Constraints on Obviation in Ktunaxa
Ally Freemond
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Bachelor of Arts in Linguistics
Bryn Mawr College
December 2020
Abstract
In Algonquian languages, when a transitive sentence contains only third-person arguments, one of the arguments is marked as obviative. Factors such as animacy and possession govern the assignment of an argument as obviative. In this paper, I follow the framework of Aissen (1997) and use Optimality Theory to apply constraints on obviation to the language Ktunaxa. Ktunaxa is not an Algonquian language, yet obviation is morphologically marked and is not applied after the fact, unlike in Aissen’s application of the constraints to the languages Tzotzil and Chamorro. These constraint rankings from Algonquian hierarchies adhere to Ktunaxa with little modification needed.
1 Contents
1 Introduction ...... 3
2 Background ...... 3
2.1 Direct and Inverse ...... 3
2.2 What is Obviation? ...... 4
2.3 Obviation in Algonquian ...... 7
2.4 Obviation in Ktunaxa ...... 15
2.4.1 Possession in Ktunaxa ...... 17
2.4.2 Animacy in Ktunaxa ...... 21
3 Hierarchy Alignment in Ktunaxa ...... 23
3.1 Genitive Effects in Ktunaxa ...... 28
3.2 Animacy Effects in Ktunaxa ...... 32
3.3 Topicality Effects in Ktunaxa ...... 35
4 Implications ...... 37
5 Conclusion ...... 41
Acknowledgments...... 42
References ...... 43
2 1 Introduction
In this thesis, I apply the model of obviation in Aissen (1997) to the language Ktunaxa.
Aissen uses Optimality Theory (Prince & Smolensky 2002) and specifies constraints and rankings to explain how a third-person argument is selected as obviative in relation to factors such as possession and animacy in Algonquian languages. Aissen specifies these constraints based on the alignment of language-specific hierarchies. For example, in Algonquian languages, a possessed noun is obligatorily obviative, and Aissen proposes that genitive nouns outrank their possessum on a hierarchy that must parallel the hierarchy of proximate nouns outranking obviative nouns. Aissen finds that a constraint on obviation related to animacy outranks this constraint concerning possession when the two are in conflict. Using this model, I ask if a ranking of constraints on obviation in the non-Algonquian language Ktunaxa results in a model of the attested data, and if they are ranked in the same way as Algonquian languages. Optimality
Theory is a fitting model for representing obviation, as it can account for the multiple factors influencing obviation - especially when these factors come into conflict.
2 Background
2.1 Direct and Inverse
Obviation is closely linked to the direct/inverse system found in verb morphology of
Algonquian languages, a group of indigenous languages of North America, in which a person hierarchy governs the person marked on a transitive verb. The person hierarchy paradigm representing this is seen in (1):
(1) 1st and 2nd > 3 (DeLancey 1981)
The person of the higher-ranking argument will be indicated by an affix on the verb, and another affix indicates whether the higher-ranking argument is the subject or the object. For example, a
3 second-person argument ranks higher on the hierarchy than a third-person argument, so a transitive verb with these arguments will mark the second-person in an affix, but this affix does not indicate the grammatical role of the argument. If a second-person argument acts on a third- person argument, then the verb will be marked as direct. Inversion will occur if a lower-ranking argument acts on a higher-ranking argument. That is, in a sentence with a lower-ranking subject/agent and a higher-ranking object/patient will be marked inverse.
(2) is an example of the person hierarchy’s role in verb morphology and how an affix in the verb marks whether it is direct or inverse. These examples are from the Algonquian language
Miami-Illinois. (2a) is the direct form and (2b) is the inverse form, and the salient affix is in bold. The prefix ki- indicates the presence of a second-person argument, the higher-ranking argument of the two. Note that because the second-person argument is higher on the person hierarchy than the third-person argument, it is indicated on both verbs regardless of its grammatical role. The glosses in the second lines of (2a) and (2b) were added by me and are informed by Costa (2003). The bolded affixes in (2a) and (2b) indicate the presence of a non- local (third-person) argument and that the verbs are direct and inverse, respectively.
(2) Miami-Illinois (Costa 2003:270) a. kiwaapamaa 2-look.at-ɴᴏɴʟᴏᴄᴀʟ,ᴅɪʀ ‘you look at him’
b. kiwaapamekwa 2-look.at-ɴᴏɴʟᴏᴄᴀʟ,ɪɴᴠ ‘he looks at you’
2.2 What is Obviation?
Obviation is a grammatical marking that is best known to occur in Algonquian languages
(Mithun 2006). Obviation only occurs in non-local scenarios – scenarios in which a transitive
4 verb has third-person arguments – and distinguishes the two arguments from each other. When an argument is marked as obviative, it is often the less salient or less relevant argument in the discourse – however, other factors can govern the selection of obviation. Obviation does not occur in local scenarios, which involve first- or second-person participants and have no third- person participants. In a scenario with a first- or second-person argument and a third-person argument, obviation will still not occur because the third-person argument will be ranked lower without the need to distinguish it from another third-person argument. Obviation has a syntactic role and has morphological marking, but also has relevance in discourse, such as marking the less topical argument.
As two third-person arguments are equally ranked on the person hierarchy in (1), obviation distinguishes the two, with one argument marked as obviative morphologically, and the other designated as proximate. The proximate is essentially the more salient of the two third- person arguments. Within the Algonquian person hierarchy, the proximate ranks higher than the obviative, as seen in (3).
(3) 1st and 2nd > proximate > obviative (Oxford 2019)
(4) is an example of a verb with two third-person arguments in Miami-Illinois. (4a) is the direct form, and (4b) is the inverse form. Note that the prefix present when there are two third- person arguments is ∅-. If a first- or second-person argument was present, it would be indicated on the prefix because first- and second-person arguments outrank third-person arguments on the hierarchy. Therefore, the lack of a first- or second-person prefix marker can be understood as indicating the presence of two third-person arguments. The -eewa affix marking the direct form
5 in (4a) undergoes a phonological change but is the same marker as -aa- in (2a). (4) demonstrates that the bolded affixes in (2) are not third-person markers. The glosses in the second lines of (4a) and (4b) were added by me and are informed by Costa (2003).
(4) Miami-Illinois (Costa 2003:270) a. waapameewa 3-looks.at-ɴᴏɴʟᴏᴄᴀʟ,ᴅɪʀ ‘he looks at him (obv.)’
b. waapamekwa 3-looks.at- ɴᴏɴʟᴏᴄᴀʟ,ɪɴᴠ ‘he (obv.) looks at him
I employ Plains Cree, or Nêhiyawêwin, as a straightforward example of obviation in an
Algonquian language as well. Blain (1998) argues that obviation and the direct/inverse system are a realization of the alignment or misalignment of a person hierarchy with a grammatical relations hierarchy. Blain uses the term “grammatical relations hierarchy” to encompass both the grammatical function hierarchy (Subject > Direct Object > Indirect Object…) and the semantic role hierarchy (Agent > Patient > Goal…). These are ranked lists, so that agent is outranking patient, and agent and patient both outrank goal. When a construction is direct, the person hierarchy in (3) and the aforementioned grammatical function hierarchy and semantic role hierarchy are aligned.
(5a) and (5b) demonstrate the morphology of obviation in a sentence with two third- person arguments. In (5a), the proximate John, which is ranked higher on the person hierarchy in
(3) than Mary, is the agent/subject. In (5b), Mary is proximate and is the object/patient. For the purposes of (5), the proximate argument is more salient to the discourse or is the more topical of the two arguments (Blain 1998). Note that in Nêhiyawêwin, the proximate is unmarked, where an obviative argument has an affix marking it as obviative.
