Air and Space Power Journal: Winter 2008

Chief of Staff, US Air Force Gen Norton A. Schwartz Commander, Air Education and Training Command Gen Stephen R. Lorenz Commander, Air University Lt Gen Allen G. Peck

Chief, Professional Journals http://www.af.mil Lt Col Paul D. Berg Deputy Chief, Professional Journals Maj James C. Ulman Editor Capt Lori Katowich Professional Staff Marvin W. Bassett, Contributing Editor Darlene H. Barnes, Editorial Assistant Steven C. Garst, Director of Art and Production http://www.aetc.randolph.af Daniel M. Armstrong, Illustrator L. Susan Fair, Illustrator Ann Bailey, Prepress Production Manager Air and Space Power Journal Web Site Catherine Parker, Managing Editor

The Air and Space Power Journal (ISSN 1554-2505), Air Force Recurring Publication 10-1, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for the presentation and stimulation of innovative thinking on http://www.au.af.mil military doctrine, strategy, force structure, readiness, and other matters of national defense. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying Air and Space Power Journal the official sanction of the Department of Defense, 155 N. Twining Street Air Force, Air Education and Training Command, Air Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026 University, or other agencies or departments of the US e-mail: [email protected] government. [email protected] (alternate) In this edition, articles not bearing a copyright notice may Visit Air and Space Power Journal online be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil. Articles bearing a copyright notice may be reproduced for any US government purpose without permission. If they are reproduced, the Air and Space Power Journal re quests a courtesy line. To obtain permission to reproduce material bearing a copyright notice for other than US government purposes, contact the author of the mate rial rather than the Air and Space Power Journal. Winter 2008 Volume XXII, No. 4 AFRP 10-1

Senior Leader Perspective Lichte on Leadership: A Yankees Fan’s Perspective ...... 5 Gen Arthur J . Lichte, USAF

Focus Area Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power ...... 12 Lt Col Paul D . Berg, USAF, Chief, Professional Journals

Features Defense of US Space Assets: A Legal Perspective ...... 75 Capt Adam E . Frey, USAF Shifting the Air Force’s Support Ideology to Exploit Combined Arms in the Close Fight ...... 85 Lt Col Collin T . Ireton, USAF Why We Should End the Aviator Continuation Pay Bonus Program ...... 95 Maj Brian E . A . Maue, USAF

Departments Prelaunch Notes Honoring Maj Gen I. B. Holley for His Many Years of Service to Air and Space Power Journal ...... 13 Ricochets and Replies ...... 14 The Merge Reply to “A Look down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of Military Culture” ...... 17 John R . Leibrock Comments on “Weather and the Calculated Risk” ...... 19 Col Bob Glahn, USAF, Retired Reply to “Military Transformation: Ends, Ways, and Means” ...... 21 Mr . Benoît Drion An Airman’s View of United States Air Force Airpower ...... 23 Dr . Stephen E . Wright, Colonel, USAF, Retired Asking the Right Questions ...... 31 Capt David Blair, USAF Asymmetric Air Support ...... 34 Maj Gary L . Burg, USAF Human Performance Enhancement: Überhumans or Ethical Morass? ...... 39 Col Lex Brown, USAF, MC, SFS Lt Col Anthony P . Tvaryanas, USAF, MC, SFS Air-Mindedness ...... 44 Dr . Dale L . Hayden

2008-4 contents.indd 1 10/27/08 9:02:41 AM The Reconstitution Imperative © ...... 46 Les Doggrell Self-Evaluation: A Disconnect in Our Values ...... 53 Col Jim Slife, USAF Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Ground Commander ...... 60 Maj Steven Maceda, USAF

PIREPs Developing Airmen for Integration into Air, Space, and Cyberspace: The New Aggressors ...... 62 Col David R . Stilwell, USAF Journals for Space Professionals: So Much to Read, So Little Time ...... 73 Lt Col David C . Arnold, USAF, PhD

Book Reviews Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea ...... 105 Bruce E . Bechtol Jr . Reviewer: Dr . John Farrell Phantom Reflections: The Education of an American Fighter Pilot in Vietnam ...... 106 Mike McCarthy Reviewer: Dr . David R . Mets The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creating a New Superpower ...... 107 William H . Overholt Reviewer: Maj Rodney D . Bullard, USAF Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shaping the U.S. Air Force Academy ...... 107 Paul T . Ringenbach Reviewer: Col Phillip S . Meilinger, USAF, Retired On Call in Hell: A Doctor’s Iraq War Story ...... 108 Cdr Richard Jadick with Thomas Hayden Reviewer: MSgt Kelley Stewart, USAF Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security ...... 109 Hans Binnendijk and Richard L . Kugler Reviewer: Lt Col James J . McNally, USAF, Retired Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and Terrorists ...... 110 James S . Corum and Wray R . Johnson Reviewer: Lt Col Michael C . Grub, USAF Tempered Steel: The Three Wars of Triple Air Force Cross Winner Jim Kasler ...... 111 Perry D . Luckett and Charles L . Byler Reviewer: Cadet David L . Morgan, USAF The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler ...... 112 Jeffrey Record Reviewer: Maj Paul G . Niesen, USAF, Retired Silver Wings, Golden Valor: The USAF Remembers Korea ...... 113 Dr . Richard P . Hallion, ed . Reviewer: R . Ray Ortensie

2008-4 contents.indd 2 10/27/08 9:02:41 AM Heirpower! Eight Basic Habits of Exceptionally Powerful Lieutenants ...... 114 CMSgt Bob Vásquez, USAF, Retired Reviewer: Cadet Luis Santiago Billy Mitchell: “Stormy Petrel of the Air” ...... 115 Roger G . Miller Reviewer: Cadet Jennifer Walne Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Civil-Military Relations ...... 115 Thomas C . Bruneau and Scott D . Tollefson, eds . Reviewer: Lt Col Joseph L . Derdzinski, USAF Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd ...... 116 Frans P . B . Osinga Reviewer: Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired Bomber Boys: The RAF Offensive of 1943 ...... 117 Kevin Wilson Reviewer: Kenneth P . Werrell Into the Wild Blue Yonder: My Life in the Air Force ...... 118 Allan T . Stein Reviewer: Cadet Philip T . McCombs Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003 ...... 119 Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter Reviewer: Capt Daniel L . Magruder Jr ., USAF Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership ...... 120 Bruce R . Pirnie et al . Reviewer: Col Lawrence R . Roberts, USMC Semmes: Rebel Raider ...... 121 John M . Taylor Reviewer: Dr . Robert B . Kane Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Programs and Operations in the 9/11 World ...... 122 William M . Arkin Reviewer: Dr . Frank P . Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir ...... 123 Ted Morgan Reviewer: LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN Corky Meyer’s Flight Journal: Dodging Disasters—Just in Time ...... 123 Corwin H . Meyer Reviewer: Maj Herman Reinhold, USAF, Retired Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peacetime America since 1783 ...... 124 Thomas S . Langston Reviewer: 1st Lt Kevin M . Hullihan, USAF Thunder over the Horizon: From V-2 Rockets to Ballistic Missiles ...... 125 Clayton K . S . Chun Reviewer: Maj Jeffrey James, USAF

Mission Debrief ...... 126

2008-4 contents.indd 3 10/27/08 9:02:42 AM Air and Space Power Journal Board of Reviewers

Col Ronald K. Bartley, USAFR Mr. Charles Tustin Kamps Air University USAF Air Command and Staff College Lt Col Eric Braganca, USAF Dr. Tom Keaney Naval Air Station Johns Hopkins University Patuxent River, Maryland Col Merrick E. Krause, USAF, Retired Dr. Kendall K. Brown Department of Homeland Security NASA Marshall Space Flight Center Col Chris J. Krisinger, USAF, Retired Col Steven D. Carey, USAF, Retired Burke, Virginia Daphne, Alabama Dr. Benjamin S. Lambeth Dr. Clayton K. S. Chun RAND US Army War College Mr. Douglas E. Lee Dr. Mark Clodfelter Air Force Space Command National War College Dr. Richard I. Lester Dr. Conrad Crane Eaker College for Professional Development Director, US Army Military History Institute Mr. Brent Marley Col Michael D. Davis, USAF Redstone Arsenal, Alabama Air Force Research Institute Mr. Rémy M. Mauduit Col Dennis M. Drew, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Air University (professor emeritus) Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF West Chicago, Illinois The Pentagon Dr. Daniel Mortensen Dr. Stephen Fought Air Force Research Institute USAF Air War College (professor emeritus) Dr. Richard R. Muller Col Richard L. Fullerton, USAF USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies USAF Academy Dr. Bruce T. Murphy Lt Col Derrill T. Goldizen, PhD, USAF, Retired Air University Westport Point, Massachusetts Col W. Michael Guillot, USAF Col Robert Owen, USAF, Retired Air University Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Dr. John F. Guilmartin Jr. Lt Col Brian S. Pinkston, USAF, MC, SFS Ohio State University The Pentagon Dr. Amit Gupta Col Bob Potter, USAF, Retired USAF Air War College Air Force Research Institute Dr. Grant T. Hammond Dr. Steve Rothstein Dean, NATO Defence College Colorado Springs Science Center Project Dr. Dale L. Hayden Lt Col Reagan E. Schaupp, USAF Air Force Research Institute Air University Dr. Thomas Hughes Col Richard Szafranski, USAF, Retired USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies Toffler Associates Lt Col Jeffrey Hukill, USAF, Retired Lt Col Edward B. Tomme, PhD, USAF, Retired Air Force Research Institute Sci-Ops Consulting Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired Dr. Christopher H. Toner LeMay Center for Doctrine Development and Education USAF Air Command and Staff College Col Mark P. Jelonek, USAF Lt Col David A. Umphress, PhD, USAFR, Retired The Pentagon Auburn University Col John Jogerst, USAF, Retired Dr. Harold R. Winton Navarre, Florida USAF School of Advanced Air and Space Studies

2008-4 Board of Reviewers.indd 4 10/27/08 9:03:12 AM Lichte on Leadership A Yankees Fan’s Perspective

Gen Arthur J. Lichte, uSAF*

s A student of leadership over my beloved Yankees and our great Air Force. the past 37 years, I’ve received nu I quickly found out that there’s some real merous briefingsand read countless wisdom and hidden insights waiting to be works on the subject. I quickly found discovered by those who spend even a little Aout that the range of different perspectives ri time and effort looking at both of these valed the number of works themselves. not championship organizations. But before we surprisingly, I discovered that some perspec jump into the specifics, let’s take a brief look tives resonated with me more than others, and at some of the similarities between the Yan with that as a foundation, I began forming my kees and the Air Force. own thoughts on leadership. As a child, I grew up with my house just blocks away from Yankee stadium, “the Similarities between the house that Ruth built.” so naturally, I be Yankees and the Air Force came (and remain) an avid Yankees fan. As I joined the service and learned more over It may not appear so on the surface, but the years, I began to see similarities between our Air Force and the new York Yankees have

*the author was born and raised in the Bronx, new York, where he graduated from Cardinal spellman High school and Manhattan College before earning his commission in the us Air Force.

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many things in common, namely, their ori “When You Come to a gins, winning traditions, and incredible people. the Yankees, for instance, started as the Balti Fork in the Road,Take It” more Orioles, just as the Air Force found its decisions are a fact of life, no matter what origins in the Army Air Corps. A Yankees fan we do or where we go. those of you in uni wants to see his team win all 12 games by a form made a conscious decision to raise your score of 10–0, a goal we share in the Air Force hand and serve—and for that, I applaud and . . . we never want a close fight. And it’s the thank you. Military service opens many doors great leaders and superstar players in both or for us, but we have to be receptive to the op ganizations that have given us our amazing portunities that come our way. so I encourage successes to date. you to push your boundaries and branch out the Yankees can look to Casey stengel, into the uncomfortable unknown. don’t be Ralph Houk, Joe torre, and of course Yogi afraid to take risks and learn from your mis Berra as their great leaders. their leadership, takes. Above all, resist the temptation to be combined with superstar players such as Babe come so fixatedon seeking a particular job or Ruth, Joe diMaggio, Mickey Mantle, and assignment that you miss out on the opportu derek Jeter, produced a record-setting 2 nities right there in front of you. the key to World series titles to date, and enabled them success is realizing that the job you have today to win more World series games (130) than is the most important one you’ll ever have—so any other team has even played. the Yankees run with it with zeal and enthusiasm. are the perfect example of what happens When I was a captain coming up for an as when leadership and talent intersect. signment, I was flying KC-13s at Plattsburgh Air Force Base, new York, and I really wanted the Air Force is the same. We have been to cross-train to the Air Force’s newest air re fortunate to have great leaders such as Gen fueler, the KC-10. the Air Force, however, Ron Fogleman, Gen Mike Ryan, Gen John had other plans, sending me to what was then Jumper, and Gen Michael “Buzz” Moseley, strategic Air Command as a personnel offi reaching all the way back to Brig Gen Billy cer. As a young pilot, I didn’t know a thing Mitchell. together with superstars such as about the personnel system, but I went with a Capt eddie Rickenbacker, Maj dick Bong, positive attitude and consequently learned a Capt Lance sijan, and sgt John Levitow, us great many things. though I couldn’t have airpower has played an ever-increasing role foreseen it at the time, the assignment gave in ensuring our nation’s success in conflict. me a foundation in our personnel system All in all, our forefathers’ collective efforts that I still use. Just as importantly, though, I have paid off in recruiting, developing, and leaned heavily on that knowledge during my retaining the outstanding Airmen who next assignment, when I not only cross- serve as the core of our superstar team, ul trained to KC-10s but was entrusted to com timately resulting in our service becoming mand a squadron of them! the most respected air and space force in the world today. Leadership and talent in tersect yet again. “We Have a Good so the parallels are there. Growing up in Time Together Even When the shadows of Yankee stadium, I had the good fortune of seeing Yogi Berra in action We Are Not Together” and found a number of his famous sayings Yogi’s talking about family members here, not only fun but also insightful from a lead and it’s important to remember that they too ership perspective. I’d like to use some of should play a significant part in dealing with those sayings as starting points to share my the “forks in the road” you encounter through thoughts on leadership. out your career. despite what many of us may

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want, we can wear the uniform for only so up to date on the latest tactics, techniques, long. Your goal should be to have your family and procedures. this is a technical, complex with you when you leave the service. I simply business we’re in, and the cost of failure is can’t overstress the importance of family. measured not in dollars but in lives. We’ve When I say “family,” I’m not just talking about been at war for over 17 years now, and the our husbands, wives, and children but our stress of the operations tempo, coupled with parents and siblings too. Make a concerted ef the transformation of our service to a lighter, fort to stay in touch and have fun, even while leaner, and more efficient organization, de you’re forward-deployed—don’t leave it to mands our continued focus on training. chance. take advantage of technology and Mentorship is no different, and we’re never use the Internet (e-mail, etc.) to remain close too young to give it or too old to receive it. to your loved ones despite physical separation. Great mentoring doesn’t always have to do If you’re just going on a short tour of duty, with work, and it doesn’t always have to be don’t underestimate the power of souvenirs. pleasant either. Good mentors are candid in As the years go by, those items will not only their suggestions (positive and negative), and serve as warm reminders of your travels, but, I encourage you to seek out constructive feed more importantly, they’ll stand as a testament back (even if it stings a bit) so you can learn to your ongoing love of your family. and grow. similarly, be open and honest when others seek your opinion. We all have areas in which we can improve. “Public Speaking Is One of Finally, make an effort to broaden the the Best Things I Hate” “circle of friends” to and from whom you give and receive advice. As a personal example, Communication is crucial to the success of shortly after I arrived on station as a second any project, organization, or individual leader, lieutenant, my squadron operations officerin and the ability to speak publicly is critical for vited me to his house for a cookout. We had a Airmen of all ranks. develop this skill early great time, and just before I left, I asked if he on, and seek out opportunities to speak in would come to my place in return. He thanked front of groups. understand that the vast ma me for offering but asked that I invite some jority of us start out feeling uncomfortable, one else instead—someone new to the base. and accept that those of us who are comfort What a great idea! It’s one that has stuck with able have likely gotten that way by repeatedly me ever since. I’ve made some really good placing ourselves in front of groups and speak friends through my assignments just by open ing. the best advice I can give is to be yourself, ing doors to new arrivals, and I in turn have talk from the heart, and be honest—that’s encouraged them to do the same. how you’ll convince and inspire others. In do ing so, as I’ve found, you’ll soon realize the power behind public speaking, and you’ll “If You Don’t Have a Bullpen, cherish the skill as a key tool to ensure not You Got Nothing” only your success but also—and more impor tantly—that of your organization. teamwork, teamwork, teamwork. that’s what enables the Air Force to do the amazing things it does. It’s not a place for individuals “[He’s] Learning Me All His who look out for themselves or place their Experience” own interests above the service’s. As President Kennedy said, “Ask not what your country can Just as public speaking is a critical leader do for you—ask what you can do for your ship skill, so is technical expertise and profi country.” We should take those words to heart. ciency. take training seriously, and ensure Back up your fellow Airmen, and recognize that you carve out the time necessary to stay that every individual plays a vital role in the

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success of our Air Force mission. By helping also true—we should ensure that opportuni each other, we not only help the Air Force ac ties don’t pass us by because of something we complish its mission but also benefit person failed to do. developmental education (de) ally from the experience by strengthening the and academic degrees, for example, are bonds of camaraderie and further expanding known yardsticks by which we’re measured. so our understanding of Air Force operations. be sure that you take the time to do these things at appropriate stages in your career. Additionally, start thinking about learning a “You Can’t Win All the Time— foreign language—a great advantage in to There Are Guys Out There day’s coalition environment. Better Than You” After you’ve met your school and de re quirements, focus on those people one rank Although a positive character trait, humility senior to you, and start learning how they lead is a hard pill to swallow at times. Our Air Force personnel, motivate others, prioritize efforts, is fortunate to have so many great people who and allocate resources. You will be in their po are motivated to succeed. that said, it’s simply sition sooner than you think. If you’re a lieu reality that everyone can’t be “number one” tenant, don’t try taking on the duties of a colo in everything. the Air Force findsitself in the nel—that’s simply a bridge too far. Instead, enviable position of having to struggle to focus on the next-higher rung, and study the identify a select few for early promotion or in- captains around you. By doing so, you will residence schooling, because the pool is ex tremely competitive. Accepting this fact un learn to think and lead like your boss, who will derscores the importance of stratification* gain someone (you) who inherently knows and requires us to accept the responsibility of what he or she needs. looking our Airmen in the eye and making the hard call. If we don’t do it as raters, selec tion boards will be forced to treat our people “You Can Observe a Lot as equals and rank all of them behind their by Watching” stratified peers. As ratees, it’s our duty to remain humble You have an opportunity every day to ob among our peers while striving continually to serve your boss and your organization’s lead improve ourselves. As leaders, it’s our duty to ers. don’t waste it. take note of the traits you stratify our superstars, candidly tell our Air find effective, and incorporate the best into men where they rack and stack, and consis your set of skills. Conversely, be aware that tently provide everyone with quality feedback, you too are being watched. take care of your identifying areas in which they excel and those appearance, from haircuts to uniform wear in which they can improve. to the cleanliness of your workplace. take pride in your work, and raise the bar by set ting a positive example. You’ll find that your “If You Don’t Know Where colleagues will emulate you—so make sure You Are Going,You Might it’s for the better, not worse. Your paths will cross again someday, and when they do (be Not Get There” lieve me, they will), you’ll be grateful that As I mentioned under the first Yogi saying, your positive example helped propel them to we need to make the most of the opportuni success and that their example helped you ties the Air Force gives us. But the reverse is develop as well.

*stratification is the sequential, numerical ranking of an organization’s members according to their perceived ability to serve in the next-higher grade. Persons of a given rank are stratified only against others in the organization of the same rank (e.g., my number two captain of five).

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For those who think that your paths won’t admitted he hadn’t. However, after he at cross, let me tell you a quick story. I was a tended the person’s church and reported that lieutenant colonel in the Pentagon back in the singer had a wonderful voice, I considered 10, working for Gen Robert Rutherford, a the matter resolved. On the day of the cere combat air forces (CAF) pilot. At the time, mony, the narrator asked the audience to General Fogleman, another CAF pilot, also please stand for the arrival of the officialparty , worked for General Rutherford. I clearly re posting of the colors, and singing of the na member thinking to myself that since I was a tional anthem. Well, just as the color guard mobility air forces pilot, our paths would took its first step, the singer began in a great, never cross again. Well, as fate would have it, deep voice, sounding marvelous—only two General Fogleman was selected to take over minutes too early. the color guard still stood the newly established Air Mobility Command in the back of the room! Well schooled in drill (AMC), and the next thing I knew, I was his and ceremony, its members stopped in their executive officer! What’s more, after General tracks and presented the colors—in the back Fogleman became the Air Force chief of staff, of the room. Realizing that something wasn’t he picked General Rutherford as his replace quite right, the singer became distracted but ment at AMC. so in the end, I worked for continued the anthem—and, in going from both of them! the moral of the story is to al bad to worse, he began mixing up the words! ways do your best, look for great leadership It was all the audience could do to contain it traits, and anticipate the time when your self until he finallybelted out, “Pilgrims burst paths will cross again. ing in air!” at which point everyone burst out laughing. somehow we got through it, but it just goes to show you there is no such thing as “We Made Too Many a “dumb” question—I never asked the captain if our guest had ever sung in an official Air Wrong Mistakes” Force ceremony. In the mid-to-late 10s, service members But I don’t want to leave this point without shared a concern that their Air Force was distinguishing between making mistakes and evolving into a one-mistake service. I believe breaking the law. People who choose to use we’ve moved beyond that misperception—and illegal narcotics or drive under the influence that’s a good thing. As humans, we’re going to clearly don’t make a mistake—they break the make mistakes, and I’ve found that, more of law. We in uniform place our very lives in each ten than not, that’s how we really learn. As I other’s hands and therefore cannot tolerate said earlier, I encourage you to step outside any such disregard for the health and safety of your comfort zone and try new things. Good our fellow wingmen. leaders accept the fact that their people will make mistakes, but they also do their best to minimize the pain associated with the learn “There’s Always Some Kid Who ing process. May Be Seeing Me for the First or In fact, most mistakes and potential pitfalls can be easily prevented. Often, a series of Last Time—I Owe Him My Best” questions will bring such problems to light. Okay, for my fellow Yogi fans out there, he despite our best intentions, though, some didn’t actually say this one. Rather, Yogi heard times we simply don’t ask enough questions. it from Joe diMaggio when diMaggio, one of A perfect example comes from one of my the senior players on the team, gave Yogi an own changes of command. One of my unit’s earful for choosing to sit out the second game captains, whom I’d directed to run the cere of a doubleheader. the message here is simple: mony, informed me that he had arranged to people are watching us all the time, so as rep have someone sing the national anthem. resentatives of our Air Force team, we have a Asked if he had heard the individual sing, he responsibility to give them our best.

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As you meet people at home or abroad, on even delivered. Our task as leaders is to lead duty or on leave, it’s quite possible that you through the cultural change and push the en may be the only person in the armed forces velope, to foster and encourage the culture of they come across in their entire lives. though innovation, to break through the culture of an intimidating possibility, it also presents a resistance—and ultimately continue to make great opportunity. Just be yourself, and don’t the Air Force even better than it is today. be afraid to tell them about all the great places you’ve been and the great things you’ve done. I’ve found that Americans and their interna “Always Go to Other People’s tional partners respect our men and women Funerals—Otherwise, in uniform, and I believe they deserve the op portunity to meet them face to face, shake They Won’t Go to Yours” their hands, and thank them for their service. On opening day in Yankee stadium, a cere mony recognizes former Yankees who have passed away since the prior season. during “The Future Ain’t What one such tribute, Yogi said, ”I hope I never see It Used to Be” my name on that list.” Like many of Yogi’s say ings, it makes us chuckle, but the point is that this was true when Yogi said it, and it’s even we should show our support for others—not truer today. When I was commissioned back in only because it’s the right thing to do, but be 171, the global positioning system (GPs) cause we’d like others to support us too. I’m wasn’t even in development, much less opera talking about everything from promotion and tional. today it serves not only as a primary retirement ceremonies to unit intramurals, means of navigation but also as a critical piece picnics, and hails and farewells. sure, naysay of our targeting and ordnance-delivery sys ers will always want us to think that it won’t tems. such capabilities as the GPs and Global be any fun, but in my experience, people Information Grid, both of which operate in who go to these events have a great time and the new cyberspace domain, enable us to see a learn something. target anywhere on the face of the earth, track For the officersout there, you need to start it, hold it at risk, and present viable options to thinking about the day you’ll officiateat those our president. ceremonies. Believe me, when the first time the same technology has also improved comes around, you’ll wish you had attended a our quality of life. Gone are the days when we few more and paid attention. It will come had to take our records with us to the finance sooner than you think. You may believe that officein order to collect a paycheck. Gone are only squadron commanders officiateat retire the days when we had to walk over to the per ments, but every once in a while, you’ll see a sonnel office to obtain a copy of our perfor second lieutenant retire a senior noncommis mance report. We’re at a point now where sioned officer with over 20 years of service. It there is little that we can’t do online. Airmen just goes to show you that it’s never too early have leveraged technology to make things bet to start taking notes. ter, and the efficiencies we’ve gained help to In addition to supporting your unit, you generate cost savings that we can put towards should also get involved in professional orga modernizing and recapitalizing our fleet. nizations such as the Air Force Association, But leveraging cyberspace is a double-edged the Airlift/tanker Association, or other enti sword. On the one hand, it promises improve ties specific to career fields. these organiza ments in every area—operations, mainte tions provide ample opportunity to broaden nance, support, and quality of life. On the your horizons as well as network and meet other, it brings out a certain amount of built- people. the relationships you’ll foster in those in resistance to the change it produces—resis forums will open doors that otherwise would tance that threatens the benefitsbefore they’re have remained closed to you.

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“I’d Rather Be the Yankee “It Ain’t Over ’til It’s Over” Catcher than the President” so there you have it—a Yankees fan’s per Yogi spent 1 years as catcher for the Yan spective on leadership. I hope you’ve gathered kees, and this statement clearly shows that he some food for thought and smiled along the loved every moment of it. For me, it’s my Air way. Leadership is a challenge, no doubt about Force career. I just can’t imagine feeling more it. But that’s part of what makes it fun, inter fulfilled or happier in any other occupation. esting, and worthwhile. this really is a great And you should be happy and proud of what time to serve our country, and I applaud every you’re doing because if you think of your job one who has answered this noble calling. Re as the best in the world, then it will hardly gardless of whether you serve for four years or seem like work! 40, the experience will forever change you, there simply hasn’t been a better time to and America will always be grateful. so get out be in our service. We’re the most combat- there, keep doing the incredible things you ready and combat-tested air force in history! do every day, and continue to lead. And while When you go home, tell your family and you’re at it, don’t forget to treat your family to friends what you’ve done and where you’ve a day at the ballpark every now and then. As been. tell them about the places they’ve only for me, I already have tickets to check out the heard about. You have an incredible story to new Yankee stadium in 200. so if a Yankees tell, and all too often people back home don’t game is on your calendar, keep an eye out—I ❑ understand how engaged we are in the fight. just might see you there! Airmen are making a difference and are sav ing lives every day, so go ahead and brag on yourself a little. You’ve earned it!

Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power constitute America’s edge—America’s asymmetric advantage that shapes the global security environment. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

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Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS Global Vigilance, Reach, and Power

he US Air Force has long character vigilance to the concept of “situational aware ized its mission in global terms. Gen ness” and making it the foundation of the other hap Arnold chose Global Mission for two concepts. The new global vigilance not only the title of his memoirs, published in encompasses data-gathering and assessment T1949. An Air Force white paper of 1990, Global activities that enable global power, but also re Reach—Global Power, articulated a vision of lies on global reach to gather and transmit the how the service would contribute to national resulting information to facilitate situational defense in a changing world. Five years later, awareness. Global reach becomes “operational Global Presence appeared, followed soon there access,” which comes from establishing con after by yet another Air Force publication, nectivity throughout the air, space, and cyber Global Engagement. domains. Such connectivity depends upon More recently, “global vigilance” joined the both global vigilance and global power to exer legacy notions of global reach and global power cise the requisite degree of control over the to form a conceptual trio. The Air Force de relevant domains. The analysts redefine global fines global vigilance as “the persistent, world power as the “ability to create and sustain ef wide capability to keep an unblinking eye on fects” of all kinds in each of the Air Force’s op any entity—to provide warning on capabilities erational domains, an ability based upon global and intentions, as well as identify needs and op vigilance and global reach. They also reinforce portunities”; global reach as “the ability to move, the existing trio by proposing an underlying supply, or position assets—with unrivaled ve “global partnering” foundation that would en locity and precision—anywhere on the planet”; able the other three concepts as well as reflect and global power as “the ability to hold at risk or the importance of long-term military coopera strike any target, anywhere in the world, and tion with other nations.3 project swift, decisive, precise effects.”1 Whether these reformulated ideas crystal At first glance, these three terms appear to lize into a more holistic vision of air, space, coherently encapsulate the service’s diverse and cyber power remains to be seen, but, with mission areas and serve as building blocks of out question, Airmen will continue to debate strategy, but they have partially devolved into these complex topics. Air and Space Power Journal, slogans that Air Force major commands exploit the professional journal of the Air Force, dedi to advocate their programs. Specifically, Air cates this issue to promoting dialogue about Force Space Command has become associated global vigilance, reach, and power. ❑ with global vigilance, Air Mobility Command with global reach, and Air Combat Command with global power. Such interpretations ill suit Notes an Air Force dedicated to integrated air, space, 1. Gen T. Michael Moseley, The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force, CSAF White Paper (Wash and cyber activities. in effect, something in ington, DC: Department of the Air Force, Office of the tended to serve as a unifying vision of what the Chief of Staff, 29 December 2007), 1, http://www.af.mil/ service contributes to national defense has split shared/media/document/AFD-080207-048.pdf. into narrower, command-centric concepts.2 2. i am indebted to a number of colleagues at the Air Force research institute who developed this idea while Defense analysts at the Air Force research conducting the chief of staff’s Air Force Strategy Study institute propose redefining the concepts to during 2008. restore their visionary nature, anchoring global 3. ibid.

Focus Area.indd 12 10/27/08 9:03:40 AM Lt CoL PauL D. Berg, uSaF, ChieF, ProFeSSionaL JournaLS

Honoring Maj Gen I. B. Holley for His Many Years of Service to Air and Space Power Journal

aj Gen I. B. Holley has announced have appeared in ASPJ (formerly known as Air his retirement from Air and Space University Quarterly Review, Air University Review, Power Journal ’s (ASPJ ) editorial Airpower Journal, and Aerospace Power Journal ). advisory Board (eaB—its board The air Force Historical Foundation recently Mof directors, charged with determining the honored him by establishing the Major Gen Journal’s strategic direction). a military-history eral I. B. Holley award to honor scholars who icon, he has been associated with ASPJ for over have made “a sustained, significant contribu three decades—actually only a small part of tion to the documentation of air Force history his amazing military and academic career. af during a lifetime of service.” The inaugural ter enlisting in the army air Forces and serv award went to General Holley for his “decades ing as an aerial-gunnery instructor during of assistance, support and encouragement to World War II, he joined the air Force Reserve military historians.”* in 1947. In the military, he served in the Of nobody will ever fully comprehend all the fice of the Secretary of the air Force, at the ways that General Holley has contributed to Keesler Technical Training Center in Missis ASPJ, but his pervasive influence is ingrained sippi, and at Maxwell air Force Base, alabama, in the Journal’s Dna. I first met General Holley as mobilization designee to the commander over 10 years ago, when he taught a short of air University. By 1976 his talents had taken course on research and writing at air Univer him to the rank of major general; he retired sity. His crisp, no-nonsense, highly demand from the air Force Reserve in 1981. Meanwhile, ing teaching style left a lasting impression. for over 60 years he has enjoyed a parallel ca Since then, I have hosted him at eaB meet reer as a professor at Duke University, teach ings, during which I have done my best to ing a number of subjects, including military profit from his wisdom. He periodically sends history and the history of technology. notes to the ASPJ staff, offering witty advice General Holley is renowned for his keen and constructive criticism. Fellow eaB mem insights into how thought affects military or ber Dr. Dave Mets has known General Holley ganizations and the conduct of war. His land much longer, having met him at the air Force mark book Ideas and Weapons, published in academy in the 1960s. Dr. Mets served with 1953, analyzes the evolution of weaponry be General Holley on the West Point faculty in tween World War I and World War II, notably the early 1970s, benefited from his mentor in terms of the influenceof doctrine upon airing during Dr. Mets’s tenure as editor of Air power development. He has published other University Review in the late 1970s, and again books and innumerable articles, some of which while assigned as a professor at the School of

*“Major General I. B. Holley award,” air Force Historical Foundation, 2008, http://www.afhistoricalfoundation.org/awards/Major _General_I_B_Holley_award.asp.

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advanced air and Space Studies at Maxwell supporting this journal and the air Force as in the 1990s. Dr. Mets told me that General long as both have existed.” Holley “has ever been an inspiration as well On behalf of the ASPJ staff, past and present, as perhaps my greatest teacher, but most of I thank General Holley for his many years of all a dear friend. He has been a stalwart pillar dedication to the Journal’s ongoing mission. ❑

We encourage you to e-mail your comments to us at [email protected] or [email protected]. We reserve the right to edit your remarks.

AIRPOWER IMBALANCE again, the limited range of the Pakistan air Force’s aircraft precludes Pakistan’s ability to air Commodore Tariq Mahmud ashraf’s article break any such naval blockade. Considering “airpower Imbalance: nuclear Pakistan’s achilles’ Heel” (Fall 2008) is intriguing. How that all critical resources, including petro ever, the points that he chooses not to address leum, are brought into Pakistan by sea, a sea- are extremely disturbing. Specifically, what is based economic blockade could have a crip the definition of “economic strangling” (p. 15)? pling effect on Pakistan’s war potential. If India continues its economic development Meddling in each other’s domestic activi and becomes an even stronger regional eco ties has been a hallmark of both the Indian nomic power, would that constitute economic and Pakistani foreign intelligence agencies. strangling? also, is Pakistan saying that if do Lately, India’s extensive inroads into afghani mestic destabilization occurs, it could opt to stan, support to insurgent elements in Baluch use nuclear weapons against India? How can a istan, and attempts to foment dissent amongst government prove that a foreign government the Pashtuns have been disturbing develop (India) is the cause of internal problems? Is ments. although it would take a lot for India there a threshold? to really be able to create domestic instability Lt Col Guillermo R. Gonzalez, USAF severe enough to threaten the very existence Fairfax, Virginia of Pakistan as a nation-state, the possibility does exist and cannot be eliminated. In the remote case in which suspected Indian inter AIRPOWER IMBALANCE: ference in the domestic affairs of Pakistan THE AUTHOR RESPONDS reaches a level where the eventual breakup of Pakistan has had only one main seaport at the nation appears possible, Pakistani recourse Karachi, and although it has been supple to the nuclear option cannot and should not mented somewhat by the construction of Port be ruled out. Qasim and the Gwadar Port, India’s blue- Air Commodore Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, water-capable navy could still attempt to choke Pakistan Air Force, Retired Pakistan’s principal shipping routes. Once Al Ain, United Arab Emirates

Prelaunch Ricochet 2008-4.indd 14 10/27/08 9:04:36 AM RICOCHETS AND REPLIES 15

STRATEGY AND COST LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP I really enjoyed Lt Col Lawrence Spinetta’s The articles “Lorenz on Leadership” (Sum article “Strategy and Cost: a Gap in Our Mili mer 2005) and “Lorenz on Leadership: Part tary Decision-Making Process” (Fall 2008). 2” (Spring 2008) by Gen Stephen Lorenz Last year, while attending the army’s Com are superb, and I hope to see a third article mand and General Staff College, I came to or even a book. I had the great personal the same realization as Colonel Spinetta that honor of sitting in the front row at Officer Training School at Maxwell aFB, alabama, cost—and economics in general—did not when General Lorenz briefed us on leader figure into the discussion during the military ship during my air Force ROTC field train decision-making process. even with our in ing this summer. I definitely share his taste creased focus on information operations and for the study of leadership. stability operations, we don’t seem to con I liked how General Lorenz used quota sider cost and economic incentives as care tions from prominent historical figures. fully as we should. as a comptroller and Those statements were a great touch and economist, I find that a bit disturbing. helped me grasp the thought process behind Maj John C. Hansen, USAF leadership principles. With respect to the Laughlin AFB, Texas general’s experiences as a student, I find my self in the same boat, which is why I appreci ated the quotations from Winston Churchill. THE ROLE OF AIR FORCE CIVIL ENGI The real-world examples were also helpful to NEERS IN COUNTERINSURGENCY an aspiring leader like me. The principles Lt Col Kendall Brown’s article “The Role of are easier to apply when they come from a story that is easy to remember. I have noticed air Force Civil engineers in Counterinsur that when I follow General Lorenz’s advice gency Operations” (Summer 2008) does a and ask people how they are doing three wonderful job of outlining the capabilities of times in a row, they answer sincerely and not air Force civil engineers (Ce) and the ways halfheartedly. This is a great asset to a lead they have been effectively employed. How er’s assessment of his or her people. ever, there is a strategic component of our after reading the general’s articles and Ce force structure that he does not address— digesting the briefing he gave, I do wonder the Prime Base engineer emergency Force about a couple of things. First, the author (Prime BeeF) Staff augmentation Team (S- mentions his time at the air Force academy Team). These teams complement Prime BeeF as a cadet who earned less-than-perfect and the Rapid engineer Deployable Heavy grades. It is humorous that he is now in Operations Repair Squadron, engineers charge of all air Force education, but I’d (ReD HORSe) to complete the air Force’s like to know how he drew the inspiration to Ce triad. The S-Teams exist only in the air excel after he graduated from the academy. What caused the change? Second, during Reserve Component but have played an im his briefing, General Lorenz said that the portant role in supporting combatant com four things that get people in trouble are manders’ engineering needs in-theater since drugs, sex, alcohol, and money. afterwards, 11 September 2001. In fact, the S-Team capa all of us cadets and our air Force officer bility is expanding. The air national Guard mentors discussed that point extensively, is currently adding two new units in response and we generally agreed with what he said. to the demand. I wonder why General Lorenz did not in Lt Col Mike Ray, North Carolina Air National Guard clude those four things in his articles. I Charlotte, North Carolina think that writing about them would help

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some readers. Maybe he could include that thor’s broad experience in operational air- discussion in a future article. power and enjoyed the wisdom reflected be The leadership principles presented by tween the lines of his article. He accurately General Lorenz have made a profound impact defined irregular warfare (IW) as includ on my life. add my name to the long list of ing “counterinsurgency operations and for people whose lives he has influenced. eign internal defense (FID)” (p. 10) and Cadet Matthew D. Dunlevy, Air Force ROTC pointed out its effect on air Force develop University of North Dakota ment as well as its roles in future wars. Many Grand Forks, North Dakota students who are now junior officers taking language courses here at the Defense Lan LORENZ ON LEADERSHIP: PART 2 guage Institute will participate in FID opera tions in Iraq or afghanistan. Such IW experi “Lorenz on Leadership: Part 2” (Spring 2008) ence will broaden their field of vision, is a fantastic article. It not only tells about the sharpen their war-fighting skills, and enable art of leading servicemen but also radiates hu them to know themselves and their oppo maneness. Military leaders should manifest nents better. These junior officers “may well themselves as seniors because “you truly never be responsible for the strategic aspects of to know when you are going to make a differ morrow’s war” (p. 11). The general’s article ence” (p. 12). Leading one’s men in battle therefore serves as good reading material for certainly inspires awe and respect but not nec our language students—the warriors of cur essarily love and affinity. Those things can be rent and future IWs. gained more often through warm caring about Zhao Luyuan routine details. This reminds me of the tradi Defense Language Institute tion of the Chinese People’s Liberation army Monterey, California (PLa) that advocates communication and unity through “heart-to-heart” private talks be Editor’s Note: Major General Peck was recently pro tween supervisors and subordinates. When moted to the rank of lieutenant general. The Chinese nostalgic holidays come, senior leaders will version of his article is available at http://www.air travel to remote company and platoon bar power.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-c/ racks, dining and chatting with soldiers to 2008/spr08/Peck.htm. learn about their concerns. This way, the PLa successfully maintains servicemen’s loyalty and the force’s power. LEAN UNIFORMS: CUTTING THE Wang Zhibo “WASTE” LINE Beijing, China I enjoyed the article “Lean Uniforms: Cutting Editor’s Note: Lieutenant General Lorenz was re cently promoted to the rank of four-star general. Mr. the ‘Waste’ Line” by Lt Gen Terry Gabreski, Wang read the Chinese version of his article at Maj Gen Loren Reno, and Brig Gen Robert http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinter allardice (Spring 2007). It introduced new national/apj-c/2008/sum08/Lorenz.htm. concepts of uniform design to us in Iraq. If the article’s concepts were studied and tested, it might be feasible for the new Iraqi military to adopt them. AIRPOWER’S CRUCIAL ROLE IN Staff Maj Gen Qaa’id K. M. Al-Khuzaa’i, Iraqi Air Force IRREGULAR WARFARE Baghdad, Iraq I very much enjoyed both the Chinese and Editor’s Note: General Al-Khuzaa’i read the Arabic english versions of Maj Gen allen G. Peck’s version of that article at http://www.airpower.max article “airpower’s Crucial Role in Irregular well.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-a/2007/win07/ Warfare” (Summer 2007). I admired the au gabreski.pdf.

