legislators. One could also speculate that this result may have occurred because rather than forming perceptions on the basis of in-depth thinking, these individuals’ attitudes toward government instead arise from patriotism, which encompasses emotions such as love of country, expressions of values, and attachment to national symbols (Parker, 2010). Research has shown that the president serves as a national symbol of unity and that people may also view
Congress favorably when the legislative branch and executive branch are in accord
(Hetherington & Nelson, 2003). The fact that the office of the Presidency and the halls of
Congress are enshrined in marble monuments accentuates their symbolic value for many
Americans. Therefore, trust in the executive and legislative branches of government may have more to do with affect than intellect for those lower in need for cognition.
It makes intuitive sense that people who believe powerful others or chance control events and outcomes would also seek material about government conspiracy theories in an array of media sources, as conspiracy narratives by definition feature cabals of shadowy individuals and groups manipulating people and events. As Sunstein (2014) explained, acceptance of government conspiracy theories may be indicative of an obdurate mindset that attributes causality to external forces: “Some people appear to hold a broad view of the world according to which the authorities are engaged in conspiracies; accounts that fit with that view of the world are appealing even if they contradict each other” (p. 11).
There were, however, significant positive correlations between increased use of conspiracy-theory-oriented media and internal locus of control as well. This may be explained by a conviction or hope among those who consume media fare about government conspiracy theories that in learning about the conspiracy theories, one might be able to unmask the conspirators and thwart their plans. Indeed, for many of history’s confirmed conspiracies such as 140 the Watergate scandal or the FBI’s COINTELPRO activities, public exposure of secretive actions did put an end to some attempts at illegal surveillance or political corruption (Theoharis,
1978). Therefore, respondents in this study may have acknowledged the possible existence of government conspiracies and sought material related to them in media to empower themselves with knowledge to guard against or oppose them in some way.
However, this result may also be an artifact of the wording of items in the locus of control measures; items about car accidents, making friends, or opportunities for leadership might have lacked the context necessary for meaningful responses, rendering them vague or general to the participants. Despite successful usage of this measure in previous studies, future studies involving locus of control and conspiracy theories may benefit from separating the internal, powerful others, and chance locus of control items into discrete portions of the survey to allow for respondents to contemplate each set of items separately rather than all at the same time.
Internal locus of control was a positive predictor of trust in all four areas of federal government (i.e., executive branch, legislative branch, law enforcement, regulatory agencies).
Chance locus of control was also a positive predictor of trust in the executive branch, whereas powerful others locus of control was a negative predictor of trust in the legislative branch. These findings may suggest that individuals who feel they are in control of their lives have positive feelings about the federal government, perhaps because they adhere to the philosophy that in a democratic society, the people are the government. These findings may also have to do with whether respondents agree with the leadership style and decisions of the specific people in the executive and legislative branches of government. Barker and Carman (2010) found that preference for particular candidates is driven in part by individuals’ perceptions—often shaped by media portrayals—of whether they think candidates are motivated by conscience or a desire 141
to reflect the will of their constituents. So those who believe Powerful Others determine events
may disagree with the decisions made by individuals in Congress or believe they are not acting
in the interests of the people. People who believe fate or luck determines events may dismiss negative reports involving the executive branch as beyond the administration’s control, or they may respond to symbolic associations of the presidency (e.g., patriotism, stability) to help them cope with uncertainty (Parker, 2010).
Conservatism was also a positive predictor of trust in three areas of the federal government (i.e., executive branch, legislative branch, and law enforcement), but liberalism was a positive predictor of trust in regulatory agencies. Conservative individuals who place trust in the federal government generally might view regulatory agencies very differently than would individuals who tend to be more liberal. In the survey question used in this study regarding trust in regulatory agencies, respondents were given examples of the types of entities that would fit into this category: the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal Trade Commission.
Individuals who tend to be more conservative often view these types of agencies—as well as
many others not listed in the survey question (e.g., the Federal Election Commission, the Food
and Drug Administration, the Federal Communications Commission)—as restrictive of
individual liberty or economic growth; in contrast, individuals who tend to be more liberal might
see these agencies as ensuring safety, preserving public commodities, or providing valuable
oversight (Crum, 2015; Stelzer, 1997; Turner, 2009). Therefore, these results concur with
previous research.