6
(5) Nêhiyawêwin (Blain 1998:45) a. John ê-wâpam-â-t Mary-wa John ᴄᴏɴᴊ-see-ᴅɪʀ-3 Mary-ᴏʙᴠ ‘John (prox.) saw Mary (obv.)’
b. John-a ê-wâpam-iko-t Mary John-ᴏʙᴠ ᴄᴏɴᴊ-see-ɪɴᴠ-3 Mary ‘John (obv.) saw Mary (prox.)’
The person hierarchy that Blain assumes is (2nd > 1st > 3rd), which is not accepted by all to be fixed across Algonquian languages (DeLancey 1981). For the purposes of this thesis, I operate with (Local > 3rd) as the person hierarchy to avoid this issue and because I am looking primarily at scenarios with two third-person arguments.
2.3 Obviation in Algonquian
I will take Aissen (1997) as a foundational model of the syntax of obviation and apply her model of Optimality Theory and obviation to the language Ktunaxa. Aissen proposes the
“obviation tier”, a universal abstract representation of the obviation status of a clause, and that languages differ in the way they connect to the obviation tier. Aissen uses Optimality Theory to address the role of obviation in a language. Optimality theory is a framework in which a language’s grammar is modelled by ranking a series of violable universal constraints. For a given underlying form in a language, an optimal candidate is chosen based on which constraints are violated (Prince & Smolensky 2002).
Aissen establishes the Algonquian person hierarchy:
(6) Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy): local person > proximate > obviative
Aissen describes that when the subject outranks the object on the participant hierarchy in (6), the direct form is used, and when the object outranks the subject on this hierarchy, the inverse form
7 is used. This relationship between the ranking of the subject and object as its own hierarchy is shown in (7).
(7) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): subject > primary object
Note that Aissen (1997) describes the participant hierarchies presented for Algonquian and other languages to be particular to each language and acknowledges that language-specific hierarchies are not ideal for Optimality Theory, as constraints must be universal with the rankings of the constraints being specific to each language.
When these two hierarchies in (6) and (7) are “aligned” – that is, when an argument outranks another in the hierarchies of both (6) and (7), this satisfies a constraint that Aissen calls
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ. For example, if a sentence has a first-person subject and a third-person object,
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied because the first-person argument, which outranks the third-person argument in the participant hierarchy in (6), also outranks the third-person argument in the relational hierarchy in (7) because the first-person argument is a subject and the third-person argument is an object. When Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied, the direct form is used. Note that the
‘primary object’ in (7) is equivalent to a direct object, because in a language with a primary object/secondary object distinction, the primary object is a direct object when in a monotransitive verb construction (a verb construction with only one object) (Dryer 1986:814). Aissen mentions that secondary objects are not relevant to the direct/inverse system in the Algonquian language
Fox. In a relational hierarchy for Ktunaxa stated by Dryer (2007) that I will discuss in Section 3, secondary objects/obliques are included because the proximate status may fall on an oblique in an intransitive clause, depending on whether or not the subject of the intransitive clause is third- person. Otherwise, secondary objects will not be discussed further.
8 However, consider what happens when these two hierarchies in (6) and (7) are not
“aligned.” With a third-person subject and a first-person object, the first-person argument outranks the third-person argument in (6) but not in (7). That is, the third-person subject is outranked by the first-person object on the participant hierarchy but outranks the first-person object on the Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ), and inversion occurs. This satisfies a constraint that
Aissen refers to as Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ. When (6) and (7) are aligned, Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied and the direct form is used. An example of this is a sentence with a proximate subject and an obviative (primary) object. When (6) and (7) are not aligned, Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is violated but
Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied, and the inverse construction is used.
Possession is an example of another factor that Aissen asserts as informing the role of obviation in a language. Possession is one scenario in which obviation marking on a specific argument is obligatory in Algonquian and is not informed by topicality – in other contexts, topicality determines the obviative argument. When a third-person argument possesses another third-person argument, the possessed noun is obviative and the possessor/genitive is proximate.
Aissen specifies constraints based on these restricted scenarios. She frames the requirement for the genitive to be proximate as an alignment constraint and uses Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ to refer to how the genitive outranks the possessum in a way similar to how proximate outranks obviative. That is, the alignment of the nominal relational hierarchy in (8) and the participant hierarchy in (6) is realized in Algonquian languages as genitives being proximate and possessums being obviative.
(8) Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): genitive > possessum
(9) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Nᴏᴍ Rᴇʟ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ
9 In (9), Gᴇɴ stands for the genitive or possessor, and Hᴇᴀᴅ stands for the head or possessum of the genitive. Again, the alignment of (6) and (8) is the constraint Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ that governs possession in Algonquian languages. Under this definition, an obviative possessor and a proximate possessum would violate this constraint and be ungrammatical.
Aissen finds gaps within the obviation paradigm, describing these “gaps” as instances where a sentence can only be either direct or inverse due to an obligatory obviative, such as when a subject’s possessor is co-referential with its object. An inverse marker on the verb is required, as the possessed obviative is acting on a proximate possessor.
(10) Plains Cree (Aissen 1997:712) Ca·n ote·ma ki·-ma·kwamik. John(3) his(3).dog(obv.) bite (ᴛᴀ obv>3) ‘John’s dog bit him.’ (ᴛᴀ = transitive animate)
The verb in (10) is inverse, as an obviative argument is acting on a proximate argument.
The possessum ‘dog’ is obligatorily obviative because of Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ, and ‘him’ is proximate because it is co-referential with the genitive/possessor ‘John’. Again, inversion occurs when a lower-ranking participant, such as an obviative argument, acts on a higher-ranking participant, such a proximate argument. The opposite of an inverse clause, a direct clause, occurs when a higher-ranking participant acts on a lower-ranking participant.
Further effects of the obligatorily obviative possessum are seen in (11). Though both
(11a) and (11b) are ambiguous, the possessum ‘son’ is obligatorily obviative due to Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ.
As (11a) is direct, the obviative ‘son’ cannot be acting on ‘him’ if it is co-referential with the proximate possessor – an obviative acting on a proximate requires an inverse construction. As
(11b) is inverse, the proximate possessor ‘him’ cannot be co-referential with the subject ‘he’, as a proximate acting on an obviative requires a direct construction.
10 (11) Ojibwe (Aissen 1997:713) a. /o-waabam-aa-an o-gwis-an/ 3-see(ᴛᴀ)-ᴅɪʀᴇᴄᴛ-ᴏʙᴠ 3-son-ᴏʙᴠ ‘Hei sees hisi/j son.’ also ‘Hisi son sees himj/*i.’ (ᴛᴀ = transitive animate)
b. /o-waabam-igo-a o-gwis-an/ 3-see-(ᴛᴀ)-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ᴏʙᴠ 3-son-ᴏʙᴠ ‘Hei sees hisj/*i son.’ also ‘Hisi son sees himi/j.’
Aissen (1997) presents a conflicting animacy constraint that interacts with the genitive constraint. She specifies a constraint in which animacy outranks inanimacy in the designation of arguments as proximate or obviative, In Algonquian languages, nouns have a grammatical gender of either animate or inanimate. A third-person animate argument must outrank a third- person inanimate argument in obviation and therefore must be proximate. That is, if a sentence has two arguments of differing animacy, the animate argument will outrank the inanimate argument on what Aissen calls the animacy hierarchy in (12), and the animate will be designated as proximate. Aissen proposes an alignment constraint concerning animacy, as animate arguments outrank inanimate arguments in a way similar to how proximate arguments outrank obviative arguments. That is, the alignment of the animacy hierarchy in (12) and the participant hierarchy in (6) is realized in Algonquian as animate arguments being proximate and inanimate arguments being obviative, as defined in the constraint in (13).
