Afkar: The Undergraduate Journal of Middle East Studies 1, no. 1 (Fall 2019): 3–19

Terror in the : Jihadism, Ethnic Conflict, and Virtuous Violence in Central

MICHAEL KEEN, Emory University

Abstract

In 2015, jihadist fighters affiliated with groups originating in northern Mali began to assert themselves in central Mali’s Region and have since carried out many armed attacks not just against the Malian state, but also against ethnic militias and civilians. This article explores how jihadist groups became new actors in preexisting conflicts over economic and political relations between different ethnic groups and state actors in central Mali. I argue that traditional theories of both terrorism and ethnic conflict are by themselves incapable of explaining the ongoing system of violence in . The events following 2015 are better understood in the context of the communal sharing and authority ranking relational models of virtuous violence theory. By highlighting the social consequences of violence, this theory can also be applied towards resolving the interlocking conflicts in Mopti Region. Finally, I discuss how the factors behind the success of jihadist groups in central Mali relate to those present in other conflict zones across Africa. Based on this comparison, I argue that the conflict in Mopti Region risks becoming a blueprint for jihadism and terrorism that is highly transferable to other conflict zones in the coming years.

Keywords: Mali; Katibat Macina; ; jihadism; terrorism; virtuous violence theory; ethnic conflict

Michael Keen is currently a Robert T. Jones Fellow at the University of St. Andrews studying in the Department of International Relations. He earned a dual bachelor’s degree in Middle Eastern and South Asian studies and Arabic studies from Emory University in 2019. His upcoming book Azawad’s Facebook Warriors: The MNLA, Social Media, and the Malian Civil War, 2012-2015 (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2020) examines the social media discourse of members and officials of the Tuareg-led separatist movement that staged an armed uprising against the Malian state in 2012. 4 Michael Keen

On January 8 and 16, 2015, unidentified sharing and authority ranking relational armed men attacked Malian military outposts models of virtuous violence theory. By and the village of Dioura near Ténenkou in highlighting the social consequences of the southwestern part of central Mali’s Mopti violence, this theory can also be applied Region, killing a dozen soldiers. Media towards resolving the interlocking conflicts reports claimed that witnesses heard the in Mopti Region. Finally, I discuss how the attackers chanting “God is great” and “there factors behind the success of jihadist groups is no god but God” in Arabic.1 More in central Mali relate to those present in other specifically, press accounts soon linked the conflict zones across Africa. Based on this attacks with a purported jihadist group called comparison, I argue that the conflict in Mopti the Macina Liberation Front,2 ostensibly Region risks becoming a blueprint for under the control of Hamadoun Kouffa.3 jihadism and terrorism that is highly Kouffa was a preacher turned jihadist who transferable to other conflict zones in the had led the assault by jihadist groups against coming years. the city of Konna in Mopti Region in January 2013 during the Malian civil war. On July 18, 2015, a few months after the Dioura attacks, The Inner Niger Delta: Geography, armed men from the pastoralist Peul People, and History community attacked the village of Mondoro more than 200 miles to the southeast. The Central Mali’s peoples and history have been village was inhabited by Dogon, an ethnic shaped by the unique geography of the area. group whose members primarily cultivate The Niger River—which flows roughly land, and the attacks resulted in the death of southwest to northeast from its sources in the six people.4 Although the events of January highlands of Guinea—dramatically turns in and July initially appeared to be unrelated— northeastern Mali, from there flowing local officials dismissed the Mondoro attack roughly northwest to southeast until it as merely an “inevitable” confrontation empties into the Gulf of Guinea from Nigeria between herders and farmers5—the violent (see figure 1 below). Just south of this “Great jihadist campaign against the Malian state Bend,” in central Mali, the river forms what and cycles of intercommunal violence is dubbed the “Inner Niger Delta”—hundreds between herders and farmers have expanded of kilometers of alluvial floodplains, and merged into a single system of violence wetlands, and marshes. The level of the in Mopti Region, and the death toll from Niger River rises and falls each year in these interlocking conflicts has grown to far accordance with the rainy and dry seasons. outstrip that of the better-known conflict in The annual flooding of the wetlands means northern Mali. that the Inner Niger Delta is remarkably This article examines how jihadist fertile and can support a great deal of groups became new actors in preexisting production of both crops and of animals. In conflicts over economic and political 2012, Mopti Region—the administrative relations between different ethnic groups and division of Mali into which most of the Inner state actors in central Mali, all overlaid on a Delta falls—accounted for 40% of Mali’s rice backdrop of ecological stresses induced by production and 20% of its millet and changes in rainfall patterns straining old sorghum production. 6 It was also the norms of communal resource access and country’s leading region for livestock management. I argue that traditional theories raising, despite comprising only 6% of of both terrorism and ethnic conflict are by Mali’s land area. Due to the major seasonal themselves incapable of explaining the changes in the river’s water levels, the same ongoing system of violence in Mopti Region. land can be used or transited by both The events following 2015 are better agriculturalists and herders at different times understood in the context of the communal of the year. Typically, herders pasture their

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 5

FIGURE 1. Map showing the location of Mopti Region in relation to the Niger River.7 Note: The borders for Mopti Region are approximations, and only for illustrative purposes. animals on pastures outside the flood zone framed in ethnic terms, as will be discussed during the rainy season, but during the dry below. Today, the majority of the Inner Niger season they lead their herds to pastures Delta’s people are Sunni Muslims, and, within the flood zone, where their animals despite the formally secular nature of the graze on a nutritious plant that grows modern Malian state, Islam is an important underwater when the area is flooded during component of the identity of most residents the rainy season. Access to these pastures and of the Inner Delta.10 However, Islam is more the right to move herds across the land to important to some groups than others. reach them is regulated not just by the laws Different communities converted to Islam at of the Malian state but also by a set of different points, and the region as a whole customary laws dating back to the nineteenth embraced Islam significantly later than other century.8 areas of .11 For example, Peuls in Central Mali is populated by a large central Mali place the introduction of Islam number of ethnicities. Members of ethnic to their community at the end of the groups are often identified with certain seventeenth century, but some Peuls, as well occupations; for example, Peuls (also as members of other ethnic groups such as referred to as Fulbe or Fulani) are known as the Bambara, remained non-Muslim for pastoralists, Bozos are fishermen, and centuries longer.12 Even in the present, many Songhai and Dogon are farmers.9 In practice, members of certain ethnic groups, such as the things are not quite so simple, and members Dogon—the single most numerous group in of any given group may practice many central Mali—are non-Muslim, holding on to different forms of economic activity. traditional beliefs. Nevertheless, the identification of ethnic In the early nineteenth century, after groups with occupations is widespread and centuries of fragmented political authority, means that economic conflicts are sometimes the Inner Niger Delta was unified by Seku

