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Russian Analytical Digest No 101: Russia and the Nuclear Industry

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Russian Analytical Digest No 101: Russia and the Nuclear Industry No. 101 1 August 2011 russian analytical digest www.res.ethz.ch www.laender-analysen.de Russia and the nucleaR industRy ■■AnAlysis Russia and Fukushima 2 By Vladimir Slivyak, Moscow ■■AnAlysis The Russian Anti-Nuclear Movement 6 By Alisa Nikulina, Moscow ■■stAtistics Nuclear Energy in Russia 9 ■■OpiniOn Poll Russian Attitudes on Nuclear Energy 11 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Basel University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 101, 1 August 2011 2 Analysis Russia and Fukushima By Vladimir Slivyak, Moscow summary Since the accident in Japan’s Fukushima power station, Russian officials have consistently reassured the pub- lic that Russian nuclear plants are safe. One reason for this position is Russia’s desire to export nuclear power technology. The events in Japan might have a detrimental effect on Russian exports. However, the nuclear industry is also experiencing severe problems on the domestic front. According to reports by the “Ekoza- shchita!” (EcoDefense!) environmental group, Russian nuclear plants have numerous defects. The security situation will not improve as long as the presidential administration and the government continue to try and convince the world that there are no problems in Russia’s nuclear power stations. Fukushima in Russia? eral times a year, leading government officials together In March this year, the nuclear power plant in Japan’s with Rosatom chief Sergei Kiriyenko demonstrated their Fukushima prefecture experienced a disaster that is still complete support for nuclear energy as one of Russia’s underway at the time of writing. While the earthquake safest, most economical, and most ecological technol- failed to destroy the reactors and the cooling pond con- ogies, which is also available for sale to other countries. taining spent fuel rods, the energy supply was dam- The same reassurances are still heard today. aged to such an extent that the plant was cut off from However, the reality is much more grim that polit- external power and the cooling systems broke down. ical speechwriters would have one believe. Of Russia’s The nuclear disaster that followed was due to the lack 32 reactors, 22 are old and insecure. They are either at of energy supply to the reactors. These are the facts of the end of the 30-year lifespan envisaged by their plan- the matter that must be taken into consideration when ners or have already exceeded it. Much like Japan, Rus- dealing with the question of whether the Japanese sce- sia wants to use these reactor blocks beyond the 30-year nario could repeat itself even in the absence of a sim- limit. The usage period is to be extended by 15 years— ilarly strong earthquake. If one assumes that security without consulting ecological surveys, as required by systems depending on an external power supply might law. One would not hope to see a repeat of the Japanese fail, a contingency might arise in any nuclear plant— events in Russia, but it seems that the chances of such including a Russian one. a recurrence are increasing. All of Russia’s nuclear power plants are in proximity to cities with populations ranging from at least several notice of Defects for Russia’s nuclear tens of thousands to several hundreds of thousands of industry residents. These people would need to be evacuated. At The Russian nuclear industry, however, has already issue here is not a hypothetical scenario, but very real recovered from the shock of Fukushima. It went onto points of fact: In 1993, a storm damaged power lines the offensive by announcing projects for new and highly on the Kola Peninsula, the backup diesel generators of a secure reactors that are able to withstand any earth- nuclear power station failed to start, and the plant was quake. The reality is different, however. In 2009 alone on the brink of a disaster that could have reached the (the last year for which the records of the Rostechnad- proportions of a second Chernobyl. In 2000, a disrup- zor watchdog agency are available), inspectors noted tion of the power grid caused a shutdown of the reac- 491 violations of safety codes and laws in the struc- tors in the Mayak industrial complex in the Chelyabinsk tures charged with project planning and construction region as well as of the Beloyarsk nuclear plant 60km of nuclear power installations. Some companies were from Yekaterinburg. In both cases, a scenario similar to threatened with revocation of their licenses due to qual- that currently seen in Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant ity deficiencies in production. While all of the nuclear was only narrowly