(12) Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): animate > inanimate
(13) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Aɴɪᴍ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ
The alignment of the Algonquian person hierarchy in (6) and the animacy hierarchy in (12), represented by the constraint Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ in (13), informs the role of animacy in the selection of arguments as proximate and obviative in Algonquian. Under this assumption, a proximate
11 inanimate argument and an obviative animate argument in the same clause would violate the
Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ constraint and be ungrammatical. (13) defines Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ as the alignment of
Aɴɪᴍ Hɪᴇʀ and Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ.
Aissen (1997) demonstrates an animacy “gap” in Algonquian languages like the genitive gap above, in which only either the direct or inverse form of a sentence is acceptable due to Aɴɪᴍ
> Iɴᴀɴ. Verb morphology in Algonquian is influenced by the animacy of the arguments of a verb; transitive verbs are classified based on the animacy of the object. This results in groupings of verbs referred to as transitive animate verbs (TA) and transitive inanimate verbs (TI).
(14) is an example from Fox of a sentence with a transitive animate verb and an inanimate subject. The -ekwi- affix is derived from the inverse affix, and the gloss 0.sᴜʙᴊ indicates that the subject is inanimate. This sentence does not have a corresponding direct form.
(14) Fox (Aissen 1997:715) wa·pam-ekwi-w-a look.at-sᴜʙᴊ-3-sɢ ‘It looks at him.’
This sentence is inverse because it has an obviative subject acting on a proximate object.
The object ‘him’ is proximate due to Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ, as the animate ‘him’ outranks the inanimate
‘it’ on the Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (13). A direct form is not acceptable because an inanimate proximate argument and an animate obviative argument in the same clause violates Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ.
Aissen then presents an example of a sentence with a transitive inanimate verb in Plains
Cree with an animate subject, seen in (15). There is no corresponding inverse form for this sentence.
(15) Plains Cree (Aissen 1997:715) wa·pahtam see (ᴛɪ 3) ‘He sees it’.
12 The inanimate object ‘it’ is obligatorily obviative due to Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ, as it is outranked by “him” on the Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (13). A proximate subject and an obviative object require a direct construction. An inverse construction is not acceptable due to the object ‘it’ being obligatorily obviative. The effects of an animacy constraint are responsible for the respective absence of a direct form for (14) and an inverse form for (15).
In a scenario with an inanimate possessor and an animate possessum, however, the possessum is expected to be obviative because of the genitive constraint, but the inanimate possessor is expected to be obviative as well due to the animacy constraint, creating a conflict between Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ and Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ that Aissen resolves with Optimality Theory.
The tableau in (16) is an example of Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ being ranked above Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ.
Aissen examines past literature on Potawatomi and Menominee, two Algonquian languages, to determine this ordering. The proximate animate possessor and obviative animate possessum is the optimal candidate, as shown in (16), because the obviative possessor and proximate possessum in the second candidate violates Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ. The first candidate does not violate either constraint. ☞ indicates the optimal candidate. Note that ‘backbone’ in (16) and ‘roofbeam’ in (17) are in fact grammatically animate; objects that are not necessarily living things can be grammatically animate in Algonquian languages (Pentland 2006).
(16) (Aissen 1997:717) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ hisanim backboneanim
☞ Prox Obv
Obv Prox *!
13 However, in the tableau in (17), the first candidate has a proximate inanimate possessor, which satisfies Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ, as the possessor outranks the possessum and is selected as proximate.
However, the proximate argument is also inanimate, which violates Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ; neither candidate satisfies both constraints. The second candidate is selected as the optimal candidate, even though the second candidate violates Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ because the possessor is obviative and the possessum is proximate.
(17) (Aissen 1997:718) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ itsinan roofbeamanim
Prox Obv *!
☞ Obv Prox *
The cell for Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ for the first candidate in (17) is grayed out because although Gᴇɴ >
Hᴇᴀᴅ is satisfied, it has no effect on the outcome because Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ is violated. Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ takes precedence in this tableau, as Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ being satisfied overrides Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ being violated. Because these constraints can be violated and can be ranked over one another, Aissen asserts this as an example of the precedence of the animacy constraint.
A summary of the hierarchies and constraints proposed by Aissen (1997) is provided below, where (6) – (9) and (12) – (13) are restated.
(6) Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy): local person > proximate > obviative
(7) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): subject > primary object
(8) Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): genitive > possessum
(9) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Nᴏᴍ Rᴇʟ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ
14 (12) Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): animate > inanimate
(13) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Aɴɪᴍ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ
When (6) and (7) are aligned, Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied and the direct form is used. An example of this is a sentence with a proximate subject and an obviative (primary) object. When
(6) and (7) are not aligned, Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is violated but Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied, and the inverse construction is used. An example of this is a sentence with an obviative subject and a proximate (primary) object.
Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ in (9) is the alignment of the participant hierarchy in (6) and the nominal relational hierarchy in (8). Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ is violated when a possessor is obviative and a possessum is proximate. This constraint has the effect in Algonquian of genitives being proximate and possessums being obviative. Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ in (13) is the alignment of the participant hierarchy in (6) and the animacy hierarchy in (12). Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ is violated when an inanimate argument is proximate and an animate argument is obviative. This constraint is realized as animate arguments being proximate and inanimate arguments being obviative.
2.4 Obviation in Ktunaxa
Ktunaxa is a language isolate of Idaho, Montana, and British Columbia that Dryer (1991,
1992, 1994, 2007) describes extensively. Dryer’s publications refer to Ktunaxa as its older name
Kutenai; however, the Ktunaxa people refer to their language as Ktunaxa when speaking
English, so this change in language name is linguists using the name used by non-linguists and the Ktunaxa people (Dryer 2019).
I want to clarify that this thesis was written with no communication with the Ktunaxa community. This is not my language, and I did not do the research necessary to collect this data.
15 The data I use was provided to Dryer by native Ktunaxa speakers, and my analysis is only possible due to previously established relationships with the Ktunaxa community.
The person hierarchy of Ktunaxa does not involve first- and second-person arguments, as morphemes indicate the person of each argument as well as the subject and object of the sentence. (18) shows examples of first-person and second-person subjects of a sentence being indicated by the morpheme hu and hin, respectively.
(18) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:187-188) a. hu wu·kat-i 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘I saw him/her/it/them.’
b. hu wu·kat-alaʔ-ni 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-1ᴘʟ,sᴜʙᴊ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘We saw him/her/it/them.’
c. hin wu·kat-i 2,sᴜʙᴊ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘You (sg.) saw him/her/it/them.’
d. hin wu·kat-kil-ni 2,sᴜʙᴊ see-2ᴘʟ,ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘You (pl.) saw him/her/it/them.’
However, a direct/inverse system and a proximate/obviative distinction analogous to Algonquian languages emerges in scenarios with multiple third-person arguments, as shown in (19).
(19) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:3) a. wu·kat-i palkiy-s titqat’ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ man ‘The man saw the woman.’
b. wu·kat-aps-i palkiy-s titqat’ see-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ man ‘The woman saw the man.’
16 (19a) is a direct construction, as the proximate ‘man’ acts on the obviative ‘woman’, while (19b) is an inverse construction (with the verb marked as inverse) because the obviative ‘woman’ acts on the proximate ‘man’. Dryer uses the terms “notional subject” and “notional object” to refer to the verb arguments. In the direct construction in (19a), the notional subject is the proximate and the notional object is the obviative. He describes the proximate as generally being more topical and the contrast between proximate and obviative as being rooted in discourse. The obviative is morphologically marked with the suffix -s, and the verb in the inverse construction contains the suffix -aps.