6 Michael Keen

Amadu, a charismatic Peul Muslim religious eradicate customary systems regulating leader with links to Sufi orders and the resource access. By many rural residents of of northwestern Nigeria. central Mali the state is seen as distant, Seku Amadu’s new state became known as abstract, and—due to the corruption and the Macina Empire, and its ruling elite was overbearing attitude of state officials dominated by Peuls. Under the Macina deployed to the area—predatory and Empire, Islam thoroughly penetrated Peul threatening.18 At the same time, the state’s society. The empire’s bureaucracy consisted expansion has undermined traditional entirely of ʿulamaʾ—Islamic clergy—and authorities, and, as a result, most non-state Islam guided the state’s ideology; for systems are not fully functional. Many example, the empire’s administration, called traditional leaders of ethnic communities the Diina, sponsored Qurʾanic schools and have also moved to towns and cities in the traveling preachers to spread Islam to the region, leading members of their common people.13 In addition to firmly communities in rural areas, especially the entrenching Islam amongst the inhabitants of youth, to question their authority, thus the Inner Delta—especially among Peuls— further weakening traditional systems.19 As a the Macina Empire formalized and codified result, state authority and traditional customs customs to manage resource access. maintain an uneasy coexistence in central Territories for rice cultivation and pasturing Mali. were defined, fishing rights were allocated, In addition to political pressures, the and regulations were set down to clarify who systems regulating resource access in central could access which pastures when, and via Mali have increasingly been stressed by which routes. For example, specific Peul environmental factors. In one way, these clans were granted the right to graze their systems have always been subject to changes cattle on delineated seasonal pastures and to in the environment. During years in which charge access fees to those wishing to transit the Niger River’s flood has been small—such the land.14 as during the droughts of the 1970s and Since Mali gained independence in 1980s—herders have sought to move their 1960, the Malian state has persistently sought animals to formerly submerged pastures to restructure the traditional systems of earlier in the year in order to arrive before resource access and play a larger role in other herders. This has led to conflict both regulating land use and arbitrating disputes, between different groups of herders and with mixed success.15 State-sponsored between herders and farmers, as earlier interventions, especially in the form of land transit of animals over cultivated land is ownership reforms, have consistently more likely to interfere with the harvest and favored cultivated agriculture and those who damage crops.20 Over the last few years, practice it—mainly Bambara, Songhai, and however, climate change has led to drastic Dogon—over pastoralism and pastoralists.16 changes in rainfall patterns in the region, Decade by decade, the state has clawed for severely impacting traditional systems of itself an ever-larger role as an arbiter in resource access. According to a local conflicts over land use at the expense of climatologist, some parts of Mopti Region traditional authorities.17 Despite these today receive only half as much rain as they efforts, the Malian state does not have a did during the 1960s, putting enormous major on-the-ground presence in rural areas pressures on the livelihoods of many local of the Inner Delta, and the provision of people and groups.21 In particular, drought services such as infrastructure, health care, reduces soil productivity, leading cultivators and education is nonexistent in many areas. to attempt to make up the deficit by A lack of state presence, especially in terms expanding onto new land—including land of rural access to the central justice system, formerly used as pasture—again leading to means that the state has not been able to farmer-herder conflicts.22 Especially since

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 7

2015, conflict has broken out over access to control throughout the remainder of 2012 as water and land, and, due to the identification the Malian government was occupied by an of ethnic groups in the area with an economic ongoing military coup and the international occupation, this conflict has been cast in community dithered about mounting a ethnic terms.23 response. Initially, neither the MNLA nor the Ansar al-Din-MUJAO alliance succeeded in establishing a presence outside the main Violence in Mopti Region: Origins and towns of the northern Mopti Region, despite Actors attempting to recruit locals into their ranks.29 In January 2013, however, the alliance The MNLA, Ansar al-Din, and MUJAO attacked the city of Konna in Mopti Region, The current violence in central Mali has its breaking through the Malian army’s front immediate roots in the Malian civil war, lines and threatening to push further south, which formally lasted from 2012 to 2015. possibly even to the capital, Bamako. Faced The war began in January 2012 with a with the prospect of AQIM-linked groups rebellion in Mali’s three northern regions seizing control over all of Mali, France (Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal)24 led by the intervened militarily with , National Movement for the Liberation of which swiftly repelled the jihadists and Azawad (MNLA), a secular, mainly Tuareg25 pushed the war back into the north. group seeking the independence of northern Although the period of war in central Mali. The MNLA was joined in its rebellion Mali was relatively brief, it would have a by Ansar al-Din (“Partisans of Religion”), a significant impact on the region in the group with an Islamist ideology and possible subsequent years. As previously discussed, links to al-Qaʿida in the Islamic Maghreb the Malian state presence in central Mali was (AQIM).26 By April 2012, the two had always tenuous at best, especially in rural defeated the Malian military in the north, and regions. The fighting in 2012 and 2013 the MNLA declared the independence of caused many government officials to flee northern Mali as Azawad.27 In June 2012, their posts for the relative safety of the city however, the MNLA and Ansar al-Din had a of Mopti or areas further south, and many of major falling out over the formal role of them have neither returned nor been Islam in Azawad, and fighting erupted replaced.30 The loss of these officials has between them. Following the separation crippled state presence in much of Mopti from the MNLA, Ansar al-Din became more Region, and unsurprisingly left the state even explicitly committed to an AQIM-inspired less capable of mediating conflicts over jihadist ideology and the implementation of resource access in central Mali. At the same AQIM’s interpretation of Islamic law in the time, as discussed above, the state’s territories under its control. As part of this historical expansion into the area had come process, Ansar al-Din was also joined by new at the expense of local systems of jihadist groups, most notably the Movement governance, and it was not always possible for Jihad and Tawhid in West Africa to simply fall back on traditional systems (MUJAO).28 Together, these jihadist groups when state officials left in 2012-2013. Thus, decisively defeated the MNLA and seized by the end of 2013, a critical power vacuum military control of most of the north. had emerged in much of rural central Mali. The civil war, however, was not just contained to the North but spread into central Katibat Macina, JNIM, and Dan Na Mali as well. In 2012, the MNLA had Ambassagou occupied the northern part of Mopti Region While central Mali saw a period of low before being replaced by the Ansar al-Din- violence following the French intervention in MUJAO alliance. Most of northern Mali and January 2013, the power vacuum created by part of Mopti Region remained under jihadist the withdrawal of the state during the civil