Prelaunch Ricochet 2008-4.indd 16 10/27/08 9:04:37 AM In air combat, “the merge” occurs when opposing aircraft meet and pass each other. Then they usually “mix it up.” In a similar spirit, Air and Space Power Journal’s “Merge” articles present contending ideas. Readers are free to join the intellectual battlespace. Please send comments to [email protected] or [email protected]. Reply to “A Look down the Slippery Slope: Domestic Operations, Outsourcing, and the Erosion of Military Culture”

John R. LeibRock*

AJ BryAn D. Watson’s article “A tent, well-trained military men and women Look down the Slippery Slope” who believe in the armed defense of our coun (Air and Space Power Journal, try. But they also comprise a decreasingly rep Spring 2008) should be required resentative cross section of our society. More Mreading for every military commander, con and more, military service is viewed either as tracting officer, and support-function service a purely financial decision or as a business/ member who looks only for the cheap way of professional pursuit—but not as a societal ob meeting the mission. People other than legal ligation to be borne in some manner by all staff members such as Major Watson need to members of our society. know, appreciate, and write about the dan If our military leaders are brutally honest ger. The article should also be read by our with themselves, they should recognize that elected officials who put us on this “slippery the all-volunteer force was the firstembrace of slope” to begin with, when they opted for the the “let’s hire our self-defense” approach. all-volunteer force because it was politically Once we accept that notion, contracting out expedient. This force was just the first step our national defense does not seem too radical. toward our society’s current acceptance of the commercialization of national defense. US business has a long history of making Traditionally the US military culture about money by supplying the military with defense which Major Watson writes has consisted not hardware. A democracy grounded in capital only of a core cadre of “professional” military ism can tolerate that, but it will not survive personnel with traditions and customs, but business’s providing the “man and woman also of a generous complement of individuals power” of defense. Our uniformed services from all segments of our society. That some should be populated with strong, indepen times contentious mixture kept the military in dent, patriotic citizens loyal to the ideals of touch with society’s values—and engendered their country—not to the bottom-line deals of the trust and confidence of the citizenry. I their company (or, in the worst-case scenario, do not want to disparage members of the all- the belief that the military knows what is best volunteer force. They are, I believe, compe for the country).

*The author is a retired Air Force reservist, an attorney, a labor-relations adviser, and a citizen concerned about the willingness of our society to defend itself and its basic principles.

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Major Watson, a judge advocate, used the is complacent, so, what the heck, we just hire phrase “slippery slope” to describe what has mercenaries. Even cheaper and more moti happened or will happen to our military cul vated, they will be honest, loyal, devoted de ture. Another device, the “parade of horri fenders of our democratic liberties, won’t bles,” is often used in arguments before a they? We are, after all, paying them good court to describe what could happen in the wages. And we can all just sit on our entitle future if some course of conduct is not re ments to a safe and free society while our versed. My parade of horribles is this: Because heavily armed hired help happily fights and of ill-advised military entanglements, the coun dies for us, right? If we as a society won’t re try loses its commitment to personal military quire sacrifice of ourselves, then we are al service. requiring universal military service is ready sacrificing ourselves to the next moti politically untenable, so the country goes com vated and determined authority. mercial by increasing monetary incentives to In my opinion, a society is best served and join the service, calling it all-volunteer. But defended from both external and internal that gets very expensive, so the politicians hide military dangers by armed forces that consist the costs by drawing down the uniformed of members from all strata of that society. ❑ force and hiring contractors to do the jobs. That is still too expensive and the population Randolph AFB, Texas

01-Merge-Leibrock.indd 18 10/27/08 9:34:53 AM Comments on “Weather and the Calculated Risk”

Col BoB Glahn, USaF, RetiRed*

was very pleased to see Maj anthony products, services, and the nation’s infor eckel, Capt Jeffrey Cunningham, and mation needs. Maj dale Hetke’s article “weather and The increased interest has been fostered by the Calculated risk: exploiting Forecast the computer power now available to address IUncertainty for Operational risk Manage uncertainty in the numerical weather-prediction ment” (Air and Space Power Journal, spring process. ensembles of model runs exhibit the 2008). I am a strong proponent of probability uncertainness attributed to incompletely known forecasting, mainly for the reasons given in initial conditions and inadequately modeled that article. Most decisions are based on in atmospheric processes. These ensembles pro complete information, and a great many de duce a distribution of weather variables of in pend on weather. If we can quantify the uncer terest. Characteristically, however, the ensembles tainties and know the risks, we can base are underdispersed; that is, they do not cover decisions on decision theory concepts. the full range of possibilities. For probabilistic probability forecasting is not new. Cleve forecasts to be useful in formal decision pro land abbe, who helped establish the weather cesses, they must be reliable. That is, if the Bureau (now the National weather service probability of an event is forecast to be 20 per [Nws]), was called “Old probabilities.” deci cent on many occasions, then the event should sion theory was also known early on, and I occur on about 20 percent of those occasions. published “The Use of decision Theory in If that is not true and the user has no way to Meteorology with an application to aviation make them reliable, then the use of the prob 2 weather” in Monthly Weather Review in 1964. abilities may do more harm than good. even The weather Bureau established a national though the ensembles do not produce reli program of forecasting the probability of pre able probabilities, their output can be post- cipitation in 1966. Unfortunately, progress in processed statistically to provide reliable and probability forecasting has been excruciat more skillful forecasts. such postprocessed ingly slow. forecasts from the Nws’s Global Forecast sys However, there is now renewed interest in tem will soon be in the National digital Guid probability forecasting. The National research ance database, which is interoperable with 3 Council recently issued a report on the topic, the National digital Forecast database. Completing the Forecast: Characterizing and Com The future is brighter than ever before municating Uncertainty for Better Decisions Using since we can now make informed operational Weather and Climate Forecasts, that was sponsored decisions by applying risk-management prin by the Nws.1 partly in response to that report, ciples; however, as eckel, Cunningham, and the american Meteorological society has estab Hetke state, the shift to rigorous use of prob lished an ad Hoc Committee on Uncertainty ability forecasts in decision models will not oc in Forecasts. Many scientists from various walks cur overnight. The process will be gradual, ❑ of life are participating to help identify bet but we will make progress. ter ways of addressing forecast-uncertainty Silver Spring, Maryland

*The author is director of the Meteorological development laboratory, National weather service.

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Notes 1. National research Council, Completing the Forecast: 1977): 803–16, http://ams.allenpress.com/archive/1520 Characterizing and Communicating Uncertainty for Better Deci -0493/105/7/pdf/i1520-0493-105-7-803.pdf. sions Using Weather and Climate Forecasts (washington, dC: 3. Harry r. Glahn and david p. ruth, “The New digital National academies press, 2006). Forecast database of the National weather service,” Bulle 2. allan H. Murphy, “The value of Climatological, tin of the American Meteorological Society 84, no. 2 (February Categorical and probabilistic Forecasts in the Cost-loss 2003): 195–201, http://ams.allenpress.com/archive/1520 ratio situation,” Monthly Weather Review 105, no. 7 (July -0477/84/2/pdf/i1520-0477-84-2-195.pdf.

The Airman’s Creed

I am an American Airman. I am a warrior. I have answered my nation’s call. I am an American Airman. My mission is to fly, fight, and win. I am faithful to a proud heritage, a tradition of honor, and a legacy of valor. I am an American Airman, guardian of freedom and justice, my nation’s sword and shield, its sentry and avenger. I defend my country with my life. I am an American Airman: wingman, leader, warrior. I will never leave an Airman behind, I will never falter, and I will not fail.

02-Merge-Glahn.indd 20 10/27/08 9:35:21 AM Reply to “Military Transformation: Ends,Ways, and Means”

Mr. Benoît Drion*

do not Intend to make a complete naturally, this is a source of tension and commentary on dr. Jack d. Kem’s very conflict since each country or organization interesting article “Military transforma having an end will obviously seek to attain it. tion: ends, Ways, and Means” (Air and However, for a given country, the flexibility of ISpace Power Journal, Fall 2006); instead, I will its ends—that is, of its foreign policy—remains outline a few thoughts that it inspired in one limited. In countries such as the United States reader. the first concerns the four consider and France, political philosophy evolves very ations discussed by dr. Kem, namely, the geo slowly. In France, foreign policy represents al strategic setting (context), the ends, the ways, most the only point of agreement between the and the means—as well as the manner in political left and right. which these considerations interact. Conversely, one could think that Russia is Undoubtedly, one could consider the over currently evolving its foreign policy very strongly. all context as almost a given, impervious to In fact, however, it is merely returning to the any sort of action. of course, some powerful power formerly possessed by the Holy Russia countries or organizations might exert some of the tsars and, once, by the Soviet Union. degree of geopolitical influence in a part of Since the so-called fall of the Berlin Wall (ac the world and for a certain time. one has seen tually the signal of Russian renewal), Russia the United States create and sustain govern has opened itself to a market economy and ments in South America, and France has done knows how to both politically and economi the same in Africa. But, ultimately, what re cally optimize the clout conferred by its riches mains of them? Has doing this changed the of oil and natural gas. that country has again course of things permanently or even durably? become powerful because today it has the eco thus, a particular country must consider the nomic means necessary to wield political power. context as a given, a backdrop for its thoughts thus, one sees that a country’s end is often about the ends it seeks. a heavy trend that certainly evolves, but with the end is the political policy that a coun the slowness required for its population to try agrees to define and hold. Quite clearly, grasp great currents of thought. In contrast, nearly as many different ends exist as do coun ways and means evolve at a much less re tries in the world—hardly an exaggeration. In strained speed and rhythm. effect, numerous countries lack the power, People have an uninhibited capacity to means, or will to have clearly definedgoals for conceive of the best manner of attaining their foreign policy. Some blocs, such as europe, try ends. they can exhibit treasures of imagina to organize themselves in order to definecom tion, patience, and perseverance in order to mon ends, but they do so with difficulty and achieve them. In parallel with their thought only over the long term. We therefore live in a about the ways, they display the same energy world in which the ends sought by countries concerning the means. In these domains, or organizations (al-Qaeda, the Mafia, etc.) things can move very fast—a phenomenon are multiple and, of course, contradictory. commonly seen in industrial techniques and

*editor’s note: the author, a consultant who resides in Marnes-la-Coquette, France, read the French version of dr. Kem’s article, available at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-f/2008/pri08/kem.html.

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revolutions but equally true concerning mili trine as bypassing areas of strong enemy activity tary tactics and armament. in order to encircle and destroy the enemy), but Ways and means can strongly interact and the Germans applied it first—in 1940. In the pre evolve at the same rapid pace without either war United States, Gen George Patton had great of them taking precedence over the other. In difficulty obtaining funding for the armored- effect, the way will spur development of the vehicle units whose development he advocated. means necessary to its realization, but the As for means, the Germans circumvented availability of new techniques will permit the the Versailles treaty and strongly developed implementation of other ways. History con their aeronautical industry, the design and tains many examples of these two cases. manufacture of tanks, cryptographic materials Another thought inspired by reading the (enigma), and so forth. thus, the German tiger article concerns the role of mechanized forces and Panther tanks, despite some defects, per and the manner in which they are used, as formed well and proved more than a match well as the investment the Allies made in them for the American Sherman tanks—reliable and prior to the Second World War. I findit useful easy to handle but vulnerable due to their to distinguish between classical conflicts such excessive height and flammability. German as that war and more recent forms of discord. fighters such as the Focke-Wulf 190 acquitted the classical variety features regular armies themselves well against the famous British composed of professionals (or of soldiers who Spitfire. despite the Allies’ possession of radar, have become professionals through their en German submarines remained numerous and listment) usually content to spare civilian popu formidable. As long as the Germans possessed lations the brunt of the conflict’s operational both the ways and the means, they continued aspects. the other, more localized, forms— to win. they maintained their technical effort those not conducted solely by professionals— throughout the conflict, regardless of supply totally involve civilian populations who are and industrial difficulties from mid-1943 on obliged to participate. wards due to Allied ground advances and the thought concerning mechanized forces bombardments. one could cite as examples relates only to classical wars—here linked to the firstoperational jet aircraft (Messerschmitt the Second World War. It is thus a historical 262) and the V1 and V2 rockets. thought without import for the future in that on the other side, the Allies found it neces it seems unlikely that such a conflictwill recur. sary to crank up (or restart) the machinery of or at least nobody will be around to examine it. war. As always, the United States did so with on the one hand, dr. Kem cites Gen Henry the determination, pragmatism, and energy of H. Shelton, who said that because of the con an entire unified country. engineers worked certed effort by the Allies before the war, in feverishly to convert factories for the war ef terms of development, they possessed tech fort, and soldiers benefited from increasingly nology superior to that of the Germans, but good training. Soon, therefore, the Allies pro that the Germans had better utilized theirs. duced more war materiel than they lost in battle; on the other hand, Gen Charles de Gaulle de from this time on, the situation on the ground clared on 18 June 1940, “Foudroyés aujourd’hui turned in their favor, and they launched a par la force mécanique, nous pourrons vain counteroffensive. Henceforth, the Allies pos cre dans l’avenir par une force mécanique su sessed ways and means—both of them neces périeure” (Vanquished today by mechanical sary to win the Second World War. ❑ force, we will be able to overcome in the fu Marnes-la-Coquette, France ture by a superior mechanical force).1 I assert that the Germans simultaneously possessed ways and means at the beginning of Note the conflict. the englishman J. F. C. Fuller 1. “L’Appel du 18 juin 1940,” La France, 18 June 1940, proposed operational doctrine for using ar http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/dossier/18juin/ mored vehicles (one could summarize his doc temoignages/appel.htm.

03-Merge-Drion.indd 22 10/27/08 9:35:49 AM An Airman’s View of United States Air Force Airpower

Dr. Stephen e. Wright, Colonel, USAF, retireD*

he following discussion re Air force provides options to defend the na sulted from a review of a proposed tion and its vital interests by means of efforts revision to Air force doctrine docu in and through the air, space, and cyberspace ment (Afdd) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, domains, protecting access to those domains Tand the author’s belief that it fails to ade for the nation, as well as for allies and part quately describe the airpower of the united ners. in conjunction with sister services and states and of the us Air force.1 consequently, other instruments/institutions of national in this article i take the original Afdd 1 frame power, the Air force defends the nation and work and expand it to offer a more compre protects access to these global domains as a hensive picture of us airpower and the contri global good in peacetime and as a matter of butions of the Air force. My discussion begins necessity during conflict. when and where with an expansive perspective of us airpower required, the Air force uses its access capa and concludes with elements that combine to bilities to obtain control of a domain and explain the “air-mindedness” unique to Air then employs its capacities for persistence to force Airmen. sustain that access and control. The ability to To understand Air force airpower, one protect worldwide access and to project con must firstunderstand that the united states is trol of air, space, and cyberspace constitutes an airpower nation. it is a global leader in air- the Air force’s unique contribution to na power technology, economically dependent tional defense. on access to the global domains of airpower The Air force’s role in us airpower en (air, space, and cyberspace), and a provider of compasses the synergistic application of air, access to these domains. its people love the space, and cyberspace capabilities to project technology of airpower, and they make up a strategic military power throughout the globe. nation of air, space, and cyberspace innova Airmen exploit speed, range, payload, and tion. us airpower, therefore, is a combination precision to create effects in the global do of the nation’s air, space, and cyberspace re mains of air, space, and cyberspace, as well search and development, production capacities as in the maritime and land domains. un (both private and government), commercial encumbered by the constraints of surface capabilities (in and across the three domains), domains, airpower provides the nation and military capabilities resident in its military ser joint team unequalled flexibility in response vices, and, most importantly, people who ex options to meet mission requirements dur cel in every aspect of airpower activity.2 for ing either peacetime or contingencies. in the purpose of this discussion, the term air- defense or on offense, only Air force airpower encompasses all three domains: air, power can so quickly and precisely provide space, and cyberspace.3 so many effects anywhere on the planet, in The Air force conducts air, space, and air, space, and/or cyberspace. cyberspace operations around the globe as Three strategic pillars—global reach, global the leading “full-service” military provider power, and global vigilance—direct Air force and protector of the nation’s airpower.4 The strategy in the development of ways and means

*The author is a faculty member at the school of Advanced Air and space studies, Maxwell AfB, Alabama.

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to offer flexible options to the president, sec the ideas, values, and information transmitted retary of defense, and combatant command through cyberspace give us policy makers power ers; those pillars function across the spectrum ful options. indeed, defending and exploiting of operations and through every phase of joint ever-expanding transmission capabilities con and coalition actions. serving as the concep stitute one of the Air force’s (and the entire tual framework for the Air force, they are joint team’s) key challenges in the future. therefore neither restricted nor tied to an or global vigilance underpins Air force capa ganizational command structure or platform; bilities across the range of military operations. they guide the way Airmen think about the ap in each of the global domains, the Air force plication of airpower.5 uses its surveillance and reconnaissance capa global reach, which directs the Air force’s bilities to develop actionable intelligence to determination to offer options and effects exploit its capacities for reach and power. By anywhere, anytime, spans all three global do integrating its capabilities with the other ser mains and includes both kinetic and nonki vices, allies, partners, and national agencies, netic capabilities. The service’s reach includes the Air force can supply policy makers with airlift that supports humanitarian-relief opera decision-quality information. for the future, tions such as tsunami relief in indonesia and the service will work to improve its coverage the transport of soldiers to limit convoy expo (in terms of both area and persistence) and sure to improvised explosive devices, as well data-fusion ability to offer even greater capa as air-refueling capabilities that support air bility to the combined team. in the future, the lift and strike operations around the globe. Air force plans for every system to serve as an Reaching out and kinetically producing ef intelligence-collection gatherer, receiver, or fects by means of operational concepts such transmitter that can seamlessly plug into the as global strike reflects another aspect of global grid to share data with national systems global reach. finally, the reach provided by and those of America’s allies and partners. Air force capabilities in the cyberspace do A foundation based on global partnership main permits options and effects restricted supports the three strategy pillars. without only by the limits of imagination and tech question, global partnerships have increas nology. Thus, global reach, which transcends ingly become the key to mission success and all other Air force capabilities, lies at the core will remain so in the future.6 in this regard, of its two companion pillars. the Air force will chart a path beyond its cur global power focuses on providing effects rent efforts in foreign internal defense (fid) enabled by global reach, those of the kinetic and foreign military sales. A clear requirement variety often the most visible ones. for ex exists to build partnership capacities, begin ample, the termination of news broadcasts ning with fid missions to lay the foundation from Baghdad during the firstnight of opera for partners to conduct their own internal- tion desert storm in 1991 dramatically dem defense initiatives. such engagement will en onstrated the might of us military airpower. able the Air force to operate more effectively The power of the Air force’s kinetic capabili with counterparts around the world, extend ties greatly contributed to joint and coalition ing global reach and leveraging the talents triumphs in operations deliberate force, Al and capabilities of its allies and partners. The lied force, enduring freedom, and iraqi service will do more than sell systems—it will freedom, making the war-fightingportions of look for opportunities to share training, edu these missions some of the most successful in cation, and personnel to ensure that its cul us history. in addition, every airlift mission tural knowledge matches the operational acu that provides humanitarian aid throughout men of those allies and partners. the world also delivers the power of us values. The Air force executes its strategy within A c-130 with its American flagtail flashrepre three operational, or war-fighting, global do sents a visible statement of us values and com mains (air, space, and cyberspace), seeking to mitment to the global community. similarly, control access to and use of these domains, as

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directed by national leadership. The Air force technological innovation created the cyber is prepared to conduct operations in one or space domain in its entirety. The maritime do all of these global domains to support national main is similar in this regard because tech defense and ensure their use to secure na nology allows mankind to exploit this domain, tional interests and to support allies and part both in commerce and war. Although our an ners. Although attaining supremacy in any cestors could hurl rocks, arrows, and other one of these operational domains may not al projectiles through the air, they could not ac ways be possible, the Air force will provide the cess the domains without the requisite tech joint and/or coalition team with access to and nology. As technology advanced, however, the control of a domain to conduct operations, of operational nature of the air, space, and cyber fensively or defensively, in support of mission space domains took shape and matured in its objectives. Because it supplies a tremendous usefulness and effect on national objectives array of flexible options to policy makers, Air and military actions. force airpower can be used in supported or The global nature of the three domains supporting command relationships to carry constitutes a unique aspect of airpower. The out the mission. The service rapidly provides air and space domains have no boundaries effects within and across these global domains, other than earth’s surface itself. Although using its asymmetric advantages of range, pay that surface frames the air domain on one load, and precision to meet the needs of na side, air covers the entirety of the planet and tional leadership. By working to improve its seamlessly merges with the space domain on capabilities, the Air force will offer policy the other side. Today, the operational space makers and the joint team new options and domain takes airpower to geosynchronous or greater persistence to access and control op bit for the most part and occasionally to outer erations in these global domains. space. The future may see us airpower reach ing further out into the space domain. A unique global province, cyberspace can occur The Nature and anywhere in any of the other operational do Characteristics of Airpower mains and thus generates great concern among all war fighters. The domain is characterized over 100 years have passed since the wright by the use of electronics and the electromag brothers’ first powered flight; in that time, netic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange civil and government efforts have developed data via networked systems and associated and produced technologies that make the physical infrastructures.7 Additionally, cyber united states an airpower nation, allowing space is unique in that partners and adversar today’s Airmen to operate with great effect in ies alike can create new cyberspace, which re their global domains. The joint team depends mains unknown until it plugs into the existing, upon us airpower, as evidenced by the fact known cyberspace. that each service has significantportions of its elevation, the vertical dimension, represents capabilities operating in each of these do perhaps the most obvious aspect of the nature mains. More importantly, the American people of air and space power. Technological innova rely upon us airpower as an engine and en tions have provided that power with increas abler of daily life, economically and person ingly capable tools for use in the high ground ally. Thus, Air force airpower must ensure ac of these two domains. in essence, this eleva cess to these global domains. tion dimension becomes a vertical flankfor all The nature of airpower emerged from its Air force operations, whether offensive or de technological foundation and the unique ad fensive—supported or supporting. for ex vantages found in its three global domains. ample, imagery from air or space assets can first and foremost, airpower is inherently generate information for assessment of agri technological. The air or space domains re cultural crops, worldwide weather analysis, or main unusable without technology; indeed, traffic reports. similarly, such imagery offers

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insights into an adversary’s intentions, en precision, increased persistence widens the abling us forces to act to prevent conflict or Air force’s range of flexible options available to fight more effectively if crisis prevention or to the joint team and national political lead deterrence options fail. ers. The image of our service delivering hu The physical nature of these domains, cou manitarian aid persists wherever Airmen reach pled with technology, allows for dramatic in out to refugees or displaced, hungry, and suf creases in the speed and range of transmitting fering peoples. each year, Air force cyber effects in and through them. in the air do forces engage in the fight to defend cyber main, this factor allows for speeds in the hun space against hundreds of thousands of at dreds of miles per hour; in space, speeds in tacks. Truly these forces give new meaning to the thousands of miles per hour; and in cyber the idea of continuous, persistent operations. space, transmission at light speed. each year, Air force airpower possesses a tremendous airpower is the primary means of transporting versatility through its adaptation of technology. millions of people over vast distances and of increasingly, Air force capabilities have shown moving high-value assets from one location to that they can multitask during a given mis another. no other country can match us sion—or simply reconfigure to new require space capabilities, and the Air force possesses ments with little degradation in operations the means to track items in space as a service tempo. for example, a platform configured to the global community. in cyberspace, bil for deep strike on one sortie can be reconfig lions of dollars worth of communication traf ured for close air support on its next flight.i n fic and electronic transactions occur at light the future, most platforms in each global do speed from users around the globe on the in main will have not only a primary function but ternet, developed by the united states. This also the task of data gathering to support isR level of speed and range of transmission of activities. Multirole and multitask capabilities people, things, and information is possible give rise to versatile forces that contribute to only within these domains. the flexible options derived from Air force The technology inherent to airpower has airpower—a potent combination of efficiency produced several key, advantageous charac and effectiveness at the disposal of policy mak teristics in addition to speed and range—pre ers and combatant commanders. cision, for one, which manifests itself not only The nature of airpower also imposes key in terms of weaponry but also in global posi limitations upon our use of its domains. The tioning; navigation; and intelligence, surveil technologies that allow such use require sup lance, and reconnaissance (isR). These ad port in order to ensure continuous and per vantages allow the Air force to employ fewer sistent operation. That is, we must have bases assets to produce desired effects. in this way, capable of regenerating people and equip precision has so altered the war-fighting idea ment. The Air force does possess a force- of mass that force commanders and policy multiplying factor with its air-refueling capa makers can think in terms of massing effects bilities, enabling it to extend airpower across versus massing forces. its global domain. however, once on the Another such characteristic, theaterwide ground, air assets themselves become more persistence, derives from Air force airpower’s vulnerable to attack. despite these limita ability to provide policy makers and com tions, the high entry barrier of cost means manders with forces capable of long loiter or that only a peer competitor with great eco rapid reconstitution times. furthermore, in nomic wealth could directly challenge the many cases, Air force space power can pro Air force in the air domain. duce near-continuous dwell time for isR and space power requires specialized launch communications services. The advent of un and recovery sites and highly specialized manned aerial vehicles enables the service to equipment to allow for operations. As with increase dwell time significantly, thereby en airpower, space capabilities need fuel and abling isR support or strike missions. like maintenance or they cease to function. in ad

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dition, because of the tremendous costs as The Airman’s Perspective sociated with space operations, few countries will have the means to access this domain di Because airpower possesses the unique na rectly; however, many peoples on earth can ture described above, Airmen have developed make use of numerous applications available a distinct perspective that guides how they from space (e.g., information from the global think about it in their operational war-fighting positioning system). Air force space power domains of air, space, and cyberspace. gen hap Arnold referred to this “Airman’s per must provide capabilities to ensure access to spective” as air-mindedness.9 first and fore the space domain and, if necessary, to deny most, Airmen view airpower from a global per access to a potential adversary. Today, this re spective. since airpower operates in and across quirement drives the militarization of space; global domains, Airmen begin with this per tomorrow, it may necessitate its weaponiza spective and often work across as well as within tion. That decision, of course, remains one theater boundaries. having limited assets, the for us policy makers. Air force must view its commitments through in order to function in a meaningful man a worldwide lens. in a given theater, Airmen ner, cyberspace must have its physical infra must focus across all boundaries—geographic structure—analogous to bases for aircraft, a or surface-based operational lines—to sup tether from which operations occur. fueled by port theaterwide requirements. Although a electricity, it too must either have a continu given effect might be local, the perspective is ous fuel source or deal with the limitations of always theater-to-global. This view results in a battery capacity and the need to recharge. strategic perspective that Airmen carry into creating and functioning in cyberspace, how every operation. ever, is inexpensive. Many nations can train scarcity also factors into the Airman’s per and employ a few cyberspace agents yet pro spective. Because airpower capabilities are duce significant effects (from the tactical to costly, we procure them in limited numbers. the strategic level), for good or ill, in the cy This limitation makes most air, space, and berspace domain. These characteristics com cyberspace forces high-demand, low-density bine to make cyberspace one of the most de national assets. As such, military airpower manding domains in which to operate—a is usually matched to a coalition/joint force tremendous challenge to the joint team and commander’s (Jfc) objectives and desired ef the nation. further, because so much infor fects having the highest value. during conflict, mation of such great value travels through this the Air force makes control in each domain domain, the Air force and the other services its priority effect. in the air domain, control may be expressed in either local or theater- must assure access to and defense of it. wide terms; in space, usually in either theater Airpower in all its forms remains inherently or global terms. in the latter domain, control limited by its inability to physically seize and 8 capabilities may seek to ensure that friendly occupy territory. we can apply varying levels forces have access to space assets, while deny of control in each domain, however. for ex ing access and/or services to an adversary. ample, in the interwar years, the British similar to control in space, that in cyberspace achieved a level of air control over Middle will mature to encompass a theater-to-global eastern tribesmen by using airpower to re perspective. what might appear as a local strict and/or direct ground movement. This denial-of-service attack could progress to a modified “air occupation,” however, was lim theaterwide shutdown if cyberspace power fails ited in both temporal and geographic scope. to defend the entire team. if surface forces if policy makers and military leadership de must engage an adversary, then the priority ef cide to impose physical occupation, then a fect for Air force airpower could become sup combination of airpower and ground power port of ground and maritime operations. The must complete the mission. broad range of effects that high-demand, low

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density Air force airpower brings to the joint and/or joint component commander to guar team typically results in our thinking of mili antee that the Jfc’s team can protect its own tary airpower as a strategic asset that meets the use of the cyberspace domain and exploit or Jfc’s priority mission requirements by means deny its use by an adversary. of its employment across all levels of conflict in response to the demands of irregular and throughout the spectrum of operations. warfare, the Air force is examining its capa The phrase “speed, range, and payload” bilities to distribute tactical-planning func captures another important aspect of the Air tions to tactical echelons of operation. To of man’s perspective. not only can airpower op fer ground forces increasingly responsive air, erate across domains but also it can do so rap space, and cyberspace power in the dynamic idly to deliver payload (effects) at any point in operational environment of irregular warfare, the global domains and upon earth’s surface. the Air force must develop new ways to achieve Airmen believe they serve as a global maneuver effects without sacrificing unity of effort and force, unrestrained by geographical boundar command for the Jfc. increasingly, adversar ies, that provides policy makers flexible op ies opt to challenge the united states with tions which allow the united states to take asymmetric means. Rather than massing their political and/or military initiative. whether forces to fightus forces head-on, they use un tasked to deliver relief aid in the Berlin airlift conventional and irregular means to offset or to tsunami refugees in indonesia, or to the tremendous capabilities of the joint team, strike at the heart of an adversary’s command especially those of the Air force. our service and control (c2) system by using either ki must become equally adept at centralized and netic airpower or nonkinetic cyber power, distributed control (primarily in planning), the Air force can quickly and effectively de along with decentralized execution.10 liver tactical-to-strategic effects anywhere on the planet. Today, the Air force delivers ef finally, Airmen traditionally think of air- fects with amazing accuracy, day or night, in power and the application of force from a all kinds of weather. Many Airmen say that functional rather than geographical perspec “flexibility is the key to airpower,” but a more tive. They do not divide the battlefield into accurate statement is that “airpower is the operating areas as do surface forces. Typically, key to flexibility” for the joint team and na Airmen classify targets and their missions in tional policy makers. terms of the effect their actions would have on Airmen believe that they need domain ex the adversary, not in terms of the physical lo pertise to execute military airpower to its best cation of the targets or mission activities and/ advantage in support of taskings from national or execution platforms. This approach nor and combatant commanders. This belief has mally leads to more inclusive and comprehen led Airmen to argue for the selection of com sive operations that favor strategic and opera manders with air and space expertise to fill tional perspectives over tactical ones. we can positions such as the coalition or joint force summarize air-mindedness as follows: air component commander (c/JfAcc). Ac cording to the Air force, any airpower expert, Control of the Vertical and Cyber Dimension regardless of service component, could serve Is Generally a Necessary Precondition for as a c/JfAcc. That said, our service provides Control of the Surface the Jfc with the most robust and flexible c2 to develop strategy, as well as plan, execute, The first mission of the Air force involves ac and assess air, space, and cyberspace effects. cessing and controlling air, space, and cyber The design of the centralized control and de space for the joint team. Those tasks may re centralized execution found in its operations- quire the defeat or neutralization of enemy center capabilities ensures unity of effort and air forces so that friendly operations on land, command to support national and Jfc objec at sea, in the air, and in space can proceed un tives. in the future, we may need a coalition hindered; at the same time, the Air force must

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protect us military forces and critical vulner ing a humanitarian crisis, the Air force has in abilities from attack. place, at all times, the c2 necessary to ensure unity of effort, effect, and command in and across its global domains. Airpower Is Usually the First Force That Can Hold an Enemy at Risk, from the Tactical to the Strategic Levels Airpower Is Inherently Technological, and war and peace are decided, organized, planned, Advancements in Speed, Range, Payload, supplied, and commanded, beginning at the Precision, and Persistence Have Resulted strategic level of war. Airpower can hold an in an Air Force Capable of Providing a Vast enemy’s centers of gravity and critical vulner Array of Flexible Options to Civilian and Military National Leaders abilities directly at risk, immediately and con tinuously. it can bring capabilities to bear on Airpower’s versatility allows rapid, simultane that enemy’s political, informational, military, ous employment against strategic, operational, economic, and social structures simultane and tactical objectives. That versatility derives ously or separately. Air force airpower also has not only from the characteristics of air forces great capability for nonlethal strategic influ themselves but also from the manner in which ence, as in humanitarian-relief and security- they are organized and controlled. cooperation activities.

Air Force Airpower Results from the Effective Air Force Airpower Gives the Joint Team the Integration of Platforms, People, Weapons, Bases, Means to Exploit, Rapidly and Simultaneously, Logistics, and Supporting Infrastructure the Principles of Mass and Maneuver no one aspect of air, space, and cyberspace ca Because the vertical environment has no pabilities should be treated in isolation since natural lateral boundaries to prevent air, each element is essential and interdependent. space, and cyberspace systems from quickly ultimately, the Air force depends upon the concentrating their power at any point, Air performance of the people who operate, com force airpower is often the first force to ar mand, and sustain air, space, and cyberspace rive in-theater and begin operations. The forces. furthermore, our service’s capabilities speed with which the Air force can maneu ver and concentrate effects allows it to domi can produce strategic effects even when con nate the fourth dimension—time. This ability ducting tactical missions. Therefore, these to produce rapid effects gives policy makers unique elements require an Airman’s exper and commanders a wide array of flexible op tise to command them at the component level tions to deter potential adversaries, deny of operations. and/or defeat enemies, or provide a variety of alternatives for security cooperation and Supporting Bases with Their People, Systems, and peace support. Facilities Is Essential to Launch, Recovery, and Sustainment of Air Force Forces Air Force Airpower Can Be Employed Jointly or The Air force’s ability to move anywhere in Independently to Meet Mission Requirements the world quickly and then rapidly begin op The tremendous c2 capabilities of the Air erations has remained one of its most impor force enable it to employ in either small or tant aspects. however, we must balance the large units to meet mission tasking. whether need for mobility against the need to operate the task entails sending a flight of stealth at the deployment site. The availability and bombers to deliver a show-of-force strike, de operability of suitable bases can become the ploying expeditionary wings to fight a major dominant factor in employment planning and conflict, providing persistent isR, or support execution.

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Air Force Airpower Can Respond Rapidly, Span high-value, low-density capabilities to meet the Globe, and Precisely Deliver Effects (Kinetic or the Jfc’s priorities, thus avoiding the “penny Nonkinetic; Lethal or Nonlethal; Security-Related or packet” use of yesteryear. Humanitarian in Purpose) to Defend the United The united states is a nation with incredible States and Its Vital Interests and Assure Access to the airpower and an air force to match. its people Global Domains of Air, Space, and Cyberspace have a pioneering drive, as reflected in the The Air force engages in these activities con nation’s development of commercial and stantly across the spectrum of operations. As a military airpower capabilities, and a determi first-in,last-out expeditionary force, it delivers nation to excel in both arenas. The Air force effects anytime, anywhere. operates in the global domains of air, space, and cyberspace, defending the nation and Ideally, an Airpower Expert Will Command ensuring both access and control as required and Control Military Airpower by policy makers. Although this article has focused on what the Air force brings to us component commanders must have expertise airpower, each member of the joint team over the domains in which they operate. The contributes to the nation’s airpower capa global domains of air, space, and cyberspace bilities, creating the world’s preeminent air- are not unique in this regard. Today, the cen power force. ❑ tralized control of military airpower resident in the c/JfAcc ensures application of the Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Notes 1. An offer to rewrite the “Airpower” chapter in Afdd to the strategic level—one that transcends organizational 1 prompted me to write this article. i present this concep structure or weapon systems and platforms. tualization of airpower to replace what i perceive as an 6. some strategists argue that global partnership is a anemic “lowest common denominator of agreement” subset of global reach. This article suggests that global text. Though not given to hyperbole, i do believe that the partnership stands alone for two key reasons. first, it cuts Air force’s seminal doctrinal document needs a bolder across each of the three strategy pillars, affecting what the proclamation of airpower. Air force can accomplish as it projects power and reach. 2. A. T. Mahan eloquently made a similar argument in second, the us need for partnership across all of the de The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (new partment of defense will raise this element of national York: dover Publications, 1987). see chap. 1, “discussion security operations to ever-higher levels of importance. of the elements of sea Power.” simply stated, its importance dictates that we give it a 3. within the Air force, one finds much angst over place at the strategic table. using a single term, especially airpower, as a sole descrip 7. This definition of cyberspace, developed by the tor. That said, the roots of modern air, space, and cyber usAf cyberspace Task force, remains one of the best characterizations of this domain. see briefing, dr. lani space power draw from aviation in peace and war, scien Kass to the Air force Association, subject: “A warfighting tificdiscover y, and the barnstormers of a past era. The use domain,” 26 september 2006, http://www.maxwell.af.mil/ of airpower as the overarching term only recognizes the info-ops/usaf/cyberspace_taskforce_sep06.pdf. genesis of flight, not an end state or terminus of activity 8. however, the imaginative cyber warrior could make and achievement. This broader terminology applies to a case for capabilities that might allow one to occupy cy both us and Air force airpower. when the article refers berspace, albeit with some temporal limitations. to capability in a given domain, it uses the terms airpower, 9. see Afdd 2, Operations and Organization, 3 April space power, and cyberspace power, as applicable. 2007, 2, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ 4. in 2005 Michael w. wynne, secretary of the Air afdd2.pdf. force, and gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, released 10. By “distributed control,” i mean a construct that the Air force’s new mission statement, which expanded Air builds upon the responsibilities of the air component coor force operational domains from air and space to include dination element in today’s fight. in the future, the Air force cyberspace. see Msgt Mitch gettle, “Air force Releases may find that it needs to distribute some of its c2 elements— new Mission statement,” Air Force Link, 8 december 2005, strategy and planning come first to mind. Tomorrow’s fight http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyid=123013440. may require strategy and planning efforts at much lower lev 5. in recent years, the Air force has allowed specific els of c2 than those we see today in central command— major commands and/or platforms to characterize its specifically, in iraq and Afghanistan. The Air force needs to strategic pillars. The discussion here returns those pillars prepare today for a more distributed fight tomorrow.

