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The Agenda Behind 'Abenomics'

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The Agenda Behind 'Abenomics' REMAKING JAPAN IMAGE MAKEOVER: Shinzo Abe has become much more media savvy in his second turn as Japan’s prime minister. REUTERS/TORU HANAI Premier Shinzo Abe is riding high on his popular recovery program. But the true aim of him and his backers is to remake Japan’s pacifist post-war order. The agenda behind ‘Abenomics’ BY LINDIA SIEG, YUKO YOSHIKAWA AND TETSUSHI KAJIMOTO TOKYO, MAY 24, 2013 hen ill health and political gridlock forced Occupation after Japan’s defeat in World War Two. Shinzo Abe to quit after one dismal year “What worries me most now is that because of Was Japan’s prime minister, his pride was my resigning, the conservative ideals that the Abe dented and his self-confidence battered. administration raised will fade,” Abe wrote in the One thing, however, was intact: his commitment magazine Bungei Shunju after abruptly quitting in to a controversial conservative agenda centered on September 2007. “From now on, I want to sacrifice rewriting Japan’s constitution. Conservatives see myself as one lawmaker to make true conservatism the 1947 pacifist charter, never once altered, as em- take root in Japan.” bodying a liberal social order imposed by the U.S. Less than six years after his humiliating departure, SPECIAL REPORT 1 REMAKING JAPAN THE AGENDA BEHIND ‘ABENOMICS’ Abe, 58, is back in office for a rare second term. He is riding a wave of popularity Support for Shinzo Abe’s cabinets spurred mainly by voters’ hopes that his FIRST ABE CABINET, Sep. 2006 - Sep. 2007 SECOND ABE prescription for fixing the economy will Support Don’t support CABINET, Dec. 26 - end two decades of stagnation. The policy, known as “Abenomics”, is mix of monetary 80% easing, stimulative spending and growth- 70 65% inducing steps including deregulation in 55% sectors such as energy. 60 But interviews with some two dozen al- lies and insiders show “Abenomics” was a 50 late addition to his platform. 40 34% Abe’s unlikely comeback was engineered by a corps of politicians who called them- 30 selves the “True Conservatives,” many of 18% whom share his commitment to loosening 20 constitutional constraints on the military and restoring traditional values such as 10 group harmony and pride in Japanese cul- 0 ture and history. Oct. N D J F M A M J J A S Jan. F M A M While the cultural-political agenda is 06 07 13 what drove them, Abe and his backers Note: data for Sep. 2006 and Dec. 2012 not available. Sep. 2007 figures follow a cabinet reshule also came to realize that voters cared most Sources: Reuters; NHK Political Survey. about the economy, so this time, they made it the first priority. “Mr. Abe in his first term put more prior- HOPE OF REBIRTH ity on revising the constitution than on the economy - repeating a mistake seen as a key economy,” said Yoichi Takahashi, a former factor in Abe’s first failed attempt to govern. Months after resigning in September 2007, finance ministry official who is an adviser to “He wants to achieve what he left un- Abe visited Kumano Shrine deep in the Abe. “Even now, I think that is the case. But done – to break free of the ‘post-war mountains of western Japan, known since I think he realized that in terms of order of regime’,” said Koichi Hagiuda, a law- ancient times as a place of healing and res- priority, he had to work on the economy first.” maker and special aide to Abe. “What is urrection. Few thought then he would be Ahead of a July upper house election most symbolic of that is the constitution politically reborn as one of the country’s that his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) that was drafted in one short week un- most popular leaders. looks set to win, Abe is again floating the der (U.S. General Douglas) MacArthur’s “It is said that if you make a pilgrimage conservative political agenda, including Occupation.” there, you will be restored to life,” said one constitutional revision, that drew his core But Hagiuda added: “He has no inten- government source close to Abe. “I said, ‘Let’s supporters even as he tries to steer a more tion to rush”. go there and you will surely come back.’” pragmatic course. Japan’s security ally, the United States, “I urged him many times ... to take some Revising the constitution, though, ranks would likely welcome an easing of the con- action aimed at becoming prime minister far down the list of public priorities, polls stitution’s constraints on Japan’s military. again. But he kept saying, ‘No, no. It’s too soon. indicate, and voters are sharply divided over But Washington worries that Abe’s efforts The public will not forgive the way I resigned.’” whether to alter the document’s signature