8 Michael Keen war was eventually taken advantage of by rhetoric is built around the need to “return” newly formed local jihadist groups. In to the era of the Macina Empire, and Kouffa January 2015, these groups—whose has frequently praised the Macina system, identities were initially somewhat unclear— framing it as a golden age for local Peuls mounted their first attacks against Malian characterized by a just system of resource soldiers in central Mali. Many more attacks access.35 Indeed, the group is highly critical soon followed targeting not just Malian of the status quo in central Mali, which they security forces but also other state officials, perceive as disadvantaging most Peuls. It state institutions (such as schools), and local heavily criticizes the Malian state and its ally community leaders who opposed the France for imposing foreign norms and jihadists. The Malian press quickly labeled morals on the Muslims of the Inner Delta. In Hamadoun Kouffa, a locally known Peul this context, it also attempts to provide basic preacher with alleged ties to the leadership of services—including a justice and education Ansar al-Din, as the leader of the jihadists.31 system—in many areas of the rural Mopti While the media portrayed these jihadists as Region where the state has no presence or has operating under a new group called the been driven out by Katibat Macina’s Macina Liberation Front (MLF), the nature attacks.36 Moreover, the group is also critical of this organization was, and has remained, of parts of the Peul community. For one, it extremely unclear (no evidence existed of a rhetorically attacks Peul elites for having political or military command structure, and sold out their people and frames itself as a the group never claimed responsibility for means for people to liberate themselves from local attacks or produced videos or other unjust social hierarchies.37 media content).32 Instead, in May 2016, an As fighting between Katibat Macina official communication appeared by a group and Malian security forces continued through which referred to itself not as the MLF but as 2015 and 2016, a third set of violent actors Katibat Macina, again led by Hamadoun soon entered the scene: non-Islamic ethnic Kouffa. The group claimed to be part of militias. Many of these ethnic militias Ansar al-Din.33 In March 2017, Kouffa emerged from the primarily agricultural himself appeared in a video announcing the Dogon community, which, while not an creation of a new jihadist umbrella group in absolute majority, is the largest single ethnic Mali, Jamaʿat Nusrat al-Islam wa-l- community in Mopti Region. While some of Muslimin (JNIM; “The Group for the the Dogon are Muslim, most have Support of Islam and Muslims”), which maintained traditional beliefs, and these subsequently pledged allegiance to al- groups did not frame themselves as Qaʿida’s central command and was officially “jihadists” or “Islamic fighters.” Instead, recognized as al-Qaʿida’s Malian affiliate. most Dogon self-defense groups were While Katibat Macina, along with initially formed by Dozos—traditional several groups operating primarily in Dogon hunting societies38—as anti-jihadist northern Mali, is supposedly an official part responses to localized conflict eruptions. of JNIM, little suggests that the group has With time these groups got more organized, been formally integrated into either al- and in late 2016, a number of them merged Qaʿida’s or JNIM’s command structure.34 to form a new group, named Dan Na Aside from the extent to which Katibat Ambassagou (“Hunters Who Trust in Macina is centrally controlled and integrated God”).39 Dan Na Ambassagou reportedly has vertically into JNIM and al-Qaʿida, certain a military-style command structure with characteristics of the group are known. As ranks and units and commands hundreds of the name suggests, the group is dominated by fighters throughout Dogon areas.40 With Peuls, most of whom have been recruited Dogon militias entering the political and from rural areas of Mopti Region and had military arena, violence in Mopti Region low social standing. Much of the group’s became more explicitly embedded in ethnic

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 9 tensions. Because, as mentioned above, most exists of links between the Malian military jihadists are recruited from the Peul and the Dogon militias, and many civilians in community, the anti-jihadist stance of Dan Mopti Region have accused the state of Na Ambassagou and its likes has often been providing military weapons to the Dogon cast in ethnic terms, as Dogons versus Peuls. militias.44 At a minimum, elements within Nevertheless, ethnic tensions do not just arise the Malian military see the Dogon militias as due to the Peul involvement in jihadist useful in securing areas of central Mali where movements. In addition to maintaining the state has no presence (despite the Dogon security and defending their communities militias’ less-than-stellar record in actually from jihadist attacks, Dan Na Ambassagou fighting jihadists). The leader of Dan Na and other Dogon militias have also been Ambassagou has even publicly stated his motivated by economic concerns, responding men have worked alongside the Malian to increasing tensions regarding resource military in just such a role.45 However, the access, especially in terms of land usage. In formal policy of the Malian government this context, they have framed their remains the disarmament and demobilization operations in terms of mobilizing of the Dogon militias, and the two sets of agriculturalists against pastoralists and have actors have different goals. In this way, mainly targeted Peul villages and civilians. Katibat Macina, Dogon militias, and Malian While similar forms of economic and ethnic security forces are all actors in a single motives for violence in central Mali can be mutually reinforcing system of violence in traced to the 1980s,41 earlier instances of central Mali, in which each group has fought fighting took place at far lower levels. with the other two.46 Following the Malian civil war, the rise of jihadist movements, and the growing impact of climate change on resource access, the Applying Theories of Terrorism and spread and intensity of ethnic violence have Ethnic Conflict to Central Mali escalated drastically. The relationship between the Dogon In international media and scholarship, militias and the Malian state is somewhat violence in the central Mali region has often more complex. Malian government leaders been framed as either “terrorism” or “ethnic have consistently called for the dissolution conflict.” There are many reasons why this and disarmament of the Dogon militias, terminology is appropriate. Although there is especially after the latter was found to have no universally accepted definition of committed atrocities against civilians. In terrorism, many common definitions March 2019, Dan Na Ambassagou was understand terrorism as violence intended to formally banned after it was accused of intimidate or coerce civilian populations.47 killing more than 125 Peul civilians in the When this definition is applied, all three sets village of Ogossagou.42 Prior to the of violent actors in central Mali can be said —which raised such to have engaged in terrorism. Indeed, the national and international furor that it led to brunt of the fighting in Mopti Region has the resignation of the government of Malian been borne by civilians, and civilian deaths prime minister Soumeylou Boubèye in Mopti Region have come to far outstrip Maïga—the Dogon militias, and especially casualties from fighting in other areas of the Dan Na Ambassagou, had clashed with country.48 This reality is a shared Malian security forces in several instances responsibility, and members of each of the over the course of 2018, albeit with far fewer three main sets of actors involved in the casualties. Nevertheless, despite its official conflict have been accused by international stance against Dan Na Ambassagou, the rights groups of committing war crimes and government has yet to take serious action crimes against humanity.49 Similarly, there is against the group.43 In fact, strong evidence certainly an ethnic component to this