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Capt DaviD Blair, USaF*

eflecting upon Mr. Rémy en’s pronouncements are as sure to make the Mauduit’s excellent article “effects- news as any presidential press release. is it even Based information Battle in the conceivable that a distant son (disowned by his Muslim World” (Air and Space Power family a decade ago, no less) of the divorced RJournal, Spring 2008), i found that i had more 10th wife of the Yemeni construction magnate questions than answers. Reflecting further, i Muhammad bin ladin could be the counter realized that this was probably a good thing. point to francis fukuyama’s vaunted “end of We have a surplus of answers, but perhaps we History”?2 So our first question becomes, “is al- have a shortage of the right questions. After Qaeda a terror network or a global insurgency?” all, an answer is useful only when paired to its the second question is, “Was 11 September correct question; a good answer to a bad ques 2001 a military operation, or was it advertis tion is still a wrong answer. therefore, rather ing?” the ubiquitous World trade center twin than add to our stockpiles of answers, let us towers have been the backdrop of this war from instead seek questions. the outset. Did we ever figure out why? in the first, let us frame the question. one of immediate aftermath of the attack, explana counterinsurgency’s counterintuitive truisms tions such as “the terrorists attacked because asserts that what seems offensive may, in fact, they could” tended toward the nihilistic. Alter be defensive, whereas what seems defensive nately, some advanced the paper-tiger theory may, in reality, be one’s best attack.1 this truth that if we took one big hit, we would turn tail may hold just as well for a global insurgency as and come home. And certainly our adversaries for a local one. A terror group uses violence to got more than they expected, for worse and for replace “the way things are” with “the way better. they got hit hard, but the value of our things should be.” An insurgency adds to all of currency and the strength of our alliances the above the support of other broad factions seemed to get caught in the blast pattern of our also discontented with the way things are. people militaryresponse.perhapstheterroristsadapted. can sometimes become more than people; the or perhaps, even from the beginning, it was insurgent becomes the lightning rod for the more about the message than the messenger. people’s grievances. Have our enemies become Despite his guerilla coming-of-age in Afghani that lightning rod? Al-Qaeda continues to draw stan, bin laden comes from a family deeply im a borderless distinction between the way things mersed in world trade, so he doubtless under are and the way they should be. it has demon stood the significance of the World trade strated a willingness to use unconstrained vio center. in the days that followed the destruc lence to move the world from the former cate tion of the towers, all the world’s good guys gory into the latter. the last piece, the broad (along with most of the in-between guys) de support of other discontented factions, is the clared their support for the united States, game changer. How effectively has al-Qaeda which means, implicitly, that all the world’s bad aligned global discontent to its narrative? is our guys are now pushed toward al-Qaeda. So, not global war on terror a kind of counterinsurgency even a decade later, al-Qaeda’s brand recogni writ large? nascent groups with only the most tion rivals that of coca-cola; it has become the tenuous link to ibn Wahhab’s way of thinking standard by which world terror is judged. have taken the name al-Qaeda. osama bin lad Which then raises a question: did we acciden

*An Ac-130u “Spooky” gunship pilot with the 4th Special operations Squadron, the author is a graduate of the uS Air force Academy and the Harvard Kennedy School.

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tally help al-Qaeda in this? the Mexican bandit guidance systems. this is no Schweinfurt; i pancho Villa looks much more exciting on a highly doubt we will find such a factory on a wanted poster; we took bin laden, superim falconView mapping display. But if it is an idea posed his picture on the ugly pockmark of his that directs the explosives to their targets, then greatest accomplishment, and spread his im perhaps we will findthis factory somewhere in age around the world. So we must ask one more idea space. Which are irreplaceable: terrorists derivative question: how does one beat a brand or terror messages? if we answer this question, name? i don’t know, but i’m reasonably sure perhaps our air tasking orders will start hitting it’s not the same way one beats a military. much closer to our enemy’s heartland. Moving from the attack to the attackers, next, let us consider terrain: “Where does our next question asks, “is a suicide bomber a our world end and theirs begin?” in the cold combatant or a munition?” one wins a war by War, that question was quite straightforward. killing the enemy’s combatants, hopefully be Accordingly, there was one set of rules for idea- fore they get a chance to use their munitions. space operations back home and a quite differ the old adage “kill the archer, not the arrow” ent set of rules for idea-space operations in was in all likelihood not written with kamikaze bad-guy land. After all, Reuters wasn’t exactly aircraft in mind. it does make the question waiting with bated breath for the latest video more complicated, but there is still an under tape from Pravda and tASS. one cannot say lying truth which holds that one must destroy the same for Associated press and Al Jazeera. what one’s enemy cannot replace, rather than ironically, as much as we talk about network- what he can replace. So we must ask, what can centric warfare, our adversaries may have our enemies not replace? What is essential to bested us on certain aspects of the strategy. the them; what can they not do without? let’s take internet and integrated global economy pro a step back and examine ourselves. consider vide them a signal corps and an arsenal. the an f-16 launching with Joint Direct Attack international news media is no less intercon Munitions (JDAM) on a conventional-war nected. So where is the boundary between pub interdiction strike. the JDAMs are expend lic affairs and psychological operations when able; they are written off as soon as the f-16 leaves the ground. But in the most immediate one can read the Maxwell AfB newspaper in sense, the aircraft is irreplaceable because Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, and jihadi Web sites in without it, the JDAMs will never reach their Montgomery, Alabama? An answer is limited by targets. in the same way, aren’t suicide bomb definitions; sometimes one has to change those ers already entering the endgame as they re definitions to get the right answer. cord their obituary videos? it would be the Having considered the battlespace, we look height of stupidity to place one’s hopes on the to questions of strategy. let us start with the survival of a person who has decided that his topic that dominates our headlines: “is the only remaining purpose is to fail at survival in conflict in iraq a war or a battle?” the war of the most violent way possible. And that which normandy makes no sense, but the battle of is essential must survive. So the individual sui normandy in the context of the Second World cide bomber cannot be essential. Returning to War makes perfect sense. one has to take land our JDAM example, even the f-16 is replace in order to drive on the enemy’s homeland, able in the broader view: other aircraft can but how does one take land in a war of ideas? drop the JDAMs. What, then, is strategically ir Which was more important, the end of Sad- replaceable? one viable answer, at least, is the dam Hussein or the beginning of a free iraq? JDAM factory. Without it, there are no JDAMs; Did we allocate our attention accordingly? without any JDAMs, there is no need for the thankfully, the iraq troop surge has given us a f-16. What if the suicide bomber is a JDAM, a chance to go back and revise our answers to package of explosives maneuvered to its target these questions. As gen David petraeus in by a guidance system? then it would make scribes his doctoral thesis upon the sands of sense to hit the factory manufacturing those Mesopotamia, i hope, with no small amount

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of self-interest, that his second thesis defense to Wahhabi eyes, Dubai is a symbol of the goes as well as his first. West. Yet, the seven-star hotels of Dubai are far turning to the axis of conflict,we must ask, closer to the splendor of the actual caliphate “is al-Qaeda’s war against America, or is it than anything found in the mountains of Wa against Muslims?” it almost seems intuitive ziristan. After all, the caliphate was known for that the war is with us, yet look at whom the its greatness, and the emir of Dubai can buy terror organization kills. Takfiri, or apostate european land. Al-Qaeda can blow up night (by al-Qaeda’s exceedingly skewed definition) clubs. Which is a more coherent narrative of Muslims, seem to consistently end up atop its Arab greatness? What if we could steal our target lists. Al-Qaeda has killed orders of mag enemies’ argument? What would they be left nitude more Muslims than it has killed Ameri with if we tore the heart out of their dreams? cans. if its war is with us, then these casualties that is an answer i would enjoy hearing. are nothing more than collateral damage. on As the forever-quoted Sun tzu tells us, the other hand, if its war is with Muslims, then know your enemy, know yourself, and victory those dead were the primary targets and our in 100 battles will be yours. in order to do dead were just good theater for our enemies. either, one must begin with the right ques if al-Qaeda’s war is with us, then the Arab tions. if i may hazard a guess at a few of these world becomes a disinterested third party in a questions, i would firstask who we are. then i conflict between two disliked factions. But if would ask where we want to go. finally, i would its war is with Muslims, then there is no side ask how we can get there. i will not embarrass line and no sense whatsoever in a “see no evil” myself by trying to answer these questions in strategy. of course, people have to find some this confined space with my confined mind, answers on their own, but we can still help but i do not doubt that these answers are al those answers along. ready present in the fertile minds of our di Another of those better-facilitated-than verse (and disparate) foreign-policy establish told answers completes our series of questions: ment. perhaps we are in need of a “unified “What does the caliphate actually look like?” fieldtheor y” of foreign policy, a metanarrative is it a Wahhabi Disneyland or a Mecca of trade that starts with the most important questions and scholarship? our enemies seem to have of interest and influence and works downhill cornered the market on answers to this ques from there.3 Among our military theorists, ac tion. perhaps that monopoly can be broken. i ademic experts, and technical specialists, we am hardly a scholar of islamic history, but i have veritable warehouses of answers. the seem to recall that the caliphate was known challenge seems to lie in asking the right ques for its scholars and merchants. By the stan tions in the right order. ❑ dards of the time, the tax on non-Muslims was Hurlburt Field, Florida a paradigm of religious freedom. i can’t see famous Muslim scholars and philosophers such as Averroes or Avicenna fitting in well in a Wahhabi madrassa (Muslim religious school), Notes and bin laden is a far cry from the Muslim 1. paraphrased from “paradoxes of counterinsur hero Saladin. We can’t cut and paste history gency operations,” field Manual 3-24 / Marine corps into a world where it no longer belongs and Warfightingp ublication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, Decem expect it to retain its meaning. even if we ber 2006, 1-26, http://www.usgcoin.org/library/doctrine/ coin-fM3-24.pdf. could, ibn Wahhab wasn’t around to know 2. francis fukuyama, The End of History and the Last what the caliphate was like in any event. More Man (new York: free press, 1992). than eight centuries stand between him and 3. An influence-based “theory of everything” might the rightly guided caliphs. What if al-Qaeda’s reconcile some of the seeming paradoxes that we face in this conflict, and it might tie the instruments of national vision of the caliphate is a past that never power together along the lines of the joint interagency was—fundamentally incompatible with the task force as envisioned by gen peter pace, former chair historical caliphate or any modern equivalent? man of the Joint chiefs of Staff.

05-Merge-Blair.indd 33 10/27/08 9:36:35 AM Asymmetric Air Support

Maj Gary L. BurG, uSaF*

he iniTial phases of Operation requests ranging from a movement-to-contact iraqi Freedom and Operation en operation to armed overwatch for religious during Freedom involved extensive celebrations. close air support (Cas). Just as the Tbattlefield has evolved into a more asymmet rical composition, so have ground-force re The Status Quo quests for support. Most Cas requests no lon The land component is acutely aware that ger call for putting ordnance on target. under current doctrine, it is apportioned/al air component requirements for providing located Cas assets based only on Cas require tactical air support in iraq and afghanistan ments.4 The word close in Cas does not imply have evolved outside the traditional roles of a specificdistance; rather, it is situational. The Cas and reconnaissance, creating the need to requirement for detailed integration due to revise air support that the air component doc proximity, fires,or movement is the determin trinally provides to ground forces.1 This article ing factor, but this is becoming less and less describes asymmetric air support (aas), a new relevant to what the ground component actu area of support not mentioned in current doc ally needs in order to serve as a stabilizing trine, and proposes the development of new force. The need for Cas to deliver ordnance doctrine. it also addresses issues that must be in close proximity to friendly forces is becom resolved to give all parties involved a better ing a smaller factor in the current environ understanding of the support requested of the ments of iraq and afghanistan. air component, and questions those decades- Over the last fiveyears, fighter/bomberair old methods of operation that have not craft of the coalition air forces have evolved to evolved with technology. it is designed to stimu become more than just strafing/bombing late discussion about better utilizing the lim platforms. Granted, their targeting pods were ited assets available without wearing out our designed to employ precision-guided muni current aircraft inventory; the article does so tions and reduce collateral damage, but the by examining current doctrine, identifying inherent capabilities of the pods have expanded common terminology, introducing some non their role into widely used and effective recon traditional ideas, and addressing the issue of naissance/surveillance. Unfortunately, the air unmanned aerial vehicles (UaV). Force lacks the intelligence infrastructure to The land component conducts full-spectrum exploit the information garnered from the operations, and its joint tactical air strike re pods and other sources. The air Force should quests (JTaR) reflect these operations.2 Full- have intelligence capability integral to the spectrum operations consist of four elements: squadron, as did an RF-4 squadron, if it is go offensive operations, defensive operations, sta ing to fully exploit the intelligence gained bility operations, and civil support operations.3 from full-motion video (FMV) footage.5 Based on the land component’s wide range of in today’s operations, the land component operations, the air component receives Cas has a great need for reconnaissance platforms;

*The author is chief of the master air attack planning cell, combined air and space operations center, al Udeid air Base, Qatar. he thanks the following subject-matter experts in both the iraq and afghanistan theaters who reviewed and commented upon this article: Col Jay B. silveria; Col seth p. Bretscher; lt Col aaron lehman; lt Col Jose sanchez; lt Col Michael Brockey; lt Col John Giles; lt Col Richard Flake; lt Col Randy King; Maj Bruce Munger; MaJ lawrence J. Baker Jr., Usa; CpT Kevin a. Campbell, UsMC; CW4 Robert R. Whigham, Usa; and ssgt John D. nguyen.

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some people have even called it a “limitless countermortar ; counterrocket; counter-indirect fires hunger.”6 This need far exceeds the assets (C-iDF); countersmuggling ; counterinsurgency; available to cover requirements, some of which positive identification; FMV; precision-guided mu are for armed reconnaissance to enable im nitions; low collateral damage estimate weapons; mediate strikes against the enemy during show of presence; show of force; and ROVeR. Joint time-critical operations (e.g., indirect-fire set publication (Jp) 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, ups and emplacement of improvised explosive and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 sep devices). These requests may not involve close tember 2003, addresses none of these. Yet, all proximity to friendly forces or require de of these terms and abbreviations are found tailed integration since no operations may be within the JTaRs submitted for support in cur occurring at the proposed reconnaissance lo rent coalition operations. The air component’s cation. even so, none of the current fighters tasks are anything but traditional Cas. De in the air Force’s inventory were designed as pending on who is talking, not only do these FMV reconnaissance platforms. The F-16C+ tasks have different meanings/requirements (Block 30), a reconnaissance-capable aircraft, but also the ability to assess their results has replaced the RF-4 as the air Force’s primary variations. Until the services agree upon which armed-reconnaissance platform, but its capa mission types should be supported by strike bilities lack the real-time feed desired by the assets, there will be a battle over requirements, land component, which wants the real-time, and thus force posture, of strike assets. This is FMV feed that it gets from aircraft equipped the first area that we need to resolve during with the Remote Operations Video enhanced the doctrine-revision process. Receiver (ROVeR). Because the land compo nent can’t fulfill reconnaissance-support re quirements from organic assets or from sur Break the Mold veillance and reconnaissance platforms, it now Under current doctrine, no Cas fighter/ uses the JTaR process to request armed recon bomber asset has a mission set/role for nTisR. naissance from traditional Cas assets. al Capabilities of the new targeting pod linked though referred to as Cas to keep within doc with ROVeR have not added a new role for trinal limitations, this is not Cas as the air which the fighter/bomber community trains component community would typically define in the isR arena, but everyone knows that the it. Unfortunately, fighter units assigned to the capabilities exist. it is time to acknowledge the two theaters of operations must provide Cas requirement to use them simply because the to the land component. This is where the fric air component does not have enough UaVs in tion starts. its inventory to meet demands. From a fighter aircrew’s standpoint, this is not an appropri Terms and Terminology ate use of its weapons platform, but from the land component’s perspective, this is a great Terms integral to traditional Cas, such as capability that it wants to use. forward line of troops and fire support coordination if the air Force acknowledges its fighter/ line, often do not exist when aircraft perform bomber nTisR capability and is willing to sup aas since the land component has “control” port the land component with these assets in of the entire area of operations. Today’s Cas this role, half of the controversy would end. in environment in iraqi Freedom and enduring doing so, however, some long-term problems Freedom uses many new terms, such as armed would emerge, affecting the fleet’s ability to overwatch / top cover; opportune surveillance ; air meet requirements of its airframe life span. presence ; air effects; nontraditional intelligence, another hurdle would involve getting the surveillance, and reconnaissance (nTisR, also fighter and bomber communities to acknowl known as nonstandard isR); aerial reconnais edge this as a viable role. Tactical air assets are sance; counter-improvised explosive devices (C-ieD); expensive reconnaissance platforms. The air

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Force and the army must consider the in ing smugglers to a point where ground forces tended, ultimate use of air Force assets and can interdict them. it is impossible for the determine if the effects outweigh the lack of land component to fully control these vast ex efficiency. additionally, air Force leaders must panses of border. We can control some of make some hard decisions about the roles that these areas only by designating airpower as our Cas assets will support. This may mean the lead and supported command.8 Yet joint restricting Cas assets to Cas roles and remov task force / land-component leaders seem to ing their isR roles. importantly, we must re dislike anything that would put them in a sup member that the land component is the sup porting role. Thus, they fail to take full ad ported component (the customer) and that vantage of the capabilities of platforms such the air component is the supporting compo as the Joint surveillance Target attack Radar nent (the provider). Whose requirements have system and UaVs, and we therefore under- the higher priority—the army’s need for isR perform in the countersmuggling/border or the air Force’s need to maintain the life operation roles. Consequently, both air and expectancy of the tactical air support fleet? land leadership misunderstands the supported/ although the air component currently can supporting relationship. For a stabilization not fulfillall of the land component’s requests, mission, equal partnership is a prerequisite most feedback from that component has been for success in certain missions. assignment to positive. aircrews, on the other hand, do not either a supporting or supported role for a sta seem pleased with the support they are asked bilization mission does not deny equal part to provide. The fighter and bomber commu nership. The reluctance of land leaders to nities feel that they are wasting much airborne recognize that fact dooms them to under time by searching for the proverbial needle in achieve in the full spectrum of aas. the haystack. From the land component’s standpoint, The land component requests armed re the air component can’t control the border connaissance to provide one of two effects: since it is not a ground-operation force. air find the enemy or deter/deny him. When it forces can produce effects on the ground, but, tasks the air component for C-iDF or C-ieD, it short of a nuclear strike, those effects are gen hopes that the supporting airframe will find erally temporary. This is a manpower issue; the enemy in the act and be able to neutralize the land component just doesn’t have enough the threat or prevent him from employing troops. a great force multiplier, airpower iDFs or ieDs. if the supporting aircraft meets should nevertheless be applied in a surgical either of these objectives, the mission is suc manner when it integrates with ground forces. cessful. Unfortunately, the prevention role is air Force intelligence, operations, and com not well recognized by manned supporting mand and control systems are not suited to aircraft. C-iDF or C-ieD mission reports usu taking the lead in ground operations. The ally indicate that nothing was accomplished supported service is usually the one that ac and that the aircraft wasted time performing cepts more risk. equal partnership should the requested task. The measure of merit equate to equal contribution or risk. Currently should be results from the customer’s stand in iraq and afghanistan, this is not the case. point. if the air component produced the de The question becomes, is the air component sired effect from the land component’s stand willing or able to provide support for full- point, then the mission was a success. spectrum operations? Once again, from the some individuals have suggested that the land component’s standpoint, this is what the air component become the supported command air component signed up for in the support during certain operations that the land com ing role. Therefore, it should be willing to ponent cannot fully cover—countersmuggling/ provide full-spectrum air support. border-operation roles, for example.7 Both We must also consider the air Force’s tradi iraq and afghanistan have long, unguarded tional use of the fighter element. Within the borders with no natural barriers for channel bounds of the fighter aircraft’s current mode

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of operation, a two-ship formation is the small could handle the data links, then we would est maneuver element. The main concept be have a good chance of significantly reducing hind this formation—mutual support—is based the number of piloted, fixed-wing Cas assets on threat reaction. When the aircraft func in-theater. One predator mission can provide tions as a Cas platform, this should continue up to 12 hours of continuous coverage unre as the minimum maneuver element, but when fueled, while it would take four two-ship pi a fighter/bomber is tasked to an isR role, it loted aircraft formations flying three-hour may not be required. in light of the absence of windows and using over 250,000 pounds of threats from the air and only minimal ones fuel to cover that same time frame. at a mini from the ground (small-arms fireand possibly mum, we could greatly decrease the number rocket-propelled grenades), fighters should of hours flown by piloted, fixed-wing assets, be able to operate in a single-ship mode. navy, thus significantly reducing the amount of Marine, and some coalition fighters already air refueling. conduct single-ship operations within 60 miles of their wingmen. it is time for the air Force to consider this mode of operation when it is Conclusion/Questions tasked for the isR role. here again, the air Traditionally, Cas has been definedas put Force needs to acknowledge its isR capability, ting ordnance on target in close proximity to which would enable more efficient use of its friendly forces, but this is not how we use the assets and increased ability to support the land vast majority of the air component’s tactical component.9 air assets in today’s stabilization missions. That doesn’t mean that ground forces do not re Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and quire our support, especially when most of our weapons platforms have multiple capabili Their Roles and Capabilities ties, but armed isR assets can provide Cas, Reconnaissance plays a critical role in an and isR does not require two-ship formations. air-support mission for national stabilization. now is the time to revise our official doctrine The MQ-1 predator and MQ-9 Reaper UaVs for integrating with ground forces. The air both provide valuable FMV to the ground Force needs to address how it can best sup commander and isR community. Unfortu port requirements to prevail in a counterin nately, requests for support far exceed the as surgency environment. air Force and Depart sets available to cover those requests. The land ment of Defense leaders need to answer the component is fully aware of the capabilities of following questions: fered by the air component’s FMV assets; when 1. Where is the dividing line between sup it can’t get FMV support from organic assets porting the land component with air as or through isR division requests from the co sets that have multiple capabilities and alition’s air and space operations center, the maintaining the combat fleet in its de land component uses the JTaR request pro signed roles? cess. This is the primary reason that traditional reconnaissance/surveillance requests are be 2. at what cost is the air Force willing to fly ing passed to piloted, fixed-wing Cas assets, its Cas platforms to support isR taskings? which possess these inherent isR capabilities. 3. how long can the fleet continue flying arming of the predator and Reaper has at its current rate, and what are the long- made them viable, multirole assets that can be term implications? tasked for either isR or Cas missions. They do, however, lack the ability to strafe, which 4. What are the training implications and limits their options for escalation of force. if requirements of using Cas assets in the we had an endless supply of armed predators isR role and armed isR platforms in the and Reapers and if the frequency spectrum Cas role?

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5. Does the stabilization/aas mission cre or forward operating bases (traditional Cas) ate a need for a new airframe that can and place 15-minute ground-alert fighters (a do it all (provide FMV, bomb, strafe, and two-ship package) at strategically located bases loiter a long time without requiring within the two areas of responsibility in iraq tanker support)? and afghanistan. Based on our current opera as a starting point for answering these ques tions in both locations, i would immediately tions, i recommend that we immediately stop look into modifying a current isR platform to using fighter aircraft (Cas platforms) for the have an alternate role in the Cas mission or C-ieD and C-iDF roles and limit their use in developing a new multirole platform that can the armed-reconnaissance/nTisR role. i would operate in a permissive air superiority envi return all predators to the control of the com ronment (either manned or unmanned). bined force air component commander and The air Force needs to allocate and use its equally distribute them between isR and Cas. resources wisely. Time is of the essence in in the Cas role, we would use these predators making this happen if we wish to preserve the primarily in C-iDF and C-ieD missions. i would longevity of our fleet. ❑ limit the fixed-wing fighter assets to direct land-component operations outside air bases Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

Notes 1. The term air component encompasses piloted, fixed- 2003 [incorporating change 1, 2 september 2005], ix, wing fightersand bombers from the Us air Force, Marine http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_09 Corps, and navy, as well as coalition aircraft tactically con _3ch1.pdf. trolled by the combined force air component commander. 5. Col Jay B. silveria, supreme headquarters allied 2. The term land component refers to Us, iraqi, af powers, europe, european Command, Belgium, to the ghan, and coalition ground forces. author, personal communication, 4 March 2008. 3. The army defines its operational concept of full- 6. Maj Bruce Munger, director of operations, 20th air spectrum operations as follows: “army forces combine of support Operations squadron, and joint tactical air con fensive, defensive, and stability or civil support operations troller instructor, Operation iraqi Freedom, October simultaneously as part of an interdependent joint force to 2007–april 2008, to the author, personal communication, seize, retain, and exploit the initiative, accepting prudent 5 February 2008. risk to create opportunities to achieve decisive results.” 7. Col seth p. Bretscher, chief of combat operations, Us army Field Manual 3-0, Operations, February 2008, 3-1, international security assistance Force air Component http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/repository/materials/ element, Kabul, afghanistan, to the author, personal FM3-0(FeB%202008).pdf. communication, 17 February 2008. 4. Joint publication 3-09.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, 8. ibid. and Procedures for Close Air Support (CAS), 3 september 9. silveria to the author, personal communication.

06-Merge-Burg.indd 38 10/27/08 9:36:56 AM Human Performance Enhancement überhumans or Ethical Morass?

Col lex Brown, USAF, MC, SFS lt Col Anthony P. tvAryAnAS, USAF, MC, SFS*

Ritalin seems to have become the drug for our day. As competition on every level intensifies, our preoccupations as a culture increasingly center on performance. And our children, whether we realize it or not, have been serving as a proving ground for the premise of medicating to enhance performance. Are we likely to see a time in the not-so-distant future when a large part of America will be running on Ritalin? —Lawrence Diller, mD Running on Ritalin

he primary funcTion of the air hpe encompasses those methods that enable force is to organize, train, and equip airmen to operate beyond established and forces that a combatant commander sustainable performance thresholds. hpe brings will employ during the course of to mind cutting-edge fields in biotechnology Tjoint operations.1 The air force’s health ser such as genomics and nanotechnology. how vice and science and technology (S&T) com ever, we should conceptualize hpe as cover munities, among others, support this function ing a spectrum ranging from intrahuman by providing expertise in human performance.2 (e.g., biotechnology and pharmacology) to in essence, then, the air force, in conjunc extrahuman (e.g., hardware and software), in tion with other military services and civilian cluding such tools as selection, training, equip agencies, is responsible for providing human ment, pharmacology, and surgery. performance capabilities to the joint force. ideally, we should optimize and enhance these capabilities so that we field (human) weapon Pharmaceuticals systems superior to those of current and po in the wake of this surge of interest in hpe, tential adversaries. Such thinking has driven the air force medical community must be heightened interest within the military ser poised to consider performance-enhancement vices regarding human performance, in part modalities within the context of Western so sparked by the office of net assessment’s re ciety’s principles of medical ethics: autonomy, port entitled Human Performance Optimization nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. This and Military Missions.3 Thus, Department of concern is perhaps most pressing for pharma Defense (DoD) health affairs formed a hu cological hpe since the military services em man performance optimization Steering ploy this modality in current operations (e.g., committee,4 and uS Joint forces command fatigue countermeasures). Dating back to the sponsored a human performance enhance fourth century Bc, one of the most funda ment (hpe) joint-capability document (in mental principles in medical ethics—first do draft) under the guise of joint-force health no harm—received much attention during the protection. for the purpose of this discussion, firstyears of the twenty-firstcentur y, given the

*colonel Brown is director, human performance integration, 711th human performance Wing, Brooks city-Base, Texas. Lieutenant colonel Tvaryanas is a phD candidate at the naval postgraduate School, monterey, california.

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renewed public, judicial, and legislative inter quately assess the risk of adverse events. for est in drug safety. for example, such popular example, the authors’ cursory review of the and widely prescribed drugs as troglitazone, literature found no hpe studies of modafinil cerivastatin, rofecoxib, valdecoxib, and cisapride as a fatigue countermeasure that even came were withdrawn from the market. manufac close to utilizing 100 participants. Though not turers added boxed warnings to the labels for surprising, given the difficultiesof conducting celecoxib and other nonselective, nonsteroidal, large trials, such a situation does raise ethical anti-inflammatory drugs, and to the labels for concern over meaningful, informed consent all antidepressants. There is continued con (i.e., the ethical principle of autonomy) since cern over inaccurate perceptions that approval both risks and benefits remain largely unde by the food and Drug administration (fDa) fined.i n addition, can military leaders reliably represents a guarantee of safety based on a depend on pharmaceutical countermeasures high degree of clarity and certainty about a when they plan operations and at the same drug’s risks and benefits.i n reality, it is impos time respect the ethical principle of autonomy? sible to know everything about a drug at the although use of the current generation of point of approval because of the complexity hpe agents is limited to select populations and of its mechanisms of action and because pre- situations, could more widespread usage in the approval clinical testing generally occurs in future create an inherently coercive environ controlled settings using carefully selected ment and compromise individual autonomy if 5 populations. at present a critical need exists performance is a factor in the selection and for large, simple clinical trials to test the safety promotion of airmen? Given these consider and real-world effectiveness of widely used ations, initially well intended hpe require drugs as well as those currently under devel ments such as a nonaddictive pill to maintain 6 opment. in the meantime, in the absence of vigilance in the face of routine, prolonged a public-health mandate, the ethical principle wakefulness; a prohormone to increase mus of autonomy dictates that physicians and pa cular strength and endurance during train tients cooperatively make individualized risking; or pharmacotherapy to enhance cogni benefit decisions regarding the selection and tive function and decision making may have use of pharmaceutical agents for the preven ethically unacceptable ramifications from a tion and treatment of human diseases. medical and societal perspective. outside the clinical setting, how is risk- benefitdefined in hpe? in the latter case, the individual is healthy, and the benefit is hypo Nanotechnology thetical (e.g., decreased likelihood that a drowsy airman will commit an error of omis many of the ethical issues raised with phar sion or commission with significant effect on maceutical hpe also apply to nanotechnology, the mission). The benefit is hard to define a burgeoning field featuring particles smaller quantitatively, as is the risk. often the drug is than one micron. nanotechnology may be used for a non-fDa-approved indication, and poised to transform medicine with potential the intended population does not represent uses spanning all aspects of disease diagnosis, the one employed in preapproval testing or prevention, and treatment as well as hpe ap observed during postapproval surveillance. plications such as embedded intelligence.8 although clinical testing reliably detects ad however, at present we lack comprehensive verse events occurring in one of 100 patients, and conclusive information on the long-term it probably will not observe such reactions oc health and safety effects of nanomaterials.9 curring in one of 1,000 patients—or less fre for example, preliminary evidence suggests quently, even if they are very severe.7 Thus, that the large surface area of insoluble nanopar many hpe studies of pharmacologic agents ticles can trigger inflammatory responses, and are unlikely to involve sufficient numbers of a substantial body of evidence supports the participants (i.e., statistical power) to ade conclusion that chronic inflammation can

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predispose an individual to cancer.10 although working in the field of genetics have voiced we need more research into the health effects concerns about the ethics of genetic enhance of nanotechnology before we can consider ments, especially those inherited as a result of human use, such concerns highlight the larger germ-line, gene-transfer technologies. They issue of prolonged and potentially lifelong have raised questions about the long-term surveillance when using hpe agents. Since safety of such interventions, the viability of cancers usually have latencies of 15–20 years consent when cross-generational effects are or more, ideally we should require an assess prevalent, and the possible impact of enhance ment program akin to the Longitudinal Study ments on our conceptions of human achieve of Astronaut Health for airmen exposed to hpe ment and excellence.13 although the creation agents in order to adequately address the of a warrior class may sound implausible in ethical principles of autonomy,nonmaleficence, contemporary Western society, what about and beneficence.11 current fiscal realities make other societies—whether allied, neutral, or such a program impracticable and unlikely to adversary? What about the apparently less sin be implemented. however, we could begin ister gene doping? other forms of surveillance, such as conduct ing periodic health surveys or tracking medical- claims data for airmen receiving government- Conclusion and funded medical benefits, at significantly less Recommendations expense. ultimately, we will discover adverse effects associated with long latencies only by This discussion has only scratched the sur tracking the health of airmen long after they face of potential ethical issues brought on by have separated from military service. The po advances in hpe. up to this point, the dia tential need for such surveillance is a hidden logue has focused solely on biotechnology. cost that should be factored into decisions to however, ethical dilemmas likely will exist across the hpe spectrum. for example, are use hpe agents. there ethical implications in conducting psycho logical screening and training to develop and Genetics harden aggressive personality traits in air men? What are the ramifications for those Like nanotechnology, advances in genetic airmen’s families during their military service S&T have enormous potential to revolution and for society at large upon their separation ize medicine in terms of assessing risk for and or retirement? even a seemingly innocuous treating human diseases. however, the same hpe intervention such as nutritional supple technology that enables gene-transfer therapy mentation now has attendant ethical consid for treatment of clinical disease can also be erations, given evidence from recent interven used for hpe. already the term gene doping tion studies of previously unrecognized risks has entered the sports lexicon.12 for example, caused by nutrient toxicity and nutrient inter it may be possible to transfer genes that re actions.14 overall, we should not view hpe as lease human-growth hormone to build muscles inherently unethical since it may in fact be or that enable muscles to use oxygen more ef ethical in terms of beneficence(i.e., increased ficientlyfor endurance. on the horizon, gene likelihood of survival). Given the military ser transfers may target the calcium channels in vices’ heightened interest in human perfor muscles to make them more responsive, mance and the ongoing efforts to develop strengthen bones, and blunt or eliminate the hpe road maps and requirements, we should response to pain. at the extreme, genetic en address ethics early in the process. unfortu gineering—to date limited to plants and ani nately, existing policy, concepts of operations, mals—could be used to create an optimized and doctrine do not address hpe, let alone “warrior” germ line sometime in the not-too the associated ethical issues.15 Thus, we ur distant future. for a long time, bioethicists gently need to confront this situation in light

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of the rapid pace at which new S&T advances sentatives from the state medical boards with potential hpe applications appear. That (which license DoD medical personnel), to said, we offer four recommendations. draft a code of practice for endorsement by first, the air force should include human the air force chief of staff. Doing so will lead performance in its existing and future doc to a consistent and defensible use of hpe trine—the officially accepted practices taught agents across the air force. to airmen, related to means and involving is Third, the air force should establish an ex sues of how strategy is carried out.16 Thus, doc tended longitudinal-surveillance program for trinally addressing human performance com airmen exposed to current and future hpe pels the air force to officially contemplate agents. The air force surgeon general should and codify the means by which it will use hu have primary responsibility for administration man weapons to achieve military strategy. The and oversight of this program, which would Lemay center for Doctrine Development and serve the two separate goals of surveillance of education center at maxwell afB, alabama, occupational health effects from hpe agents is the logical agency for coordinating this and research into their long-term effects. how work. however, given the unprecedented na ever, a credible, independent agency such as ture of this subject matter within the doctrinal the institute of medicine should be commis community, we require a deliberative process sioned to develop the protocol for conducting that actively involves and informs all relevant this surveillance and periodically assessing the stakeholders, including the war-fighter, S&T, data collected. information on exposures to medical, legal, and bioethical communities. hpe agents must be collected and correlated equally important, this work must proceed with individual airmen, as is presently done quickly so the air force can proactively man for other occupational exposures such as toxic age rather than react to hpe. industrial materials, noise, and so forth. The Second, the air force surgeon general air force should then assume responsibility should develop a code of practice that bal for the lifelong surveillance of those airmen ances accepted medical ethics with the mili exposed to hpe agents, including the con tary’s unique need for superior (human) duct of periodic surveillance exams and com weapons. ideally, this task would occur con pensation for associated costs incurred. currently with the development of an official finally, the assistant secretary of defense air force human-performance doctrine. air for health affairs should conduct a workshop force medical personnel are at the front lines to define minimum evidentiary standards (e.g., of this issue, advising commanders on hpe sample size, duration of assessment, measures and prescribing pharmaceutical hpe agents. of merit, etc.) for preapproval and postapproval however, as we have discussed, hpe doesn’t studies assessing the effectiveness and safety of fit well within ethical frameworks developed hpe agents. This workshop should include for treating disease. in the absence of clear experts from academia and nongovernmental professional or societal guidance, we think organizations (e.g., the institute of medicine), that this ethical uncertainty should be ad government research agencies (e.g., the na dressed at the organizational level rather than tional institutes of health), and appropriate leaving it to individual medical personnel for regulatory agencies such as the fDa. its rec resolution. The air force medical Service ommendations should form the basis for sub ❑ should establish a panel composed of medical sequent DoD policy. leadership and bioethicists at the air force Brooks City-Base, Texas and major-command levels, as well as repre Monterey, California

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Notes 1. air force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doc 294, no. 15 (19 october 2005): 1881–83, http://jama trine, 17 november 2003, 35, https://www.hqafdc.maxwell .ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/294/15/1881. .af.mil/afdcprivateweb/afDD_page_hTmL/Doctrine 9. paul a. Schulte and fabio Salamanca-Buentello, _Docs/afdd1.pdf. “ethical and Scientific issues of nanotechnology in the 2. Agile Combat Support Concept of Operations (Washing Workplace,” Environmental Health Perspectives 115, no. 1 ton, Dc: air Staff Directorate of Logistics readiness, 15 (January 2007): 5–12, http://www.ehponline.org/members/ July 2005), h-1, T-1. 2006/9456/9456.pdf. 3. adam russell, Bartlett Bulkley, and christine Graf 10. claire monteiller et al., “The pro-inflammatory ton, Human Performance Optimization and Military Missions, effects of Low-Toxicity Low-Solubility particles, nanopar report for the director, officeof net assessment, GS-10f ticles and fine particles, on epithelial cells in Vitro: The o297K (mcLean, Va: Science applications international role of Surface area,” Occupational and Environmental corporation, may 2005), 10–12, 92–101. Medicine 64, no. 9 (September 2007): 609–15; and emily 4. patricia Deuster et al., Human Performance Optimiza Shacter and Sigmund Weitzman, “chronic inflammation tion in DOD: Charting a Course for the Future, report pre and cancer,” Oncology 16, no. 2 (february 2002): 217–29. pared by the human performance optimization Steering 11. David e. Longnecker, frederick J. manning, and committee for the assistant secretary of defense for health melvin h. Worth Jr., eds., Review of NASA’s Longitudinal affairs (Bethesda, mD: Department of military and emer Study of Astronaut Health (Washington, Dc: national aca gency medicine, uniformed Services university, 28 June demic press, 2004), 9–15, 45–52. 2006), 3. 12. h. Lee Sweeney, “Gene Doping,” Scientific American 5. alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton, and Sheila Burke, 291, no. 1 (July 2004): 62–69. eds., The Future of Drug Safety: Promoting and Protecting the 13. ronald Green, guest editor, “Justice and Genetic Health of the Public (Washington, Dc: national academies enhancement” (special issue), Kennedy Institute of Ethics press, 2007), 17–20. Journal 15, no. 1 (march 2005): 1–2. 6. Judith S. hochman and nirav r. Shah, “What price 14. alice h. Lichtenstein and robert m. russell, “es pain relief?” Circulation 113, no. 25 (27 June 2006): sential nutrients: food or Supplements? Where Should 2868–70, http://circ.ahajournals.org/cgi/reprint/113/ the emphasis Be?” Journal of the American Medical Associa 25/2868. tion 294, no. 3 (20 July 2005): 351–58, http://jama.ama 7. Brian L. Strom, “how the uS Drug Safety System -assn.org/cgi/reprint/294/3/351. Should Be changed,” Journal of the American Medical Asso 15. Deuster et al., Human Performance Optimization, 6–7. ciation 295, no. 17 (3 may 2006): 2072–75, http://jama 16. maj Gen i. B. holley Jr., uSaf, retired, Technology and .ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/295/17/2072. Military Doctrine: Essays on a Challenging Relationship (maxwell 8. Tracy hampton, “researchers Size up nanotech afB, aL: air university press, 2004), 1–3, http://www nology risks,” Journal of the American Medical Association .maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/books/holley/holley.pdf.