avoided. industry’s projects appear to be safe on paper, the de facto situation is that safety begins not on paper but Russia’s nuclear Discourse with the very real defects of material as well as human In view of the Fukushima disaster, the situation in Rus- failures, which cannot be ruled out. It is also worth sia appears increasingly ominous, as it closely resembles remembering that the Russian nuclear industry was that in Japan. Until March this year, in Russia as well issued with more than 3,000 notices of defects con- as in Japan, debates over the “insecurity” of nuclear cerning assets delivered in the construction of the Tyn- power plants were perceived as a breach of etiquette. Sev- van nuclear power plant in China. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 101, 1 August 2011 3 Russia’s nuclear industry experiences no pressure the system of loans in support of reactor exports. At the that might force the operators to enhance safety. On time, the sum of all such “assistance” from Russia was the contrary, the full support extended by the prime about US$5 billion. According to extremely conserva- minister and the president to the nuclear industry only tive estimates, it is six to eight times as high today. Tur- enhances the complacency in the sector: If politicians key alone has been promised a power plant at a cost of are completely on the side of Rosatom, there is no rea- around US$20 billion (fully financed by the Russian son for concern. There may be disagreements over which taxpayer). With all these loans, the conditions for pur- reactors are safer than others, or as to whether their con- chasers of the reactors are extremely favorable—includ- struction in earthquake zones should be permitted, but ing very vague securities for funds whose repayment is it is patently obvious that the situation in Russia is the deferred for decades to come. worst of all possible worlds in terms of nuclear safety. The Development of nuclear Energy in new construction and Marketing of Russia nuclear power plants As far as the development program for nuclear energy Rosatom is pursuing at least three projects in zones at risk in Russia itself is concerned, there are plans for con- of earthquakes—in Bulgaria, in Turkey, and in Arme- struction of 20 to 40 new reactors, according to vari- nia. There is also a project for a floating power station ous sources. However, the real-world capabilities of the that is scheduled to be delivered next year to Kamchatka, engineering sector currently only allow completion of in proximity to the tsunami zone. Not one of these one reactor complex a year, which makes it difficult to schemes has so far been reconsidered. Instead, assur- see how Rosatom can complete this ambitious plan. The ances are issued that all is completely safe. The Japanese question already arose last year when the comptroller’s heard the same assurances for decades and believed that office, having audited the Energy Ministry, announced their nuclear plants were designed to withstand earth- that 60 per cent of the reactors scheduled to go online by quakes and tsunamis—as well as airplane crashes and 2015 would not be started up until a later date (which all other manner of events. was not specified). At the beginning of this year, Dep- Regarding the new VVER-1200 reactors that uty Prime Minister Igor Sechin announced a reduction Rosatom wants to export to other countries, including of funding for Rosatom’s investment program. The rea- EU members, it is claimed that construction problems son is not, of course, that the Russian government has are non-existent. In case of a disruption of the power decided to stop subsidizing the nuclear industry. The supply to such a reactor, however, or if the heat removal problem was rather that the stated deadlines for plant should be severely affected (e.g., as a result of a disrup- construction inside and outside of Russia could not be tion in the first cooling circuit), these reactors might also met. Nevertheless, nobody intends to withdraw from experience a major accident. However, Rosatom cannot the comprehensive nuclear planning schedule at this discuss the shortcomings of the new reactor type, since point—at issue is merely a delay, albeit quite a long one. that would mean a moratorium on all sales efforts. On How is the program financed in Russia? The lion’s the other hand, refining the reactor would be expen- share is paid from the state budget. Beyond this, Rosatom sive and lead to a complete loss of return on investment. is to make use of private investors, who are to contrib- Even before the Fukushima incidents, the cost of ute a considerable part of the funding. Another source new reactors had reached high levels: while the aver- is the profit generated by state-owned companies.
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