NLARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 1999
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NLARMS Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 1999 J.M.J. Bosch H.A.M. Luiijf A.R. Mollema (eds.) Information Operations The Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies is published under the auspices of the Royal Netherlands Military Academy at Breda. For more information about NLARMS and/or additional copies contact the editors at the address below: Royal Netherlands Military Academy c/o the Academy Research Centre Kasteelplein 10 P.O. Box 90154 4800 RG Breda +31 76 527 3319 (phone) +31 76 527 3322 (fax) NLARMS 1997: The Bosnian Experience J.L. Soeters and J.H. Rovers (eds.) 1998: The Commander’s Responsibility in Difficult Circumstances A.L.W. Vogelaar, K.F. Muusse, J.H. Rovers (eds.) 1999: Information Operations J.M.J. Bosch, H.A.M. Luiijf, A.R. Mollema (eds.) Copy rights: Copyrights Tilburg University Press 1999. Copyright of the articles by Szafranski and De Caro remain exclusively with the authors. Printed and bound by HAVEKA BV, Alblasserdam ISSN: 0166-9982 2 CONTENTS I Editorial Preface 5 J.M.J. Bosch II The Philosophical Dimension PERCEPTION WARFARE; A concept for the future 13 H. Friman INFORMATION WARFARE; Learning with Sun Tzu 21 G.J. Stein MARS CHUCKLES AND ATHENA SIGHS IN FRUSTRATION 37 R. Szafranski THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION 61 P.J. Tyrrell III The Conceptual Approach INFORMATION OPERATIONS; Some Operational reflections 79 J.M.J. Bosch INFORMATION WARFARE OR INFORMATION OPERATIONS? 105 F. Faucon INFORMATION OPERATIONS, THE NATO PERSPECTIVE 115 J. Gardeta THE GERMAN-NETHERLANDS STUDY ON INFORMATION WARFARE 127 A.R. Mollema IV On Information Assurance INFORMATION ASSURANCE; A long way to go 147 H.A.M. Luiijf RED TEAM OPERATIONS TO ASSESS INFORMATION 165 TECHNOLOGY VULNERABILITIES M. Veltman and R. Parker AN HOLISTIC APPROACH TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS; 181 The Canadian Experience T. Romet 3 INFORMATION WARFARE IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY- 191 RELATED ISSUES; Where could we go from here? W. Stein V The Reality CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ATTACK; 211 An Investigation of the vulnerability of an OECD Country A. Cobb A SOFTWAR VIEW OF THE KOSOVO CONFLICT 233 C. De Caro INFORMATION OPERATIONS; 241 Ideas for a strategic approach in a small country A.A.J. Forstner-Billau TO INFORM, EVEN IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES; 247 How Switzerland plans to do this E. Hofstetter INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 255 H. Matthee IS MORE NECESSARILY BETTER? 269 Advantages and disadvantages of the explosion of information technologies for political and military preparedness M.V. Metselaar VI The Legal Perspective INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS 287 K.F. Muusse VII Annexes BIOGRAPHIES 303 LIST of ABBREVIATIONS 309 URLography 315 4 EDITORIAL PREFACE INTRODUCTION Science and technology are the cornerstones of economic and military action. Technology functions as an engine for a broad range of developments. Indeed, technology may create problems, but it is - first of all - determining the chances for prosperity and our position within the modern world. We focus on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and its effects. In fact ICT brings blessings, mixed blessings and certain vulnerabilities. The blessings are countless; people are able to communicate worldwide within seconds; GPS enables us to know where we are; Internet functions as an enormous databank and links people, organisation, information and ideas, etc. There are also mixed blessings. One has either to adjust to the latest technology, or one is left behind, unable to communicate and act with the same speed. Some see dangers where computers seem to dominate the world we live in. Others question the almost religious belief that computers ‘are right’. Again others point at the dangers over information overload and the mismatch between media and governments concerning ‘news’, as messages, travelling at the speed of light, may be true, partly true or even false. Our scope does include those blessings, mixed or not. But our main topic is about vulnerabilities, as they do count in a world where states, groups, and individuals fight for power, influence, wealth and gain. These vulnerabilities are - as a concept - not new. Information always was a precious good as it is a means to plan and act on Information always has been one of the instruments to influence others. So there is a very old notion on information as a means, a weapon or a target. New however is the complete dependence of modern organisations on ICT, or - in short - computers and communications. Industry, financial institutions, the military, the state, the media, etc.; they are only functioning because they use ICT to store, send, receive and use information. The underlying information infrastructures are often connected and are based on more or less the same standards. Within the military realm there is ‘Command and Control Warfare’. The existing concepts do however not give credit to some new realities. The first has to do with new