Our Air Force combines capabilities in the domains of air, space, and cyberspace to deliver Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power to the Joint force. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

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Dr. Dale l. HayDen*

hat makes airmen different cult to define.Learned airpower scholars con from soldiers or sailors? it has to tinue to debate the definition of air-mindedness, be more than the uniform they and reasonable airmen continue to disagree— wear or the technology they not because airpower cannot be defined but Wmaintain and operate. the distinction is the because, like viewing an object through a unique perspective they bring to the art of prism, it depends upon one’s perspective. warfare—an attribute we loosely define as air accordingly, air-mindedness does not have mindedness. it might have been easier to gain a static definition but captures nuances that consensus on a definition 15 years ago, when change over time. in its simplest form, air the air Force was occupied principally in stra mindedness is the lens through which airmen tegic operations in defense of the nation. perceive warfare and view the battlespace. as however, since then the air Force has been warfare has evolved, so has the definition of almost exclusively engaged in theater-specific air-mindedness. First and foremost, it implies operations, such as northern and southern an offensive mind-set. During the interwar Watch, allied Force, enduring Freedom, and years, air-mindedness described a strategic vi iraqi Freedom. these operations and the sion of airpower that produced the concept of global constructs of space and cyberspace be daylight precision bombing in World War ii. gan to reshape how airmen perceive their During the Cold War, it provided the rationale contributions and cast new questions about for nuclear deterrence, deep-strike bombers, what airmen bring to the fight. and ballistic missiles. air-mindedness has never in his work The Command of the Air, Giulio been platform-centric, so it enables today’s Douhet wrote, “as long as man remained tied airmen to think firstabout desired effects and to the surface of the earth, his activities had to then about the means of attaining them. Con be adapted to the conditions imposed by that sequently, it enables airmen to express the surface. . . . By virtue of this new weapon [the concepts of space and cyberspace operations airplane], the repercussions of war are no lon as easily as they expressed airpower concepts ger limited by the farthest artillery range of only a few years earlier. surface guns, but can be directly felt for hun thus, airmen are better equipped to ex dreds and hundreds of miles over all the lands ploit the other global commons of space and and seas of nations at war.”1 in an attempt to cyberspace since they view them as domains identify the unique contributions that air- rather than as tools. the distinction is that a power brings to surface warfare, Gen henry surface operator might ask, “how can i do my h. “hap” arnold termed the airman’s “par job using space or cyber?” Conversely, an air ticular expertise and . . . distinctive point of man would ask, “how can i achieve the de view . . . ‘airmindedness.’”2 sired effect though space or cyber?” air-mindedness should not be confused air-mindedness, however, does have certain with airpower doctrine and its implementa constants. it is a global, strategic mind-set pro tion, such as centralized control and decen viding perspective through which the battle- tralized execution. Like esprit de corps, it binds space is not constrained by geography, dis airmen together and guides their actions. tance, location, or time. the air-mindedness however, again like esprit de corps, it is diffi- lens enables airmen to think about conflictin

*the author, a retired air Force colonel, is a researcher at the air Force research institute, maxwell aFB, alabama.

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which force-on-force and armies in the field ture among airmen distinct from the surface are only one element. it implies the ability to approach to employing military force. the influence the links between adversary materiel notion of air-mindedness probably will not and moral strength. although airmen rarely find consensus among either airmen or their claim to target the enemy’s will, they perceive surface partners. however, if it furthers the a direct connection between his physical ca discussion, then this article has accomplished pacity and desire to continue the fight. a significantobjective by encouraging airmen air-mindedness also connotes a cultural to examine why they believe what they believe characteristic that distinguishes airmen from so they may become better advocates of their their partners in the other services. the ability profession. ❑ to range over the battlespace rapidly and with relative impunity while surface forces often Maxwell AFB, Alabama struggle to advance even short distances cre ates the potential for conflict among the ser vices. additionally, the perception that airmen Notes operate in the relative safety of a highly tech 1. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino nical, pristine environment while their surface Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC: Officeof air partners remain in much closer proximity to Force history, 1983), 7, 9. the dangers of the battlefieldover longer peri 2. Quoted in air Force Doctrine Document 2, Opera tions and Organization, 3 april 2007, 2, http://www.dtic ods of time creates a divide. .mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2.pdf. Brig Gen Billy mitchell said that airpower 3. William mitchell, Winged Defense: The Development 3 was “the ability to do something in the air.” and Possibilities of Modern Air Power—Economic and Military that ability has sparked innovation and a cul (1925; repr., new York: Dover Publications, 1988), xii.

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Les DoggreLL*

It is thus an essential condition of strategic leadership that forces should be held in reserve accord ing to the degree of strategic uncertainty. —carl von clausewitz, On War

he US Space community was reconstitution approach would require in or alarmed by china’s antisatellite der to respond in a timely manner to a threat (aSaT) test of 11 January 2007 but to our space capability. has made little practical response.1 The Department of Defense (DOD) has an TBy performing a public demonstration, china ticipated the development of counterspace put the world on notice of its ability to hold forces. In 2001 former secretary of defense spacecraft at risk. as many pundits note, the Donald Rumsfeld warned of a possible “space United States is critically dependent on space pearl harbor.”3 The US Space Transportation capabilities to fight future conflicts. Some in policy, issued in 2005, calls for the ability to dustry analysts have speculated that the de “respond to unexpected loss or degradation struction on 22 February 2008 of a spacecraft of selected capabilities, and/or to provide timely identified in the press as USa 193 was in availability of tailored or new capabilities—to tended to demonstrate a US aSaT capability, support national security requirements.”4 The yet in a future conflict, destroying opposing same policy establishes 2010 as a goal for dem spacecraft will not replace lost space capability.2 onstrating a responsive space capability: Given the relative dependence of the United Before 2010, the United States shall demon States on space systems, what, if anything, strate an initial capability for operationally re should we do to prepare for future space op sponsive access to and use of space to support erations under contested conditions? One national security requirements. In that regard, possible solution calls for preparing to re the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with place—or reconstitute—lost capability, at least the Director of central Intelligence, shall: to some extent. a) Develop the requirements and concept of op congress and senior defense officials have erations for launch vehicles, infrastructure, and identifiedOperationallyResponsiveSpace(ORS) spacecraft to provide operationally responsive as a means for responding to future threats to access to and use of space to support national US space systems, but no one has articulated security, including the ability to provide critical space capabilities in the event of a failure of specifically what ORS will do. What elements launch or on-orbit capabilities; and of ORS would react to a counterspace threat? No one has published a clear description of b) Identify the key modifications to space launch, ORS and what it does. consideration of the spacecraft, or ground operations capabilities guidance provided by congress, and of the that will be required to implement an opera tionally responsive space launch capability.5 needs and technology available for a reconsti tution capability, can identify, at least in out Thus, policy direction to take action clearly line, features and capabilities that ORS or any exists.

©The aerospace corporation *The author is a senior project leader with The aerospace corporation, supporting headquarters air Force Space command’s Directorate of Requirements, peterson aFB, colorado.

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In testimony before congress in March measures could represent a solution or part of 2007, Dr. Ronald Sega, executive agent for a set of solutions to the loss, or threat of loss, space and undersecretary of the air Force at of space capability. according to Dr. Sega, Mr. that time, identifiedORS as the United States’ england, and congress, ORS provides the activity to prepare for a threat to our space sys means to reconstitute space capabilities, yet tems: “This ORS focus includes the ability to within even this limited scope, it is unclear ex launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily actly what ORS will do to perform this mission. useful satellites to provide surge capability, re We could replace any lost national-security constitute or augment existing constellations, space capabilities by maintaining a complete or provide timely availability of tailored or backup inventory, holding these spacecraft in new capabilities.”6 Deputy Secretary of De standby for responsive launch aboard an in fense Gordon england articulated this view in ventory of launch vehicles. The ORS mission- a memorandum of 2007 that established ORS needs statement, signed by the chief of staff of as the initiative to meet the US Space Trans the air Force in 2001, documented the need portation policy’s goal. Despite this direction, for the launch component of this type of ap the DOD has received continuing criticism for proach.12 an analysis of alternatives (aOa), failing to define ORS accurately and suc completed in april 2005, examined a wide cinctly. a recent report to congress defined range of launch architectures for performing ORS broadly as “assured space power focused responsive space missions. It found that rap on timely satisfaction of Joint Force com idly replacing lost intelligence, surveillance, and manders’ needs.”7 however, this definition reconnaissance as well as precision navigation encompasses almost any imaginable military and timing capabilities had a significant im space capability. according to one commenta pact on the results of hypothetical future mili tor, “ORS has essentially been a loosely de tary campaigns.13 This findingdepended upon fined and directed series of space and rocket an inventory of spacecraft designed for re hardware procurements.”8 sponsive launch. Based on the result of the The US air Force has struggled to define aOa, the air Force initiated an affordable Re ORS.9 Is it a launch system, a series of space sponsive Spacelift project. craft, infrastructure improvement, an acquisition- although space systems are relatively short reform effort, or all of these? What size and lived, the current on-orbit US capability repre number of spacecraft with what capabilities sents decades of investment at a level of tens are involved? What type of system do we need of billions of dollars per year. Building, much to respond to a military threat to US space ca less maintaining, a complete replacement in pabilities? We have answered none of these ventory, even if technically feasible, is well be questions with any certainty, but we must do yond reasonable expectations of increased so before we can field a solution. congress defense expenditures. Such an investment in provided some direction in the John Warner a contingency need becomes even less likely National Defense authorization act for Fiscal when compared to the necessity of recapital Year 2007.10 however, no agency has published izing existing defense systems.14 a reconstitution concept for ORS. The growing inventory of commercial satel We can easily identify conceptual responses lite capability is a potential source of capacity to threats to our space systems. china and that we have used in conflict and that would Russia advocate eliminating the threat through likely see use in the future. One challenge to a treaty banning space weapons.11 Weaning this approach includes the increasingly multi our defense establishment from its depen national character of the commercial space dence on space systems might reduce the vul market. The impact of conflict on international nerability. establishment of passive and active consortiums would largely depend upon the defense of spacecraft could offer another al specific parties and interests affected by the ternative. preparation for the reconstitution of conflict.For example, the “neutrality” of com space capability following the failure of other mercial spacecraft would prove difficult to

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maintain if they were providing militarily es point out the ability of space systems to ob sential services. serve denied territory and provide strategic In the Defense authorization act of 2007, capabilities. It is important that we determine congress effectively ended the affordable the minimum space capability required to Responsive Spacelift program by redirecting support the joint force in conflict. Gen Kevin the president’s budget and providing guid chilton, commander of US Strategic com ance that ORS is intended not as a com mand, defined this level of performance as plete “replacement” capability but as a small “good enough to win.”18 as noted by colonel satellite-based system: Tomme, one small spacecraft provides very little capability, compared to the existing con It is the policy of the United States to demon strate, acquire, and deploy an effective capability stellations of large spacecraft. Several authors for operationally responsive space to support have suggested various configurations of or military users and operations from space, which bital constellations to provide persistent cov shall consist of— erage.19 a reconstitution system would need to incorporate constellations of several small (1) responsive satellite payloads and busses built spacecraft to effect such coverage. addition to common technical standards; ally, small, single-purpose spacecraft, by defi (2) low-cost space launch vehicles and support nition, would not serve multiple missions. ing range operations that facilitate the timely Spacecraft orbits are carefully tailored for the launch and on-orbit operations of satellites; mission envisioned and matched to the capa (3) responsive command and control capabili bility of the spacecraft. For example, multiple ties; and types, rather than a single type, of spacecraft would provide surveillance and reconnais (4) concepts of operations, tactics, techniques, sance, communications, and navigation capa and procedures that permit the use of respon bilities. a minimal reconstitution capability sive space assets for combat and military opera tions other than war.15 would involve multiple constellations of dif ferent types of spacecraft. each typical con In the same act, congress provided further stellation, which would involve three to eight guidance on the systems to be procured, es spacecraft per mission, would occupy orbits tablishing a $20 million goal for the purchase appropriate to the mission and capabilities. of a launch vehicle and a $40 million goal for an expressed ORS objective calls for pro the purchase of a spacecraft. congress let the viding greater capability in smaller, less expen DOD determine the composition and struc sive future projects and delivering these on ture of the ORS force. shorter timelines. however, better, faster, and By establishing cost goals, congress has cheaper space systems have proven elusive. even determined the type of ORS force structure on accelerated timelines, we cannot currently it expects to be created. a rough rule of produce small launch vehicles in less than 18 thumb for pricing spacecraft at $100,000 per months. Spacecraft-fabrication timelines are kilogram would indicate that congress in even longer. an optimist might estimate two tends ORS spacecraft mass to not exceed ap years to produce and test a small spacecraft. proximately 400 kilograms. conveniently, although we can, and should, take steps to re this is about the size of the spacecraft that we duce these timelines, even optimistic projec could launch on a $20 million vehicle—and tions of responsive fabrication times greatly very close to the size and cost of the tactical- exceed the likely warning and allowable recov satellite class of spacecraft.16 ery time to respond to a significantloss of our Lt col ed Tomme has examined the ability space capability. providing meaningful capa of small spacecraft to perform military mis bility within days to a few weeks of an attack is sions, noting the cost/performance trade possible only if we have stockpiled the neces offs.17 These trade-offs are generally negative sary spacecraft and launch vehicles. Given the on small spacecraft, but colonel Tomme does reserves of bombs, boots, and beans maintained

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for future military contingencies, it should an end-to-end capability to perform a recon come as no surprise that a military space capa stitution mission will require facilities such as bility would require similar stockpiling. launchpads; storage, assembly, and integra Both the air Force Research Laboratory tion structures; on-orbit command and con and Naval Research Laboratory are working trol; and telemetry systems integrated into the on technologies to reduce the need to stock tasking and dissemination infrastructure as pile spacecraft and still meet a responsive well as their associated facilities. timeline, with the goal of assembling a space Once on orbit, we will need to fly reconsti craft within six days.20 To do so, however, ei tution spacecraft. Two opposing operating ther the government or a contractor must concepts exist, and an optimum solution will maintain an inventory of preengineered and likely draw from both. To operate seamlessly prequalified components. We must still bear in the augmentation role or as a replacement the cost of keeping this inventory and re for a lost or damaged spacecraft from an es quired personnel on standby to perform the tablished constellation, reconstitution space assembly. The success of the rapid assembly craft could be operated by mission-focused and low-inventory business model, as illustrated command and control structures and opera by Dell computers, relies on high volume. We tions teams now in place. This concept maxi need a trade-off study to evaluate the use of mizes the use of the existing operations infra fully assembled spacecraft at the launch site structure and minimizes disruption from the versus the use of a centralized small-satellite users’ perspective. alternatively, rapid-response depot that would contain spacecraft in various reconstitution spacecraft could be operated states of assembly. But the costs of inventory by facilities dedicated specifically to that pur would be significant. Likewise, a common, pose. This concept is most applicable if the modular, or plug-and-play spacecraft bus would various reconstitution spacecraft are built with reduce the nonrecurring and recurring ex a common bus and operations concept. For pense of small spacecraft and could prove example, a reconstitution communications helpful in meeting the $40 million spacecraft spacecraft must integrate into the existing or goal. even assuming the success of these ef remaining communications, command, and forts, we would still need an inventory of busses control infrastructure. however, a small space and payloads to meet likely wartime needs. craft capable of performing the reconstitution an alternative approach involves stockpil mission is not likely to use the same command ing the spacecraft on orbit in advance of need. and telemetry structure as the spacecraft it re The on-orbit reserve, built in peacetime, could places, thus requiring some dedicated func provide capability continuously. This approach tionality. Significant research in spacecraft au is particularly useful if the United States re tonomy now under way suggests that enhanced ceives strategic warning of an impending or autonomy may relieve the challenges presented likely conflict; however, given china’s aSaT by rapidly launching multiple constellations of threat, on-orbit stockpiling may do little more spacecraft. additionally, such autonomy could than provide additional targets. Detailed evalua aid in freeing operators from the telemetry- tion of the threat and potential-response time- monitoring function, allowing them to focus lines are central to considering the trade-off on commanding the spacecraft to respond to between launch-on-schedule and launch-on threat actions and optimizing payloads and or demand strategies. a future opponent is not bits in response to changing needs. likely to provide two years of strategic warn More important than hardware, a reconsti ing, and the United States may not be suffi tution system will require people to operate it. ciently prescient to take advantage of the These personnel, whether military, civilian, or warning it does receive. contractor, will need to train and practice Like all military capabilities, stockpiling re their wartime tasks before executing them in sponsive space hardware alone will not be suf earnest. additionally, they should use such a ficient to ensure its readiness for future need. system in their own training exercises since we

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cannot reasonably expect all of these interac lying technology and industrial base. Obvi tions to occur in wartime without extensive ously, any strategy that projects a one-time peacetime practice. Military professionals know production run will not support a continuing from experience that, in combat, they can rely industrial base. only on well-trained troops familiar with their a viable concept of reconstitution, even weapon systems. one with very modest goals for the amount of Though not unusual for a military func restored capability, will not be cheap. assum tion, maintaining a full staff in peacetime to ing that we could procure spacecraft and respond to a wartime surge requirement launch vehicles that assure a “good enough to would prove expensive for a responsive space win” level of performance at costs near the concept, regardless of whether it involved goals stated by congress (a large assumption), contractor or military personnel. The need creating an inventory of multiple constella for a small peacetime cadre and the ability to tions of small spacecraft will cost hundreds of surge in time of crisis to perform a responsive millions of dollars. Supplying and maintain reconstitution mission could align well with ing personnel and facilities to support these either Reserve or National Guard missions. systems will add considerably to the cost. Fi Unlike the US ballistic missile force, space re nally, peacetime training and the replacement constitution would not likely find itself re of consumed assets represent additional ex sponding to a “bolt from the blue” attack. Be pense. producing space systems in larger fore developing a staffing plan, we should quantities will significantly reduce the unit further analyze the cost trade-offs of meeting costs of these systems.22 Granted, we can ex different response times. pect some reduction; however, in terms of the providing a reliable reconstitution capability total system level, costs will remain significant. will require recurring, end-to-end demonstra as colonel Tomme and LTc Bob Guerriero tions. These training or exercise launches of note in their articles examining tactical satel responsive spacecraft could coincide with ma lites, the key question is not whether we can jor military exercises. In addition to building build such a system but whether we should.23 up a wartime reserve of hardware, ORS or any We can answer that question only by compar other serious reconstitution effort would need ing the magnitude and likelihood of the threat to provide continuous production of space to the cost and effectiveness of alternative craft and launch vehicles to support training concepts. practitioners of military operations and exercises. We could also utilize these ca analysis are adept at performing aOa. One pabilities to augment the on-orbit inventory central question for any aOa entails the cost- for lesser contingencies. In addition to allow effectiveness of proposed approaches. Be ing the crews and users to train with their cause this type of analysis is a statutory require weapon systems, continuous use and produc ment before initiation of a major defense tion would help keep the inventory up to date. program, it should begin as soon as possible. existing space architecture faces a continu The potential for “paralysis by analysis” exists ing problem with the inability to modernize. but is counterbalanced by the cost of analysis Once launched, spacecraft hardware can sel compared to that of performing on-orbit ex dom be modified.21 Turning over the inven periments to determine what capability is tory of small, responsive spacecraft by consum “good enough to win.” ingthem in training, exercises, and contingency The reliance of US forces on space capa response would enable the incorporation of bilities creates an asymmetry between the new, improved technology into replacement stakes and power calculations of potential ad spacecraft. additionally, ongoing production versary nations that are considering counter- would allow for continued support of the in space operations. an effective reconstitution dustrial base that produces the spacecraft. capability, demonstrated in peacetime, could The viability of long-term reconstitution capa deter adversaries from contemplating such ac bility depends upon maintenance of its under tion. comparing the value and cost of a space

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reconstitution capability should fully reflect ture should follow rapidly. If ORS is the pro the importance of a system capable of deter gram to meet this need, as directed by Dr. Sega, ring this type of attack. We need to weigh this Mr. england, and congress, then we should consideration carefully against the immediate focus ORS developments toward this end and needs of the war fighter. not dilute them through lack of focus. Joint doctrine has included reconstitution Former secretary Rumsfeld used the ex of space forces as a defined mission since ample of the Japanese attack on pearl harbor 2002.24 Yet, despite the chinese test of 2007, to describe a possible future event. The analogy the United States has no more capability to has appropriate features. The United States day than it did in 2002. Inventorying a com has long considered space a sanctuary, invest plete replacement for our on-orbit space ca ing heavily over decades to develop a set of pability is financiallyunrealistic. congress and preeminent capabilities. On 7 December 1941, the president have issued directions to build a it “discovered” not only that battleships were small, responsive, satellite-based reconstitu suddenly vulnerable to air attack but also that tion system. We should immediately perform those ships were no longer a key determinant an analysis to determine the cost-effectiveness of national power. For the United States, the of such a system, the priority of missions, question is not whether future opponents will and the necessary system capabilities. Fund develop counterspace systems but how ready ❑ ing to support the fielding of an inventory it will be to respond. of spacecraft, launch vehicles, and infrastruc- Peterson AFB, Colorado

Notes 1. craig covault, “chinese Test anti-Satellite Weapon,” 8. Dwayne a. Day, “how to Tell Your ORS from a hole Aviation Week, 17 January 2007, http://www.aviationweek in the Ground,” Space Review, 31 December 2007, http:// .com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id= www.thespacereview.com/article/1027/1. See also James news/chI01177.xml. R. Wertz, “It’s Time to Get Our ORS in Gear,” Space Re 2. Jeffrey Kluger, “Was a Satellite Shootdown Neces view, 7 January 2008, http://www.thespacereview.com/ sary?” Time, 20 February 2008, http://www.time.com/ article/1032/1; and Dwayne a. Day “Some ORS for ORS,” time/health/article/0,8599,1714811,00.html; and Greg Space Review, 28 January 2008, http://www.thespace Miller, “Missile’s Bull’s-eye on Satellite echoes Far, ex review.com/article/1048/1. perts Say,” Los Angeles Times, 22 February 2008, http:// 9. See Les Doggrell, “Operationally Responsive Space: www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-satellite a Vision for the Future of Military Space,” Air and Space 22feb22,0,4969568.story. Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 42–49, http:// 3. Jean-Michel Stoullig, “Rumsfeld commission Warns www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/ against ‘Space pearl harbor,’” Space Daily, 11 January 2001, sum06/sum06.pdf. http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html. 10. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 4. “U.S. Space Transportation policy Fact Sheet, 6 Fiscal Year 2007, hR 5122, 109th cong., 2d sess., Title 9, January 2005,” SpaceRef.com, http://www.spaceref.com/ sec. 913, “Operationally Responsive Space,” 273–76, news/viewsr.html?pid=15010. http://www.govtrack.us/data/us/bills.text/109/h/ 5. Ibid. h5122.pdf. 6. house, Department of the Air Force Presentation to the 11. Michael Krepon, “Russia and china propose a House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Repre Treaty Banning Space Weapons, While the pentagon sentatives Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Subject: National plans an aSaT Test,” henry L. Stimson center, 14 Febru Security Space Posture, Statement of Honorable Ronald M. Sega, ary 2008, http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=568. Undersecretary of the Air Force, 110th cong., 1st sess., 23 12. “Mission Need Statement aFSpc [air Force Space March 2007, http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Strat command] 001-01, for Operationally Responsive Space- 032307/Sega_Testimony032307.pdf. lift” (peterson aFB, cO: headquarters aFSpc/DRS, 30 7. Plan for Operationally Responsive Space: A Report to October 2001), http://www.responsivespace.com/ors/ Congressional Defense Committees (Washington, Dc: Depart reference/ORS_MNS_Final.pdf. Gen John p. Jumper ment of Defense, 17 april 2007), 2, http://www.responsive signed the statement on 20 December 2001. The Joint Re space.com/ors/reference/ORS_plan.pdf. quirements Oversight council validated it in april 2002.

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13. Despite completion of the Operationally Respon availability” (presentation at the Fifth Responsive Space sive Spacelift analysis of alternatives in 2005, aFSpc has conference, Los angeles, 23–26 april 2007), http://www not released it. congress’s removal of funding for afford .responsivespace.com/papers/RS5/SeSSION%20 able Responsive Spacelift from the president’s budget for papeRS/SeSSION%202/2004_KaNTSIpeR/2004p.pDF. fiscal year 2007 made the analysis moot. 20. Jeffrey L. Janicik, “Implementing Standard Micro- 14. an alternative concept entails building and launch satellites for Responsive Space” (presentation at the ing additional capacity before it is needed, but the eco aIaa–Los angeles Section / SSTc 2003-0000, First Re nomic and military utility of swarming the enemy with sponsive Space conference, Redondo Beach, ca, 1–3 potential targets in advance of need is highly questionable. april 2003), http://www.responsivespace.com/papers/ 15. John Warner National Defense Authorization Act, 273. RS1/SeSSION4/JaNIcIK/4003p.pdf; and andrew D. 16. Mike hurley et al., “a TacSat Update and the Williams and Scott e. palo, “Issues and Implications of the ORS/JWS [Joint Warfighting Space] Standard Bus” (pre Thermal control Systems on the ‘Six Day Spacecraft’ ” sentation to the american Institute of aeronautics and (presentation at the Fourth Responsive Space conference, astronautics [aIaa] Third Responsive Space conference, Los angeles, 24–27 april 2006), http://www.responsive 26 april 2005), http://www.responsivespace.com/papers/ space.com/papers/RS4/papers/RS4_6001p_Williams.pdf. RS3%5cSeSSION%20papeRS%5cSeSSION%201%5c1 21. Despite demonstrations such as the Defense ad 006-hURLeY%5c1006c.pdf. vanced Research projects agency’s Orbital express and 17. Lt col edward B. Tomme, “The Myth of the Tactical the hubble mission, the practical capability to provide Satellite,” Air and Space Power Journal 20, no. 2 (Summer on-orbit maintenance is not well developed. 2006): 89–100, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 22. See the then-titled Office of Force Transforma airchronicles/apj/apj06/sum06/sum06.pdf. See also ed tion, “Operationally Responsive Space: a New and com ward B. Tomme, “Tactical Satellites: It’s Not ‘can We?’ plementary Business Model” (Washington, Dc: Office of but ‘Should We?’ ” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 the Secretary of Defense, Officeof Force Transformation, (Summer 2007): 30–33, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af Summer 2004), http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/ .mil/airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/sum07.pdf. document_382_J2850-Space%20Response(12).pdf. 18. Quoted in capt catie hague, “Space experts Meet 23. LTc Bob Guerriero, “Tactical Satellites: The Rest to address WarfighterNeeds,” Air Force Link, 4 September of the Story,” Air and Space Power Journal 21, no. 2 (Sum 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?storyID=123066738. mer 2007): 27–29, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ 19. Lt col Scott c. Larrimore, “partially continuous airchronicles/apj/apj07/sum07/sum07.pdf. earth coverage from a Responsive Space constellation” 24. Joint publication (Jp) 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space (presentation at the Fifth Responsive Space conference, Operations, 9 august 2002, IV-10, http://www.dtic.mil/ Los angeles, 23–26 april 2007), http://www.responsive doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf. See also air Force space.com/papers/RS5/SeSSION%20papeRS/SeSSION Doctrine Document 2-2, Space Operations, 27 November %202/2001_LaRRIMORe/2001p.pDF. See also Brian L. 2006, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/ Kantsiper, patrick a. Stadter, and pamela L. Stewart, “ORS afdd2_2.pdf. a draft revision of Jp 3-14 incorporates a heO [high earth Orbit] constellations for continuous brief description of ORS in an appendix.

Our Airmen have maintained constant watch, deployed continuously, engaged America’s adversaries directly, responded to human crises around the world, and provided the Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power to secure our Nation. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

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Col Jim Slife, USAf*

n the last two years, I’ve drafted a their short careers they had written every one dozen performance reports and recom of their own performance reports. mendations for officer promotion. that On another occasion, I asked a group of may seem like a reasonable number that air Force interns—captains identified as near Iought not be too burdensome for one officer the top of their peer group from a wide cross to handle, but I find it quite unsatisfactory. section of the air Force—how often they had Why? Because I haven’t been in a supervisory written their own reports. almost unanimously, role in the last two years. I drafted each of they indicated they had done so every time. these documents at the request of officers whose supervisors were unwilling to prepare the documents and required the officers be The Disconnect in ing rated to put together their own reports Our Core Values and recommendations. self-evaluation (the practice of writing our this anecdotal evidence suggests widespread own—or allowing or directing our subordi behavior that undermines two of our institu nates to write their own—performance re tional core values: “integrity first”and “service ports and promotion recommendations) is before self.” Our Little Blue Book of air Force forbidden. the governing guidance is unam core values tells us that responsibility is a fun biguous: “Do not have the ratee write or draft damental part of integrity: “no person of integ any portion of his or her own performance re rity is irresponsible; a person of true integrity port. . . . [senior raters] will ensure no subor acknowledges his or her duties and acts ac dinate commander/supervisor asks, or allows, cordingly.”2 More recently, air Force Doctrine an officer to draft or prepare his or her own Document (aFDD) 1-1, Leadership and Force PRF [promotion recommendation form]. . . . Development, has defined “responsibility”—a no officerwill be asked to draft or prepare his component of the core value of integrity or her own PRF.”1 nevertheless, this practice first—as follows: “airmen acknowledge their seems to be growing in our air Force. duties and take responsibility for their own For instance, several years ago, I served on successes or failures. a person with integrity a promotion board and took the opportunity accepts the consequences of actions taken, to spend some time with the captains who par never accepting or seeking undue credit for ticipated as “board recorders.” By virtue of the accomplishments of others.”3 asking, ex their presence, they were obviously highly re pecting, or allowing our subordinates to draft garded in their own communities and seemed their own performance reports simply doesn’t bright young officers. When we discussed this square with our institutional concept of integ topic over dinner, all of them told me that in rity because as raters, we are specifically pro

*the author currently serves as director of the emerging Capabilities Division in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense (acquisition, technology, and logistics).

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hibited from doing so and are charged with bility to do the right thing and insist that our the responsibility of ensuring that our subor actions are consistent with our values. We dinates are not put in a position to write their must do this to ensure that the airmen follow own reports. ing us will not have occasion to lose faith in Further, when we ask our subordinates to the system. In the context of performance re write their own reports (or establish a culture porting and promotion recommendations, in which they believe they have to), we under this means we must not ask or allow our subor mine our core value of service before self. the dinates to draft their own documents, and, as Little Blue Book identifies “rule following” as a professional airmen and leaders worth emu critical component of service before self: “to lating, we mustn’t do it ourselves. serve is to do one’s duty, and our duties are most commonly expressed through rules. While it may be the case that professionals are ex All the Usual Reasons pected to exercise judgment in the perfor In addition to the corrosive effect that engag mance of their duties, good professionals un derstand that rules have a reason for being, ing in this practice has on our values, there are and the default position must be to follow powerful, pragmatic arguments against it from those rules unless there is a clear, operational both supervisors’ and subordinates’ perspectives. reason for refusing to do so.”4 additionally, when we—as leaders—write Nobody Cares about Our Careers our own reports, we are telling our subordi As Much As We Do nates that service before self is a great concept although this statement may be true, that for them but that our careers are too valuable doesn’t necessarily mean that we are the ones to risk trying it out on our own reports. this best able to document our performance. left highlights “faith in the system,” another com to our own devices, most of us would write ponent of service before self: “to lose faith in about things that seem most significant to us, the system is to adopt the view that you know which are not, as a general rule, the things better than those above you in the chain of most significant to the usual audience for these command what should or should not be done. documents (some type of central selection In other words, to lose faith in the system is to board). Our supervisors, on the other hand, place self before service. leaders can be very are in a position to communicate the kinds of influentialin this regard: if a leader resists the information a board needs to determine our temptation to doubt ‘the system,’ then subor potential. let them do so. dinates may follow suit.”5 Finally, aFDD 1-1 highlights the concept of duty as another Having Subordinates Draft Their Own Reports component of service before self: “airmen Is Good Writing Practice for Them have a duty to fulfillthe unit’s mission. service before self includes performing to the best of For the reason highlighted above, doing so one’s abilities the assigned responsibilities will actually amount to negative training. When and tasks without worrying how a career will writing about ourselves, many of us focus on be affected. Professionals exercise judgment accomplishments rather than the assessments while performing their duties; they under that boards findmore useful. If we truly desire stand rules exist for good reason. they follow to provide subordinates some practice, we rules unless there is a clear operational or legal should consider allowing them to become su reason to refuse or deviate.”6 pervisors in their own right. In this manner, In short, if our values are to have any last they can gain experience in writing reports, ing significanceto us as an institution, we must and the supervisor can help them learn to demonstrate them in our actions. Leaders— write well without inserting his or her own and I use the term in its broadest possible performance (a matter of some emotional at sense, to include all airmen—have a responsi tachment) into the learning process.

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I Have Too Many Reports to Write mediocre report with no corresponding feed Them All Myself back is an attempt to write one’s own perfor this points to a span-of-control issue, perhaps mance report next time around. supervisors indicating that the organization is not prop must not allow this to develop—no one should erly structured. We often extol “flat”organiza be surprised by his or her performance re tions for their many virtues, but an ample port. honest and direct feedback is critical to body of practical military experience suggests building trust in our system. that one person has difficulty adequately and directly supervising more than three to six im My Boss Is Extremely Busy—I’m Just Helping Out mediate subordinates.7 nevertheless, if a su typically offered in defense of supervisors who pervisor wishes to retain authority for writing are senior officers,this justificationis not com a substantial number of performance reports, pelling because those officers generally have then he or she must also accept the responsi staffs to help them fulfill their duties, includ bilities that accompany that authority—one of ing the documentation of performance. senior which is writing the reports. With an expan officers—despite their pressing schedules— sive span of control, the supervisor generally remain responsible for that task. Whether needs more robust staff support. Part of the they choose to write the reports from scratch staff’s effort—usually the responsibility of execu or ask their staff to gather inputs and prepare tive officers or a director of staff—should fo a first draft for their review is a matter of per cus on drafting performance and promotion sonal preference. documents for the boss. alternatively, subor dinate supervisors in the chain of command may My Boss Is from Another Service and Doesn’t reasonably be asked to draft these documents. Know How to Write an Air Force Report For example, a group or squadron commander might draft a major’s PRF for the wing com every non–air Force organization has a desig mander’s consideration. nated “air Force advisor” to assist non–air Force supervisors in preparing air Force per formance reports and in understanding our My Boss Is a Terrible Writer—A Report 8 by Him Would Ruin My Career performance-reporting system. anyone in doubt about the ratee’s, rater’s, or advisor’s even if this is true, the subordinate should still responsibilities in the joint environment should recognize that one of the responsibilities of seek out the designated air Force advisor and the rater’s rater is to provide a backstop for ask. Members of the other services generally this type of shortfall. We have to trust the sys don’t write their own performance reports and tem—it’s part of service before self. In this often walk away from interactions with the air case, the system is personified in the supervi Force somewhat puzzled by our propensity to sory chain’s leaders; we must trust them to do write our own reports—and to ask our subor their jobs. Furthermore, ratees must under dinates to do the same. stand—and no one likes hearing this—that receiving a performance report they consider less than positive does not necessarily mean Counterpoints to Consider that the rater doesn’t care or lacks the writing Other compelling reasons exist for not en skills to produce a better report. Raters have the institutional responsibility to make the gaging in this unhealthy practice. best look like the best, the worst look like the worst, and everyone else look okay. Doing so Self-Evaluation Often Results in a Lack of Useful Bullets requires moral courage and frank feedback along the way. Failing to do so punishes the When we provide our bosses with a com excellent in order to reward the mediocre. pleted performance report—even under Many times, the natural result of receiving a the fatuous guise of providing “inputs”—we

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generally provide only a completed report Make Expectations Clear in Commanders’ without any further inputs or substantiat Calls or Organizational Meetings ing data. If our supervisors seriously put ef there is no substitute for the involvement of fort into improving the product, they are leadership in solving a problem like self- often left removing “fluff” and finding evaluation. simply expecting people to comply nothing with which to replace it. so they with the necessary instructions is not enough. expand an existing bullet into more fluff, leaders need to make explicit their expecta essentially leaving the quality of the report tions for the organization and provide a cli unchanged. By not providing an extensive mate in which subordinates can voice their menu of accomplishments with detailed re concerns when they see disconnects between sults from which our leaders can choose, espoused values and the ones practiced. we essentially constrain their ability to write the best report possible. Establish Manageable Spans of Control the air Force’s Military Personnel Data sys It Reduces the Supervisor’s tem can provide commanders and supervisors Ownership of the Report with lists of ratees, raters, and report close-out When our supervisors receive a completed dates that they can sort by any of the fields. a report, they tend to believe (1) that it is the quick look at the system’s report, sorted by best set of inputs we can possibly provide rater, will show which ones have excessive spans of control, enabling leaders to adjust (after all, it is our report, right?) and (2) the supervisory chain accordingly. In some that we would be satisfied were the report cases, commanders intentionally establish ex filed substantially as written. this takes a cessive spans of control at their level because tremendous burden—that of ownership— they want their subordinates rated by their off supervisors’ shoulders. We feel this own own commander (e.g., the squadron com ership most acutely when we write about our mander rates 15 officersso that all 15 can have best people because we want to take care of the group commander as their additional rater). them the best way we can. however, know although this may be desirable, the squadron ing they’d be satisfied with the report lifts commander (in this instance) retains the bur the burden, and the final product isn’t as den for ensuring that subordinates are not good as it might have been. asked to draft their own reports.

It Feels Slimy (or Ought to, at Least) Establish Management Systems That Force Feedback and Performance-Report Inputs When we write our own reports, we should throughout the Rating Period wonder what the boss (and “the system”) re One mechanism that has enjoyed some suc ally thinks of us. When something good hap cess involves quarterly goal-setting and feed pens to us, we should wonder if it occurred back sessions during which raters provide because the system worked properly or be structured performance feedback and com cause we short-circuited it in trying to “take pare the subordinate’s performance to the care of ourselves.” as the old saying goes, “there goals agreed upon during the previous quar is no pillow so soft as a clean conscience.” ter. subordinates come to the conversation with proposed goals for the next quarter and Some Practical Advice accomplishments for the previous one (re tained for reporting purposes at the end of Commanders and supervisors can take a the rating period). the army uses an Officer number of practical steps to curtail this un evaluation Report support Form to formalize healthy practice. not only performance expectations and objec

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tives for the rating period, but also perfor the rater must draft his comments—only that mance-report inputs to the rater.9 a similar the ratee may not. however, two circumstances mechanism, either developed by the unit or demand caution. First, before submitting the standardized across the air Force, could be report, subordinates should not edit the peer’s easily implemented. or mentor’s draft, and they should state ex plicitly that they are providing an unaltered draft prepared by someone else. second, they Options for Subordinates should include a separate set of accomplish Regrettably, many supervisors still expect ments to the rater along with the draft, giving their subordinates to write their own reports. him or her additional material with which to In this situation, subordinates can consider work. Regardless of who drafts the report, rat several options. ers at all levels have sole responsibility for the content to which they affix their signatures. Push Back As a Last Resort, Report It Oftentimes, when the boss asks for inputs, we assume that means “on-the-form-with-all-the air Force instructions are clear on the prac flowery-language.” Perhaps just taking the tice of writing one’s own performance report boss literally is the right answer. When asked or promotion recommendation. a supervisor for inputs, we do just that, keeping in mind who insists that we do so (or intimates that the that the ones which quantify results, highlight quality of our report will suffer if we don’t) impact, and provide some context are the most acts illegally, and this constitutes grounds for a valuable. For example, “raised fully-mission valid conversation with the chain of command— capable rates to 82 percent” means nothing our boss’s boss. as a last resort, we can always unless we know that those rates were 52 per file a complaint with the inspector general. cent previously. We all want the best possible Certainly, most of us would prefer to handle report, but the most effective way to influence issues such as this without resorting to a formal the process entails making sure the boss has complaint, but it beats the alternative of com all the data we can possibly provide—it’s hard promising our personal integrity as well as to write a good report with empty inputs. In that of our institutional systems. those cases in which a supervisor asks a subor dinate to “provide a draft,” he or she will often Recommendations back off without any hard feelings when the response is, “Boss, how about I just provide aside from “don’t do it” and “don’t ask sub you detailed inputs? I don’t let the folks work ordinates to do it,” there are several practical ing for me write their own, and I think I’d recommendations to consider. have a hard time explaining why it’s okay for me to do it but not for them.” Characterize the Problem One colonel’s claim that we have an institu Ask Someone Else to Write It tional problem does not necessarily make it so. although many bosses will back off, some Perhaps it would be helpful to include a few won’t. One contemporary of mine made an questions on the next air Force institutional eloquent pitch for why he shouldn’t draft his climate survey to characterize the extent of this own PRF and offered his boss several pages of corrosive practice and the reasons for its perva solid inputs, only to be told, “I said ‘draft your siveness—if it is, in fact, widespread. addition PRF.’ ” In cases like this, subordinates should ally, commanders at every level can add ques not hesitate to ask a trusted peer or mentor to tions about this practice to their unit climate draft a performance report or promotion rec assessments to determine the extent of the ommendation. Our guidance does not say that practice within their own organizations.

