The historical background of the National Labor Relations Act of July 5, 1935

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Authors Kelley, Edward Francis, 1911-

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Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/553432 THE HISTORICAL BACEGROUKD OF THE

HATIOHAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

OF JULY 6, i m B

by

Edward F* Kolley

A Theoio

mibmittod to tho faculty ef the

Department of Hiotory and Pelitieal Science

In pert lei falflllaent of

the requirements for the degree of

tester ef Arte

In tho Graduate Collogo

IMwreity of Arizona

1959

Approved$ i* 4? o* £ 9 7 9 / / 9 3 9 £ S ~ C ^ Q . Z

COHTEMTS

I* INTRODUCTION ...... 2

II. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OP THE WORLD WAR PERIOD TO THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT ...... 8

III. THE INFLUENCE OF RAILROAD LABOR ACTIVITIES IN THE FORMULATION OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT ...... 45

IV. THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NATIONAL RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION TO THE FORMATION OP THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT...... 153

V. AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT ...... 190

BI B I J O G R A m r ...... 201

J2 3 6 2 3 THE mSTOBICAL BACKGROUND

Op Tfflg

StTIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

OF JULY 8, 1986. CHAPTER I

imODUCTIO*

The national Labor Relations Act of July 5, 19S81 in spite of

. - ■ ' » ' ' ■ four years of observation, analysis, and operation, continues to bo regarded by many as n revolutionary, impractical, and illogical pioco

of legislation., Due to a lack of proper education and publicity in

regard to the provisions of tho Act, a largo portion of the Amorloam

public lacks a true and accurate understanding of this labor disputes

legislation. Although it is unfortunate that a comprehensive analysis

of tho background of the Act has not been previously prepared, yet

this assignment remains of utmost importance since the 1935 labor

measure or some similar pioco of legislation will continue to be a

matter of considerable import in American industry. If it can be

shown that each provision of tho Act vraa tho result of decades of ex­

periences and experiments in the relations between employer and em­

ployee, if it can bo demonstrated that tho policies of the Act had

proven to be workable and helpful in tho railroad industry, and if it

can be appreciated that tho practicability and advisability of the Aot

had boon uphold by industrialists, labor loaders, and government

officials, then a more accurate and valid understanding of the legis­

lation may be secured* 1

1. 49 State L. 449, 1

The purpose of this study is therefore to point out that the national Labor Eolations Act of July 5, 1935 was not a sudden legis­ lative bolt but instead tho cumulative result of years of experiments, experiences, hostilities, and legislative enactments. July 6, 1955, did not mark tho beginning of a now period in labor history but in­ stead merely dated another chapter in tho steady formation of an

American labor policy* Professor Sumner II. SlieMer, In discus sing the 1935 Act, stated that ”tho Eoosovelt Administration is broadening, defining more precisely, and supplementing more effectively a policy which began under Wilson and which developed slowly under Coolidge and Hoover."^

Seemingly tho most effective arguments for tho soundness of this study are to bo found in tho Congressional oommitteo hearings and re­ ports in regard to tho 1934 and 1935 proposals for labor relations legislation.5 In tho report of the Senate Committee on Education and labor accompanying S. 2926,4 tho statement is made that tho "substan­

ce Sumner H. Sliohter, * Labor and the Government,” Tho Yale Review, Vol. XXV (December,1935), p. 250.

S« On Parch; 1, 1934, Senator Robert Wagner introduced S. 2926, a bill "to equalize tho bargaining power of employers and employees, to encourage tho amicable settlement of disputes between* employers and emplcyoos, to oroato a Rational Labor Board, and for other purposes." This proposal was sidetracked in favor of Public Reso­ lution Mo, 44 of Juno 19, 1934. On February 21, 1935, Senator

Labor Relations Act. of July 5, 1955.

4. Roport ]*£• H84 to Accompany S. 2926, Comadttoo on Education and Labor, UTS. Senate, lid Cong., 2nd boss., p. 8. This bill tainod the same basio principles as the 1935 proposal. 4

W e features of tho bill are not new, but merely codify and clarify the policy already declared by Congress in different fields of industry, trade and transportation.” In substantiating this decla­ ration, references are made to such legislation as tho Railway labor

Act of 1926, tho Korrlo-La Guardia Act of 1952, tho Bankruptcy Act of 1953, the Emergency Transportation Act of 1935, and tho national

Industrial Recovery Act of 1933.5 The report continues by stating that "not only tho substantive features of this bill are familiar, but tho procedural features are well known and tested." Here roforonces are made to the United States Board of Mediation, the

Rational War Labor Board, and to the Rational Labor Board under the

Rational Recovery Administration.6 It was "from this wealth of

precedent that the features of the present bill have been drawn."7

The Congressional hearings in 1935 on the bill which eventually

became tho Rational Labor Relations Act reveal the same dependence

on previous labor legislation and experiences. The sponsor of the

legislation. Senator Robert P. Wagner, of Row York, in explaining the

unfair labor practicos listed in the measure, stated that tho language

employed followed "practically verbatim" the provisions of the Rail-

5. See infra, pp. 114, 137, 124, 125, 138 for a discussion of these Acts.

6. See infra, pp. 119, 21, 350 for a discussion of these agencies.

T* Report Ho. 1184 to -Accompany S. 2926, op. oit., p. IS, 6

•cray Labor Act of 1926, tho Horris-La Guardia Act of 1932,

ruptey Act of 1933, 8 tho National Industrial Eooovery Act of 1933,

President Y/iIlian F, Groon of the J

stressed tho fact that the bill should not be regarded as

legislation” but instead as tho result of long-tine planning,

legislation is by no

. * IB

to tho applicability of tho experiences of the railroad industry, Dr.

William M. Loisorson, Chairman of the National radiation Board,

as followsx

T, tiuuujuu v.w havo this effort industries, trying to diooovor America all over again.

vront through SO years ago? V,hy not begin -with our wisdom which vm learned from bitter experience, to corns whore m are now on the Railway Labor Act, and adopt that policy for other interstate industries. The arguments for this, it to me, is wo are taking Congress* own policy, upheld by the courts, giving tho reason for upholding it, but you need to maintain peace, and you cannot interfere with, the constitu­ tional rights of employees to associate themselves. This • Mi l policy to tho

It seems to me it is just a sense to adopt the policy that has been fc ry as * result of experience and is embodied in this bill.1

6. Hearings before the Committee on Education and labor 1958, S. Senate, 7 4 W C o n g . , 1st Ifeas., Pfc. 1, p. % , "

# IMA,, p, 108. io.ma., Pt. s, p. gas. 6

With tho passage of the national Labor Relations Act, Congress did follovr the philosophy and principles of earlier measures and experiences* Therefore, it is clear that if a proper understanding of the Act is to bo obtained, tho first requisite is a knovrlodgo of tho legislation and experiences on which tho acasuro is based*

It is through this procedure alone that tho provisions of the Act, the intentions of Congress, and the interpretations of the National

Labor Relations Board can be fully comprehended. Such is tho pur­ pose of this study.

In preparing this thesis it was found that there wore throe principal sources to which tho majority of the provisions of tho

National Labor Relations Act oould be traced. Those wore the ex­ periences of tho World War period, tho legislation and activities in the railroad industry, and, thirdly, the policies and principles evolved by the Labor Boards under tho National Recovery Adminis­ tration. Each sphora of activity is considered, in detail in a separate chapter with a general coordination of the material in the final chapter in which the provisions of the Act itself are analyzed as tho products of these oarllor developments.

In concluding this introductory chapter it is advisable to ox- plain the procedure used in the succeeding three chapters. This study is not a general history of labor problems but instead an examination of the sources of the provisions of the National Labor

Relations Act of 1935. This Act does not regulate hours of labor, J wages, or working conditions. It merely attempts to aid in the T

ostabliohiRonti and strengthening of collective bargaining botmaon the representatives of employer and employee as a means of preventing and settling industrial controversies. As shall bo noted in tho concluding chapter, the Act provides that certain practices on tho part of the employer nhich prevent or interfere with collective bargaining are to be considered invalid. In substance, the 1936 legislation is simply anottor program in tho movement to decrease the number of costly strikes and disturbances and indirectly to im­ prove the status of tho industrial worker, Thoroforo, the tracing \ ■ ' ■. , .. . , . of tho steady development of the policies and principles which ultimately culminated in the national Labor Relations Act of 1935 is tho primary objective. CHAPTER II

THE COetHBOTIOKS OF THE WORLD WAR PERIOD TO THE

HATIOHAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

The World War period provides an unusual opportunity to study # series of labor developments which undoubtedly exerted a good deal of

Influence direstly and indirectly on the formation of the National

Labor Relations Act. With necessity, patriotism, and enthusiasm pro­ ducing a situation which permitted expansion ef governmental activities, a successful system for handling labor controversies was developed#

Outside of the National Recovery Administration attempts of 1955-1934 this program was iho only experience applicable to general industry on which the authors of tho 1935 labor disputes legislation oould roly.

Hero wore provided opportunities to study such technical matters as organisations of workers, conduct of elections, collective bargaining, and enforcement procedures. Outside of tho railroad industry those activities, especially on tho part of the National War Labor Board, represented the sole successful operations of a general labor relations program in American industrial history. Thus an intensive analysis of tho activities in tho sphere of labor relations during these years will bo of assistance in gaining a better understanding of tho text of the

National Labor Relations Act of 1935. To accomplish this objective, tho year 1918 will bo selected as tho starting point.

Tho period from 1912 to 1916 was ono of extensive strife between capital and labor. Labor was seeking collective bargaining, tho eight- 9

hour day, and a larger wage to offset the vastly increased cost of living* Kanagemont groups exhibited a more uncompromising attitude than previously, perhaps partly duo to labor's increasing success as witnessed by the passage of the Clayton Act, the establishment of the Department of Labor, and the rapidly expanding union member­ ship. A spirit of ©©operation and solidarity m s being built up among the laboring groups in all sections of the country. Certain factors, hor/evor, tended to impede the steady development of * unified and coordinated organization. Revolutionary unionism as particularly exemplified by the International Workers of the World vias commencing to make rapid progress in gaining a strong foothold in the Pacific Coast and Rocky Hountain districts. In tho final analysis such revolutionary groups actually• provided the industrialists with now strength and arguments to increase their battle against unionise.

The second adverse factor m s intertwined with the heterogenous character of our population. Tho importance of this atom should not bo underestimated especially ia view of tho sigsifieamo# of tho change in tho source of immigrant laborers during tho period from 1882 to

1916. Dr. Gordon Watkins after a careful survey of the situation pointed out tho important part playod by the immigrant group in tho field of labor relations. Duo to their background and training as woll

. . :...... • : ' , as to tho lack of proper Americanization programs, tho immigrant workers

often proved to be a barrier to union organization. Tot thoy wore

easily attracted to the more revolutionary philosophies and policies 10

ti such organisations as tho International Vforkors of tho 'world.*

la vietr of the troubled situation trhich was to develop, it is

interesting to note vrtiat macliinory tho federal governmont had avail­ able for investigating and settling labor disputes. First, there m s a. Board of Radiation and Conciliation1 2 3 established in 1913 whoso

activities wore confined to interstate railroad disputes. The only

other labor relations agency was the Division of Conciliation

organized by the Secretary of Labor under a grant of power as found

in the Act of March 4, 1913, establishing the Department of Labor.5

However, the Division of Conciliation actually had no enforcement

powers for the settling of disputes. Thus, with tho commencing of

oporations of national defense, it was found that tho government

lacked adequate machinery to settle labor disputes. TShersas in the

past this matter had been of little concern, tho slogan now became

"maximum production" and so some remedy for the steadily increasing

number of industrial disagreements had to bo found. The result of

thie previous lack of foresight m s the haphazard creation of numerous

offices, boards, and commissions without regard for unified organization.

1. Gordon S. Watkins, "Labor ftroblens and Labor Administration in the United States During the World War," University of Illinois Studies in tho Social Sciences, Yol. VIII, No. S (.SoptQmbor~I5I5')p:'&S:.

2. 88 Stet. U 108.

3. 57 Stat. L. 736. Section 8 provided; That tho Secretary of Labor shall havo powers to act as mediator and to appoint commissioners of conciliation ta labor disputes whenever in his judgement the interest of industrial peace may require it to bo done'**# e 11

T/hilo it io not nocoscary to amlyzo in detail eaob agoncy sot up to handle labor problems during ths m r period, nevertheless, it is

essential that the principal developments be considered in order to noto the steady formulation of a definite labor policy.

The first stop was taken urith the passage of the national

Defense Act of August 29, 1S16,4 which provided for the establishment

of a Council of national Defense to consist of the Secretary of War,

the Secretary of Kavy, the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary of

Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor.

In order to provide the Council with tho necessary administrative

awl industrial advisors, provision was made for an Advisory Board.

In view of tho absolute need of gaining tho full support of organized

labor, President Wilson appointed Samuel Compare, President ef the

American Federation of Labor, to tho Advisory Committee. With the

formation of the various subcommittees, Gompors was selected as the

chairman of tho Committee on Labor. In this capacity, Gompors was able

to render valuable service duo to his thorough training, vast ex­

perience, and hearty cooperation. Tho major features of M s policy,

which proved to be of price importance in the War labor program, in­

cluded tho following t

(1) labor strongly supports government in the prosecution of tho wars

(2) labor and capital must agroo not to take adrantago of the situations

4. 59 Stat. L. 619. 12

(3) labor would put no obstacle in way of dilution of skilled labors

(4) management should not discriminate against union workers and should not lower standards s

(5) labor and capital should submit disputes to an arbi­ tration tribunal and abide by the decision!

(6) the government must prevent profiteering*5

The real value of this ocean it too is to bo found in the fact that

it was able to persuade labor and management to confer on pressing problems. From the very start labor leaders proclaimed their willing­ ness and desire to aid in ovory manner possible in the preparedness campaign. Perhaps the moot important result of these conferences from tho point of view of organised labor was the recognition by government and industry of labor as an important factor in every program and

policy. Labor's power and importance had at last gained some degree

of respect. This changing regard for labor was later portrayed in

graphic fashion by Frank P. VTalsh, Co-Chairman of tho national War

Labor Board, who wrote that "wo are no longer looking at labor with tho

same capitalistic eyes that we used to." Horeaftor under tho Presi­

dential doctrine of labor, labor was to bo accorded "an equal voice in

the affairs of the nation with capital."6

However, the impression that patriotism or a drastic change in

tho philosophy of industry towards labor had produced this transfor-

5. ^ William(ms), p.P. tor.Willoughby, Government Organisation ------:— in War Times and After

®. Frank P. Walsh, "The Presidential Doctrine of Labor," The Forum. Vol. LX (August, 1918), p. 167. ------IS

nation in attitude should bo carefully qualified. %hon one is able to put aside vrar tino hysteria and patriotism and analyse this seeming phenomenon, tho motives for the change in policy become quite apparent.

To gain a proper conception of the gains of labor during this period, it is advisable to indicate briefly tho basic reasons for this new

relationship which was developing between management and labor. In­ asmuch ao a full realization of tho actual situation seems to have

escaped many of the labor leaders during the war period, the following

quotation will aid in crystallizing tho issue:

Employers and the government wore willing to make concessions, on their side, for a number of reasons• First, there was the need, already mentioned, of greatly increased output in all the basic war industries of munitions, food, clothing, and other supplies. Second, there was tho "cost-plus" practice whereby the government, in order to secure early and adequate fulfillment of its war orders, guaranteed profits to pro­ ducers by agreeing to pay a good margin above eeets of pro­ duction (increasing labor costs). Another factor that made employers willing to pay high wages was the war-time sus­ pension of anti-trust laws...

A second major agency created in an attempt to lessen labor unrest

and to settle industrial disputes was the President's Mediation Com­

mission. fills instrumentality was created by an executive memorandum

sent to the Secretary of labor on September 19, 1917 in order "to l o a m

tho real causes for any discontent" in tho industry in tho mountain

region and on tho Pacific Coast, and to work out "a mutual understanding"

7. Carroll R. Daugherty, Industry (1933),. p.115. 14

Throughout tho first nino months of 191? there had boon a continu­

ous series of industrial disturbances in tho West and Northwest, It mas not alone the increasing number of disputes that caused alarm but, more important, the industries affected and the oxtroao methods of violence employed by all parties concerned. Four principal industries

vital to tho execution of the war policies were seriously handicapped,

namely, tho mining of copper, the refining of oil, the construction of

transport ships, and tho manufacture of aircraft.9

While much of public opinion at that time seemingly passed over

the entire situation as being directly attributable to the Industrial

Workers of tho World and enemy propagandists, tho painstaking report

of the President's Mediation Commission as submitted to the President

on January 9, 1918, contended that the basic oausos of a large pro­

portion of tho disputes in tho region in question wore traceable to

tho attitude of the employers toward the worker. The soundness of

such conclusions was later supported by tho unusual transformation re­

sulting after the establishment of the "right of tho men to organize

was made effective by providing administrative enforcement for the pro­

hibition against discrimination because of union affiliation."3^

9. of Labor," Reports of the Department of labor, 1918 (1919), pp. 12 - is!

10. Report of President's Mediation Commission to tho President of the ^ d T n Tbil, pp. 14 - 2WT sport will aid in sub-

Repressive dealing with manifestations of labor unrest is tho source of much bitterness, turns radical labor leaders into martyrs and thus increases their following, and, worst of all, in the minds of workers tends to implicate tho Govern- 15

Inasmuch as tho report of this commission has boon rocognisod as an important contribution to tho study of labor relations and cinoe many of its recommendations oxorted a strong influence on future labor policies and programs, an examination trill be of value♦ While it is true that this agency directed its attention to only such industries as eepper mining, oil refining, communication, lumber finishing, shipbuilding, and meat packing, the contention tras hold that "those disturbances were apparently duo to general rather than purely local causes"1* and that an intensive study by a qualified and impartial group might provide the groundwork for future labor eonsillatien programs, The accuracy of this assumption was later emphasised by the influence of tho report on labor, capital, and government aliko not only during tho war period, but especially la the ease of industry, in the decade after the oenelusim of tho xmr»

Section S of the report in presenting the major causes of in­ dustrial unrest stressed the absence of administrative machinery for settling grievances, the lack of understanding between capital and

' ' . . . . : - - - ' '

ment ao a partisan in an economic conflict. The problem is a delicate and difficult one. There is no doubt, however, that the Bisbee and Jerome deportation, tho Everett incident, the Littlo hanging, and similar nets of violence against workers have had a very harmful effect upon labor both in the United States and in some allied countries. Such incidents are attempts to deal with symptoms rather than causes. Tho I. 7/. W. has exorcised its strongest hold in those industries and com­ munities whero employers have most resisted the trade- union movement and whero goto fora of protest against unjust treatment was inevitable.

11. Ibid., p* 12. . IS

labor, and tho adverse effects of "long unoorroctod hardships."

Special enphasis, hor/ovcr, tms accorded tho absonco of a collective bargaining oystosn in industry, as is indicated by the following

excerpts

Broadly speaking, American industry lacks a healthy basic of relationship betwoen nacagesiont and :non. At bottom this ic duo to tho insistence of employers upon individual dealings with thoir non. Direct dealings with employees* organisations is still the minority rule in the United States. In the majority of instances employers are in active opposition to labor organization. This failure to equalize tho parties in adjustments of ' inevitable industrial contests is the central cause of eur difficulties,1®

In ‘concluding its report the Commission made definite recommen­

dations as to tho measures that should bo taken to remedy tho abuses

and controversies of American industry, uhen one secures an under­

standing of the policies and philosophies of the employer class at

this time, the almost revolutionary character of the Commission’s 12

12. Ibid., p. 26. Tho above excerpt is of special significance for at least two important reasons. It is the first frank recognition of the need for a system of collective bargaining in American industry. Thus with this announcement cane tho commencement of such a program of action for general industry and not with tho IIorris-La Guardis Act of 1932 as is commonly stated, (Soo Infra, p, 137 for a discussion of tho Uorris- La Guardia ActJI Secondly, this statement ic an excellent summary of the reasons for tho passage of the National Labor Eolations Act of 1931* The keynote of tho arguments of the supporters of this legislation was concerned with balancing tho strength of tho employer and employees through the medium of a program of collective bargaining. (Koto especially the testimony of Senator Robert ?. Vfagnor, chief sponsor of tho National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor on ~SV '15687 O . Senate, 74th Cong., 1st Seas ."Ti' p • 327) If

proposals can be realized. 2Zorcover, as shall bo noted later, thooo reeomrr.ondations wore used as the basis of the major labor policies of the goronmont’s program during tho war period. For those reason*, the entire body of suggestions is included for study*

(1) The eliaiantion to the utmost practical extent of all profiteering during tho period of tho war is a pre­ requisite to the host morale in industry.

(3) Modern large-scale industry has effectually destroyed the personal relation between employer and employee. It is therefore no longer possible to conduct industry by dealing with employee* as individual*. Some fora of collective relationship between management and men is imdl*p*m#abl#. The recognition of this principle by tho Government should form an acceptable part of tho labor policy of tho Nation.

(3) Law, in business or olsewhore, depends for its vitality upon steady enforcement. Instead of waiting for adjust­ ment after grievances oomo to tho surface there is needed the establishment of continuous administrative machinery for the orderly disposition of Industrial issues and the avoidance of our atmosphere of conten­ tion and the waste of disturbances.

(4) Tho eight-hour day is an established policy of the country; experience has proved justification of the principle also in war time.

(5) Unified direction of the labor administration of tho United States for the period of the war should bo established. At present there is an unrelated number of separate committees, boards, agencies, and depart­ ments having fragmentary and conflicting jurisdiction over tho labor problems raised by tho war. A single headed administration is needed, with full power to determine and establish tho necessary administrative

(•) When assured of sound labor conditions and effective means for tho just redress of grievances tbit m y arise, labor in its turn should surrender all practices which tend to restrict maximum efficiency. 18

(?) Uncorreotod evils are the greatest provocative to extremist propaganda, and their correction in itself would be the best counter-propaganda, labor has most at stake in this war, and it will eagerly devote its all if only treated with confidence and understanding, subject neither to indulgence nor neglect, but dealt with as a part of the citizenship of the state.15

Here then at last was a definite program for the government to follow in regard to labor problem#. Up until this time the formulating of labor policies and the settling of labor disputes were entwined la a bewildering maos of haphazardly created governmental agencies.

Offices, boards, and commissions had been established without the least semblance of order or without any overhead unifying force. Moreover, there had been no definite policy or program to guide the disorganized agencies whioh at one time or another had included such organizations sis the Labor Adjustment Board, the Committee on labor of the Bar In­ due tries Board, the Emergency Construction Adjustment Commission, the

Harness and Saddlery Adjustment Commission, the Arsenal and Navy Yard

Commission, the Ship Building Labor Adjustment Board, the Cantonment

Adjustment Commission, and the Board of Control of Labor Standards in

A m y Clothing,1* *14

18. Ibid., p. 28. The wording of item 2 should bo. carefully noted as the language is almost identical with that of the declaration of policy of the Borris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act of 1952. Since this 1932 Act is considered as a forerunner of the National labor Relations Act of 1935, the recognition of the problem in 1918 by the President's Mediation Commission is indeed significant.

14. For a discussion of the various agencies seo Louis B. Treble, "Labor Problems in the United States During the 7,hr," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. X X H I (February 1918), p. 333; also "A National"" " Tabor Policy," The New Republic, Vol. H U (November 1917) p. 67. 1#

With maximum production being sought by governmont and industry, such a situation of confusion and chaos cbuld not bo afforded. Finally the Council of National Defense in a message to the President urged the immediate creation of a unified labor agency provided with the necessary powers and moans to insure adequate labor for war industries, to establish continuous machinery for settling industrial disputes, to safeguard working standards, and to inaugurate qualified fact-finding agencies.15 In response to the request tho President appointed the

Secretary of Labor, William B. Wilson, to the position of Labor Admin­ istrator while Felix Frankfurter was assigned to act as Assistant

Labor Administrator. As part of the same program an Advisory Council of seven members was organised in order to gain the points of view of all interests and to enlist united support.

The next stop was to formulate a program of action to bo used as a general guide for all labor agencies. On January 22, 1118, tho War

Labor Conference Board was established by the Secretary of Labor on the recommendation of tho advisory group. "Convinced that tho succoss of principles formulated to guide war labor administration would bo con­ ditioned upon their acceptance by both capital and labor,"16 the Secre­ tary of labor called upon the National Industrial Conference Beard and the American Federation of Labor to appoint five members each to the nowly created agonoy so that tho principles would actually be tho

15. Willoughby, o£. oit., p. 224.

16• National War Labor Board, 9.8. Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin V67 Zef (mBjrp: W “ so

product of a collective ngreement botween capital and labor. Both organizations readily complied and a caroful and orderly program of dissuasion oomreencod under the supervision of William Howard Taft and Frank P. Walsh, who wore selected as alternate efficors by em­ ployers and workers respectively. After an intensive analysis of the major problems was completed, the Board suggested in its report ef March 89, 1918, to the Secretary of Labor "the appointment for the period of the war of the Rational War labor Board, consisting of the cam© number and appointed in the same manner as the conference board... .,l17 Certain recommendations were also advanced as to tho future policy and structure of the governmental agencies in the field of labor. In fact a comprehensive outline of action was prepared in ft clear and easily understood fashion.

In this manner the foundation was provided for not only tho major war labor agency but even more important for much of.the future governmental activity in labor relations. Tho Secretary of Labor realizing the absolute need for quick aotieea aeeeptod the entire program and appointed tho members of the Conference Board to tho Ration­ al War Labor Board. President Wilson, by formal proclamation on April 17

17, Ibid. It may bo of interest to note tho original personnel of the 'WarLabor Conference Board. The following represented the em­ ployer: Loyall A. Osborne, C, E. Michael, W.'H. Van Borveort, B. L, Hordoa, L* F. Loroo? Labor was represented by Frank J. Hayes, William L. Hutcheson, William H. Johnston, Victor A. Olander, Ti A. Riohert. Another item of importance was the fact that while all the representatives of the wage earners wore union officials, only one of tho employers had ever dealt with organized labor. #1

8, 1918* sanctioned the organization and announced the principles agreed to by the Conference Board and now adopted by the National War Labor

Board as the basis of notion.18 nGovernmental sanction was thus placed upon a system of mediation and arbitration which had been adopted voluntarily by the parties concerned."* 19

The National War labor Beard, commonly known as the "Taft-Walsh

Board," was empowered "to settle by mediation and conoiliation contro­ versies arising between employers and workers in fields of produetion nosessary for the effective conduct of the war* and in other industries which might ba endangered by delay.20 The Board acting as a "supremo court of industry, only to bo invoked when other agencies failed" per­ formed varied functions such as hearing appeals, settling jurisdiction­ al disputes between labor agencies, issuing rules and regulations in

regard to the interpretation and enforcement of adopted policies, and adjusting Industrial disputes*81 In view of the importance of the poli­

cies and principles firmly-established by the Labor Board, a brief

exposition of the organization and the program of action will bo of

assistance. Ihe following summary provides this explanation*

IS. Ibid., p. 54.

19. Ibid., p. 14.

20. Ibid., p. 54.

21* °2S th®. Government Handled Its Labor Problems During the Yiar, Handbood of tho Organizations Associated with tho KatlonaTTabor Administration, p. 13. 22

(1) Tho Board contained representatives of industry, labor and the public.

(2) The program of policy was in general that as formulated by tho

T.'ar Labor Conference Board.

(3) Controversies woro usually not considorod until after every local conciliation agency had boon exhausted.

(4) Complaints and petitions could be filed by any interested group of persons in a simple and informal mannor.

(5) In any ease where both parties to a controversy reached # written agreement for immediate review by the Board, original jurisdietlen could bo assumed. Likewise the Board could assume original jurisdiction on its own initiative.

(6) All hearings wore conducted in an informal manner without re­ gard for technical rules of evidence.

(7) A large staff of examiners was built up which first gathered evidence and recorded testimony for the use of tho Board, and, secondly, put tho findings of the Board into effect.

(8) A corps of field agents was organised to aid oaoh party in the dispute in preparing its case so as to facilitate the rendering of a fair verdict.

(9) Practically all cases wore first heard by two members of the

Beard* If this sub-agonoy which contained a representative of both capital and labor could not reach a satisfactory agreement, tho matter was referred to the entire Board.

(10) In any case whore the Board was unable to reach a unanimous de-

eision, an umpire was selected to render a final decision. The umpire tras aolootod from a panel of ton icon who had boon nominated by the

Pronidont*^ - ' ‘ •; ' ■ "

(11) Execution of decisions was supervised by the examiner* In

special cases a local board of enforcement was established to carry

eat tho program of action as decided upon by tho Board.

(12) Yihile tho Board had no enforcement powor, tho decisions were

effected through public opinion, cooperation of other governmental

agencies, governmental contracts, and tho emergency powers of tho

President,

(13) Tho national War Labor Board was organized on April 8, 1918,

and functioned for sixteen months. Howovor, after December, 1918, its

activities woro of little consequence.23

Tho national War Labor Board thus organized and, possessed of these

functions and powers, proceeded to adopt tho program of action formula tod

by the War Labor Conference Board# In considering theso major policies,

certain questions should be kept in mind. What did labor desiro in re­

gard to each particular phase of action? To what extent were labor's

demands recognised? What tras tho effect on tho organization, power, and

Influence of labor? What influence did this period exort on tho future

plans and ideas of Labor?

22. Tho panel of umpires included: Honry Ford, Ifatthcw Hale, James B. Covington, C. G. Ho Chord, V. Evorot Hacy, Julian W. I5aok, Henry Suzallo, Jeto Lind, William R. Wilcox and Walter Clark.

23. This summary is based on material found in How the Government J l i r 24

Tho first provision stated that "there should bo no strikes or lockouts during the war."24 This opening statement of policy seems dynamic but proved inconsequential. The use of the word "should* t instead of "must" or "shall" in plirasing the statement is signifies**.

It was the general assumption that tho sontonco in question was in­ tended as an indication of the moral duty of both employer and em­ ployee. Tho employer in view of tho emergency noods of the nation, the desire for industrial' paaoo, and tho voluntary nature of the agroo- meat* should fool that ho was morally bound to refrain from looking out striking workers from M s establishment. Tho same restraint should bo observed by the workers in regard to strikes. ;

A thorough understanding of this particular plank seems essential . v - ' ' In order to arrive at a proper evaluation of the war-time activities ef InbM*. Although very little information is obtainable on tho exact moaning of tho sentence in question, all of the available evidence indicates that noithor industry* labor, nor government intended the declaration to take tho form of on absolute prohibition. It is an

- : . ; ■ ' ' accepted conclusion that organised labor has at all times in tho United

States proclaimed tho right to strike not only as a constitutional

24. Rational War Labor Board, ep. cit., p. 52. m

guarantee, but also as its strongest weapon in securing its demands.^*5

It is conclusive, therefore, that tho phrase "should bo no strikes" was mot intended as a final prohibition because the representatives of labor on the War labor Conference Board would have refused to agree to any sueh polioy*

Qadoubtedly the most sensible method to use in solving the problem

2S» It is truo», however, that differences of opinions existed in respeet to the right of 3ab«r to strike. The following summary from Daughertyi op. -eit.,. pp, 380-383, presents certain of tho di- .. vergenees. Viewed as mere collective quitting of work in a plant, every strike in private industry is legal, and no court has doniod it since tho celebrated Commonwealth v. Hunt decision in 1842, This fact has led many persons to be­ lieve that workers may strike for "a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all"— in short* that workers have an absolute right to strike. But tho truth is that strikes always involve much more than tho moro collective stoppage of labor, Tho strikers made certain demands on tho em­ ployer, and after ho refuses to grant them and tho workers walk out, they do a variety of things calculated to bring him to terms. It is those later acts which determine a strike's legality and make the "right to strike" a relative rather than an absolute thing. The strikers' rights aro relative to tho rights of tho other parties, and although no court in peace-time will compel striking employees in private industry to go back to work (this would be "involun­ tary servitude" and a violation of the Thirteenth Amend­ ment), it may make them eoase conducting the strike if it decides that tho acts constitute an unjustifiable and un­ lawful interference with others * rights. workers in public employment, such as federal employees, postal clerks, firemen and policemen, and in quasi-public industries, such as soamon and railroad employees, have com­ monly been put in separate categories regarding tho right to strike. The public safety and welfare aro here a para­ mount consideration. The usual attitude toward strikes of public employees is exemplified in the famous telegram sent by Qovsrner Coolidgo to Samuel Gompors over tho Boston police strikes "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, at any time, anywhere." ... Tho right of railway and public utility workers to strike may be subject to special limitation oven when circumstances aro not such as to menace human welfare directly, because of tho very fast that they aro employed in business "affected with public interest•" Table A*8

Kuabor of strllcoa and lookouts boginning in oaeh month.