However, it is important to note that conservatism/liberalism as a background
characteristic worked in concert with other factors to influence trust in government, and in some
cases, political participation through trust in government. For instance, conservative individuals 142
in this study who tended to seek conspiracy-theory-oriented media to fulfill a general
information seeking motive were more likely to have a favorable view of law enforcement,
which in turn, made them less likely to engage in interactive political messaging. More liberal
individuals in the study who also sought conspiracy-theory-oriented media to fulfill a general information seeking motive tended to express a greater degree of trust in regulatory agencies, yet that trust did not help to predict any forms of political participation. This reinforces the notion that background characteristics are certainly important to consider in predicting outcomes, but—
in accordance with uses and gratifications theory—their influence varies in conjunction with
motives that drive media exposure to shape attitudes and potentially behaviors as well.
While certain background characteristics such as those included in this study are certainly
worthy of consideration, we must be cautious in jumping to the conclusion that there are just
certain kinds of people who consume conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. In addition to individual differences in the people who consume this type of material, we must also consider their reasons for selecting various media for content related to government conspiracy theories.
Motives for using media for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare. Sunstein
(2014) argued that “Reactions to a claim of conspiracy … are often determined by the motivations as well as the antecedent knowledge of those who hear the claim” (p. 14). It follows, then, that motives for using government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media are an important aspect of the uses and gratifications model used in this investigation.
Of the four motives identified in this study (i.e., social utility/relaxing recreation, political evaluation, pass time, and general information seeking), only the social utility/relaxing recreation and general information seeking motives were significant predictors of the outcome variables.
Prior research (e.g., Conway & Rubin, 1991; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Rubin, 1985) suggests 143
that these two motives reflect moderately active media use. This should be reassuring to those
who may have feared that government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media would serve as a
primary source of misleading political information (e.g., Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, &
Rich, 2000) and to those who may have worried that such fare would serve as mindless diversion from more politically germane media consumption (e.g., Putnam, 2000). Instead, it would
appear that the individuals in this study used media for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented fare in a judicious manner. Conspiracy theories were part of their media diet, but the individuals did not use this type of media as their complete basis for forming attitudes about government or deciding whether or how to participate in politics. As Margulies (2009) put it, “It is fortunate that most people who believe in conspiracy theories also maintain a certain amount of rationality—to them conspiracy theories are an interest that does not significantly affect other parts of their lives” (p. 218).
Individuals who reported using media for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented content to fulfill a general information seeking motive were more likely to express a higher degree of
trust in law enforcement agencies and regulatory agencies. Although law enforcement and
regulatory agencies do make information available to the public, they are often less transparent
(or at least operate under different guidelines for disclosure) than legislative and executive
government offices (Crow, Albright, & Koebele, 2016). However, many of these agencies have
made efforts to release information or solicit public feedback, and openness as well as
stakeholder deliberation and input often results in greater satisfaction with procedures and policy outcomes (Steelman & Ascher, 1997). Therefore, individuals who use media to fulfill a general information seeking motive might encounter information and viewpoints that provide them with 144
a better understanding of how these agencies work, which could lead to more favorable
impressions of these government groups.
People who used government-conspiracy-theory-related media fare to fulfill a social
utility/relaxing recreation motive were more likely to engage in interactive political messaging,
civic participation, and traditional political participation activities, but they were less likely to
engage in interpersonal political discussions. This may have been because using media for
material related to government conspiracy theories served as a functional alternative for
interpersonal communication in terms of gratifying social or psychological needs (Blumler &
Katz, 1974; McQuail & Windahl, 1981; Rubin & Rubin, 1985). Rather than engaging in face-to- face conversation with family, friends, co-workers, or others, the respondents may have turned to conspiracy-theory-oriented media for social and recreational reasons.
In sum, this study demonstrates that in exploring the role of government conspiracy
theories in the U.S. political media environment, background characteristics, motives for
government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media use, and patterns of exposure to government-
conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare are indeed relevant. In addition, trust in government
mattered as an attitudinal outcome but also—in conjunction with the other components of the
conceptual model— in its capacity to shape political participation behaviors. These numerous
and interesting findings reinforce the suitability of the uses and gratifications framework that
guided this study and underscore the lesson that future researchers of conspiracy theories must
consider these elements to avoid producing short-sighted conclusions.