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Implement Optional “360-Degree Feedback” port but do write your own award” occur in other places as well. For example, the current Many senior officers and chief master ser airmen Development Plan contains the fol geants have an opportunity to participate in lowing unfortunate admonition to airmen who leadership-development programs at various provide comments to their development team: civilian institutions during which they receive “‘suggested Comments’ for your Rater/Review 360-degree feedback as part of the curricula. ing Official are optional, but highly recom In such systems, members (and, often, their mended.”11 asking our airmen to self-assess supervisors) get an anonymous glimpse into on behalf of their supervisors sends them how peers and subordinates perceive their be mixed messages about what our values look haviors and performance. all airmen deserve like in action. however, we can cite a great these insights in order to improve. although number of success stories in this regard. For implementing 360-degree feedback into the instance, the air Force’s new performance re formal performance-reporting system might port and feedback forms support both our in prove problematic, making it an optional part stitutional values as well as the concepts out of the process would enable supervisors to lined in this article. assessment-based, as well judge the effect of their behaviors. establish as short and to the point, the forms provide ing the information-technology mechanisms for feedback at the end of the rating period to enable such a process, though not trivial, and at midterm. In short, the new processes would be neither difficult nor expensive. In and forms remove several of the former op fact the army has an optional 360-degree portunities for sending mixed messages to our 10 feedback mechanism in place for all soldiers. airmen. We need only implement the pro cesses as designed. Guard against Institutional “Mixed Messages” as leaders, we have an institutional obligation even though a number of sources explicitly to prevent disconnects between our espoused forbid self-evaluation on performance reports values and our values in action, evidenced by and promotion recommendations, no such practices such as allowing, encouraging, or prohibition exists regarding writing oneself a participating in self-evaluation. as an institu nomination for awards or decorations. never tion, we have spoken about what our values theless, leaders have an obligation to ensure are. as always, however, the challenge lies in that our recognition systems do not rely on each one of us getting up every day and con self-identification—not only because such ac scientiously making sure that our own values tions belie the inherent responsibilities of are in consonance with our institutional ones leadership, but also because of the mixed mes and that our own actions support what we say sage it sends when we expect our subordinates we stand for. We are an air Force full of air to self-identify for recognition programs. men who deserve the best leadership our na though not explicitly prohibited, these ex tion can provide. Remaining true to our values pectations serve to undermine our values— establishes the foundation of the leadership that self-identification for awards and decorations we all—from the newest airman to our most lies at odds with the very definitionof “service senior officers—have a right to expect, both ❑ before self.” however, mixed messages such as up and down the chain of command. “don’t write your own officerper formance re Arlington, Virginia

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Notes 1. air Force Instruction (AFI) 36-2406, Officer and En- pany, 1921), 229; see also John S. Brown, “Spans of Con- listed Evaluation Systems, 15 April 2005, 20 (par. 3.2.1.4), trol,” Army 56, no. 8 (August 2006): 78–79. 103 (par. 8.1.4.1.3), 107 (par. 8.2.3.1.2), http://www 8. aFI 36-2406, Officer and Enlisted Evaluation Systems, .e-publishing.af.mil/shared/media/epubs/AFI36-2406.pdf. 40 (par. 3.10), 109 (par. 8.2.8). 2. United States Air Force Core Values: “The Little Blue 9. Department of the Army Form 67-9-1, Officer Book,” 1 January 1997, http://www.usafa.af.mil/core-value/ Evaluation Report Support Form, March 2006. The Army cv-mastr.html. Though dated, this handbook contains valu- performance-feedback form is also instructive. See De- able discussion about the meaning of the core values as partment of the Army Form 67-9-1A, Developmental well as insight into what they meant when first articulated. Support Form, March 2006. Both forms are available at 3. air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1-1, Leader- “Official Department of the Army Forms,” http://www ship and Force Development, 18 February 2006, 5, http:// .army.mil/usapa/eforms/eforms_1.html (accessed 20 www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd1_1.pdf. December 2007). 4. United States Air Force Core Values. 10. see “The Army Benchworks,” https://www.bench 5. Ibid. works.army.mil. 6. aFDD 1-1, Leadership and Force Development, 6. 11. see “Airmen Development Plan (ADP),” http:// 7. see, for example, Gen Sir Ian Hamilton, The Soul ask.afpc.randolph.af.mil/fdtoolkit/default.asp?prods1=1 and Body of an Army (London: Edward Arnold & Com- &prods2=244&prods3=2859.

Air Force Mission Statement

The mission of the United States Air Force is to Fly, Fight, and Win… in Air, Space, and Cyberspace.

10-Merge-Slife.indd 59 10/27/08 9:38:25 AM Control of Theater Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance for the Ground Commander

Maj Steven Maceda, USAF*

read with great interest Lt Col tasking order nor the process for a joint tac- Michael Downs’s article “Rethinking the tical air strike request works fast enough to Combined Force Air Component Com- move ISR assets to cover these operations. mander’s Intelligence, Surveillance, and All full-motion-video assets can be retasked IReconnaissance Approach to Counterinsur- during execution, but Army assets are more gency” (Fall 2008). I agree that the system responsive than the Air Force’s. The current needs reform but disagree with his proposal ISR system has the combined force air compo- to use the close air support request process for nent commander (CFACC) apportioning a intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance certain number of ISR combat air patrols to (ISR). Though faster than the air tasking or- MNF-I. Through Multi-National Corps-Iraq der cycle, the joint tactical air strike request (MNC-I), these patrols are then further allo- process used for close air support still does cated to the various major subordinate com- not allow the flexibility in execution required mands (MSC) for planning purposes. For by the ground commander. Given that the Air instance, my organization can rely on a par- Force has decided to apply theater ISR assets ticular time block on a given Predator com- to tactical priorities, that commander must bat air patrol and schedule the asset to cover have the ability to shift those assets when pri- missions during that time according to our orities change. The combined air operations priorities. MNC-I also controls its own ISR as- center (CAOC) must allow decentralized exe- sets (referred to as echelons above division cution of ISR assets—particularly full-motion- [EAD]), which include manned and un- video platforms—by delegating tactical con- manned platforms, notably Warrior Alpha and trol of platforms apportioned to Multi-National Sky Warrior—Army versions of the Predator. Force-Iraq (MNF-I) during execution. Doing These EAD assets are also allocated to the so would speed the process of dynamic retask- MSCs for planning. ing and shorten the time required to respond Based on the known allocation, my orga- to the ground commander’s shifting priorities nization and the other MSCs attempt to and time-sensitive targets. schedule assets to cover as many preplanned As ISR collection manager, I see firsthand operations as possible. Since some opera- how the ground commander’s operations tions may receive approval only hours (or tempo demands flexibility in ISR procedures. less) before execution, dynamic retasking of In particular, there is an insatiable demand for assets to cover these time-sensitive targets is full-motion-video ISR to provide overwatch for common. Compared to EAD assets, CFACC raids as well as longer-term target-development assets require an extra level of approval be- missions. Many operations are triggered and fore retasking. At best, this is a minor an- approved only hours before execution. Nei- noyance to the ground force; at worst, it can ther the present planning cycle for the air cause an asset to arrive on target after an as-

*The author is an Air Force intelligence officer deployed to Joint Base Balad, Iraq, as a collection manager.

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sault has begun, missing the most critical must sanction the change. This delay wastes portion of the operation. precious time—after all, the asset has already When a time-sensitive target calling for dy- been apportioned to MNF-I and allocated to namic retasking arises, the MSC collection the MSC. If the latter’s priorities change dur- manager receives an ISR request from the tac- ing execution, it should be able to shift the tical unit, weighs the new request against ex- asset to a new mission—of course, keeping isting priorities, and may direct an asset to the MNC-I and the CFACC informed of the move. new mission location. Retasking an EAD asset Certainly, the CAOC needs to know where already allocated to the MSC by MNC-I fol- its assets are flying and, as ColonelD owns says lows a simple procedure: the MSC simultane- in note 27 of his article, must prevent changes ously notifies MNC-I of the impending move from affecting the availability of aircrews or and passes the new target information to the aircraft. Having already apportioned certain ISR mission commander; the asset then moves assets to MNF-I (and from there down to the to the new location. This rapid retasking is MSCs), however, the CAOC is not adequately possible because the MSC collection manager positioned to judge the ground commander’s knows the command’s priorities and can de- priorities. Execution authority (tactical control) termine if the new operation warrants mov- should pass with apportionment to MNF-I during the asset from another mission. ing the scheduled mission time. Extensions Occasionally, MSCs request EAD assets to beyond planned coverage windows (e.g., late cover operations outside their allocated cover- return to base) should remain subject to the age times. In these instances, the requesting CAOC’s approval. Within the apportioned command works through MNC-I to coordinate windows, however, those commanders closest shifting an asset from another MSC. If the latter to the fight should employ the assets. The does not wish to relinquish control of the as- CFACC should remain informed yet stand outset, the MNC-I chief of operations can make a side the normal approval process, intervening decision on relative priority. After MNC-I ap- only by exception. Having already made the proves reallocation, the requesting command decision to apportion full-motion-video com- can direct the asset to the new mission. bat air patrols to MNF-I, the CFACC should Retasking a CFACC combat air patrol to pass tactical control during the scheduled win- accommodate an MSC involves a similar pro- dows as well. Doing so would give the ground cess, but navigation of another level of bu- commander maximum flexibility with the as- reaucracy adds to the time expended. Re- sets the CFACC has already decided to appor- questing assistance from a CFACC asset that tion. Meanwhile, keeping the CFACC informed supports another MSC requires MNC-I’s ap- of movements would enable intervention in proval—a sensible prerequisite because it in- the rare case when an asset is asked to exceed volves weighing priorities between different crew- or aircraft-availability requirements. The units. The CAOC must then approve the half measures currently in place only slow the change as well. Though sometimes done process of shifting assets and delay fulfillment quickly, this process often results in delays of of ground commanders’ ISR requirements. Using joint tactical air strike requests to task 10 minutes or more. Even when an MSC wants ❑ to shift an allocated CFACC asset between ISR will not effectively close this gap. MSC missions, both MNC-I and the CAOC Joint Base Balad, Iraq

11-Merge-Maceda.indd 61 10/27/08 9:38:42 AM Editor’s Note: PIREP is aviation shorthand for pilot report. It’s a means for one pilot to pass on current, potentially useful information to other pilots. In the same fashion, we use this department to let readers know about items of interest.

Developing Airmen for Integration into Air, Space, and Cyberspace The New Aggressors

Col David R. Stilwell, USAF*

evitalization of the aggres- fact, we can blame dependence on technology sor program provides expanded during the Vietnam War for higher-than- training opportunities in the air, expected attrition in the air. Rather, the way the space, and cyber realms. The follow- Air Force employs technology has enabled the Ring discussion details basic principles of the service to stay ahead of its adversaries. Effec- aggressor program, developed over time by tive, realistic training prepares Airmen to use organizations whose express objective has their weapons systems in expected roles and been to expose weaknesses in current systems missions; it also prepares them to deal with and tactics in order to improve them. The ar- the unexpected. Such training teaches them ticle then looks to the future as the aggressor not what to think, but how to think, react, im- program integrates space and cyber capabili- provise, adapt, and overcome. ties into its existing activities involving air and The opposing force (OPFOR or “Red”), air defense. “the stone upon which the Air Force hones its With the current pace of operations, train- combat skills,” constitutes a key component of ing for the full spectrum of conflict has in realistic, meaningful training.1 If the OPFOR large part given way to the need to focus on presents an outdated, unrealistic, or otherwise today’s battle—as it should. High-end training nonrepresentative threat, then Airmen learn opportunities are limited for any number of the wrong lessons or don’t learn at all. Giulio reasons, but at some point in the future, we Douhet’s observation that “victory smiles upon will likely need to employ in major combat op- those who anticipate the changes in the char- erations, bringing to bear technological ad- acter of war, not upon those who wait to adapt vantages the United States has developed and themselves after the changes occur” may be maintained over the years. But the US Air true, but beyond solid preparation, one must Force cannot attribute its success during the also be able to deal with the unexpected.2 A last 61 years only to superior technology; in valid OPFOR assesses the present and looks to

*The author is commander of the 35th Fighter Wing, Misawa Air Base, Japan.

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the future to anticipate and replicate the next greater scrutiny. If a unit performed poorly, its threat, and it does so independently of the leaders feared that the aggressors would keep mainstream or “Blue” forces. In doing so, it track and report their findings up the chain of both prepares Blue for what’s coming next command. But in 1973, the F-4 training unit and develops tactical flexibility as Blue forces, at Homestead AFB, Florida, agreed to host the executing established tactics, techniques, and new 64th Aggressor Squadron’s (AGRS) pilots procedures (TTP), learn to adapt them to the and their T-38s, aircraft that approximated unique problem presented. Foundational tac- MiG-21s in size and maneuverability.6 The first tical training has to develop a baseline from “Aggressor Road Show” sought to present a which we can adapt, improvise, and overcome. realistic replication of MiG capabilities and The reinvigorated Air Force aggressor pro- tactics observed in Vietnam, tailoring it to the gram, dedicated to analyzing and presenting audience and thus enabling student as well as current and emerging adversary systems and instructor F-4 crews at Homestead to learn tactics, offers tactical problems that reinforce from trial and error, minus the threat of real baseline training as well as develop flexibility missiles and bullets. Thirty-five years later, and stimulate thought. fighter wings are eager to have the aggressors The aggressor program has provided com- visit—in some ways, tactical execution becomes bat air forces (CAF) this high-end training for simpler when crews fight dissimilar platforms the last 36 years. The program stood up in (because fighting against similar aircraft com- 1972 during the final phase of the Vietnam plicates the beyond-visual-range and within- War, when the vaunted technological and tac- visual-range identification process).A ggressor tical superiority of American fighters and pi- training also brings with it the element of the lots netted a depressing 2.4:1 kill ratio, de- unknown, which challenges and hones an air- creasing at one point to parity as F-4 Phantoms crew’s adaptability. and F-105 Thuds traded shots with Commu- nist MiG-19 Farmers and MiG-21 Fishbeds.3 Although we now accept the OPFOR as a Valid Training? means of providing positive training, in 1972 the concept of dedicating units exclusively to Eleven years after the Homestead AFB road studying/teaching enemy tactics in jets similar show, Maj Gen Eugene Fischer, commander to MiGs was fraught with risk—at a time when of the Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons risk mitigation was the watchword. To fly dis- Center at Nellis AFB, Nevada, assembled all of similar air combat training was to invite disas- the 64th and 65th AGRS pilots, berating them ter. CAF leadership held that pilots who had for the unprofessional behavior of a number trained exclusively against their own fighter of the flyers.7 The aggressor Class A (loss of types would dangerously mishandle faster or life, loss of aircraft, or damage in excess of $1 more agile adversary aircraft, resulting in loss million) accident rate had skyrocketed in 1984 of control or midair collision—bent metal and to 22.9 events per 100,000 hours of flying; be- dead aircrews.4 Today, the benefits of this sort tween them, the 64th and 65th had crashed of training are a given; dissimilar air combat five F-5 aircraft in a year’s time. Without the training is necessary to prepare aircrews to aggressors, Tactical Air Command’s (TAC) ac- fight the ultimate in dissimilar aircraft: those cident rate was 1.9, roughly the same as today’s.8 of real-world adversaries. The establishment’s worst fears had been real- Initially, aggressors’ offers to travel to a host ized—instead of making the Air Force stron- base to fly and teach elicited a tepid response: ger, the program was actually decreasing the “At the time accident rates in the tactical air service’s capability. Mechanical malfunction forces were high. ‘Wing commanders were accounted for only one of a spate of accidents; scared to have us come.’ ”5 “A bunch of guys the others resulted from pilot error. The ag- [from] Nellis” not only would drive up acci- gressors prided themselves in selecting the dent rates even higher but also would invite best stick-and-rudder pilots available, so the

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accidents weren’t due to a lack of pilot skill. and US Air Forces in Europe (the 26th and Instead, General Fischer focused on the pi- 527th AGRS, respectively) as well as the 65th lots’ motivation, narrowing the problem to at- AGRS at Nellis. The 64th AGRS was drawn titude—the development of an egocentric down to a flight-sized unit with six authorized “win at all costs” approach to the aggressor F-16s and 10 pilots and then subsumed by the mission. Despite existing for the sole purpose 414th Combat Training Squadron (Red Flag).13 of providing high-fidelity training to opera- This professional core unit would train air- tional flying units, the aggressors had devel- crews on temporary assignment to Nellis to oped a reputation as “cowboys” who bent or augment the Red Air presentation during Red broke rules in the name of teaching aircrews Flag exercises and USAF Weapons School sup- by “punishing errors.” On the one hand, their port. Although this arrangement permitted a charter called for presenting an adversary numerically challenging threat picture, the tough enough to challenge the Blue force and part-time aggressors did not have the same improve its tactical skills. However, one could grounding in tactics as did the professionals, always find intelligence to rationalize this N“ ellis so in the end, the value of training decreased. freestyle” approach to adversary support, one In 2003 Gen T. Michael Moseley, vice-chief that contributed to the win-at-all-costs mind- of staff at the time, reinvigorated the aggres- set.9 On the other hand, although the aggressor program at Nellis, renewing the 64th sors presented a challenging threat, it had AGRS and initially expanding it to a primary grown increasingly unrealistic—the desired aircraft authorization (PAA) of 12 F-16s (even- end state had become defeating Blue, not tually increasing to 24 in 2009).14 In 2006 he making Blue better.10 reconstituted the 65th AGRS, this time in F-15C In 1990 the aggressor program found itself Eagles with upgraded radars and avionics. in trouble once again, this time due to shrink- Whereas in the past, the aggressor program ing budgets. During the post–Cold War budget- simulated the threat with older, less-capable prioritization debate, fiscal pressures overcame Air Force fighters to reduce costs, upgraded the value of the program. Because the aggres- F-15s enabled the squadron to accurately rep- sors could not provide adversary support to all licate fourth-generation fighters of the former fighter units at once, wings continued to train Soviet Union. Flying-unit deactivations made internally, using their own aircraft and pilots the F-15s available, and experience gained from to simulate the threat. This practice continues training against the former Soviet Union’s today: tactics manuals give guidance on how modern fighters, flown by countries such as to replicate adversary aircraft, weapons, and Germany, Malaysia, and India, drove home tactics, but operational aircrews who support the reality that we cannot ignore near-peer air Blue training as Red Air do so to the detri- forces—that aggressor replication needs to in- ment of their own Blue skills. Consequently, clude the most dangerous potential oppo- Air Combat Command (the follow-on to TAC) nents. In many ways, the 65th AGRS’s F-15s limits the number of Red Air sorties aircrews are technologically more capable than some can use as credit toward annual training re- operational Eagle squadrons. quirements.11 As Blue equipment and mis- At the same time, the aggressor program sions become increasingly complex, pilots expanded to bring all air and air defense (for find it more difficult to invest the timere- brevity this article refers to both as “air”), quired to learn and properly execute emerg- space, and cyberspace aggressor activities un- ing adversary tactics. However, from a purely der one roof as part of the 57th Adversary Tac- programmatic perspective, it costs less to add tics Group (ATG), which includes the 547th sorties to existing flying-hour programs for Intelligence Squadron, thus continuing the operational units to use as Red Air than to hand-in-glove relationship between aggressors stand up and support dedicated adversary and intelligence. Likewise, every other squad- squadrons.12 With this in mind, the Air Force ron in the ATG includes intelligence personnel closed F-5 aggressor units in PacificA ir Forces who help focus the collection of information

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and conduct research. An important element Win-at-All-Costs Mentality of the aggressor program is the close relation- General Fischer delivered his severe critique ship between operations and intelligence—all of the program in 1984 as a reaction to a cor- aggressor operators are schooled in intelli- rosive win-at-all-costs attitude that eventually gence capabilities and limitations, spending a led to the aggressors’ losing sight of their pri- significant amount of time studying the adver- mary purpose—to serve as a training aid for 15 sary. With continuous exposure to opera- Blue. Having existed for nearly 12 years, the tions, intelligence officers and enlisted mem- program enjoyed the luxury of hand-selecting bers acquire a much better appreciation for highly experienced and capable pilots—an es- the efforts they support than they get else- sential level of expertise. If it seemed difficult where. Since its inception, the aggressor pro- to execute Blue tactics in modern aircraft, it gram has capitalized on integrating otherwise proved doubly so to replicate Red tactics in separate disciplines. significantly less capable T-38s and F-5s. In The ATG continues in this mold today; part hindsight, this combination of substandard of its charter involves integrating all aggressor aircraft, restrictive tactics, and pilots selected activity in the air/space/cyber domains under for their outstanding flying records (individuals one centralized, independent organization in used to winning) led to an egocentric attitude. order to present the most threat-representative Dying for a living goes against everything that adversary possible. Doing so will enable the combat aircrews learn in training—from the ATG to present a coherent, realistic air/space/ very start in defensive basic fighter maneuvers, cyber picture of the adversary. An active, pro- pilots are told to “never give up.” Even the fessional aggressor program allows opera- most mature aggressors still react viscerally tional units to concentrate on honing their when referred to as “dead” in an exercise. tactics without the additional burden of de- Preventing aggressors from slipping back ploying to Nellis to provide adversary support into the win-at-all-costs mentality takes careful to the Weapons School and Red Flag. The selection, strong squadron leadership, and ATG concept enables high-quality, accurate, continual emphasis that “we’re here to train and predictive threat training. It also has the Blue—if Blue wins, we all win.” It also requires potential to pay for itself as it assumes respon- a high level of maturity to find satisfaction in sibility for all adversary support for the Weap- acting as a combat-training aid. Ed Clemons, charter member of the 64th AGRS, put it this ons School, the 422nd Test and Evaluation way: “The best possible feeling for an aggressor Squadron (TES), and Red Flag at Nellis, sav- was to come back from a flight out of breath, ing combat-coded units from having to deploy tired, and sweaty, knowing he used every tac- there to provide such support. tic, employed every advantage he knows, and With noted exceptions, the aggressor pro- still did not come away with a ‘kill.’ ”16 The cur- gram has demonstrated continued improve- rent ATG selection process allows the group’s ment for the last 36 years, expanding from its leadership to handpick the best qualified people small-scale proficiency to today’s ability to from the pool of CAF instructor pilots and ex- challenge more than 80 aircraft in a Red Flag perienced four-ship flight leads during each scenario. Hard lessons, such as those learned assignment phase, in an effort to find pilots in 1984, have become imprinted on the ag- with the right balance of skill and maturity. gressor program and continue to have rele- Based at Nellis AFB, the aggressors are sur- vance in this most recent era of expansion. rounded by Weapons School instructors, weap- The following review of the three most impor- ons upgrade pilots, and operational test pilots tant lessons from the past applies to the air, from the 422nd TES. The pressure to measure space, and cyber domains; keeping them in up is significant—continuously losing training mind will help the program stay on track as it engagements has the potential to leave aggres- continues to grow and adapt. sors looking for opportunities to demonstrate

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their own skills that set them apart from their presented. But this requires a constant mantra peers in the selection process. Left unchecked, of “when Blue wins, we win; when Blue wins, this understandable but unacceptable attitude we win” as the aggressor is “killed” and returns to can lead to unprofessional execution and in- the regeneration airfield to do it all again. By se- creased risk, as occurred in 1984. When ag- lecting skilled, mature pilots; by keeping a close gressors are allowed to feed their egos, bad eye on training-rule infractions; and by con- things happen. Prevention starts with the se- tinually reminding pilots that in this business lection process—stick-and-rudder skills are getting beaten is a good thing, we can assure important, but a mature attitude is mandatory. that aggressors avoid the win-at-all-costs trap. Squadron leadership offers the second anti- This process applies to space and cyber ag- dote to the win-at-all-costs mentality. Supervi- gressors as well. Both domains are still work- sors can identify deviations very early in the ing through the execution of tactics in an un- process of an aggressor’s loss of focus. The key opposed setting; we must closely tie adversary entails actively soliciting feedback from those involvement to distinct objectives associated who use the aggressors as training aids. Viola- with known vulnerabilities. Just as the first ag- tions of training rules should always merit at- gressor road show to Homestead AFB saw Red tention during debriefs. Even if Red flight significantly altering tactical replication to meet members don’t report violations to their super- student training objectives, so must we limit and visors, these events are not quickly forgotten focus aggressor activity in the growing worlds by Blue. AGRS supervisors need to develop and of space and cyber. At best, “win at all costs” in sustain a relationship with their Weapons School, these nascent disciplines will prove counter- 422nd TES, and Red Flag peers to maintain productive; at worst, it could set fledgling ef- awareness of pilot performance and then fol- forts such as network operations back markedly. low up on violations. As the self-professed “keepers of the training rules,” leaders must Ossified/Unrealistic Tactics address any violation. Failure to do so allows squadron members to start down a slippery Even if aggressor squadrons use only the most slide toward unprofessional behavior. qualified pilots with perfect attitudes, ossified, Finally, aggressors need constant reminding rigid Red replication and unrealistic tactics that, regardless of whether they win or lose, can also detract from their ability to prepare they win. If they design and execute realistic Blue for the next battle. By far the most diffi- adversary replication perfectly and if Blue fails cult aspect of the professional adversary mission to manage the problem appropriately, then is keeping up with the development of adver- the aggressor pilots can employ weapons and sary tactics. Whereas enemy systems improve kill Blue assets. The experience will burn the over time, technology is limited by physics and lesson into the Blue pilots’ psyche as they cost; by leveraging intelligence collection and make the long, lonely dead-man’s journey current scientific knowledge, theAT G’s threat- back to Nellis. During debriefing, the threat assessment processes have proven able to ac- expert then has the opportunity to explain curately assess how far a given technology can the origins of the tactic and the weakness it advance in the next five to eight years.17 Armed sought to exploit. Blue pilots win when they with this knowledge, aggressors can modify internalize the painful lesson, and Red forces systems/weapons/airframe employment to enjoy the satisfaction of executing their tactics replicate adversary technology with a high de- properly and winning. gree of fidelity. With higher-echelon support, Happily, this scenario has become increas- the ATG has enjoyed considerable success in ingly rare, yet Red still wins even when Blue acquiring threat-representative equipment. wins. Keeping in mind that the aggressor’s Tactical replication presents a very differ- mission is to make Blue better, Red derives sat- ent problem since the development of tactics isfaction from executing that mission properly is limited only by the imagination. How an ad- and cheering Blue on as it solves the problem versary chooses to employ his technology var-

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ies widely across nations/cultures. Highly hi- and tactics replication. Blue systems vulnera- erarchical cultures typically dictate tactics to bilities identified during test and evaluation aircrews through rigid command and control are remedied before the fielding of radars, architectures. More liberal cultures tend to jammers, and weapons in operational units. delegate tactical decision making to lower levels, The 422nd also requires the most representa- allowing more flexible, responsive execution. tive Red tactics the aggressors can muster as it Tactics have infinite possibilities; that is, even assesses the effectiveness of new Blue systems closely linked allies who operate similar sys- and tactics. tems—referencing the same tactical doctrine— The opposite is true of the Weapons School, develop and execute noticeably different tac- where attaining accurate threat replication is tics.18 One can imagine the difficulty in observing less important than achieving “Desired Learn- and documenting these tactics in insular, ing Objectives,” also the title of a graduate-level closed societies. When charged with “accurate course. In this course, replication require- threat replication,” the aggressors face a di- ments vary as mission complexity grows from lemma: is it possible to know how an adversary one-versus-one aircraft maneuvering to multi- is going to react in combat? And even if they formation package operations. Weapons School do manage to find a source for this data, with instructor pilots frequently request nonrepre- so many potential adversaries, which do they sentative formations/execution, seeking to replicate? Aggressors seek to design tactics test upgrading students’ situational awareness that resemble those observed in real/poten- and comprehension of Blue tactics. tial adversaries, but this is an imperfect sci- On the “replication versus training” spec- ence at best. trum, the Red Flag audience lies somewhere Accurate threat replication therefore re- between the 422nd TES and the Weapons quires constant study and adjustment to pre- School. On the one hand, Red Flag scenarios vent tactics from becoming rigid and dogmatic. demand accurate threat replication to validate It also demands that pilots understand the cul- the execution of large force-employment ture they seek to replicate, an endeavor that packages, but that must be tempered by the has recently received additional emphasis.19 requirement to train not only the air-to-air es- The “Aggressor Threat Replication Guide” de- cort aircraft on the leading edge of the pack- lineates tactics that duplicate observed Soviet age but also the bomb droppers following 30 tactical behavior as well as postulated country- miles behind them. Perfect replication would specific modifications, based on intelligence and result in training for only a few flights in the the impact of improved systems capabilities package, while perfect training would over- (active missiles, improved radars, data links, whelm the mission commander’s plans, result- etc.). The simplicity of the bipolar world allowed ing in mission failure. During Red Flag, adver- the United States to focus on Soviet tactics; to- sary tactics are adjusted to both validate Blue day the problem set has grown significantly. tactical execution and provide training to as Taken to the extreme, this situation argues many participants as possible. for nearly infinite tactical possibilities, de- All this is to say that aggressors walk a fine pending on culture, weapons systems, and sce- line between falling back on known, comfort- nario. For the aggressors, replication means able 1980s Soviet tactics and starting down the little if it does not serve to prepare Blue for a slippery slide of Nellis freestyle, designing tac- wide array of potential combat scenarios; often tics that initially challenge Blue but eventually times, however, completely realistic replica- become unsolvable, hindering valid training. tion takes a backseat to part-task training, Aggressor tactics need to be finite but adapt- which produces yet another variable—Blue able, threat representative but challenging, training objectives. Three units at Nellis AFB and culturally informed. That’s a tall order. By illustrate this well. In order to develop the actively soliciting feedback from Blue, aggres- most effective Air Force systems and tactics, sors can ensure that presentations meet train- the 422nd TES requires pristine threat systems ing and/or replication requirements. Although

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Blue may debate a new tactic’s viability (espe- ATG program has adequate resources and has cially if it works), an ongoing dialogue will provided tangible benefit to operational units. serve to explain the thought process behind September 2007 saw the firstA GRS road shows the tactic and guarantee that threat presenta- in seven years (the 64th AGRS to Eglin AFB, tion meets the training need. The tactic has to Florida, and the 65th AGRS and 507th Air De- be anchored in reality, but it can’t become so fense Aggressor Squadron to Shaw AFB, South rigid as to stifle Blue’s learning. Ideally, ag- Carolina). The 33rd and 20th Fighter Wings gressor tactics will always drive Blue forces to warmly received these units, which provided deal with a slightly different problem, keeping dedicated adversaries and boosted threat them flexible and improving their ability to awareness through detailed academics cover- adapt to new situations. ing current and emerging threats. Having a Because of their constant engagement in unit offer dedicated professional dissimilar real-world operations, the space and cyber adversary support with well-studied tactics and realms are far less susceptible to the problem specialized equipment (i.e., electronic jam- of ossified aggressor tactics. Additionally, ad- mers) takes an enormous burden off opera- versary capabilities and intent in these do- tional squadrons, but the impact is difficult to mains remain largely unknown. No one could quantify in fiscal terms. possibly misinterpret enemy fighters attacking With the potential of overpromising and friendly aircraft and territory, but in the world underdelivering adversary support, the ATG of space operations, blue-on-blue interference must manage expectations. Still in the growth and adversary jamming are often indistin- phase, it will reach full capability in 2011. In guishable. This goes double for network op- the interim, the danger lies in raising expecta- erations; the spectrum of possible adversaries tions without enough people or equipment to ranges from teenage hackers to nation-states, satisfy them. Once the 64th and 65th AGRS each employing different tactics. However, as reach 24 PAAs each and the 18th AGRS at Ei- aggressor programs for space and information elson AFB, Alaska, completes its conversion to mature, they too will develop workable tactics 18 PAAs (Block 30 F-16s), sufficient capability and must stay mindful of the need to continu- will exist to cover all adversary requirements ally challenge Blue’s flexibility. at Nellis, as well as to visit every fighter unit in the continental United States, PacificA ir Forces, Failure to Show Value and US Air Forces in Europe once a year for An environment characterized by shrinking two weeks (including formal training units at resources threatens any activity that appears Tyndall AFB, Florida, and Luke AFB, Arizona).21 to be underperforming, whether it’s a new sys- Additionally, the 527th and 26th Space Aggres- tem or an established organization. Under- sor Squadrons will be able to support satellite performance comes in many forms, some per- communications (SATCOM) jamming for Air ceived, some real, but when the time comes to Force Space Command’s operational, test, and prioritize a program during resource alloca- training requirements, as well as make training tion, both hard facts and perceptions about it available in jamming the global positioning are weighed against those of other programs. system (GPS) to flying and other units, mostly A line is drawn, and those activities that don’t during Flag exercises. They will also provide make the cut don’t get fully resourced. Be- support during road shows. Finally, the 57th cause aggressor contributions are difficult to and 177th Information Aggressor Squadrons quantify (about the only hard fact available is will offer training in network attack and de- travel costs saved by no longer having to defense to Air Force Cyber Command network ploy units to Nellis to support Weapons School, operators, with the potential to continue the test, and Red Flag adversary support—about current effort to educate individual users $7 million in 2007), the aggressor program through focused network-vulnerability road stays at risk.20 Currently a high priority, the shows at the base level.

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The aggressor program will soon claim an cades of flying-aggressor experience. This has operational wing’s complement of combat- proven a sound approach during the stand-up capable aircraft, an air defense aggressor squad- period, but as these disciplines mature, it be- ron, two squadrons of space aggressors (with comes increasingly clear that each will develop GPS and SATCOM jammers), and two infor- its own unique attributes. Despite their differ- mation aggressor squadrons—quite a bill to pay ences, the ATG charter calls for presenting for specialized training. Because it is a new ini- the “complete enemy target set” in various tiative, the ATG enjoys the benefit of the doubt stages of integration. Depending on the sce- during the stand-up phase. Over time, should nario, air/space/cyber will sometimes act in- it fail to continuously demonstrate value for dependently, sometimes in unison, leveraging the investment, the group could again face each other’s strengths to compound the prob- the same programmatic axe it did in 1990. lem for Blue. For example, in a recent exercise, Blue forces compromised key position and timing information on air packages through Looking Ahead: Integration and sloppy operations-security procedures. The info Operational-Level Support aggressors secured the sensitive data (the objective is to make US and coalition forces Because the Air Force moved all air/space/ stronger, not more vulnerable) and then passed cyber training under the ATG program, the it to the air and air defense aggressors, who benefits of flying-aggressor lessons over the decimated the lead fighters in the package. It years have been actively integrated into the ac- remains to be seen to what degree real and tivities of space and cyber aggressor squad- potential adversaries are developing the ability rons. Interestingly, the 1970s-style “safety first” to integrate effects, but the ATG’s mission in- training mentality that made the first aggres- volves anticipating changes in the character of sor road show so unpalatable to TAC units is war—integration of air/space/cyber effects is apparent in space training today. Mistakes coming in some form. made during past training events received A noteworthy feature of the ATG—its inte- high-level scrutiny—the fixes have had the ef- gration of air, space, and cyber disciplines at fect of making realistic training too hard to the squadron level—enables it to innovate and do. This situation resembles the one that ex- experiment without excessive coordination. isted as the Air Force (and Navy) conducted Because of the organization’s relatively small operations in Vietnam. That is, the services size (500 people), each discipline can learn considered dissimilar training too dangerous extensively about the others. Air and air de- to practice in peacetime; the impact on war- fense aggressors coordinate their tactics with time performance is a matter of record. The the space aggressors’ GPS jamming and, in the aggressor experience highlights the need for process, learn about other space endeavors; more frequent and realistic live training, not meanwhile, space aggressors gain valuable ex- less. Unfortunate mistakes occurred early in posure to air operations, broadening them for the flying-aggressor program (resulting in the follow-on assignments in their field.A lthough “Cancer of TAC” speech of 1984, previously air, space, and cyber professionals tend to be mentioned), but the overall effect over time stovepiped in the broader context of the Air has been to reduce accidents and improve ca- Force and Department of Defense, the small pability. Space aggressors have steadily advo- size of the ATG encourages ongoing interac- cated the delegation of SATCOM jamming tion at this level. Lessons from this interaction authority down to levels low enough to allow have yielded positive learning well beyond timely, effective training. The more that units Nellis’s gates.22 Additionally, even though air practice their expected wartime missions, the and space work independently and jointly in lower the probability of errors. their fairly narrow aggressor realms, informa- The fledgling aggressor effort for space tion operations appear to hold the key to all and cyber has patterned itself after three de- integration efforts in the age of information-

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enabled warfare. Information aggressors have it might be possible to use the ATG’s combined interacted with everyone in the group, mak- knowledge of adversary capabilities and inten- ing believers of them all. Once the ATG’s indi- tions to effectively train operational-level organi- vidual air/space/cyber operators become fully zations such as air operations centers and air aware of the capabilities of the other domains, support operations centers, this would cross into the results will be impressive. the realm of “red teaming”—clearly not in the Before becoming an aggressor, one must ATG charter.23 However, the ATG could coordi- obtain an “instructor pilot” level of expertise nate with organizations that already do red in a particular realm. Although aggressors teaming (e.g., the Air Force Research Labora- spend most of their time studying, teaching, tory and the Agency for Defense Analysis) to and replicating adversary systems and tactics, make training at the operational level of war they also rely heavily on their Blue experience as realistic and meaningful as possible. to know which adversary capabilities will provide the most realistic training. This depth of experience is shared across domains in courses Conclusion such as Aggressor 101 (Introduction to Adver- Today’s expanding Air Force aggressor pro- sary Tactics—a broad look at the entire ag- gram is built on 36 years of valuable, some- gressor program, taught at Nellis and required of all ATG members) and follow-on training, times painful, experience that will advise the such as AGRS 202, 303, and so forth. Squad- development of integrated air, space, and cy- ron commanders should be able to give each ber training. Not every lesson from the past other’s mission briefs, an effort to keep ag- will apply to space and cyber aggressors, but gressor leaders mindful of their role in pre- hard-learned, universal aggressor “laws” do senting the greater enemy target set. exist. Allowing aggressors to slip into a win-at- Although the ATG effort will be self-limiting all-costs mentality, failing to keep up with rein order to replicate observed and realistic cent developments and settling into comfort- near-term adversary capabilities, growing inte- able but ossified tactics, or forgetting the gration will certainly produce lessons that can wider Air Force / joint audience and thereby accrue to broader cross-domain efforts in the failing to show value would quickly undermine Air Force. Again, ATG members’ firsthand ex- the program. Current ATG TTPs include a perience operating in the air, space, and cyber multitude of other lessons: pitfalls such as tak- domains will enable them to better under- ing on an assessment role (one of the factors stand how these can combine to challenge that made the first aggressor road show unde- Blue with likely future scenarios in various ex- sirable), attempting to teach Blue forces their ercise and experimentation venues (Virtual own tactics, or developing exceedingly diffi- Flag, for instance). Just as importantly, the ex- cult tactics that replicate a threat which doesn’t perience will also inevitably reveal strengths exist.24 These apply not only to the flying pro- and weaknesses associated with increasing in- gram but also to all aggressor domains. Yet, tegration. The ATG will capture and transmit the space and cyber aggressors will develop these lessons through mechanisms such as tac- their own domain-unique lessons that they tics conferences and USAF Warfare Center will need to incorporate into their own TTPs publications for greater Air Force use outside and then share with the other domains to en- the ATG. sure that integration doesn’t create problems. Beyond the integration of tactical-level effects The primary ATG focus in this regard en- exists the possibility of moving this training to tails maintaining a spirit of continuing evolu- the operational level. Aggressor squadrons spe- tion, driven by ever-increasing knowledge of cialize in creating tactical effects that have al- the adversary’s technology and tactics. Closely ready seen use in operational-level exercises linked to Air Force and national intelligence such as Virtual Flag to provide realistic and at activities, members of the ATG take pride in times unexpected adversary scenarios. Although their ability to “know, teach, and replicate”

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the adversary as one of only a few Air Force In the end, the aggressors aren’t Red but a organizations specializing in breaking down deep shade of Blue, gearing all their effort to- barriers between operations and intelligence. ward training Blue forces and making them This culture of continuous revalidation (the better. Growing dependence on a shrinking “know” of “know, teach, replicate”) makes the CAF fleet as well as the metamorphosis of space program well suited to taking the next step in and cyber from supporting to supported com- high-fidelity training—integrating, expand- bat roles means that full-spectrum, integrated ing, and increasingly overlapping air, space, aggressor training will become increasingly im- and cyber capabilities. Whether aggressors portant as time goes on. “Enemy air-to-air suc- provide a two-ship formation of Red Air for cesses during the Vietnam conflict led to the supporting upgrade training at Shaw AFB or establishment of the firstA ggressors in 1972. It combine air, space, and cyber effects to train a should not take another . . . Project RED widely dispersed Virtual Flag audience, the fo- BARON type-report, generated from US com- cus remains on valid, realistic training to pre- bat losses, to serve as the catalyst for Aggressor pare the Air Force for future warfare. training advocacy in other domains.”25 ❑

Notes 1. Brig Gen Steve Hoog to the author, note, 25 Janu- 9. “Nellis freestyle” refers to using one’s knowledge of ary 2008. Blue forces’ capabilities and limitations to defeat them. 2. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, trans. Dino Although replicating an adversary’s potential technology Ferrari (1942; new imprint, Washington, DC: Office ofA ir is a finite problem, replicating his tactics is a limitless Force History, 1983), 30. challenge. An undisciplined AGRS program can claim 3. Dr. Richard P. Hallion, “A Troubling Past: Air Force that any tactic is valid (observed or postulated to be em- Fighter Acquisition since 1945,” Airpower Journal 4, no. 4 ployed by known adversaries), but truly valid tactical rep- (Winter 1990): 4, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/ lication depends on the strength of the group’s leader- airchronicles/apj/apj90/win90/1win90.htm; see also Maj ship and the proper attitude of its pilots. Michael P. Donovan, “Full Circle? The Transformation of 10. to be completely fair, transition from the F-4 to Dedicated Adversary Air Training in the USAF” (thesis, the revolutionary F-15 contributed to this apparent de- School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell AFB, AL, parture from pure replication. Whereas unsophisticated 1998), 10. F-5s could challenge F-4 crews with Soviet tactics, the vastly 4. Gen Bruce K. Holloway, “Air Superiority in Tactical improved F-15 radar and fire-control systems made what Air Warfare,” Air University Review 19, no. 3 (March–April were once challenging threat presentations easily solvable. 1968): 8–9, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/air The aggressors felt the need to challenge the incredibly chronicles/aureview/1968/mar-apr/holloway.html. Tac- capable F-15s with tactical problems to match. In some tical training in the 1960s focused on Cold War nuclear cases, this led to pilots flying theirF -5s beyond the jets’ and employment; air superiority training took a backseat to the pilots’ capabilities, resulting in accidents. This situa- flawless execution of the nuclear war plan. Furthermore, tion bears watching today as the F-22 comes online and as Holloway says, this reluctance to train against realistic the aggressors seek to challenge this highly effective plat- adversaries “was partly a reflection of concern for flying form in order to prepare Raptor units for future combat. safety” (9). This “safety first” theme came up repeatedly 11. this guidance is spelled out in Headquarters ACC/ during interviews with pilots of that era. A3’s annual Ready Aircrew Program Tasking Message. 5. Reina Pennington, “Grounded: The Aggressor 12. after the AGRS drawdown, a former aggressor Squadrons,” Air and Space, March 1994, 28. said, “One way the Air Force is compensating for closing 6. Ibid. down the Aggressor squadrons is by having operational 7. Maj Gen Eugene Fischer, “The Cancer of TAC” wings train against each other” (Pennington, “Grounded,” (speech, Nellis AFB, NV, 7 September 1984, transcript of 36). Although training was less expensive, quality suffered an audio recording). as Blue units reluctantly assumed Red roles on a one-for- 8. for comparison, the CAF’s 2007 Class A rate was one basis. Donovan notes that “even when engaged in 2.69, and 2006’s was 1.74 (as was 2005’s). “Flight Safety [dissimilar air combat training] with non-dedicated ad- Statistics,” http://afsafety.af.mil/stats/07fltstats.txt. For versaries . . . practicing US versus US tactics leaves a dan- Air Force–wide rates, see “USAF Flight Mishap History, gerous gap in threat knowledge, and may prove to be CY47–FY06,” http://afsafety.af.mil/sef/stats/USAF%20 negative training in the end” (“Full Circle?” 25). Flight%20Mishap%20History.pdf. 13. Pennington, “Grounded,” 35.