10 Michael Keen violence, evident in the rhetoric of both Mali to clear-cut political goals. First, it is Katibat Macina and the Dogon militias. uncertain whether or not Katibat Macina Nevertheless, violence in Mopti Region is actually exists as a unified group rather than more complex than this. Due to the belief on a loose collection of fighters, as there is no the part of Dogon militias and state security evidence of a clear military or political forces that Peuls automatically support command structure.53 Second, even jihadist groups and the identification of assuming Katibat Macina is a unified group ethnic groups with economic occupations, it and is responsible for most or all attacks in is no longer possible to effectively separate Mopti Region attributed to jihadists, the violence motivated by differing group does not publicly claim responsibility interpretations of Islam (i.e. jihadism), for its attacks, nor does it release videos or violence motivated by ethnicity, and other media, undermining the idea that it violence motivated by competition for seeks to leverage its attacks for political resources. In this context, traditional theories goals.54 Third, and most importantly, when of terrorism and ethnic violence have largely former members of central Malian jihadist been unable to completely explain events in groups—including those who left voluntarily Mopti Region. and those who were captured by security In the case of terrorism, most forces—were interviewed by a team of established theories seek to explain terrorist Malian and European researchers working violence in one of two ways. First, some for an NGO, they overwhelmingly claimed theories paint terrorism as a product of that they joined these groups primarily to underlying psychological conditions. As protect themselves and their families and Walter Laqueur, a proponent of the secondarily to increase their social standing psychological conditions model, wrote, “all in their communities.55 While Katibat terrorists… suffer from some form of Macina’s purportedly has an overarching delusion and mania.”50 political goal, namely the establishment of an Alternatively, other theories frame terrorism Islamic state in Mali and the application of as a strategic choice, a tool in the service of the group’s interpretation of Islamic law in political goals. Shibley Telhami, one daily life, this does not appear to have advocate for the strategic choice model, influenced recruits.56 Thus, in the case of argues that terrorists are not psychologically Katibat Macina, the strategic choice abnormal but that groups adopt terrorism “as approach must be complemented by a more a method to serve their ends,” ends that are expansive theory. typically political in nature.51 Nevertheless, Similarly, neither the psychological both of these paradigms run into problems conditions model nor the strategic choice when applied to the context of central Mali. approach can comprehensively account for One such problem arises in analyzing Katibat terrorist acts committed by fighters from the Macina and similar jihadist groups. While Malian state and the Dogon militias. First, little empirical data on individual members the high number of participants makes it of jihadist groups in central Mali exist, the unlikely that perpetrators of terrorist actions extant data—mainly consisting of interviews from either of these two sets of actors suffer conducted by NGO researchers with youths from psychological conditions such as formerly involved with jihadist groups, some delusion and mania. Second, it is unlikely of whom were in government custody at the that attacks against civilians carried out by time of the interview—does not indicate any the Malian state is part of the government’s sort of systematic psychological political strategy. Malian military authorities abnormalities or predilections on the part of have repeatedly condemned atrocities central Malian jihadist recruits.52 It is against civilians in central Mali, and taken similarly difficult to ascribe Katibat Macina measures against members of its own fighters’ use of terrorist strategies in central security forces when these have been

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 11 suspected of perpetrating such atrocities.57 informing public motivations on all sides of Any attempt to apply the strategic choice the violence, such as the importance of approach to the attacks against civilians thus promoting or combating religious ideologies. inevitably relies on retroactively divining Neither do these theories capture the from security forces’ terrorist actions goals importance of economic struggles over that Malian military and Malian state resource access. Finally, theories of ethnic officials at all levels themselves deny. The conflict are completely unable to explain acts strategic choice approach is perhaps best of violence committed by the Malian state. applied to the Dogon militias, as their attacks As discussed above, Malian security forces against Peul civilians appear to be part of an operating in central Mali are not organized explicit strategy to achieve their goals of along ethnic lines or dominated by any ethnic “protecting Dogons against potential jihadist group from the area. attacks.”58 The Dogon militias seem to view Peul civilians as potential jihadist supporters and believe that terrorism can coerce the Peul Virtuous Violence and Central Mali civilian population into abandoning their support of the jihadist groups. Terror against Since traditional theories of terrorism and civilians could arguably also be used to ethnic violence are unable to fully explain intimidate and deter Peul pastoralists from what motivates perpetrators of violence in using Dogon lands. Nevertheless, as we will central Mali at the group and individual level, see below, there are other dimensions to a broader theory of violence is needed. Here, these acts of terrorism that can only be virtuous violence theory, articulated by Alan understood outside the strategic choice Fiske and Tage Shakti Rai, offers a number approach. of useful lenses through which to examine Traditional theories of ethnic violence in central Mali. Fiske and Rai argue violence are similarly incapable of alone that perpetrators of violence overwhelmingly explaining the system of violence in Mopti believe their actions are morally justified and Region. These theories typically incorporate engage in violence to advance four types of three sets of causes.59 The first sees ethnic universal social relationships or relational violence as instrumental and claims that models, which they call communal sharing, people participate in ethnic violence because authority ranking, equality matching, and they believe it is in their personal interest to market pricing.63 Of these, this article will do so.60 The second views ethnic violence as focus on communal sharing and authority fundamentally emotional, suggesting that ranking.64 Communal sharing derives from ethnic violence is driven primarily by the idea of group unity, which, as Fiske and emotional impulses and emotional antipathy Rai put it, “is directed toward caring for and towards another ethnic group.61 Finally, the supporting the integrity of in-groups through third set of causes for ethnic violence found a sense of collective responsibility and in the literature, albeit somewhat less common fate.”65 More pointedly, for those frequently, is obligation—people perpetrate “motivated by [communal sharing] unity, ethnic violence because they believe their violence is morally praiseworthy if the social ties oblige them to do so.62 To some victim is perceived as a potential threat or extent, the combination of instrumental, contaminant to the in-group.”66 Authority emotional, and obligatory motives ranking, for its part, is motivated by traditionally explored in theories on ethnic hierarchy, “creating and maintaining linear violence can account for violence perpetrated ranking in social groups.”67 Violence by the Dogon militias and jihadist groups. motivated by authority ranking is deemed Nevertheless, by definitionally focusing on morally acceptable if it is directed against ethnicity as a cause for violence they do not those who are a threat to what the perpetrator adequately account for other factors in sees as the ideal hierarchy in social

12 Michael Keen relationships. The principle holds for protect their communities also implicitly hierarchies composed of both individuals and signal their willingness to carry out offensive groups. In addition to the relational models, operations against their communities’ Fiske and Rai propose six constitutive enemies in response to perceived threats phases, referring to the ways in which each (redress and rectification). In line with the relational model “generate[s], shape[s], and theory proposed by Fiske and Rai, both preserve[s] the social relationships a person constitutive phases strengthen the unity of needs.”68 The six constitutive phases are: the in-group. creation, “violence that is intended to form Authority ranking motivations new relationships”; modulation, which behind Katibat Macina are somewhat more change “the nature of an existing relationship subtle, but they exist in multiple forms. At in a way that does not create a fundamentally the individual level, some former members new relationship”; protection, violence said they were motivated to join the group by deployed to protect the perpetrator and the the prospect of group membership helping perpetrator’s relationship partners; redress them rise within their communities.71 For and rectification, violence designed to these recruits, joining Katibat Macina fulfills restore a relationship to its ideal state by the modulation and potentially creation punishing a transgressor; termination, constitutive phases of the authority ranking violence intended to forever end a relational model. By committing themselves relationship; and mourning, violence “in to perpetrate violence against third parties, response to the loss of an important they seek to modulate their hierarchical relationship.”69 Each of these constitutive relationships with other members of their phases can be motivated by and contribute to community and potentially create new social any of the four relational models. hierarchies in which they benefit from their All three of the main sets of status as specialists in violence. At the group perpetrators of violence in central Mali have level, Hamadoun Kouffa, the purported acted in accordance with both the communal leader of Katibat Macina, has rhetorically sharing and authority ranking relational attacked Peul elites in Mopti Region for their models. For example, former members of corruption,72 and his group has targeted Katibat Macina who spoke with members of many traditional Peul leaders who refuse to an NGO stress that they joined the group pay taxes to jihadist groups.73 Attacks on primarily because they sought to protect their traditional Peul leaders fulfill the redress and communities as the state cannot or will not rectification constitutive mode of the do so. As one former member put it, “since authority ranking relational model, as the the state left, we have had to protect group perpetrates violence to punish those ourselves as best we can.”70 The decision of who have transgressed against the group’s these recruits to join Katibat Macina is an ideal hierarchy by refusing to pay taxes. The explicit fulfillment of the protection punishments are designed to restore the constitutive phase and an implicit fulfillment hierarchy and warn other would-be of the redress and rectification constitutive transgressors. At the community level, phase of the communal sharing relational Katibat Macina has attacked local model. By joining a group dedicated to agriculturalist communities, especially the violence, the recruits preemptively Dogon, in tandem with its attacks against demonstrate their willingness to participate state forces and institutions. Combined, these in violence to defend members of their in- attacks serve to challenge through violence group—their local community (protection). the Malian state’s longtime preference for Moreover, because Katibat Macina is not a cultivators over herders, expressed through strictly defensive group but also carries out land policy, in favor of a more egalitarian or offensive operations against its perceived even opposing hierarchical relationship opponents, recruits who ostensibly join to between cultivators and herder