Limitations and Future Directions
This analysis of the relationships among individuals’ background characteristics, motives
for media use, exposure to media fare related to government conspiracy theories, trust in 145
government, and political participation was a valuable study that was both enhanced and
hindered by its expansive scope and conceptual complexity. As an exploratory, empirical study,
it presents a more comprehensive view of the role of conspiracy theories in media and politics
than many other studies have provided to date. But like any research endeavor, there were
limitations that could be addressed in future research.
One strength of this study is that respondents came from a national sample gathered via
the online survey aggregator Qualtrics, allowing for a greater degree of diversity than a typical
undergraduate college student population, for example, might provide (Gosling, Vazire,
Srivastava, & John, 2004; LaMarre, 2013). However, it should be acknowledged that even this
fairly large and diverse sample may still not represent the U.S. adult population exactly. Because
Qualtrics facilitates online sampling and survey administration, only those with access and
inclination to use the Internet would be included in the sample. Presumably, this might exclude
people who do not have access to the Internet, those who lack computer literacy skills, or those
who are not inclined to use the Internet generally.
This sample might also exclude people who are unwilling to share information about
their habits and opinions with others, perhaps out of a desire to safeguard their privacy or maybe
due to suspicion about the “real” reasons for gathering data, given that the study openly deals
with consumption of media related to government conspiracy theories. That is, even if individuals do use media for conspiracy-theory-oriented fare, those people who are especially convinced of the veracity of government conspiracy narratives may be wary of any attempt to gather their personal information, regardless of how transparently the purpose of the study or the questions therein may have been communicated to them. However, there are many people who create, share, and comment on government conspiracy theories in online or other mediated 146
contexts (e.g., YouTube videos, chat forums, social media channels, talk radio, letters or e-mails to newspapers and magazines), so even very ardent proponents of conspiracy theories must be aware that their online habits and posted opinions are publicly observable, at least to some extent. Therefore, it is likely that the sample used in the current study still includes a fair portion of conspiracy buffs and believers. Still, future research should attempt to address potential limitations to the sampling methods to ensure even greater diversity and inclusivity.
Another challenging component of the study was the need to locate or develop a measure of exposure to government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media. While previous studies have employed survey instruments to measure belief in a list of particular conspiracy theories (e.g.,
Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013;
Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Noruipanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Goertzel, 1994), and uses-and- gratifications-based studies have used a range of different media sources (e.g., Hanson,
Haridakis, Cunningham, Sharma, & Ponder, 2010; Muhtaseb & Frey, 2008; Ponder & Haridakis,
2015), there were no existing survey instruments that addressed conspiracy-theory-oriented media sources specifically or that accounted for the breadth of content which could be construed as related to conspiracy theories.
Therefore, in this study I used a measure that combines the two approaches, with recognition that media fare related to conspiracy theories transcends both media channels as well as traditional genres. Conspiracy theories—which include unverified claims still under investigation, completely unfounded or outrageous narratives, as well as conspiracies that have been exposed as true—are often recounted and dissected in news, entertainment, or educational media sources. Conspiracy theories themselves frequently meld established fact and flights of 147
fancy, and media fare related to conspiracy theories often blends the stylistic conventions and
communication norms of various types of content.
As explained previously, respondents were first given a list of topics or claims commonly
addressed in media fare related to government conspiracy theories to help clarify the type of
content in question. This list was derived from items used by Brotherton, French, and Pickering
(2013) in their study of beliefs in conspiracy theories. The list of media sources often containing
conspiracy-theory-oriented content was derived from Stempel, Hargrove, and Stemple (2007) and supplemented by specific examples of the types of conspiracy-theory-oriented content available in each medium. Respondents were asked to indicate how frequently they used each media source for content related to government conspiracy theories.
This approach did provide insight into where people tend to go for government- conspiracy-theory-oriented content, and the categories of media listed did delineate the types of content available from each source. However, the measure used in the study more overtly addressed the media respondents were selecting for material related to government conspiracy theories rather than identification of conspiracy-theory-oriented content per se or a particular conspiracy theory. Future research in this area would benefit from more distinct measures of media selectivity and content preference.