1916, 1917* 1916 Month Kind of not Dispute Jan. Feb. mr. App. luay June July Aug. Sept. Get. lev. Dee. Stated fetal Strikes 1911'1 " 180 203 ( 289 419 604 540 610 618 647 288 192 147 174 3,678

1917 268 196 299 481 438 297 m 846 628 812 245 180 478 4,285

1919 180 208 293 SOI 577 284 274 260 194 140 200 257 224 3,181

Leek-

ISIS 8 3 5 18 38 14 8 8 5 4 4 2 24 108

1917 14 7 10 14 12 10 4 7 9 4 6 12 17 126

1918 8 11 n 10 6 6 6 6 10 6 10 16 104

28. Souroot Tho data for this table was scoured from Edsen L. Tdiitney, "Strikes and Loekeuts,n Monthly Labor Review, Vel, fill ( J w 1919), p. 1857. “ 27

is to dotenninb whothor or not any strikes or lockouts existed during the period of supervision by the War Labor Board and, secondly, what attitude was manifested by the government. The answer to the first interrogation is affirmative for there wore indeed strikes and lockouts during tho war period. la fact during the months of actual Aserioan hostilities (from April 6, 1917, to November 11, 1910), 6,206 strikes and lookouts.occurred. Table A provides a detailed statistical analy­

sis of the industrial disputes during this entire period, indicating

tho number of strikes and lockouts beginning in each month.

It may bo contended that thoso figures aro of little significance

if no basis of comparison is provided. In order to appreciate fully

their significance, a few summaries with statistics of previous years may be used. It is necessary to note, however, that the United States

Department of Labor did not commence the recording of comprehensive

statistics on labor problems until tho early months of 191S. The amount

of reliable statistical information in this particular field is there­

for© limited. An investigation of 2600 strikes in 1916 showed that

the average number of workers involved in each strike was 596; in Itlf

for 2,174 strikes, tho average was 549; and in 1918 for 2,027 strikes,

tho average was 588.2^ On this basis the number of workers involved

in strikes for 1916, 1917, and 1918 would be 2,188,410; 2,328,917$ and

1,870,428 respectively.

27. Ibid. 28

Tablo B26

iiunbor of Strikes, With Enployeos Involved, 1881-1931

Period ATarage (Actml and Relative) Number per Year of Strikoo Strikers Actual Relative Actual Relative (1881-5-100) (1881-5-100)

1 2 5 4

1881-1886 498 100 124,000 100

1886-1890 1336 268 266,000 206

1891-1806 1577 276 279,000 226

1896-1000 1351 271 281,000 227

1901-1905 2793 661 407,000 324

1916-1981 8045 611 1,7*6,000 1407

1922-1926 1060 211 778,000 626

1927-1951 763 165 275,000 222

28. Souroot The data for this table xmn Isecured from Daugherty, °P» clt.j p. 356. 29

Comparison of tho vrar period with other years in respect to the frequency of disputes and the number of participants is-, also of interest. It will be seen from Table B that the 1915-1921 period witnessed an unusually large number of industrial disputes, relative­ ly •peaking* Of course it should bo remembered that this span in­ cludes 1919, the year in which 4,160,548 workers were involved in disputes. But tho average number of strikes for tho years 1916, 1917, and 1918 is slightly larger than the average for the five year tora.

For this reason it would seem that the relative comparisons are in­ deed appllesM*.

Tho second question to be considered under this section is con­ cerned with the attitude manifested by the federal government in re­ gard to strikes. In general tho various labor agencies of tho national government # M everything possible to discourage strikes but never­ theless recognized tho right of workers to strike. Workers who wont on .strike did not load their draft exemption nor were strikers con-

Thic was portrayed by the rulings of the Secretary of War and Provost Mar­ shall General.29 Moreover, in spite of the influence of the Allies and tho suggestions of many industrialists, movements toward conscripting labor was thwarted. Secretary of Labor Wilson la voicing the official opposition of the government to such proposals, labeled them as "unfair,”

"impracticable/1 and "unpatriotic."80 *50

29. Alfred L. Bornholm and Dorothy Van Doren, Labor and the Government (1955), p. 150. ------—

50. "Fifth Annual Report of tho Secretary of Labor," Reports of tho Department of Labor, 1917 (1918), p. 160. — ------Although tho govarnmont did not attempt to prohibit strikes, tho

National War Labor Board considered fair and propar certain limitationo on the calling of strikese In some instances tho Board refused to roopon cases if the workers were out on strike.51 In disputes in

•which workers went on strike after the complaint had been submitted to tho Board or while tho hearings wore being hold* the award was suspended until the men returned to work. For example in one case tho Board declared that "this award terminates as of January 30, at the time the men went on strike, and is made applicable conditional upon the strike being promptly called off."32

The most severe restriction or punishment on striking workers is found in a letter of President Wilson to the members of the Bridgeport branch of the Interoatlon Union of Kachimists* In the so-called Bridge­ port case,33 after a prolonged investigation by the Board had produced no agreement, the controversy was assigned to an umpire with both

SI. National War Labor Board, op. oit., p. 162, Hatter of Manufacturers of Newsprint Paper (June 277 1918) * (Horafter this system will be used in citing awards of tho National War Labor Board. This method of citation is based on the plan explained in footnote 67, infra, p. 166. - ' ' -

32, Ibid.* p, 269, Hatter of A. H, Peterson Manufacturing Company (Faroh H 7 1 9 1 # ) .

55. Ibid., p. 198, Matter of Employers in Munition and Related Trades TSugust 28, 1918). 51

parties agreeing to abide by his decision. After the award (which was highly satisfactory to over ninety por cent of the workers), a

portion of the employees went out on strike. Then followed the

President’s letter on September 15, 1918i

1 desire that you return to work and! abide by the award. If you refuse, each of you will be barred from employment in any war industry in the community in which the strike occurs for a period of one year. During that time the United States Employment Service will decline to obtain employment for you in any war industry elsewhere in the United States, as wall as under the bar and Envy Depart­ ments, the Shipping Board, tho Bailroad Administration, all other government agencies, and tho draft board will

In summing up this phase of tho labor program it may be said that

in general only the unreasonable use of the strike was forbidden or

punished by tho federal government. This attitude on tho part of tho

administration is significant in this particular thesis inasmuch as

» form of collective bargaining was preferred as a method of preventing

and settling employer-employeo disputes to a forood-labor program.

. • ^ V ' : . If such a system was feasible and workable during a period of emergency,

then it would indeed be acceptable under normal circumstances. In

view of such reasoning is it surprising that the war period activities

exerted a strong influence on later labor relations programs?55 34

34. Ibid., p. 36.

55. This discussion applies only to the federal government. Eany of tho probably because of the pressure exerted on the members or tho legislature by industrialists and patriotic organisations, adopted varying forms of compulsory work legislation. In tho folic ing states a broad compulsory law was enacted: Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Now Jersey, Rhode Island, West Virginia, and " 32

The second major plank of tho program of the National War Labor

Board -mas ocnoornod with the recognition of "tho right of the workers to organise in trade-unions and to bargain oolleetively," Actually this section was tho source of tho principal contributions of this period to the formation of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

Aa the four clauses dealing with the rights to organize and to bargain eollectlvoly as listed below are studied, sections 7 and 8 of tho 1955 *

ally was a strict vagrancy law which was utilised in forcing con­ tinuous employment. New Hampshire on tho othor hand ignored compulsory employment but forbade interference with workers en­ gaged in public or private employment and prohibited tho encourag­ ing of strikes or industrial disputes• Idaho and Minnesota enacted criminal syndicalism measures which regulated methods of inter­ ference with persons employed. "Compulsory Work Laws in the United States," Monthly Labor Review. Vol. VII (Docombor 1918), P# 5*9.) ' ' Ab authoritative survey presents tho following summary as an accurate account of tho prevailing policy in the sphere of state a®Mob. It is of interest to note the difference in attitude. While tho federal government was pursuing its policy of maintaining production by guaranteeing the rights and Standards of labor and was setting up boards to enforce these guarantees and to adjust disputes, a contrary policy of maintaining production through compulsion was also being tried. Tho Chamber of Commerce, important employers* associations, and many newspapers advocated the prohibition of all strikes. Twelve states actually passed legislation requiring all able-bodied men outside of the military service to be gainfully employed, and such laws wore on occasion used to break strikes. New Hampshire prohibited strikes by law in 1917 while Minne­ sota through its Public Safety Commission promulgated an order to the same effect tho following year. Strikes wore also broken by court injunction and by military authorities. (Bemheim and Van Doran, 0£. cit., p. 160.) B

labor Act should be kept in mind in order that the close resemblance

may be noted.

(l) The right of workors to organise in trade unions and to bargain collectively, through chosen representa­ tives, is recognized and affirmed. This right shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered with by the employers J

(*) The right of employers to organize in associations or groups and to bargain collectively, through chosen repre­ sentatives, is recognized and affirmed. This right shall not bo denied, abridged, or interfered with by the workers in any manner whatsoever.

(S) Employers should not discharge workers for member­ ship in trade-unions, nor for legitimate trade-union •etivltlss.

(4) The workers, in the exercise of their right to organise, shall not use coeroivo measures of any kind to induce persons to join their organisation, nor to l e d w e employers to bargain or deal therewith.56

From the point of view of organized labor, three principal advance­ ments were represented in these sections, namely, tho right of the worker to organize, the recognition of collective bargaining through representatives of tho employee's own choosing, and, finally, the prohibition of employer discrimination against tho employee who belongs to a legitimate labor organization. labor leaders voiced the opinion that definite advancements would be forthcoming provided these rules and prohibitions wore adequately enforced by tho Labor Board.

In the matter of upholding the right to organize tho Board was very careful to insist upon a strict observance of tho rule by all employers. 36

36. national War Labor Board, op. cit., p. 32. 54

As a neoossary adjunct evory available moans -ms onployod to stamp out discrimination in ono form or another against union workers. These four significant principles eventually came to be established as the result of the various awards of tho Board$

(1) Employees are free to join any legitimate labor union or organisation without interference. Employers aro forbidden to make with their employees individual contracts which dotor their employees.from joining unions.37 38

(2) Workers shall not b? discriminated against because of. union membership. Employees shall not be discharged because of union membership. If it shall be deter­ mined that this rule has boon violated, tho dismissed workers must be reinstated and reimbursed for the compensation lost.58

(3) There shall bo no blacklisting of union workers.39

(4) Ho compulsion shall bo placed on workers to join a company union40 regardless of its banofioial nature.41

- (5) Tho subjects for collective bargaining shall include questionable discharges, wage scales, conditions of employment, and hours.42

57. Ibid., p. 260, Hatter of Smith and 7/osson Arms Company (August 28, . 1918); ibid., p. 211, Matter of Omaha and Council Bluffs Street Railway Company (July 31, 1918).

38. Ibid., p. 170, Matter of national Refining Company (August 28, 1918)i 151%,, p. 243, Matter of General Electric Company (October 24, 1918).

SS. IMS., p. 132, Bitter of §le#s*Sh#ffl#M Steel and Iron Company T3uTy 31, 1918).

40, Tho standard definition of a company union appears to be that pro­ posed by Professor R. P. Hoxio who described it as a union "insti­ gated and practically dominated by the employers, organized and

(Robert F. Hoxie, Trade Unionism in tho United States (1923), p. 51.)

41. National War Labor ia3- L w °r °f com “

42. Ibid#, p, 62, An excellent exposition of the entire problem is to be found in the decision of t W Board in the-Hew York Consolidated Railroad Company controversy. In this case almost every important issue in regard to the right of organization m s considered. For this reason the inter­ pretation of the Board in regard to the rights of the employee in this respect Trill bo of value.

organise in trade unions, or to join the same, and to h&rg&is collectively, is affirmed, end discharges for legitimate union activities, interrogation of workers by officials as to their union affiliations* espionage by agents or representatives of the company, visits by of­ ficials of the company to the neighborhood of the meeting place of the organization for the purpose of observing the mon who belong to such unions, to their detriment or employees of tho company, and like actions, the intent of which is to discourage and prevent mon from exorcising tliis right of organization; must bo deemed an interference with their rights as laid down in the principles of tho beard.

Y/o therefore recommend, as the only just basis for a proper settlement of this controversy, that the Hew York Consolidated Railroad Company reinstate to their positions tho following employees whom tie find to have boon dismissed primarily beoause of legitimate union activities, with full pay for-all time lost from the dates of their service dis­ missals, minus any intervening earnings in other employ

Organized labor had truly won a groat victory in gaining not only

recognition but also protection of the right to organize. Ho longer were the organizers of the American Federation of labor bound by past

restricting decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this

respect. Two huge barriers had been removed, namely, discrimination 43

43. Ibid., p. 263, Matter of New York Consolidated Railroad Xoctober 24, 1918). ##

against union workers and tho "yellow-dog" contract,44 The renoval of these obstacles meant at least the temporary* overruling of tho

Coppage v* Kansas decision of 1915 and the Hitchsan Coal and Coke Co, v* Mitchell ruling of 1917,45 In general the findings of the National

War labor Board meant a tremendous strengthening of the status of tho trade union, for now the worker was free to join any legitimate labor organization without foar of being dismissed by his employer while the union organizer could solicit memberships in ail industries as long as tho methods employed vroro legal. In short, the real significance of tho do findings of tho supreme labor agency probably was best ex­ pressed in the following sentence: "No victory comparable to this has ever been won by organized labor at a single stroke,"46

In tho final analysis, however, there appears to bo only one method of actually determining the true effect of this particular policy of the National War labor Board. Eow did tho official safe­ guarding of the right to organize affect the membership of the Ameri­ can Federation of Labor? Wore tho union organizers allowed to take full advantage of the apparent situation?

An examination of tho membership figures of the American Federation of Labor for tho years 1913 through 1920 as found in Table C will pro­

44, The "yollow-dog" or "anti-union" contract was a dovico perfected by employers to oheok tho growth of unionism. If a worker desired a position, ho was forced to sign a contract whereby he agreed not to join any labor organization or to assist in any labor activity such as strikes,

45, 236 T W . 1 (1915) | 254 U.S. 229 (1917)

46, "National Labor Policy," Tho Now Republic, Tel, XIV (Aoril 1918). p, 314. m

Table C47

Year Membership

1915 1,996,004

1914 2,010,671

1915 1,9*6,147

if li 2,072,702

1917 , 2,371,454

1918 2,726,478

1919 3,260,068

195to 4,078,740

47. Sour cos The statistical data for Table C -sras soourod from tho Report of Proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of theAmerican s c m

•vide the ancrjors to these questions. Tvro trends are emphasised by this report, namely, the decrease in mentorship from 1913 to 1918, and, seooiyily, the tremendous increase in membership from 1915 to 1920. In foot the 1920 membership shows a 109.6 per cent increase over the 1915 totals, or a gain of 2,282,393 new members, Tbit extraordinary gain assumes greater significance when it is recalled that from 1881 to 1915, a period of thirty-five years, the increase in membership ef the Ameri­ can Federation of Labor amounted to only approximately 880,000.

tihilo the right to organise is of course the basis of labor unionism, labor leaders preferred to consider it merely as a phase of the preparations for tho establishment of collective bargaining.

In other words, the right of the worker to organize and to soloct repre­ sentatives of his own choosing must be safeguarded so that the bar- - z " . gaining strength of tho worker would be increased through association with his fellow employees. Then by collective bargaining, agreements could bo made between management and labor in regard to tho various problems arising.48 From tho findings and awards of the bar Labor Board,

it is quite apparent that tho almost absolute need of collective bar­ gaining was quickly recognised. If tho reasoning of the Board is grasped, tho soundness of such an attitude is easily understood. It was a means of satisfying organised labor which had boon struggling for

collective bargaining without much success due to tho nullification of

its enforcement weapons by hostile court decisions. But more important

48. This was exactly tho same reasoning as the supporters of the national labor Relations Act of 1935 employed in defending their proposal. 59

it xras the most sttitable and logioal -cmy of settling disputes— es­ pecially those of a minor nature. I'oreovor, regardless of economic reasons, tho adoption of a collective bargaining system was actually forced upon the Board because of the physical impossibility of ad­ justing all disputes.

Tho first question to be answered was concerned with the repre­

sentatives of the employees. Viho was to represent the workers in bar­ gaining with the employer? Gradually through a sorios of findings a

general system was organized for tho selection of representatives. IB any dispute which came before tho Board, a study was made of tho situ­

ation existing in the particular concern in regard to collective bar-

gaining. If this system was not being employed, the Board immediately

arranged for an election in order to select tho members of a committoo which would bargain with tho omployor. Although there wore variations

allowed to meet peculiar conditions, the general plan was to have the

employees in each shop select a committee of throe to represent all tho workers in that particular section in dealing with tho employer. In

some instances in addition to these shop committees, a general plant

committee of ten members, with equal representation for employer and

employees, was organized in order to settle general factory problems

and to hear appeals from tho decisions of the shop boards. A third

plan provided for a factory board of three employer representatives and

three employee representatives to Bottle all problems arising in the

entire factory or concern. A very important thing to note, however. Is

tho foot that the War Labor Board itself decided what should be the

proper unit of representation whether craft, shop, or plant. It was 40

felt that such cm important phase of election procedure and collective bargaining should be settled by an impartial authority.49 *

All elections were conducted under the strict supervision of field examiners appointed by the Board with every precaution taken to insure a fair and free election. In general the Board attempted to make pro­ visions so that the committees oould be "elected by secret ballot in such manner and place and under suoh conditions as the employees m y determine, without influence or interference by the company or any of its.superintendentse"99 Usually the election was hold in the shop but if necessary or desirable some public building or vacant store was selected as the site.®*

So far two matters of procedure in regard to the selection of the representatives of tho employees for the purposes of collective bar­ gaining have been considered. A third procedural contribution of the

Board which cane to be known as tho "majority rule” has boon considered one of the major advancements made during this period in the develop­ ment of a workable system of collective bargaining.52 Thus the ropre-

49. national War Labor Board, op. eit., p. 58.

§0. Ibid., p. 185, Hatter of C o m Products Refining Company (November H 7 1 9 1 8 ) . 51* Ibid., p. 209, Natter of Jacks on and Church Company, Vale ox Motor and Manufacturing Company, Stork Motor Company, Cordo Stamping and Tool Company, Jackson-Church-micox Company, Nelson Brothers Company, National Engineering Company, Warner and Pfleldoror Company, V/ickoa Brotilers, and American Cash Register Company (October 25, 1918),

SB* I* hia discussion of tho soundness of the majority rule as sot forth in the proposal which eventually became tho 1935 labor law. Senator Wagnor based his arguments on the reasoning used by tho National labor Relations Board (created under tho National Recovery Adminis­ tration) in the famous Houda oaso. (Hearings before tho Committee on Education and labor on S. 1958, o£. olt., p. 44). But if ono 41

gentatiiros nolootod by ths chop, croft, or plant according to tho typo

of unit decided upon by tho Board roprosbntod all rrorkors within its

sphere. There m o no allcrance ;nado for minority or proportional

representation sinco it was felt that tho gonoral woIf are of the workers would bo best served by tho majority rule. If tho decision of tho Board

is considered it will be realised that if the bargaining strength of

tho workers was to be increased so as to bo able to compete with the

power of tho employer, then tho majority rule alone should bo adopted.53

Moreover, tho majority rule simply followed tho generally accepted

political system in uso in tho United States.

An explanation in regard to tho position of labor unions in matter*

of elections and oollootivo bargaining should bo considered at this

point. It is necessary to note the language of tho basic rulos of tho

Board as originally formulated by the T,rar Conferonco Board, for tmdor

the heading of existing conditions it was stated that while tho procent

union shops must be maintained, the continuance of the open shop where

"tho employer meets only with employees or representatives engaged in

said establishment... shall not be deemed a grievance." If an employer

turns to the decision of the national Labor Eolations Board in this controversy, it will bo noted that the Board in turn based its ruling on tho precedents established first by tho national War labor Board and later copied by the Railway Labor Board. (Deeieien* of tho National Labor Eolations Board, Vol. I (July 9. 1934T= WoroBerTSW,' pTSS)”------

“ • : : ° 2 . mittee plan as instituted at Bridgeport, Connooticut, ibid*,p. 57. had dealt m t h the union, he must continue cuoh a policy; but if he had

not pursued such a program, ho rata not required to rooogniso the union

at this time. Sunned up, this meant that tshilo workers in an open shop were freo to organiso or to join any legitimate labor union, tho em­

ployer noed not recognize the union or moot with the representatives of

the union as such. Of course if tho employees* comittoo was made up

of factory workers although controlled by the union and actually chosen

by the union, tho employer must meet this group— that is, as representa­

tives of the workers in his factory and not as the representatives of •ay anlsia*®4 -

Moreover, under this policy the company union plan54 55 flourished.

Employers in all parts of the country noised upon this method as the

means of satisfying the requirements as promulgated by the Board, and,

secondly, of chocking tho spread of unionism. However, the employer ■■ j . could not force an employee to join a company union56 nor could the em­

ployer satisfy the collootive bargaining ruling by merely organizing a

company union*

Yet labor loaders appeared to bo well satisfied with the progress

being made during the period, Tho first objective m s to increase tho

membership and the strength of tho unions and now the road had boon

cleared of all barriers. With this accomplished, the collective bar­

gaining systems already established could bo easily altered to recognise

54. Ibid., pp. 54, 137.

55. See footnote 40, supra, p. 34.

56. National War labor^Bcard, op. cit.^p. 183, Matter of C o m Pr oducts tho union ac tho roprosontativo of the employees. T e t h e r or not the labor leaders adopted a faulty attitude is of ninor significance in this study. Tho important fact to remember is that labor had gained m n y objoctivoo during this period in regard to organization and collective bargaining. : '

In concluding tills division of the study it is vroll to summarize tho principal contributions of tho ifcrld War period t e m r d the formation of tho provisions of the Rational labor Relations Act of 1935.57 Tho period from 1912 to 1919 roprosonts eight-years of unusual change and development in the field of labor relations. From 1912 to 1916 organ­ ized labor made little progress duo to a variety of factors. Although, as has boon noted, tho general attitude t e m r d labor improved appreciably

in 1916 with the establishment of tho Rational Defense Council and its

subsidiary agencies, no real attempt m s made to analyse the causes of

labor unrost until tho creation of tho President's Mediation Commission

in 1917. Yihon in 1918 the Commission stated that much of tho unhealthy

attitude existing among American workers was due to tho hostility of em­

ployers to labor organizations and to collective bargaining, tho foun­

dation was laid for improvements in omployor-eaployoe relationships.

57. In this study such items as shortage of labor, preservation of standards, campaign for a living trago, and excessivo production demands will not bo considered. If the Introductory chapter is reviewed, the logic of such a plan will be fully understood. The sole objective of this paper is to determine the influence of previous periods and happenings on the formation of tho pro­ visions of the Rational labor Relations Act of 1935. 44

With tho establishment of tho national War Labor Board, tho federal

^ovomr.ont attempted to install a general system of oolloctivo bar- gaining as a moans of preventing industrial rrarfaro and of keeping

labor satisfied during tho course of tho War. Thus tho government avoided compulsory arbitration or conscription of labor. Instead tho ri^tt# of tho vrorker to join a trade union, to select roprosentativos

of his oim choosing, and to Mrpila eellectively wore safeguarded etrietly. Thus the concrete oontributions of tho war period include tho recognition of oolloctivo bargaining as tho most sensible system for proventing and settling industrial disputes, tho methods for con­ ducting elections, tho majority rulo in regard to tho selection of representatives, tho outlawing of tho "yellow-dog" contract, and the

formation of rules as to what items should bo covered by collective bargaining. Regardless of whether thoso advancements were made because

of tho nood for maximum production, tho fact remains that the accomplish- neats of tho rational War Labor Board blazed the trail for future labor

relations programs dealing with general industry. Haro tbs start had

boon made and tho feasibility of such polioios established. In chapters

I B and IT tho influonco of this period will be evident in tho develop­ ments of the railroad industry and of the National Recovery Administra­

tion, Thus both directly end indirectly the World War period made im­

portant contributions to tho Rational Labor Relations Act of 1935 as will bo noted in tho final chapter. OMPflB III

THE I1IFLUENCE OF RAILROAD IABOH ACTIVITIES III THE

FORMULATION OF THE ITATIO’IAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

' . ' ' ' ■ .. : J i In a survey of tho historical background of the national Labor

Relations Act of 1935, ovon a brief analysis of labor problems and activities in the railroad industry may appear illogical inasmuch as the provisions of tho Act nro not applicable to this particular field.

Employees of railroads engaged ia interstate cComoroo look not to the

National Labor Eolations Board for support or protection in thoir on- deavors to improve living and working standards, but instead to the

Rational Mediation Board. In short, railroad eapleyeee havo no con­ nection with the National Labor Relations Act of 1936.

Then one may ask of what importance is a study of railroad labor problems in reference to the formation of tho National Labor Relations

Act? The answer is, tho railroad industry has boon tho groat arena - - . ■ ■ . - : for experiments and battles in regard to the most sensible and feasible method for settling and preventing labor-management disputes.

Here every major -system for tho solving of industrial conflicts had

passed in review. Arbitration, conciliation, mediation, government supervision, and, finally, collective bargaining wore tested under all typos of circumstances and pressures. In tho end after fifty .

years of experimenting, labor leaders and sympathetic government

officials realised that collective bargaining was unquestionably tho 4#

most sonoiblo and offootivo method for solving employor-enployoo

Thus xfiXGXL organised labor xmo given an opportunity to out lino a ooutgo of notion, minute examination vras made of the experiences

of the railroad industry. Finally the system of collective bargaining

as developed by railroad labor organisations xras adopted as the basis

of, first, the famous soction 7 (a) of the National Industrial

Kooevery Act of 1935, end, then, the National Labor Eolations Act of

1955. As one reviews the pages of tho hearings conducted by the

Senate Committee on Education and Labor on Senate Bills 2926 and

1956, tho 1954 end the 1955 forms of tho National Labor Relations Act,

tho froquont references by government officials, labor loaders,' and

industrial executives to the railroad labor legislation and experiences

substantiate this statement. It is clear, therefore, that a requisite

to an understanding of the provisions of the National Labor Relations

Act of 1935 is an acquaintanceship with its economic and political

foundations. Perhaps the best expression of this idea was presented

by Dr. William M. Loioerson, Chairman of the National Mediation Board,

who in testifying before tho Sonato Committee on Education and Labor

in roforenco to Senate Bill 1958, stressed tho idea that any intended

labor relations legislation should bo based on tho Railway Labor Act

thus avoiding tho "same fight and strife that tho railroads went through

50 years ago."1 During these hearings President William Croon of the *•

*• Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor s. me. tf.S. Senate, ?4th Cong., 1st Bess., Pt. 3, p. 8SB* American Federation of Labor likewise indicated tho dependence of his own organization on railroad labor experiences in obtaining reasons and arguments to support tho proposed labor relations legislation*8

With this brief explanation as a supporting basis for a review of activities in railroad labor history, the procedure followed in this chapter should be considered. Tho purpose of tho study is not to make

& thorough survey of railway labor problems in general but instead to

provide an acquaintanceship with the particular experiences which may have aided in the formation of the national Labor Relations Act of

1955* In aeeomplishing this objective, it has boon found necessary at

times to provide what might bo to mo d background material. Thus tho

first part of tho chapter is devoted to a discussion of tho peculiar

characteristics of railway employment, of the typo of workers involved,

of tho wago and hour systems utilised, and of tho union organisations,

polieiee, and objectives. Tho main portion of tho chapter is concerned with an analysis of tho various labor legislative enactments commencing with the Act of Ootobor 1, 1888 and continuing with tho Erdman Act of

1898, tho Rowlands Act of 1915, the Adamson Act of 1916, the legis­

lation of tho World War period, the Transportation Act of 1920, tho

Railway Labor Act of 1926, the Bankruptcy Act of 1955, the Emergency

Railroad Transportation Act of 1935, and the Railway Labor Act of 1934.

la the diesesoion of those labor measures the attempt lias boon made 48

t@ trace the steady development of on effective and desirable system for the prevention and settlement of caployer-eaployeo oontrowrsiese

The advantages and disadvantages, as vroll as the attitudes of employer and employee, have been noted in regard to mediation, conciliation, investigations, and arbitration. Throughout the entire survey the evolution of a system of collective bargaining as the most feasible method for handling labor controversies has boon carefully observed.

Thus by following this procedure, a bettor understanding may be

secured of the discussions at the Congressional hearings, of the attitudes and beliefs of labor and management, and, finally,- of the

intended execution of the provisions of the National Labor Eolations

Aet*. ■ ■

The railroads constitute what is termed a public utility

industry.- While there are numerous definitions and opinions'as to

the exact meaning of a public utility, a favorable approach to the

understanding of the term may bo gained by an enumeration of the

peculiar characteristics of this particular industry— the traits which distinguish the public utility from other industrial enter­

prises.

A public utility is usually described as a business ’'affected ##

with a public interest”? It is said to occupy a special role because

of its Indispensable status. It performs servioos of a public nature.

thus attaining the label of a quasi-public corporation. The public

utilities because of the almost absolute dependence on many of its

anco of the policy of allowing public utilities to function in monopo­

listic fashion. Competition with its duplication of facilities has

proven to be ruinous inasmuch as the fixed charges are so groat. The

ordinary public utility operating under a decreasing cost principle

oervioo englo should competition be allowed. As production increasos,

the cost per unit decreases, and thus the benefits may be passed on

to the eonsmor. It is not difficult to understand why in view of the

nature of the public utility concern the statement has been made that

a public utility is a natural monopoly.