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 13 communities.74 These attacks thus constitute imposed hierarchy placing Malian security the modulation constitutive phase of forces above Dan Na Ambassagou as authority ranking because Katibat Macina legitimate purveyors of violence in central uses violence to challenge the farmer-herder Mali. hierarchy. While Katibat Macina justifies its Finally, Malian security forces have actions through the language of Islam and also perpetrated violence in central Mali to jihad, the group operates according to further the relational models of communal multiple logics. In this context, Fiske and sharing and authority ranking. For instance, Rai’s relational models offer a in May 2018, Malian security forces complementary understanding of the group’s summarily executed 12 civilians at a weekly everyday operations. cattle market in the village of Boulkessy after Dogon militias, and especially Dan a Malian soldier was killed in an attack Na Ambassagou, also perpetrate violence in nearby.77 The killing of civilians in accordance with the communal sharing and Boulkessy is an example of violence used to authority ranking relational models. Both fulfill the redress and rectification and Dan Na Ambassagou and the militias that protection constitutive phases of the preceded it (and continue to exist in parallel) communal sharing relational model, the were explicitly founded as a community self- community, in this case, being the Malian defense group intended to repel jihadist military. By killing nearby civilians and attacks.75 Individuals who joined Dan Na falsely accusing them of having been Ambassagou under these auspices thus terrorists,78 the Malian soldiers sought to sought to fulfill the protection constitutive avenge their comrades (redress and phase of the communal sharing relational rectification), eliminate potential threats to model, signaling their intent to perpetrate the in-group (protection), and induce those violence to protect members of their in- outside the in-group to desist in attacking group. At the communal level, Dan Na members of the in-group (protection), thus Ambassagou has attacked Peul villages and demonstrating their commitment to the in- civilians outside the areas under the effective group’s unity. The Boulkessy massacre was control of jihadist groups. These attacks not an isolated incident, and international constitute the redress and rectification and rights groups have documented a pattern of protection phases of communal sharing. By violent reprisals by the Malian military killing Peul civilians, Dan Na Ambassagou against local civilians.79 In this context, Fiske militiamen punish third parties for attacks on and Rai’s theory can be used to cast light on the militiamen’s in-group (redress and some of the motivations behind the soldiers’ rectification) and eliminate perceived actions. Moreover, this theory can also be potential threats to the in-group (protection). applied to the confrontations between the At the same time, these attacks also fulfill the Malian state and Dan Na Ambassagou. In redress and rectification phase of authority attacking the Dogon militia, the military ranking by punishing Peuls for challenging seeks to punish it for its transgressions traditional herder-farmer hierarchies in against a perceived hierarchical agreement central Mali. Dan Na Ambassagou has also between the two groups that Dan Na frequently engaged in armed confrontations Ambassagou would operate only in areas with the Malian state, even if the levels of where the army was not.80 Moreover, the violence accompanying these confrontations Malian military seeks to restore the honor of have thus far been significantly lower than its in-group by demonstrating that it is those associated with Dan Na Ambassagou’s capable of maintaining security in areas attacks on civilians.76 These confrontations under its control without assistance. In this fulfill the modulation constitutive phase of way, the confrontations with Dan Na authority ranking as Dan Na Ambassagou Ambassagou fulfill the redress and seeks to challenge the Malian government’s rectification constitutive phase of both the

14 Michael Keen authority ranking and communal sharing and multilateral ceasefires and disarmament model. schemes.81 All such schemes, however, have quickly broken down. Although some Malian public figures—especially Salafi- Conclusion oriented religious leaders such as Mahmoud Dicko, former leader of the High Islamic This article has argued that violence in Council of Mali—support negotiating with central Mali is being perpetrated by three Hamadoun Kouffa and Katibat Macina over primary sets of actors: jihadist groups, an end to violence in exchange for an especially Katibat Macina; Malian state adjustment to the role of Islam in public life security force; and ethnic militias, especially in Mali, no such negotiations have formally the Dogon militia Dan Na Ambassagou. By occurred.82 The Malian state, community targeting civilians, all three sets of actors peacebuilders, civil society groups have committed acts of terrorism. An representing ethnic militias, and international analysis of the central Malian conflicts donors and human rights groups all agree in shows that violence is fueled by a wide range principle that lasting peace can only be of factors, including disputes over the role of achieved in central Mali if Malian security Islam, ethnic tensions between Peuls and forces can guarantee security to all elements Dogons, economic conflict over resource of the populace impartially and if the Malian access, tension between state and traditional state expands its presence on the ground to authority, and changing rainfall patterns due provide services to the population.83 to climate change. More importantly, this However, in their current form, Malian article has argued that these actors and security forces are firmly contributing to the factors cannot be viewed separately from one system of violence in central Mali rather than another. What is occurring in central Mali playing a role in ending it—one rights cannot be broken down into distinct sub- group’s investigation concluded that the conflicts pitting just two of the actors against Malian military summarily executed more each other, nor can it be reduced to insulated than 100 civilians and tortured dozens of models of terrorism or ethnic conflict. others in 2018 alone.84 This comes despite Instead, traditional theories of both terrorism extensive sums of money and time being and ethnic conflict are best complemented by spent on training for the Malian military a more expansive theory of violence—such focused on respecting the rights of the as Fiske and Rai’s theory of virtuous populace. In the short- and medium-term, the violence. By showing how violence is Malian state simply lacks the resources to informed by a wide range of logics— dramatically expand services in central Mali, including supporting the integrity of the in- and it is unlikely that it will be able to single- group, and maintaining the in-group’s linear handedly ensure peace in the region. ranking—Fiske and Rai allow us to see Where other efforts have failed, central Mali as a complex social and political however, virtuous violence theory offers a space in which acts of terrorism are not just subtly different approach towards reducing rooted in ethnic hatred, political strategizing, levels of violence in central Mali. As Fiske or psychological disorder. and Rai note, violence only continues to be Understanding the system of violence seen as morally acceptable when it actually in central Mali through virtuous violence enhances the perpetrator’s social theory also offers insight into potential paths relationships through any of the relational to reducing the current levels of violence and models—violent practices formerly seen as ultimately ending the interlocking conflicts. morally acceptable “[disappear] as soon as Over the course of the past three years, the the consequences of violence bec[o]me Malian government and various ethnic maladaptive.”85 According to this line of militias have formally agreed to unilateral reasoning, violence in central Mali should