In this particular study, I examined direct predictors of trust in government and political participation, but I did not address indirect relationships among variables because they were beyond the scope of the current project. But future research applying methods such as structural equation modeling or path analysis might be valuable for exploring indirect effects. Broadly speaking, the fact that trust in government predicted political participation and that other 148
variables predicted trust in government means it is likely that variables that predicted trust in
government indirectly influenced political participation through trust in government.
Because empirical research regarding conspiracy theories is relatively nascent, it also
may be important in future research to situate this type of media fare into a larger context.
Conspiracy-theory-oriented media might compare and contrast with other types of content such
as rumor (Allport & Postman, 1946), troll information (i.e., caricatures, parodies, or sarcastic
imitations of conspiracy theories) (Bessi, Coletto, Davidescu, Scala, Caldarelli, &
Quattrociocchi., 2015), opinion entrepreneurship (Dreier & Martin, 2010), conspiracy
entrepreneurship (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009), factitious informational blends (Rojecki &
Meraz, 2016); viral political marketing (Sharma, 2014); fabrication, slanted reporting,
propaganda, or other forms of biased media often lumped into the category of “fake news”
(Peters, 2016).
In contextualizing conspiracy-theory-oriented media in future research, it may be
necessary to consider factors that contribute to their creation and dissemination. While some
conspiracy theories seem to arise spontaneously among various groups, “others are initiated and
spread, quite intentionally, by conspiracy entrepreneurs who profit directly or indirectly from
propagating their theories” (Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009, p. 212). For instance, Cameron Harris,
a recent college graduate trying to start his own political consulting business, admitted he earned
several thousand dollars in ad revenue for concocting and spreading negative, fake news stories
linking Bill and Hillary Clinton as well as the Democratic National Committee to such crimes as
electoral fraud, underage sex trafficking, and murder (Shane, 2017). Goode (2012) highlighted
far-right radio host Alex Jones as “a popular, virtual one-man conspiracy industry” (p. 255) because in addition to his radio show, he also has his own Web sites and has produced or 149
directed many films regarding a range of government conspiracy theories implicating U.S.
presidents Bill Clinton and Barack Obama, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and think tanks such as the
Bilderberg Group in various plots to engineer or feign terrorist attacks as part of a larger plan to decimate and enslave the world population. Because individuals may create as well as consume media related to government conspiracy theories, it may be important in future studies to take into account the desire for profit or political influence in the conception and transmission of conspiracy-theory-oriented media fare. Correspondingly, future research might also explore people’s perceptions of particular conspiracy theories and whether those perceptions influence the popularity or persuasive impact of media fare related to those specific conspiracy theories.
Clarifying the placement and influence of government-conspiracy-theory-oriented media in such a byzantine assemblage of potentially deceptive discourse may lead to important insights in future research about hostile media bias perceptions that might impact media consumption patterns or dampen the expression of dissenting opinions and participation in public discourse
(Ladd, 2010; Lin, Haridakis, & Hanson, 2016; Matthes, 2013). Intentionally disseminated conspiracy theories share characteristics with a category of misinformation Rojecki and Meraz
(2014) referred to as “factitious informational blends (FIBs),” which play a crucial role in
“speculative politics—the intentional use of unverified information to undermine the credibility and public image of a political opponent” (p. 26). In their analysis of FIBs in online and traditional media during the 2004 U.S. presidential election, they found that partisan entities were able to disseminate FIBs to influence the agenda of traditional media outlets, which in turn created feedback loops of Web searches for information about the FIBs that served to amplify their impact among partisan audiences. The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, conservative media personality Matt Drudge, and several conservative blogs circulated FIBs critical of Democratic 150
candidate John Kerry, which spread further due to repetition by Fox News on cable television,
and by Rush Limbaugh and Ann Coulter on talk radio (Rojecki & Meraz, 2014). During the
same election, conflicting FIBs about President George W. Bush’s military record were
addressed by left-leaning blogs and investigated by mainstream media outlets (e.g., the
Washington Post, the New York Times, CNN), but conservative blogs and publications drove an
aggressive agenda to dispute the allegations against Bush (Rojecki & Meraz, 2014). As a result,
partisan elites were able to create a homogenous media environment that would facilitate
selective attention and polarization (Rojecki & Meraz, 2014).