However, it is crucial to note that there is one scenario where the verb will explicitly be marked for the presence of a third-person argument, and that is when the third-person subject of a sentence is obviative, as seen in (20).
(20) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:193) watak-s =la ·tiqanmitak-s-i frog-ᴏʙᴠ busy.do.something-ᴏʙᴠ,sᴜʙᴊ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘Frog (obv) was busy doing something.’
‘Frog’ is the only argument in the sentence and has an obviative marking, and the verb has a -s suffix that indicates the presence of an obviative subject. Dryer (1991) describes this scenario as dependent on the discourse and as occurring more often in texts than elicitation. I mention this because the obviative subject, and the -s verb suffix indicating an obviative subject, is relevant for understanding examples of possession in Ktunaxa.
2.4.1 Possession in Ktunaxa
In Ktunaxa, the possessed argument in a possessive construction is obligatorily obviative
(Dryer 2007). However, the possessed argument will not always have the obviative suffix, instead being “syntactically obviative.” In (21a) and (21b), the obviative ‘tongue’ and the
17 obviative ‘son’, respectively, are not marked with the obviative morpheme, only the possessive suffix, though the possessive suffix and obviative suffix can both occur on the obviative noun.
Despite the absence of an obviative marking, however, the aforementioned obviative subject suffix -s, as seen in (20), does appear on the verb.
(21) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:6) a. qa·l ʔakmuxu-s walunak-ʔis niʔ watak ᴘᴛᴄʟ fall.out-ᴏʙᴠ,sᴜʙᴊ tongue-3,ᴘᴏss the frog ‘The Frog's (prox) tongue (obv) would come out.’
b. pamik k-sanq́ukatiʔ-s xali-ʔis qu palkiy ᴘᴛᴄʟ sᴜʙᴏʀ-ugly-ᴏʙᴠ,sᴜʙᴊ son-3,ᴘᴏss that woman ‘That woman’s (prox) son (obv) is so ugly.’
Dryer compares this to an example from the Algonquian language Cree, stating that this scenario in which a noun is not marked for obviation but triggers an obviative suffix on the verb is referred to as being “covertly obviative”.
In Ktunaxa, the possessor is not obligatorily proximate, as an obviative can possess another obviative. Dryer (1991) claims that an obviative possessum will not have an obviative marker if it has a proximate possessor, but it will have an obviative marker if it has an obviative possessor. Therefore, the obviative possessum is marked for the obviation of its possessor rather than itself. In (22), the obviative possessum ‘clothing’ is only marked as obviative because its possessor ‘frog’ is also obviative. Again, the obviative status of the possessum can be known because of examples like (21), in which the obviative subject suffix occurs on the verb despite the possessum not being marked as obviative because of its proximate possessor.
(22) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:7) k-ʔituqlantilik ʔakuqlant-ʔis-is watak-s sᴜʙᴏʀ-dress.up clothing-3,ᴘᴏss-ᴏʙᴠ frog-ᴏʙᴠ ‘He (prox) dressed up in Frog’s (obv) clothing (obv).’
18
Regarding the presence of an obviative possessor in (22), Dryer (1992) claims that the possessor is obviative in order to distinguish it from the proximate subject of the clause.
I question the implication of including an obviative possessor and obviative possessum on the ranked hierarchies necessary to specify constraints like Aissen (1997), as it could interfere with the alignment of a participant hierarchy and a nominal relational hierarchy. However, Dryer
(1992) compares the obviative possessor and obviative possessum to the “further obviative” of a dialect of Ojibwe, which can also have an obviative possessor and obviative possessum when both arguments are animate. (23) is an example from Western Ojibwe demonstrating the ‘further obviative’, as the obviative possessums in (23a) and (23b) have differing obviative markers. In
(23a), the possessor ‘Mary’ is proximate and the possessum ‘sister’ is marked as obviative with - an, while in (23b), the possessor ‘Mary’ is obviative with the marker -an and the possessum
‘sister’ is the “further obviative” with the marker -ini. The orthography for Western Ojibwe below is used by Grafstein (1984); colons after vowels represent long vowels and tildes over vowels represent nasalized vowels.
(23) Western Ojibwe (Grafstein 1984: 258) a. John o-gike:nima:-an Mary o-miseh-an 3-know,TA-OBV 3-sister-OBV ‘John knows Mary’s sister.’
b. John o-gike:nima:-an Mary-an o-miseh-ini 3-know,TA-OBV Mary-OBV 3-sister-FURTHER.OBV ‘John knows Mary’s sister.’
Dryer treats the obviative possessor and obviative possessum in Ktunaxa like the “further obviative” of this dialect of Ojibwe, except that the morphology of the the two obviatives in
Ktunaxa is the same.
19 Aissen (1997) accounts for the “further obviative” as well, citing an example in Blackfoot similar to (23) where the two obviatives have different morphological markers. She presents a hierarchy ranking of (obviative1 > obviative2), where obviative1 is the possessor of obviative2.
The possessor must rank higher than the possessum, even if both are obviative. Therefore, Gᴇɴ >
Hᴇᴀᴅ is still satisfied. Aissen assumes ranked obviatives and the “further obviative” to be compatible with her model. As Dryer (1992) describes the Ktunaxa obviative possessor and obviative possessum to correspond to the “further obviative” in Ojibwe, and Aissen (1997) assumes them to follow a ranked hierarchy, I will also treat the obviative possessor and possessum of Ktunaxa in a similar way Aissen’s model in Section 3.1.
(24) is an example of possession in Ktunaxa that parallels the Cree example in (10), repeated below, in which the possessor of the subject is co-referential with the object of the verb.
In (10), the obviative ‘dog’ acts on ‘him’, which is co-referential with the proximate possessor
‘John’.
(10) Plains Cree (Aissen 1997:712) Ca·n ote·ma ki·-ma·kwamik. John(3) his(3).dog(obv.) bite (ᴛᴀ obv>3) ‘John’s dog bit him.’
Similarly, (24) is inverse because ‘mother’ is obviative and ‘Mike’/‘him’ are proximate, and the obviative ‘mother’ is acting on ‘him’, which is co-referential with the proximate possessor ‘Mike’. Again, as the possessum in Ktunaxa is syntactically obviative and only morphologically marked as obviative when it has an obviative possessor, and ‘mother’ is not marked as obviative despite the fact that the possessive suffix and the obviative suffix can co- occur, the possessor of ‘mother’ is not obviative.
20 (24) Ktunaxa (Dryer 2007:13) wu·kat-aps-i ma-ʔis misal. see-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ mother-3ᴘᴏss Mike ‘Mike’si mother saw himi.’
2.4.2 Animacy in Ktunaxa
Unlike Algonquian languages, Ktunaxa does not have grammatical animacy. In
Algonquian languages, animate nouns are distinguished from inanimate nouns morphologically, and verb forms depend on the animacy of their arguments, as seen in (14) and (15), repeated below.
(14) Fox (Aissen 1997:715) wa·pam-ekwi-w-a look.at-sᴜʙᴊ-3-sɢ ‘It looks at him.’
(15) Plains Cree (Aissen 1997:715) wa·pahtam see (ᴛɪ 3) ‘He sees it’.
Additionally, whether or not an argument is morphologically marked as obviative depends on its animacy.
In Ktunaxa, however, obviation marking on animate nouns does not differ from obviation marking on inanimate nouns, and the animacy of arguments does not impact the verb form. In
(25), the inanimate obviative has the same -s obviative marking as the animate obviative
‘woman’ in the earlier example (19).
(25) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:5) n-aʔt-i ʔak¢amal-s ᴘʀᴇᴅ-have-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ knife-ᴏʙᴠ ‘He (prox) had a knife (obv).’
