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Ferry, Martin Hugh (1998) The "intelligentsia in power" and the development of civil society: Mazowiecki's Poland. PhD thesis http://theses.gla.ac.uk/4496/ Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Glasgow Theses Service http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] The 'Intelligentsia in Power' and the Development of Civil Society: Mazowiecki's Poland. Martin Hugh Ferry Ph.D. Thesis University of Glasgow Faculty of Social Sciences Institute of Russian and East European Studies November 1998 Volume II (c) Martin Ferry November 1998 Chapter 4: The Mazowiecki Government and Polish Society. Introduction Chapter 1 outlined the basic function of the intellectual in society as transformative. As leaders of societal progress intellectuals have the duty of mobilising the rest of Polish society behind the processes of modernisation such as industrialisation and urbanisation. To achieve this they develop ideologies or value systems to explain and reinforce societal change. We noted the danger that these ideologies, carrying with them the intellectuals' universal, or 'total' perspective, can be contrary to the interests of democratisation if practised by intellectuals in power. In the West this danger has been largely averted by the professionalisation of intellectuals and their integration with different social groups in civil societyl. The specific characteristics of the Polish case took the relationship between the Polish intelligentsia and society in a different direction. Integration with society was stifled by the elitism of the milieu and the underdevelopment of Polish society. The relationship between the intelligentsia and the workers and peasants tended to be patronising rather than integrative. Different, mutually hostile, values and 'visions' of Poland continued to exist. Thus ideologies such as nationalism and 443 Marxism tended to take on a 'totalist', exclusive perspective and 2 spur the development of intolerant, populist agendas . For instance, in the inter-war period the intelligentsia tended to use the peasants and workers instrumentally in its pursuit of state power and this contributed to the rise of intolerant nationalism 3 and the radicalisation of the pOlitical scene . In the early communist period, the situation was similar. The Polish intelligentsia continued to see its ultimate goal as state power rather than integration with society. The ideology of reform communism illustrated the milieu's continued concentration on the characteristics of state power. In 1956 the isolation of Polish social groups from each other was demonstrated by their separate 4 protests against the Party-state . In the late communist period the anti-communist intelligentsia's ideology of 'the reconstruction of civil societyI suggested a unique attempt by the milieu to integrate with Polish society. However, the ultimate aim of this project was to form a critique of state power. The I visions I of different social constituents of 'Solidarity' were sublimated into the conflict of universal categories: society versus state, good versus evil etc .. Thus different viSions 5 continued to exist within the opposition movement • In the transition period Polish society was undergoing profound socio-economic and political change in the direction of a modern, 444 democratic state and a free-market economy. In this context the intelligentsia could have been expected to play an integrative role: rallying Polish society behind the programme of modernisation through the formulation of an ideology which would encourage the development of a consensual, democratic political culture. However, the intelligentsia had now achieved state power and this deepened its isolation from Polish society. It could not play the role of articulating societal values to the state when occupying the state itself. Thus the conflicting visions of Poland extant in Polish society remained unarticulated at state level. The ideology introduced by the intelligentsia in power to explain and offset the austerities of the transition period illustrated the isolation of the milieu. Poland was making its 'return to Europe' and all civilised Poles should be prepared to make sacrifices in the short-term for the achievement of this goal. Those who did not subscribe to this vision were undemocratic and 'beyond the pale'6. This was in keeping with the central role of the 'European ideal' in the ethos of the traditional Polish intelligentsia. However, other groups in Polish society did not share this unambiguous subscription to the project of 'returning to Europe'. Workers, peasants and the Catholic Church all had reasons to be anxious about the influence of Western European values in Polish life. An had their own visions of post-communist Poland., and these 445 differed significantly from the vision of a Western-style, liberal democratic state envisioned by the 'intelligentsia in power'. The industrial workers envisaged a lworkers state' where their role in the Solidarity trade union, their part in the downfall of communism and the value of their labour were finally reflected in control over their economic destinY. Workers thus looked to exert influence over the transition, especially on economic reform which they thought should be directed primarily by a strong 7 Solidarity Trade Union and workers' co-operatives . The prospect of increased influence from Western economic interests in post-communist Poland increased the workers' anxiety and their desire for control over their own destiny. This vision was not in keeping With the development of a largely free market economy envisaged by the 'intelligentsia in power'. The peasantry felt that as a vital section of Polish society and one that had been politically impotent under communism, it deserved special allowances when it came to economic reform. This was particularly the case with the potential expansion of Western producers into the Polish market. Its attraction to the conservative, nostalgic elements of populism, though contradictory to the intelligentsia agenda, was understandable as the peasantry harked back to the pre-industrial era when rural issues were high 446 on the political agenda. Its tenuous ties with the rest of Polish society meant that its disillusionment was manifested not through a battle over Solidarity's identity (as with the intelligentsia/workers conflict) but with outright rejection of the 'Solidarityethos's. The Catholic Church hierarchy saw Solidarity primarily as an outpouring of Poland's Catholic identity. It thus envisaged a populist, 'Catholic democracy' where, as representatives of the overwhelmingly Catholic popUlatiOn, it would have a major say in public issues and in the defence of Polish identity from external forces, including the secUlar West. This could be expected to involve support for a strong central government and for some reference in the new Constitution to Poland's 'Catholic identity '9. On their own, each vision of Solidarity could not be used as a base for the development of a democratic civil SOCiety in post-communist Poland. The populist vision of workers and peasants, its subscription to the 'will of the people I undermined the role of state institutions in the development of democracy parties, parliaments and governments. The Catholic Church's emphasiS on Solidarity's national-Catholic identity was obviously exclusionary. Finally the 'European' perspective of the lO intelligentsia was elitist and dismissive of other perspectives • 447 The failure of the 'intelligentsia in powerl to reconcile and integrate these competing visions undermined the attempt to institute democracy in post-communist Poland. For the duration of the Mazowiecki period, Polish society remained polarised and riven by deep, hostile cleavages. This situation made the position of the Mazowiecki government untenable. The renewal of anti-intelligentsia prejudices amongst broad sections of Polish society gave populist intellectuals sources of social support. This was reflected in the results of the presidential elections of winter 1990. The Mazowiecki government was revealed as ruling on behalf of a narrow social group rather than a broad, society-wide front committed to reform. The first part of Chapter 4 will examine the relationship between the 'intelligentsia and powerl and the major social groups in early transition Poland (the workers, the peasantry and the Catholic Church). The conflicting visions each had of post-communist Poland will be explained as manifestations of historic differences which had never been reconciled. These clashes Will be illustrated through detailed examination of 'watershed issues I • The second part of the chapter will deal with the Presidential election as a clear manifestation of the isolation of the 'intelligentsia in power I from the rest of Polish society. The campaign of the Mazowiecki campaign and the profile of his vote will illustrate the fact he was 448 communicating with only a narrow social elite. In contrast the success of Walesa, and the populist, dark horse

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