The data from this study do not support the assertion of some that consuming conspiracy-
theory-oriented media fare only appeals to unbalanced people or necessarily leads to fanaticism.
But history has shown that, in some cases, hostile views of media and government have played
into the philosophies and actions of antigovernment militia movements and racial or religious
separatist and supremacist groups, as well as terrorists (Gulyas, 2016). Empirical studies of
specific theories may help scholars understand why certain conspiracy narratives gain traction in media or among certain groups of people, or whether consuming particular types of conspiracy-
theory-oriented material could contribute to an extremist ideology. Because government
conspiracy theories proliferate for different reasons in different contexts and address a variety of
topics, perceptions of particular conspiracy theories might be an interesting outcome to explore
in future research.
Future research related to government conspiracy theories in media might also shed light
on how Americans view major institutions critical to public and political communication, free speech, civil liberties, democratic governance, and societal order. Suspicion about politics and politicians as well as media messages and outlets may indicate larger issues of political 151
misinformation, disaffection, cynicism, and apathy (Hanson, Haridakis, Cunningham, Sharma, &
Ponder, 2010; Kuklinski, Quirk, Jerit, Schwieder, & Rich, 2000; Lariscy, Tinkham, & Sweetser,
2011; Pinkleton, Austin, Zhou, Willoughby, & Reiser, 2012; Valentino, Beckmann, & Buhr,
2001; Yamamoto & Kushin, 2014) that ultimately may have dire consequences for political participation.
But as Kurtz (1998) stated, skeptical inquiry regarding government conspiracy theories
“need not lead to unbelief, despair, or hopelessness” (p. 40). Likewise, the proliferation of government conspiracy theories in media need not induce national panic. This is because in societies that value free speech and dissent, an unfettered press, transparency, and access to information, people will have the opportunity to assess conspiracy theories. According to
Sunstein (2014), in free and open societies, not only do government and media institutions have the ability to debunk or confirm conspiracy theories, but private institutions and individuals can research, rebut, refute, or expose them as well: “In such a society, those who might be tempted to believe such theories are exposed to evidence and corrections, and they are unlikely to distrust all
knowledge-creating institutions” (p. 23). Provided that societies preserve civil liberties and
promote media literacy, government conspiracy theories may serve an essential role in
meaningful political discourse.
Conclusion
Gulyas (2016) acknowledged that the propagation of some conspiracy theories has had a corrosive effect on public discourse and characterized many such theories as outrageous and extremist. Still, he argued that such conspiracy theories have perceptible effects that make them worthy of scholarly attention: “Despite the fringe positions these theories occupy, they persist
and continue to evolve in response to new political, social, and cultural concerns. Because of 152
this, conspiracy theories (and theorists) are important” (p. 2). Given the importance of the topic,
this study not only helped to shed light on the nature and impact of conspiracy-theory-oriented
media fare in U.S. society, but it also provided useful insights that may guide future research.
It serves as an important exploration into a topic that has been largely overlooked by
quantitative researchers for too long. It is among the first empirical studies of this subject and
the only study of this topic to have applied a uses and gratifications model incorporating background characteristics, motives for media use, and media exposure to predict trust in government as an attitudinal outcome and political participation as a behavioral outcome.
Therefore, despite its limitations, this study makes a substantial contribution to the scant body of socially scientific research in this area.
However, there is much more to learn about the role of government conspiracy theories in the U.S. political media environment as well as in societies around the world. Scholars must
continue to investigate the influence of social and psychological factors working in concert with
people’s motives for seeking material related to government conspiracy theories and with
patterns of media exposure to this type of fare that together lead to particular, meaningful
outcomes. When it comes to a more complete understanding of government conspiracy theories,
to paraphrase the tagline of The X-Files franchise, the truth is still out there. Future researchers
must continue to pursue it.
153
Appendix A Informed Consent to Participate in a Research Study Document
School of Communication Studies College of Communication and Information
Study Title Use of media fare pertaining to government conspiracy theories
Principal Investigator Dr. Paul Haridakis, Professor, Kent State University
Co-Investigator Rekha Sharma, Assistant Professor/Doctoral Candidate, Kent State University
You are being invited to participate in a research study. This consent form will provide you with information on the research project, what you will need to do, and the associated risks and benefits of the research. Your participation is voluntary. Please read this form carefully. It is important that you fully understand the research in order to make an informed decision.