3. This general principle was established in the case of ilmm v. Illinois, 94 U.S. U S (1876). In delivering the opini'm*of~the court. Chief Justice Waite stated that#

Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the com­ munity at largo. When, therefore, ono devotes his property to a uso in which the public M s an interest, he, i* effect*

uso, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of tho interest ho.has thus created. #0

The existence of this Situation ns described nbenre has led to a policy of strict regulation of public utilities* It is felt that olnco competition is not feasible and since the service is Indis­ pensable, the government must adopt measures necessary to insure

rates, capitalisation, accounting, expansion, and service in an exacting fashion. This situation is obviously quite different from the ordinary private industry v/horo a large sphere of freedom exists*

A fourth characteristic which is of major importance is con­ cerned with the tremendous capital investments required in the field of public utilities. It has boon figured that the ordinary manu­ facturing concern must utilise one dollar for every seventy cents of annual gross income. But in contrast, public utilities need four to five dollars for each dollar of annual gross receipts or in other words about coven times tho investment of the usual manufacturer. A steady flow of capital is therefore essential and accordingly no

Finally, public utilities enjoy a steady income. In fact the group as a whole is marked by the stability of its earnings. Because of the resulting combination of tho above factors, most of the utilities occupy a desirable financial status, and thus they arc able to attract the enormous amounts of capital needed to continue opera­ tions. While this position is not hold by all classes of public 51

irbilitioB," a comparison of the steadiness of inoono of the public utility group no a -whole with that erioting in -various other industrial

fields is enlightening.5

Tho matter of the interest of the general public in the operation

of a public utility cannot bo overemphasised, especially in a treatise

m labor problems. For in similar fashion those peculiar conditions

oxtond to tho railroad employees. Tho conditions of employment indeed make the railroad service one of a special nature. Railroad labor

leaders, realizing the peculiar character of the industry, havo learned

to proceed cautiously in planning the node of action. For if a public

utility is considered as a quasi-public enterprise, then tho workers may bo regarded as quasi-public employees with special duties and

obligations. In regard to tho observance of tho rights of the public,

the federal courts havo maintained a strict attitude in regulating

certain activities of labor. Interstate commerce cannot bo interfered

with since transportation is too important in the interests of the

public. V/hile tho ordinary industrial worker is free to leave his

employment as ho may decide, certain railroad employees cannot end* 12

4. Y/hile the railroad industry at the present m y not conform to all these characteristics, tho unusual position of tho industry can bo clearly visua He e d .

# Tho materials for tho basis of tho study of tho peculiar character­ istics of tbs public utility havo been largely drawn from two principal sourcess 1) L, E. Hash, Tho Economics of Public Utilities (1935), ch. II. 2) Eliot Jones and Truman G. Bighorn, Principles of Public utilities (1931), ch. II. ------thAir tanks except under special conditions. This continuance of the

old ca-iznon law doctrino in regard to the duties of quasi-public workers was firmly established by the federal courts in 1893 when it was dsoidod that the nature of the railroad workersf sendee, “in­ volving as it does the custody of human life, and the safety of

millions of property, imposes upon them obligations and duties com­

mensurate with character of the trusts committed to then.”2

Again in 1917 in a case involving tho constitutionality of the

Adamson Act, the United States Supremo Court emphasised tho same

legal doctrinet

Hero again it is obvious that what wo have previ­ ously said is applicable and decisive, since whatever would be tho right of an employee engaged in a private business to demand such wages as ho desires, to leave tho employment if ho dees not got them and by consent of action to agroo with others to leave upon tho same condition, such rights arc necessarily subject to limitation when employment is accepted in a business charged with a public interest and as to which the power to regulate commerce possessed by Congress applied mad the resulting right to fix in case of disagreement and dispute a standard of wages as wo have soon necessarily obtained.7

iVith tho survey of tho legal background completed, it is

desirable to indicate the number and types of workers involved in

order to gain some idea of the magnitude of the problem* Column

7. Wilson v* How, 243 V.S, 332 (1917). m

2 of Table A provides statistics relative to the average a m b e r of workers engaged on Class I Eailroads0 from 1913 to 1935. It m y bo observed that front 1923 to 1932 there has been a steady decrease in tho nuribor of employees amounting to 825,971 or a.percentage decrease of 44 per cent. Those decreases in positions have been spread through­ out all divisions of employment, but in a smswhat strange fashion as will bo noted..

In general tho railroad employeec m y be divided into four prin­ cipal classes.9 Classification one inoludos son who ore engaged directly in tho movement of trains, such as engineers, firemen, con­ ductors, and brakomen. The shopmen employed in tho building and re­

pairing of equipment, including machinists, blacksmiths, boiler makers, electrical workers, sheet motel workers and others, consti­

tute tho second group. Tho thousands of unskilled maintenance of way and structure workers fern tho third unit, while the fourth class

includes miscellaneous employees as station agents, clerks, flagmen, and telegraphers. Thus it can be seen that all grades and standards

of workers are represented with some functioning in positions re­

quiring unusual skill, stamina, alertness, and years of training,

while other posts are definitely of tho unskilled variety.

8. Claes of i» For analysis soe Fiftieth Annual Report of Statistics of Hallways in the r* state

9..This olasslfleatlon system is that devised by Jacob Ibrlnan in hie article on ’'Eailrcads— Labor” in tho Encyclopedia of tho Social Sciences, Vol. XIII, p. 93. --- *--- 6------IWblo A 10

Employee# of Htsaber and Conponsatioa 10

Year A w n a g e Total Yearly Average Ended Dumber of fetal Hour# Compensation Hours ?or Em­ Average Compensation Dee. 81 Employeeo (Thousands) (1000 dollar#) ployee Par hour For year 19iS 1,841,575 5,701,417 2,613,813 3,69519 30.4*'"'.' 31,419 ™ I 5 B l'»13.422 5,632,493 ily 843^ 128 .*566--- "1529 8,022,668 5,446,741 3,681,801 2,692.6 IpB2C$ "IWI 1,8S®,Sl3 _ 4 » 1 ^ . 3 l 9 2,766,215 2,499.1 .667 -- 1-m1,666-- T d Z Z 1,626,834 4,Sll,d»7 2,640,817 ■" 2,650.0 ##19 .i 4,928,651 3,004,072 2,6a)3#l . M o 1zi,6i7: "1523 1,751,362 4,534,679 2,626,776 2 j58d 1581 1,744,311 4,531,861 z m i 1 ^ 3 5 1526 1,779,273 4,671,786 2,946,111 625#6 *(>81 1,566 1527 1,735,105 4,519,881 M l o i S B 2,604.6 •644 1,677 1 5 2 B 1,656,411 4$813^674 2,826,636 #06 S 1,706 "1915 1,665,860 1 4,346,822 2 3896,56fa 2,617.2 ^666 1,744 15^0 "1,467,835 3,759,772 2,650,769 2,627.6 .678 . 1,714 1551 1 1,258,716 3,039,110 2,654,994 2 r" 1655 1 ^ 0 4 ^ 3 5 1 5 5 2 .1 , # 1 , 7 W 8,378,266 1,812,616 2 j 3 trs -ggg IdSS 2,283,045 1,403,641 2 jSdyeS 1,445 1553 1,557,702 1,519,352 2,375.6 +6S5 1,508 158 b 964,871 1 2 ,357,363 < 1^643^^79 1r .386 1

10, Sourcet Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1937, O ri5epaiSnt'bf C&Kce"'(l#5); pTBW. 55

The next phase to bo oonsiderod deals with the hours and wages

railroad employees. In certain divisions of railroad employment the matter of hours and emponsation is based on a mileage or time basis or upon a combination of both. This system applies for the most part only to employees engaged in the actual movement of trains.

Thus "100 miles or 8 hours constitute a day*o work in road freight service" while in tho standard passenger service "100 miles or 5 hours

is the usual standard day's work for engineers and firemen, and 150 miles or 7^- hours for conductors and trainmen."11 In connection with those standards the fact that tho above system determines for the most part only tho basic daily wage should bo emphasized inasmuch as

* definite hour schedule is vory difficult, if not impossible, to ar­ range in tho railroad industry. Railroad employees engaged in tho

shop, yard, and maintenance activities are paid on tho hourly or weekly basis. Tho usual day is of eight hours duration or forty- eight hours per week. In discussing railroad wages it is worthwhile

to study columns6 and 7 of Table A. Those divisions show the average

compensation per hour and per year. For tho period 1929 - 1936 it may be observed that the average hourly and yearly wage amounted to *

H e "Rules Determining Thymont of Compensation in tho Train and Engine 56

5.664 and $1,616, respectively. At first * cate that railroad T/ages aro indcod far in «

a typical picture. Perhaps a brief rovicrr of the extent of losr wages trill- esqAafeise this contention.

Coordinator of Transportation that 155,540 employees, or 13.7 per cent

of the total railroad employment, received thirty-five cents an hour

or loss. In 1935 the"percentage had declined to 10.4 per cont or

117,081 employees. Thus on tho basis of those returns it may bo

mately $840. If the average wage for 1953 as * A is

oomparod with the 5840 a diooropanoy of $026 i*

reliable lusions are im contrast!;

view of the problem is

problem, tho following figures in cu

earnings and standard of living of a thousand railway employees during

the depression may best sun up the whole discussion* By the sampling

method, trained interviewers covering all districts and all types of

workers in their proper proportion found that "for the year 1932

loss than $1,000, and one-tenth had received leas than $5 0 0 ."12

12. Carter Goodrich, Earnings and Standard of Living of 1,000 Railway Employees During the Depression, U.S. Department oF Labor (1934), p r r r ------

Z if

The principal justification for such a lengthy treatment of hours and rragos in the railroad industry is based on the contention that reports and charts showing average wages are definitely misleading.

The public rarely is acquainted ’with any other figures except these averages and therefore may bo easily won over by propagandist move­ ments urging wage reductions. The fact is that a large proportion of

the railroad workers do not earn a standard subsistence wage, although

it must bo admitted that the highly skilled workers receive -what might bo termed excellent compensation.

Any discussion of employment, hours, and wages in the railroad

industry which failed to mention the seniority rule could not be con- ■ • . - i sidorod complete. Seniority, that is, the length of service of a

- . > worker, is the guiding principle in many important industrial ro-

. " . - ' latione as promotions, transfers, demotions, dismissals, and; wages.

With the support of the strong labor organisations and unlon4nanage-

ment agreements, seniority becomes almost an automatic regulator of , ■ , ■ ■- ■ ; major labor conditions pertaining to the above mentioned fields. The

: ■ , ■■■:'' ...... ■ rules of seniority are not applied to the industry on a general scale

- ■ . , - - - r ■ I ■ ' • -v - -t; ’ - * but instead by separate crafts or oven positions. It is natural that

such a system would exert a strong influence on the ago and service ' ' ' k - . V . ' of railroad employees. In a recent survey of 980 railway employees

conducted through the sampling method to insure a representative study,

it was found that 64 per cent were at least forty years of ago while

12 per coat wore fifty-five or over. One half of the non had seniority

ratings of at least fifteen years while 25 per cent showed twenty years of service.10

A report of a group of Eastern locals of various prominent rail­ road unions further emphasises tho effect of the seniority rule on the age and length of service of workers. As will he seen in tho following listing,1* only one group falls below the ton-year standing.

Brakoraon and flagmen 17-35 Telegraphers and toiToraen 15-42 Dispatchers 16-26 Clerks in freight office 9-44 Laborers in freight shod 11-21 Clerks in car-service dopartnoa* 11-42 Signalmen and tewermon 11-84

Tihilo the effects of tho seniority principle as enumerated are of

Interest, the real result of this rule is to bo found in its tendencies to produce a feolleg of conservatism among tho railway employees affeoted— particularly the highly skilled and well compensated workers.

It is a strong force against rash activities of internal or union variety. YJhon tho influence of such a system is fully appreciated* tho emphasis placed on the strict safeguarding of seniority principles by management and labor leaders•alike can be understood. Moreover, what is especially important in this study is tho fact that all phases of seniority rest upon agreements perfected through a system of collec­ tive bargaining. 59

Boforo concluding tho portion of the thesis devoted to peculiar conditions of railroad employment, careful consideration should ho m d o of ths trorking and living standards of the railroad employees.

Much of the data available is either of a conflicting or a misleading nature. It is essential that an attempt he made to ascertain the true situation if a proper understanding of railroad labor legislation is to bo obtained. Yihile arrangements have been improved appreciably through tho efforts of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the various Railway Labor Boards, nevertheless, the statement made by XI.

ef railway service are very onerous”* *6 still holds true to a large extent. Such a situation is for the most part attributable to the special activities of the transportation industry. The normal home life is disrupted by train schedules. Much time is consumed in waiting for train make-ups and assignments. Tho danger of accidents is over present* Great caro and responsibility devolve upon certain olassos of workers In respect to the safeguarding of human life and freight earge. The living conditions of tho caboose or shanty are far from ideal* - - - ' - '

1st brief ouoh are the general employment conditions of the rail- road industry. Yftiile much of this discussion may soon unrelated to tho general topic, it should be realized that if a comprehensive study

IS. ¥. Jott Lauok, ’’The Case of Railroad Employees for an Eight-Hour Day,” Tho Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social • Science, Vol. LXii" (Juno l9l7), p. is. —— — af proper historical conception. During the entire history of labor of history the entire During conception. historical proper wages and working conditions has reacted in an improvement of thoof improvement in an reacted has conditions and working wages revenue as possible regardless of what may ba tho outcome for tho for outcome batho may of regardless what possible as revenue distinct­ as seme by termed be may course which a observed havo hoods brother­ principal four the respects In many aloofness. and pendenoe and of highly-skillod a the low pay brackets. In fairness also it should bo stated that tho that stated should itbo also fairness In low pay brackets. the ly oolfish. The motto has been to get just as large a share of tho tho of share a large as just to get been has The motto ly oolfish. general welfare of practically all workers. practically of general welfare for better campaigns in their brotherhoods principal of tho success of Locomotive Engineers, the Order of Railway Conductors, tho Brother­ tho Conductors, Railway of Order the Engineers, Locomotive of A-

I i $ would have boon diverted to iividends and not to tho workers in in to tho not workers and to iividends diverted boon have would if tho trainmen did not secure tho wage increases, the amount the amount increases, tho secure wage did not thotrainmen if skilled worker. Of course tho answer to this charge has been been has charge to this answer tho course Of skilled worker. The four principal trainmen's brotherhoods are the Brotherhood •Brotherhood the are brotherhoods trainmen's principal The four 60 in #1

hood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemon, and the Brotherhood of Rail­

road Trainman# Tho dates of organisation are 1863, 1E68, 1873 and

1883 roopootivoly, Thoao organizations vrero originally planned along

ritualistic or fraternal linos, with special onphasio on mutual in­

surance protootion. Vory little importance was placed upon what would

bo termed labor union principles. In fact, in the strikes of 1886

■and 1800 tho nombors of tho Order of Conductors wore encouraged to

fill placed vacated by striking switchmen, engineers, and firemen.

Ib the Railway Conductors' Monthly for March, 1886, tho editor wrote.

tint he "would not to citato to take any striker's place, no matter

who that striker night bo, unloss deterred by fear of bodily harm."16

Gradually, however, all four organizations cana to stress improve­

ments in labor conditions. Thoir chief grievances included tho fifteen

to eightoon hour day, the excessive ront charged for shanties, tho

withdrawal of passes, the blacklisting of union mombors, and tho low x Tfsgo ratos,17 Thus intolerable working conditions brought true union

objectives to tho foreground. With cooperation botwoon tho brother­

hoods finally ostablishod, tho union activities reached a decidedly

successful levol duo to throe factors, namely, tho indisponoablo ser­

vice rondorod by the trainman, tho high calibre of tho loaders, and,

finally, tho conservatism of thoir program, as is evident from tho

— ------. - - ...... - ' ■ - ...... -...... ------■ '

16. As quoted in Edwin Clyde Robbins, Railway Conductors (1914), p. 110$ ■

17. Walter J. EoCaleb, Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1956) . p. 7. “ ------62

sparing use of the strike weapon.IS. *18 By the beginning of tho new contury definite progress had been nado. Collective bargaining, tho rule of seniority, the ton-hour day, and a uniform wage system had been partially established* Moreover, many of the worst abuses of employment conditions had been abolished.19

Although tho four trainmen* s brotherhoods are boing used as examples of railroad unionism, the many other labor organizations should not bo ignored. By referring to Table B tho various organiza­ tions in steam railroad transportation together with their reported memberships may be noted. It will be observed that there are two principal groupings, namely, the organizations affiliated with tho

American Federation of labor and, secondly, tho independent unions.

Although tho major brotherhoods are independent, the accomplishment of tho American Federation of labor in unifying the activities of its affilnto railway unions should bo accorded proper recognition because of its importance in strengthening tho employees* position in oolloo- tivo bargaining as is indicated in this excerptt

IS. Tho railroad unions have boon wary concerning tho use of tho strike, probably beoauso of tho possiblo adverse public opinion that would result# But beoauso of tho sparing uco of tho strike it should not be imagined that the leaders wore willing to forego the right to strike. For a discussion of this point see in­ fra, pk'75, where the matter is analysed in reference to compulsory arbitration and tho outlawing of strikes.

19. I. Loo Sharfran, The American Railroad Problem (1921), p. 320# important agency of cooperation. Its Bailmy Employees' Department constitutes the immediate source of unifi­ cation. This department, organised in 1909, is designed to lend greater uniformity to tho polioios and activities of tho various organizations, to settle disputes totwoon them— particularly those arising out of jurisdictional difficulties— and to facilitate combined action against the carrier when deemod necessary and expedient, Tho lessor railroad unions, as thus united through fader- _ ation, have achieved considorahlo poorer and influence.20

Tct* in the last analysis, tho one way to cocure a proper judgement os veil as an evaluation of tho methods and purposes of tho labor or­ ganization is to study it in action. For this reason it seems pro­ pitious to give immediate consideration to labor legislation in tho railroad industry.

From 1882 to 1888 Congress witnessed an almost continuous wave of investigations, hearings, and resolutions relative to the proper methods of settling labor disputes on American railroads. Y/hilo thoro had been a concentrated wave of strikes and disagreements for over a decade, it was not until 1888 when tho organizations of engineers, fire­ men, and switchmen effected a devastating strike against the Chicago,

Burlington, and Quincy Railroad, that Cengrossional leaders were fully impressed with tho need of immediate legislation. In this strike tho

labor unions wore clearly defeated but the financial losses suffered by the railroad wore so great that the maagemat reprosentatives did not care to risk any further hostilities. In order to remedy this

situation, legislation was sought which would prevent such occurrences

la the future. In this instance favorable legislation would take tho form of compulsory arbitration, or in actuality, tho outlawing of strikes. 64

Table B21

Organizations in Stoan Railroad

Organizations Affiliated with the American Membership Federation of Labor Eoportod

Railway Enployooo1 Department of tho American Federation of Labor (1) Clorks, Freight Handlers, Express and' Station Employees, Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship 135,000 Conductors, Order of Sleeping Car 2,200 Maintenance of % y Employees, Brotherhood of 100,000 Porters, Brotherhood of Sleeping Car 5;.000 Switchmen* o Union of North America 9,600

Independent organizations

Brakonon-Porters, national Association of 3*$ Conductors of America, Order of Railway (2) Conductors, Brotherhood of Dining Car 1,000 Dining Car Employees, Brotherhood of 2,700 Dining Car Employees, National Brotherhood of 1,100 Engineers, Grand International Brotherhood of Locomotive 59.000 Firemen and Engineers, Brotherhood of Loccaot: 60,886 Porters, Brakomon, and Switohmon, Associated Train TOO Railroad Workers, American Federation of 20.000 Signalmen of America, Brotherhood of Railroad a * o o * Station Employees, Brotherhood of Railroad 1,100 Train Dispatchers, Association, American 2,416 Trainmen and Locomotive Firenon, Association of Colored Railway Trainmen, Brotherhood of Railroad „:s Yardmastors of America, Railroad Yardmotoro of North Amorioa, Railroad ■ S " • Total l&mborahip 533,540 50,000

, « w X

(2) No report, Howover, in the case of tho Order of Railway Con­ ductors of America, Professor Carroll Daugherty estimated tho momber- twip for 1932 to bo 50,000. See Carroll R. Daugherty, Labor Problems in American Industry (1953), p. 461. 0$y Approximate inasmuch as statistics for Railroad Yardmastors of North America aro lacking.

51. Seurees "Organised Labor Movement, 1959 to 1937 - P a r t II," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 44 (February 1957), p. 309. Detorninod opposition both from motiborc of Conrross ond from labor loaders was inznodiatoly expresse/a.22 Thoir attitude was that in spite of tho public nature of tho railroad service, tho employees should not bo deprived of their major weapon in the campaign for better working and living conditions.

After extensive hearings and numerous compromises, the first rail­ road labor act was passed by Congress and with tho approval of President

Cleveland went into effect on October 1, 1888e2° This initial piece of labor disputes legislation was made up of two major "parts, namely, two plans for lumdling controversies« Tho first system which may be termed voluntary arbitration provided that if either party to the dispute secured tho acceptance of the other to arbitration, then each would appoint a representative with c neutral chairman being selected by tho original two. Hot only was this procedure voluntary but there was no method or provision for enforcing tho awards or findings of tho board of arbitration. The second method was to have tho President appoint a commission of throe, one of whoa would bo the Commissioner of Labor, to investigate any dispute and make public its findings and recommendations. This provision could bo put into effect by the Presi­ dent on his own volition when interstate commerce was obstructed or on tho request of either party to the dispute or the governor of the state

in which the trouble was concentrated. Public opinion was to be relied upon in both instances as an enforcement weapon. *25

22, Infra# p. 76 for labor’s arguments against arbitration.

25. 28 Stmt. L. SOI. iti a

with the Pullman strike In 1894,

The Pullman strike of 1894 is indeed an important epic in labor

history. After the

of federal intervention, President Clove 2425

24. historical Outline of the Hallway labor Act as Amended June 81, 18S4, and Preoeding Legislation. Railway Baployeos Department of the ISTrican federation of tabor, (n.d.)

25. The ocRmission consisted of Carroll D. Tfright, John D. Kernan, Uioholas E. Worthington. The ciroumstahoes under which the commission was appointed as introduced at a hearing before the national labor Relations Board are of interest: But after tho strike was over and ackncwlodgod by all parties to have been very effectively killed by tho imprisonment of tho strikers and strike loaders, and tho use of the injunction, of troops, and of marshals. President Cleveland appointed a Commission under tho law of 1888, to investigate tho Pullman strike. As quoted in Governmental Protection of Labor's Right to Organise, Bulletin. No, 1 o F t b e national Labor Eolations Board (1886), p. SS, Sf

had boon nado by tho President to uso tho 1888 logiclation as a means

@£ settling tho strike* llovortholoso, the Pullman strike due to the - :5 ,= ' intense Mtternesa aroused, the tremendous financial losses suffered, ■ : ' ■ ■ ■ . ' : „ the evidenoo of inadequate governmental conciliation machinery for

ward labor, and, finally, the recommendations of the Presidential

Commission, had a distinct Influence on future railroad labor legis­ lation* Thus a brief review will be of advantage*

In 1893 and 1894 tho Pullman Palace Car Company of Pullman,

Illinois had a series of disagreements with the local shop unions con­ cerning wages, rents, and shop conditions. Viagea were out 25 per cent but no reductions were undo in tho salaries of executives. Tho concern had built up a surplus of $25,000*000 while on a capital investment of $36,000,000, the 1894 dividends amounted to $2,880,000, Pullman was truly a company town with workers practically forced to livo in company- owned houses although tho rents were 20 to 25 per cent higher than in the Chicago district. In addition, numerous shop abuses wore in evidence.

Finally, after the company refused to remedy conditions, tho members ef the local union went out on strike on May 11, 189*. Shortly thereafter the American Bailway Union came to the support of tho local shop organisation, and asked the Pullman Company to enter into oemoiliatiott or arbitration. Various eivio organisations and mayors of cities of

Illinois urged similar action but were repulsed by tho concern. The

American Railway Union in an attempt to end tho controversy suggested tho formation of a commission composed of two representatives of tho company, two appointed by the federal courts, and a neutral chairman to As a

Pullmn oars. At no timo during tho strike did any of the labor loaders urge violence. Frost Kay 11th to July 3rd no violence or des­ truction -ms reported.26 The Presidential Commission was later to

suoh dignified conduct under those trying circumstances, it concluded that "like prudence in all their directions will result in duo time in the ItRTful and orderly redress of labor wrongs."27

In spite of concerted pressure from many sources, neither the governor nor tho legislature of Illinois would request tho aid of federal troops, yet on tho basis of tho contention that obstruction of tho mails warranted intervention. President Cleveland employed three dovioos to stop tho strike. Thirty-six hundred speoial deputy marshals wore sworn in at the direction of tho Attorney-General of tho United

States. These men wore soleotod and paid for by tho Pullman Company— yet had tho full authority of federal officers. Secondly, tho General

Managers* Association which had taken over the rope Hence of tho strike for the Pullman Company persuaded Cleveland to appoint Edwin Walker as a special assistant attorney-general to handle federal legal pro-

26. Tho source of most of tho information on the Pullman strike is the by the U.S. 7 (1895).

27. Ibid., p. X X m i l . it

Ci

Finally, in on unprocodonted action, Cleveland ordorod federal troopo

nuoh to eduoato putlio opinion as to the rights and needs of labor.

After urging employers to recognize labor unions as the representatives

of their employees, the Commission indicated the failure of the govern­ ment to "protect tho rights of labor and rodress its ■wrongs."28 Labor's right to organise and to select representatives to deal with the manage­ ment must be accorded full recognition before any labor legislation

could operate successfully.

Thus tho Act of 1888 from a consideration of the period's major

labor uprising was definitely of an unsuccessful nature. But, although

it has boon termed an "unintelligent piece of legislation because it

had no provisions protecting tho worker's right to organize,"29 never­

theless, as Professor Sharfman stated, it did bring recognition of tho

problem.50

?ath the impetus resulting from tho 1894 strike, numerous measures *30

S®. Ibid. - - .

29* national Labor Relations Bulletin Ho. 1, o£. cit., p. 48.

30. Sharfman> op. clt., p. 330. 70

of a diversified nature were submitted for Congressional aetion.

Special emphasis was placed on the public character of the railroad service* Plans for compulsory arbitration, for rigid public control of operations, and for a railroad court of labor were proposed• In

1895 Hoproooutativo Erdman introduood a bill providing for voluntary arbitration and mediation under tho guidance of a permanent agency*

Ibis bill, which was supported by the railway brotherhoods and govern­ ment officials, m e thoroughly discussed and analyzed by members of

Congress for throe years before being finally enacted into law on

Juno 1, 1890iS1 .

The Erdman Act, limited in scope to those employees actually en­

gaged in train operation, provided for mediation and conciliation by

tho United States Commissioner of labor and tho Chairman of tho

Interstate Commerce Commission— but only at tho request of either

party to the dispute* Although the investigating procedure was

omitted, voluntary arbitration was retained* If arbitration was

accepted, each party would appoint a representative with these two

nominees selecting a third party to servo as chairman. In order to

give the arbitration process some force of compulsion, both parties

upon agreeing to this procedure waro obliged to abide by certain rules.

Tho findings and award of the board were final and wore to remain in

effect for a period of ono year. During the period of the hearings all

conditions wero to bo maintained in tho exact fashion as found at the

timo of tho agreement to arbitrate. This Included a prohibition on

H i SO Stat. L. 42*. 71

be made only with labor organisations unless unorganised workers could prove that thoy represented a majority of the particular craft in tho employ of the concern involved. But this was not the only stimulus provided for tho strengthening of labor organisations, for section 10 ruled out all "yollow-dog" contracts.02 No longer could a worker be required to agree to stay out of unions as a condition of employment.

Ho longer could a union membership bo used as the basis of discrim­ ination or blacklisting*

Such was the lew in theory. In practice tho situation was quite different. After an attempt by labor in 1899 to use the machinery of

the Act was balked by tho railroads, tho entire- legislative program

lay dormant for eight and one-half years— seemingly an unworkable measure. But from 1906 to 1913, when the Act was repealed, sixty-one oases wore settled through t M s medium. Over two hundred and fifty

thousand employees wore involved in these disputes. Hotone arbi­

tration award was repudiated during this entire period. In order not

to give undue stress to the arbitration clause, it id advisable to

call attention to the methods used in settling disputes. Of the sixty-

32. See footnote 44. supra, p. 36. 72

•one settlements, twenty-six were reached through mediation, ton

through mediation and arbitration, and oix through arbitration alono.

Thus mediation came to bo established as the simplest and most desir­

able method of settling controversies in spite of tho inability of

the mediators to initiate proceedings or to enforce the agreements.35

. nevertheless, certain weaknesses soon were manifested. It was

felt that the mediators should be permitted to initiate proceedings

in order to prevent disputes from reaching any degree of magnitude.

Also great difficulty was frequently experienced in attempting to

obtain a neutral chairman to conduct arbitration proceedings, for an

experienced man might bo partial while an inexperienced person would

bo almost valueless. Moreover, grave doubt was expressed as to tho

wisdom of placing so much power in;one individual.5^

In general, although labor Readers were not in complete agreement

with certain phases of the policy, no great resentment was shown until

the decision in Adair v. United States Was handed down, by tho Supremo

Court in 1 9 0 8 .55 As has been already pointed out, section 10 of tho

Erdman Act was regarded as of major importance in increasing union

' membership and prestige, since *yellow-dog" contracts could no longer

33. Clyde 01in Fisher, Use of Federal Power in Settlement of Railway labor Disputes, Bulletin ifo. 305 of tho U.S. Bureau e d T I a W Statisticn (1922), p. 10.

M . Charles P« Mill, Mediation and Arbitration of Railway labor Disputes in the United States, Bulletin ilo. 98 of tho~U. S. Bureau of labor resssee xisw; p. s.

35. 208 U.S* M l (1908). f 75

%*-used by employors in their battloe against the spread of mionism. But all this m s changed by the Adair decision -which invalidated section 10. The following two portions of Justico

Wo hold that thoro is no such connection be­ tween interstate consnorce and membership in a labor organization as to authorise Congress to make it a crime against tho United States for an agent of an interstate carrier to disohargo an omployoo because of such membership on his part*

In all such particulars tho employer and the em­ ployee hevo equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary Interference with tho liberty of contract trhich no government can legally justify in a free land.

While this decision m e a serious setback,36 tho alert loaders of tho brotherhoods quickly perfected a new typo of action to strengthen the power of the unions. This was known as the Mooacorted

5G. It is of interest to contrast tho reasoning of this decision

collectively was emphasized due to the inequality existing between the employer and the individual worker. But in 1903 such beliefs had little, if any, legal foundation. 74

movomont,*57 IMdcr tho "ooncortod novonont" aethod the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers on fifty-two Eastern railroads petitioned for higher -rages. After months of public anxiety this dispute ras settled through extra-legal means. But in similar actions in 1913 by the conductors and trainmen no mode of settlement could bo reached, filth a threatening situation dove loping, a conference ras called by

President Wilson, and all parties agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration as provided in the Howlands measure then pending before

Congress.*8 finder the force of this pressure, the Howlands bill ras enacted into law on July 15, 1915.59

The Howlands Act ras actually only an amendment to tho Erdman

Act with two major changes being made. With emphasis placed on mediation, provision ras mode for a permanent Board of Mediation which. 373839

37. As tho term indicates, tho conoorted movement was simply a program of cooperation among tho main brotherhoods. During tho early period of development of those labor organisations, each followed its own individual course of action in attempting to improve conditions of employment. From 1903 to 1815 stops were taken to bring about cooperation in presenting demands to the railroad management, but usually those movements were limited in scope. However, in 1915 with little progress being made in tho campaign for an eight-hour work day, tho four principal brotherhoods engaged in tho movement of trains decided to present a unified set of demands to tho railroads on a national scale* Tho result ras a powerful group of almost indispensable workers in all sections of tho country competing with the railroad industry as a whole. Perhaps the most effective example of what this concentrated power meant in railroad history is to be found la the analysis of the enactment of the Adamson Act in 1916 os will bo noted later.