Dryer (1992) compares the lack of a grammatical animacy distinction in Ktunaxa to the aforementioned “covertly obviative” nouns in Cree, in which an inanimate obviative is not
21 morphologically marked as obviative but causes the verb to be inflected with an obviative subject suffix.
Animacy, however, is a relevant feature in Ktunaxa because it can govern the selection of the obviative. In a sentence with an animate argument and an inanimate argument, the inanimate argument will be obviative. Additionally, in a sentence with a human animate argument and a non-human animate argument, the non-human animate argument will be obviative. Example
(26a) sounds odd to speakers because ‘dog’ is proximate, and ‘woman’ is obviative. This is resolved in (26b) when ‘woman’ is proximate, and ‘dog’ is obviative. An inverse construction must be used to express this sentence, and this requirement for the inverse and the ungrammaticality of this argument pair in a direct construction indicates an ‘animacy gap’ that I will investigate further in Section 3.2.
(26) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:6) a. ?? xaʔl¢in n-ʔit́x-ni palkiy-s dog ᴘʀᴇᴅ-bite-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ ‘A dog (prox) bit a woman (obv).’
b. palkiy n-ʔit́x-naps-i xaʔl¢in -s woman ᴘʀᴇᴅ-bite-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog-ᴏʙᴠ ‘A dog (obv) bit a woman (prox).’
It is also of interest that Dryer (2007) presents an example of animacy taking precedence over discourse topicality. (27) is a response to the question ‘where’s my food?’ in Ktunaxa. ‘It’ is the more topical of the two arguments, as it is the food, however only the direct construction is grammatical. (27a) is grammatical because the human argument ‘Mike’ is proximate and the more topical inanimate argument ‘it’ is obviative. (27b) is ungrammatical because the human argument is obviative while the more topical inanimate argument is proximate, and the construction is inverse. As the more topical argument is generally proximate in Ktunaxa, (27) is an example of animacy overriding topicality.
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(27) Ktunaxa (Dryer 2007:13-4) a. ma n=̓ik-ni misa=l. ᴘᴛᴄʟ ɪɴᴅɪᴄ=eat-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ Mike ‘Mike (prox) ate it (obv).’
b. * ma n=̓ik-naps-i misa=l-s. ᴘᴛᴄʟ ɪɴᴅɪᴄ=eat-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ Mike-ᴏʙᴠ ‘Mike (obv) ate it (prox).’
This interaction may be relevant to ranking constraints on obviation, as a constraint concerning discourse topicality similar to Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ and Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ could be specified and
(27) provides an interaction between animacy and topicality in which a constraint on topicality is potentially violated.
3 Hierarchy Alignment in Ktunaxa
I will frame the examples of Ktunaxa above in the same manner that Aissen (1997) frames and parses the non-Algonquian languages Tzotzil and Chamorro. Aissen, in applying constraints on obviation and Optimality Theory to Tzotzil and Chamorro, makes assumptions about constraints on obviation being operative in a language. I will also compare the handling of these languages’ obviation systems by Aissen (1997) to my own framing of Ktunaxa. First, however, I will restate the hierarchies in Ktunaxa as indicated by Dryer’s data. Again, Aissen
(1997) operates on the claim that participant hierarchies are language-specific, and I do the same.
(28) is a proposed participant hierarchy for Ktunaxa, in which proximate arguments outrank obviative arguments. Note that this differs from the Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy) of (6), in which local arguments play a part – I will affirm my reasoning for this shortly.
(28) Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy): proximate > obviative
23 Dryer (2007) refers to a Ktunaxa relational hierarchy in which normally (i.e., when the construction is direct) the proximate is the highest ranking third-person participant on this hierarchy, and this hierarchy is only violated in the instance of an inverse construction, when the primary object is proximate. This mirrors the Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) of Aissen (1997) in (7).
I will refer to this as the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ), as seen in (29).
(29) Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): subject > primary object > {secondary object, oblique}
Therefore, in Ktunaxa, the constraint Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied when the Ktunaxa Part(icipant)
Hier(archy) in (28) and the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (29) are aligned. For example, when a third-person proximate subject acts on a third-person obviative primary object, these two hierarchies are aligned, and the constraint is not violated as the proximate outranks the obviative on the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) and the subject outranks the object on the
Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ).
This study is only concerned with third-person arguments in Ktunaxa. The Ktunaxa
Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (28) does not include local arguments, unlike the Algonquian
Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (6). I restate that in Ktunaxa, local arguments are not subject to the direct/inverse system, unlike Algonquian languages, in which both local and non-local arguments are subject to the direct/inverse system. Again, local scenarios are those that involve only first- and second-person arguments and therefore not third-person arguments. Similar to
Ktunaxa, the local scenarios of Tzotzil as described by Aissen (1997) are not relevant to the direct/inverse system of the language, which also only involve two third-person arguments. She demonstrates this by providing examples of sentences in Tzotzil with non-local subjects and local objects. (30) contains examples in Ktunaxa of the same scenarios.
24
(30) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:188) a. wu·kat-ap-ni see-1sɢ,ᴏʙᴊ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘He/she/it/they saw me.’
b. wu·kat-awas-ni see-1ᴘʟ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘He/she/it/they saw us.’
c. wu·kat-is-ni see-2sɢ,ᴏʙᴊ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ He/she/it/they saw you (sg.).’
d. wu·kat-is-kil-ni see-2,ᴏʙᴊ-2ᴘʟ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘He/she/it/they saw you (pl.).’
These sentences in an Algonquian language would require inverse constructions, as the third- person arguments are acting on first- and second-person arguments. Again, on the Algonquian
Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (6), first- and second-person arguments outrank third-person arguments. Compare (30) to (18), where the local and non-local arguments are switched. The morphological marking of the arguments is different – for example, the suffix -ap in (30a) indicating that the first-person argument is the object is different from hu in (18a) indicating the presence of a first-person subject.
(18) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:187-188) a. hu wu·kat-i 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘I saw him/her/it/them.’
b. hu wu·kat-alaʔ-ni 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-1ᴘʟ,sᴜʙᴊ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘We saw him/her/it/them.’
c. hin wu·kat-i 2,sᴜʙᴊ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘You (sg.) saw him/her/it/them.’
25
d. hin wu·kat-kil-ni 2,sᴜʙᴊ see-2ᴘʟ,ɪɴᴅɪᴄ ‘You (pl.) saw him/her/it/them.’
Aissen (1997) assumes that third-person arguments in scenarios with a local argument are to be considered proximate. In a scenario with a third-person argument and a local (first- or second-person) argument, Aissen considers Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ as being “trivially satisfied” with the direct form used, as there is no way for the Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) and the Algonquian
Part(icipant) Hier(archy) to misaligned and the inverse form cannot be licensed if there are not two third-person arguments, and therefore, there is no obviative argument. Dryer (1991) similarly states that in Ktunaxa sentences with one third-person argument, the third-person argument is proximate. Therefore, the third-person subjects and objects in (30) and (18), respectively, can be assumed to be proximate by default. Under Aissen’s assumption, I can say that Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is trivially satisfied in Ktunaxa in the examples of both (30) and (18) as these sentences all involve a “mixed” scenario with a local argument and a non-local argument. Dryer
(2007) also describes that because of the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (29), if the subject of a sentence is first- or second-person, then the primary object will automatically be proximate. Note that a sentence with only obviative third-person arguments can occur in both
Algonquian languages and Ktunaxa.
However, Dryer (1991) finds an exception to this, briefly describing the suffix -mil in disagreeing with another linguist’s claim that local arguments in Ktunaxa can be obviative. The existence of local obviative arguments could be interpreted from sentences like (31).