Purpose In this study, I am interested in learning more about people’s attitudes, behaviors, and experiences using media fare related to government conspiracy theories.
Procedures Participating in this study is completely up to you, and you will not be penalized in any way if you decide not to complete this survey. If you do decide to participate, please keep in mind that there are no correct or incorrect answers. Just answer each question as honestly as possible. You should simply click the response that best reflects your opinions or describes your actions. You will also be asked to provide some basic information about your demographic characteristics, but no information will be used to identify you specifically. Your feedback will be kept confidential, and I will not contact you in any way after you participate in this study. It will take you approximately 20 minutes to complete this survey.
Benefits Ideally, the results of this study will yield insight into people’s experiences using media fare related to government conspiracy theories. This may inform research of public communication and political communication by refining academic understanding of particular concepts and theories as they relate to this type of content.
Risks and Discomforts There are no anticipated risks or discomforts beyond those encountered in everyday life. 154
Privacy and Confidentiality Your name or other identifying information will be kept separate from and will not be associated with your responses on the questionnaire. Thus, your responses will not be linked to you. Your study-related information will be kept confidential within the limits of the law. Research participants will not be identified in any publication or presentation of research results; only aggregate data will be used.
Voluntary Participation In order to participate in this study, you have to be 18 years old or older and watch, listen to, or read media fare pertaining to government conspiracy theories. Taking part in this research study is entirely up to you. You may choose not to participate, or you may discontinue your participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Contact Information If you have any questions or concerns about this research, you may contact Dr. Paul Haridakis (primary investigator) at 330-672-0180 or Rekha Sharma (co-investigator) at 330-672-3804. This project has been approved by the Kent State University Institutional Review Board. If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant or complaints about the research, you may call the IRB at 330-672-2704.
Consent Statement and Signature I have read this consent form and understand that moving forward and answering the survey items will represent my agreement to participate in this study. I voluntarily agree to participate in this study.
155
Appendix B Media Skepticism Scale (Tsfati, 2010)
Instructions: Please indicate the answer that best reflects your feeling about each statement. Please use the following scale:
1 = Never 2 = Rarely 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Always
1. In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are fair? 2. In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are accurate? 3. In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they are unbiased? 4. In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they tell the whole story? 5. In general, when you think about the mainstream media, do you think they can be trusted?
156
Appendix C Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996)
Instructions: For each of the statements below, please indicate to what extent the statement is characteristic of you. Please keep the following scale in mind as you rate each of the statements below: 1 = extremely uncharacteristic; 2 = somewhat uncharacteristic; 3 = uncertain; 4 = somewhat characteristic; 5 = extremely characteristic
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems. 2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking. 3. Thinking is not my idea of fun. * 4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities? * 5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to think in depth about something.* 6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours. 7. I only think as hard as I have to. * 8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones? * 9. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them? * 10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me. 11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems. 12. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much? * 13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve. 14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me. 15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought. 16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. * 17. It's enough for me that something gets the job done; I don't care how or why it works. * 18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.
* Reverse scored. 157
Appendix D Internal, Powerful Others, and Chance Locus of Control Scales (Levenson, 1974)
Instructions: Please rate your level of agreement with the following statements, using this scale:
1 = Strongly 2 = Disagree 3 = Agree Somewhat & 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Agree
1. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends mostly on my ability. 2. To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings. 3. I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people. 4. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I am. 5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work. 6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interest from bad luck happenings. 7. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I’m lucky. 8. Although I might have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility without appealing to those in positions of power. 9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am. 10. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen. 11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others. 12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck. 13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups. 14. It’s not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things may turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune. 15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me. 16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I’m lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time. 17. If important people were to decide they didn’t like me, I probably wouldn’t make many friends. 18. I can pretty much determine what will happen in my life. 19. I am usually able to protect my personal interests. 20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver. 21. When I get what I want, it’s usually because I worked hard for it. 22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure they fit in with the desires of people who have power over me. 23. My life is determined by my own actions. 24. It’s chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends.