38. Fisher, op. cit., p. 45.

39. 38 Stat. L. 208. 75

if feasible, could initiate proceedings• Arbitration tras retained, but the number on the board tras increased from throe to six. Thus

*

First of all the question of arbitration should bo given attention. In order te have a common understanding of the torn it is advisable to insert a simple and oonoise explanation. From tho

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences the following is takent

putos botsroen employers and employees to the decision of impartial adjudication. It differs from ordinary collective bargaining (sometimes called conciliation) by its use of outsiders not parties to the dispute. It differs from mediation (also frequently called conciliation) in that those outsiders are called upon to make tho actual decisions instead of merely using thoir good off! to bring tho

Arbitration is of too main typos and cues its grewth to two linos of development. In ono case, voluntary arbi­ tration, tho parties directly ooncornod dooido to appeal to an arbiter's judgement as a supplement to their ordinary

tratioa, the movement typically begins outside industry, and the contestants are, if necessary, forced to arbitration by the power of the state

ttatil approximately 1905 the railroads wore definitely opposed to any fora of arbitration. Inasmuch as cooperation between the various 40

40, Carter Goodrich, "Industrial Arbitration," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Tel. II, p. IBS. ------76

groups of management officials brought power and prestige, any pro­ cedure which might usurp their powers was opposed, la general under any ordinary bargaining program, the management was almost certain to dominate proceedings. Koroovor, as Dr. Fishor concluded after an oxtonsivo study, tho railroads realized that should they find it advisable to aocedo to tho demands of the employees, tho solution was simple, namely, raise the rates.41 During this same period the labor

organizations cognizant of thoir weaknesses, welcomed any outside

intervention since it was apparent that nothing could bo lost and

something night bo gained.

Gradually a complete cycle of change of tactics wan completed.

By 1910 tho situation presented a vastly different appearance. Tho

railroad labor organizations were rapidly mounting in membership and

strength. The concerted movement was in process of formation. Tho

publio and industrial groups wore demanding lever rates. Governmental

supervision was gaining real force. All these factors combined to im­

press labor with tho propitiousnoss of striking out in an independent

vein. Arbitration became ono of, if not tho chief object of, labor's

criticism and condemnation, labor's case against arbitration appears

to fall under these five general heading#*

(1) There is an absence of any definite and generally acooptod

standard for the determination of a wage rate.

(2) The substitution of arbitration for strikes and beyeetts will

weaken labor organizations.

41. Fisher, ©£. alt., p. 46, 77

(3) Tho proocduro involves the intorvontion of n third party who nay bo ignorant of conditions.

(4) Tho method ia judicial la nature. This moans that precedent plays a largo part which in turn moans lower wages and poorer conditions f®r t W workors, -- '

(8) The resulting decision is difficult to onforcc.-2

Perhaps the principal point of contention cbntorod about the sel­ ection of the members of a board of arbitration. Ydio should bo soloctodt

How should they be appointed? The man with training and experience in railroad problems usually came from the management group naturally inasmuch as these alone were available. If a person without any rail­ road experience was to bo selected, the situation was almost hopeless from the point of view of settling disputes. Thus labor could not visualise arbitration as being an impartial or adequate form of pro­ cedure in major labor disputes. "Why should an important wage or hour

issue bo submitted to an inexperienced or to a partial arbitrator for dooioion.

Tot in spite of tho impressiveness of those objections of labor, tho most important disputes centered about tho administration of the awards of tho various boards of arbitration. Tho management in most

settlements immediately put the award into effect according to its own

interpretation regardless of the attitude or beliefs of tho interested

42. This summary is based on material presented by Frank T. Carlton, "The Advantages and Defects of Compulsory Arbitration," The Annals ?@

labor groups* Inasmuch as no governmental agency v/as provided for the administration of dooxsions, tha management groups naturally took over this function. Protests of labor mount nothing for there fras no redress unless another arbitration hearing -sms requostad, ' ' ' .A ^ Thus with labor attaining a more porrorful role, what was to bo gained from such a disagreeable and distorted method of settlement?

Before this discussion of compulsory arbitration is concluded, mention at least should bo made of the influence of tho Canadian In­ dustrial Disputoo Investigation Aot of 190? on American labor leaders.

From 190? up until after the World War, demands were almost continu­ ously hoard for the enactment of a Congressional statute similar to tho Canadian legislation, commonly knotm as the Lonieux Aot. In general this Act was ordinarily thought of as maroly providing for publicity and a complete investigation of labor disputes. While strikes and lookouts were banned during the period of investigation, it was agreed that tho real purpose was merely to prevent hasty action by either party. Labor loaders contended that this period of armistice provided tho employer with an opportunity to reinforce himself and thus be prepared to continue tho plant operations regardless of tho. findings of tho commission. Preparations often meant assurance in disregarding official findings.

Because of the different interpretations of this Act a descrip­ tion will be of assistance in interpreting various American proposals.

Fran a study by tho United States Board of tTodiation and Conoiliatian the following excerpt ic taken: 70

Tho scop© of tho law of 1907 applied dirootly to eeployors or employoos on{ragod in mining, transportation, oonununication, or publio-aorvioo utilities. Indirectly,' upon tho request of both parties to a controversy, tho provisions of tho law may be applied to any branch of industry. Employers and employoos aro required to give at least 30 days' notice of proposed changes in wages or hours of labor. Provision is made for tho establish­ ment of boards of investigation on tho application of either party to a dispute and for mediation and com­ pulsory investigation and a public report by ouch a board. Strikes and lockouts are prohibited until the investigation and report of tho board aro made. After this procedure strikes and lockouts are legal.-5

Again as was true in every instance of earlier proposed restric­ tive measures, labor emphasised the necessity of maintaining the right to strike. But on the other side tho public and industry as sup­ posedly represented by various pressure groups pointed out the im­ portance of continuity of service. In fact service alone was not sufficient. Any possible danger of interruption must not exist— at tho hands of labor. Thus, under tho disguise of compulsory in­ vestigation, the movement to limit the use of tho strike weapon was

given momentum, Tho labor organizations wo loomed fair publicity but

coercion under the label of publicity w o definitely detrimental.

The next atop in the legislative history had an important bearing on

arbitration* Since the latter part of 1914 tho brotherhoods had boon

steadily "demanding en eight-hour day. The first attempts were rather

of a cautious nature so as not to arouse hostile public opinion.

Finally* In 1916 an absolute demand for an eight-hour day on a ten- 43

43, Railway Strikes and Lockouts, U.S, Board of Mediation and Conciliation (19lu%/ p. 23 8 0

hour compensation basis was mado. Either tho request must bo granted or a nation-srido strike would bo called• Tho railroads refused to comply with the request and suggostod arbitration. Tho presidents of tho brotherhoods refused any outside node of settlement except a

Congressional act. In a last desperate cove to halt the strike,

President Wilson sent a message to Congress on August 29th requesting favorable action on the eight-hour day demands«

Vihilo tho action of Congress and tho President in acceding to tho demands of labor met with condemnation and derision from certain interests, the actual passage of the Adamson Act44 45 in itself is not of major importance^ in a study of tho settling of labor disputes•

44. 59 Stat. L. 721.

45. Prom tho above statement it should,not bo assumed that tho Adamson law was not of importance. Perhaps more than any other act of railroad labor tho preliminaries to tho passage cf this law aroused a great hostility against labor. While most of this feeling was due -to propaganda manufactured by the railroad associations, never­ theless, tho notions of tho directors of the brotherhoods may have

a sorvice-to-tho-publio complex carefully devised by tho railroads for decades. Of .course as various observers pointed out, what tho labor loaders actually wanted and obtained was a wago increase. Ten hours pay was secured for eight hours of labor. Uo limit was placed on tho length of the work day inasmuch as tho brotherhood leaders fully realised that such a limitation would bo impossible due to the peculiar conditions of railroad employment. Professor William 2. Ripley summed up the effects of the law with tho following statements "The so-called Bi^ht-Hour law, then, is a statute fixing wages, with only an incidental bearing upon hours... in effect a minimum wago law," (William 2. Ripley, "The Railroad Eight-Hour law," Tto Amor loan Review of Reviews, Tel. U Y (Oeteber 1916), p. 669). Therefore, it should be kept in mind that tho primary purpose of tho brotherhoods appeared to bo a wage a%

Tihat is far noro significant are the facts dealing with the utter failure of tho Howlands Act ns ah inctruaont of mediation and arbi­ tration and, secondly, the program of President Wilson for settling railroad labor disputes as outlined in his message to Congress,

m y did the loading brotherhoods absolutely and openly refuse to use mediation or arbitration as provided by the Howlands Act in an attempt to settle tho hour controversy? The various objections to arbitration already enumerated were quickly emphasized. Stress was also placed on tho powerful effects of tho hostile propaganda created by the loading newspapers at the request of tho railroad management groups. It m s believed that arbitration would not bo an impartial procoduro, Tihilc most writers have given major publicity to theso ethical arguments of labor, seemingly tho deciding factor in the minds of tho brotherhood loaders was the almost positive belief that

# concerted movemont in all sections of tho nation would bring a quick victory for tho employees. Therefore, if sn extensive and contain gain could be made through the medium of a well coordinated pressure movement, why take a rather risky chance with arbitration or modiaMee measures? This reasoning alone appears to explain tho ignoring of the

Howlands Act,

The second matter in connection with the passage of the Adamson

Act that deserves scrutiny was the attitude of President Wilson in re­ gard to tho most feasible system for handling future railway labor disputes, Yihothor It was duo to tho tension created by tho European

7&r, or traceable to tho pressure exertod by tho railroad association, or explainable by the fact that 1916 was a presidential election year. 82

tho reoomondntions proposed in tho Presidential message were de­ cidedly of an anti-labor nature. Actually, the executive demanded the passage of an act similar in many respects to the Canadian

Lemioux Act, In uncompromising language Wilson declared:

But the proposal that the operation of the railways of tho country shall bo stopped or Interrupted by the concerted action of organised bodies of men until a public investigation shall have boon instituted uhioh shall make the whole question at issue plain for the judgement of the opinion of the nation is not to propose any such principle • It is based upon tho very different principle that tho concerted action of principal bodies of men shall not be permitted to stop tho industrial. processes of the nation, at any rate before the nation shall have had an opportunity to acquaint itself with the merits of the case as between employee and employer, time to form its opinion upon an impartial statement of tho merits, and opportunity to consider all practicable means of oonoillation or arbitration.^

After much heated discussion during the course of which the rail­ roads demanded the outlawing of the strikes in order to balance the '• granting of what was actually a wage increase. Congress finally ap­ proved of only two major items, namoly, the eight-hour day and tho provision for a fact-finding commission to study the effects of tho new work day.^

However, tho campaign of tho carriers against tho increasing powers of labor was not yot ended. The Adamson Law was to go into effect on January 1, 1917, but prior to this date, it was declared *47

48. Congressional Record, House, Midi Cong., 2d Seas., 7*1. U V , Pt.l, p* 32.

47. The commission consisted of George W. Goothals, Edgar E. Clark and Goorge Hub loo. Their report was of little oignifioanoo because of tho groat war events which intervened. See Report ef the Eight-Hour Commission (1918), 83

invalid by a lover federal court. Incensed at the course of events, tho brotherhoods called a general strike for Harch 17th. With the

European situation becoming more threatening to American oomnoroial activities, tho possibility of a nation wide transportation tieup brought alarm and notion. On I&rch 19th, the final doadlino for activity, a committee of tho Council of National Defense succeeded in effecting an eight-hour day for a large portion of tho railway employees through tho cooperation of tho carriers.

Tho final chapter in the Adamson Aot controversy came in tho case of Wilson v. Ncw^8 in which the United States Supreme Court up­ hold tho law as a proper exorcise of Congressional regulation of intorotato commerce. Yet, in spite of its victory, organised labor was incensed at tho reasoning employed by Chief Justice White who seemingly went to unnecessary lengths in order to enunciate the principle that Congress undoubtedly possessed the power to provide for compulsory arbitration by appropriate legislation.^9 4849

48. 243 u.8, m (mr)*

49. At this time the influence of the railroad labor experiences in regard to arbitration on the formation of tho provisions of the Rational Labor Relations Aot of 1935 should bo noted. In this industry, organized labor had ample opportunities to gain a thorough understanding of tho harmful effects of such a system for settling industrial controversies. Therefore as a result, labor leaders boliovod that the proper role of the government was to safeguard such activities of the laborer as tho right to organise and to bargain collectively. Labor did not want tho government to arbitrate or make the final settlement. Instead labor would obtain its objectives through its cam bargaining weapons under tho general protection of tho government. 84

But with the

tioc, especially as the govoramnt assumed the role of employer in the railroad industry. The assumption of the management of tho nation’s railroads by tho federal govorment occurred in the midst of

concentrated efforts by practically every major labor organization

to attain a higher nago standard, Morale and efficiency xroro dwindling

rapidly, Tho ozisting machinery for handling labor disputes had

reaohod an unrrorkablo atago. Thousands of highly skilled workers wore being lured away from tho railroad industry by industrial di­

rectors who, cognisant of tho hugh profits to be gained, wero willing

and able to offer higher rates of compensation. Tho threat of strikes

in all sections of the country was rapidly approaching the state of

actuality. Vihon all factors wore combined, tho situation of the

American railroads at the time when a Presidential order inaugurated

governmental control was indeed alarming. Fortunately, December 28,

1917* the date of the commencement of federal operation, marked the

beginning of a now period in the history of railroad labor problems

for the imprint of the governmental poliey was to remain indefinite­

ly— all this in spite of the seriousness of tho existing situation

is 1917.

By a statute of August 29, 1916,50 the sixty-fourth Congress pro-

50. 59 Stat, L, 619. 86

vidod for the operation of all railroads by the federal gorormnent

■when and if tho President doenod such action necessary and foasiblo.

This Congressional grant of pesror was not exorcised by Wilson until

Deconbor 28, 1917, In his proclamation of December 26, 1917, tho

President designated tho Secretary of the Treasury, vailiam KoAdoo, as tho Director General of all American railroads.51 Congress ap­

proved of those executive actions by an Act of I.!aroh 21, 1918,82

Railroad workers wore now actually employees of tho federal govern­

ment. This now relationship produced mixed reactions • Fears were ex­

pressed on ono hand that this new situation might result in a rigid

application of public officer responsibility with its attending out­

lawing of certain actions such as tho strike. Such a procedure would

not only bo an inciting tendency but, more important, would create a

precedent for future policies. A second group welcomed governmental

supervision as a means to an end— a short cut to higher wages and

bettor worldng conditions. Actually no radical changes in the gonoral

relationship between labor and management were effected but numerous

of omployoo dissatisfaction.

As has already been indicated, demands for wage increases wore

SI. Proelnmtion of President Wilson 26, 1917, as found in Public Acts, Proclamations by tho President Relating to tho United a&Aos Railroad Adminstration anl Gonoral Qrdora ancf oTrcuIars lilroadlTto Ceconbor 31. 1918. HF'lio. 4’TRovi'ced), XI S l U T p -

52. 40 Stat. L. 451. 86

boing voicod in all sections by all classifications of vrorkers* The situation v ms of a threatening nature not because railroad labor, boing troll organised, could probably onforco its demands, but bacauso the Trorkera were affected by the tremendous rise in the cost of living sinco 1916, The vrago campaign thon centered about a pica for additional funds to meot increased living expenses.

On January 18, 1918, the Director General appointed a cosraioaien to investigate the wage standards in the entire railroad industry.

The agency immediately won the support of all factions largely because of tho calibre and standing of its membership which included Franklin

K» lane. Secretary of Interior, dsarlee 0. 2&Chord, a member of the

Interstate: Commoroo Commission, J, Harry Covington, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of tho District of Columbia, and Trillion E. tVillccx of Hew York.5 5 . With a keen regard for tho need of quick yet equitable action, tho board worked diligently to ascertain the actual conditions of compensation in tho industry, -* On April SO, 1918, a comprehensive survey of the situation was presented to the Director General with emphatic recommendations for.an immediate readjustment of wage scales.

On the basis of this "report tho Director General issued General

Order Mo. 8? sblsh* with frequent supplementary measures, served as the basis of tho administration*o wage and hour policy throughout the

period of federal control.64 A wago increase in itself or tho granting

63. Report of the Eailroad Wage Commission to the Director General of ISilroalsriprll 30, 19I q7 “U.S. Railroad” (IsISJTpT •f the eight-hour day to all employees is of little oignificanoe in this particular study, but the fact that this deoicion served as the entering trodge in a

for a brief analysis. In

ile.

The prinoipal purpose m s to remedy the worst abuses. For this reason, while the increases for the high wage employees were negligible, the

-wage plan whioh was based on the compensation standards existing in

December, 1915$65

46.01 to 47 102.01 to 103 30.39 154.01 to 155 15.16 206.01 to 20? 7.58

#

little

upper let.

in opito of this general disregard of wage demands of the most power­ 88

ful brotherhoods, tho cooperation of ovary organisation m o assured at all tinooe

nent of a Board of Railroad Wages and Working Conditions.56 Tho

Board acted as a general aid to tho Director in problems oonoeming m g o s , hours, and working conditions particularly in regard to con­ ducting investigations and hearing complaints.

From the tin® of the issuance of General Order Mo. 27 until 1919, a survey of the records of tho Wage Board rovoals an almost continuous

parade of union and non-union groups seeking trago increases as m i l as

improvements in working conditions. Tho numerous supplementary orders

to the general compensation plan hoar testimony to tho spirit of fair­

ness and cooperation of the administration which did all in its power

to oorroot a disgraceful state of affairs in tho railroad trades.

Hero at last the complaints of all groups were given an impartial and

thorough examination. Rogardloss of whether tho requests wore granted,

labor fully appreciated tho attitude shewn by the Railroad Adminis­

tration in at least giving on employee tho chance to present M s case.

The value of such a procedure in maintaining morale and improving tho

56. This personnel of tho board included J, J. Dormody, F. F. Gaines, E. E. Lindsey, Yi, E. Horoo, G. H. Sines, and A. 0. bharton. 69

esprit do corps of the conrioo cannot to belittled by any keen winded

Division of Labor in tho Eailroad Administration by order of the Direc­ tor on February 19, 1918* This agency vma placed under tho supervision

# S. Carter, President of the Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen*

cooondly, to roprosont the unorganised.railroad worker* Although the agency was originally established to not as advisor to tho Director

3a regard to labor problems. Carter, duo to M o union position and

of a

t# this union official who worked untiringly to solve incipient dis­ putes and to remedy abuses in which both union and non-union workers

organized movement* Section 5 .of this order provided that: ”No dis­ crimination will bo made in tho employment, retention, or conditions ef employment of omployoos booauso of membership or noiruombcrship I*

labor organizations."57 It will be recalled that section 10 of tho

Erdman Aot of 1098 provided for tho outlawing of all "yellow-dog"

57. Bulletin Ho* 4 of tho U.S. Railroad Administration (Revised), op* oit*, p. i m contracts as a condition of employment. But it also Trill to remembered that the United States Supremo Court in Adair v- United States58 declared section 10 of the Erdman Act unconstitutional. Thus from the time of this decision in 1909 up until tills enunciation by Director

L'cAdoo, tho '’yollovr-dog" contract raraained a strong club in the hands of the anti-union omplcyor. Although this restricting contract system meant little to tho highly skilled employees, it had boon employed very successfully in preventing a general growth of unionism in the majority of trades.

Her;/ any and every -morkor in the industry m s free to join a labor

organisation is ho so desired, Naturally this recognition of tho

right of the v/orker•to organ!so proved to bo of great assistance to

the unions, Uemborship in almost ovary railroad labor organisation

immediately showed a positive roacticn with the largest gain being

registered among tho leas skilled groups, V.liilo complete statistical

material is not available, it has boon estimated that union member-

chip in the industry as a whole inoreasod by about 10 per cent among

the train movement employoos and by about SO per coat among the other

olassos during tho period of governmental control. As a result of

thoso increases Dr, H.. D, %'olf computed that the employees engaged in

the movement of trains wore 90 per cent organised while all other

groups were almost 80 per cent unionized.59 The significance of this

58. Supra, p. 72.

&§♦ H»D, Wolf, Tho Eailroad Labor Board (1927), p. Be, 91

augsontod onrollnont can only bo gracpod tiirough a ropetition of tho policy of tho railroad unions, nanoly# to maintain an opon chop at all tinea, Soomingly, then, a fair conolucion would bo that tho

of the

railroad industry should not bo mderoctinated. Tot cnothor innovation must bo recognised ao tho major achievement of tho Hailroad Adminis­ tration, It will bo recalled that in a previous part of tho die- cuggIoh60 epooial emphasis was placed on labor’s complaints regarding

interpretation of awards obtained through the efforts of boards of arbitration or mediation. In each case the management assumed tho matter of interpreting the decision. Labor had no voico whatsoever

in tho actual application of tho findings. Because of this unfortunate

situation management officials often were able to thwart the real pur­

poses and intentions of tho decision. Labor had no rodress except to

threaten another general strike with tho adverse effects such a pro­

cedure would produce. Public opinion as created by management-minded

newspapers was always ready to abhor such un-American action.

With a realisation of tho import of this complaint of labor, tho

creation of Boards of Adjustment. Thoso Boards wore in ono sense a

60. Supra, p. 77, 92

follovvirig official statement $

The principle of colloctivo bargaining hao boon further recognised in the making of national agreements between tho Dirootor General and certain organisations of railroad employees, ouch agreements to remain operative during Federal control, subject to modification as pro­ vided in tho agreements. These agreements have defined. tho working conditions with more particularity than tho general orders did, have provided against strikes or lookouts except after resorting to tho maohinory pro­ scribed in the agreements, and generally have sought to give a definiteness and stability to tho status of tho employees to rcfcich they soem properly entitled.81

To prevent past recurrences, provision was made for throe national boards to handle controversies as agencies of last resort. In explain­ ing the now plan the Director General stated:

Ibrsonal grievances or controversies arising under interpretation of wage agrooaonts, and all other dis­ putes arising between officials of a railroad end its employees, covered by thio understanding, will bo handled in their usual manner by general committees cf tho employees up to and including tho chief operating officer of tho railroad (or some ono officially desig­ nated by him), when, if an agreement is not reached, tho chairman of tho general oommittoo of employees may

to tho President by Walker D* 1 of tho L J a u u u u $ AW* AUUA UUVki i LHohlT (1921), p. 16.

—-A.'---' ^ '' 9S

refor tho matter to the chief executive officerof the organisation concerned, and if tho contention of tho employees1 committee is approved by such executive officer, then the chief operating officer of the rail­ road and the chief executive officer of the organi­ zation concerned shall refer tho matter, with all supporting papers, to the Director of the Division of Labor of tho United States Railroad Administration, ■who frill in turn present the caco to tho Railway Board of Adjustment Ho. 1, which board shall promptly hear and decide the case, giving due notice to the ♦ M o f oporating officer of the railroads interested and to the chief oxocutive officer of the organi­ zation concerned of tho time set for hearing.62

fb# Director General urged all groups to reach a settlement through local moans whenever possible* Although encouraging such a

national unit, nevertheless, the right of appeal was emphasized from time to tire. Supplements 10, 11, and IS to General Order No.

IT specifically stated the right of appeal must bo uphold and recognized in every situation co that no worker could conclude that he m m being nado the object of discrimination.

Board of Adjustment No. 1 was created by General Order No. 13 .

on I&rch 22, 1918. This agency was concerned with controversies „

arising over agreements between the carriers and tho Brotherhood of

Locomotive Engineers, tho Order of Railway Conductors, the Brother­

hood of Railroad Trainmen, and the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen

and Enginemon.*5® Tho personnel consisted of eight members— four

62. Bulletin No. 4 of the U,3. Railroad Administration (Revised), °P* oit*. p. 177. es. ibid., p. m. pointed by the principal brotherhoods • All the mashers trers there­ fore experienced in railroad problems# There were no so-called

impartial or public representatives who would have the actual deciding

poser. In othor words it was an instance of a conference between capital and labor, between the employer and employee. Actually it was a oaso of collective bargaining on a national scale— the ob­

jective organised labor had been seeking for decades, Eero were the.

opportunities furnished for the representatives of employee and of

or pr

sh a

D»1

“result ic that in several

three hoards which have been created there has been an agreement in

practically every case,"64

Bocrd of Adjustment No, 2 was created by General Crdor lio. 29 on

May 31, 1918, The interested labor organisations included the Inter­

national Association of Machinists, tho International Brotherhood of

Boiler lakers, tho International Brotherhood of Blacksmiths and Helpers

and tho Brotherhood of Railway Conductors of America,65 In this

64, Report to the President by Walker D. Hines, op, cit., p. 14.

65. Bulletin Ho. 4 of tho U. S. Railroad Administration (Revised), £P. oit., p. 300, 95

instance tho board consisted of six representatives for oach side who wore compensated by the groups naldLng the selections.

Board of Adjustment Ho. 3 m o organisod under tho authority of

General Order Ho. 53. The Order of Railroad Telegraphers, the Switch­ men's Union of Horth America, tho Brotherhood of Railway 0larks, and the United Brotherhood of Ikiintonanoo of Vfay Employees wore covered by this particular agency.

In summarising the results of railroad labor experiences under .

gmromaont operation throe major accomplishments m y bo noted, Tho right of tho worker to join any labor organization of his can soleotion m s uphold. Protection m s accorded to the oxoroiso of tho right to

elect representatives without restriction or influence. Also* recog­

nition was acoordod tho system of ’ collective bargaining as the most

effective and sensible method for settling disputes.

’ Under this program of recognition of tho rights of the employee,

industrial peace prevailed* Cooperation between labor and management

TFl ft O V** +.>1/^ 1F\ /% O % 1 f* 1*1 — 11 #1 H r, T~li n M ^ ^1 ^1^1 ^TV 11 ^ VAAf-W ^ %# A V %J W w vA L* Lf V/Ae W A ^“^jcT l«r %A V #*##%#

the federal government as employer was willing to recognise the ' •

elementary rights of tho worker.G G • This principle should be.emphasised

in view of tho condemnation by critics of tho government's labor66

66. Here was found a convincing argument relative to tho soundness of the program sponsored by tho authors of the national Labor Relations Aot of 1935. The accomplishments of the Railroad Administration in the field of labor relations undoubtedly exerted a decided influence on tho formation of the 1936 Law inasmuch as it was realized that theso accomplishments wore simply the result of intelligent collective bargaining. 9*

polioios, Tho opinion t o o voiced by thoco individualc that peace in

In other trordo, the charge t o o made that the government bought eo~

General of tho Railroads, iesued an analytical otudy of tho costs of operation ospooially in regard to labor charges. For purposes of com­ parison of the "wages and costs of operation of the railroads with an industry under private control, tho United States Stool Corporations

■was selected as a representative concern. 1$ t o o found that the costs of operation for tho stool concern in 1914 more 049-1,800,030 mhilo in

1918 this figure had increased to vl,240,800,003— an increase of

$746,000,000 or 141 per cent. In the railroad industry the 1914 and

1919 figures wore $2,140,000,000 and $4,524,000,000 respectively.

This was an increase of $2,104,000,000 or 102 per cent. Thus on tho

4 second illustration between the sano objects refutes even more

la 1913 the direct labor costs per ton ware #16.13, the Kerch, ISIS records showed an item of $34.61 or an increase of 119 per cent. Thus

^ 1919 tho wage compensation in the iron and steel industry had in­ creased 121 por coat over the 1913 level. But the increase in tho railroad industry for tho oaco period amounted to only 100 por cent*67

Although the advisability of such a detailed analysis m y be questioned, it should bo remembered that if any value is to bo gained from a study of the policies and accomplishments of the Railroad Ad­ ministration, tm accurate account of tho reasons for tho successful program of operation must bo available. Otherwise, no worthwhile valuation could be made. In fact tho true situation must bo ascer­ tained for thoro would bo little purpose in studying labor relations under federal control if tho basis of the accomplishments was uncertain.

With the cessation of hostilities in Europe in November, 1918, tho problem of what type of policy should bo adopted for tho future supervision of tho railroads again came to the foreground. Tho Federal

Control Act of 1910 definitely limited governmental control to a period of twenty months after the conclusion of tho war. Therefore, if tho mistakes and blunders of previous hastily conceived plans were

ef prominence, the most important problems were oonoomod with financial and rate matters. Nevertheless, attention must bo limited for the most part to tho field of labor.

What was to bo done with tho railroads? Tho Director General of 98

fixro ycara.68 Organisod labor put forbh tho Plumb Plan which would provide for govenmont ownership. Briefly tho proposal suggested tho purchase of all tho railroads by tho federal govornr.ent. The government in turn would lease the roads to an operating company which would function under tho direction of a board of fifteen numbers composed of on equal number of representatives of classified cm- ployoos, of railroad officials, and of the public. The five repre­ sentatives of the public would be appointed by the Prasidont. Tihat labor actually was seeking was government ovmorship with employee participation in the control and employee sharing in tho profits.

In contrast tho management representatives demanded immediate --- " ^ ' ' - Vi:;:.-'- f.x return of tho railroads to private control. With tho conclusion of the war a natural reaction set in which made tho task of tho capital group of arousing public hostility to continued governmental control of industry rather simple. Dr. H» D* Wolf who mado nn extondod study of tho railroad labor problem during tho period from 1919 to 1926, concluded that tho general public sentiment was strongly opposed to tho continuance of federal control. A realisation of this sentiment was shorn by Rrosidont T/ilson who stated in a Congressional message on Kay 20, 1819 that tho transfer of all railroads to private control would definitely bo completed before tho end of tho year.69 Thus

68. Wolf, 0£, eft., p, 74.

69. Congressional Record, Senate, 66th Cong., 1st Sons., Vol. HIM:*, Pb. 1, p. 46. 99

1919 m e a year of proposals, plans, and discussions for solving tho f&ilrwd situation with Congressional hearings providing adequate

opportunity for all interests to present their omi special ideas, measures, and objectives.

Labor loaders were very active during this period attempting to

evolve a now railroad labor program which would insure at least a

maintenance of the existing standards and provide a workable system

for settling controversies. During the tenure of governmental opera­

tion, labor, while perhaps dissatisfied with certain results, had

openly supported the organization established. Tho experiences of

this period had indeed made a profound impression on tho program of

action of tho organisation lenders. In brief the railroad brother­

hoods cognizant of their increased power and prestige duo to tho in­

creased membership, the establishment of collective bargaining, and

tho disorganized state of operations from a management point of view,

expressed tho hope that the government would not restore its former

system of intervention in labor disputes, Tho most acceptable plan

of action was to permit tho two parties to a controversy to bargain

between themselves. But should Congress as the result of pressure

from tho railroad, shipping, and manufacturing interests insist upon

governmental intervention, then tho most feasible plan would bo to

groups alone. Allow eaoh party to nominate its own representatives

*e a bi-partisan board and tho resulting developments should be of a

satisfactory nature Inasmuch as all Bombers of tho tribunal would bo

fully qualified to handle technical problems arising from tho con-

S S 3 R 2 3 1 0 0

ditions of cnploynont or componcatlcn,70

Tho year 1920 tmo a period of continual otrugglo for labor to prevent the Congressional adoption of decidedly aafei-labor Esaouros*

Actually in the last analysis tho employee representatives rroro .

forced to adopt a dofonsive position in tho face of the concerted

drive organised by management groups to regain thoir former degree -

of control. Tho final outcome vras a defeat for tho labor interests

as represented by tho passage of the Transportation Act of 1920 comaoi

ly known as the Esch-Cummins Law.71 With the approval by President

Wilson on February 28, 1920 of tho measure, there was inaugurated a

six year period of labor hostility as will bo noted.

Organized labor sought a continuance of tho program whereby tho

employees and employers settled thoir differences between themselves.