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14. “ATG Enabling Concept” (Washington, DC: and then the Weapons School, and then test. In 2007 the Headquarters US Air Force, 2004). 64th and 65th AGRS supported all Red Flag adversary re- 15. Boots Boothby, original commander of the 64th quirements and roughly 30 percent of Weapons School AGRS, “remembers telling the commander of Tactical Air requirements. Command that there was ‘a huge wall between operations 21. With 48 PAAs at Nellis, the ATG will be able to fly and intelligence. And the reason it’s there is because no approximately 9,400 sorties per year. The Weapons School fighter pilot was ever going to admit there was something requires 5,300 sorties, whereas Red Flag needs 1,140 (12 he doesn’t know’ ” (Pennington, “Grounded,” 30). One sorties per vulnerability period), 1,440 for 12 road shows, cannot overstate the synergies that come from teaching and 400 to support operational test and evaluation, total- flyers about intelligence (and vice versa). ing roughly 8,000. Sortie requirements for Eielson AFB 16. Quoted in Pennington, “Grounded,” 32. remain to be determined. 17. the Emerging Threat Tactics Team (ET3) process 22. the ET3 process demonstrates the utility of hav- has proven very useful in proactive threat assessment. By ing small numbers of select representatives from each bringing intelligence professionals, operators, engineers, domain assemble to assess an emerging capability. Al- scientists, and think-tank researchers together, the ET3 has though the end product is not fully vetted, it is timely. been able to assess observed adversary activity and then ET3 reports have had remarkable impact on Air Force postulate where this technology might lead in five to eight training in a very short period of time. This same “think years. By looking forward, the ET3 enables the acquisition tank” approach to ATG integration will provide lessons and test communities to better prepare for the future. that will support Blue integration. 18. for example, a Dutch exchange officer at Shaw 23. a red team is “an organizational element com- AFB, SC, approached air combat maneuvers and air com- prised of trained and educated members that provide an bat tactics differently than his American hosts. During air independent capability to fully explore alternatives in combat maneuvers, USAF pilots considered the aircraft plans and operations in the context of the operational that merged with the adversary to be the “engaged” fighter. environment and from the perspective of adversaries and The nonengaged fighter’s job is to shoot missiles at the others.” Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- lone adversary but stay out of the fight in order to prevent tionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 (as midair collision between Blue fighters. Interestingly, the amended through 30 May 2008), 460, http://www.dtic Dutch approach was to identify the nonmerged Blue .mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. fighter as engaged—the jet that merged with Red was to 24. Assessment: There have been attempts in the past fight to stay alive while forcing the adversary to maneuver to have the aggressors support operational readiness in- away from the engaged fighter, creating sufficient range spections as adversary air. Although this sounds like a per- to allow a quick kill. This puts the nonengaged fighter at fect fit on the surface, it is important for the ATG to stay a disadvantage since she or he is not allowed to fight in out of the assessment role. If units are concerned that the most tactically efficient way. Instead, the nonengaged fighter trusts that the engaged pilot will quickly kill the their performance in Red Flags / road shows will go on a adversary. These differences are attributable to variations scorecard and be sent up the chain of command, they in cultures and experiences; Dutch tactics were as effec- won’t focus on learning. Instead they’ll stack the deck tive as US tactics, yet they developed in a different culture with their best to make sure they pass the test. Teaching with a different mind-set. If NATO allies execute differ- Tactics: Because members of the initial aggressor cadre ently, one can imagine the innumerable variations among were hand selected for their superior tactical skill, they potential adversaries from non-European cultures. were encouraged to teach basic fighter maneuvers and air 19. after returning from an exercise with another combat tactics to the units they visited. Today, the pro- country, one aggressor pilot made the very astute observa- gram still gets the most qualified operators, but because tion that cultural/societal attitudes in this country would they focus exclusively on the threat, their familiarity with call for executing defensive counterair tactics very differ- Blue tactics falls away quickly. Blue knowledge forms the ently than the USAF’s practice. In the American construct, basis for their understanding of the adversary; maintain- the closer the threat to the point defended (home base, ing independence from Blue demands that they present major city), the higher the acceptable risk level, to the the most relevant adversary tactics and let Blue figure out point that a pilot will engage at a disadvantage, risking how to deal with them. Presenting a Threat That Doesn’t Exist: being shot down. The value of the defended target is At first blush, many adversaries appear to be much more greater than that of the pilot or the aircraft. Because they capable than they really are. In their desire to prepare for occupied a relatively high place in the social strata, host- the worst case and to challenge Blue to be better, aggres- nation pilots were more apt to continue to retreat until they sors have sometimes found intel that supports difficult, if established a tactical advantage, even if it meant putting the not unsolvable, tactical presentations. It takes a good deal defended object at risk. The pilot and aircraft were consid- of judgment to know when scenarios/tactics are nonrep- ered more valuable than the defended people/places. resentative. 20. air Combat Command/A3J, telephone conversa- 25. lt Col Paul Huffman, “Aggressor Transformation: tion with the author, September 2006. According to the Beyond the Flightline” (thesis, Air War College, Maxwell Weapons School commandant, the budget for traveling AFB, AL, 2007), 38, https://research.au.af.mil/papers/ adversary support was $14 million in fiscal year 2007.AT G ay2007/awc/Huffman.pdf. Project Red Baron analyzed priorities for supporting Nellis training are Red Flag first, the reasons for the Air Force’s air-to-air losses in Vietnam.

1-PIREP-Stilwell.indd 72 10/27/08 9:39:12 AM Journals for Space Professionals So Much to Read, So Little Time

Lt Col David C. Arnold, USAF, PhD*

pace was the final frontier—later, specific mission areas in space operations. the ultimate high ground. Today we High Frontier always features a senior-leader squeeze space in between air and cyber perspective and often one from industry lead space in the Air Force’s responsibility— ers as well as war fighters other than Airmen. Sa fact certainly reflected inAir and Space Power The journal considers the joint view impor Journal. But two other journals provide space tant because it seeks to reach space profes professionals with current and historical per sionals in the military—both Airmen and war spectives solely on that middle domain with riors from sister services. Most issues also out becoming overly technical or focusing on include book reviews intended to spark com the engineering or science of spaceflight. So, mentary and foster intellectual discussions. although it is always difficult to find time to Advised by some of the leading intellectuals in read many of the recommended books on the space business, High Frontier offers readers professional reading lists devoted to space, a a free subscription to its electronic version. 50- or 60-page journal is an easy read on a long Making its appearance in 1992, the quar temporary-duty flight. terly journal Quest: The History of Spaceflight First published in 2004, High Frontier, a quarterly publication from Headquarters Air is packed with articles written by professional Force Space Command, was really the brain and amateur historians alongside interviews with key figures and visionaries.E ach 64-page is child of former Space Command leader Gen sue is enhanced with photos and charts that will Lance W. Lord. Acting on a mandate from the entice the most casual reader. Rumsfeld Space Commission, the command inaugurated a development program for space Quest is [the only peer-reviewed journal devoted professionals that, among other things, has exclusively to space history and] the only publi begun a certification plan for space profes cation solely dedicated to the history of space sionals working in the space operations, missile flight. It exists to capture stories related to the people, projects, and programs that have been operations, and acquisition fields. However, part of the last fifty years of . . . civil, military, the “journal is designed to generate intellectual commercial, and international space activities.2 debate through thought provoking articles and essays on the strategic, operational and Every issue includes an oral-history interview, tactical aspects of space and missile power in often taken from the National Aeronautics the twenty-first century.”1 Themes have run and Space Administration’s (NASA) archives from “Space and the Joint Fight” to “Space- of conversations with former astronauts and Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing” engineers, and other interviews with key fig to the future of the intercontinental ballistic ures from the military or commercial sides of missile and strategic deterrence. Topics dis space. One issue featured an oral history cussed have included development of space with the first director of the weather satellite professionals, the total force and space, and program as well as an article on the program’s

*The author, deputy commander of Thule Air Base, Greenland, volunteers as editor of Quest and has contributed to High Frontier. He is the author of Spying from Space: Constructing America’s Satellite Command and Control Systems (Texas A&M University Press, 2005).

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development inside the National Reconnais pher (First Man: The Life of Neil A. Armstrong sance Office.3 Recently, Quest has offered [Simon & Schuster, 2005]), contributed a piece themed issues as well, such as the one com on Armstrong’s role in the Challenger accident- memorating the 50th anniversary of the investigation board, a piece that Hansen had launch of Sputnik. That issue’s feature article, removed from the biography. Each issue of by Roger D. Launius, former chief of the fers several book reviews and lists of recent NASA history office and dean of space histori publications on space history. Although a not- ans, received accolades from the Society for for-profit publication, Quest does charge $30 History in the Federal Government for its look per year for a subscription. at the way historians have interpreted the im pact of Sputnik on American society. The So, while space professionals can continue Sputnik issue also included a look by well- to develop by reading Air and Space Power known Soviet space-history expert Asif Siddiqi Journal, it certainly doesn’t hurt to branch out from the Soviet side of the launch. Another a bit and explore some other perspectives recent article showed all of the different de from time to time. High Frontier and Quest: The sign options for the Dyna-Soar X-20 program. History of Spaceflight are two good options for James R. Hansen, Neil Armstrong’s biogra doing so. ❑

Notes 1. Gen Lance W. Lord, “Welcome to High Frontier!” 3. See David C. Arnold, “An Interview with Thomas High Frontier 1, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 3, http://www.afspc Haig,” and Cargill Hall, “A History of the Military Polar .af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-070622-055.pdf. Orbiting Meteorological Satellite Program,” Quest: The 2. “About Quest,” http://www.spacebusiness.com/quest History of Spaceflight 9, no. 2 (December 2001): 53–61. (accessed 19 May 2008).

We imperil our security, our people, and our way of life if we fail to maintain and sharpen America’s edge—the Air Force–provided Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power advantages which underwrite the defense and sovereignty of our Nation. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

2-PIREP-Arnold.indd 74 10/27/08 9:39:30 AM Defense of US Space Assets A Legal Perspective

Capt Adam E. Frey, USAF

Editorial Abstract: A recent antisatellite test by China—which that country can legitimately claim is legal, according to international treaty—highlights the danger posed to spaceborne US assets. To determine the most appropriate US response, the author delves into a legal assessment, using both United Nations treaty stipula- tions and principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, to choose the better of two future courses of action. In deciding between weaponizing space or reducing vulnerability, he concludes that the US should select the latter.

he U.S. is more dependent on space than any other nation. Yet the threat to the U.S. and its allies in and from space does not command the atten- Ttion it merits.”1 This was the conclusion of a space commission headed by former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, warning of a possible “space Pearl Harbor” incident that could exploit the vulnerabilities of US space assets. Gen Lance Lord, former commander of Air Force Space Command, similarly warned that a loss of space assets “not only cripples our land, air and sea forces but . . . would have catastrophic consequences to our entire economy.”2 For example, the accidental loss of a single satellite in 1998 disrupted pag- ers, television, and radio broadcasts world-

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wide.3 It takes little imagination to consider 3, states must conduct their space activities “in the resulting chaos if multiple satellites were the interest of maintaining international destroyed simultaneously. peace and security.” Article 4 prohibits plac- The possibility of a space Pearl Harbor is very ing “nuclear weapons or any other kinds of real. On 11 January 2007, exactly six years af- weapons of mass destruction” into orbit or ter the Rumsfeld report, the People’s Republic permanently affixing them to a celestial body. of China steered a missile into one of its own Furthermore, the moon and other celestial aging weather satellites, bringing this hypo- bodies may be used only for “peaceful pur- thetical danger one step closer to reality.4 poses”; they cannot be equipped with military China’s test reignited the debate over bases or be used for weapons testing. How- whether and how the United States should ever, celestial bodies may be used for “scien- prepare for space warfare. Because of its heavy tific research” or “peaceful exploration.”7 commercial and military dependence on sat- There are two noteworthy points here. ellite technology, America has good reason to First, the treaty explicitly places the “peaceful take notice of this test. The Air Force, one of purposes” restriction only on the moon and the largest contributors to satellite operations, other bodies. As written, Article 4 suggests that has a particular interest in learning how China states may engage in nonpeaceful activity in accomplished this feat and, more importantly, outer space as long as it does not occur on a how the United States can defend its satellites celestial body. Indeed, this is how the United 8 from similar attacks. States officially interprets this article. How- When developing satellite-defense strate- ever, as a matter of policy, the United States con- 9 gies, one must consider a particularly impor- ducts its space activities for peaceful purposes. tant factor—the law. This article examines Second, the phrase “peaceful purposes” is how relevant treaties and legal principles af- problematic since it is undefined. Some argue fect space warfare. First, it outlines the perti- that the “peaceful purposes” clause applies by extension to outer space, meaning that any nent international space law, focusing on both 10 United Nations (UN) treaties and conventions military use of space violates the treaty. How- and the principles of the Law of Armed Con- ever, the clause is generally interpreted to mean that states cannot use outer space for full-scale flict (LOAC), and then analyzes the legality of 11 China’s test under these bodies of law. Finally, warfare, particularly nuclear war. Military it discusses the options available to the United use of space in support of operations—such as States, explaining why the best legal and prac- communications, intelligence gathering, and precision targeting—is commonly considered tical choice is to design better satellites and peaceful if it does not violate other interna- limit the extension of warfare into outer space. tional law.12 In other words, space operations are peaceful, provided they are not “aggressive.”13 Overview of Space Law Space may still be used as a medium of warfare: the treaty does not prohibit antisatellite Any legal analysis of space activities must (ASAT) weapons or even nuclear weapons begin with the UN’s Outer Space Treaty of 1967, that merely transit space.14 Other weapons which establishes the basic legal principles may be deployed in space so long as they are and prohibitions relevant to space.5 Its first neither nuclear weapons nor weapons of mass two articles set the framework by declaring destruction.15 Furthermore, self-defensive acts that nations have “freedom of scientific inves- in space are also permissible, provided they tigation in outer space” and that space and do not violate other treaty restrictions.16 celestial objects (such as the moon) cannot be The Outer Space Treaty also provides the owned.6 The broad concept is that all nations appropriate response if one state interferes will share space. with another’s space activities. Articles 6 and 7 Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty significantly hold states liable for damage caused by their restrict military activity in space. Under Article space activities and launches, whether such ac-

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tivity is conducted “by governmental agencies Although it clarifies some of the Outer or by non-governmental entities” within the Space Treaty’s ambiguity, the convention still state.17 Article 9 requires states to avoid the faces criticism. First, its definition of an “ob- “harmful contamination” of outer space and ject” as including “component parts” does not celestial bodies. If a state believes that its ac- specify whether this includes debris, so a tivities could cause such harm, it must under- launching state might not be liable for debris- take “appropriate international consultations” based damage.25 Second, although the con- before proceeding. Conversely, if a state be- vention imposes a “fault” standard for dam- lieves it could be harmed by another’s actions, ages, it does not define how much care should it “may request consultation concerning the be exercised during a launch.26 In other words, activity or experiment.”18 Article 10 further if two space objects collide, one state could ar- allows states to request observation of each gue that it took all reasonable precautions other’s launches, and Article 12 requires any while the injured state could argue that it did space facilities and equipment to be open for not. Third, fault may be difficult to prove since observation.19 However, the treaty provides no specific pieces of debris can be difficult to right of appeal if two states cannot resolve identify and track, and the cause of a collision 27 these issues themselves. can prove equally elusive. One scholar notes These sections of the treaty suffer criticism that the mere fact of a collision does not auto- matically put the state that created the debris for shortcomings such as vague terms and lack 28 of enforcement mechanisms.20 However, the at fault. Finally, there is no established system for processing claims or for interpret- UN’s Liability Convention addresses some of 29 these problems by expanding when, how, and ing or enforcing the convention’s terms. The convention’s litigation mechanisms to what extent a nation is held accountable when have never been used, so their effectiveness its space activities injure another’s interests.21 remains unknown.30 The convention’s first article provides that A final body of law for consideration— states can be held liable for loss of life, per- LOAC—governs how nations may wage war. sonal injury, or property damage caused by LOAC sets limits on conflict-related issues, their space operations. It also reinforces the including when and to what degree force may Outer Space Treaty’s provision that a state is be used; targeting; and treatment of non- liable for damage caused by nongovernmental combatants, civilians, and prisoners of war. entities launching under state license. It fur- Although several LOAC principles are inap- ther provides that a state is liable for damage plicable to satellites, others, such as targeting caused not only by an object but also by an principles, are very relevant to their wartime 22 object’s “component parts.” However, Article application. 3 qualifies the liability by noting that the The first principle to consider, “military ne- launching state is liable only if those control- cessity,” provides that a person or object 23 ling the launch are at “fault.” should not be targeted unless doing so gives The remainder of the convention presents an attacker some real advantage.31 The United procedures for an aggrieved state to make a States formally acknowledged this principle claim for damage. Articles 9 through 15 pro- when it signed the 1907 Hague Convention, vide that claims must be presented within one which prohibits any action “to destroy or seize year through “diplomatic channels” or, if un- the enemy’s property, unless such destruction available, through the UN secretary-general. or seizure be imperatively demanded by the If the states cannot settle matters, they may necessities of war.”32 The Nuremberg trials fur- create a commission, with each state provid- ther explained that “destruction as an end in ing a representative and a mutually appointed itself is a violation of international law. There chairman. Damages are determined under must be some reasonable connection between international law, with the goal of restoring the destruction of property and the overcom- the state to its preinjury condition.24 ing of the enemy forces.”33

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A second relevant LOAC principle, propor- shielded satellites over a wide range.42 Space tionality, holds that an attacker must balance mines or other “proximity weapons” could ex- the expected damage against the military ad- plode within lethal range of a satellite.43 A vantage to be gained.34 This principle is re- laser or energy-based weapon could damage a flected in Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva satellite’s components, including circuitry, op- conventions, which prohibits “an attack which tics, or solar panels.44 Or a “soft kill” could may be expected to cause incidental loss of render a satellite inoperable—for example, by civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civil- tipping it out of orbit, jamming its signals, or ian objects, or a combination thereof, which blinding it with lasers or paint.45 would be excessive in relation to the concrete China’s recent ASAT test offers an example and direct military advantage anticipated.”35 of another type of attack: the “kinetic energy Thus, an action causing excessive or catastrophic weapon,” which relies on force of impact rather damage to civilians or property is illegal. than an explosion.46 This weapon has the tre- A final, relevant principle—discrimination— mendous speed necessary to achieve orbit, trav- holds that attackers must distinguish between eling in the range of 17,500 miles per hour.47 military and nonmilitary targets. Additional Even the smallest space objects can cause seri- Protocol 1 limits targets “strictly to . . . those ous damage at such tremendous velocities.48 objects which by their nature, location, pur- China’s “kill” occurred in an orbit over 800 pose or use make an effective contribution to kilometers (500 miles) above Earth’s surface, military action and whose total or partial de- dangerously close to the range of many US spy struction, capture or neutralization, in the cir- and missile-defense satellites as well as many cumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite civilian satellites.49 Besides the test’s proximity military advantage.”36 Examples of prohibited to US space interests, the major concern is the targets include civilians, civilian property, cul- danger to satellites or other space objects from tural places, food supplies, and drinking water.37 the test’s debris. The explosion created a “hy- Discrimination can be difficult to apply to personic shockwave” that tore both missile “dual use” objects having both civilian and and satellite into a high-speed debris cloud, military functions, such as airports, buildings, composed of 300,000 pieces.50 Scientists have and communications systems.38 Although at- labeled this contribution to orbital space de- tacking such objects would hinder the enemy, bris “the worst ever,” as it scattered fragments civilians would also suffer. Moreover, since Ad- between orbits as low as 200 kilometers (124 ditional Protocol 1’s test is subjective, com- miles) and as high as 3,800 (2,360 miles).51 Al- manders could reasonably disagree on whether though some of the individual particles may attacking these objects truly “offers a definite fall back to Earth, others are expected to re- military advantage.”39 Here, the principle of main in orbit for “a very long time.”52 Addi- proportionality gives some guidance: since tionally, many of the particles are too small to collateral damage to civilians is considered a track, making them effectively invisible to natural consequence of combat, the propor- spacecraft and payloads.53 Most satellites lack tionality test should determine if an attack on the protective shielding necessary to defend a dual-use object warrants the consequences against such debris.54 to the innocent.40 China claims that its test was both nonbel- ligerent and completely legal; on the latter point, that appears mostly correct.55 That is, China’s Test and Its the test does not seem to have violated any of Legal Ramifications the aforementioned treaties or LOAC principles. First, the ASAT test evidently did not Satellites are vulnerable to several possible violate the Outer Space Treaty, which provides attacks from ASAT weapons.41 A nuclear deto- that all nations have an equal right of access to nation could generate an electromagnetic space for peaceful purposes. China could pulse, disabling the sensitive circuitry of un- claim that it conducted the test for scientific

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and defensive purposes, which would make it However, the principle of proportionality peaceful under the treaty’s terms. would require further restraint from China. The only treaty section that China could An attack on satellites could be considered have violated is Article 9, which prohibits the “catastrophic” for two reasons. First, attacking harmful contamination of space. However, even a single satellite risks creating additional whether the test amounted to a contamination debris, further contaminating Earth’s orbit. is open to interpretation. Under the treaty, Each successive attack would put other satel- “harmful contamination” of space, though lites and spacecraft at increased risk, and these prohibited, is undefined. China could point deadly debris particles would not distinguish out that because some of the debris will fall among friend, foe, or neutral. Even China’s into the atmosphere and disintegrate, the in- own space operations could be disrupted if cident was not “harmful” as envisioned by the space became sufficiently polluted. Attacking convention. It might also note that space de- any satellite, therefore, requires serious con- bris is not a new problem and that no other sideration of the collateral consequences.58 nation has yet been held responsible under Second, since the United States depends international law for polluting outer space.56 heavily on satellite technology and since the The Liability Convention may also be of military and the civilian sector share many sat- little aid. Even if China’s debris damages an- ellites, destroying certain satellites could dras- other state’s assets in the future, China might tically affect the civilian population. Attacking simply argue that it was not at “fault” under communications systems could impair bank- the convention since it could not have reason- ing and trade, disrupting the US economy. ably predicted the amount of debris created Likewise, the Federal Aviation Administration by the collision. may upgrade the national air traffic controller Furthermore, the Liability Convention out- systems to exclusive use of global positioning lines a state’s options in the event of disaster; system satellites.59 The unexpected loss of this it is a reactive rather than a proactive measure. network could result in numerous lost or Presently, the United States can only observe crashed aircraft. the debris cloud and prepare for damage to Although proportionality should restrain its space assets. If this occurs, the United States China from attacking US satellites under these could invoke the convention but would still circumstances, LOAC is largely self-regulatory, need to establish its damages, prove that the so states must ensure their own compliance harm is traceable to China’s test, demand pay- with these rules. Therefore, China could in- ment, and hope that the collections process terpret the rule unfavorably or disregard it al- goes favorably. Since these litigation mecha- together. Furthermore, LOAC analysis could nisms have yet to be employed, their effective- come too late. That is, the realization that an ness remains unknown.57 attack violates the rule of proportionality might LOAC’s targeting rules do not directly ap- occur only after a catastrophe has taken place. ply to China’s test since that country targeted its own satellite. LOAC could only affect any future warfare application of the test. The The Appropriate US Response principle of military necessity would permit China to target US military satellites in a US- Because of space law’s uncertainty, the only China war. China would only need to show a practical limitation on an attack against US benefit to its war effort, such as disrupting space assets is a foreign power’s own self- US communications, targeting, or battlespace restraint. This may exist in one of two forms: awareness. Although the principle of discrimi- fear of US retaliation with political and mili- nation prohibits China from targeting purely tary power, or compliance under a moral or civilian satellites, dual-use satellites shared by legal obligation to treaty law. However, as de- the military and the civilian sector might also veloping nations and terrorist groups gain ac- become legal targets under this first principle. cess to space, the United States can no longer

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assume that either form of self-restraint will policy might be systems exclusively designed protect its orbital assets. Instead, it must now to protect satellites. take proactive defensive measures. Two ques- The better argument against weaponiza- tions remain. First, what options does the tion lies in the United States’ obligation to United States have? Second, how does the law protect the space environment, both legally restrict those options? (treaty requirements) and practically (the Space law provides only two diplomatic op- need to keep space safe and usable). Nations tions that the United States could invoke to always have a right to self-defense (which can- prevent future missile tests by China or an- not be surrendered, even by treaty), but the other nation. The first is the Outer Space United States is still bound by the treaty’s pro- Treaty’s provision allowing consultation if one hibition against contaminating space. Although state believes that another’s activities could in- a self-defensive act that pollutes space may be terfere with its space programs. The second is permissible, the testing of technology in an- the provision allowing one state to observe ticipation of self-defense might not be. There- and inspect another’s space programs and fa- fore, the United States should remember its cilities. Neither provision, however, enables a obligation to avoid creating debris when de- 63 state actually to stop future tests. The treaty veloping defensive space weapons. “Soft-kill” allows only a request for consultation or in- weapons that disable an attacking weapon are spection, and the other nation is not obligated clearly acceptable. Explosive weapons, such as to grant it. space mines surrounding satellites, might not The United States, therefore, is left with two be if they create significant space debris. military options—“weaponization” and “hedg- Thus, it is evident that weaponization, in practice, may violate the duty to avoid the ing.”60 Weaponization is the process of placing harmful contamination of space. Hedging, permanent weapons systems in space in antici- therefore, is the only remaining military alter- pation of an attack. Hedging, which focuses native. The United States has multiple hedg- on vulnerability reduction, “minimize[s] any ing options with which it could successfully adverse consequences in the event of space defend its space assets. An examination of warfare initiatives by other states, and . . . these options reveals that they do not risk vio- deter[s] other states from first crossing the lating any part of the relevant space law. critical thresholds of flight-testing and deploy- 61 First, the United States could rely upon ex- ment.” The Air Force is already considering isting technology to prevent space-based weap- both options, weighing whether to shield sat- ons from leaving Earth’s atmosphere. The pri- ellites individually (hedging) or to build a bal- mary goal would involve targeting the enemy’s listic missile system to destroy missiles before weapons before launch, with a secondary goal they reach US satellites (arguably, a form of of targeting enemy space facilities to disable 62 weaponization if extended into outer space). their launch capability.64 An antiballistic mis- Although arguments may exist for employ- sile (ABM) system could be used on missiles ing either option, space law appears to prefer that are successfully launched, whether from hedging over weaponization. Recall that the space facilities or mobile platforms such as United States is generally limited to using ships or aircraft. The United States recently space for peaceful purposes. Although the tested the effectiveness of an ABM system Outer Space Treaty does not entirely preclude when an F-16 fighter used an air-to-air missile weaponization, it does restrict it—a fact illus- to destroy a rocket in its boost phase.65 Since trated by its prohibitions on placing nuclear the missile never reached orbit, there was no weapons or weapons of mass destruction into space debris. orbit. Aggressive uses of space are generally Second, several possibilities for reducing disfavored, but defensive use of space is con- satellite vulnerabilities present themselves. sidered acceptable. Thus, the only permissible These include using antijamming measures; weaponization under either the treaty or US hardening the satellites to protect against

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electromagnetic pulses, radiation, or explo- nopoly on space operations. Other nations sions; adding maneuverability to actively avoid have been operating in space for decades, and attacks; or including stealth features.66 Making developing nations such as China are now en- satellites more difficult to locate and disable tering that realm. By signing the Outer Space also eliminates the problem of space debris. Treaty, the United States acknowledged that Moreover, as a passive methodology, hedging all nations have the right to explore and oper- ensures that the United States’ use of space ate in space. It is therefore obligated to respect remains peaceful. Admittedly, implementation other nations’ space operations as long as they of hedging mechanisms on currently orbiting do not threaten its own. satellites is problematic. However, the United Second, the test illustrates that Thomas States can reduce vulnerabilities by upgrading Jefferson’s statement that “the price of freedom its newer replacement satellites. Although is eternal vigilance” applies as readily to space these features could make a payload more ex- as it does to Earth. US space assets are not im- pensive, the benefit to the fragile satellite net- mune from warfare by virtue of being in orbit. work would clearly outweigh the cost. Rather, the United States should assume that Third, the United States should prepare re- its space systems could be attacked. Although dundancies or backups to protect its satellite many nations have signed the relevant space network in case of an attack. The results of los- treaties, the United States should not naïvely ing a satellite in 1998, mentioned previously, assume full compliance. Nor should it expect suggest that a major attack on its space sys- nonstate actors, such as terrorists, to comply. tems—or even one critical satellite—could The applicable international treaties, con- shatter US interests. Options for compensat- ventions, and LOAC principles do not spe- ing for the network’s weaknesses include re- cifically explain what the United States dundant satellites, ready-to-launch replacements, should do in preparation for a real attack. or secondary alternatives to satellite functions. Rather, they outline what it cannot do. The Strategic planners also should plan for scenarios United States must use space for peaceful in which the benefits of satellite technology purposes, refrain from using space aggres- are suddenly unavailable to war fighters. sively, take care not to pollute the space envi- Finally, one option involves neither weap- ronment, and be prepared to make repara- onization nor hedging. Specifically, the United tions if it damages another state’s assets. In States can influence other nations by using its the event of war, states might be able to treat other instruments of national power, includ- each other’s satellites as legitimate targets but only after ensuring that the satellite’s loss ing information, diplomacy, and economics. would not excessively harm civilians. In brief, these instruments present nonmili- Although arming the heavens might seem tary alternatives for convincing foreign pow- the most tempting military response, the law ers to use space peacefully. For example, the clearly favors the defensive method of hedg- United States could use diplomatic power to ing. Admittedly, weaponization could be legal engage in discussions with nations regarding in some limited circumstances. However, hedg- their space programs. It could even use diplo- ing raises fewer concerns over violating inter- macy to invoke the consultation and observa- national law and still provides viable solutions tion portions of the Outer Space Treaty. Al- for protecting space assets. Whether hedging though the effectiveness of those parts of the occurs via ABMs, more secure satellites, or treaty remains uncertain, they still present a some other method is a question best left to peaceful alternative to space warfare. military strategists. Ultimately, following the law is vital for ensuring that outer space re- Conclusion mains the peaceful environment envisioned by the treaties. By doing so, the United States China’s test raises two important points. will maintain not only the ultimate strategic First, the United States does not hold a mo- high ground but also the moral one. ❑

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Notes

1. Jean-Michel Stoullig, “Rumsfeld Commission Warns 18. ibid., 6. against ‘Space Pearl Harbor,’ ” Space Daily, 11 January 19. ibid., 6, 7. 2001, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/bmdo-01b.html. 20. Robert C. Bird, “Procedural Challenges to Envi- 2. Gen Lance W. Lord, “Why America Needs Space: The ronmental Regulation of Space Debris,” American Business Prerequisites for Success,” High Frontier 2, no. 1 ([Fall 2005]): Law Journal 40 (2003): 655–56; and Peter T. Limperis, 2, http://www.afspc.af.mil/shared/media/document/ “Orbital Debris and the Spacefaring Nations: Interna- AFD-060524-005.pdf. tional Law Methods for Prevention and Reduction of De- 3. “Wayward Satellite Wreaks Havoc,” Reuters, 20 May bris, and Liability Regimes for Damage Caused by Debris,” 1998, http://www.wired.com/science/discoveries/news/ Arizona Journal of International and Contemporary Law 15 1998/05/12414. (1998): 330. 4. James Oberg, “Bold Move Escalates Space War De- 21. “Convention on International Liability for Dam- bate,” MSNBC.com, 18 January 2007, http://www.msnbc age Caused by Space Objects,” in United Nations Treaties .msn.com/id/16694039. and Principles on Outer Space, 13–21. China joined the con- 5. “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of vention by accession in 1988. States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, includ- 22. ibid., 13. ing the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,” in United Na- 23. ibid., 14. However, under Article 2, if an object tions Treaties and Principles on Outer Space (New York: causes damage while “on the surface of the Earth or to United Nations, 2002), 3–8, http://www.unoosa.org/ aircraft in flight,” liability is absolute, with no consideration pdf/publications/STSPACE11E.pdf. China joined the to whether the launching state was at fault. Ibid., 13. treaty by accession in 1983. 24. ibid., 16–17. 6. ibid., 4. 25. Limperis, “Orbital Debris,” 330–33; and Christopher 7. ibid. D. Williams, “Space: The Cluttered Frontier,” Journal of 8. Maj Douglas S. Anderson, “A Military Look into Air Law and Commerce 60 (1995): 1147–48. Space: The Ultimate High Ground,” Army Lawyer, no. 276 26. Limperis, “Orbital Debris,” 330–31. (November 1995): 25. 27. Jennifer M. Seymour, “Containing the Cosmic Cri- 9. National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, US sis: A Proposal for Curbing the Perils of Space Debris,” Code, vol. 42, sec. 2451 (2007): “The Congress hereby de- Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 10 (1998): clares that it is the policy of the United States that activi- 900; and Williams, “Cluttered Frontier,” 1158–59. ties in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for 28. Williams, “Cluttered Frontier,” 1159. the benefit of all mankind.” 29. Marc S. Firestone, “Problems in the Resolution of 10. Richard A. Morgan, “Military Use of Commercial Disputes Concerning Damage Caused in Outer Space,” Communication Satellites: A New Look at the Outer Tulane Law Review 59 (1985): 763–64. Space Treaty and ‘Peaceful Purposes,’ ” Journal of Air Law and Commerce 60 (1994): 318–19. 30. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 91. Canada invoked the 11. See Maj Christopher M. Petras, “Space Force Al- convention in the “Cosmos 954” incident in 1978, when a pha: Military Use of the International Space Station and crippled Soviet satellite fell into its Northwest Territories. the Concept of ‘Peaceful Purposes,’ ” Air Force Law Review However, the incident was settled without resorting to liti- 53 (2002): 157–61, for a fuller discussion of the limits of gation. See “Across Canada: Ottawa Signs Cosmos Pact on “peaceful purposes.” Crash,” Globe and Mail, 3 April 1981. 12. Maj Robert A. Ramey, “Armed Conflict on the 31. The principle has four subelements: the user of Final Frontier: The Law of War in Space,” Air Force Law force must be capable of regulating it; force must be nec- Review 48 (2000): 79–82. US policy states that “peaceful essary to achieve, as quickly as possible, the enemy’s par- purposes” include “defense and intelligence-related ac- tial or complete submission; it must be no greater in ef- tivities.” US National Space Policy, Article 2, 6 October fect on the enemy’s personnel or property than needed to 2006, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf. achieve victory; and it must not otherwise be illegal. En- 13. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 79; Maj Elizabeth Wal- sign Florencio J. Yuzon, “Deliberate Environmental Modi- drop, “Integration of Military and Civilian Space Assets: fication through the Use of Chemical and Biological Legal and National Security Implications,” Air Force Law Weapons: ‘Greening’ the International Laws of Armed Review 55 (2004): 222–24; and Petras, “Space Force Al- Conflict to Establish an Environmentally Protective Re- pha,” 171–72. gime,” American University Journal of International Law and 14. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 83–84; and Col Carol Policy 11 (1996): 812. Hattrup and Maj Elizabeth Waldrop, “Space Law: Past, 32. “Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Cus- Present, and Future,” High Frontier 2, no. 1 (Fall 2004): 24. toms of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Con- 15. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 83–84. cerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, the 16. Anderson, “Military Look into Space,” 26. Hague, 18 October 1907,” Article 23(g), International 17. “Treaty on Principles,” 5. Under Article 6, nongov- Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) International Hu- ernmental entities conduct space activities only under the manitarian Law Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/ authorization and supervision of the state from where the 385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/1d1726425f6955 activity is conducted. Ibid. aec125641e0038bfd6.