(31) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:200) hu wu·kat-mil-ni xaʔl¢in-ʔis misal. 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ᴍɪʟ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog-3,ᴘᴏss Mike ‘I saw Mike’s (prox) dog (obv).’
26 Dryer is uncertain on how to analyze the -mil suffix fully but claims that the -mil suffix only indicates a construction with a local subject and a third-person obviative. For example, (32a) with a proximate third-person object does not have the -mil suffix, and as seen in (32b), would be ungrammatical if it did. However, (32c) with the -mil suffix and with a local subject and an obviative third-person object is grammatical.
(32) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1991:201) a. hu wu·kat-i xaʔl¢in 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog ‘I saw a dog (prox).’
b. * hu wu·kat-mil-ni xaʔl¢in 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ᴍɪʟ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog ‘I saw a dog (prox.)’
c. hu wu·kat-mil-ni xaʔl¢in-s 1,sᴜʙᴊ see-ᴍɪʟ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog-ᴏʙᴠ ‘I saw a dog (obv.)’
Dryer writes that (32c) is only acceptable in certain discourse contexts, such as a story where another third-person argument is also relevant but not mentioned. Dryer does not discuss it further due to its irrelevance to inverse constructions and states that the -mil suffix needs further study. Note that this interferes with Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ being ‘trivially satisfied’ in Ktunaxa and is another example of how Ktunaxa differs from Algonquian languages.
I will return to the data from Ktunaxa in (19), demonstrating direct and inverse constructions.
(19) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:3) a. wu·kat-i palkiy-s titqat’ see-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ man ‘The man saw the woman.’
b. wu·kat-aps-i palkiy-s titqat’ see-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ man ‘The woman saw the man.’
27 (19a) satisfies Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ because the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (29), in which subject outranks the primary object, is aligned with the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (28), in which the proximate outranks the obviative. In (19a), the proximate ‘man’ is the subject and the obviative ‘woman’ is the object. As it satisfies Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, the direct form is licensed.
(19b) violates Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ because the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ)
Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) is not aligned with the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy). The obviative ‘woman’ is the subject and the proximate ‘man’ is the object. As (19b) satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ, the inverse form is licensed.
3.1 Genitive Effects in Ktunaxa
As I have restated the hierarchies of Ktunaxa in order to apply Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ
Aʟɪɢɴ, I will specify the hierarchies in Ktunaxa governing obviation in possessive constructions.
Again, Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ in (9) is the alignment of the Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (6) and the Algonquian Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (8). Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ is realized as obligatorily obviative possessums.
(6) Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy): local person > proximate > obviative
(8) Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): genitive > possessum
(9) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Nᴏᴍ Rᴇʟ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ
In order to apply this to Ktunaxa, I must specify a nominal relational hierarchy that mirrors the Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (8). The Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ)
Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) is presented in (33).
(33) Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): genitive > possessum
28
Assuming, then, that Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ is operative in Ktunaxa, Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ is the alignment of Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) and the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy), in which possessums in Ktunaxa are obligatorily obviative. However, as the ‘further’ obviative shown in Ktunaxa in (22) must be accounted for, the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) needs to be modified, resulting in (34). Therefore, the alignment of (33) and (34) results in a Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ constraint in Ktunaxa, seen in (35). The possessor must outrank its possessum, whether the possessor is a proximate outranking obviative1, or obviative1 outranking obviative2. In this model, a proximate possessum is still ungrammatical and violates Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ.
(34) Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) proximate > obviative1 > obviative2
(35) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Nᴏᴍ Rᴇʟ Hɪᴇʀ, Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ
I now re-introduce (24), in which the possessor of the subject is co-referential with the verb’s object. The verb in (24) is required to be inverse because ‘mother’ is obviative and
‘Mike’/‘him’ are proximate, and the object ‘him’ is obligatorily obviative because its antecedent
‘Mike’ is the possessor of ‘mother’.
(24) Ktunaxa (Dryer 2007:13) wu·kat-aps-i ma-ʔis misa=l. see-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ mother-3ᴘᴏss Mike ‘Mike’si mother saw himi.’
(24) satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ because an obviative subject is acting on a proximate object.
It also satisfies Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ because the possessed argument is obviative and the proximate possessor ranks higher than the obviative possessum on the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in
(34).
29 I present (24) in tableaux in (36) and (37) to further specify the relationship between the alignment constraints and Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ. My use of tableaux will differ from their use in Aissen
(1997) for Tzotzil and Chamorro, as in these languages, obviation is not morphologically marked and Aissen applies the terms ‘proximate’ and ‘obviative’ after demonstrating that constraints involving possession and animacy are useful in analyzing the languages. That is, Aissen designated arguments in Tzotzil and Chamorro as obviative after determining that explaining gaps in animacy in possession would benefit from a ranking of some arguments over others in a participant hierarchy. However, my use of tableaux is similar to Aissen’s tableaux for
Algonquian languages, as obviation in Ktunaxa is morphologically marked. Aissen’s analysis still works for Ktunaxa despite Ktunaxa not being an Algonquian language.
Some of my tableaux, therefore, feature grammatical data and projected ungrammatical assignments of proximate and obviative, and are indicated as satisfying or violating Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ
Aʟɪɢɴ or Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ after the fact. That is, I present grammatical data with morphologically marked obviation as candidates, as well as candidates with arguments assigned as proximate and obviative counter to grammatical data. The Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) is abbreviated as KRH, and the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) is abbreviated as KPH. Both (36) and (37) involve the gloss of (24). ☞ indicates the optimal candidate; in this case, the optimal candidate will be grammatical data from Dryer. In these tableaus, the candidates are presented in English to give the meaning, and the proximate/obviative notation is shorthand for Ktunaxa sentences.
(36) Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ (KRH, KPH) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ
Mike’si mother saw himi. (a) ☞ Prox Obv Prox (b) Obv Prox Obv *! *
30 (36a) does not violate Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ because the obviative subject ‘mother’ is acting on the proximate object ‘him’, and it does not violate Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ because ‘mother’ is obviative and the proximate ‘Mike’ in (24) is possessing it. (36b) would violate Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ because the possessed ‘mother’ cannot be proximate as seen in candidate (36b), but this has no effect on the outcome, as this candidate violates Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ as well. This tableau is unranked to demonstrate how these constraints are violated.
I repeat that the violation of Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ or Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ does not necessarily mean a sentence is ungrammatical – the scenario in which either only Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ or Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ is violated and not the other is one in which the selection of a specific argument as obviative is obligatory, and therefore the presence of an obligatory obviative prevents either a direct construction or an inverse construction from being grammatical. Sentences without an obligatory obviative can be represented as either direct or inverse. In (36), however, as the subject ‘mother’ cannot be a possessed proximate, the ranking of Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ requires this possessed subject to be obviative, and an obviative subject acting on a proximate object satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ and the inverse form is licensed. Therefore, a high-ranked Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ in this scenario requires the inverse construction.
If Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ was the highest-ranked constraint in Ktunaxa, (36a) would violate
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and would not be the optimal candidate, (36b) would not violate Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, and (36b) would still violate Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ but this would not affect the outcome. Because of this,
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ should not be ranked relative to each other. The dotted line between these constraints in (37) indicates that they are not ranked relative to each other.
However, (36b) does violate Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ, as the obviative possessum is obligatory, and therefore should be ranked higher than Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ. This ranking is presented in (37).
31 (37) Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ (KRH, KPH) (KRH, KPH)
Mike’si mother saw himi. * (a) ☞ Prox Obv Prox (b) Obv Prox Obv *! *
(37a) violates Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ but satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ and does not violate Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ.
(37b) does satisfy Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, but this has no effect on the outcome, as the violation of Gᴇɴ >
Hᴇᴀᴅ takes precedence. (37a), therefore, is the optimal candidate.