158
Appendix E Conservatism/Liberalism Scale (Adapted from Mehrabian, 1996)
Instructions: Please rate the following statements on how they describe your political leanings, using this scale:
1 = Strongly 2 = Disagree 3 = Agree Somewhat & 4 = Agree 5 = Strongly Disagree Disagree Somewhat Agree
1. I am politically more liberal than conservative. 2. In any election, given a choice between a Republican and a Democratic candidate, I will select the Republican over the Democrat. 3. Communism has been proven to be a failed political ideology. 4. I cannot see myself ever voting to elect conservative candidates. 5. The major national media are too left-wing for my taste. 6. Socialism has many advantages over capitalism. 7. On balance, I lean politically more to the left than to the right.
Note: Items 1, 4, 6, and 7 are reverse coded.
159
Appendix F Motivations for Consuming Media Fare Related to Government Conspiracy Theories
Instructions: Here are several reasons people may have for choosing media fare about government conspiracy theories. For each statement, please select the number that indicates whether each reason is not at all (1), not much (2), somewhat (3), a lot (4), or exactly (5) like your own reasons for choosing media content related to government conspiracy theories.
I use media related to government conspiracy theories…
1. To meet new people 2. To search for information 3. Because it’s fun to just play around and check things out 4. To participate in discussions 5. Because it’s convenient 6. Because it’s just a habit 7. Because it’s entertaining 8. So I can get away from family, friends, or others 9. To keep up with current issues or events 10. So I can get away from what I’m doing 11. Because it’s enjoyable 12. Because it provides a new and interesting way to do research 13. To communicate with family and friends 14. So I can forget about school, work, or other things 15. Because it’s sometimes easier to send something online or by e-mail than say it to the other person’s face 16. Because I just like to use it 17. To get information for free 18. To help others 19. Because people don’t have to be there the exact time you send the message 20. To see what is out there 21. Because it is cheaper than other ways of sending information to other people 22. Because it is easier to get information 23. Because it gives me something to occupy my time 24. Because I wonder what other people have to say 25. When there is no one else to talk to or be with 26. To get more points of view 27. To let others know I care about their feelings 28. To belong to a group with the same interests as mine 29. When I have nothing better to do 30. Because I can talk as long or as short as I want 31. To show others encouragement 32. Because I can use it anytime 33. Because it makes me feel less lonely 160
34. Because it passes the time away, particularly when I’m bored 35. Because I can view material and videos online, and I don’t have to buy them 36. To tell others what to watch or see 37. Because it allows me to unwind 38. So I won’t have to be alone 39. Because I want someone to do something for me 40. Because it relaxes me 41. Because I can express myself freely 42. Because it is a pleasant rest 43. Because I enjoy answering other people’s questions 44. To get something I don’t have 45. Just because it is there 46. Because it amuses me 47. Because it is thrilling 48. Because it is exciting 49. Because it peps me up 50. Because it is something to do when friends come over 51. So I can talk to other people about what is going on 52. So I can be with other members of the family or friends who are consuming media with me 53. To judge what political leaders are like. 54. To see what a candidate would do if elected. 55. To help make up my mind about how to vote in an election. 56. To use as ammunition in arguments with others. 57. To judge who is likely to win an election. 58. To enjoy the excitement of an election race. 59. To remind me of my candidate’s strong points. 60. To check accuracy of media 61. For information about government conspiracy theories 62. For information not found in traditional media 63. To compare online accounts to traditional media 64. To keep up with the main issues of the day 65. To make up my mind on important issues 66. To access information from work 161
Appendix G Media Use for Consuming Content Related to Government Conspiracy Theories (Adapted from Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013; Stempel, Hargrove, & Stemple, 2007)
Instructions: There is a great deal of media fare for people to choose that relates to alternative explanations for government actions. Conspiracy theories about government take various forms and address many different topics. Here are a few statements that illustrate some common conspiracy theories about government that are routinely portrayed in the media:
• The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret. • The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics. • Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public. • Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public. • The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement. • A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war. • Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public. • The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity. • Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events. • Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent. • A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public.
Please answer the question using the following scale: 1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Very Often
In general, how often do you look at or listen to media content related to these types of topics or other government conspiracy theories not specifically listed here?
