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Förstasida Och Abstract Lund Universitet Kurskod: UNDK02 Statsvetenskapliga institutionen Handledare: Tony Ingesson Desinformation och dödliga sjukdomar. Ola Torkelsson Abstract In December 2019, news came from China about a mysterious virus that infected people in the Chinese city of Wuhan. During the following weeks the disease spread further to a number of countries all over the world (DW 2019). The new disease turns out to be very dangerous and highly contagious. While the pandemic spread and people died disinformation started to spread in the media, social media, and in the general discourse (Bandera et al 2021: 5). The emergence and spread of the Covid-19 virus gave Russia an opportunity to exploit the deadly disease for disinformation. A similar disinformation operation was carried out by the Soviet Union in connection with the AIDS disease in the 1980s (Boghardt 2009: 4). I have chosen to study these two cases of deadly diseases and how they have been used for disinformation by the Soviet Union and Russia, respectively. I have examined the similarities and differences in the use of disinformation in the two cases against the background of the Soviet deception strategy Maskirovka. The result shows that you can trace some features from maskirovka to the AIDS and Covid-19 disinformation operations. Key words: Disinformation, Russia, Soviet Union, Covid-19, and AIDS Words 9484 Innehållsförteckning 1 Inledning 1 1.1 Syfte & Frågeställning 1 1.2 Struktur 1 2 Bakgrund 2 3 Tidigare forskning 2 4 Metod 4 4.1 Avgränsningar 5 4.2 Källor och ällkritik 5 5 Teori 6 5.1 Maskirovka 6 5.2 Aktiva åtgärder 7 5.3 Desinformation 9 6 Empiri 10 6.1 Fallstudie I, AIDS under 1980-talet 10 6.2 Fallstudie II, Covid-19 under 2020 15 7 Analys 19 7.1 Utgångspunkt för desinformation 19 7.2 Mål med desinformationen 19 7.3 Organisation och resurser 20 7.4 Tidsperspektiv 22 7.5 Spridning och ekosystem 22 7.6 Träffsäkerhet 26 7.7 Innehåll i desinformationen 27 7.8 Dolda, öppna, indifferenta åtgärder 28 8 Slutsats 29 9 Referenser 32 1 Inledning I december 2019 kom det uppgifter om ett mystiskt virus som infekterade människor i den kinesiska staden Wuhan, Kina. Sjukdomen spreds vidare till en mängd länder i världen under januari och februari 2020 (DW 2019) Inför den nya sjukdomen spreds information men också desinformation. Rapporter om hur pandemin spreds och hanterades kom från många länder och bidrog till stora mängder information och desinformation i media, sociala medier, och i den allmänna diskursen (Bandeira et al 2021:5). Uppkomsten och spridningen av viruset Covid-19 gav Ryssland en möjlighet att utnyttja den dödliga sjukdomen för desinformation. En liknande desinformations- operation genomfördes av Sovjetunionen i samband med sjukdomen AIDS under 1980- talet (Boghardt 2009:4). Jag har valt att undersöka desinformation kopplad till dessa två dödliga sjukdomar och hur de har utnyttjats av Sovjetunionen respektive Ryssland. Jag har undersökt likheter och skillnader i användandet av desinformation i de två fallen mot en bakgrund av den sovjetiska vilseledningsstrategin Maskirovka. Min förhoppning är att studien kan ge ett bidrag kring rysk och sovjetisk desinformation kopplad till pandemier och dödliga sjukdomar. 1.1 Syfte och frågeställning Vilka likheter och skillnader finns mellan Sovjetunionen och Ryssland gällande användandet av desinformation och aktiva åtgärder kopplat till de två dödliga sjukdomarna AIDS och Covid-19? Jag kommer även att undersöka i vilken utsträckning det går att klassificera de olika desinformationsåtgärderna som öppna, dolda eller indifferenta enligt vilseledningsstrategin maskirovka. 1.2 Struktur Uppsatsen inleds med en kort bakgrund till desinformation följt av en genomgång av tidigare forskning kopplat till ämnet. I teoridelen går jag igenom vilseledningsstrategin maskirovka och desinformation som en utgångspunkt för uppsatsen. Detta följs av en 1 beskrivning av de två fallen AIDS och Covid-19. Efter fallbeskrivningarna följer analysen där jag går igenom ett par teman inom desinformation kopplat till de två dödliga sjukdomarna. Uppsatsen avslutas med slutsatser. 2 Bakgrund Enligt Thomas Rid befinner vi oss i den fjärde vågen av desinformation. Den första var mellan åren 1920-1930 under den stora depressionen. Den andra vågen började efter andra världskriget och inbegrep politisk krigsföring mellan främst USA och Sovjetunionen. Den tredje vågen kom i slutet av 1970-talet med en hög grad av kunskap och professionalitet, inte minst från Sovjetunionens sida. Den fjärde vågen av desinformation växte fram under 2010-talet i och med digitala mediers genomslag och en alltmer uppkopplad befolkning över hela världen. 