3.2 Animacy Effects in Ktunaxa
As done with the genitive effects in Ktunaxa above, I will restate and reconfigure
Algonquian hierarchies concerning animacy to fit with Ktunaxa in order to specify the role of animacy in governing obviation. I am operating as Aissen (1997) operates in modifying elements within language-specific hierarchies.
Again, the phenomenon of obviation in Ktunaxa that is represented as the hierarchical ranking of third-person animate arguments over third-person inanimate arguments in Algonquian languages is realized in Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ, which is the alignment of the Algonquian Part(icipant)
Hier(archy) and the Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ), which I repeat in (6) and (12). The animate argument must be proximate and outrank the inanimate argument on these hierarchies, and the inanimate argument must be obviative.
(6) Algonquian Part(icipant) Hier(archy): local person > proximate > obviative
(12) Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): animate > inanimate
(13) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Aɴɪᴍ Hɪᴇʀ, Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ
32 I have already specified the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (28), which I have also restated below. In order to specify an animacy constraint such as (13) for Ktunaxa, the
Algonquian Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (12) must be modified to account for non-human animates ranking below humans, as this distinction is relevant in Ktunaxa. The Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ
Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (38) reflects this. Dryer (1994) provides the same hierarchy as (38) in discussing a strong preference in Ktunaxa for the proximate to be higher on this hierarchy than the obviative and suggests that animacy may override discourse factors, which I will discuss in
Section 3.3.
(28) Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy): proximate > obviative1 > obviative2
(38) Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): human > non-human animate > inanimate
The alignment of (28) and (38) results in an Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ constraint for Ktunaxa, as seen in (39). In Ktunaxa, the proximate must outrank the obviative in animacy, and in a sentence with two arguments, an argument outranking another argument on the animacy hierarchy, such as a human outranking a non-human animate, must also outrank it on the Ktunaxa Part(icipant)
Hier(archy).
(39) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Aɴɪᴍ Hɪᴇʀ, Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ
Due to a lack of access to relevant data, I am unable to say how the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ)
Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) would operate in a sentence with a human argument, a non-human animate argument, and an inanimate argument – the question remains if this hierarchy would interact with the further obviative of the Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy).
33 Again, I assume that an animacy constraint is operative in Ktunaxa based on (26), repeated below. (26a) has been judged by speakers as questionable because the non-human animate ‘dog’ is proximate and acting on the human obviative ‘woman’. The non-human animate proximate ‘dog’ is outranking the human obviative ‘woman’ on the Ktunaxa Part(icipant)
Hier(archy), but not on the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ). The inverse construction in (26b) is required as to make the non-human animate ‘dog’ the obviative and the human ‘woman’ the proximate.
(26) Ktunaxa (Dryer 1992:6)
a. ?? xaʔl¢in n-ʔit́x-ni palkiy-s dog ᴘʀᴇᴅ-bite-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ woman-ᴏʙᴠ ‘A dog [prox] bit a woman [obv].’
b. palkiy n-ʔit́x-naps-i xaʔl¢in -s woman ᴘʀᴇᴅ-bite-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ dog-ᴏʙᴠ ‘A dog [obv] bit a woman [prox].’
(26) is represented in the tableau in (40). Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ must be ranked higher than Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ
Aʟɪɢɴ and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ because animacy effects on obviation are obligatory.
(40) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ (KRH, KPH) (KRH, KPH)
A dog bit a woman. *! * (a) Prox Obv ☞ (b) Obv Prox *
(40a) satisfies Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, but violates Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ because the non-human animate
‘dog’ acts on the human ‘woman’. (40b) violates Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, as the obviative ‘dog’ acts on the proximate ‘woman’, but satisfies Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ, and is the optimal candidate. (40a) satisfying
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ does not effect the outcome of this tableau, as it violates Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ, which ranks
34 higher in this tableau. (40b) satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ, and the inverse construction is licensed, as seen in (26).
3.3 Topicality Effects in Ktunaxa
I further depart from Aissen (1997) in proposing a topicality hierarchy in Ktunaxa. As previously stated, topicality and salience to the discourse play a role in Algonquian languages in the governing of obviation when other factors such as possession and animacy are not relevant.
In Ktunaxa, Dryer (1991) states that the proximate is generally more topical than the obviative.
Dryer (1994) delves into the role of the proximate argument in surrounding discourse and under what circumstances a new proximate argument is selected in a discourse. This analysis provides further insight into the effect of animacy in relation to topicality. In discussing this,
Dryer (1994) uses ᴀ for notional subjects (usually agents) and ᴘ for notional objects (usually patients) as he describes a scenario in which a ᴘ that was proximate in an inverse clause in preceding discourse becomes obviative when the ᴀ of the next sentence is higher on the animacy hierarchy. He characterizes this as the animacy hierarchy (identical to (38)) overriding discourse factors and having some effect on the selection of the proximate.
A constraint on topicality must be low in the ranking of constraints, as topicality does not result in obligatory obviation and is overridden by other factors like animacy. I am relying on
Dryer’s writing to know which arguments are topical. Again, possession and animacy “gaps” in what is grammatical due to obligatory obviation are not indicative of all constructions involving inversion and obviation, and I want to repeat that sentences can be represented in both direct and inverse constructions. Topicality can play a role in these sentences without making one of these constructions ungrammatical. Therefore, a topicality constraint is violable.
35 (41) is the proposed Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Tᴏᴘ(ɪᴄᴀʟɪᴛʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ), modeled after the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ
Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) and the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Nᴏᴍ(ɪɴᴀʟ) Rᴇʟ(ᴀᴛɪᴏɴᴀʟ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ). I restate the
Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy) in (28) below as well. The alignment of (28) and (41) results in a topicality constraint for Ktunaxa, as seen in (42) and represented as Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ. This constraint has the effect in Ktunaxa as a generally more topical proximate. Again, I emphasize that this constraint is violable and does not result an an obligatory obviative.
(28) Ktunaxa Part(icipant) Hier(archy): proximate > obviative1 > obviative2
(41) Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Tᴏᴘ(ɪᴄᴀʟɪᴛʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ): topical > non-topical
(42) Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ (Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Tᴏᴘ Hɪᴇʀ, Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Pᴀʀᴛ Hɪᴇʀ): Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ
I specify this constraint and assume it to be operative in Ktunaxa due to data presented in
(27), restated below, in which animacy and topicality are in conflict. (27) is a response to the question ‘where’s my food?’ in Ktunaxa. In (27), the argument ‘it’ is more topical than ‘Mike’, and ‘Mike’ is a human animate. Topicality is not morphologically marked – ‘it’ has discourse topicality here because it is what the question ‘where’s my food’ is about. Regarding the
Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Tᴏᴘ(ɪᴄᴀʟɪᴛʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) in (41), due to topicality not being morphologically marked and its dependence on the surrounding discourse, ‘topical’ and ‘non-topical’ could also be characterized as ‘more topical’ and ‘less topical’, respectively, with the same effect.
(27) Ktunaxa (Dryer 2007:13-4) a. ma n=̓ik-ni misa=l. ᴘᴛᴄʟ ɪɴᴅɪᴄ=eat-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ Mike ‘Mike (prox) ate it (obv).’
b. * ma n=̓ik-naps-i misa=l-s. ᴘᴛᴄʟ ɪɴᴅɪᴄ=eat-ɪɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ-ɪɴᴅɪᴄ Mike-ᴏʙᴠ ‘Mike (obv) ate it (prox).’
36
(27b) is unacceptable because the inanimate ‘it’ is proximate, and the human ‘Mike’ is obviative. Therefore, the direct construction in (27a) must be used so that the human ‘Mike’ is proximate. I present (27) in the tableau (43) below.