70. In connection with this discussion it is of interest to note tho developments in regard to the most acceptable procedure for handling labor controversies. Should it be conciliation, mediation, arbitration, or collective bargaining? What part should the government play in tho settlement of the so disputes? Seemingly at this time the brotherhoods preferred a system of collective bar­ gaining but if there was to be government intorventicn, it should take the form of a board composed of representatives of employer and employee. The 1920 experiment was unsuccessful in spite of tho attempt to maintain industrial peace through, a Board consisting of representatives of tho employer, the employee, and the public. As wo shall noto lator tho 1926 legislation provided for a strong program of collective bargaining with a neutral Board to insist upon an observance of tho rights of both parties. It is interesting to notice that tho Rational Recovery Administration at the start failed to profit by tho 1920 legislative mistakes. In fact not until tha passage of tho Rational Labor Relations Act of 1955 did general industry gain tho full advantages of those railroad labor experiences.

71. 41 Shah. L» 466* Title III of tho Act specifically applied to labor matters. 101

Congress was urged to enact legislation which would provide for boards

of adjustment consisting of representatives of management and labor which would hoar-and settle all disputes in tho railroad industry.

Instead Congress» under the force and pressure of tho dominating in­ dustrial interests, created a system which ignored tho experiences and i results of previous years— a system whioh from the very moment of its

origin was doomed to derision and failure,

Tho importance and successful operation of mediation has been notod

frequently in oarlior phases of this study,72 Yet this process of

settling disputes was totally ignored for while the 1920 not did not

dilation had boon established, novertheloss, the restrictions placed

on the powers of this agency automatically ended Its existence. With­

out much doubt this constituted a major blunder because of the per­

centage of previous settlements clearly attributable to mediation.

' tint this was not tho extent of the blundering for in the last anal­

ysis tho 1920 Act was patterned directly after the- Adamson measure,

an enactment which neither capital nor labor relished. The research

division of the National Nodiation Board later was to comment as follows

regarding this particular mistake of the reactionary Congress of 1920:

Neither employers, employees, nor tho-genoral public wars satisfied with that attempt (i.#. the Adamson Act) to settle a labor dispute by direct decision of the govern­ ment, yet a governmental body, the Railroad labor Board, was given authority to decide what wages and salaries should bo

72, Supra, pp. 72 and 74. paid to all classes of employees including subordinate officials in a privately cvmod industry. An attor.pt rms m d e by Congress to proscribe standards by triiich just and roasonablo pay v ma to bo arrived at, but theso vroro nooessarily oouchod in the most gonoral terzs capable of many interpretations.7*

Title III of the Transportation Act of 1920 then marked a back- tmrd step in the development of railroad labor legislation. It vras decidedly an anti-labor measure reared in the midst of the 1919-1920 . '' ' I-'-' . epidemic of strikes, lockouts, and riots by a novonont centering its attack on labor organizations, conciunists, and revolutionists. It

tainod anti-strike and compulsory arbitration provisions. . Theso trare stricken out only because of the stubborness of a certain bloc of members in the House of Roprosontativos and because of tho absolute noed of securing inr.odiato passage of the transportation legislation, due to tho state of uncertainty in tho railroad industry.74 Thus from the very-start the conditions surrounding the Act were of a nature to crouso hostility* But ac will bo seen this was to bo merely tho be­ ginning of the difficulty mid confusion which wore to identify tho

A review of tho significant clauses of Title III of tho Each-

Cumins Law is of assistance. Tho manner in which these previsions

75, First Annual Report of tho Rational Hodintion Board, (1935), p T M .

74. Wolf, op. cit., p. 89. irore effeotuated in practice will also be noted.

Section 301 in dealing with relationships botiraon labor and mi m g o -

m n t laid dorm, the following general guiding principles:

It shall be the duty of all carriers and their officers, employees, and agents to exert every reasonable effort and adopt every available moans to avoid any interruption to

between the carrier and the employees or subordinate of­ ficials thereof. All such disputes shall be considered and. If possible, decided in conference between representatives

the employees or subordinate officials thereof, directly interested in tho dispute. If any dispute is not decided in such conference, it should be referred by the parties thereto to tho board which under the provisions of this title is authorised to hear and decide such disputes.

Seemingly the intention of Congress was to base settlement of dis­

putes on a system of collective bargaining. Frequent reference was

made to labor organisations and chief executives of labor groups.

Section 507 in explaining how disputes could be brought to the atten­

tion of tho Railroad Labor Board definitely ruled out individual com­

plaints. Disputes would bo reviewed upon the request of tho chief

tho matter.

In fact tho United States Supreme Court, in upholding the right ef

the Labor Board to proscribe rules for the selection of representatives

by the employees, recognised this intention on tho part of Congress.

Chief Justice Taft as spokesman for tho court voiced tho following

opinlees

Again, wo think that this question of who may be renre- centativoo of employees, not only before tho board, but in the conferences and elsewhere, is and always has been one of tho most important of tho rules and working conditions in the operation of a railroad. The purpose of Congress to promote harmonious relations botrroen the managers of railways and their employees is seen in every section of this not* and tho importance attached by Congress to. conference between them for this purpose is equally obvious. Congress must have intended, therefore, to in-, elude tho procedure for determining representatives of employee as a proper subjoct-mttor of dispute to bo considered by the board under 307*7v

In matters dealing with collective bargaining, representatives. and elections, tho Labor Board continually upheld tho demands of organised labor. Decision 119 dealing with the conduct of confer­ ence between employers and employees included a set of sixteen principles from which tho following are selected: -

(4) The right of railway employees to organise for lawful objects shall not bo denied, interfered with or obstructed.

(D) The right of such lawful organizations to act toward lawful objects through representatives of its own choice, whether employees of a particular carrier or otherwise, shall bo agrood to by tho management.

(6) Ho discrimination shall bo practiced by manage­ ment as between members and non-members of organisations or as between mombors of different organizations* 1 - » - ' ■ . ;v- _ (?) Tho right of employees to be consulted prior to a decision of management adversely affecting their wages or working conditions shall bo agreed to by the management.

(16) Tho majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine what organization shall represent mombors of such craft or class. Such organization shall have tho right to make an agreement which shall apply to all employees in such craft or class.76

75. Fmvei Pennsylvania erTr.rr Railroad ir;11 tw United States Railroad Labor 76. Decisions of tho Railroad Labor Board, Vol. IX, p. 91, as ____ in Historical Outline of tSe Bai*Say Labor Act as Amended June 21,' 1954, and Weceodihg legislation, op. cTET 10%

Section 302 of the Act provided for the establishment of railroad boards of labor adjustment. Unfortunately the language used m s "nay be established." Very little could be aoocnplishod in this particular

: . . ' ■ ' ' ■ ,

*1 organizations. In 1922 regional conferences between the major brotherhoods and the railroad managements ware arranged but little success m s forthcoming in the natter of the establishment of adjust­ ment boards.77 In fact tho action of the Labor Board in ending national agreements which had served as tho foundation of the war tine boards practically removed any immediate hope of reestablishing those agencies. In view of the unfortunate circumstances surrounding tho

Labor Board the absence of adjustment boards resulted in confusion, ill feeUng, and dissatisfaction.

Section 304 provided for the organisation of the Railroad Labor

Board to act as the supervising agency of labor relations im tho rail­

road industry, Tho scope of activities of this agency extended to all

labor matters of concerns under the jurisdiction of tho Interstate

Commerce Commission. Thus the number of employees included under the

legislation,

Tho personnel of tho Board was to consist of nine membors with

77. Wolf, 0£. oit.it p. 267. ' 10S

equal representation accorded to management, labor» and the public,

$» the case of labor and mamgoraent, tho President would m k o hio

oolootion from six candidates named by tha reepeotivo interests.

Tho Interstate Conmerco Cosmissicn was to formulate rules which would

outline tho procedure to bo followed by the two groups in making

their selections. In the ease of tho representatives of the public,

the choice was to bo made by tho President without restriction.

Inasmuch as one of the principal condemnations by labor of tho entire

system established by tho 1920 Act centered about the personnel of

tho labor Board, it is worthwhile noting the members selected by

Presidents Wilson and Harding, ; ^

■ The Interstate Commerce Commission, cognisant of tho fact that

80 par cent of the employees were organized* decided that for the

purpose of making nominations, tho labor organisations should bo

classified under three major groups with each group being permitted

to make two nominations. The three groups were composed respectively

of tho train sendee employees, the shop workers* and a miscellaneous

gathering of telegraphers, naintonanco non, clerks, and stationary

firemen. At a later data tho Interstate Commerce Commission added a

fourth classification consisting of "American Federation of Railroad

Workers, tho order of Railroad Station’agents, the Train Dispatcher's

Association, and some seventeen othor minor railway labor organizations."78 70

70, Ibid., p. 96. The source of most of the material dealing with the personnel of the Railroad Labor Board Is Dr. H. D. Wolf's study. i@r

To represent the public. President Yfilson appointed C-. W, W,

Hanger, formerly assistant to the director of tho Division of labor of tho Railroad Administration, R, II. Barton, formerly a member of the

Tennessee court of appeals, and Henry Hunt, fonnsrly rayor of «

Sinoinnati* - - " 1 •' • - -

The management representatives included Horace Bakor, former­

ly general manager of the Hew Orleans and Texas Railroadj Ji K. Elliot,

formerly genoral manager of tho Texas and Pacific Railroadi and Wi L.

Park, a former vice-president of the Illinois Central Railroad.

Ao spokesmen for the interests of labor, President Wilson selected

Albert Fnillips, past vice-president of tho Brotherhood of Lecomotive

Firemen and Enginomen, A. 0. ITharton, formerly president of the Rail­

road Employees Department of the American Federation‘of Labor, and

J. J. Forroeior, past president of the Brotherhood of Railway Clorko,

Freight Eandlora, and Express and Station Employees.

Organised labor strongly opposed this entire legislative program

but nevertheless docidod to oooperate m t h the Board. But as will bo

soon, cooperation beoano almost iapossiblo. A brief review of tho

e.ppolntmontc in labor’s sphere of interest will partially explain the

preceding statement. In 1521 and 1923 respectively, the t o m s of

Forrester and Phillips expired. In each case President Harding refused

to reappoint those nsnbors hut instead in both instances selected

candidates put forth by group four. Thus group four, although it in- / eluded loss than 8 per cent of the total number of railroad employees,

camo to havo two-thirds of labor’s representation on the Board. Hore-

ovor, not only was neither individual a member of any union included In group four but neither w e endorsed by M s own mien, Under auoh eircxiaatances were not tho m j o r brotherhoods justified in stating that the Board could not be considered an impartial agency?

This confusion was further accentuated by a decision of tho

Suprer.:o Court in 1923* In c case involving the refusal of the Penn­ sylvania Bailroad to observe the prescribed rules relative to the right of employees to select their cram, representatives cm the grounds that tho Railroad Labor Board had no poser to issue ouch regulations, the Supremo Court recorded a decision -which practically nullified the ponor and prestige of the Board. Justico Taft stated:

The decisions of the Labor Board are not to be en­ forced by process* Tho only sanction of its decision is to bo the force of public opinion invoked, by tho promise , - of a full hearing, tho intrinsic justice of the conclusion, strengthened by tho official prestige of the Board, and the full publication of the violation of such decision by any party to the proceeding,79

Such was the state of affairs in 1923. The Board could issue v orders but the management would decide whether observance of the regu­

lation should be forthcoming. But what about labor? Could not organ­ ised labor treat the decision of the Labor Board in like manner?

B* B. Robertson in testifying before a Senate Committee dynamically

suataod up tho issue in these words:

This is a safe tribunal for the railroads. If tho decisions by any chance fail to moot with tho approval of tho carriers, they can cither start litigation of tho question of the jurisdiction of the board or doclino flat­ ly to put its decisions into effect.

79* %Mted States Railroad Labor 109

,If the dooislons are opposed to the Interest of tho employees and favor tho carriers, they oan put the decisions promptly into of foot, against which the employees havo no possible roliof oxoopt through tho desperate expedient of quitting their employment. Even Hr. Hooper admits that the employees can only reject on adverse decision by striking. If there is a quitting of employment in suoh numbers as to exert any pressure upon tho carriers to improve conditions, tho oarriors can thon utilise the decisions of this board to whip up "public opinion" into the notion that tho on-

ruling as that of tho Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting in Chicago, which hold that the shopmen*o strike of 1922 was a strike against an instrumentality of tho national govern­ ment... .

Tho Labor Board is clearly not a two-odgod sword which cuts impartially in oithor direction. It has a blunt odgo whan uood against tha employers. Its blows havo no force* but when tho sword is turned against the employees it is sharp and outs deep... .80

In concluding our observations relative to tho 1920 act it may be of assistance to summarize tho principal objections of organized labor to the act and its administration. These criticisms included tho fallowing*

(1) Absence of boards of adjustments

(2) inability of Labor Board to handle oases promptly#

(5) diesatiofaction in regard to personnel of Board*

(4) lack of enforcement power by Board;

(5) recognition of company unions by Board*

(6) attitude of Board in ignoring demands of employees for a living wage*

(7) open hostility of Board in shopmen's strike of 1922*

80. Statement of H. B. Robertson, President, Trothorhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginomen, as quoted in Wolf, nj>. cit., p. 573. 12J0

(0) Qbacnoo of porconcat nociatica nGoncyt

($0) *

Items 4, 6 * lag prlnoipally

Diaicferatiati* • fhs start of activities anted as July 1221, tLa laontli in which

labor

tiio dlreavoro of

This SooieieB July 1st, I» these three deeisions the faf-'

raintain thcasolves oa #m in tint oouipmont raipht bo replaced is ft i cbjoctivoly, for the

in a 81

81, See Alfred L, Dorothy V an (19555, p, 101, m

With tho controversy conorally centering about the shop craft

unions, the climax esno on July 1/ 1922, when 400,030 shopaon "laid

With speed rnknemn in previous activities, the Labor Board formulated

and issued a set of resolutions uhioh for all purposes supported the

actions of the carriers and blacklisted the striking workers* This

entire announcement is so extreme in its partisanship that a quota­

tion of its essential points is of value.

ated Shop Grafts have notified tho Railroad Labor Board that a very large majority of the employees which they represent have left the service of the carriers, that the members of said organisations are no longer employees of the railways, under tho jurisdiction of tho Railroad labor Board as subject to the application of tho Transportation Act, and...

Vihoreas in tho future submission of disputes involving rules, wages, and grievances of said classes of employees of the carriers, it will be desirable# if not a practical necessity, for the employees of each class or each carrier to form some sort of association or organisation to function in the representation of said employees before the Railroad Laber Beard, in order that the effectiveness of tho trans­ portation set nay be maintainedt Bow, therefore, be it

Sesolved that it be communicated to the carriers and tho employees remaining in tho service and the new employees succeeding those who have left the service to take steps as soon as practicable to perfect on each carrier such organi­ sations as m y be doomed necessary for the purpose above mentionede03 *85

• 82. This entire matter is thoroughly analyzed by Wolf, op: c i t „ oh. XL. Inasmuch as this study is considered the most authoritive on the 1922 strike, much of the discussion has been based on this source,' 85. Ibid., p. 239. strike be settled. Finally the Interstate Ccmerco Coecnisaion 84

84. Bornholm and Van Boron, 0£. oit., p. 180. 115

district court of

proportion-.”03

In this thosis there is no reason for detailed consideration of tho court action. Tho shop men vroro defeated cloarly hy this judicial action since thoy could no longer carry on any strike inasmuch ns every possible action— ovon picketing and uso of their own funds— was ' ' ' '- ' - - absolutely prohibited. Under those oircunstancos an agreement trac reached, and for tho most part tho hostilities ware concluded. A hostile administration Trith the aid of a hostile or over-zoaloua judgo had again defeated labor.

As has already boon noted and substantiatod the period from 1920 to 1926 time indeed one of reverses end degression for tho organised forces of labor in tho railroad industry* Perhaps too much attention has been accorded to this particular phase of railway labor legis­

lative history in view of the absence of any constructive gains. But it should not bo overlooked that negative results are of considerable

latiotte In a decidedly nogativo fashion many valuable lessons wero

learned by labor loaders— lessons which proved of incalculable value 85

85. Wolf, o£. cit., p. 253. 114

la determining a future course of action.

In his annual report for the year 1925 the Secretary of Labor

■wrote in regard to the labor provisions of tho 1920 Act:

It seems to m that some.machinery less complicated and less cumbersome should be set up to provide for the equitable and expeditious settlement of those disputes through well-known and oft-used channels in order that our transportation system ray function at its highest rate of efficiency In the interests of the country.86

Such was tho prevailing attitude of a siseable proportion of the

leaders among carriers, employees, and government officials during the ontiro period of operation of Titlo III of the Transportation Act of

1920, As a result, ample opportunity to plan a workable system was available to all parties, but particularly managemnt and worker. As

analysis is made of the hearings held before the Senate and House com­ mittees in regard to railway labor legislation, it Is easily ascertained

proposed in 1926. Actually this evidence of cooperation in revamping

tho existing rules was the outstanding feature of the Hailway Labor

Aet of 1926.87

W. 17. Atterbury, President of tho Pennsylvania System,.in testi­

fying before tho Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce in regard te

Senate Bill 2306 stated: .

Heretofore labor and management have been opposed... . Today we come to you with an agreed upon program. I do not hesitate to say, gentlemen, end I have said it right *87

8G* Eleventh Annual Roport of tho Secretary of Labor (1923), p, US.

87. 44 Stat. L. 577 (fay 20, 1926). 23*

with nothing but a

# #* * < At the

atod tho railroad labor organizations supporting tho bill. I

as tho nomborsliip represented by thoso unions nnountod to 1,750,000

men, it seems advisable to list these organizations at this time M

posal. The groups as listed by Richborg included the follo^ingt

Brotherhood of Oilers.

^kuuuaut roptuuunv^uxvij Qi jLiiuvr* ve D#

Brotherhood of Locomotive Fir omen and

Association of Railway Exooutii

88, Hoarlngsbofo „ 1st '•* Pt» 1, p. 29. 89. Ibid,, p, 88, into consideration, and aa a result •<

ho stated that it

-y ‘william Greon, -I:

It is this m d volant a: lotion which you from the Bail; Aot sought to lish its

fact finding, and arbitration.

kind of

Thus it boocnco clear that collective bargaining was the basis of the

Eailway Labor Act of 1926. Voluntary action replaced government force

and compulsion. Practically the entire field, was left to the employer 90*

90. Ibid., p. 39.

SI. Ibid., p. 221.

______: lit

and employee with the public excluded for the most yurt from all settlements.92

’That wore tlio major provisions of this 1926 Hallway Labor Act?

Section 2 imposed a definite obligation on both the employer and em­ ployee to sottle each and every dispute through conference methods

in a manner most practical and expeditious. Throe divisions of this

section aro of major import.

Section 2. First. It shall bo the duty of all car­ rier®, their officers, agent, and employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of tho application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out of any dispute between the carrier and tho employees thoroof.

Second. All disputes between a carrier end its em­ ployees shall bo considered, and, if possible, decided with all expedition, in conference between representatives designated and authorized so to confer, resreotivoly, by the carriers and by tho employees thereof interested in tho dispute.

Third. * Representatives, for tho purpose of this act, shall bo designated by the respective parties in such manner as may bo provided in their corporate organization or unin­ corporated association, or by other m a n s of cdlloctivo action without interference, influence, or coercion oxeroisod by either party over tho self-organization or designation of representatives by the other.92

92. The new procedure was described by David E. Lilionthal in tho follow­ ing words: "It is tho first legislation in which a duty has boon imposed upon an industry to settle its affairs by tho methods of collective bargaining.” (David E. Lilionthal, ”Strikeloss R a i l r o a d s , Tho Survey, Vol. LV (Kerch 15. 1926), p. 690). 118

T-.70 dofinito planks of labor's platform aro very ovidont in the above conditions, namely, collective bargaining and tbs right of the worker to select hie own representatives. In this respect nothing was loft to chance or faith for here in clearly defined language those two provisions made positive guarantees to labor* later the interpre­ tation of the Supreme Court on these two issues will be considered.

In instances of failure of collective bargaining to settle a dis­ pute, boards of adjustment already organised would be ready to function, in order to prevent delay, agreements were to be made by the carriers and thoir employees relative to the organisation and functioning of the adjustment board or boards. To prevent misunderstanding and to eliminate confusion. Congress stated exactly tho procedure which was to bo followed in oommonoing hearings boforo an adjustment board. Tho fourth clauco of section 2 directed that:

In case of a dispute between a carrier and its em­ ployees, arising out of grievances or out of the inter­ pretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, it shall be the duty of tho designated representative or representatives of such carrier and of such employees, within ton days after tho roooipt of notice of a dosire on the part of either party to confer in respect to such dispute, to specify a tins and plaoo at which such conference shall bo hoId....

In addition to these carefully planned provisions, a special pro­

cedure was established in regard to the changing of rates of pay, rules,

and working conditions. Apparently the reasoning behind this policy wne that tho above items constituted tho principal causes of friction

in tho past and therefore special treatment would be advisable. Sec­

tion 6 provided that: 119

Carriers and tho representatives of the employees ehall give at least thirty day’s iTritten notice of an in­ tended change affecting rates of pay, rules, or working conditions, and the time and piano for conference between tho representatives of parties interested in such intended changes shall bo agreed upon within ton days after tho receipt of said notice, and said tine shall be within the thirty days provided in the notice. ... In every case

conferences are being held with reforonoo thereto, or the services of the Board of foliation liavo boon requested by either party, or said board has proffered its services, rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be * altered by tho carrier until tho controversy lias boon finally acted upon, as required by section 5 of this act, by tho Board of Mediation, unless a period of ten days has elapsed after termination of conferences without request for or proffer of tho services of the Board of Mediation. . . . - . » - , » - »-*<-. - In any dispute which failed of settlement through the three proced­ ures outlined above, either party to tho dispute could request tho aid of a Board of Mediation or the Beard could offer its assistance toward reaching a settlement, Tho Board of Mediation which consisted of five members appointed by the President was simply an agency of conciliation and mediation. It had no powers of compulsion or rostrlotion but was to be ever alert in offering its services to prevent or to conclude as rapidly as possible any controversy. In tho last analysis it was an

executive agency of tho government established to aid in the process of

collective bargaining. Should the Board be unable to bring about a

definite settlement, it was its duty to do all in its power to convince both parties to the dispute of tho wisdom of submitting the disagree­ ment to a board of arbitration. Assistance instead of force was the

keynote of the new program.

A special arbitration tribunal was to be organised for each dispute

in accordance with tho terms of agreements which all carriers and tho MO

tho tonus of tho Act, Tho arbitration councils wore to consist of either three or six norabero as each agreement dictated. Each party m s to designate one or -bro members and these appointees would select the remaining one or two members. In any ease in which the delegates of the two contesting groups were enable to agree on the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators within five days of tho first meeting, the Board of Mediation was empowered to make tho appointment or appointments, Although tho system of arbitration was of a volun­ tary nature, the awards of tho arbitration commission xraro final, , conclusive, and enforceable at law. Tho findings wore to bo filed with tho federal district court and appeals had to be takon within ton days.

Tho final cog in tho administrative machinery was an agency known as an emergency board. Section 10 providedt

If a dispute between a carrier and its employees bo not adjusted under the foregoing provisions of this act and should, in tho judgment of the Board of Mediation, threaten substantially to interrupt interstate commerce to a degree such as to deprive any section of tho country of essential transportation service, the Board of Mediation shall notify the President, who may thereupon, in his discretion, create a board to investigate and report respecting suoh disputo.

In order to provide proper rospoot for tho actions of an omorgonoy

board tho law provided that a period of status quo must bo observed for

sixty days after the creation of the board by the President. Tills

period of armistice resulted from an arrangement whereby tho board was

required to make its report thirty days after its organization and

"no change, oxoopt by agreement, shall bo made by the parties W 1

ft period of thirty days after the filing of the board’s report.

Thus it nay be soon that the 1926 Railway Labor Act providod for oollootive bargaining, mdiation, cono illation, voluntary arbitration. and investigations as implononts for the prevention and eottlonont of disputes. Chfef reliance was to bo placed on an extensive system of collective bargaining which had been carefully planned by the representatives of employers and emplpyees • With govormontal pro­ tection safeguarding the right to organize, collective bargaining in tho full sense of the term was possible. Such was the program in

. . : ly because of the absence of any definite procedure for insuring the > ' ' ,

railroad export lator summed up the entire difficulty when he stated that the legislation did not prove "to bo self-enforcing."93 Gradu­ ally these weaknesses wore remedied through throe successive legis­

lative enactments. However, before those changes arc oonaidorod, an

important decision of the Supremo Court should bo considered.

It will bo recalled that the Supreme Court had declared that under

the 1920 Act tho Railroad Labor Board had no authority to foroo carriers

to refrain from interfering with tho selection of representatives by

their employees. In rather confused reasoning the court emphasized tho

93. ?rrn— f 122

by any and all employees but then concluded by stating that it did not boliovo Congress had entrusted the Board with enforcement perrors.

Under the 1926 legislation certain employers continued the policy of interference and the organizing of company unions. The problems oan© to a showdown in the famous case of Texas and lew Orleans Kail- road Company at al, v. Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, etc,, et al. which was decided on May 26, 1950,9^ Hero in positive

terms the Supreme Court upheld the right of the railway employees to

organise and bargain without interference from the employer.

The ease started when the brotherhood sought an injunction in the

federal district court to restrain the railroad management "from inter­

fering with, coercing, or influencing clerical employees of railroad

company in matter of this organisation and designation of representa­

tives for the purposes set forth in the Railway labor Act of May 20,

1926.n The court issued an injunction against the continuance of a

company union by the carrier but tho concern continued to recognise

the company union. At subsequent hearings the court ordered the rail­

road to purge itself by disbanding tho company union and by recog­

nising tho brotherhood as tho official representative of tho employees

until a secret ballot could be taken. The court also ordered the re­

instatement of all employees discharged because of union activities.

Claus© 2 of section S of the. 1926 Act was cited as tho legal reason

for those judicial orders. 96

96. 60 Sup. Ct• 627 (i960). IBS

Eventually the controversy came to the Supreme Court for review

and tho action of tho lc\Tor court xrac uphold. After a detailed re­ view of previous railway labor legislation, tie Court pointed out the

intentions of Congress to remedy tho weaknesses of tho 1920 legis­

lation by insuring tho right of the employer to his own representatives

without interference. In concluding. Chief Justice Hughes stated:

Freedom of choice in the selection of representatives on each side of tho dispute is the essential foundation of the statutory scheme. All tho proceedings looking to amicable adjustments and to agreements for arbitration of disputes, the entire policy of tho act, must depend for success on tho uncoorcod action of each party through its own representatives to the end that agreements satisfactory to both may bo reached and the peace essential to tho un­ interrupted service of tho instrumentalities of interstate oomroorco may bo maintained.

As tho carriers subject to tho act have no constitution­ al right to interfere with the freedom of tho employees in making their selections, thoy cannot complain of the statute on constitutional grounds.95

la analysing tho significance of this decision there appeared to

bo four major obligations imposed on the carriers:

(1) To recognise freedom of organization for employees;

(2) to recognise tho right of employeos to select their own repre­

sentatives;

95. This particular decision assumed major importance in the formation of the Rational Labor Relations Act of 1935, for hero tho Supremo Court had upheld in regard to tho railroad industry tho objectives tho framers bf the 1935 legislation had foremost in mind. In

debates frequent references to tho 'Tomas and How Orleans Railroad Company ease may be found. Seemingly this decision was tho chief basis for the constitutionality of tho Rational labor Relations Act from tho point of view of its supporters. 124

(3) to deal with tho designated employee organizations

(4) to refrain from tmdoraining a labor-organization by financing a company union, by depriving union menbors of privileges, by dis­ charging union loaders for union activities, for discharging union members for membership, and by instituting anti-union contracts.96

let, in spito of tho liberal interpretation by the court, violations of tho ruling continued. Tho first stop toward remedying part of tho

Situation came with tho passage of anondmonts to tho Federal Bankruptcy

Aot.97 Soction 77 of this measure dealt with reorganization of rail­ road conoorns under governmental receivers. Subsections p and q wore concerned with tho rights of employees to organize and to soloot their own ropresontativos. Boonuso of the rceurronco of those olausos it is of value to note their contents.

p. Ho judge or trustee acting under this Aot shall deny or in any way question tho right of employees on tho property under his jurisdiction to join tho labor organi­ zation of thoir choice, and it shall bo unlawful for any j«6ga» or trustee, or receiver to interfere in any way with tho organization of employees, or to use the funds of the railroad under his jurisdiction, in maintaining so- called company unions, or to influence or coerce employees in an effort to induce thorn to join or remain combers of eueh company unions.

q. Ho judge, trustee, or receiver acting-under this Act shall require any person seeking employment on tho property under hie jurisdiction to sign any contract or agreement promising t o ‘join or to refuso to join a labor organizations and if such contract has boon enforced on the property prior

' ' ' ' ^ -A -,; " 06* This summary is based on the material presented by Edward Berman, "The Supreme Court Interprets tho Bailway Inber Act," Tho American Economic■ Review, Vol. XX (December 1930), p. 619.

97. 46 Stat. L. 1481 (March 3, 195§). , eeiver, as soon as tho mtfcor is called to his attention, shall notify tho employees by an appropriate order that said contract has boon discarded and is no longer binding on then in any way.

Those principles providing for freedom of organization and for the

•etlawiag of ’’yellow-dog" oontraoto, applied only to railroad conoorns

tatioa Act of Juno 16, 1935.98 Paragraph e of section 7 of part I stated that:

Carriers, whether under control of a judge, trustee, re­ ceiver, or private management, shall be required to comply with tho provisions of tho Hallway Labor Act and with the provisions of section 77, paragraphs (o), (p), and (q), of the act approved March S, 1953, entitled "An act to amend an act entitled *an act to establish a uniform system of bank­ ruptcy idiroughout tho United States *, and act amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto."

Uador the provisions of the Act the office of Federal Coordinator of was or&ated. Ik*. Joseph t© tho position realized tho importance of labor cooperation if waste and inefficiency wore to bo prevented and, therefore, ho imodiatoly proceeded to enforce tho rights of tho employee to organize and to select his own representatives. A project providing for an intensive investigation of labor organizations on every railroad included under the provisions of the 1926 Railway Labor Act was immediately launched.

98. 48 Stat. L. 814. 226

Yihonovor a violation of tho rights of on omployoc vras discovered, an order to desist from such practices tsas issued. Numerous elections wore ordered in instances of doubt as to tho legality of existing

organisations. As a result not only did the company union movement receive a serious reverse„ but tho strength of the labor organizations

increased and collective bargaining gained a stronger foothold.