to strike a less apologetic tone on wartime Yet Abe never abandoned hope of po- passage, the war-renouncing Article 9, to history will further strain ties with China litical redemption, his closest advisors from legitimize the military. and South Korea, who suffered under those times say. Some Abe allies worry that a hasty push Japan’s occupation and colonization before “He definitely wanted to be prime min- for constitutional changes could upset vot- and during World War Two. ister again,” said Hidenao Nakagawa, who ers who want the focus to stay firmly on the Abe has declined requests for interviews. had served as the LDP’s No. 2 official SPECIAL REPORT 2 REMAKING JAPAN THE AGENDA BEHIND ‘ABENOMICS’ INNER CIRCLE: Executives supporting Abe include railway executive Yoshiyuki Kasai and Fujifilm Holding’s Shigetaka Komori; loyal backer Yoshihide Suga is now his chief cabinet secretary. REUTERS/ISSEI KATO/TORU HANAI during Abe’s first term. “And those around he was hospitalized after quitting. powerbrokers thought his future was on him encouraged him and told him ‘Your the back bench. “TRUE CONSERVATIVES” time will come.’” “Politically savvy people did not think Abe’s time had appeared to come when Soon after his resignation, Abe and oth- that he could come back as prime minis- the scion of a wealthy political family took er LDP conservatives set up the True ter,” said Michael Green, Japan chair at the office in 2006 at the age of 52, Japan’s young- Conservatives Association. Its goals were Washington-based Center for Strategic & est post-war premier. Abe was dedicated to protect tradition and culture, revise the International Studies, whose ties to Abe go to conservative ideals imbibed at the knee “post-war regime”, protect national inter- back to his stint at the U.S. National Security of his grandfather, former Prime Minister ests and earn international respect. Council from 2001 to 2005. “The people Nobusuke Kishi, and encapsulated in Abe’s Central to the group’s world view is a who pushed his comeback and remained 2006 book, “Toward a Beautiful Country.” belief that the constitution, drafted by U.S. fiercely loyal were not the most influential.” A wartime cabinet minister, Kishi was Occupation officials in February 1946, not A group of conservative business ex- imprisoned but never tried as a war crimi- only restricted Japan’s right to defend itself ecutives known as the Four Seasons nal after World War Two. He was premier but also eroded traditional mores by em- Association provided moral support and from 1957 to 1960, but had to resign with- phasizing individualism and citizens’ rights advice. Members included Central Japan out achieving his goal of revising the paci- over social harmony and duty to the state. Railway Co’s Yoshiyuki Kasai and Fujifilm fist constitution due to a public furor over The association included close allies Holdings Corp’s Shigetaka Komori. a U.S.-Japan security pact that he rammed such as Yoshihide Suga, a former min- “Mr. Kasai and Mr. Komori thought through parliament. ister in Abe’s first cabinet. It formed the they needed to nurture a future prime min- Just 12 months after taking over as heir core of Abe’s support when many LDP ister from among younger politicians,” said to charismatic Prime Minister Junichiro former economics minister Kaoru Yosano, Koizumi, however, Abe stunned the politi- The constitution puts who first introduced Kasai to Abe before cal world by quitting. His term was marred he first became premier. “After he resigned, by scandals in his cabinet, a public outcry individual rights too far out in they disbanded, but contact and friendship over lost pension records and a huge elec- front. remained on a personal basis. Mr. Kasai and tion loss that created a deadlock in parlia- the others were in full agreement that he ment. He also suffered a severe worsening Shigetaka Komori should have a second chance.” of his chronic ulcerative colitis, for which Chairman and CEO, Fujifilm Holdings Kasai, 72, is an outspoken critic of China SPECIAL REPORT 3 REMAKING JAPAN THE AGENDA BEHIND ‘ABENOMICS’ HE’S BACK: Abe bowing to the applause of fellow members of parliament after his election as prime minister last Dec. 26th. REUTERS/KIM KYUNG-HOO and during the first Abe cabinet served on Group - a pun on Abe’s name and the icon- interview with Reuters in May of that year. an advisory panel on teaching of patrio- ic cover of the 1969 Beatles album. “I want to receive the judgment of the tism in Japanese schools. He declined to be Suga had been working towards Abe’s people in the election, obtain the voters’ trust interviewed. Komori, 73, is credited with return from the time he quit. His reasons, and work towards my next goal,” he said then.
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