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33. United States v. List, in Trials of War Criminals be- 49. “US Condemns China Satellite-Killer Test,” Agence fore the Nurenberg Military Tribunals under Control Council France Presse, 18 January 2007; Marc Kaufman and Dafna Law No. 10, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: Government Print- Linzer, “China Criticized for Anti-Satellite Missile Test,” ing Office, 1950), 1253–54, http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/ Washington Post, 19 January 2007, http://www.washington Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-XI.pdf. post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/18/AR2007 34. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 39. The proportionality 011801029.html; and “Scientists Decry China Satellite- test is the United States’ preferred method of determin- Killer,” United Press International, 19 January 2007, ing whether a target is a permissible one. The United http://www.upi.com/Security_Terrorism/Analysis/ States has declined to sign certain treaties, or portions 2007/01/18/scientists_decry_china_satellitekiller. thereof, that prohibit certain targets without any balanc- 50. Oberg, “Bold Move”; and Kaufman and Linzer, ing test. “China Criticized.” 35. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 51. Frank Morring Jr., “China Asat Test Called Worst of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Vic- Single Debris Event Ever,” Aviation Week, 11 February tims of International Armed Conflicts (ProtocolI ), 8 June 2007, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story 1977,” Article 51(5)(b), ICRC International Humanitarian _generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/aw021207p2.xml. Law Database, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/470. A 52. ibid. common example of this principle is the act of destroying 53. Ned Potter, “China’s Space-Weapon Test Could a dam, which both disrupts an enemy’s power supply and Endanger Astronauts and Satellites,” ABCNews.com, 1 Feb- simultaneously kills a large civilian population. For this ruary 2007, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/print reason, Article 56 of Additional Protocol 1 specifically ?id=2841745. prohibits attacking dams and other installations contain- 54. “China Anti-Satellite Test Sparks Space Junk Outcry,” ing “dangerous forces.” The United States has not ratified Breitbart.com, 19 January 2007, http://www.breitbart.com/ Additional Protocol 1 but does interpret it as a restate- article.php?id=070119103900.6anervk3&show_article=1. ment of customary international law. (See ICRC Interna- 55. Associated Press, “China Denies Intent to Militarize tional Humanitarian Law Database, http://www.icrc.org/ Space,” Breitbart.com, 22 January 2007, http://www.breit ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=470&ps=S.) I discuss it bart.com/article.php?id=D8MQHI1G0&show_article=1; here for illustrative purposes. and “China Calls for Early Treaty to Ban Arms Race in 36. “Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions,” Outer Space,” Malaysia General News, 16 March 2007. Article 52(2). 56. The United States is rated the highest contributor 37. ibid., Articles 51–54. to the space-debris problem. Erin McCarthy, “Litter 38. J. Ricou Heaton, “Civilians at War: Reexamining Kings,” Popular Mechanics 181, no. 7 (July 2007): 81. the Status of Civilians Accompanying the Armed Forces,” 57. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 91. See also note 30 Air Force Law Review 57 (2005): 182. above. The “Cosmos 954” incident was settled without any 39. ibid. formal trial between the countries. Christopher C. Joyner, 40. ibid., 182–83. International Law in the 21st Century: Rules for Global Gover- 41. Satellite systems are also indirectly vulnerable in nance (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), 244. two other aspects: at their ground-based control installa- 58. Maj David L. Wilson, “An Army View of Neutrality tions and in their data links via jamming. Michael Krepon in Space: Legal Options for Space Negation,” Air Force with Christopher Clary, Space Assurance or Space Dominance? Law Review 50 (2001): 210–11. The Case against Weaponizing Space (Washington, DC: 59. “ ‘NextGen’ Air-Traffic Control Would Mean Safer Henry L. Stimson Center, 2003), 68, http://www.stimson Skies,” News Tribune [Tacoma, WA], 18 May 2007. .org/space/pdf/spacebook.pdf. International space law 60. Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance, 58–86. likely would not apply to attacks on these aspects, so I will 61. ibid., 58–59. not analyze them further in legal terms. 62. “Air Force Mulls How to Defend Space Assets, 42. Maj Earl D. Matthews, “U.S. Space Systems: A Critical Wynne Says,” Space and Missile Defense Report 8, no. 12 (26 Strength and Vulnerability,” student paper (Newport, RI: March 2007). Naval War College, 1996), 12, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ 63. Some might question whether the United States ADA307419; and Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 19–21. violated these standards when it shot down one of its own 43. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 19-21; Krepon and spy satellites on 21 February 2008. The satellite became Clary, Space Assurance, 64–65. inoperable after launch and risked crashing into a popu- 44. Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance, 65; and Ramey, lated area, exposing humans to its toxic fuel supply. How- “Armed Conflict,” 23–26. ever, the US strike differs from China’s in that it poses a 45. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 27. lower risk from space debris. The US strike occurred 130 46. Daniel Engber, “How to Blow Up a Satellite,” Slate, miles above Earth’s surface, unlike China’s, which oc- 19 January 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2157855; and curred much higher. Although debris from the Chinese Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 22–23. strike still remains in orbit, much of the debris from the 47. “General Urges Protection of Space Assets against US strike was expected to fall back to Earth within 48 ASATs,” Space and Missile Defense Report 8, no. 44 (3 Decem- hours, and the rest within 40 days. “Navy Says Missile ber 2007). Smashed Wayward Satellite,” MSNBC.com, 21 February 48. Ramey, “Armed Conflict,” 22. 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23265613.

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64. China currently has three launch facilities at 65. Bettina Haymann Chavanne, “First NCADE [Net- Xichang, Tiayuan, and Jiuquan, with a fourth under de- work Centric Airborne Defense Element] Missile Inter- velopment at Wenchang. William Atkins, “China to Add cept Test Successful,” Aerospace Daily and Defense Report, 6 4th Launch Site: Wenchang Satellite Launch Center,” December 2007. iTWire.com, 24 September 2007, http://www.itwire.com/ 66. Krepon and Clary, Space Assurance, 68–71. content/view/14574/1066.

1-Frey.indd 84 10/27/08 9:09:50 AM Shifting the Air Force’s Support Ideology to Exploit Combined Arms in the Close Fight

Lt Col Collin T. Ireton, USAF

Editorial Abstract: Today’s war on terror requires the Air Force to employ all of its varied weapons effects for engaging in this fight. To do so, the author suggests that the service must make the support of US ground forces its tactical thrust by ensuring availability of the effects of combined arms. He proposes that the Air Force can realize that goal by fielding mission- specialized equipment, using the appropriate aerial platform, properly organizing core units, and integrating training.

he Normandy invasion lost but quickly learned that a combined-arms ap- momentum in June 1944 as Allied proach was the answer. Attack teams capitalized troops encountered hedgerow coun- on the inherent strengths of coordinated and try. Here, German soldiers made varied weapons effects. First, engineers blew a Teach hedgerow a fortified line, every encircled hole in the hedgerow, allowing a Sherman tank pasture a killing field. With machine-gun pits to poke through and put a white-phosphorus in each corner, entrenched riflemen armed round into the corners of the opposite hedge- with Panzerfaust antitank weapons and pre- row, engulfing German machine-gun pits in sighted artillery waited for Allied troops to the burning chemical. While a slowly advanc- make the mistake of a haphazard advance. ing tank covered the top of the hedgerow with Those troops had arrived with no training .50-caliber machine-gun fire, the mortar team on how to assault these barriers successfully worked the area behind the berm to neutral-

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ize the entrenched enemy. Infantry advanced Not entirely obvious is the fact that varied behind the tank and, after reaching the far weapons effects are more important than mul- side, used grenades and rifle fire to destroy tiple methods of attack. A single, survivable the remaining Germans.1 Even an entrenched, platform that can continue to deliver a variety skilled, and dedicated enemy had no means of weapons, despite environmental condi- to resist a determined advance that used the tions, will generate the synergistic effects of multiple weapons effects intrinsic to com- combined arms. The individual effects of clas- bined arms. sic combined arms (armor, artillery, mortar Later, forward artillery observers (and, fire, etc.) do not derive from their being gen- eventually, tank crews) were linked via radio erated individually from different platforms; with P-47 fighter-bombers and Piper Cub aircraft, providing additional options to front- rather, they result from each munition’s hav- line troops in need of support. Not only were ing its own strength. Essentially, we must match the heavy machine guns and rockets of the each target with ordnance that meets the chal- P‑47s at their disposal, but also the Piper Cubs lenges of the situation. For example, we could could spot for long-range artillery or, when destroy an enemy bunker impervious to 105 needed, relay requests to higher headquarters.2 millimeter (mm) cannon fire with a penetrat- These tactics, born of necessity and engen- ing bomb; we could use a string of general- dered on the battlefield, fueled the Normandy purpose rather than precision bombs against breakout. For the first time, US ground and a dispersed enemy; and we could direct pre- air forces communicated directly to achieve cise cannon fire instead of a bomb at an enemy real-time battlefield effects through close air in close contact with friendly troops. support (CAS). If, however, no single platform has all the On many levels, today’s global war on terror engagement options required or if environ- (GWOT) differs from the US experience in mental conditions or enemy defenses prevent World War II. There are, however, parallels its use, then we may need multiple platforms that lead to lessons of value for today’s con- (usually a combination of ground and air assets) flict.I n this article, I posit that the US Air Force should accept as its main tactical mission the to produce the desired effects. For example if provision of varied weapons effects associated poor target weather or asset availability dic- with classic combined arms on all US battle- tates selection of a B-52 against a dispersed fields. Additionally, I point out current barri- enemy, we may use it to conduct semiprecise ers to assembling combined arms, gaps in cur- strikes with Joint Direct Attack Munitions rent CAS capabilities, and a possible solution. (JDAM) or to cover an area with multiple un- guided bombs. However, we may need armor’s direct cannon fire to support closely engaged Roots of Success with ground forces. The effective use of combined Combined Arms arms is not a function of utilizing multiple delivery platforms but of appropriately and smartly What is the root cause of the synergistic ef- matching weapons effects and targets in time fects of combined arms? Clearly, an enemy and scale to overwhelm defensive efforts. can devise a defense or counter any one threat relatively quickly. If rifle fire is the predomi- Clearly, the combined-arms effects avail- nant danger, he can dig a trench; if the other able to US ground-air teams can be decisive. side releases gas, he can wear a mask; if at- But are they always available on today’s battle- tacked by massed and unescorted bombers, field? How will the US military ensure that its he can employ fighters—and so forth. For the engaged troops always have the synergistic defense, multiple methods of attack and var- firepower effects of combined arms on hand? ied weapons effects cause defensive integrity Before answering these questions, let’s con- to fail. sider an example.

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March 2002, Afghanistan them unavailable for duty on the second day of the battle.10 In early 2002, the United States launched Initially planned as a quick operation for Operation Anaconda against Taliban and al- trapping the enemy, Anaconda devolved into Qaeda forces in the Shah-e-Kot Valley in south- a patchwork of friendly troops fighting defen- eastern Afghanistan—an isolated area, rugged sive battles where “small-arms and mortar fire and difficult to reach. Coalition forces had no and effective and timely CAS . . . ensured that access to artillery or armor—only small arms, none of the small, isolated forces were over- mortars, eight AH-64 helicopters, and fixed- 11 wing CAS aircraft.3 The plan called for indige- run.” The effects of airborne-supplied com- nous forces, augmented by embedded special bined arms proved pivotal, but we must won- operations forces and ground forward air con- der about the effectiveness had poor weather trollers (GFAC), to attack and push enemy developed after the helicopter insertion or forces through mountain passes where US had an enemy well supplied with advanced forces pre-positioned by helicopter insertion surface-to-air missiles been present. We may would kill or capture them.4 not be so lucky in the future. The helicopter insertion of infantry came under immediate fire from an entrenched enemy’s small arms, mortars, and rocket- A Change in Mind-Set 5 propelled grenades. It quickly became clear Clearly, at certain times US operations, that the enemy forces did not plan to flee as whether planned or unplanned, require the expected and that there were many more of them than just the several hundred irregulars massed and varied weapons effects of the originally estimated.6 Later calculations placed combined-arms concept. But are combined their numbers between 500 and 1,000.7 arms always available on today’s battlefield? Errors made in estimating enemy numbers Recent examples suggest they are not. In the and their intent (to stay and fight), as well as battle of An Najaf in Iraq (28–29 January the lack of supporting armor and artillery, led 2007), artillery never became available, and to heavier reliance on CAS than the coalition Stryker armor didn’t arrive until several hours had planned.8 In the first 24 hours of the after the battle had begun.12 The situation in battle, F-15Es, F-16s, F/A-18s, and an AC-130 Anaconda proved even direr: we had no ar- executed 177 attacks, strafing and dropping mor or artillery at all. JDAMs as well as laser-guided bombs (LGB) in Why were those assets not available? Surely, an area only about five and a half miles long a variety of reasons present themselves, rang- by three miles wide.9 Airborne assets again made ing from incorrect intelligence (and the con- up for the lack of ground-based combined- sequent flawed planning) to political require- arms elements. ments. However, geography also plays a role. Our use of 37 enlisted terminal attack con- Today’s battlefields encompass large geographic trollers to observe the same valley and many areas (at times, much of Iraq) without obvious of the same targets, combined with a lack of areas of enemy concentration, a situation that forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC[A]), amounted to poor employment of assets. In precludes stationing artillery and armor units some cases, redundant attacks were called in near every potential battlefield. Second, as in on the same objective. More importantly, be- the case of Anaconda, battlegrounds can be so cause of the lack of control, the extreme ur- isolated, either by terrain or distance, that we gency of the situation, and redundant CAS can’t transport artillery and armor to the scene requests, we did not always select the most sur- without a large-scale logistical undertaking, vivable aircraft and most effective munitions which may not prove feasible, depending on for the job. As a result, all but two AH-64s suf- the tactical situation. These examples support fered significant combat damage, making the following propositions:

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1. varied weapons effects inherent in com- close-support (i.e., both CAS and FAC[A] bined arms are potent, and their use in roles) assets consists of eight AC-130Hs, 17 the CAS role can prove decisive. AC-130Us, and a planned strength of 356 A- 10s.13 Though formidable weapon systems in 2. US troops garrison large geographic areas their own right, neither the AC-130 nor the that preclude positioning the traditional A-10 can deliver the envisioned close-support elements of combined arms at each po- capability. tential point of need. For the AC-130U, high-resolution sensors 3. The United States can expect to fight in (such as the all light level television and the isolated areas that may preclude the use infrared detection set) and a sophisticated of armor, artillery, and large-scale rein- fire-control system enable this aircraft to tar- forcements. get its side-firing 25 mm, 40 mm, and 105 mm guns with remarkable accuracy. A strike radar 4. at times, US forces will fight with imper- even allows for all-weather and night-target ac- fect intelligence. Poor knowledge of quisition and strike capability. Although the enemy numbers, armament, and intent AC-130H lacks the strike radar (and associ- will prevent preplanned use of tradi- ated all-weather capability), it retains much of tional combined arms. the AC-130U’s strengths.14 However, that gun- 5. The range, speed, and access inherent ship can’t deliver the variety of cluster bomb to airpower can make the multiple weap- units or low- and high-yield general-purpose ons effects associated with combined and penetrating munitions available in JDAM arms available to our troops over large and LGB packages. Nor is it reasonable to ex- or isolated geographic areas. pect any AC-130 model to operate in or near surface-to-air-missile or guided antiaircraft The nature of the GWOT ensures that our artillery (AAA) threat zones. Indeed, the ubiq- troops will engage the enemy nearly anywhere, uity of shoulder-launched missiles and truck- anytime, in a variety of tactical situations. In mounted/-pulled AAA underscores the signifi- this war, since the tactical thrust of the Air cant risks to any daylight AC-130 operation. Force is to support our ground forces, it must Certainly, the aircraft has defensive counter- embrace this understanding and position it- measures, but systems as simple as optically self to maximize support. I do not mean to say guided AAA will plague a platform that re- that other Air Force roles have simply faded quires a predictable left-hand orbit to employ away—only that their importance diminishes its weapons. in light of new challenges. When the A-10 became operational in 1976, I suggest that the Air Force can optimally it represented a significant step forward in its contribute to this war by assuring that the ef- niche, but today’s modernization programs, fects of classic combined arms remain avail- despite adding capability, are not the leap for- able to our ground forces at all times and all ward commensurate with our current need.15 places. In short, we must be capable of deliver- Upon completion of the A-10C moderniza- ing scalable destructive power with a variety of tion program, the aircraft will have the ability kill mechanisms where our ground forces to drop precision LGBs, near-precision JDAMs, need them and when they need them—all the and strings of bombs or cluster bomb units. while surviving possible battlefield threats. Also, its versatile 30 mm cannon can employ The Air Force must be able to employ weap- armor-piercing and high-explosive incendiary ons close to or far from our troops, day or rounds. These varied weapons effects hint at night and in poor weather. the ideal combined-arms platform envisioned Because of a lack of focus or failure to rec- in this article. ognize the importance of this requirement, Nevertheless, even though the A-10 is more the Air Force has not developed such a capa- robust than its gunship brethren, it is still vul- bility. The current inventory of dedicated nerable. Its ability to fly at low and medium

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altitudes and to maneuver aggressively miti- cobbled together in an attempt to fulfill an gates many threats. However, the jet’s poor Air Force responsibility. thrust performance makes it vulnerable when The traditional mind-set with regard to Air climbing back to the safer medium-altitude Force missions is that air superiority enables environment after a diving weapon delivery. all other missions. Without air superiority, other All A-10s downed in Operation Desert Storm roles (e.g., interdiction, suppression of enemy were hit by shoulder-launched missiles after air defenses [SEAD], or CAS) become diffi- delivering ordnance and climbing back to cult, if not impossible, to execute. Hence, the medium altitude.16 No doubt the prolifera- Air Force has emphasized the development tion of increasingly sophisticated antiaircraft and fielding of specialized air superiority systems will further challenge this nearly 30- fighters, most recently the F-15A, F-15C, and year-old aircraft. F-22A. The Air Force developed this group of These and other airframes offer pieces to aircraft and trained its pilots to do one thing: the puzzle of the envisioned close-support destroy enemy aircraft in aerial combat. platform, but none offer an entire solution. All of the Air Force’s other fighter-based Nor does the intersection of various aircraft roles were levied on the other group of fighter aircraft. Although capable of using abilities. A B-52 may be able to fly high enough air-to-air weaponry, these platforms were ex- to avoid some threats, but it is restricted to pected to execute the other Air Force roles, providing only near-precision JDAMs or strings such as interdiction, offensive counterair of general-purpose bombs. F-16s or F-15Es (OCA), SEAD, nuclear strike, FAC(A), and may be able to fill the gap by strafing for troops CAS. Aircraft in this second grouping often in close contact with the enemy, but the pilots performed multiple roles. For example, the still need to see the target to hit it with the F-16C is, or was at one time, expected to precision required to avoid injuring friendly perform all of the above functions. troops. This is one of many examples of cur- The required training, however, is role spe- rent gaps in our close-support capability. cific, each role requiring a separate skill set The Key West Agreement of 1948 clearly as- created through an upgrade program and de- signs the Air Force responsibility for provid- veloped with experience. Pilots also need pro- ing CAS. However, “the Air Force’s preoccu- ficiency flying to preserve these skills, but pation with strategic bombers, missiles, and maintaining a high level of proficiency in all air superiority has led to lapses in other areas roles is unlikely (fig. 1). of its responsibility. Close air support had to Resources followed the perceived impor- be learned and relearned in World War II, Ko- tance of roles. For example, consider the ar- rea, and Viet Nam.”17 A lack of emphasis on chetypical air-to-air fighter and an attack air- close support has led to this patchwork of ca- craft from opposite ends of the spectrum. The pabilities, spread over various aircraft and selective acquisition report of 31 December

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Figure 1. Current mind-set

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2006 listed the cost of the F-22A program (al- forms up to the current standard or fixes ag- most exclusively air-to-air) at $65.2 billion, ing problems to enable the platform to reach equating to approximately $353 million for its phaseout date. To fix the structural prob- each of a projected 184 aircraft.18 The A-10C lems that will allow 356 A-10Cs to make their program (almost exclusively CAS/FAC[A]) projected phaseout in 2028, we must spend costs $420 million.19 If the F-22 airframe were $4.4 billion, or 12.5 F-22s.20 My point is not a unit of currency, the entire A-10C program that we need fewer F-22s or more A-10s; rather, would cost the same as about 1.2 F-22s. But I wish to show the difference in asset alloca- that doesn’t tell the whole story. The A-10C tion for aircraft in the two different groups at isn’t a new aircraft. The production line was opposite ends of the spectrum. This clearly not restarted, new airframes were not built, and demonstrates the Air Force’s priorities and new engines were not fitted. This version views on the relative values of roles. amounts to an A-10A with a glass cockpit, car- I suggest a change to the Air Force’s mind- rying upgraded weapon systems to allow JDAM set. We should stop viewing air-to-air assets as use and employing enhanced sensor integration. the priority and focusing their capabilities on The capabilities of new aircraft, such as the a single role while allowing other “nonspecial- F-22, often leap beyond existing capabilities ized” aircraft to handle all other fighter-based that fill the same role. Creating an entirely tactical roles. Instead, we should reverse the new platform ensures incorporation of im- situation by elevating the CAS and FAC(A) provements to the strengths of other aircraft (close-support) roles to paramount impor- but also enables the addition of new technology. tance (fig. 2) The F-22 program has combined improve- Critics may point out that the F-22 is capable ments and new technology synergistically to of employing the 1,000-pound-class JDAM and create unsurpassed mission capability. is currently integrating the Small Diameter Modernizing older aircraft, though essen- Bomb, and that this already represents a move- tial to force sustainment, does not achieve ment in the direction I suggest. But that falls comparable success. It can add capabilities such short of my point. The F-22 significantly -ad as JDAMs, utilization of the global positioning vances aerial combat: the combination of system, AIM-120 missiles, new radars, and so speed, stealth, sensors, data handling, and ad- forth, but does not incorporate a set of new vanced air-to-air weapons will ensure that air- abilities into an optimized package that en- to-air combat reaches a new level of sophisti- sures an entirely new level of performance. cation. By revamping older CAS systems, we For example, the packaging of LGBs and im- cannot achieve anything on this order in the provement of stealth technologies, both first CAS world. And if we are willing to invest used extensively in the Vietnam conflict, re- heavily in a capability that might possibly be sulted in the F-117, which fundamentally used in the next decade, shouldn’t we devote shifted US power projection. Modernizing, the same resources to a capability that will however, often simply brings current plat- surely be used? These same critics and others

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may point to developing Chinese, Indian, and ing new tankers, continuing to build and field Russian airpower, arguing that the Air Force the F-22, as well as refurbishing and buying must have specialized aircraft—without “a pound more cargo aircraft. We simply have no bud- for air-to-ground”—not only for power projec- get left to create this pivotal platform. In the tion but also for protection of the aircraft pro- absence of a shift in thinking that comes to viding close support. A need for such a capa- regard a dedicated CAS/FAC(A) platform as bility exists but should not become the focus. the preeminent Air Force contribution to the Furthermore, when considering such an ar- GWOT, we will not develop such an asset. gument, we should address an important de- But budget constraints should not stop the velopment that has slowly built momentum proposed shift. The Air Force’s decision that over the last decade and that has far-ranging the F-35 will replace the F-16 and A-10 is now implications. Increasingly, fighter aircraft are beyond recall, so we should embrace it.22 A becoming networked via data links such as the traditional Group Two aircraft, the F-35 is North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s standard nonspecialized, and we envision that it will Link 16.21 Formerly, we designed and built air- perform the same host of duties currently ex- to-air fighters around their radars. Generally, ecuted by the F-16 and A-10. But this should longer detection ranges equate to earlier not stop the shift toward giving CAS/FAC(A) weapons employment against enemy aircraft, higher priority than other roles. The question but in a networked battlespace, the sensor becomes how to best use this nonspecialized does not have to be on the fighter employing aircraft to enhance close support of ground the ordnance. Essentially, all properly net- forces. We must take the following steps to en- worked aircraft have the same detection capa- sure that the F-35 is best used in this role, and bility. The F-22’s greater speed may allow far- the sooner we take them, the more successful ther missile ranges, but it seems more efficient and seamless the transition. to develop a longer-range missile for all fight- The first step involves mission-specialized ers than to acquire a weapon system as expen- equipment. By dedicating onboard F-35 equip- sive as a specially designed air-to-air platform. ment to the close-support role, we ensure the The long-term fix to providing US ground availability of combined-arms effects to ground forces access to the benefits of multiple and forces. For the Allied forces, the first link in im- varied weapons effects inherent in combined proving the use of combined arms in Normandy arms starts with a mental shift. It’s clear that was the establishment of communications among the GWOT defines our enemies, who operate the artillery observers, tanks, and roving P-47s. as covert irregulars far from traditional power We too must concentrate on communications— bases. Because of their ability to hide within or for the F-35. Thus, during its development, we just outside the societies they infest, we need should emphasize integration of secure, jam- ground forces to conduct offensive operations resistant communications to effectively connect to defeat them. In light of these facts, the Air the pilot with a host of agencies. Force should embrace the idea that its pri- Initially, we must ensure effective commu- mary tactical job is to provide lethal close sup- nication between the pilot and GFAC. The port. The best support ensures survivable, ability to talk, pass images, send and receive scalable destructive power that should come target data, locate friendly positions, and com- in varied weapons effects to give our troops municate the ground commander’s intent is access to the synergistic effects of combined key. Voice communication is not sufficient; in- arms. Our service’s priorities, concept devel- stead, we need a ground-to-air data link that opment, and asset allocation must evolve to passes a host of pertinent information, layered reflect this shift. by mission and intuitively displayed. This im- It’s unlikely, however, that the Air Force will plies not only potential changes to F-35 soft- begin an acquisition program for a dedicated ware but also a concurrent effort to develop an CAS/FAC(A) platform that meets the above automated GFAC tool to guarantee seamless requirements. Current efforts include acquir- interaction between ground and air forces. This

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tool must be able to provide high-resolution tion being passed. Given the plethora of data target data in the appropriate coordinate ref- available from onboard and off-board sensors, erence for weapons guided by the global posi- such as the RC-135 Rivet Joint aircraft and un- tioning system; display GFAC and friendly lo- manned aircraft systems, that data must undergo cations, preferably on a terrain-representative heavy filtering before relaying. The best way map; show target imagery if appropriate; and to smartly tailor this information involves con- provide laser illumination for LGBs. The device sulting with both aircrews and GFACs during should be man portable and should connect software development. After all, the software the GFAC and close-support-adapted F-35s so must be designed around their needs. that they form an integrated system. Equipment efficacy, however technically Because F-35s will also have to perform the advanced, relies on proper training and profi- FAC(A) role, they must be capable of seam- ciency, yet we lack realistic, standardized CAS lessly passing this information to other air- training. Among other things, this results craft. No doubt the aircraft will be able to use from the fact that we have few such opportuni- the most current version of Link 16. System ties and that CAS training occupies a lower avionics must capitalize on this link, or a gate- priority than other types. Thus, regrettably, way when necessary, to pass critical targeting “joint close air support missions [are] forced data to inbound bombers and fighters of the to conduct last-minute training or create ad FAC(A)’s choice. It must then confirm accu- hoc procedures on the battlefield.”24 The pro- rate receipt of this data and do so via secure posed GFAC tool and mission-specialized air- means in a jamming environment. craft software that would link air and ground Just as Piper Cubs prowled the lines, spot- crews are a system—and should be used as ting for distant artillery (whether shore- or such. To truly exercise the proposed air- ship-based), so should the F-35 if called upon ground close-support system, we should incor- to do so. Such an ability would amplify the ef- porate Air Force, Army, and Marine FACs into fects of combined arms. The appropriate com- CAS/FAC(A)-specialized F-35 units. This no- munication links to Army, Navy, and Marine tion encompasses two separate concepts. artillery coordination cells would give the The first concept, designating certain F-35 GFAC another route to request artillery fires units as CAS/FAC(A), differs from saying that (through the FAC[A]) and would allow the their primary function should be close sup- FAC(A) to adjust that fire for maximum effect. port; rather, their only function should be A weak area in the Anaconda operation close support. If the Air Force is to accept its concerned limited ability to communicate role as the acme of close support, it must field over the horizon with headquarters or the co- a skilled team of CAS/FAC(A) providers. The alition air and space operations center.23 In- F-35 is just hardware and, in and of itself, can- corporation of satellite communications gear not replace the A-10 weapon system, which would enable the overhead FAC(A) to relay consists of the A-10 aircraft and the commu- critical requests as well as provide an accurate nity of expert aviators who live and breathe battlefield picture to decision makers. The air- close support. Certainly, CAS/FAC(A) F-35 craft communications suite will prove pivotal units should receive sufficient training to de- in increasing not only its close-support role fend themselves against air-to-air threats, but but also overall battlefield awareness. the focus should remain on close support (as Mission-specialized software should greatly it would if they were flying A-10s). simplify the control and use of such gear. A The second segment of this concept in- portion of the aircraft’s computer-driven avi- volves recognizing smooth and practiced onics should focus on CAS/FAC(A) capabili- teamwork as essential to effective close sup- ties. Such systems not only will enable efficient port. The proposed equipment and software use of multiple radios and data links while would link the F-35 and GFAC in such a way as communicating with a host of agencies, but to make their sum a weapon system. The stakes also could intelligently narrow the informa- are high: if this team doesn’t perform, then

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friendly positions may be overrun—and the provide the advantages of varied and multiple risk of fratricide is always a concern. This team weapons effects inherent to combined arms. cannot attain effectiveness through separate Our service must commit fully to the close- training; its members must prepare for com- support role, recognizing that close support is bat together. Currently, Air Force enlisted its most effective fighter-based, tactical input members and officers work with the other ser- to the GWOT—now and for the foreseeable vices as enlisted terminal attack controllers future. The Air Force must make a mental and air liaison officers. Rather than change shift with regard to its tactical aircraft: close this system, we should expand it, incorporat- support must eclipse other roles. Our priori- ing Army, Navy, and Marine FACs into the ties, concept development, and asset alloca- dedicated F-35 close-support units as proposed. tion must evolve to reflect this shift. The ques- This can take the form of either a temporary tion then becomes how to best support troops duty rotation or an actual unit assignment— on the ground. just as long as effective team training occurs. Ideally, the Air Force would acquire an ad- Such a scheme would ensure that both ingre- vanced platform that would catapult CAS/ dients—GFAC and CAS/FAC(A) pilot—be- FAC(A) capability forward as much as the F-22 come experts with their equipment. Then, to- raised the air-to-air bar. However, it’s unlikely gether, they would form a true weapon system. that we will begin an acquisition program for Both would also develop an inherent under- such a platform, so we must find other solutions. standing of the other’s requirements, leading One possible remedy involves the F-35, an to simpler and quicker coordination of close asset that the Air Force must embrace as the support. The two ingredients shouldn’t simply next CAS/FAC(A) provider, equipping it with meet on the battlefield or during major exer- specialized onboard and off-board equipment cises. By working together in the same unit, for the close-support role. Additionally, we should designate specialized F-35 units as they will develop a synergistic relationship. CAS/FAC(A) and imbue them with interser- vice GFACs to maximize training and ensure Conclusion seamless operations. None of this can take place without first ac- The GWOT defines our current enemies, cepting close support as the primary tactical who operate as covert irregulars far from tra- responsibility of today’s Air Force. Our service ditional power bases. Our ground forces will must affirm the support of our ground forces continue to seek and engage them in expan- as its primary fighter-based role and take ac- sive, sometimes rugged and often isolated, ar- tion concomitant with this decision. If we are eas that can prevent us from assembling tradi- willing to do anything to win this war, then this tional combined-arms assets. The Air Force mental shift must be among the first the Air has the ability to overcome these barriers to Force implements. ❑

Notes

1. stephen E. Ambrose, Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army War/Lsn08/ANACONDA%2520Case%2520Study%2520 from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge to the Surrender of Ger- UNClass%2520Final.pdf+%E2%80%9COperation many, June 7, 1944–May 7, 1945 (New York: Simon & +Anaconda+Case+Study%E2%80%9D&hl=en&ct=clnk Schuster, 1997), 67–68. &cd=9&gl=us (accessed 30 June 2008). 2. ibid., 71–72. 4. ibid., 19–21. 3. maj Edgar Fleri et al., “Operation Anaconda Case 5. headquarters United States Air Force, USAF/XOL, Study” (Maxwell AFB, AL: College of Aerospace Doctrine, Operation Anaconda: An Air Power Perspective (Washington, Research and Education, 13 November 2003), 23, http:// DC: Headquarters United States Air Force, USAF/XOL, 7 64.233.167.104/search?q=cache:Ovga80WD8UgJ:www February 2005), 62–63, http://www.af.mil/library/posture/ .maxwell.af.mil/au/awc/ns/electives/AirpowerPostGulf Anaconda_Unclassified.pdf (accessed 26D ecember 2007).

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6. Fleri et al., “Operation Anaconda Case Study,” 21. www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1990/ 7. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, s.v., “Operation Ana- DDD.htm (accessed 23 April 2008). conda,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Anaconda 18. Christopher Bolkcom, F-22A Raptor, CRS Report (accessed 26 December 2007). for Congress RL31673 (Washington, DC: Library of Con- 8. headquarters United States Air Force, USAF/XOL, gress, Congressional Research Service, 12 June 2007), 4, Operation Anaconda, 6. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL31673.pdf. 9. ibid., 7; and Fleri et al., “Operation Anaconda Case 19. “A Higher-Tech Hog: The A-10C PE Program,” De- Study,” 18. fense Industry Daily, 22 January 2008, http://www.defense 10. Fleri et al., “Operation Anaconda Case Study,” industrydaily.com/a-highertech-hog-the-a10c-pe-program 28–30. 11. ibid., 29. -03187 (accessed 27 June 2008). 12. erik Holmes and Gina Cavallaro, “800 Insurgents: 20. hopper, “A-10 Thunderbolt II”; and “A Higher- Airmen Play Pivotal Role in Victory at Najaf,” Air Force Tech Hog.” Times, 3 December 2007, 14. 21. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Link 16, a 13. “AC-130H/U Gunship,” Air Force Link, October standard for passing digital information, employs netted 2007, http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?fsID=71 communication techniques via a standard message for- (accessed 31 December 2007); and David R. Hopper, mat to allow properly equipped airborne assets to ex- “A‑10 Thunderbolt II Gets Technological ‘Thumbs Up,’ ” change that information. Shipborne information collec- Air Force Link, 27 August 2007, http://www.af.mil/news/ tors also add data to this network. story.asp?id=123065959 (accessed 30 December 2007). 22. “[The Joint Strike Fighter] Program,” F-35 Joint 14. “AC-130H Spectre, AC-130U Spooky,” FAS [Fed- Strike Fighter Program, http://www.jsf.mil/program (ac- eration of American Scientists] Military Analysis Network, cessed 27 June 2008). http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/ac-130.htm 23. Fleri et al., “Operation Anaconda Case Study,” 28. (accessed 20 January 2008). 24. United States General Accounting Office,Military 15. “A-10/OA-10 Thunderbolt II,” FAS Military Analysis Network, http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/a-10.htm Readiness: Lingering Training and Equipment Issues Hamper (accessed 20 January 2008). Air Support of Ground Forces, GAO-03-505, Report to the 16. William L. Smallwood, Warthog: Flying the A-10 in Ranking Minority Members, Subcommittees on Total the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1993), 142–43, Force and Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, 178–79, 190–91, 200, 205–7. House of Representatives (Washington, DC: General Ac- 17. maj David D. Dyche, “Military Reorganization: counting Office, May 2003), 3, http://www.gao.gov/new Challenge and Opportunity,” GlobalSecurity.org, http:// .items/d03505.pdf.

The Air Force can provide Global Vigilance, Global Reach, and Global Power only so long as it possesses robust capabilities in such areas as air dominance; global strike; space superiority; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); missile defense; special operations; air mobility; and cyberspace superiority. —Air Force Posture Statement 2008

2-Ireton.indd 94 10/27/08 9:11:05 AM Why We Should End the Aviator Continuation Pay Bonus Program

Maj Brian E. A. Maue, USAF

Editorial Abstract: In 1989, Congress established the Aviator Continuation Pay Bonus Pro- gram, originally designed to slow the exodus of military pilots to civilian airlines. By means of historical investigation of military and Social Security sources, the author concludes that this program, though initially a sensible idea, has outlived its usefulness. He points out that a combination of additional special pays, increased service commitments, more trained pilots, and decreased earnings potential for civilian pilots has made this program an anachronism.

note in the Air Force publica- ciency and effectiveness of the service’s tion Roll Call pointed out that ex- other policies, one incentive policy—the tending the length of military as- Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) program— signments from three to four appears worthy of scrutiny. Reviewing the Ayears would produce cost savings that the historical purpose of ACP and examining service could use to recapitalize its equip- evidence from military and Social Security ment, airplanes, and facilities.1 As Air Force sources suggest that the Air Force should decision makers review the monetary effi- end this program.