Yet, in spite of tho success of tho Fedora! Coordinator of Trans­

portation in this respect, it was realised that ’'statutory provisions

guaranteeing independence of railroad labor organisations and freedom,

of choice to employees in selecting their labor representatives"99

belonged in tho Railway Labor Act inasmuch as the Emergency Railroad

Transportation Act was merely intended as a temporary measure. ^

Under tho recommendations of the Federal Coordinator and the rail­

road brotherhoods there viac included in the Railway Labor Act of 1934100

ft statement detailing tho rights of labor in regard to tho organisation

and enumerating In definite language tho prohibitions placed on tho

employer in regard to tho observance of those rights. As will be soon

from an examination of this clause, tho wording represented a narked im­

provement over tho 1926 Aot since it stated definitely the rights and

wrongs as visualized by Congress,

Section 2. Fourth. Employees shall have the right to organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their a m choosing. Tho majority of any craft or -class of employees shall havo the right to determine who shall bo the representative of tho craft or class for the purposes of this act. No carrier, its officers or agents, shall deny

99. Testimony of Joseph li. Eastman at Hearings before tha Committee on Interstate Commoroo on S. 5266, og, cit., p. 13. 100. 48 Stat. L. 1185. 127

or in any xmy question tho right of its employees to join, organize, or assist in organizing the labor organisation of thoir o$m ohoioe, and it shall be un­ lawful for Mty wrier to interfere in any way with tho organisation of its omployeos or to use tho funds of tho carrier in maintaining or assisting or contributing to any labor organisation, or in performing any work therefor, or to influence or coorco employees in on offort to induce thorn to join or remain members of any labor organisation, or to deduct from the wages of em­ ployees any dues, foes, assessments, or other contributions payable to members of labor organisations, or to collect or to assist in tho collection of any such dues, fees, assess­ ments, or other contributions.

At last the provisions that organised labor had boon seeking for almost fifty years had boon carefully and unreservedly expressed in a

Congressional statute. The worker was free to organize and to bargain with his employer and, moreover, the employer was forbidden to inter­

fere with the union activities of his employee. This prohibition was

not merely a general statement but instead a careful cataloguing of

practices which must be avoided. In this regard Congress ted struck a

devastating blow at tho company union by forbidding any financial or

moral assistance by the employer. Vdion those various achievements aro

noted, the wisdom of a careful study of railroad labor activities be­

comes moro apparent.10*

Moreover, under tho 1954 Act, violations of any of tho provisions

dealing with the rights of employees were to be considered misdemeanors 101

101. Another important contribution of this piece of legislation was the establishment of tho majority rule in reference to collective bar­ gaining. Although this system was first established by tho Nation­ al War Labor Board, this is the first time in which it was in­ corporated into law. punishable by fine ci sontativo night apply to the proper diotriot attorney of the United

States for investigation and court action. not only were the rights of labor recognised but actually a positive

Tided. I ; *' rajor change in the 1934 Aot dealt with the ratter of adjustment boards. It will bo recalled that under the 1926 Legis­ lation employers and employees wore entrusted with the task of establishing boards of adjustment when necessary to settle disputes.

But regardless of intentions this attempt at self-government failed dismally. Little if any progress was made because of conflicting ideas as to tiie propc

Senate Committee conducting hearings on the proposed 1934

Joseph Eastman, national boards of

four regional boards, and all but ono

to tho Eailway Labor Act."102

tary actions by tho

insisted on national

in any plan oxoopt that limited to m « Cognisant of tho

successful operation of the national

government officials and

102. Hearings before tho Comittoo on on S. 3266, op. cite, p. 15. a #

of a national board of adj ustnont ac a component part of the railway labor program.* 1^

T&idor thin proscare Congress provided for a Rational Beard of Ad­ justment to be tionposod of thirty-six members with eighteen to bo ap-

m n t groups. In operation the Board was divided into four divisions la

103. Ibid., p. 33. In regard to tho demands of organised labor for nation­ al boards of adjustments, tho testimony of George M, Harrison, President of the Brotherhood of Eailsay Clerks, is significant.

national boards, or group boards, and the entire ex­ periences oyer that period of 14 years have shorn that the railroads insisted on having was not for tho good of industry, and it wouldn't work. Host of tho boards that have boon established under the present law have been unable to roach a . decision. They have deadlocked on any number of cases. Ao a result of that there was fast growing up in our in­ dustry a serious condition that might very well develop into substantial interruption of interstate commerce, the very thing the law provided machinery to mininico. They probably say that the national board is far removed from the seat of tho controversy. They probably will say that the national board will bog down. «7ell, now, I don't know anybody that has a greater interest in - grievances being prosecuted than tho man that originated the grievance. Grievances oozae about because the men file them themselves. Railroads don't institute grievances. Grievances are instituted against railroad officer's actions, hnd we arc willing to take our ohanoos with this national board because we believe, out of our experience, that tho national board is tho best and most efficient method of getting a determi­ nation of these many controversies that arose on these railroads botwooa tho offioero and tho enroloveos. 150

*

•rorioua classifications of railway employees, In any instance of a deadlock between tho trro groups, tho National Kodiation Board was ora-

Poured to appoint a neutral isonbor to facilitate a settlement. In general tho adjustment board was to handle minor problems such as have already been discussed in reference to tho adjustment boards planned under the 1926 Lcgiolaticn.

A third change effected under the 1931 Act was concerned with tho

abolishing of tho United States Board of Mediation and the substitution

of a National Mediation Board consisting of three members.r°- V.'ith

feir exceptions the powers and duties of this Board remained similar to

those of its prodeeosaor except for tho fact that it was frcod from

In so far as tho background of the National labor Relations Act is

omoornod, this ooaeludo= tho study ol labor cxporionccs in tho rail­

road industry.. In this chapter the attempt has boon redo to provide an

intensive survey of tho development of a labor policy to which tho 1935

legislation owes much of its philosophy, fora, and principles, Sinco

vention and ccttlerant of employer~employee disputes, a plan was followed

104. ef -the National Mediation Board as annointod in 1934 131

Tthoroby tho treatment would bo more intong ive and extons ivo than is truo in tho other background chapters. In executing this program, oonaidoration xras first accorded the peculiar characteristics of tho railroad industry end of railroad employment— conditions such as tho quasi-public nature of tho enterprise, tho corni-public obligations of the employee, tho disruption of homo life by train schedules, tho operation of v/ago and hour systems, and the dangers of tho employment.

Hext, tho extant of unionisation v/as noted with the result that it- was soon that skilled workers are approximately 90 par cent organised while tho unskilled labor is only cno-half unionised.

With this information available, a survey of all railway labor

legislation which had any bearing on the settlement of industrial dis­

putes was made. The A c t 'of 1883, tho Brdman Act of 1898, and the

Howlands Act of 1913 wore reviewed as attempts to solve difficulties

in employer-employoe relations through tho use of conciliation, mediation,

arbitration, and compulsory investigations. As general dissatisfaction

and disgust wero being manifested with regard to those methods for

settling disputes, the T/orld %"ar intervened. 1» view of the extra­

ordinary demands of this period the federal government found it neces­

sary to take over the railroads and thereby commenced a policy under

which collective bargaining was employed as a moans of handling labor

controversies .

The remainder of the chapter was devoted to a study of the gradual

development of the policy of collective bargaining through tho 1920

Transportation Act, tho Bailway Labor Act of 1925, tbs Federal Bank- 152

ruptoy Act of 2933, tho Baor^enoy Bailroad Transportation Act of 1953, and tho Railsay Labor Act of 1934, Thus, after almost fifty years of exporienco, railroad labor leadorc camo to realise that tho most aeoepbablo procedure for tho prevention and sottloront of onployer- employea disputes was a system of collective bargaining functioning with tho assistance of a governmental program to insure tho proper

bargaining was found to bo inpossiblo.

bo regarded as

j j j . u^u £u.-vvuuj.ng pugaue

debates, as well as

Legislation

railway labor groups,

b y a knowledge of the CH&.HEH 17 " vr

THE COKTRICUtlOIS OF THE 1IA.TIOH&L RECOVERY ADMINISTRATION

TO THE FORMATIOIi OF THE RATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT

An important forerunner of the Rational Labor Eolations Aot of 19;

i« found in the experiences evolving under the Rational Industrial Re­ covery Act of 1933.1 Tho attempt to nmlyze the Rational Recovery

separate treatment to the influences resulting from the administration

of tho national Industrial Rooovory Aot for too reasons. In the first

place, tho Rational Labor Eolations Act oas actually tho cumulative

result of experiences beginning in pro-mar days. Secondly, many ob­

servers prefer to consider the 1935 Aot as a new start in the field

ef labor relations— an epoch distinguishable from tho era of tho

mistakes,

a

Will

be noted later, is la-

1. Two other significant forerunners, providing a testing ground for various principles affecting labor problems, are the experiences * 4

soction 7(a) of the Recovery Act in ’'more explicit form" and "with a - - - ; roal offectivo prccoduro for enforcement."5

In analysing tho part played by the adniniotration of the Rational

Induetrial Recovery Act in tho formation of tho Rational Labor Relatione

Act special emphasis will bo accorded tho body of labor law built up during this period. Y M l o it is necessary to review the chronological development of labor relations agencies of the Rational Recovery Ad­ ministration, tho real contributions are to be found in the labor principles established for uso in omployor-ennloyeo relationships.

Horavor, it is important, first, to provide a brief summary of tho

M b ® r situation as it appeared in 1933.

As was explained in Chapter II, tho ranks of organized labor were

greatly augmented during the World War period as a result of a policy

of protection and encouragement sponsored by the Rational War Labor

2. At tho opening of tho hearings

i, conusor David I, may bo inserted in tho record at section 7(a) of the Rational is tho foundation of all Committee on Education and B st^gse^Trilmt^^dlrcong., 1st SoSSc, it . 1, p,' 31. )

8. Ibid., Ft. 2, p. 126. 135

Table A4

Year Lenberohip

$812 . 1,770.148 i m 1,996,004

1914 2,020,671

ISIS 1,946,347.

ISM 2,072,702

MIT 2,571,434

1918 2,726,478

IBS 3,260,068

M#0 4,078,740

M l 3,906,528

1922 3,195,635

MS 2,926,468

1924 2,865,799

MS 2,877,297

1926 2,805,966

1927 2,612,526

1928 2,896,033

MM 2,933,545

1930 2,961,096

1931 2,889,550

1932 2,532,261

1935 2,126,796

1SS4 2,608,011

Annual Con- *■ IZ.Z p . 32. 136

Board. Reference to Table A indicates that from 1916 to 1920 there

■eras an increase of 2,006,038 workers in the membership of the American

Fodoration of Labor, Thus by 1920 the membership of the Federation had reached a point in excess of 4,000,000 workers,.

But when the figures for the years 1921 to 1933 are examined, the rapid decline in numerical strength is almost startling especially in view of tho general prosperity existing during a large part of this period, Tho answer may be found in tho fact that organized labor was on the defensive during those years. The wave of strikes in 1919, tho usual post war .conservative reactions, the program of oppression effected against radicals and revolutionists with whom union organizers wero frequently classified, the reactionary policies of three Republican regimes, and the series of anti-labor decisions by the Supreme Court,* 6 * all combined to hinder the union movement with the result that by the beginning of 1933 the membership of the American Federation of Labor was only 2,126,798. This m s a decrease of approximately 50 per cent below tho 1920 level,6

$• The ambitions and plans of organized labor were particularly affected by the following decisions$ ;___ 264 TT.S. 443 (1921)$ American 'StceT 257U.S. i&no Workers v, Coronado Coal m d Bedford Cut M o n o

6. This m s tho general labor situation. See , pp. 114-124 for a discussion of definite labor victories ’the railroad

Act and tho decision of the Supreme Court in tho Texas and Raw Orleans Railway case. • 158

Actually this pieco of legislation roprosentod a najor advanco- nont for organized labor in tho United States* Horoaftor, tho perror of tho federal courts to issue injunctions in labor controversies m s to be limited severely and definitely. Ho longer would the anti* union employer bo able to turn to the federal courts for assistance ? in chocking tho valid and legitimate activities of the union organizer.

Ho longer would tho federal courts reoogniso tho legality of a

"yollow-dos" contract,9 The opportunities for an intensive union organisation drive were appreciably improved for new American labor loaders had the approval of tho federal government as to the desir­ ability* practicability, and perhaps even the necessity of collective bargaining in modern industry. Unfortunately, horrovor, tho existing economic situation was not conducive to an extensive unionisation drive or to an.extension of the principles of collective bargaining*

Such vroro tho conditions at tho time of the enactment of tho national Industrial Recovery Act on Juno 16, 1933*10 Primarily this

enactment was not a labor measurej it was in reality a program to

improve or to alter the existing industrial and commercial systems

and thereby bring about a more rapid business recovery* It is true .

that a number of provisions of the Act and of tho codes of operation 1 ■ ■ ■ as perfected under the general grant of power dealt with employment, wages, hours of work, and working conditions, but one must not think

of the national Industrial Recovery Act as a labor program for as

9* Supra, footnote 44, p, 36.

10, 48 State lie 214, 139

John T. FI^toi oonoludod that ’Vith the cxn.option of tho collectlvo harcaininr provision— r/hich as tto have soon ^ns subso^uontly robbed of nuch of its original ctrongth— tho HBA. plan roproscnted alnost

entirely tlio influonco and idoal of big business

ITovortholoss, ~hilc this conclusion is true in general* it should be nado clear that section 7(a), tko most inportant part of the

Rooorory Aot as far as labor vras concerned* m s tho "child" of or­

ganised labor— particularly, tho American Federation of Labor* For

this roacon our attention will be confined to this particular plant

of tho legislation inasmuch as it m s not only tho focal point of

labor activity but also tho source of any contributions nado by tho

Rational Industrial Recovery Aot to the field of employer-cznployeo

relationships.11 12 Another nay of expressing this same conclusion would

be to say that if tho 1935 Recovery Act exerted any influonco in tho

formation of tho provisions of the Rational Labor Eolations Act of

7(a) should bo presented.

Every coda of fair competition, agreement, and llconso approved* proscribed* or issued under this title shall con­ tain tho following conditions$ (l) That employees shall have tho right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and shall be free from tho interference* restraint, or coercion of employers of labor-, or their agents, in the designation of such repre­ sentatives or in self-organization or in tho other concerted

11. John T* Flynn, "Whoso Child ia the REA?", Earner’s Magazine. Tel. 169 (September 1954), p. 585. ------

12. Hereafter in this paper REA will bo used in referring to the aotivitieo for the purpose of collective bargelaisg or other mutual old or protections (2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required as a con­ dition of employment to join any company union or to refrain from joining* organising, or assisting a labor organisation of M o own choosings and (s) that employers shall comply with the maximum hours of labor, minimum ratoo of pay, and othor conditions of employment, ap­ proved or prosoribod by tho President.

Although this statement was to serve as the basis of future labor

to thorn m n nothinr ntm or nnvol nbout It. Daan WiIlian

:: - " ' . ■ : ■ H, Sponsor seemingly described the situation quite accurately when he stated that in reality section 7(a) followed the m i l m y Act of 1888, : ■ ■ 1 the Erdman Act, the Howlands Act, the labor provisions of the 1920

Transportation Act, the Railway labor Act of 1928, the Bankruptcy Aot of 1933, tho Emergency Transportation Aot of 1953, and the Norris- ' ' " " ' ' ' - ^ la Gmrdia Act of 1 9 5 2 . In other words, instead of being a novel _ /- ' f- .. -'X. . ; «r untried basis of labor actions, section 7(a) was modeled after the oxporienooo of tho past fifty years. If proof of this contention is desired, roforonce should bo made especially to the analysis of the provisions of the 1920 and 1926 railway labor laws.* 1415 In addition the

2S. An indication of tho meaning of this statement is to bo found in the wording of Section 7 of the national Labor Eolations Aot of 1935. Section 7. Employees shall have the right to self- organization, to fora, join, or assist labor organi­ sations, to bargain collectively throw# representatives of thoir cran choosing, and to ongago in ecnoortod activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,

14, William H. Sponoor, "Collective Bargaining Under Section 7(a) of tho national Industrial Eecevery Act," Studies in Business Administra­ t i s , Vol, V, Ho. 8 (April 1935), p T H ------

15, Supra, pp, 100-124. close

2 of

iation 7(a) road ac follow*I

'• . ■ • m . 8 title (l) That «a— ployoea shall rop: : C _ =; choosing, (2) that no as a joining & and (3) that

\ ' "Sr: apprcnrod or

organized labor. It nas felt that the protection

ef Interference or ■

m I l i a n P. Green, Frosidont of on of Labor, - ' is bill and

first ■■».....•?*-k

And shall bo

$® %.T" 142

sntions or in ofchar ooncorfcod actlvition for thp purpoco of collectivo borsaining or other nutual aid or proteofcione*T - f . - , . - ■ .

batting the hostile influonoo or activity of the employer acting through a company union. In order to inauro a thorough understanding fit this ccntrovoroial issuo, Groon rceuostod that the olauso f1to join any organization" aa found in sub-socticn (2) of the original draft bo changed to road "to join any company union."15 The importance of

this alteration Tras oacily grasped inasmuch as the entire meaning of

the first part of cub-section (2) tras changed by this ncr.v wording.

How the -prohibition wno concerned only with tho company union whoroas

before tho word organisation denoted any fora or grouning. In do-

workors xroro to bo allowed to join a labor organisation, then "it

which a corporation may oxcroiso full te

eare

Senate. The issue 1718*

17. Ibid., p. 117.

18. Ibid., p. 118.

X9. Ibid. That nothing .in this title shall he construed to compel a change in existing satisfactory relationships between the employees and employers of any particular ? t plant, firm, or corporation shall have the right to 'organise for tho purpose of collective bargaining v/ith their employer as to wages, hours of labor, and other conditions of employment#20

Senator Goorgo Norris of Nebraska protected strongly against tho adop-

ovontunlly bo used as a xroapon for preserving .company unions and preventing tho growth of independent labor organisations# Existing conditions would booono satisfactory since tho ordinary employee would fear tho loss of his job if ho opposed the company supported and con- ** ; ' " .. trolled union#21 l

As nay be noted by reading the final wording of section 7(a)

organised labor was successful in each of these legislative incidents#

nittee while the ’’existing

effored in regard to building up the nonborship of tho labor organi­

sations. The official organ of the American Federation of Labor in •

free to organise and that all ’’should avail themselves of the oppor-

20. Congressional Record, Somte, 7Sd Cong,, 1st Seas#, Vol. 77, Pb. 0,

SI* Ibid* 1*4

i tutiity thus pro3 eatod."22

V-liat did labor actually cain fron tho H R A ? 25 To nncrror this

interrogation, too dictinot dcvclopracnts must bo considered. First, what part did labor play in tho administration of tho K I M and xvhat nachinory v.na established to aid in tho onforconont of tho labor

provicions? Secondly, -.That gains wore made by labor in tho form of

established principles for-tho recognition end enforcement of tho

rights of tho worker? Father than consider those too phases as one.

' 2223

22, "Labor’s Opportunity and Responsibility/ American Fodorationist, ▼el. 40 (July 1033), p. 692, ~

23. In addition to section 7(a), there wore four other labor pro­ visions lidiioh should be mentioned. Section 1 declared that it was the policy of Congress "to induce and maintain united action of labor and management undor adoquato govoimmontal sanctions , mid supervision," Under section 4(a), the President was author­ ised to form and approve agroenonts bo too on industrialists or trade groups and labor organisations when and if such agree­ ments would aid in executing the policies of tho Act. Section 7(b) provided that tho President should encourage tho establiah- nont by mutual agreement of standards relating *to tho maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and such other conditions of employment as may be necessary (to) effectuate the policy of this title/ In any instance in which a mutual agreement was not reached, the President under section 7(c) was authorised to investigate conditions and, if feasible, proscribe a cede of fair competition in regard to hours, wages, and working conditions for tho industry, labor was also interested in tho provisions of Title II which provided for a public works program. The provisions rela­ tive to working conditions, hours, and wages had been carefully checked and found to bo satisfactory.

1 246 I it seems necessary to tmalyso each bn® separately s i m o it is be­ lieved that the principal contribution of tho m to the field of employer-omployoo relations is to bo found in tho principles es­ tablished by tho labor agencies orcanised.24 *

Organised labor and organiscl industry disagreed in regard to numerous provisions of tho HIRA almost before tho program xras in operation. Eorc disputes came as a result of tho IVosidcnt's Bo- onplopiont Agroomont of July 20, 1935, which was nerely intondod as

* ,,blankct,,Koasure to ba used until detailed codes could bo properly worked out. Among tho quostidns arising vroro those dealing with tho right of labor to participate an the formation of the codes, the meaning of collective bargaining, tho propriety of tho company union under the label of employee representation, tho interference of the

employer with the freedom of organisation of tho omplcyoo, and,

finally, the matter of the closed shop, ' • r " *

Tho dovolopaont of a troublesemo situation was soon apparent.

Seoningly labor believed that it was to have a part in the formation

of tho oodoc under tho H I M , It had hoard a good deal about tho new

24. Little may be gained from a study of the structural organisation of tho UFA inasmuch as this particular system had been tried out under tho 1920 Transportation Act. It m s demonstrated that a board with all interests roprosontod and without enforcement powers could not function satisfactorily. As a result, drastic changes wore made by the 1926 Railway Labor Act. Tot Congress did not Goem to profit by this experience in forming tho labor provisions of tho KIRA. For a discussion of the labor ex­ periences under tho 1920 Transportation Act, see supra, pp. 100- of all interests. However, on June 19, 1938, General Hugh. S. Johnson,

* v&w wwwvm A&ww

provisions of

ux uu«

"f " . . ' . *2,

usually satisfactory and relations witii en»

dividual merit, affiliation with any

26. A detailed analysis of the 1933 situation is to he found in Lewis L. Lorwin and Arthur Wubnig, Labor Relations Boards (1935), oh. III.

26. As quoted in ibid., p. 65. 147

The reaction of organised labor to such a program can be easily visualised. If such an interpretation were permitted, then the hopes ,

labor for a great organising drive culminating in the establish­ ment of collective bargain would be ruined* Eventually the issue

reached such proportions that tho President felt compelled to issue

an official ruling which declared that hereafter Interpretations of

section 7(a) should not be incorporated in codes of fair competition.27 28

With the banning of this device, the trade associations perfected a

ployors retaliated with a

discharging of workers for union activity, and to "yellow-dog" ecatraots,'

although each was illegal under section 7(a). The Bureau of Labor

Statistics found that union organization drives wore the cause of 19 - - , ...... ^ v' A.:... J' ' per cent of the strikes in 1932, Sl.S per cent in 1933, 45.9 per cent

— m— * 27. Ibid., p. 61.

28. John A. Fitch, "Labor Boards," Survey Graphic, Vol. XXIII (November 1934), p, 553. 148

I* 1934, and 47.2 por cent in 193S.29

Kush of this trouble was directly due to the canpaiga oa the part of industrialiato to establish company unions. Undor the skillful

Gubotanbial, while

Fodoratioa of Labor

nine accurately,

it is

a study of ono hundred and tiiat was

in April, 1936 to determine « i . .

ef tho formation of tho

strike

41.6 por cent of tho ooapanioa was

Tlio final 11.2

SO. Charaotori of Labor r|tati^tio-Cua36j Bull°tilt KOe GS4# IIeSe g ‘ V,; as 5,351,540 3,316,808 12,631,863 26,218,628 10,602,033 16,872,128 ------v 19,891,949 . . 15.488,337 A ^4 - -i O : : i Ending Im.'ymr 5«r»44: 181,901 322,866 286,163 324,960 346,669 . . 1,143,910 1,480,343 1,101,302 J . J ------r. #**# *#W #**# 187,225 290,413 347,141 325,682 1,491,779 1,128,646 1,166,994 In progress — d w i n g year t- a a - ' ' S- HunterWorkers of lanrelve* 182,975 329,939 288,572 inyear , SlS^ito; , 324,707 ;324,210 ;324,210 - - ’ Beginning V- V- ,, ii:- ii:- » ■ 1,168,272 1,168,272 1,466,696 ; ■V ■V ' -r ■ Strikes 1927 - to 1935 666 620 651 1,672 1,617 2,003 Ending ■:**3**r_. ' ' ' ' - ■ ■ * - "K. V' 946 924 646. 51- S0Br” * ^S0Br” * 51- = » . 39. Ht.,p. ^ V- _____ JiTO* 1,090 3,0BT - s s 669 Inprogress during year ■; ■; lusterof Strikes ; 604 * 1 637 tor 810 841 1,695 1,856 2,014 inyear . Begitmiag . i 1927 Ye&r 1928 1929 1930 m i ill! 250

to improve personnel relations.8

produced, Labor disturbances Troro increasing in both number and in intensity of fooling. The progress being made in reviving industry

■was ondangorod by tho rapid extension of industrial unrost duo largely to tho absonoo of any provision in tho KIRA for a board or agency to %

Certainly tho prime motive of tho NRA, namely, industrial recovery, could not bo aocomplishod with hostility botwoon employer and employees producing strikes and lookouts and a growing distrust of the policies

tho government on tho part of labor.

. To chock those advorso aotivitios and to provide for a eystoa of handling employer-employee disputes, the Industrial and Labor Advisory

Boards of tho IIRA jointly petitioned the President for tho establiah- meat of a labor relations board* As & result of this urgent plea, the

"national Labor Board was created on August 5, 1935 by Presidential ' ; * ■ appointment." In that following the request of the advisory agencies the n m Board would be empowered "to pass promptly on any ease of hardship or dis- ' : ' ■■■ e 32

32. Clmraotoristico of :: ■ 151

as

As has been noted the latlonal Labor Board was created simply

' ship of the agency* lio executive order aoeompanied this announcement.

Thoreforo, to gain coma understanding of the pororo and dutioo of the board, it is nocossary to examine the appeal of the advisory boards to tho President. The major section provided that:

This Beard will consider, adjust, and settle differ­ ences and controversies that may arise through differing interpretations of the President's Seemployaeat Agreement and will aot with all possible dispatch in making known their findings. In return, employers and employees are asked to take no disturbing action pending hearings and final decision. This Board will promptly proceed to establish such central and local organisations as it may require to settle on the ground, suoh differences as arise in various parts of the country.0'*

In this way was established the first labor relations board of the

Hew Deal series— a board without tho basis of a Congressional statute or even an executive order. Tho powers and scope of authority of the

. - " , - agency were vague and indefinite with no positive grant of power to

55. Decisions of the Rational Labor Board, Vol. I (August 1955 - Ihrch I l M ) , p. 17 “W o membership of tho hoard as suggested by the In­ dustrial and Labor Advisory Boards and as announced by tho President included tho following: Robert P. Wagner (United States Semtor from Hew York), Chairman* Dr. Leo Wolmsn (Professor of Economios at Columbia University, chairman of the Labor Advisory Board of N M ) j Walter 0. Teagle (Industrial executive, chairman of the Industrial Advisory Board of HRA); William Greon (President of tho American Federation of labor) $ Louis E» Kirstoin (Department store executive)* John L. Lewis (President of the United Mining Workers of America)* Gorard Svropo (Industrial executive).

#&+ T b M * etxg&fgmpa

for an

, is under section 7(a)

in its

g # %

itself as a

"t .. -?: ; . vT' .-,.r,,j»::'.t^- .*!< 'V:

.t-'rc#

Industrial Council* 159

and naintainod by nutual agrocscnt b o W o o n cnployor and onployoo in tho light of local plant and cannanity conditicncj and

Yfhereas, the policies of the national labor Board tend to prevent the prompt and peaceful local settlement of industrial disputes and to prevent tho development of sound systems of esiploynont^rolationQ, thus increasing the number of ouch dis­ putes .56

This veiled disdain for the activities of the labor Board m e quickly tronsfomod into opon opposition on the part of certain industrialists. In tiro celebrated disputes involving tho Vfoirton Steel Company and tho Budd

F-anufactaring Company, dofianoo to tho authority and rulo of tho Board t/tis the result of prolonged attempts during tho months of Kovombor and

December to settle these particular controversies, fo anti-union employers tho manifestation of a similar reaction rmxs now mado easier by thoso two

pioneer rovoltors. Of course, in turn such programs on the part of

members of tho Board with thoir conflicting interests argued over tho

proper Interpretation of section 7(a), Attendance at tho hearings and

conferences was very irregular inasmuch as each person m o attempting to

perform this work in addition to his regular, duties. Here and more -re­

liance cane to bo placed cn tho limited group of subordinates who wore : ' - ' - - . . -V ' - - - -r; " - ' ' , overwhelmed with the steadily increasing number of disputes. The outcome

m s that the Board unable "to act unitedly, promptly, and decisively.

55. “NBA Threat Seen in Industry Move," The Hew York Times, Hovraber S, 1933, p, 16* SiminiBhed ita prestige."36

In an attozapt to chock this movenont fdiich threatened to halt the activities of tho labor Board and also to provide finally sezao positive basis for its actions, tho President issuod an executive order on

Docoznbor 16, 1933, which provided that:

Tho national labor Board, created on August 5, 1953, to "pass promptly on any case of hardship or dispute that ray arise from interpretation or application of the President*s Roonploymont Agreement,K shall continue to adjust all in­ dustrial disputes, whothor arising out of tho interpre­ tation and operation of tho President1 s Heonploymont Agree­ ment or any duly approved industrial oodo of fair competition, and to compose all conflicts, threatening the industrial peace of tho country. All action horotofore taken by this Board in tho discharge of its functions is hereby approved and ratified.37

The second part of the order outlined in indefinite fashion tho powers and functions of tho Board with tho provision that it was to

"settle by mediation, conciliation, or arbitration all controversies betrroon employers and employees which tend to impede the purposes of tho national Industrial Recovery Act." But actually what powers wore given to the board? Tho functions wore those of the mediator and

conciliator. There were no grants of authority to hear oases and

issue binding decisions; to conduct elections, to insist upon tho ob- 3637

36. Lloyd E. Garrison, "The rational labor Boards," The Annals of tho American Academy of Political and Social SoiencoTTol. M 4 i936}, p. l38. See also Lcrvrin an£ Viubnig,. 0£. cit., p. 102 for a discussion of this period.

37. Executive Order No, 6511, found in tho Decisions of the national labor Board, Yol. I, ©£. cit., p. 71. 4

155

eervanco of collective bargaining, or to onforco tho concepts of the law. Thus tho reasons for the steady decrease in prestige and influence of the Board are apparent*

Then again on February 1, 1954, another Executive Order was issued with tho sara objectives in mind. But this time tho moot important

problem uf all, namely, collective bargaining, was at last given official

recognition. In view of tho future significance of the provisions of

this executive order, tho exact wording warrants consideration. Section

one stated that*

regulations as Board shall publish promptly the tives T/ho are of the

or other mutual aid or protection in their relations with their employer,3G

Tho Board had the authority now to order, conduct, and supervise

elections

collective bargaining

tention of the 35

35. Executive Order Ho. 6580, found in ibid., p. VII. 155

represent all employees tms fully recognised* Along with the establish­ ment of these concepts, provision too provided for tho enforcement of the decisions or rulings of the Board by its statement that in case of any refusal to comply with tho requirements of section 7(a), "the Board

shall report its dotomination promptly to tho Administrator for In­

dustrial Recovery for appropriate action.”

Although now tho power and authority of the Board had been

strengthened, still tho situation remained one of unroot and dissatis­

faction. A good deal of friction developed between tho Board and the

KBA especially in regard to tho meaning of what constituted appropri­

ate action by tho ITRA Administrator and tho status of majority rulo.

■ , Tho National labor Board aooopted the surface meaning of tho President's

order regarding a majority rule, namely, that tho majority group would

represent all eligible employees. The NBA, however, insisted upon

recognizing the right of tho minority groups as well as that of the

individual to bargain with the employer and, moreover, insisted upon

reviewing the actions of tho Board before considering any punitive

procedure.59 Tho problem was partially settled by an Executive Order

of February 25, 1954, which amended section 2 of tho order of February

1, 1934. Hereafter, when the Board detected violations of section 7(a),

tho order provided that:

Tho Board, in its discretion, may report such findings and make appropriate recommendations to the Attorney General or to tho Compliance Division of tho National Recovery Ad­ ministration* Tho Compliance Division shall not review 89

89. Lorain and VAibnig, og* oit., p. 110. 157

tho findinga of the Board hut it shall havo tho ponor to talco appropriate action based there on.*0

First reactions indicated that the President's announconont v.ns actually a victory for tho Labor Board over the N M # for, horeaftor, the Compliance Division m s to havo no authority to review the findings of the Labor Board. Yet a careful reading of tho last sontonco of tho ordor indicates other,vise for what do the words "shall havo power to take appropriate action" infer? Hot only m s there no compulsion, but, on the contrary, the Compliance Division could act as it saw fit. Moreover, in instances in which this division of the

IRA decided to initiate proceedings against a recalcitrant firm, tho penalty was confined to the removal of the Blue Eagle from the promises and products of tho offending concern. This m s an un­

fortunate situation in view of the fact that a largo percentage of

industrial firms would not suffer any marked hardship by such pro­

ceedings. But to tho concern seeking government contracts, tho

action of the Compliance Division would assume major proportions.