1900-talet var ett stort testlaboratorium för organiserad desinformation och propaganda, speciellt under det kalla kriget (Rid 2020:13). I samband med den digitala revolutionen flyttades stora delar av desinformationen ut på nätet. AIDS och Covid-19 är två dödliga sjukdomar där man vid utbrotten inte hade mycket information, varken om dödlighet eller hur sjukdomarna smittade. Bristen på kunskap ledde till rädsla och misstänksamhet vilket i båda fallen skapade möjligheter för Sovjetunionen och Ryssland att genomföra desinformationsoperationer där målet var att försvaga och skapa motsättningar mellan motståndare på den internationella arenan, primärt USA, EU och NATO (Weitz 2020:2). 3 Tidigare forskning Frågan om huruvida påverkansoperationer (där desinformation ingår) och dolda åtgärder (covert action) är en del av underrättelsecykeln delar forskarna i två överlappande läger. Warner och Stout (2018) argumenterar för att påverkansoperationer utgör en kärnverksamhet i underrättelsearbetet. Där ingår insamling, bearbetning och distribution av underrättelseinformation. Ibland ingår även hemliga påverkansoperationer. Underrättelsearbete är egentligen en funktion av andra aktiviteter som beslutsfattare, speciellt nationer, genomför. Dessa är säkerhet, krig och diplomati (Stout & Warner 2018:519). Beerbower & Wheaton (2006) accepterar påverkansoperationer så länge de inte är centrala i underrättelsearbetet utan genomförs 2 med viss distans från kärnverksamheten som utgörs av informationsinsamling och bearbetning. (Wheaton & Beerbower 2006:329). Yablokov undersöker rysk diplomati inom ramen för den ryska utrikespolitiken i en artikel från 2015. Med hjälp av global kommunikation är tanken att Ryssland kan engagera en världsomfattande publik för att främja landet och dess intressen. Genom att bla ta upp nyheter med konspiratoriska vinklar kan man förstärka social och kulturella motsättningar och därmed generera starka motsättningar mellan grupper och kanske framför allt, mot den politiska eliten (Yablokov 2015:301). Gerritt menar att desinformation främst är en politisk fråga och att det effektivaste sättet att hantera desinformation görs genom att minska motsättningar mellan grupper i samhället men det är en enorm utmaning. Användandet av desinformation driver på redan existerande splittring och oro i samhället och är en negativ kraft. Dessutom anser Gerritt att effekten av desinformation är överdriven. Maktbalansen i det internationella systemet är inte hotat men man bör trots det ta desinformation på stort allvar och förstå att det är ett hot. (Gerritt 2019:7). Gioe et al (2018) beskriver Sovjetunionen och Rysslands sårbarhet inför extern men även intern kritik och information. De menar att genom den egna sårbarheten förstod man kraften i desinformation, information, propaganda och kritik som kanaliserades genom strategin aktiva åtgärder (Gioe et al 2018:519). Målet med aktiva åtgärder och desinformation för Sovjetunionen under Kalla kriget var att diskreditera USA, så split och misstänksamhet mellan västallierade stater och köra in en kil mellan medborgarna i alliansfria länder och deras ledare som beskrevs som amerikanska marionetter (Gioe et al 2018:520). Ajir & Vailliant (2018) undersöker och dissekerar ryska strategier för informationskrig i sin artikel ”Information Warfare: Implications for Deterrence Theory”. De ger en överblick av hur olika källor i Ryssland sprider desinformation och de beskriver även hur tre domänerna kopplade till desinformation och vilseledning: cyberdomänen, den konventionella domänen och den psykologiska domänen, är sammankopplade och fungerar. Ajir & Vailliant beskriver det som de kallar den ”sjätte domänen” som 3 psykologisk krigsföring som ibland överlappar men som inte nödvändigtvis är kopplad till cyberdomänen. De argumenterar för att desinformation och informationsoperationer bör förstås i ett bredare perspektiv och att USA bör inta en mer aktiv roll gentemot Ryssland, framför allt i den psykologiska domänen (Aijir & Valliant 2018:89). I boken ”Den Stora Maskeraden” (2000) går Lars Ulfving igenom och förklarar den sovjetiska vilseledningsstrategin Maskirovka. Ulfving ger en bakgrund där han bla går igenom uppfattningsförmåga, beslutsförmåga, den historiska bakgrunden till strategin och historiska exempel på vilseledning. Ulfving skriver även om huruvida maskirovka kan tänkas vara en strategi framåt för Ryssland. Han resonerar även kring den tekniska utvecklingen på området under Ryssland och vilka implikationer det medför. Slutsatsen är att strategin fortfarande är aktuell men att den kommer att anpassas för att öka chanserna för effektiv vilseledning och överraskning (Ulfving 2000). Schultz och Godson (1984) går i sin bok ”Dezinformatsia” igenom desinformation och aktiva åtgärder under Kalla kriget. Schultz och Godson tar upp hur spridandet av desinformation organiserades och genomfördes under Kalla kriget.
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