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 15 theoretically cease if violent actions have a trying to make violence negatively impact negative impact on the perpetrator’s social the perpetrator’s social relationships and to relationships. The impact of violence on the socially reward non-violent options, and, in perpetrator’s social relationships is most the case of the Macina women, also easily adjustable on the side of the Malian furthering the communal sharing relational security forces because the Malian state is model through non-violent means. However, already formally committed to ending the while these grassroots peace efforts have met violence, providing security impartially, and with some successes, they remain largely respecting human rights. The Malian state unconnected from each other and from state has even paid lip service to the need to end support.89 At the moment, it is not the culture of impunity in its armed forces. immediately clear what can be done to However, thus far punishments inflicted by support the efforts of such local activists, and the state on soldiers found or alleged to have the topic requires further research. committed violent rights abuses have not Nevertheless, virtuous violence theory extended beyond simply redeploying indicates this approach is likely to be offending units to other parts of the productive if more support is given. country.86 As such, these punishments have Virtuous violence theory is not just not succeeded in making violence on the part relevant in the case of central Mali but can of the security forces maladaptive. cast light on many of the ongoing violent Nevertheless, security reforms dedicated to conflicts in the broader African context. rendering violence maladaptive for the social Worryingly for counterterrorism efforts, the relationships of perpetrators—starting with underlying conditions that have allowed harsher, more transparent punishments for Katibat Macina to persist and grow— transgressors but focusing on forming preexisting ethnic and economic conflict, negative perceptions of transgressors among low levels of state presence, and Islam as a those in communal sharing and authority strong local identity marker—are present in ranking relationships with them—may many other regions throughout Africa. For succeed where attempts to simply educate example, in Plateau State of central Nigeria, soldiers on the importance of human rights at least 4,000 people have been killed since have failed. 2001 in violence that has largely pitted Peul Reducing the adaptivity of violence and Hausa Muslim herders against Christian for perpetrators in jihadist groups and ethnic farmers from other ethnic groups.90 As in militias is more difficult. As Fiske and Rai central Mali, the Nigerian conflict features a suggest, changes in cultural views in these mix of ethnic conflict and conflict over communities must come from within the access to resources, and changing rainfall communities themselves. However, in some patterns have exacerbated economic places, local activists—and especially pressures. Until now, the conflict in Plateau women—have spurred local community State has not been framed in jihadist terms, reconciliations. For example, in the small and the Nigerian military has not become a town of Macina,87 following an eruption of primary perpetrator of violence against violence between the local Peul and Bambara civilians as the Malian military has. communities, local women organized first However, the example of central Mali shows community dialogue and then a formal that jihadist ideology can graft itself onto reconciliation celebration featuring cultural existing conflicts, and the Nigerian military activities shared by both groups. The event, has a history of perpetrating violence against which successfully ended the outbreak of civilians in other areas of the country. The violence in the area, also shamed authority conflict in Plateau State is not alone in figures in the community who could have sharing parallels with that of central Mali; the done more to stop the violence but did not.88 Central African Republic and Mozambique In short, these local peacebuilders have been are also home to conflicts with similar

16 Michael Keen characteristics. Local factors will determine nature to the system of violence present in whether or not conflicts in states such as central Mali underscores the importance of Nigeria, CAR, and Mozambique are understanding and resolving this situation. eventually framed in terms of jihad, but the When confronted with a system of violence underlying elements for escalating violence involving jihadism, ethnic conflict, state along central Malian lines are present. actors, and economic tension traditional Violence, moreover, is not just a social and theories of terrorism and ethnic violence political question, but also an environmental encounter severe limitations. Only a broader one. Across the continent, increasing climate theory of violence, such as virtuous violence pressures will induce greater tensions theory, can be applied to the conflict between different communities over resource holistically. Perhaps most importantly, such access, raising the potential for violence to theories hold the key for conflict resolution assume ethnic and jihadist dimensions. The in the years to come, both in central Mali and potential proliferation of conflicts similar in elsewhere.

1 “Attaques de Tenenkou: L’ombre de Hammadoun 8 Matthew D. Turner, “The Micropolitics of Common Koufa avec un Mouvement de Libération de Macina Property Management on the Maasina Floodplains of plane,” Le Républicain, January 23, 2015, Central Mali,” Canadian Journal of African Studies http://malijet.com/a_la_une_du_mali/121613- 40, no. 1 (January 2006): 47–48, attaques_de_tenenkou_l_ombre_de_hammadoun.htm https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2006.10751335. l. 9 Anca-Elena Urcu, Under the Gun: Resource 2 In this article, I use the term “jihadist” solely as a Conflicts and Embattled Traditional Authorities in label in accordance with the term’s overwhelming Central Mali (Clingendael: Netherlands Institute of occurrence in Malian discourse and the Malian media. International Relations 2018), 10, An analysis of the nuances of the deeper concept of https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/under-gun-resource- jihad in the Malian context and how groups operating conflicts-and-embattled-traditional-authorities- in Mopti Region engage with the concept is beyond central-mali. the scope of this article. 10 Ibid., 92. 3 A note on names: different spellings of many Malian 11 Timothy Insoll, “The Archaeology of Islamisation personal and place names appear in various scholarly in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Comparative Study,” in and media sources. For example, the jihadist leader Islamisation: Comparative Perspectives from History, Hamadoun Kouffa’s first name appears as Hamadoun, ed. Andrew C. S. Peacock (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Hamadou, and Amadou, while his second name is University Press, 2017), 260. While the Inner Niger variously rendered as Koufa and Kouffa, among Delta was incorporated into major West African others. In this article, in my own writing, I strive to empires such as the Malian Empire, the rulers of consistently use the name that appears to be most which converted to Islam in the early 14th century CE, commonly used, and I include French accents and it is unclear to what extent Islam spread to the diacritical marks where applicable. However, I do not common people during this period rather than make any attempt to standardize names in quotations remaining a religion of the elite. and citations. 12 Despite their relatively recent conversion, Peuls 4 “Mali: violents affrontements communautaires au today place Islam at the very center of Peul identity: centre du pays,” Radio France Internationale, July 20, they believe the ancestor of all Peuls was a 2015, http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150720-mali- Companion of the Prophet who married a Malinké violents-affrontements-communautaires-centre-pays. woman. See Mirjam De Bruijn and Han van Dijk, Arid 5 “Mali: six morts dans des violences entre Peuls et Ways: Cultural Understandings of Insecurity in Fulbe Dogons,” Jeune Afrique, July 20, 2015, Society, Central Mali (Amsterdam: Thela Publishers, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/247833/societe/mali- 1995), 51. six-morts-violences-entre-peuls-dogons/. 13 Ibid., 53–54. 6 Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making? (Belgium: 14 Ibid., 54. International Crisis Group 2016), 15 While the systems of resource access laid out by the https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west- Diina of the Macina Empire have been repeatedly africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making. contested over the past two centuries, these systems 7 Map derived from “Map of the River Niger,” continue to influence norms for communal resource Wikipedia Commons, available from access in the rural Inner Delta to this day. See Turner, http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Niger_river “The Micropolitics of Common Property _map.svg (accessed October 5, 2019). Management,” 48 and De Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid Ways, 92–93.