ways to manipulate, degrade or influence digitised information. The second reality has to do with the growing interconnections of military and civil information infrastructures. This means that these interconnections can be used to influence military and/or civilian Command and Control. The third reality has to do with the sobering observation that an attack on civil information infrastructures might endanger the functioning of modern society. ‘Information operations’ thus cover a broad range of risks and options. The enemy will probably wear no uniform. The opponent may or may not be a State; there is no warning (time) and we may not know who acted from where. Do the Geneva Conventions apply? And who actually defends those infrastructures? Many countries are studying this new dimension of conflict. It is not only within the United States that one understands these new realities. It also is a concern in countries like the United Kingdom, Sweden, France, Canada, Russia, China, Israel, Switzerland and Germany. NATO presented early 1999 a Military Committee Document, MC 422 on ‘Information Operations’. 5 In 1998 the Dutch and German Ministries of Defence activated a Working Group to study the meaning and implications of this topic. This publication informs about these developments. The findings of NATO and the German- Dutch Working Group are among the contributions. But it has a broader scope; it wants to address the broad spectrum of visions on ‘Information Operations’ as to foster awareness and to start further discussions. There were many options to present the different contributions. We decided to organise them under five headings: the philosophical dimension; the conceptual approach; the realities of Information Operations; on Information Assurance, and the Legal Perspective. THE ‘PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSION’ The thesis of George Stein is whether the conduct of Information Warfare is like the conduct of war described in the ‘Warring States era’ in ancient China (c. 403-221 BC) by Sun-Tzu’s Art of War. Can it provide strategic insight in what he describes as the real asymmetry, the ‘metaphysical’ or ‘epistemological’ as it flows from a total different ‘model’ of how the universe ‘works’ and how men ‘know’ to ‘work’ in the universe. Szafranski has another thesis. In his opinion the Armed Forces and their national command authorities in modern Western States have much to learn about effectively integrating information operations into both war and anti-war security operations. Worse, at the present rate of learning, the Western democracies may be surrendering intellectual leadership and ultimately operational leadership to those states, hackers, and criminals who more quickly adapt these new tools. Tyrrell examines the nature of information and looks at how it has changed in the ‘post information revolution world’. Has it changed the way in which we use it, has it altered the way in which we, as human beings, respond to it? He also examines some potential threats and looks at how information integrity might be better safe guarded. He also raises other questions: where does the responsibility for information rest; what sovereignty can a nation exercise over information and information flow; how should global networks be controlled and what threats to national information integrity can be identified? Friman discusses the concept of perception warfare. He questions whether the main object of warfare is the information or the perception. He argues that perception warfare is not something new, but that this concept has mostly been discussed as part of other concepts of war. It is reasonable to believe that we constantly are objects for perception attacks, but what makes it perception warfare? THE CONCEPTUAL APPROACH Bosch addresses ‘Information Operations’ within the broader context of change and continuity. We now face some ‘cyberspace’, a new dimension where war can be waged. There is a close relationship between ‘Information Based Warfare’ and ‘Information Operations’. The latter do not only influence the military domain, but may well use national, international and even global layers of connectivity to influence those outside the traditional military domain. Given our dependence on information and communication technology and options to manipulate information and the human decision-maker, we face new threats. Gardeta 6 discusses NATO-policy on Information Operations. The global technological evolution in the field of information changed the world. It also resulted in an operational shift of focus towards a systems approach to war fighting. This led to a new policy as contained in the Military Committee document MC 422 of December 15, 1998. The North Atlantic Council approved it on January 22, 1999. Information Operations are actions taken to influence decision-makers in support of political and military objectives, by affecting information as well as the information-based processes. They integrate Command and Control Warfare with the political consultation process, decision making apparatus and combined political-military operations of the Alliance. The German and Dutch Ministries of Defence activated a Working Group to study Information Operations.