(43) Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ (KRH, KPH) (KRH, KPH)
Mike ate it. * * (a) ☞ Prox Obv (b) Obv Prox *! *
In (43a), the proximate ‘Mike’ is less topical than ‘it’, which violates Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ, but proximate ‘Mike’ but is higher in animacy than ‘it’, so Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ is satisfied. Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ is satisfied, and the direct form is licensed. In (43b), the inanimate proximate ‘it’ is more topical, but ranks lower on the Kᴛᴜɴᴀxᴀ Aɴɪᴍ(ᴀᴄʏ) Hɪᴇʀ(ᴀʀᴄʜʏ) than the human obviative ‘Mike’, so
(43b) violates Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ. (43b) satisfies Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ, but this has no effect on the outcome.
(43a) is the optimal candidate.
4 Implications
Zúñiga (2014) describes the interaction between animacy, possession, and topicality in
Blackfoot and Ktunaxa as well, and creates a hierarchy for the selection of the proximate in
Blackfoot that could serve as a guide for ranking constraints, as seen in (44). This hierarchy prioritizes third-person animate arguments over all other third-person arguments; if there are multiple animate arguments, then the proximate argument must not be possessed by another third-person argument. If there are two non-possessed animate arguments, the more topical argument will be proximate. Again, this hierarchy is only for selection of the proximate
37 argument; Zúñiga focuses on selection of the proximate because there can only be one proximate in a sentence.
(44) Blackfoot proximates are (i) animate > (ii) non-possessed > (iii) topical
Citing data from Dryer (1994), Zúñiga also presents a hierarchy for proximate preference in Ktunaxa that is the same as his Blackfoot hierarchy, as seen in (45). In presenting a ranking this way, Zúñiga states that only animate arguments can be proximate, and therefore in the context of Aissen (1997), a constraint on animacy would take precedence over constraints on possession and topicality. Interestingly, this hierarchy by Zúñiga comes from his interpretation of the earlier mentioned Dryer (1994).
(45) Ktunaxa proximates are (i) animate > (ii) non-possessed > (iii) topical
I want to note that Zúñiga’s hierarchies, in claiming that only animates can be proximate and in wholly excluding inanimate arguments, leaves the question of if an inanimate possessor and inanimate possessum is possible and if the inanimate possessor would be selected as proximate in a sentence with only inanimate arguments. In Algonquian languages and Ktunaxa, sentences with no proximate argument and only obviative arguments are described as possible, so it may be that the selection of a proximate along these hierarchies does not occur if all arguments are inanimate - though due to a lack of access to relevant data concerning the interaction between animacy and possession, I am unable to make this claim.
My analysis notably lacks the data of either a sentence with an inanimate possessor and an animate possessum or a sentence with an animate possessor and inanimate possessum, which would be key to ranking these constraints more accurately and seeing how the genitive constraint
38 Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ and animacy constraint Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ interact in Ktunaxa. Any grammaticality judgment on the former construction or the existence of the latter construction would give an indication of whether animacy or possession overrides the other.
However, Zuñiga does suggest that proximates in Ktunaxa are animate before they are non-possessed and topical. To tentatively agree with Zuñiga is to claim that the Ktunaxa Aɴɪᴍ >
Iɴᴀɴ constraint outranks the Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ constraint, and if the two constraints were in conflict, a proximate animate possessum would be more acceptable than a proximate inanimate possessor.
I want to return to the question of whether or not the framework of Aissen (1997) adheres to the fact that in Optimality Theory, constraints must be universal, and the ranking of universal constraints is language specific. Aissen acknowledges that language-specific participant hierarchies are unsatisfactory, as only the ranking of constraints between languages should differ.
The language-particular nature of these hierarchies is a flawed aspect of Aissen (1997). Aissen also doesn’t address if Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ and Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ are universal, instead questioning whether or not they are operative in a language, which is also not in line with Optimality Theory.
However, Aissen suggests that language-specific participant hierarchies could be replaced by universal hierarchies ranking local arguments above third-person arguments and proximates over obviatives, and that specific elements differ within each language-specific hierarchy. Further work could be done on a more ideal Optimality Theory analysis that uses the universal hierarchies suggested by Aissen (1997) as a replacement for language-specific participant hierarchies. Additionally, further investigation could be done on whether specific elements varying within language-specific hierarchies can occur with the alignment constraints themselves remaining universal; my modification of Ktunaxa hierarchies to adhere to Aissen’s constraints raises this question.
39 When the tableaux (37), (40), and (43) are inputted into the program OTSoft
(Hayes et al., 2003), the constraint ranking in (46) and the Hasse diagram in (47) are generated.
In my tableaux, I leave out additional candidates that violate unspecified presumably high- ranking constraints in the grammar of Ktunaxa, such as a constraint on the number of proximate arguments in a sentence.
(46) Stratum Constraint Name Abbreviation Stratum #1 *Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ *A>I *Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ *G>H Stratum #2 *Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ *T>NT Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ Direct Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ Inverse
In (46), Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ and Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ in the upper stratum outrank Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ,
Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ in the lower stratum. This ranking also suggests that Tᴏᴘ >
Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ should not be ranked above Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ. The Hasse diagram in
(47) represents the relationship between constraints on obviation in Ktunaxa.
(47)
· or , or
40 In (47), Aɴɪᴍ > Iɴᴀɴ outranks Tᴏᴘ > Nᴏɴ-Tᴏᴘ, Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ, and Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ. Additionally, either Gᴇɴ > Hᴇᴀᴅ outranks Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ or Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ outranks Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ. That is, Gᴇɴ
> Hᴇᴀᴅ is determined by OTSoft to be unnecessary if Iɴᴠᴇʀsᴇ Aʟɪɢɴ outranks Dɪʀᴇᴄᴛ Aʟɪɢɴ.
5 Conclusion
Aissen (1997) models her constraints on obviation using Algonquian languages, in which obviation is morphologically marked, and finds the designation of arguments in transitive sentences as proximate and obviative to be helpful in explaining gaps in possessive constructions and those concerning animacy in non-Algonquian languages such as Tzotzil and Chamorro.
Further work could be done looking at obviation in subordinate clauses in Ktunaxa within the framework of Aissen (1997), specifically obviation and co-reference involving arguments in main clauses and subordinate clauses. Additionally, Aissen’s framework could be applied to other non-Algonquian languages with systems analogous to Algonquian direct/inverse and obviation, such as Karuk (Macaulay 1992) and Movima (Haude 2014).
This thesis, using previous observations of the effects of possession and animacy on obviation in Ktunaxa, contributes a more productive and explanatory analysis of the assignment of obviation in the language. Ktunaxa is not an Algonquian language, yet obviation is morphologically marked and is not applied after the fact, unlike in Aissen’s application of the constraints to Tzotzil and Chamorro. These constraint rankings from Algonquian hierarchies adhere to Ktunaxa with little modification needed. An animacy constraint is operative in Ktunaxa through obligatorily obviative inanimates although animacy is not morphologically marked, and a possession constraint is operative in Ktunaxa through obligatorily obviative possessums although possessors in Ktunaxa can be obviative as well. The existence of data in which animacy
41 and possession compete in governing obviation would provide insight on the relative ranking of these constraints against each other.
Acknowledgments
I would like to sincerely thank my thesis advisor Professor Amanda Payne for all of her feedback, support, and suggestions throughout the process of writing this thesis; without her help, this thesis would not have been written. I would also like to thank Professor Emily Gasser for her guidance in junior seminar, my faculty reader Professor Jonathan Washington for his recommended revisions and his help with the program OTSoft, and my peer reviewers Blien
Habtu and Emily Mow for offering feedback on my early drafts. Lastly, I would like to thank my friends for their continued support of me during the fall semester of 2020.
42 References
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