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 17

Ansar al-Din and a successor group to MUJAO 16 This favoritism originated with the political ultimately formally pledged loyalty to AQIM. ideology of the Malian government under President 29 Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, 7. Modibo Keita (1960-1968), which viewed cultivated 30 Ibid. agriculture as the key to economic development, but 31 “Attaques de Tenenkou: L’ombre de Hammadoun has generally continued under subsequent regimes. Koufa avec un Mouvement de Libération de Macina For more information, see Charles Grémont, “Villages plane,” Le Républicain, January 23, 2015, and Crossroads: Changing Territorialities Among the http://malijet.com/a_la_une_du_mali/121613- Tuareg of northern Mali,” in Saharan Frontiers: attaques_de_tenenkou_l_ombre_de_hammadoun.htm Space and Mobility in Northwest Africa, ed. James l. McDougall (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 32 Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, 11. 2012), 137–138. 33 Aurélien Tobie, “Central Mali: Violence, Local 17 De Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid Ways, 489. Perspectives, and Diverging Narratives,” SIPRI 18 An analyst who had recently spent time in Central Insights on Peace and Security Series No. 2007/5, 7, Mali told the author that among Malian government https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018- officials, Central Mali is seen as a place to get rich, i.e. 02/sipriinsight_1713_mali_3_eng.pdf. through corruption, rather than provide services. See 34 Katibat Macina and Ansar al-Din were each De Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid Ways, 465. announced separately as becoming parts of JNIM, 19 Interview conducted by the author with an analyst leaving Katibat Macina’s previous reported status as a employed by an NGO based in the United States who division of Ansar al-Din unclear. had recently spent time conducting research in Central 35 See Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, 12, Mali, July 2018. and Tobie, 11. In positioning itself to appeal uniquely 20 Turner, “The Micropolitics of Common Property to a specific group—in this case, Peuls—Katibat Management,” 53–54. Macina followed in the footsteps of many AQIM- 21 Sebastien Malo, “In Rain-Short Mali, Villagers linked groups present in the Sahara and Sahel more Enlist Irrigation to Ward Off Extremism,” Thomson broadly. Indeed, rather than claim to control a single Reuters Foundation News, October 29, 2018, unified group, AQIM and central al-Qaʿida leadership http://news.trust.org/item/20181029065819-is8ps/. encouraged the proliferation of ostensibly 22 De Bruijn and van Dijk, Arid Ways, 93. independent groups that tailored their rhetoric and 23 Urcu, Under the Gun, 23–24. messages to specific audiences. This was done for 24 Taoudenit and Ménaka, formerly administrative three reasons. First, al-Qaʿida leadership was simply subdivisions of the Timbuktu and Gao regions logistically incapable of exerting direct control over respectively, have subsequently been promoted in many of its lieutenants in the Sahara and Sahel, and status to full regions, bringing the total of northern rivalries existed between different commanders. Thus, regions to five. commanders could not be prevented from acting 25 Tuaregs constitute a transnational ethnic group independently, at least occasionally, and separating spanning Mali, Niger, and Algeria. In Mali, Tuaregs them formally helped minimize intra-organizational are concentrated in the North, although some also live rivalries. Second, AQIM leadership cautioned its in the Center. Traditionally nomadic pastoralists, lieutenants and supporters in the Sahel against Tuaregs have long had a contentious relationship with showing their power too openly, lest they provoke the Malian state; Tuareg-led rebellions have occurred international retaliation. Because the small groups in northern Mali in 1963, 1990, 2006, and 2012. were not officially pledged to al-Qaʿida, they were 26 The precise nature of the links between Ansar al- thought to attract less undesirable attention. Third, al- Din and AQIM and between the MNLA and Ansar al- Qaʿida leadership believed that a number of smaller, Din during the first half of 2012 are highly contested. specifically tailored groups could, combined, recruit 27 Although Azawad was originally a geographic more effectively than a single umbrella group. All of term—referring to a valley spanning the Mali-Niger these beliefs were re-evaluated following the takeover border—since the 1970s it has been linked to the of northern Mali by AQIM-linked groups and Tuareg nationalist movement as a name for a would- subsequent international intervention, leading to the be Tuareg nation-state. formation of JNIM as an umbrella group. Although 28 A full discussion of the jihadist groups operating in the ideology of the group is framed around a “return” northern Mali during the MNLA’s uprising and the to the Macina system, both Katibat Macina and JNIM complex, ever-changing relations between them is support a form of Islam quite different than that outside the scope of this article. However, Ansar al- practiced in the Macina Empire. The group thus Din and MUJAO were both front groups for AQIM, presents a return to an idealized ahistorical condition although Ansar al-Din was through its leadership tied of Islam as the solution to both perceived injustice much more closely into elite Tuareg religious and within the Peul community and repression of the Peul political circles in Kidal Region, while MUJAO community by the Malian state. developed extremely close links with predominantly 36 Ibid., 15. Arab drug traffickers, especially in Gao Region. Both 37 Tobie, “Central Mali,” 14.