162
Some common media sources are listed here. Now, please indicate how often you use each of these specific sources for government-conspiracy-theory-oriented material, using the following scale: 1 = Never 2 = Seldom 3 = Sometimes 4 = Often 5 = Very Often
Radio News (For example: National Public Radio)
Talk Radio (For example: Rush Limbaugh)
TV News (For example: CNN, Fox News, NBC Nightly News, CBS Evening News, ABC World News Tonight)
Television non-news programs (For example: The X-Files, Codes and Conspiracies, Conspiracy Theory with Jesse Ventura, Brad Meltzer’s Decoded)
Political satire programs (For example: The Daily Show, Saturday Night Live, Last Week Tonight)
Political Talk Programs (For example: The O’Reilly Factor, Washington Week)
Movies (For example: JFK, Conspiracy Theory, All the President’s Men, The International, Loose Change)
Advertisements (For example: Political campaign ads regarding candidates or issues)
Books (For example: Counterknowledge; Everything you know is wrong: The disinformation guide to secrets and lies)
Daily Newspaper (For example: USA Today, The New York Times, The Washington Post)
News Magazines (For example: Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report)
Tabloids (For example: The National Enquirer, Globe, The New York Post)
Internet homepages (For example: MSN.com, Yahoo!, AOL. com)
Social Media/Video sharing sites (For example: Facebook, Twitter, YouTube)
Other Web sites (For example: sites devoted to a particular conspiracy or topic; Web sites of government agencies)
Discussions with Others (For example: conversations with friends, family, co-workers, or other individuals)
163
Appendix H Perceptions of the Federal Government Scale (Pfau, Moy, & Szabo, 2001)
Instructions: On the scales below, please indicate your feelings about the federal government. Please select the number between the adjectives that best represent your feelings about each branch of the federal government. Numbers “1” and “7” indicate a very strong feeling. Numbers “2” and “6” indicate a strong feeling. Numbers “3” and “5” indicate a fairly weak feeling. Number “4” indicates you are undecided or do not understand the adjectives themselves. Please work quickly. There are no right or wrong answers.
Executive branch (e.g., president, vice president, and cabinet)
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable Unvaluable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish Unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic
Legislative branch (e.g., House of Representatives and Senate)
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable Unvaluable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish Unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic
164
Law enforcement agencies (e.g., Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, etc.)
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable Unvaluable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish Unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic
Regulatory agencies (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency, Federal Trade Commission, etc.)
Foolish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Wise Unacceptable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Acceptable Negative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Positive Unfavorable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Favorable Unvaluable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Valuable Bad 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Good Unqualified 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Qualified Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Intelligent Incompetent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Competent Dishonest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Honest Selfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unselfish Unsympathetic 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Sympathetic
165
Appendix I Political Participation Scale (Shah, D., Cho, J., Nah, S., Gotlieb, M. R., Hwang, H., Lee, N., et al., 2007)
Instructions: For each activity listed, please indicate how often during the past three months you have engaged in this activity. Please use the following scale:
0 times in the past three months 1 time 2 times 3 times 4—6 times 7—12 times 13—24 times 25 or more times Not specified
Interpersonal Political Discussion:
Talked about politics with co-workers. Talked about politics with people who disagree with me. Talked about politics with ethnic minorities. Talked about politics with friends. Talked about politics with family. Talked about politics with people who agree with me.
Interactive Political Messaging:
Used e-mail to organize community activities. Discussed politics or news events using e-mail. E-mailed a politician or editor to express my views. Expressed my political opinion in chat rooms or online polls. Participated in a chat room or online forum.
Civic Participation:
Went to a club meeting. Did volunteer work. Worked on a community project. Worked on behalf of a social group or cause.
Political Participation:
Attended a political meeting, rally, or speech. Encouraged someone to register to vote. 166
Wore a campaign button or candidate t-shirt. Displayed a campaign bumper sticker or yard sign. Worked for a political party or candidate. Circulated a petition for a candidate or issue. Contributed money to a political campaign.
Note: In administering this measure, I removed the subheadings regarding the particular types of political expression/participation. 167
Appendix J Demographic Characteristics
Here are some basic questions about who you are:
1. What was your age as of your last birthday? ______
2. Education level: High school/less Some college College Graduate/Professional
3. Political affiliation Democrat Republican Independent Other
4. Are you a registered voter? Yes: ______No: ______
5. Gender: Male: _____ Female: _____ Other: _____
Thank you very much for your help and cooperation.
168
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