Juatiee. Seemingly the Attorney General was not eager or desirous of

instituting court proceedings in an attempt to enforce tho decisions

of the labor Board. Once the controversy m s turned over to tho

Department of Justice, discretion rested with the Attorney General as

Vol. I, °P» oit., p. VIIIi 15#

to xThothor ho should sot. Bwntually action was conoonood against tho Budd Manufacturing Company tut without success.

Humorous other troubles came to plague the Board. Tlie number

tho industrial group duo partly to the encouragement of the National

conception of collective bargaining, but in counteracting general

criticism and internal dissatisfaction. Little could bo accomplished

tmder such conditions. . .

During tho month of larch, 1954 a thorough analysis of tho weaknesses

of section 7(a) and the National labor Board was being made in con­

nection with a Congressional proposal by Senator Robert Yhgnor for tho

enactment of a labor Disputes Act. Y&gnsr, realising that tho Rational

Labor Board could no longer function effectively, introduced on Larch

1, 1954, S. 2926, tho purposes of which wore "to equalise tho bargaining

®f disputes between employers and employees, (and) to create a Rational

Labor Board." Although tho Tfagnor proposal failed to attain the statue

«f a law, tho hoarings on the bill provide a concise resume of tho

■ ■ . . . problems confronting the National Labor Board in tho string months of

...... 159

1934. Koto tho following excerptc iron tho romark-a of Senator Vfagnor.41

Since the passage of tho Roc ovary Act, tho dovelopment of tho practice of united action has boon so one sided that there is danger of a worse balance than persisted in tho past. Trade associations have boon strengthened enormously, and industry has gained practically unchallenged control of tho code authority mechanism. During tho very sano period, genuine cooperation among employees has received one setback after another. Tho 40,000,000 working people in this country rightly feel that this is unfair... .

Tho first defect of 7(a) is that it restated the right of employees to bargain collectively, but did not impose upon employers the duty to recognise such representations.'

Tho second defect in section 7(a) has turned upon a question of interpretation. The law says that employees shall be allowed to choose their own representatives. This has been road to moan that oven after tho overwhelming majority in a plant dosir# a collective agreement covering all, the employer shall be free to deal individually with workers who want to make individual agreements. In this manner the closed union shop is illegalisod.

Tho third and moot important defect of section 7(a) is that, while it provides that employees shall bo free from interference and restraint in choosing thoir reprosontativos, it dooo not prohibit tho specific practices which make such freedom impossible. The greatest barrier to freedom is tho employer-dominated union, which has grown with amazing rapidity since the passage of the Recovery Act.42

41. In tho introductory chapter it was stated that the Rational Labor Relations Act is simply a statute designed to insure the function­ ing of collective bargaining between management and labor. To accomplish this objective tho bargaining power of labor had to be strengthened by upholding the right of tho worker to join any labor organization and to soloot representatives of his own choosing. In view of this fact the wisdom of analyzing tho KRA activities becomes most apparent for hero collective bargaining was being tried out under all typos of pressure. In tho remarks of Senator Wagner are to be noted the defects in tho program which had to bo remedied before the 1955 results oould he a- ohievod.

42. rnwrlngc bo f ^ Ccggitt.a on Education and Labor on S. 2926, U.s. Senate, 73dTuong., 2d Boss., It. 1, pTli. lee

vicrcrod it in March, 1934. Yet ctill on March 25, 1934, as the

Board actic by the President did i

permitted a system of This

the type of

uphold in.the past. This "was a

authority of the Board” after -which

torpor from which it novel

An attempt to remedy

suited in tho passage of Public

19, 1934.44 This

Wagner's plan.

to establish a investigate is employers section 7 a of aaid act atruoting, or , flow of interstate

In,accordance with this authorization tho

agency known as 4344

43. Lonvin and Wubnig, o£. cit., p. 112.

44. 48 Stat. L. 1183. “■ ssss ttivz: — mac issued on Juno 29, 1934, provided that the National Labor Board would bo suporsoded by the now Board on July 9, 1934. Thus ended the

first labor board experiment of the "Her,7 Deal” period.

. . A review of tho work of the first labor board is of value. From

August 5, 1935# to July 1, 1934, over 2,000,003 workers wore directly

effected by cases handled by tho Board and its subordinate regional

boards. Of this number it was computed that 1,800,000 wore either

returned to work, kept at work, or had thair disputes adjusted. Of

the 4,277 oases handled, 3,532 or 83 par cent were settled by tho Board.

It io of interest to note in 2,741 of these 4,277 controversies, tho

primary cause of the complaints was alleged violation of sootion 7(a).46

Suoh wore tho statistical cunmarios as compiled by tho national Labor

Board. Y/hat tho so figures indicate or how reliable they are. will not

be discussed in view of tho conflicting opinions and their minor im­

portance in this study.47 48 The principles established by tho National

Labor Board which m y have been of importance in influencing tho for­

mation of tho 1955 labor disputes legislation will bo of far greater

significance 48

46. "Work of the National labor Board up to July 1, 1934,» Monthly Labor Review, Yol. 59 (August 1934), p,. 516.

47. In regard to the reliability of these statistics the negative view is well presented by Lorwin and Y.'ubnig, op. eit., p. 217. Note should be taken of such chargee that the figures "were gathered hastily and offhand,” that there was a "considerable amount of double counting,” and that the statistics "were presented for propagandistic rather than informative purposes.”

48. Infra, pp. 165-188. 182

It ia now la order that an analysis of the posers of the National

Labor Eolations Board, aa listed in tlio President's ordor, bo node.

According to sootion 2, tho Board saa authorisod to perform the folios- ing functions: . , „ , - ».....

(1) To invoctigato practicoa and activities of employers and employees in any controversies arising under section 7(a) $

(2) to ordor and conduct electionss

(5) to hold hearings and nako findings of fact regarding com­ plaints of discrimination against or discharge of employees or other alleged violation of section 7(a) of tho HI HA and such parts of any code or agreement as incorporate this sootion;

(4) to formulate and suggest for tho consideration of tho

(5) to act upon request as a board of voluntary arbitration.

The Board mas to consist of three full-time, salaried members,49

while tho regional boards zero to continue with representatives of

management and labor under an impartial public chairman. In regard to

procedure, tho Board decided at the start to ignore mediation in view

of the number of casos awaiting settlement. In othor words tho throo

members would sit as judges and issue decisions on disputes, while tho

49. Tho mentorship included tho following:

Harry A. Millis, Chairman of tho Department of Economics, University of Chicago Edwin S. Smith, former Commissioner of labor in Lhssachusotts.

Later Hr. 165

staff assistants and regional boards would concentrate on mediation and conciliation. In the role of judges, tho doard issued 234 written opinions in the space of approximately ton months.50

Yihilo the Board enjoyed r.oro prestige than its predecessor duo

largely to its more effeotivo organization, nevertheless, tho same

T/oaknoGCos in regard to enforcement powers remained. Tho system with which the National Labor Board had struggled unsuccessfully was re­

tained. There is little need to review again tho absence of povror and authority contained in a system providing for enforcement by the Com­

pliance Division of the HRA or tho Department of Justice. Moreover,

oaoh month eooaod to bring a now reduction of the scope of authority

of the Board tlnrough presidential action. Dispute after dispute arose

between the Board and tho KRA as to the jurisdiction of each. The

Board claimed absoluto power over all labor disputes arising under

section 7(a) or any of the codes. The final outcome was that b y March,

1935 the; Board had no authority over disputes arising in industries

having their own labor relations boards. Such industries or interests

included tho textile, stool, auto, bituminous coal, newspaper, and long­

shoremen groups. The result of such limitations of authority, the

diminishing of "Bluo Eagle” amotion, and the absonoo of enforcement

powers, all combined to make effective action on tho part of the Board

almost on impossibility long before a dooision by the Supreme Court on

SO, Garrison, op. oit., p. 141. 164

May 27, 1935 invalidated tho codo provisions.51 in thoory, by the prevision of Public Resolution ITo. 44, the Board vras to continue in porror until Juno 16, 1935. T/hilo the Board did oontinuo in ex­ istence,^ its notivitieo wore mostly confined to completing details.

Attratioe was nov? conoontratod on the now disputes legislation which, after being rovicod to conform to tho dictates of the Schechtcr decision, became law on July 5, 1935.03

Tho above is a summary of the chronological development of tho agencies which eventually culminated in the National labor Eolations

Board of 1935, As is probably realised there wore many other labor

Board, the Steel Labor Board, tho Petroleum Labor Beard, tho Textile

Labor Eolations Beard, tho National Bituminous Coal Labor Board, end tho National Longshoremen*s Board,* 52*54 ’While the work of these special­ ised agencies wan of comparative importance, it is bolievod that tho rulings, decisions, and findings of the National Labor Board and its successor, tho National Labor Relations Board, will provide a mors representative source in studying tho rules evolved during tho period from 1983 t© 1935, which undoubtedly contributed much to the planning and organisation of the 1955 congressional legislation.

61. A* L. A. Soheehter Poultry Corporation, et al. v. United States,

52. Tho Board actually remained in existence until August 1, 1935 through presidential orders.

63. 49 Stat. L. 449.

54. See Lorwin and Wubnig, op. sit., cha. 22I-X7 for a discussion of tho activities of those agencies• 165

An aa&lyeis of the provisions of tho National Labor Eolations Act

of 1935 givos tho impression that this Act is in many rospoots simply an embodiment of the principles established by the two major labor

agencies functioning under tho H I M * Though many of those principles

or rulings n o r o not enforced, nevertheless, they came to bo recog­

nised as essential to tho proper conduct of labor relations in mo d e m

industry. They soon came to be known as a kind of common law; in fact, rroro designated as “National labor Board— National Labor Relations

Board common law,"®5

In analyzing what constituted the “common law" doctrines, five

major factors will to considered. The problems about which much of the

1936 labor disputes legislation centered include discrimination against

union members, collective bargaining, tho conduct of elections,

majority rule, and company unions. "Kith tho exception of tho matter of

proper enforcement of the statute and administrative rulings in regard 'V to tho Wagner Act of 1935, tho afore mentioned items cover almost the

entire labor relations situation. By considering in detail tho meaning

and significance of those issues as interpreted by the two REA. labor

boards, a fairly comprehensive account of tho principal contributions

of tho REA labor activities to the' formation of the 1935 Act should

result. 55

55. Loroin and Yiubnig, op. oit., p. 451. Attention is also directed to "The Decisions of tho National Labor Relations Board,” Harvard lew Ho view, Vol. XLVIII, No. 4 (February 1955), p. 6 3 0 . ------and to r/hat constitutes discrimination. Bille numorous decisions of tho two boards could bo citod to cover tho basic features of the above items, tho following excerpt provides a concise explanationt

Undor Section 7(a) of tho national Industrial Recovery Act, an employee m y not be required to refrain from joining, organising or assisting a labor organisation of his own choice. Tho statute thus forbids tho discharge of an employee for union activity. Thoro obviously is no noro effective way of interfering vrith the self^organization of employooo than to discharge those who are active in tho union of their own choosing... . The employer, in dismissing an employee, must

union affiliation or activities*.. . To safeguard the privileges conforrod by tho statute, hcroovor, it is imperative that the circumstances of a discharge be carefully scrutinized and that its validity bo determined.., .5?

stitutod discrimination proved to bo troublesome. Tho "yellow-dog"

eontrnct could bo diooardod; tho worker on tho surface could bo allowed

to organise and join any organisation of his choosing. All that was

needed was a judicious uso of routine dismissals, lay-offs, transfers,

@r dmmotlonse labor t o m o d it dioorinination, against tho anion worker

or a weapon to prevent unionisation whilo the employer insisted that it

was simply a matter of established proooduro. V/illian F. Green, Prosi- . ■ • . . ■ dent of tho American Foderation of labor, in testifying before a Senate *57

B6. Supra, footnote 44, p. 36.

57. ratter of The General Cigar Company, 1 HLB 71 (February 6, 1934). (Tlio precedent for this form of citaticm is the Harvard tew Review. Hereafter in referring to the decisions of the two fioardTT’this system will be used.) Iff

coanittoo rocognizod this natter as a najor problem inasmuch aa "when an employer has the intent to evade the law, he oan find ample excuses for doing so,"58 But exactly hew was any board to determine whether a discharge m s a discriminatory action or duo to inefficiency, seasonal lack of orders, violation of shop rules, or improper conduct? It m o a case of balancing one argument against tho other and yet realising that merely because the discharged worker was a union member or interested in union activities, discrimination was not thereby automatically established* A few citations will help to indicate tho complexity of tho problem* In one case nine union men with excellent records wore discharged without reason the day following the presentation of certain

requests by tho union to tho management. Although tho company stated

that tho non "wore not discharged because of labor union affiliation «r

activities but

al Labor Board decided that the circumstances warranted & finding of

discrimination and ordered that the workers be reinstated*59

In a case involving tho Hatch Hosiery Company of North Carolina

it was found that a strike had developed as the result of the nenage-

mant'o action in laying off six men and the transfer of two others to lose

desirable positions a few days after the group had joined a union. 68

68, Hearings before the Committee on Education and Labor on S, 1958, Pfe. 1, 0£. oit*, p. 104.

59* Matter of Birtman Eloctrio Company, 2 1ILB 43 (May 29, 1934). 168

Eroninnlly in tho course of a hearing by the ITational labor Board, various employees testified that tho ranagonont officials had o.x-

would bo arrived at to legalize discharges of union members. After discovering that numerous other anti-union abuses existed and that tho discharges were part of this same policy, the Board ruled that:

. We therefore conclude that tho company, when con­ fronted by an attempt to organize tho plant, purposely impeded organization by discriminating against union em­ ployees, and by causing its employees to fear that joining the union imperiled their jobs.60

Perhaps those fexr examples Tri.ll indicate the complexity of tho situ-

•tion* The determination of tho oxistonoo of discrimination vrac indeed

a difficult problem. The proof of tho charge had to be provided by tho worker but tho employer usually could find some legitimate excuse to

e w e r tho discharge or transfer. I'oroovor, it should bo clearly kept

in mind that section 7(a) was not intended as a means of depriving tho

employer of the right to firo. Kor did section 7(a) state that an em­

ployer could not discharge a union worker. What was inferred was that

sation of one's own choosing were to bo observed, then discharges or un­

desirable transfers could not be used as a means of discriminating

against union workers or of discouraging unionization programs. Thus

hero was established a very important principle for without this under-

standing how could any unionization or collective bargaining program

60. Hatter of hatch Hosiery Company, 2 MLB 51 (June 8, 1934). 169

gain a foothold

Tho second iesuo and without any doubt the foremost ono to to con­

sidered is the matter of collective bargaining. Seemingly the principal motive behind the entire labor program of the KIRA, and the Rational

Labor Eolations Act of 1935 was tho desire to strengthen tho bargaining

power of tho worker. It was realised that tho individual worker had

little opportunity to improve conditions of employment through his cvm

bargaining strength. Therefore the only remedy would bo to insure tho

right of tho workers to organise and to bargain collectively with their

employer. Section 7(a) stated that "employees shall have tho right to

organise and bargain collectively through representatives of their own

choosing." The relative importance of the collective bargaining issue

was well described in a decision of the Bitioml Labor Relations Boardi

Tho fundamental purpose of Section 7(a) was to en­ courage collective bargaining, with all that that implies. Employees were to "have the right to organise and bargain collectively," and to be free from interference in self- organisation "for the purpose of collective bargaining."61 62

Inasmuch as section 7(a) did not provide any definition or concept

of the term "collective bargaining," it is essential that first a general

moaning bo provided and then the ideas and rulings of tho two Boards be

considered.

61. Infra, pp. 19-20. While this item might well be discussed under this heading, it was thought advisable to consider it following an analysis of elections held under section 7(a).

62. Matter of Hondo Engineering Corporation, 1ITLRB S5 (August 30, 1934). 1*6

. -t. .y " ' %

Celleotlve bargaining is bo-broen tivo parties, ono of

is a devioo, interests, industrial

Thus it mas the employer and the employee to perform certain actions if collective bargaining is to be fully realised. In a controversy involving tho

Bational Lock Company the national Labor, Board explained tho obligation A of oaoh party in these vrordo:

involves a°qmlity0of obligation-an obligation on the part of employees to tho omp part of tho representatives of the. ------reasonable effort to reach an agreement on all in dispute, negotiations should precede rather than follow tho calling of a strike. But fault of tho employees may 1 *nf can be no justi- fication for tho statutory rights of his employees,1

The major

employer la regard to collective bargaining. In order to observe fully

workers or their representatives? lot until October, 1934 m s a com-

pleto anm-or to this problem provided by the Ihtioml Lobor Solationo

Board. In a controversy involving the National Aniline and Chemical

—— ...... — ■ ...... •......

63. labor's Charter of Rights, American Federation of Labor (1936), p. 13.

64. Batter of National Look Company, 1 NLB 15 (February 21, 1934). Company tho Board soenlngly attempted to up the ontiro issue in

' - • : ' " r ' • : ' '..4 - f wordei

Section 7(a) loyera to go further than mere Gontativos of their if they aro satisfactory. «istent with its purpose. It of the employoo: acceptable to tho employer, and that such an period of tamo. If such an agreement did not run for a definite period of time it would be without legal validity as an agreement. The collective bargaining requirement in Section 7(a), if it did not con- _ of mutually satisfactory terms in a legally valid mont, would be empty of significance. Collective gaining, as was said in tho Hondo case, is a means to 03 end, and tho end is an agreement (assuming an under­ standing can bo reached) which will stabilize relations tim.Gl

After extensive experience as chairman of the Chicago Regional labor

Board, Doan Viilliam Spencer concluded that there were five principal

items to be considered in relation to the position of tho employer under

collective bargaining, namely;

of his workers, the duty to bargain in good faith, tho subject matter w--'- 3. of bargaining, tho and, finally, 1 _ ' : • tho incidents of the t.6G of those five points the

principle* established

Tho receiving of tho is of

employer’s K. A :') seatatives, seotion 7(a)

65. Hatter of national Aniline and Chemical Company, 1 HLRB 114 . (October 3, 1934).

M . Spencer, 0£. elt.. p, 21. from tho intorforonoo, rootralnt, or #

er their agents, in the designation of

labor agency was very careful to insist upon strict obsorvnnco of

thoso provisions pointing out that since the ropresontativeo wore to

be the free choice of tho vrorlrars, those representatives need not bo

employees.67 Should tho employer contest the legality of any repre­

sentative, then it was up to tho Labor Board to dooido the question

and if necessary order an.election to determine tho proper representa­

tives.Gradually tho wisdom of observing at least this first stop

was rocognisod by practically every employer.

Tho second phase of collective bargaining d with tho

duty imposed on tho employer to bargain in good faith. In other words

the employer must come to the conference with every intention to

strive to reach a satisfactory agreement with his employees or thoir

representatives. Along with this obligation might well bo considered

the duty of attempting to roach an agreement since after all this is

the primary motive of any bargaining process. With this approach in

mind, a signifieent decision of the National Labor Board may be profit

ably noted.

duly chosen representatives of its employees, whether an employee or an outside union, and to negotiate actively in good faith to roach an agreement. Disclosure of thoso represented is not required. Summary rejection of era- 6768

67. Matter of A. Both and Company, 1 IILB 75 (February 2, 1934).

68. Infra, pp. 176-182. #*

The problem naturally arose as to exactly what was meant by good faith* new could any boa%d say that an employer was or was not noting in good faith? Naturally neither Board was willing to make * general statement in regard to this question. Each controversy must be carefully judged on its own merits. If tho employer moroly met tho representatives of the employees, refused ovory request, and was not willing to offer substitute proposals,, then there was a definite

UJL la ruling upon suoh a

is possi

reaction was emphasized later whon tho National Labor Eolations Board

tho famous Houde Case agreed that "collective bargain, then, is

simply a means to an end (and) tho ond is an agreement."71 One of

in regard to the

doolsion of tho

Section 7(a) therefore requires employers to go further than merely to receive tho duly constituted representatives of their employees, to give oar to thoir demands, and to assent to such demands if they are satisfactory. The statute imposes duties con­ sistent with its purpose. It contemplates that tho 6970

69. L'attor of Eagle Rubber Company, 2 NLB 51 (Kay 16, 1954).

70. Batter of S. Dresner and Son, 1 NLB 26 (January 1, 1954). **

dacands of tho cnployooc, or modification of such demands, if acceptable to tho employer, be embodied in an asreoaont, and that cuch an agreement bind both ' parties for a certain period of time. If such an agree­ ment did not run for a definite period of time it trould bo without legal validity as an agreement. Tho collec­ tive bargaining requirement in Section 7(a), if it did not contemplate tho embodiment of mutually satisfactory terms in a legally valid agreement, would bo onpby of significance. Collective bargaining, as was said in the Houdo ease, is a moans to an end, and the end is an

which will stabilise relations between employer and em­ ployee for a definite period of time,72

In this decision it will be noted that the National Labor Eolations

Board was very careful to indicate that cimply because an agreement was not reached the employer could not be automatically charged with fail- • ‘ ' ' ' • • ■ ' " ; uro to observe collective bargaining procedure. "Demands, if acceptable to tho employer" and "assuming an understanding can bo reached" care­ fully safeguarded this agency from any charge of oppression or com­ pulsory arbitration. Vdiat each Board strove to accomplish was a willingness on tho part of tho employer and employee to do all in their

tho attention of

Must tho employe: statute ? At the written

a

72. Matter of National Aniline HA (October 3, 1954). this Board.”

can give both parties tho

essential to lasting industrial peace.”73 74* Gradually, horrovor, thi»

attitude was

agroenont with tho union unless it shall appear that thoro is a misunderstanding as to terms or a disposition of

73. Matter of Pierson Manufacturing Company, 1 HLB 63 (Dooombor 28, 1935).

74. letter of National Aniline and Chemical Company, 2 NLB 58 (ihy 25, 1934)

76. Natter of National Aniline and Chemical Company, 1 NLRB 114 (October 3, 1934). IP#

Thors new remains ono problem to be considered in regard to tho duties of tho employer under collective bargaining, namely, tho subject matter of tho bargaining. This phase is of vital importance since tho too Boards found that many employers more limiting discussions to minor problems, euoh as safety measures or sanitation programs and refusing to consider the major issues. Yet such employers argued that they had observed tho statute in regard to collective bargaining. Thus the question as to what constitutes tho proper subject matter had to bo answered. The National Labor Board quickly ruled that "all questions

of wages, hours, and working conditions shall bo the subject of collec­ tive bargaining between tho employers and tho representatives"76 of

tho employees. Once this conception was established neither Board

ever deviated from a strict observance of the policy inasmuch as

collective bargaining which ignored these items could not be of any

consequence. In reality what tho national Labor Board actually did was

to adopt tho policy of Congress as stated in section 7(b) of the HIBA.

whereby encouragement shall be afforded agreements establishing

"standards as to maximum hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and such

other conditions of employment as may be necessary,,*

Up to this point tho rights of tho employee to join any organi­

sation, to select representatives of his own choosing, and to bargain

collectively with his employer have been considered. Yet a vital

matter connected with all of these rights has boon ignored, namoly.

76. Latter of Shoo Eanufaoturors of How York and Brooklyn, 1 I7LB 8# (Hovembor 2, 1933). the collective bargaining duties or the matter of elections * In this regard it vtill be recalled that prior to an Executive Order of Febru­ ary 1, 1934, the national Labor Board did not have the authority to supervise or conduct elections.77 Yot necessity had dictated other­ wise and the Board had assumed the power as a vital part of the execution of the collective bargaining program. It was not until

Juno 19, 1934,78 79 however, that Congress, by an enactment of that date, extended legislative consent to the Board's action in this respect.

On August 11, 1933, tho national Labor Board announced an agree-

Workers and about twenty-five manufacturers of hosiery of Seeding,

Pennsylvania. This agreement which come to bo known as

Boards

sontativeo of tho

(1)

(2) Tho striking

Board to emp: ditions.

77. Supra, p. 155.

78. Supra, p. 160.

79. Lorwin and Wubnig, 0£. oit., p. 97. m 179

In the

particular labor organization, to prepare a plan of

tho ohcioo of roprosontativec ia limited and tho right to vote is restricted is hardly compatible with that self- organisation which the statute sanctions, Tihoro, in addition, tho employees are not afforded an opportunity

nation of representatives, as well as designation, are placet elusive control of tho of

A review

tho part of each is tho selection

rated as

if 80

80. Livbtor of Biward G. 14, 1933). MO

election. In every case the election was conducted under the close

Supervision of a representative of the Hoard, and, tzhen necessary or desirable, m s held in a public building or vacant store.

In connection vrith any election the first stop was to dotoraino those eligible to vote. In tho obsonco of a strike, tho decision m s quite simple; noroly order an immediate oloction and settle tho entire matter. But most elections were necessitated as a means of settling a strike and thus tho matter m s not so easily solved. Vihat about workers out on strike? Gradually a definite system was evolved to handle these problems. The strike m s ordered ended at once. All ' - i '.'. '..I:**":'- 7^ .fv'- workers who woro on tho payroll.on the date of tho oommonoemont of tho strilco wero ordorod reinstated and given proforonce over all employed ainco tho strike. Thus in this m y tho employer was prevented from

interfering in the normal choice of his employees tlirough tlio use of

strike breakers or newly hired employees. Thu general rule provided

that a worker must have been in tho employ of the concern for ninety

days before ho was eligible to take part in tho election. 1'ost of

thoso technicalities could bo decided by an examination of tho company's

payroll records.81 •

. ' ■ ciplos that tho

reprosentod. In 81

81. Matter of S. Dresner and Son, 1 BIB 26 (January 51, 1954); i'nttor of national Look Company, 1 I5LB 15 (February 21, 1954). 181

proposed an election as a means of settling the controvery. "Tho company replied that if an election was hold, it would demand the names of employees voting for the olootod representatives Eventu­ ally the ease was referred to the Rational Labor Board which decided

that*

Since the company in the present ease has challenged the right of the union or tho union officials to represent its employees for tho purpose of collective bargaining, the boot method of determining tho question is by a seorot poll. The company is obligated to bargain collectively with the representatives selected by the majority in such a poll.82 83 Under these circumstances there will be no need for the disclosure of the names of those voting for the representatives so selected.85

closing the names of the employees voting for the selected representa­

tives can bo easily understood as part of the secret ballot tradition,

and as a prevention of employer discrimination against tho employee

favoring an outside labor organization. But on tho other hand the

principle established in regard to the majority rule aroused much

apposition both from industrialists and certain BRA officials.84

Hevortheless the Rational Labor Board never wavered in regard to this

interpretation, and it become a firmly established doctrine. In tho

82. Tho majority rule had been established on Haroh 1, 1934 in tho Hatter of Tho Denver Tramway Corporation, 1 ITLB 64 (March 1, 1934) but tho Houdo case gave special emphasis to tho rule.

83. Hatter of Houdo Engineering Corporation, 1 ITLB 87 (August SO, 1934).

84. Supra, p. 156. i e

Labor Eolations Board analysed in detail the validity of the majority

rule# Tho Board declared that the interpretation was "neither strained

or novel” and merely followed the precedents established by the National

War Labor Board85 and tho Railroad Labor Board,86 In concluding its

justification of such a principle, the Board stated that*

Custom vno in accord -with those precedents. Even Ga­

by a majority vote. So far as appears, tho majority rule was never questioned until employees who had boon shepherded into company unions began, under tho protection of Section 7(a), to join outside labor unions and to demand tho right to bargain oollootivoly through these unions,87

y to the individual employe®, ' f. - certain limitations,

or groups of employees tho right to

their employers, or to and act for mutual aid or

protection.

that one organization or one committee had to represent all tho em­

ployees in a particular concern. The determination of what constituted 85868788

85. Supra, pP . 40-41,

86. Supra, pp. 104-105,

87. Matter of Koudo Engineering Corporation, 1 NLRB 35 (August 30, 1934).

88. Ibid,

lSH, 183

the proper unit nc the basis of representation whether a craft, shop, or entire factory was to bo decided according to the circumstances of particular cases as they arose. The distinct differences between different crafts or sections and the previous rules of collective bargaining as observed in tho particular concern would bo examined

in order to docido whether more than one group of representatives or more than one organization was needed to represent properly tho em­

ployees in collective bargaining. In general the Boards stressed the

belief that whenever possible all employees should be considered as

one unit.89 90 In concluding this particular phase of the body of rules

establiched by the two labor Boards it is advisable to note that none

of these rulings in regard to majority rule served to "eompol em­

ployees to join the organisation representing the majority.1190 The

rights of the minority employees were to be respected for the rule

"does not establish a closed shop, nor necessarily lead to a closed

shop, that being a matter for negotiation,"91

A final item to be considered under the heading of elections is

oonoernod with the interference of the employer with the workers in

their designation of representatives for collective bargaining, In a

89. Matter of United Dry Docks Incorporated, 1 KLEB 150 (llovomber 6, 1934); Matter of The Board of Street Bailway Commissioners of the City of Detroit and The Motor Coach Operators* Association, 1 KLRB 123 (October 24, 1934); Matter of Houde Engineering Corporation, 1 IILRB 35 (August 30, 1934).

90. Matter of Houde Engineering Corporation, 1 IILRB 35 (August 50, 1934).

91, I b M . 184

plaos* Tlioroforo tho too problems can bo considered toGothor.

Section 7(a) of this IE HA. did not outlaw all company unions but

be required as a

The Supreme Court

oidorod only a particular omployor to obstruct

Company unions

attitude imralid

and illegal was definitely m

toined with technicalities ai

delicate steadily

inert

management and employe. In order to check nisinterpretations, tho

National labor Board stated that the company union in itself was not

illegal and that if it was desirod and accepted by the majority of the

employees under valid circumstances, then it would be recognized as

tho bargaining representative of all employees. A very definite state­

ment of this principle was released on January 1, 1934, which included

this oxcorpts

92. See footnote 40 on supra, p. 34.

93, Supra, pp. 122-123.

4'.'- afforded the fullest; opportunity to choose hotrroon inside and outside unions. In each plant a preliminary election was held to determine whether the workers desired to be represented by an inside union or an outside union, or whether they desired to bargain individually with their omployaos. The inside union was soloctod by an over­ whelming vote. Constitutions were thereupon prepared by the employees for the creation of an inside organi­ sation. Thereafter representatives were elected in each plant for the purpose of collective bargaining. Ho evidence was presented that any interference, restrain or coercion was practiced by the employers.

The elected representatives negotiated collective bargaining agreements with the employers which are to run from throo to six months end are then renewable for additionnblo periods of time. I M e r the machinery es­ tablished by thoso collective bargaining agreements, many

the employees.

ercion, and since the workers ware afforded an unrestricted choice ef representatives in each plant, we believe that the complaint of the union has not been sustained.9^

But when was a company union valid and under what circumstances was it invalid? The answer in every ease revolved about interference on the

. / . . , ' '

for employer aid and that their organization was due mainly to an attempt te prevent trade unionism, certain rules were formulated to assist in

94. Matter of The # 11, 1934). 186

judging tho validity of ouoh inside plant organizations. In general there appeared to bo four rajor principles.