18 Michael Keen

Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 195, 38 Dozos are secret societies of hunters with their own https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550600570119. initiation and ritual practices. They are not only drawn 51 Shibley Telhami, The Stakes: America in the Middle from the Dogon but rather from a number of ethnic East: The Consequences of Power and the Choice for groups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Cote D’Ivoire. Peace (Boulder: Westview Press, 2002), 16. However, in Central Mali, Dozos are perceived as 52 Lori-Anne Théroux-Bénoni et al., “Mali’s Young belonging to the Dogon community, and a full ‘Jihadists’: Fuelled by Faith or Circumstance?,” analysis of the Dozos is outside the scope of this Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief Series 89, article. August 2016, 3–6, 39 “Mali: deux nouveaux groupes d’autodéfense https://issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/malis- voient le jour dans le centre,” Radio France young-jihadists-fuelled-by-faith-or-circumstance. Internationale, May 24, 2018, 53 Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, 11. http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20180524-mali-deux- 54 Ibid. nouveaux-groupes-autodefense-voient-le-jour-le- 55 Théroux-Bénoni et al., “Mali’s Young ‘Jihadists’,” centre. 2–5. 40 “We Used to Be Brothers”: Self-Defense Group 56 In one way, the strategic choice approach to Abuses in Central Mali (Washington D.C.: Human understanding terrorism, which holds that groups Rights Watch, 2018), employ terrorism as a tool to achieve specific ends— https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/12/07/we-used-be- usually, but not exclusively, understood to be political brothers/self-defense-group-abuses-central-mali#. in nature—cannot be dismissed entirely in the Central 41 Turner, “The Micropolitics of Common Property Malian case. That members of Katibat Macina engage Management,” 53. in acts that fall under the definition of terrorism 42 “Mali Bans Hunting Society After Attack Kills 130 because they believe doing so will advance their goals Fulani,” BBC News, March 24, 2019, in general cannot be doubted, but the same motivation https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47687682. can be applied to practically any human behavior. 43 Moribafing Camara, “Centre du Mali : FAMA et 57 Dans le centre du Mali. Dan Na Ambassagou s’affrontent de nouveau,” 58 “Milice d’auto-défense: après les Peulhs, les L’Indicateur de Renouveau, November 22, 2018, Dogons créent leur mouvement,” Studio Tamani, June http://bamada.net/centre-du-mali-fama-et-dan-na- 1, 2018, ambassagou-saffrontent-de-nouveau. https://www.studiotamani.org/index.php/themes/polit 44 Urcu, Under the Gun, 26. ique/15836-milice-d-auto-defense-apres-les-peulhs- 45 “‘Le risque d’une balkanisation du territoire malien les-dogons-creent-leur-mouvement. est réel’,” Le Monde, June 11, 2019, 59 Matthew Lange, “Emotional Prejudice and Ethnic https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/06/11/le Obligations: Motives of Ethnic Violence,” in Killing -risque-d-une-balkanisation-du-territoire-malien-est- Others: A Natural History of Ethnic Violence, ed. reel_5474782_3212.html. Matthew Lange (Cornell University Press, 2017), 123. 46 The rise of Dogon militias has in turn spurred the 60 Ibid., 124. creation of non-jihadist Peul self-defense militias. 61 Ibid., 125–126. However, these Peul militias have had a smaller 62 Ibid., 134–136. impact on the system of violence in Central Mali than 63 Alan Page Fiske and Tage Shakti Rai, Virtuous the jihadist groups, the Dogon militias, and the Malian Violence: Hurting and Killing to Create, Sustain, End, state, and they are not discussed in detail in this paper. and Honor Social Relationships (Cambridge: 47 One definition of terrorism that frames it in such Cambridge University Press, 2014), 17. terms is the oldest extant definition of terrorism 64 Available data is insufficient to determine to what encoded in US federal law, which appears in the extent, if any, the equality matching and market Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. pricing relational models are also present as 48Rupert Colville, “Press Briefing Notes on motivations behind violence in Central Mali. Nicaragua, Mali, and Kashmir,” UN High 65 Fiske and Rai, Virtuous Violence,18. Commissioner for Human Rights, July 17, 2018, 66 Ibid. https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Displa 67 Ibid. yNews.aspx?NewsID=23383&LangID=E. 68 Ibid., 22. 49 Dans le centre du Mali, les populations prises au 69 Ibid., 21–22. While all the constitutive phases can piège du terrorisme et du contre-terrorisme (Paris: be, and usually are performed non-violently, virtuous International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), violence theory is, of course, interested in their 2018), 11, performance through violence. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/fidh_centre_du_mali_ 70 Quoted in Théroux-Benoni et al., “Mali’s Young les_populations_prises_au_pie_ge_du_terrorisme_et ‘Jihadists’,” 5. _contre_terrorisme.pdf. 71 Ibid., 2. 50 Quoted in Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, 72 Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?, i. “The Psychology of Terrorism: ‘Syndrome’ Versus ‘Tool’ Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political

Terror in the Inner Niger Delta 19

unilat%C3%A9ral-Youssouf-Toloba-Dan-Nan- 73 See ‘We Used to Be Brothers’: Self-Defense Group Ambassagou-Septembre-2018.pdf. Abuses in Central Mali. 82 Speaking with the ‘Bad Guys’: Toward Dialogue 74 Grémont, “Villages and Crossroads,” 137–138. with Central Mali’s Jihadists, Africa Report No. 276 75 See ‘We Used to Be Brothers’: Self-Defense Group (Belgium: International Crisis Group, 2019), Abuses in Central Mali. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sahel/mali/276- 76 Camara, “Centre du Mali.” speaking-bad-guys-toward-dialogue-central-- 77 “La MINUSMA conclut son enquête sur les jihadists. incidents de Boulkessy du 19 Mai 2018,” Mission 83 Richard Reeve, Mali on the Brink: Insights From Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour Local Peacebuilders on the Causes of Violent Conflict la Stabilisation au Mali (MINUSMA), June 26, 2018, and the Prospects for Peace (London: Peace Direct https://minusma.unmissions.org/la-minusma-conclut- 2018), https://www.peacedirect.org/wp- son-enqu%C3%AAte-sur-les-incidents-de- content/uploads/2018/07/P772-PD-Mali-LVP- boulkessy-du-19-mai-2018. The Boulkessy attack Report-ENG_WEB.pdf, 7. was particularly embarrassing for the Malian 84 Dans le centre du Mali, 10. government to admit because the Malian soldiers in 85 Fiske and Rai, Virtuous Violence, 239. For example, question were under the official command of the G5 in many societies around the world, a more robust Sahel, a security cooperation organization comprised formal system of justice has put an end to the of Chad, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. widespread pursuit of blood vendettas. Pursuing The G5 Sahel was set up with significant international vendettas originally furthered the authority ranking support and donor backing in February 2014; it was and/or communal sharing relational models of those originally intended as a mechanism to allow regional who pursued them, but the social cost of legal countries to more effectively address shared security penalties came to exceed the social benefit accorded threats, including terrorism. The organization has by acting violently to further these relational models. faced significant challenges in becoming operational. As a result, the violence became socially maladaptive. 78 “Mali: Communiqué du ministère de la défense sur 86 Dans le centre du Mali, 11. les événements à Boulkessy,” Mali Actu, May 21, 87 Not to be confused with the Macina Empire, which 2018, https://maliactu.net/mali-communique-du- was centered on Hamdallahi to the northeast of the ministere-de-la-defense-sur-les-evenements-a- modern cercle of Macina. boulkessy/. 88 Reeve, Mali on the Brink, 26. 79 Dans le centre du Mali, 10. 89 Ibid. 80 Camara, “Centre du Mali.” 90 Jana Krause, “A Deadly Cycle: Ethno-Religious 81 For example, Dan Na Ambassagou’s leadership Conflict in Jos, Plateau State, Nigeria” (working announced a unilateral ceasefire in September 2018. paper, Geneva Declaration, Geneva, 2011), 9–10, See “Engagement en faveur d’un cessez-le-feu https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources unilatéral de Youssouf Toloba et son groupe armé de /GD-WP-Jos-deadly-cycle.pdf. Dan Nan Ambassagou,” Dan Nan Ambassagou, September 27, 2018, https://www.hdcentre.org/wp- content/uploads/2018/09/Cessez-le-feu-