(1) A company union in itself is not illegal.

(2) No worker may bo forced to join a company union.95

(S) The employer must refrain from issuing false* unfair or in­ timidating statements or acting in a coercive manner in regard to a labor organisation.96

(4) A company union initiated, organised, and supported or favored by the employer is a clear example of interference and is illegal.

"Organization and representation are ratters which concern tho employees

exclusively.” "The employer has no right to initiate a plan of organi­

sation, or to participate in any way, in the absence of any roquost

from the employees... .”97 98

Thus in any ease in which the employer was found guilty of performing

any act which might bo termed interference,96 the Boards doomed it

advisable to call for a new oloction in order to determine boyond

doubt what organization should bo considered tho true representative of

SS. List tor of Taraqua Underwear Company, 1 1TLRB. 10 (August 6, 1934). 7

96. Hatter of Firestone Tiro and Rubber Company, Employees' Conforonco Plan, 2 BLRB 291 (March 50, 1935).

97. Matter of national Lock Company, 1 1TLB 15 (February 21, 1954).

98. Among tho practices included under interference wero the following: Soliciting company union moaborships during working hours, dis­ charging worlnrs who refused to join or who resigned from a company union, crediting tho company union with securing wage increases, granting special favors or allowances to members of tho company union, granting financial assistance to the company union, and condemnation of outside labor organizations. 18?

tho employees. Thus in any such controversy the mrkors usually vrorc allOTod to vote on either an inside union or on outside labor organi­ sation. With close supervision exorcised by tho examiner of tho Beards, with provision for a ooorot ballot, and with tho refusal of tho Boards to disclose tho names of the employoos favoring the outside organi­ zation, workers wore encouraged to exorcise their right of organization as thoy desired. If such conditions could be insured, little worry tras

caused by company unions, for without employer support end subsidy few • » would continue to exist.

the study of the major contributions of the Rational Recovery Adminis­

tration is concluded. The attempt has been made in this chapter to

point out tho indebtedness in certain respects of tho Rational Labor

Relations Act of 1935 to the principles established by tho Rational Labor

Board and tho National Labor Relations Board functioning under tho

National Recovery Administration. In accomplishing this objective, a

definite plan was followed whereby a sufficient amount of background ma­

terial has boon provided in order to facilitate an understanding of tho

discussion. After indicating the decrease in strength and prestige of

organised labor from 1919 to 1932, tho Norrls-La Guardis Act was analyzed

as tho first stop in the rapid development of a system of collective

bargaining during the period, Then tho passage of the National Industri­

al Recovery Act on Juno 16, 1933 brought tho famous section 7(a) which

granted tho worker tho right to organize, to ohocso representatives of

his own choosing, and to bargain collectively. Tho recognition of those 188

organized labor. Unfortunately, hmrovor, tho national Heoovory Ad­ ministration seemingly neglected the requests and needs of labor with the result that industrial strife was intensified. Eventually in August 1935 there m o established the National Labor Board which developed into an agency for the safeguarding of the rights of tho worker. Yet, although the need and desirability of such a program was recognized, the National Labor Board, in spite of certain actions by tho President, was unable to function efficiently and satisfactorily because it lacked adequate enforcement powers. On June 19, 1934 this

agency was superseded by the National labor Relations Board established

hotter organisation than its predecessor, its success was limited

Yet out of these mistakes and failures cane the establishment of

certain principles which the provisions of the National Labor Relations

Act of 1935 follow very closely. Tho body of law built up during this

gaining, conduct of elections, majority rule, and company unions. The

significance of those contributions can only bo fully understood by

reviewing the contents of tho National Labor Relations Act of 1935.

Such is tho purpose of Chapter V. AH AHALYS1S OF THE HATIOHAL

LABOR RELATIONS ACT - ' ' ■ . > - "C

Tho historical background of tho Rational Labor Eolations Act of

July 5, 1935, bus now been conplatod. Tho logiclativo routine in­ volving tho introduction of tho bill on February 21, 1935, tho cor^.ittco hearin£8, tho Congressional debates, and tho passage of ths Act aro not

rtant for the purposes of this thesis except as they indicate tho ISO

that of analysing tho principal provisions of tho national Labor Re­ lations Act of 1935 and indicating tho sourcos of thoso ideas. This should tend to coordinate the ontiro study and help to clarify tho material sot forth in tho main body of the thesis.

\ Sootion 1, entitled "Findings and Policy,” states that since

"tho denial by employers of the right of employees to organise and tho refusal by employers to accept tho procedure of colloctivo bargaining"

lead to industrial unrest and the obstructing of interstate ccnrerco, and since "tho inequality of bargaining p error bo-tore on employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract"

programshas proved•"that protection by law of tho rights of employees

t* organize end bargain collectively safeguards commerce from...inter­

ruption," This is followed by a statement of the basic policyt

It is hereby declared to bo the policy of the United States to eliminate tho causes of certain substantial ob­ structions to tho froe flow of comnorco and to mitigate and olininata thoso obstructions Trhcn they lizxvo occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure*' of colloctivo bargaining and by protecting tho exercise by workers of full freedom-of association, self-organisation, and desig­ nation of representatives of their own choosing, for tho purpose of negotiating tho terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.

debated on tho House floor and passed with amendments on June 19, 1935, without n record vote (79 Gong. Roe, 10057- 10092, 10094-10111). After conference, tho bill was ap­ proved by both Houses on June 27, 1935 (79 Cong. Eeo. 10668, 10704-10705, Conference Report Ho. 1371), and signed by President Roosevelt on July 5, 1955. if: An S.G probably Trail

. this

. also - data of tho important extent tho - ' - period tmder vision of the

ation of tho Raticm&l Labor

Halations - throo mtoboro appointed by the

President with tho ndrico tod * Of the Senate. It -will be noted that there is no

or employers, oi i but instead the more statement tht — ’ . . ,n • .. ■ ■ Board "shall bo o

1S1 . . ' _ .. ... ■ \ partite 1920 Bailroad Labor B ^ r d 4 were carefully avoided*

the 1935 labor Act

tion Labor - e

I. -» PP. 114-124. i " 8. pp. 21-44. .

.' ; 4. > pp. 105-109.

8. pp. 158-160.

» p« 130*

7. p.X82. .-.f'' . view of the successful operation of the one and the moderate success

of the second in spite of inadequate enforcement powers.

Undoubtedly-sections 7 and 8 captioned the "Bights of Employees"

a m the principal portions of the Act, yet there is nothing new or

novel about these provisions. Section 7 provides that:

As has already beep* discussed in the chapter dealing with tho national

Recovery Administxjation,8 this quoted provision is almost identical

with section 7(a) of the national industrial Recovery Act of 1933.

Dean Lloyd K, Garikson in testifying before the Senate Committee on

Education and Labop in regard to tho proposed national labor Re­

lations Act said that the entire bill was "in substance a restatement

of section 7(a) of the Recovery Act,.. ."9 : „

Section 8 in reality amplifies and strengthens the rights pro­

vided for in section 7 by listing motions which are to be considered

as unfair practices on tho part of the employer. Thus "it shall bo

ra. unfair labor practice for an employer" to be involved in sueh

activities as: ...... ih. , . ^ .. .. .

(1) ^ M8rcio°

8. Supra, pp. 140.

9. Hearings Before .. Committoo and U b o r on S. 1958, ti.S. ^enaie, 74tE ministration of ony labor organization or contributing . , -- '

toploymont or any or condition of toploymont encourage or i ° S y ° S r organization? : - . - ' (4) discharging or ______" tostimony under this Act;

(5) -wly with the repro-

To what previous

Tho first s

HBA national

obligation to

there is

provision outlaws

or is controlled by tho employor"11 has

166-188.

11. Rational_____ ), Labor (April I s W T p T T 1 # A

been guilty of sacrificing a strict interpretation of the rulo in

ordor to instill more confidence in the v/orkor desirous of ending re­

lations trith the company union and joining up -with an outside labor

organisation* Since the majority of company unions would ooaso to

exist without tho support or guidance of tho employer, the framers

of the National Labor Relations Act seemingly preferred to follow tho

policy prescribed by tho .SEA'Labor Boards12 * of prohibiting certain

practices which assisted the establishment and continuance of plant

unions. In this way the legal dangers attendant on a blacklisting

of company unions were avoided i The outlawing of the aforementioned

practices rested on the constitutional basis provided by the courts

in tho Texas and Hew Orleans Railway case.15

Tho third unfair practice is concerned with discrimination against

members of unions. If a collective bargaining program was to be effected,

then the past practices of employers in regard to tho freedom of workers

to join a labor organization had to be checked. Thus for example the

"yellow-dog” contract was banned from future labor relations. But

again this principle was sirply a restatement of a doe tr i m recognized

by the National Y/ar Labor Board, the Railway Labor Boards, and tho NBA

labor agencies as wall as the Norris-La Guardia Anti-Injunction Act.14

12, Supra, pp, 184-187*

IS. Supra, p, 122.

14. Supra, pp. 36-56, 103-104, 117-118, 166-166, 137-138. 195

Years of painful experiences had indicated the absolute need of this basic policy if progress m s to be made in labor relations.

In sub-section 5 there appears this rather significant clause:

That nothing in this Act...shall preclude an employer from making nn agreement m t h a labor organisation (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this Act as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership thoroin, if such labor organisation is the representative of the employees as pro­ vided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bar­ gaining unit covered by such agreement when made.

In other words tho 1935 labor Act docs not prohibit a closed-shop agree­ ment between an employer and the properly selected representatives of

his employee*. The American federation of Labor interpreted the pro­ vision as "specifically legalizing a union shop"15 while the Rational

Labor Relations Board established under tho 1935 not decided that "this

provision does not make the closed shop legal, but simply declares that

nothing in the aot shall make a closed shop illegal, under proper

safeguards." Ho general rule was established but instead Congress

"preserved tho status quo on this debatable point."10 Tho status quo

■was the policy established by the NPA Labor Boards whereby it w s

declared that tho closed shop was not prohibited but could only be

established through the regular bargaining processes between the em­

ployer and tho duly eelooted representatives of.his employees.1T

15, Rational Labor Relations Aot, op. oit., p. 7. 16, Firstpnr. Annual Report of r tho ------Rational Labor -Relations------Board (1936)

17, Supra, p. 185. *

1 *

There is little if any need of amplifying or analyzing sub­

sections 4 and 5 for the former provision is included simply as a matter of procedure whilo the latter statement, insisting upon a

recognition and participation in collective bargaining by the em­

ployer, is a restatement of a policy firmly entrenched and developed

by the War, railroad, and ERA labor programs."18 19

In section 9 there are three important problems considered,

namoly, majority rule, tho proper bargaining unit, and, finally,

elections. The first provision reads as follows$

poses of eelleetivo bargaining by the majority of tho •employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be tho exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employeos shall have

employer.

"Since collective bargaining is carried on through representatives ef

employees, the act follows established precedents for the factual

evolved by tho national War Labor Board and perfected during tho ERA.

period ic continued boro without change.20 What the appropriate unit

18. Supra, pp. 41-42, 84-132, 165-188.

19. First Annual Report of the Rational Labor Eolations Board (1936) p T U . w

20. Supra, pp. 39-40, 179-183. shall ho for the ployor unit, craft unit, plant unit, is a matter to be decided not by . If ono rovievre i#

K*) of tho employees

•sms true in in-

▼astigationa, hold e!

eolleotive a g< election, for an more than < to act as a collective r

v ' r: tho claim that he is already bargaining urith ' '>v."

mont of the rulings of tho Board, In this respect the principal func­

tion of tho Board is to chock and prevent unfair labor practices es-

pooially on the part of tho employer. The system provided by the 2122

21. For a discussion on tho evolution of this plan of action, see supra, 180-183.

22. National Labor Relations Act, op, oit., p. 10, a*t followc the general pattern perfected by the Federal Trade Com­ mission. hhonevar it is charged that any persm is engaging in any unfair labor practice, the Board notifies tho alleged violator as

-to tho charges and sets a date for a hearing. The formalities and toehniealitios of a leer court are disregarded and emphasis is placed on a procedure planned for economy, speed, and fairness. At the hearings, the Board, or one of its examiners, hears the answers to the charges and other testimony from interested parties as it may see fit. Tho final outcome is either the dismissal of tho complaint or tho issuance of a ooaso and desist order to tho person found guilty of unfair labor practices. In certain instances the Board may find it necessary to take further stops to remedy existing abuses such as

ordering a new election, or the reinstatement of discharged workers.

In regard to tho enforcement of the orders of tho Board, tho framers

of tho 1935 law profited from the experiences of the labor Boards

under tho national Industrial Recovery Act.25 While the orders of the

Board are not self-enforcing, tho assistance of tho appropriate circuit

court of appeals may bo enlisted in order to secure observance of the

rulings. Tho law provides that the Board, when necessary to secure

compliance -with any order, shall file with the court the entire record

of tho case and then the court shall take appropriate action. Like­ wise any person "aggrieved by a final order of the Board...may obtain

a review of such order" in tho proper eirouit court of appeals.

25. Supra, pp. 154-157, 165 199

Suoh is the 1935 labor relations legislation in substance. The treatment in this chapter ia brief and concise since the principal aims of the paper have been completed in chapters 11* III, and IV.

Aa has boon frequently observed previously, the most suitable method to pursue in seeking an understanding and explanation of the pro- \\ visions of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 id to gain an

acquaintanceship with previous labor developments vrhieh exerted any t influence on the formation of the Act. This study lias led to the

eenelusion that the Act is but another step in the steady develop­

ment of a definite labor relations program originally undertaken

by the government during the period of tho World War. There is

but little logic in the position that tho National Labor Relations

Act is a dangerous and untried experiment. On the contrary, it is

tho embodiment of a system culminating from numerous years' of ex- :

BiBLiosmHnr

I. DOCmSHTS, OFFICIAL Aim UNOFFICIAL

■•X

-- . , :' Vole. 24, 26, 26, 30, 37,

B*

1* BBPORIS OF COURT CASES

United

Suprt

2. REPORTS OF

Tho Federal Reporter,

C. AI

'Adjustment of * Monthly

1: '

)i

Labor Vol. 10 (April 1920), pp. 880-888,

-■■T

L##* -' ■;r "CompulsoryCTsagferg: Work Lav/s and gakr--— tele t 1 t * c [|r£l t

Fisher, Clyde Olivo, Uco of

•statTstioVliSssT: Johnson, Elisabeth A., Bulletin* and Artieles Published b^ toe ____ of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Labor Statistics, (Y/ashington (1935). > A Soloctod List of too Publioations of too Bureau of Labor

i S T u S T t 60 °tiB 6 Ur”aU ° °r tl° M ' "a8h nE" llatic m i l l , Charles P,, Mediation and Arbitration in too United States, Bulletin Ho. 98, Bureau o f ~Labor Statistics, Washington (19i2). "Hew national Labor Relations Boards,” Monthly Labor Roviow, Vol. If (August 1934), pp. 316-317. Peterson, Florence, Ho. 651, "Report of the January 9, 1918, found in Annual of Labor, Washington (1918). Report of Proceedings of the Rational War Labor Conforenoo, Washington ( i m j : .. "Right of Railroad Employees to Collective Bargaining Upheld," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 26 (June 1928), pp. 1190-1192. Whitney, Edwin U , "Strikes and Lookouts," Monthly Labor Review, Vol. 8 (Juno 1919), pp. 1857-1877. Wilson, V/. B., "Labor*s Relation to the World War, Washington (1918). "Work of the National Labor Board up to July 1, 1934," Monthly labor 202

Text and Sunmary Tables of tho F of I^llroya In tho United T 1^36* Bureau of’Statistios*, Wage lHB.stioo of Class I Steam milways in the United States, State- mont No. K-Mo' for tKb year 19&?, Buroau o? Statistics, Vsashington (1838).

First^Annual Report of the National Labor Relations Board, Washington ✓

Goveranental Frotootion of Labor's Right to Organise, Bulletin Ho. 1, / BiTrision of Bobnmio Besoarob, ms)ilngton (August 1936). Second Annual Eoport of tho National labor Halations Board, Washington ----- C i W I T ' — — ------

Decisions of the National Labor Board, Vol. I (August m s - N a r o h 1934)$ VoT." TI 1^rlT T g M '^ulyT9'gITr^shii^tw (1934). ' Dooisions of the National labor Relations Board, Tol. I (July 9, 1954- Becon5or 1934)$ Vol. li (December 1* 1954-June 16, 1936), Y/ashington (1935). Homer, Charles F., What Is the HRAt, Washington (1934). What the Blue Eagle lJoans~r5o ¥ou and Hew You Can Get It, Bulletin No. 4,

Annual ff Walkor D. Hinos, Director Gonoral of Railroads, 1919,

Dooisions—sions— itaiimyRailway BoaBoard of Adjustment No. 1— January to Washington (19157 Hinos, Walkor D., To tho Editors of

Public Acts, Froolaaatione tho Prosidont Rolating to the United J H o h and General Orders an3“Circulars Issued . "s'l'/lSis,

Report of tho Railroad 1 the Directtn" General of Rail- “~ ^ T ( ^ d o 7 A pri'l '35Tl1 Report to the President of^he #or)c of the

Report to tho Prosidont ---- T o H s T T o r ------'

203

TTagos of Railroad Enploycoo, Gonoral Ordor I7o. 27 (with ito Supplements, Addenda, Amanfoents, and Interpretations to June 30, 1919), Washington (1919).

. 7* mSCELLAIIEOUS '

Annual Report of tho TInitod States Board of Mediation, hhshington (1927)• Final Report o*Fthe Industrial Commission, Vol. XIX, Washington (1902). TIrit Annual Report of the Rational Mediation Board, inoluding The Report — ---o! the llati'imllkllFoad Adjustment Board, Washington (1935).

^ » ■ tration, Washington (n.d.). Railway Strikes and Lookouts, United States Board of Mediation and Conciliation, Washington (November 1916). Report of the Eight-Hour Commission, Washington (1918). Reports of tlie InduBtrial fiomraission on Labor Organizations, Labor *1 Disputes, and Virbibraiion, and on Railway labor, Vol. mil, VnahingtonCTuSIK

D. COHGRESSIONAL DCOBHEHTS

1. C0HGR3SSIOIIAL REPORTS

Roport^on^tho Chicago Striko of Juno-July, 1894, By tho^United States

Congress, 3d Session, Washington (1895). Railroad Labor Arbitrations, Report of the United States Board of oFlkidiation and Conciliation on the Effects of Arbitration Procoedings Upon Ratos of Pay and Working Conditions of Railroad Employees, Document Ho. 493, U.S. Senate, 64th Congress, 1st Session (1916). Throatonod Strike of Railway Enployoos, Docxnont Ho. 549, U.S. Senate, ----- 'edi F '^lagraisT" IsV6b'8sioia(l9l6). Functions of tho United States Board of rodlation. Document Ho. 6, “ 0 7 SonaEo, 73d CongressSession (1933). To Create a national Industrial Adjustment Board, Report Ho. 1184 to accompany S. 2926, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress, 1st Session (1954). To Amond tlio Railway Labor Act of Ktyr 20, 1926, Report Ho. 1944 to aocorapony H.R. 9S61, (ffoswOste© on Interstate and Foreign Commorce) 73d Congress,’2d Session,(1934)., national Labor Relations Board, Report Ho. 573 to accompany S. 1958, ----- O r g S r a t S ',.m K " " 5 o % r # w , 1st Session (1935), national Labor Relations Board, Report Ho. 969 to accompany H.B* 7978, ----- n % . " K e i n r m p r a s m m v e s , 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935). national Labor Relations Board, Report Ho. 972 to accompany S. 1958, U . S l o u s e of Representatives, 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935). national labor Relations Board, Report No, 1571 to accompany S, 1958, U.S. House of Representatives, 74th Congress, 1st Session (1935). 1, CONGBESSIONM, HEARINGS

16-30 end April 6-15, 1904. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate Ccranaroo on £. 2306, H.S. Senate, eStii bongreas, 1st Session, January 14-25"and February i-io, me. Hearings before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Coroseree on — TTTgTTirorin^ c ^ Cons'ross,"TsT- "Sbssion, January 26-29 and February t-10, 1926. Hearings before tho^Coamitteo on^Interstate Comnoroe^on 5.^5266,

Hearings before the Committee on Yfeys and Means on II.B, 5664, U.S. -----18-20, 1855. Hearings before the Cossvitteo on Education and Labor on 5. 2926, U.S. Senate, 73d Congress, 2d Session, l^archU-AprTl 9, 1934. *II.

Hoarlngs before the Committeo on labor on H.R. 6288, U.S. House of Representatives, 74th Congress, IsSTSession, larch 13-28 and April 3-4, 1935.

5. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD

Congressional Record, Vols. 17-79. Especially volumes 17, 21, 51, 54, 58, 77,"7$7"

II. BOOKS

Bornholm, Alfred L., and Van Doren, Dorothy, Labor and the Government (Tfirontieth Century Fund), McGraw-Hill Bock Company, Inc., Now York (1935). Beyer, Otto S*, Jr., Experiences With Cooperation Between labor and Management in the Railroad Industry (Wftheim Leotures on In- dustrial Eolations, IDS6), harvard^Univorsity Press, Cambridge (1929). Carlton, Frank F., Labor Probloias, D. C. Heath and Company, Boston (1933). . Cummins, E. E., The Labor Problem in tho United States, D. Van Nostrand Company, N w Y o r T T I e i S T : ------Daugherty, Carroll R., Labor A-oblens in American Industry, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston (1933). Dearau, Herbert^B., Materials for the Study^of Fublio Utility Economics,

Ellingwood, Albert R. and Combs, Vihitney, The Government and Law, A. W. Shaw Company, Chicago (1926). Fagan, James 0., Labor and the Railroads, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston (1909?;------Glooser, Martin G., Publie Utility Eoonomios, The Vm o Hillan Company, New Yor Htipdnan, J. B., Amrican Labor Dyaamiea, Haroowt, Brace and Coarany, Hew York Hoxio, Hobsrt Trade Unioaisa in the United States, 2nd Edition, D. Appleton Company, iiew YorE~( W Z z T * Isaacs, Nathan (Editor), Business and GoTemment, The Foimdation Press, lnce, Chicago (1954). Jones, Eliot, and Bigham, T r m a n C., Prinalples of Public Utilities, The Kao Millan Company, Hew York 11931). Leeklia, D. Philip, Railroad Regulation Since 1920, A, W. Shew Company, Chicago (1^8).” ' " Lorwin, Lewis L., and Tiubnlg, Arthur, Labor Relations Boards, The Brookings Institution, Washington (liSSTT IbCaleb, Walter F., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Albert and Charles Boni, Hew York (193^7. Hash, L. R „ The Eoonomics of Public Utilities, I&Craw-IIill Book C osparsy ,"*Tnc'.V HorTYork------Robbins, Edwin Clyde, Railway Conduotors, Longmans, Green and Company (for Columbia University), Hew York (1914). Sayro, Francis B., A Selection of Cases and Other Authorities on Labor Law, Harvard tgiwsWlgSssT^BSHcrge { X m T T Sharfsan, iTTdo, The American Railroad Problem, The Century Company, Hew York (192177 * Throckmorton, Archibald H., Cases on American Constitutional Law, Callaghan and Company, T H 5 a g T T M I } 7 ' 7/ard,Jrank^Mird,

Willoughby, William*?., Gownment Organisation'in War Times and After, D. Appleton and Com ^ 'y,HT5 F Yark ^ % h d o ?-03l9T:------Welf, ChicagoH. D., mm:The Railroad-- - Labor Board, The University of Chicago Press,

III. EBFEREHCB BOOKS

A Kanual of Style, 7th Edition, The University of Chicago Press, ----- 5Erca£olW0). ^noricm^Fpder^iQn^of^labor^ni^tory^EneyolopedlaeReference Book,

ventions, Vol. II, American Federation of Labor, Washington (3*m ); Enoyelopedla of the Soolal Seienoes, Vols. II, IV, XIII, the Kao Millan voniraiiy f r»ow xorK.# Labor Fact Book, Labor Research Agency, International Publishers, ” EWYo7kXl93l)$ Vol. II (1934)$ Vol. Ill (1936). Schmeckobior, Lawrence F „ Government Publioations and Their Uso, The Brookings Institution, «ashihgtSn (163d). The Amerloan^Year Book, D. Appleton and Company, Hew York; especially

I M t e d States Government Printing Office Stylo Uanual, Government Printing Office, W a s M n B w n 206

IV. REPORTS, PAMPHLETS, RELEASES

Labor«o Charter of Rights, American Federation of Labor, Washington

V. PERIODICALS

"A Rational Labor Policy,” Tho Ro t Republic, Vol. 15 (Kovonbor 1917), pp. 67-69. "A Hew Deal for labor,” The Christian Century, Vol. 51 (January 1934), pp. 10-11. Barkin, Solomon, "Collective Bargaining and Section 7(b) of RIBA," Annals. s L toeriSSl. Academy of Fplitipal and Social Science, Vol. 184 (March 1956), pp. 169-176. Dixon, Frank Haigh, "Public Rogulaticn of Railrcy Wages," The /.norloan Eoononlo Revlcsr, Vol. 5 (March 1915), pp« 245-269. Dunn, Samuel 0., ,fGo*rornn:cnt lYevention of Railroad Strikes," Scribner’s Magazine, Vol. 61 (March 1917), pp, 307-314. Eaton, Charles A., "Is Labor Bohind"tho GovernmentT", The Forua, Vol. 60 (Septoabor'1918), pp. 29-1-302. "Erdnan Arbitration Bill," American Federationist, Vol. 3 (February 1897), pp. 249-852. : : Fagan, Janes 0., "labor end the Railroads," The Atlantio Monthly, Vol. 103 (February 1909), pp. 145-153. • Pitch* John A., "Labor Bairds," Survey Graphic, Vol. 23 (llovombor 1934), pp. 533-537. Flynn, John ^'ihoao Child is the 1IHA7", Harper’s Magazine, Vol. 169 (September 1934), pp. 385-394. Garretsea, A. B., "The Attitude of Organized Labor Tosard tho Canadian Industrial Disputes Investigations Act," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, T O r S T H a S k — M f T ~ pp. i t o -U b . . Garrison, Lloyd K „ "7-A end tho Future," Survey Graphic, Vol. 24 (February 1935), pp. 83-57. • ------—* * .'...,.. » national labor Boards," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social SoTereo* (iSrch! T9^6),

Gompors, Samuel, “Tho Charter of Industrial Freedom," American Federationist, Vol. 21 (November 1914), p. 957. , "Compulsory Service Bnoonstitubional,"-American Federation!*t, Vol. 24 (January 1917), p. 21, ''... . ' , "5 to 4 on Slavery," American Federationist, Vol. 24 (April BIT), p. 290.' : , "The Drive on Labor Standards," American Federation!st, ToTT 24 (July 1917), pp. 547-551. Hondrich, Burton J., "England Has Industrial Boico - Why Hot V.e?", Tho Htarld’s Work, Vol. 35 (March 1918), pp. 480-489. Johnson, iiaory h., 1‘legislation Uoncoming the Railroad Service," The Annals^of^tho American Academy of^Political and Social Science,

"Labor’s Opportunity and Pesponslbility,” American Federationist, Vol. 40 (July 1933), pp. 692-696. : : Lauolc, W. Jett, "Tho Case of Railroad Employees for an Eight-Hour Bay," Tho Anna: foT.“W ‘ ____ , M3j pp. 776-786. Lilienthal, David E., "Strikoloos Railroads?", The Survey, Vol. 8@ (toxroh 16, 1936), pp. 690-892.

Mason, Alphouc T., ‘ Tho Labor Clauses of the Clayton Act," Tlio American Political Science Revise, Vol. 18 (August 1924), pp. 459-513. 20#

"Labor, Tho »» and Section 7(a)," % e American Political nwviuw, Vol. 28 (December 1954), pp. T O - 1 9 H : Me Cabo, b a ^ K ^ T h o Effects of tho Recovery Act Upon labor 0rGani- sations," T M Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 49 (November nI.!r. Wilson Justifies "the Eight-Hour Lan,n Tho Indopondont, Vol. 88 (October 2, 1916), pp. 5-6. "national Labor Policy," The ITott Republic, Vol. 14 (April 1118), pp, 8M-S1S. " H M Threat Seen in Industry Move," The Kcw York Times, Hoveaber 2, MBS, p, IS, Faraoloo, Julius H., "1 A n m l S g Cfjthq American Aoadeay^of Politloal and

The Review, Vol. 6 (September 1918), pp. Plumb, Glonn E., "Adjustment of Labor’s Demands During Federal Control

American Academy of Political ana social Science, vol.

Ripley, William Z., of Reviews, Vol. 64 (October 0, pp. RobortsdSrDTB., " Problem," Tho of Political and Social , pp. 88-94. Rubin, W. B*_, "Ton Years After," Federatlonist, Vol. 54 ( ary 1927), p. 206-214. "Should the Wagner Collective Bargaining Pro Congressional Digest, Vol. 14 (April 1935), pp. 119-126 TSykpSi^r;— Slichtor, Sumnor II., "Tho

“ a 8001=1 t," The Yale Review, Vol. 25

Spencer, William H., "Collective Bargaining Under Section 7(a) of the national Industrial Recovery Act," Studies in Business Adminis­ tration, Vol. 5, Ho. 5 (April 1955). " S t r i t o i T ^ e Railroad Oasetue, Vol. 9 (February 16, 1877), pp. 74-75. feed, Qriwa J^ T h o !iaw %a c e of Labor," The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 122 (August 1918), pp. 178-185. "The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers," The Railroad Gazette, Vol. 6 (March 28, 1674), pp. 112-133. "The Debs Case," American Federatlonist. Vol. 2 (June 1895), p. 68. "The Decisions of the Rational Labor Relations Board," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 48 (February 1935), pp. 650-659. "Tho labor Provisions of the Clayton Act," Harvard Law Review, Vol. SO (April 1917) pp. 632-637. "Tho Progress of the World,” The Anoricon Rovio?r of Rwrloao, Vol. 48 (August 1913), pp, 144-1^7 • "The Strike* Suggestions of Hoaedy," The Outlook, Vol. SO (July 21, 1894), pp, 69-90, "The Strikes and Their Consequences," The Railroad Gasette, Vol. 18 (April 2, 1886), pp. 232-233. “ “ ' ~ "To Derail tho Rail Strikes," The literary Digest, Vol. 89 (Kay 22,

Walsh, FranlrP., "Tho Presidential Doctrine of labor,” The Forum, Vol. 00 (August 1918), pp. 167-175. ------Watkins, Gordon S. "Labor Problems and Labor Administration in the United States During tho World War,” University of Illinois Studies in the Sooial Soienoes, Vol. T, -'(So^SoerTsiS), mrrmssTim);— — . Vfohlo, Louis B., "Labor Problonn in the United States During tho War," The Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol•- 52 (February 1918),

— * * * & * assg^> . .

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.{< £<•’• “5? % ^ - . . . , ;.; _<:■ & ' „ _ :& 4 ! % $ U . %

, Id v; I r-: . - V' * ' ... ,* - - — i

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1 0 5 1 [=1711. 1^3^ -35 C2 £ 9 7 ? / ' ? 3 9 3 * r 3900 1 UU waz 3i3u