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The Historical Purpose of Airline Salary Reports: Aviator Continuation Pay: Disappearance of the Gap after Reducing the Airline- 11 September 2001 Opportunity “Gap” During the creation of ACP, the domestic airlines offered recruits the possibility that Enacted in 1989, ACP was designed to slow one day they might become senior pilots earn- the exodus of military pilots to civilian airing $300,000 a year while flying only 14 days lines—an industry that offered “an alternative each month. Using such earnings estimates as lifestyle, better retirement and benefits, and the standard for current airline opportunities, however, is no longer valid—just as the base- shorter work weeks.”2 Congress’s establish- line assumption of guaranteed airline employment of ACP sought to increase the retention ment is no longer a certainty. rates of full-time Air Force pilots by making Ever since the deregulation of major airlines their compensation competitive with that of in 1978, competition has become increasingly civilian-airline pilots. Currently, the Air Force intense within the industry, whose members offers its pilots an ACP contract of five annual use cost-saving strategies to remain profitable. payments of $25,000 for agreeing to serve an One such strategy involves acquiring a com- peting carrier. After a merger, the resulting additional five years. airline can reduce the previous route overlap At one time, such a program made sense. of the two former carriers, increase the number After all, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) of passengers per aircraft on each trip, and identified the annual income and career earn- enhance profitability. America West’s buyout ings of civilian pilots as among the highest in of US Airways in 2005 reflected this strategy. the United States.3 A “major” airline—one An airline may also seek better profits by that earns $1 billion in revenues annually— lowering labor costs—a measure made even offered the most attractive opportunities. Ac- more necessary by the events of 11 September 2001 (9/11). As a BLS report of 2005 noted, cording to the BLS’s Occupational Outlook re- “After September 11, 2001, air travel was se- port, the median annual earnings of airline verely depressed. A number of the major air- pilots, copilots, and flight engineers amounted lines were forced to reduce schedules, lay off to $129,250 in 2004.4 Military pilots have com- pilots, and even declare bankruptcy.”7 Said US peted very well for these jobs due to their Airways spokesman Rick Weintraub when an- thousands of hours of flying experience, as nouncing the layoff of 1,100 pilots at the end well as their high-quality training in some of of September 2001, “This is part of the se- quence of events forced on us by the attacks in the world’s most technologically advanced fly- 5 New York, and the response of the traveling ing equipment. public to those events.”8 Altogether, US Air- The attractiveness of airline jobs to Air ways laid off approximately 1,800 of the 6,000 Force pilots remains a notable issue in the pilots it employed before the 9/11 terrorist at- service’s pilot-retention reports—as has the tacks. “They are cutting pilots to the point presumed effect of its ACP program. For ex- where it reaches people who have been here ample, in 2004 a report noted that “the pilot 15 years,” said Roy Freundlich, a spokesman for the Airline Pilots Association.9 ACP program will continue to provide a buf- 6 Northwest and Delta airlines, both of which fer against future airline hiring.” However, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy status on 14 using the ACP program to “buffer” against air- September 2005, provide recent examples of line opportunities no longer appears neces- the major airlines’ troubles. These two, along sary, as the following analyses suggest. with United and US Airways, represented 50

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percent of US airline capacity.10 During this a pilot joins a new airline, then he or she starts time, all of Northwest’s pilots who had been at the bottom of the seniority list and pay with the airline for less than a year were even- scales. Seniority also affects how a pilot ad- tually laid off, and Delta’s pilots, who had re- vances through an airline’s piloting ranks, in- cently accepted a five-year deal that included sofar as the first consideration for any promo- a 32.5 percent pay cut, accepted an additional tion is the pilot’s initial date of hire. Similarly, 14 percent cut in 2005.11 In aggregate, de- seniority influences employee layoffs. Accord- creased employment opportunities such as ing to a report published in 2001, these should have lowered the “average salary” benchmarks to which ACP had once been When a furlough occurs, pilots are laid off in reverse seniority order, beginning at the bottom linked, yet the historical values of the ACP of the pilot seniority list. When recalls begin, pi- contracts reflect no such updating—those val- lots usually return to work in seniority order. ues did not decline. Furloughed pilots at unionized carriers have recall rights—the company must recall any pilots off furlough before hiring new pilots. Most pilot General Airline- contracts stipulate “recall rights”—the maxi- Employment Statistics: mum number of years a pilot can be on furlough before the company can remove him from the Disappearance of the Gap seniority list. Retention ranges from five years to an unlimited number of years, depending upon Due to the strict seniority system within the the airline.13 airline-pilot career field, the industry’s hiring rates and furlough levels serve as two broad Using data from AIR Inc., I constructed two indicators of career opportunity. All of the 14 airline-opportunity charts. Figure 1 displays the major airlines’ 63,000 pilots are unionized, employment drop that occurred after 9/11. and the unions strongly enforce a seniority Prior to that date, major carriers such as system.12 Regardless of previous experience, if American Airlines and United Parcel Service,

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Figure 1. Monthly hiring of new pilots by major and national airlines, 1999–2005

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whose pilot salaries used to reach $100,000 much more difficult to find employment, and, per year by the fifth year of service, hired hun- if hired, they would have faced slower-than- dreds of new pilots each month.14 In 2002 and traditional career progression and earnings 2003, however, the average number of new hires growth. Compared to the hiring environment per month for major airlines fell under 45. during ACP’s enactment in 1989, the airline The next tier of piloting opportunities oc- industry has become a far less attractive option. curs at the national-airline level. These carriers, such as Jet Blue and Midwest Express, generate between $100 million and $1 billion in an- Airline Pension Changes: nual revenues. Although it may take a few Disappearance of the Gap more years before a pilot reaches an annual salary of $100,000 at this level, the national- When an airline such as Delta or Northwest level carriers had offered employment oppor- enters bankruptcy, the Pension Benefit Guar- tunities to hundreds of pilots every month. anty Corporation, a federal agency, takes over After 9/11, though, their hiring rates dropped the company’s pension plan, guaranteeing by an average of 200 new pilots per month. only a minimum pension amount and penal- Figure 2 complements the airline hiring izing individuals who retire before age 65. The rates by illustrating the number of pilots on corporation capped pensions at $45,613 per furlough status before and after 9/11. Within year for pension plans cancelled in 2005.15 months after that date, the airlines furloughed Since pilots must retire by age 60, their can- thousands of pilots. The largest part of the celled plan in 2005 would be capped at furlough population—over 8,000 pilots—con- $29,649. For a major-airline pilot, such as a sisted of major-airline pilots who had recall Northwest pilot, this cap could lead to a loss of rights. Thus, military pilots looking to begin half or more of a yearly pension previously ex- an airline career in 2005 would have found it pected to exceed $60,000.16

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Figure 2. Monthly furlough levels by major and national airlines, 1999–2005

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Still, these retired pilots at least would have apply to ANG and AFR officers.18 However, a “defined benefit” of retirement funds that such a data set did not exist. Nevertheless, I they could expect to receive during their life- was able to generate a reasonable proxy of air- time. Most of the airlines, however, have since line impact on military-skilled pilots by exam- transitioned their retirement programs to ining a database composed of RC service re- “defined contribution” plans whereby, in most cords as well as earnings data from the Social cases, they contribute some amount of funds Security Administration (SSA). The RC pilot to each pilot’s retirement plan but offer no data came from the Defense Manpower Data guarantee of its retirement value—the nest Center’s work-experience file.19 egg may grow or decline in value. This pen- Within this database, the RC pilots of inter- sion change, which contrasts sharply with the est served in the AFR and ANG some time military’s guaranteed pension, represents an- during the years 1999–2004 in the ranks of other major difference in airline compensa- captain, major, and lieutenant colonel, with tion since ACP began in 1989. As an Air Force eight or more years of service. This popula- report of 2004 noted, “Younger pilots have tion loosely reflected the RC pilots who could watched the news and are talking to people leave the RC at their choosing, versus not hav- who have separated and returned back to ac- ing the opportunity to leave as a result of an tive duty. As a result, the prospect of a 20-year active duty service commitment. The RC pilots Air Force career followed by a government- I studied served at least 50 percent of their re- guaranteed pension has become much more corded time (from the data) in airlift, fighter, palatable. The certainty of the military com- or refueling airframes—these three mission pensation is a notable benefit that has become 17 areas representing approximately 70 percent more apparent since 9/11.” of all RC flying activity.T he database excluded The general trends in airline opportunity smaller mission areas, such as special opera- since 9/11 have taken the form of a decrease tions or initial flight instruction, due to their in employment and a decrease in earnings small sample size and corresponding con- and pension values for employed pilots. Yet straints that the SSA uses to protect the pri- ACP values do not reflect this fact. vacy of an individual’s earnings data. Another population restriction—the fact that RC pilots Decline in Specific Airline could not be full-time reservists (e.g., Active Guard Reserve)—created a sample popula- Opportunity for Military Pilots tion of approximately 4,200 RC pilots for each Although the airlines generally tended to- year. Lastly, the SSA’s process of gathering and wards reduced earnings potential, perhaps quality-checking earnings data resulted in individuals possessing a military pilot’s skills nearly a two-year lag in data availability, so remained above the general employment 2004’s information was the latest available. fray. In order to better determine the oppor- Having identified the population of part- tunities for such individuals, I examined data time pilots, I requested that the SSA uncover to ascertain the airline-employment trend of whether or not an RC member had worked the Air Force’s Reserve Component (RC) for a major or national-level airline during pilots—part-time fliers belonging to either that year—specifically, by utilizing the SSA’s the Air National Guard (ANG) or the Air employer identification number (EIN) vari- Force Reserve (AFR). able, which facilitates identification of an in- I would have preferred to have tracked ac- dividual’s employer(s). Therefore, to find tive duty pilots as they exited the Air Force out if an RC pilot worked for an airline dur- and joined the airlines since ACP applies to ing one of the calendar years 2000–4, I sub- them and since the Air Force Instruction mitted EINs of the 21 major and 44 national- (AFI) 36-3004, Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) level carriers of that period to the SSA for Program, specifically states that ACP does not employment matching.

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Figure 3 shows that 70 percent of RC pilots built up some seniority within their airline received paychecks from such airlines in 2000. (e.g., eight or more years). Thus, the illustra- This statistic closely resembles the airline- tion understates the reduced level of opportu- employment estimates calculated from a sec- nity for someone wishing to become an airline ond source—the Status of Forces: Reserve pilot for the first time.T he fact that over 8,000 Component (SOFRC) survey for the year 2000. major-airline pilots with recall rights were on I analyzed the subset of respondents made up furlough during this period made the quick of Air Force RC pilots (by means of a unique employment and advancement of a new airline pilot identifier) and found that 75 percent of hire unlikely. them stated that they were pilots or navigators in their civilian jobs. Given the possibility that the RC pilots worked for charter-plane ser- Decrease in Specific Wages vices or other non-top-tier airlines, the 5 perfor Military Pilots cent difference between the SOFRC and EIN- matching results appears trivial. The similarity A Defense Manpower Data Center report between the two sets of results supports my as- summarizing the results of the November sertion that the EIN-matching technique ac- 2004 SOFRC showed that the top two (of 17) curately reflects employment trends among most widely selected factors affecting the con- airline pilots. tinuation decisions of all RC members were The EIN matching in figure 3 shows that the “pay and allowances” and “the military retire- percentage of RC pilots employed by civilian ment system.”20 Unfortunately, this listing did airlines gradually dropped to about 50 by not include a “strength of preference” indica- 2004, coinciding with the general trend of lay- tion that would have showed the extent to offs and decreased opportunities within the which pilots preferred these two factors over top two airline tiers. This suggests that indi- the other 15. viduals with a military pilot’s skills were sub- Still, it did suggest that individuals value ject to the same downward trend in airline op- pay and benefits as top priorities when they portunities as the general population of pilots. consider working for an employer. It seems It is worth noting that the part-time RC pilots reasonable to assume that people will attempt depicted in the figure would most likely have to optimize their employment opportunities,

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Figure 3. Employment of Reserve Component pilots by major and national-level airlines

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with pay a major influence. With this in mind, middle, those with 14–19 years of military ser- I explored the earnings information of part- vice (approximately 37–42 years old); and (3) time RC pilots also identified as airline- em senior, those with 20 or more years of military ployees. Not all-encompassing, this data did service (approximately 43 years old or older). not account for benefits received by an “RC Figure 4 also shows the BLS-reported earn- employee,” such as base-exchange privileges ings averages for airline pilots identified by and accumulation of RC retirement points— Occupational Employment Statistics code 53- or for the higher “at home” expenses incurred 2011, “Airline Pilots, Copilots, and Flight En- from overnight airline flights or temporary gineers.” The BLS average shows a continu- military duties, such as higher child-support ous, albeit gradual, rise in pay—most likely costs. Still, as I will show, the earnings investi- due to a “survivor bias.” (As the airlines laid gation told a consistent story. off their junior workers, the average salary cal- To better understand how earnings changed culated would be based upon the remaining for pilot-skilled individuals, I constructed fig- pilots, who were more senior and earned ure 4 using grouped administration data from higher salaries.) the Defense Manpower Data Center and the Given the magnitude of the airline fur- SSA. As a crude attempt to control for some of loughs and the resulting survivor bias, one the earnings issues associated with age and se- would expect a similar trend of gradually ris- niority, the figure displays the before-tax earning earnings within the airline-pilot subpopu- ings averages (including combat-zone tax ex- lation of RC members. Yet their earnings lines clusions) of part-time RC pilots, based upon differ from the BLS average, leveling off and three different “years of service” groups: (1) dipping over time, which suggests that earn- junior, those with eight to 14 years of military ings, even when biased upward by a survivor service (approximately 30–36 years old); (2) effect, were cut significantly enough to appear

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Figure 4. Annual earnings of Reserve Component pilots working for airlines

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as decreases. Each of the RC airline categories work for two employers to earn their money, showed a trend of downward earnings by the had years of seniority built up with their air- year 2004, despite an opportunity to work for line, and did not enjoy as many tax-advantaged two employers. earnings (e.g., the Air Force’s basic allowance In summary, using EIN matching to un- for housing). cover airline opportunities revealed that pilot Why, then, might a pilot leave the Air earnings did not always increase and that air- Force? In the past, a subpopulation of mili- line employment was not always assured, even tary pilots left due to the rigors of high opfor individuals with military-pilot skills. A large erational tempo. They separated from the fraction of RC pilots who also worked as air- Air Force even when the ACP option was in line pilots at the beginning of 2000 experi- place, suggesting that its financial incentives enced a decrease in airline employment and did not affect their decision. One way to miti- pay opportunities following 9/11. Those who lacked seniority, such as recently separated ac- gate this outflow of pilots would involve in- tive duty Air Force pilots, enjoyed even fewer creasing the total number of pilots in order opportunities. Yet during this same period, to lower deployment rates. The Air Force, the value of newly offered ACP contracts did however, should consider this very expensive not drop. option only within the portfolio of many pilot- stabilization alternatives. Although the actual size of the “too many Additional, Nonpecuniary deployments” population remains unknown, Considerations Affecting we do know that over 60 percent of the eli- gible ACP pilots did not accept the ACP con- Air Force Pilot Retention tracts of five or more years in fiscal years It seems reasonable to ask what would hap- 2000 and 2001. However, by fiscal year 2004, pen if the ACP policy were eliminated. Would that trend had reversed itself, and ACP ac- individuals stop flying or applying to fly?I t ap- ceptance rates approached 70 percent, cer- pears unlikely. Strategic-compensation research tainly in part due to the patriotic response shows that nonpecuniary rewards such as ca- of pilots after 9/11.22 At the same time, the reer advancement, interesting work and work decrease in airline opportunities now ap- location, a valued peer group, and training pears a valid additional, if not dominant, opportunities may also make a job attractive.21 reason for the decreased separation rates of The mission of an Air Force pilot—which has military pilots from the Air Force. global implications and for which no civilian The Air Force has enacted additional poli- equivalent exists—offers these rewards. cies in an attempt to ensure that it maintains Furthermore, military pilots already receive enough pilots to achieve its vision of global two additional compensations by virtue of be- vigilance, reach, and power. For example, ing in the pilot career field. First, they learn a when it faced a potential pilot shortage in transferable civilian job skill, as opposed to the late 1990s, it steadily increased the num- other officers with less marketable technical skills, such as ballistic-missile-launch officers. ber of pilots it trained from 650 per year in Second, military pilots already receive the ad- 1997 to 1,100 per year in 2000. The year ditional aviation career incentive pay although 2000 also saw the Air Force increase the it does decline during the latter part of a ca- length of active duty service commitments reer. In 2004 a major with 12 years of service from eight to 10 years, incurred upon com- would have been making well over $90,000 in pletion of pilot-school training. Both poli- before-tax earnings, and that individual would cies, in conjunction with decreased civilian receive a secure pension, beginning in just opportunities, have more compelling claims eight years. This is competitive with the pay of that they—not the ACP policy—have cre- junior members in figure 4, who needed to ated a more stable pilot force.

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Limitations, Implications, and have ended and that airline “recovery” has begun. The very concept of what that recovery Future Directions of Research might look like must be redefined in light of on Air Force Compensation the evidence uncovered during this research. Like the preponderance of other research, The increase in the number of low-cost air- mine did not attain a full perspective of the lines, the bankruptcy and merger activities of situation. For example, I would have preferred major airlines, and the industry’s efforts to re- to have examined more recent earnings data, duce the cost of labor all suggest that airline- but the SSA’s process of gathering and quality compensation packages from any future re- checking produced a nearly two-year lag in in- covery will be far less appealing than they were formation availability. Additionally, the effect when ACP was enacted in 1989. As a recent of the expanding force of unmanned aerial New York Times article pointed out, pursuing vehicles has not yet been integrated into pilot- some grand airline opportunity is like “chas- compensation research. ing a dream toward a disappointing reality.”23 Still, my exploration of civilian pay revealed Just how much has the airline opportunity de- that the specific earnings opportunity of a ci- creased? In that same article, Paul Rice, a vice vilian airline pilot, with regard to both annual president of the Airline Pilots Association, compensation and future pension benefits, noted that in previous decades when a tempo- has been decreasing. Yet the fact that ACP rary layoff ended, nearly 100 percent of the contracts have not decreased suggests that furloughed pilots returned to the airlines. In that program is an anachronism—the product contrast, since 9/11, 30 to 35 percent of the of a time when many airlines could entice pi- furloughed pilots have not accepted the offer lots with a $300,000 salary for 14 days of flying each month, along with the promise of a lu- of their old airline jobs, which reflects how crative pension. much less attractive an airline-pilot career has Because the career-specific incentive pay of become. Yet military ACP contracts have not ACP emerged during a time when military taken into account this decreased opportunity compensation lagged behind that of civilian within the civilian-airline sector. airlines, the Air Force should reexamine the Last, some ACP advocates have stated that ACP program, and perhaps the Aviation Ca- the program pays for itself if it persuades only reer Incentive Pay program as well, to deter- a few dozen pilots to remain in the Air Force, mine whether it is still necessary. One method since that retention saves the service millions would entail expanding EIN-matching tech- of dollars by not having to train replacement niques to include viewing the employment pilots. Given the findings of my research, the and earnings opportunities of pilots who have onus is now on ACP proponents to provide recently separated from the active duty force. evidence that, without an ACP program, some This would enable policy makers to uncover individuals would not become Air Force pilots the percentage of separating pilots who either or would leave the service for the airlines (ver- join the airlines or take nonairline jobs, as well sus an alternative explanation such as the as the amount of money they earn (within the tempo of operational deployment). constraints of the SSA). Although the airlines no longer appear to be a significant bench- The preponderance of the evidence sug- mark for ACP values, perhaps some other pro- gests that ACP pay is unnecessary and that the fession is. We should apply EIN matching to Air Force could use the funds more effectively other, recently separated, Air Force Specialty elsewhere. Specifically, it could apply money Code categories of officers as well. saved from stopping ACP expenditures to spe- Proponents of ACP will most likely point to cific war-fighting policies such as increasing the airlines’ recent hiring of a few hundred imminent-danger pay or recapitalizing equip- new pilots in 2007 as a sign that furloughs ment and facilities. ❑

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Notes

1. “PCS Changes,” Roll Call, 2–8 February 2007, 1, 14. Author’s compilation of AIR’s “Monthly Hiring http://www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD Summary” data, http://www.jet-jobs.com/guestframe.html -070202-029.pdf. (see “Monthly Hiring Summary”). 2. Lt Col Craig A. Bernhard, “How We Got the FY 89 15. Associated Press, “Airline Workers Fear Pension Plans Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP),” student report (Wash- Will End,” Boston Globe, 27 September 2005, 1, http:// ington, DC: National Defense University, National War www.boston.com/business/personalfinance/articles/ College, 1989), 3. 2005/09/27/airline_workers_fear_pension_plans_will_end. 3. “Aircraft Pilots and Flight Engineers,” in Occupa- 16. Steve Karnowski, “Bankrupt Carriers Must Fund tional Outlook Handbook, 2006–07 Edition (Washington, Pensions,” Associated Press Financial Wire, 15 September DC: Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Department of Labor, 2005, 1. 2005), 6, http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos107.htm (accessed 17. AFPC, “U.S. Air Force Rated Officer Retention 29 December 2005). Analysis,” 3. 4. ibid. 18. AFI 36-3004, Aviator Continuation Pay (ACP) Program, 5. Kit Darby and Becky Dean, Pilot Career Guide (At- 12 April 2007, 1, http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/shared/ lanta, GA: AIR, 2001), 14–15, http://www.jet-jobs.com/ media/epubs/AFI36-3004.pdf. guestframe.html (see “Products & Publications”). 19. For a detailed description of how the RC service 6. Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC), “U.S. Air data was linked with the SSA records of military and civil- Force Rated Officer Retention Analysis: Pilot, Navigator ian earnings, see Brian E. A. Maue, “Balancing Two Lives: and Air Battle Manager CCR [Cumulative Continuation The Relationship of Activation, Pay, and Retention among Rates] and TARS [Total Active Rated Service],” 2004, 3. U.S. Air Force Reserve Pilots” (PhD diss., Pardee RAND 7. “Aircraft Pilots and Flight Engineers,” 5. Graduate School, 2007), 14–21, http://rand.org/pubs/ 8. Associated Press, “Airline-Unions Announce Pilot Layoffs,” 21 September 2001, BC Cycle, 1. rgs_dissertations/2007/RAND_RGSD213.pdf. 9. Associated Press, “US Airways Plans to Lay Off 471 20. Defense Manpower Data Center Human Resources More Pilots to Return Bankrupt Airline to Profitability,” Strategic Assessment Program, “Survey Note: Factors In- 26 October 2002, BC Cycle, 1. fluencing Continuation Decisions ofN ational Guard/Re- 10. Mary Schlangenstien, “Low-Cost Carriers Poised serve Members,” note no. 2005-008 (Washington, DC: to Reap Benefits from Delta Bankruptcy,” Seseret Morning Defense Manpower Data Center, 25 July 2005), 1, https:// News, 19 September 2005, 1. America West purchased US www.hrm.osd.mil/appj/hrsap. Airways in 2005. United Airlines reemerged from bank- 21. Joseph J. Martocchio, Strategic Compensation: A Hu- ruptcy in 2006—Delta in 2007. man Resource Management Approach (Upper Saddle River, 11. Joshua Freed, “Delta and Northwest Pilots May NJ: Prentice Hall, 1998), 3–12. Have Had Enough of Cuts,” Associated Press, 18 Novem- 22. AFPC, “U.S. Air Force Rated Officer Retention ber 2005; and “Delta Pilots Accept Pay Cut Deal,” CNN. Analysis,” 4. com, 29 December 2005, http://edition.cnn.com/2005/ 23. Jeff Bailey, “For Pilots, Dreams Run into Reality,” BUSINESS/12/29/delta.pilots.ap/index.html. New York Times, 10 April 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/ 12. Darby and Dean, Pilot Career Guide, 24–25. 2008/04/10/business/10pilots.html?em&ex=1208145600 13. ibid. &en=371474b8fd0753b6&ei=5087%0A.

Global Vigilance, Global Reach and Global Power grant Joint and Combined Force Commanders the ability to safeguard the Homeland, assure allies, dissuade opponents, and inflict strategic dislocation and paralysis on adversaries—all while minimizing the loss of life associated with land warfare. —Gen T. Michael Moseley CSAF White Paper, The Nation’s Guardians: America’s 21st Century Air Force

3-Maue.indd 104 10/27/08 9:12:39 AM cedes that the North’s weakened military makes forced unification of the peninsula under a communist regime unlikely, he contends that the DPRK’s conventional forces still pose a considerable threat and can influence the political environment. Bechtol points out that the concentration of artillery and rockets aimed toward Seoul can be as much a deterrent as nuclear warheads. His analysis of a 2002 naval skirmish between North and South Korean vessels further supports his point. Bechtol submits that the clash along the Northern Limit Line separating the two countries off the western coast was most likely neither a navigational error by the North Korean sailors nor a staged confronta- tion by military hard-liners opposed to Kim Chong Il’s policies. Rather, the naval engagement was almost certainly a deliberate provocation by the North Korean leadership. He extols several possible motives for the North Korean decision to initiate the scuffle, to include highlighting the disputed border, and suggests that the timing of the event to correspond with Seoul’s hosting of the World Cup soccer games supports his theory. Bechtol also pro- Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North Korea vides a comprehensive study of the DPRK’s nefari- by Bruce E. Bechtol Jr. Potomac Books (http:// ous international business enterprises, perhaps one www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver of the least-covered aspects in the study of North Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2007, 288 pages, Korea. He does an admirable job of describing how $23.96 (hardcover). the North Koreans depend on selling illegal drugs Deciphering the enigma that is the Democratic and counterfeiting US currency and American ciga- People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has become rettes to prop up their ailing economy and applauds somewhat of a cottage industry, even more so now the efforts of international law enforcement to deal that the Hermit Kingdom has become the newest with these issues. But he laments the failure of the member of the family of nuclear powers. The gen- US State Department to confront the North Kore- eral consensus among Korean scholars is that, far ans for fear of complicating efforts to reach a nu- from perpetuating the popular madman myth, Kim clear agreement. Chong Il and the North Korean leadership have In the debate of engagement versus isolation of adroitly leveraged their limited options to skillfully North Korea, count Bechtol among the supporters employ the art of brinkmanship, with the effect of of the latter policy. Red Rogue was published prior to driving the political and military agenda of north- both the South Korean presidential elections in east Asia to maintain their hold on power, regard- 2007 and the shutdown of North Korea’s Yongbyon less of the negative impact on the North Korean nuclear facility in July 2007. One can surmise, how- people. In Red Rogue: The Persistent Challenge of North ever, that Bechtol would approve of the election of Korea, Bruce Bechtol updates this thesis by ex- Lee Myung-bak of Korea’s conservative Grand Na- pounding on how the North Koreans have changed tional Party and would be wary of North Korean their military, diplomatic, and economic strategy promises of compliance. He sees no concrete bene- since 11 September 2001 to achieve these ends. fit to the Sunshine Policy practiced by the last two Bechtol acknowledges that the nuclear situation liberal South Korean administrations of Kim Dae in the region has become more critical but believes Jung and Roh Moo Hyun, maintaining that a dem- it is a mistake to concentrate efforts solely on weap- onstration of good faith by the North Koreans is ons of mass destruction. Although the author con- required prior to any engagement with the rogue

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regime. North Korea’s tardiness in implementing Phantom Reflections: The Education of an Ameri- conditions spelled out in the joint statement may can Fighter Pilot in Vietnam by Mike McCarthy. validate his recommendations. Praeger/Greenwood Publishing Group (http:// Bechtol’s experience in the Marine Corps and www.praeger.com), 88 Post Road West, Westport, Defense Intelligence Agency, as well as on the fac- Connecticut 06881, 2006, 200 pages, $44.95 ulty of the Marine Command and General Staff (hardcover). College, gives his work a military perspective often lacking in strategic analyses of the Korean penin- Phantom Reflections explains how a conservative sula. His research can be characterized as extensive young fighter pilot went to Vietnam full of visions since he utilizes numerous primary documents, the of glory and patriotism to fight for a just cause yet, majority of them accessed through Internet sites. after retiring as an Air Force colonel, came to feel But firsthand interviews, noticeably lacking here, that it was all for naught—a waste. Nevertheless, he could have corroborated many of his assertions. says it was the “defining experience” of his life. Readers should have a firm grounding in the re- Mike McCarthy produces this memoir in a splen- cent history of the Korean peninsula, for Bechtol did writing style. Born in upstate New York into a explains little of the causal factors that have led to physician’s family, he got his college education the current situation. He only obliquely refers to (majoring in business) in Florida, but he claims the Agreed Framework of 1994 when explaining that he had decided to be a fighter pilot at age 10. events that led up to the current state of nuclear McCarthy entered the Air Force and graduated from negotiations with the South. He correctly points out pilot training at Webb AFB, Texas, as the Vietnam that the Kwangju uprising in 1980 was the seminal War moved towards its climax. He went through event that characterized antagonistic civil-military crew training in Florida in the F-4 Phantom, arriv- relations in the Republic of Korea, but his scant ing at Ubon, Thailand, as part of the 8th Tactical summary of the unrest leaves an uninformed reader Fighter Wing late in 1967. with more questions than answers. Bechtol ponders McCarthy recounts his eight months at Ubon in the question of who would succeed Kim Chong Il as some detail, describing the recurring fear of going leader of the DPRK, with no description of Kim’s to North Vietnam and the excitement involved. It own succession experience as a possible model. No- certainly was no picnic, and he had several close where in the book does he mention juche, the ideo- brushes with death. Yet, through it all he had no logical philosophy of self-reliance that has driven doubt that he was engaged in a just war and that he North Korean domestic and foreign policy for over was doing the right thing for his country. Because a half century. of the bombing halt in March 1968, McCarthy Despite these deficiencies, the informed reader could not record 100 “counter” missions to the who requires updated information will find Red North although he had combat aplenty. He thus Rogue a succinct account of the current threat and had to spend the last four months of his Southeast subsequent policy concerning North Korea. By Asia tour working on the Seventh Air Force staff at concentrating on the North’s actions that earned it Saigon. Among the tours after he returned to the a place as one of three charter members of the “world” was an instructor job at Homestead AFB, “axis of evil,” Bechtol provides ample ammunition Florida, and the one he cites as the best of his en- for critics of an engagement policy toward the tire career—an exchange tour with the Canadians, DPRK. I urge readers to peruse this book without flying the CF-104. The author also had a fine expe- delay, however, because the dynamic nature of the rience stationed in Scandinavia and a not-so-fine region may render much of the author’s current one (albeit highly educational) at the Pentagon. analysis moot in a short period of time. Only with the passing of years did McCarthy Although one may disagree about whether the come to perceive the futility of the Vietnam War, a carrot or the stick is the more appropriate method realization that has caused him to have doubts about when dealing with the North Koreans, few would the current conflict in Iraq. The book is so well dispute that the stability of the Korean Peninsula is written that I highly recommend it to air warriors/ vital to American interests. With the global war on scholars who want an evening of entertainment. If terror and conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq captur- they wish to learn more about the technologies, ing the majority of the attention of US policy makers, tactics, and history of the air war over North Viet- Bechtol provides a potent reminder of that fact. nam, then Marshall Michel’s two works, The Eleven Dr. John Farrell Days of Christmas: America’s Last Vietnam Battle and Maxwell AFB, Alabama Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965–1972

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might better serve that purpose. (Like McCarthy, cess and the treatment of foreign investors present Michel was an F-4 pilot in that conflict.) problems for China. Yet he argues that China has its share of legitimate gripes. Dr. David R. Mets Of most interest to military readers, Overholt Maxwell AFB, Alabama outlines that a serious difference of opinion exists between those who view China as a quietly brood- ing aggressor and those who see it as principally The Rise of China: How Economic Reform Is Creat- interested in the peaceful acquisition of wealth and ing a New Superpower by William H. Overholt. influence. The author falls into the latter camp, as- W. W. Norton and Company (http://www serting that China suffers from being too closely .wwnorton.com), 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, compared to the Soviet Union and other commu- New York 10110, 1994, 432 pages, $16.95 (soft- nist regimes. cover). He further argues that the United States must be careful not to create a self-fulfilling prophecy Over the past 30 years, China’s economy has through harsh rhetoric and political blackballing, been resurgent. Recent numbers published by the recommending that America maintain its strength World Bank indicate that since 1978 China has but adopt a welcoming economic and rhetorical averaged an annual growth of 9.4 percent in gross posture. Additionally, Overholt notes the differ- domestic product (GDP) and a sixfold increase in ence in military expenditures between the two GDP from 1984 to 2004; furthermore, in 2004 it countries, with China spending $30 billion a year— represented 12 percent of the world’s economy on one-tenth of US outlays at the time. To the author, the basis of purchasing-power parity (second only this symbolizes the United States’ upper hand and to the United States) and one-third of global eco- relative ability to play nice without immediate fear. nomic growth. China has also attracted hundreds The Rise of China presents a wealth of historical, of billions of dollars of foreign investment and economic, and political facts to the reader. Al- more than a trillion dollars of domestic, nonpublic though slightly dated, the book offers relevant in- investment. Just a dozen years ago, China barely formation about political issues and subissues as had mobile telecommunications services. Now it well as a more-than-adequate backdrop for a bal- claims more than 300 million mobile-phone sub- anced and fair study of China. scribers—the most in the world. There is no mistaking the fact that China has Maj Rodney D. Bullard, USAF one of the highest growth rates in the world, but Washington, DC what does that mean for other countries—particularly, the United States? In The Rise of China, a dense and scholarly work, William Overholt addresses these questions and many more. After reviewing Battling Tradition: Robert F. McDermott and Shap- China’s ancient and former status as the Middle ing the U.S. Air Force Academy by Paul T. Kingdom, he quickly lays out facts indicating that, Ringenbach. Imprint Publications (http://www notwithstanding the country’s recent gains, it still .imprint-chicago.com), 230 East Ohio Street, must overcome extreme third world poverty, in Suite 300, Chicago, Illinois 60611, 2006, 333 efficient socialist measures, and disparities between pages, $24.95 (softcover). the poor and rich. The author also compares China to Russia—the country that most Americans still When the Air Force Academy was first conceived equate with socialism and communism—arguing after World War II, senior Airmen, many of them that Russia failed and has continued to fail because West Point graduates, modeled the new school on of its initial reluctance to reform and its attempts to their alma mater. This resulted in an Air Force do too much too quickly after having finally -de Academy that copied the curriculum, honor code, cided to reform. Principally, Overholt asserts the fourth-class disciplinary system, and even military- superiority of China’s long-term strategy of piece- training regimen from West Point—not a bad idea. meal political and economic reform, maintaining The honor code and disciplinary system served as that it will eventually produce a nation much differ- solid foundations upon which to base a new mili- ent from the one we have tended to stereotype. tary academy. The curriculum was another matter. The author writes exhaustively about China in Archaic and out of touch with modern military terms of Hong Kong, international relations, and requirements and educational practices, the West the United States, acknowledging that market ac- Point curriculum offered no electives, and all ca-

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dets, regardless of prior college experience, had to Bowl in the very first year it had a four-year- pro take the specified courses. There were no academic gram—raised some eyebrows. In 1965 a cheating majors. Furthermore, mathematics and science scandal at the academy saw 105 cadets expelled, dominated the curriculum, with only a small por- nearly 42 percent of them athletes and 28 percent tion allotted to the humanities and social sciences. from the football team. Two years later, another This did not represent a suitable plan for develop- scandal hit, with an additional 46 cadets thrown ing forward-looking Air Force officers. Fortunately, out—nearly a third of them athletes as well. help was on the way. Critics identified the problem as an overempha- Col Robert McDermott became dean in 1956 sis on academics, charging that McDermott’s changes after serving two years as vice-dean. “McD,” who went too far by pushing cadets into impossible had new and radically different ideas, wanted an time-management binds as they attempted to make all-military faculty. To establish academic credibility, passing grades in increasingly advanced and diverse however, he worked the Air Force personnel system courses. For his part, McDermott argued precisely to ensure it supplied him with officers who already the opposite: that an overemphasis on athletics, es- had a master’s degree. He also began sending doz- pecially a football program that aspired to play na- ens of officers off to school to obtain graduate de- tionally ranked opponents on a regular basis, was grees so they could later join the faculty. To gain the culprit. further credibility, he pushed to have the academy Surprisingly—and I don’t think Ringenbach ex- officially accredited before graduation of the first plores this issue deeply enough—McDermott and class in 1959—an unheard-of goal that the school his faculty escaped from these scandals largely un- nonetheless met. scathed, despite the fact that both occurred in their As for the curriculum itself, McDermott inaugu- domain. Instead, the superintendent, comman- rated an “enrichment program” that allowed in- dant, and athletic director soon left under clouds. coming students to validate courses they had al- McDermott retired in 1968 after 25 years of service ready taken at a civilian university. He directed the and then went on to even greater success as presi- academic departments to offer electives and then dent of the United Services Automobile Association. restructured the curriculum to deemphasize math Overall, Battling Tradition is a thoroughly re- and sciences while boosting humanities and social searched and insightful look at a driven man who sciences. This in turn allowed cadets to choose an left an indelible stamp not only on the Air Force academic major—anything from aeronautics to his- Academy but also on the other service academies. tory. McDermott’s ultimate goal called for the Although this biography will appeal mostly to academy to offer an accredited master’s degree. academy graduates, there are important lessons In these efforts, he encountered resistance. Some here for all officers, regardless of service, concern- of it came from other agencies at the academy, but, ing military education, discipline, and the dynam- more significantly, West Point, Annapolis, and the ics of change in a military organization. Coast Guard Academy implacably opposed him, fearing being overshadowed by such far-reaching Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, Retired reforms. They lobbied their supporters in civilian West Chicago, Illinois academe, the press, and Congress to oppose such “radicalism.” McDermott swept all of them aside. He achieved almost all he hoped for although he On Call in Hell: A Doctor’s Iraq War Story by Cdr had to settle for a “cooperative” master’s program Richard Jadick with Thomas Hayden. New that saw the academy offering accredited graduate- American Library, a division of Penguin Group level courses for selected cadets who, upon gradua- (http://us.penguingroup.com), 375 Hudson tion, would then complete their master’s degree in Street, New York, New York 10014, 2007, 288 six to nine months at participating civilian universi- pages, $24.95 (hardcover). ties. It was a measure of McDermott’s success that within a few years, the other academies had initi- I first heard about Cdr Richard Jadick’s story in ated such changes themselves. the 20 March 2006 issue of Newsweek, so when he In other areas, however, McDermott proved less wrote a book about his experience with the 1st Bat- successful. Although the author notes that the dean talion, 8th Marine Regiment (1/8) in Fallujah, decried what he saw as an overemphasis on inter- Iraq, I just had to buy it. I read On Call in Hell in collegiate athletics, the seeds for future problems one day and enjoyed it from beginning to end. My were sown early on. The football team’s success— reactions ran the gamut from laughing to crying as going undefeated and earning a trip to the Cotton Jadick and Thomas Hayden describe Jadick’s expe-

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riences as a battalion surgeon during the battle for put up with a haphazard, notional approach to ca- Fallujah in November 2004 and how he got to that sualty evacuation” (p. 147). point in his life. Near the end of the book, the authors return The book begins on the day that marines kicked the reader to the battle in Fallujah. The narration off Operation Phantom Fury to clear the city of in- details how Jadick brings medical care to wounded surgents. A call came in to pick up a wounded marines. “I couldn’t control who got hit or where, force-reconnaissance corpsman who had been shot but I still had my sphere of influence, and I decided near the city’s cultural center, so Jadick jumped that if it was taking too long to get the wounded out into a Humvee driven by Lt Matthew Kutilek, leader of the city, then the only way we could cut that of 3d Platoon, Weapons Company. “I couldn’t go in travel time down was by moving ourselves in. That alone, but I didn’t want to send the Marines in would mean, in effect, setting up an emergency alone either—and although he looked bewildered room in the middle of the hot zone” (p. 162). To at first, he shrugged and accepted that I was going do that, Jadick sought and received permission along for the ride. I could have sent in a senior from his chain of command to set up the forward corpsman, but I didn’t want to do that either. For aid station in Fallujah. one thing, a leader has to be willing to take the The 1/8 pulled out of Fallujah in December same risks he’s asking his men to take. And al- 2004, along with Jadick and the corpsmen who though I had trained my corpsmen well, I had seen worked with him. In January 2006, Jadick accepted sucking chest wounds before and they hadn’t. I fig- the Bronze Star with “V” device for valor—to that ured I would be in and out in 15 minutes” (pp. date, the only doctor in Iraq to earn that combina- 15–16). This run marked the beginning of a har- tion. Jadick was credited with saving the lives of 30 rowing and emotional journey for Jadick and his 54 marines who might have died had he and his corps- Navy corpsmen. men not followed them into the fight. Just as the narrative pulled me into the upcom- Well written, On Call in Hell is certainly worth ing battle, so did it take me back to how Jadick be- reading. One caveat: readers averse to coarse lan- came involved with the military in the first place. guage should be advised that the book does con- Although he lost an appointment to West Point be- tain some profanity. cause of a wandering right eye, he received an ROTC scholarship from the Marine Corps to at- MSgt Kelley Stewart, USAF tend college, spending 10 years in communications Maxwell AFB, Alabama before leaving the Corps to enter medical school. Jadick tells how he and his assistant battalion surgeon at his first assignment developed the con- Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Secu- cept of the forward aid station, which brings medical rity by Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler. attention to the wounded at or near the front lines. National Defense University Press and Potomac Jadick took this idea with him to his next assign- Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), ment where he sold it to the senior enlisted man in 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, his new organization, who helped Jadick “hone the 2007, 336 pages, $48.00 (hardcover), $24.00 leadership and requisitioning skills [he] would need (softcover). to put it into action in Iraq, and [they] worked together on figuring out how to really make it a part Professional military education (PME) programs of battalion combat medicine” (p. 82). are typically reading-intensive. As any PME student Finally, the book explains why Jadick’s concern knows, though, it’s only a lot of reading if you do it. about evacuating wounded marines made him In Seeing the Elephant, PME students have a tool that think about putting his concept into practice. Ac- goes a long way toward reducing that burden. cording to his account, operational plans had con- The authors of this work are well suited for the sidered actual combat but not how to treat and task. Dr. Hans Binnendijk is director of the Center move the wounded. “I couldn’t trust my guys to a for Technology and National Security Policy and system I didn’t understand, a system that might or Roosevelt Chair at the National Defense University might not be able to guarantee that they get the in Washington, DC. Dr. Richard Kugler is Distin- very best care we could possibly provide. There was guished Research Professor at the Center for Tech- no way I was going to be okay with that, for the sake nology and National Security Policy. As they men- of my Marines, and honestly, for the sake of profes- tion in the preface, the authors have written the sional and military pride as well. I had done too book especially for students attending the war col- much and come too far, and so had my Marines, to leges—students who typically have not had the time

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to develop a deep-seated knowledge of issues con- defense strategy, describing the national security cerning national security and international relations. elephant as they see it. The study serves as “an intellectual history of na- Finally, the range of titles selected for analysis— tional security thinking since the end of the Cold perhaps Seeing the Elephant’s most valuable asset— War” (p. xi). Since that time, hundreds of books also sets this book apart. The authors, of course, have described the international environment in have “rounded up the usual suspects,” examining the post–Cold War world and/or have provided a works by Graham Allison, Zbigniew Brzezinski, variety of often-contradictory prescriptions for a Robert Keohane, John Mearsheimer, and other new national security strategy. Seeing the Elephant ad- well-known academics in the field of international dresses these disparate ideas. Binnendijk and Kugler security. However, Binnendijk and Kugler have summarize the ideas from more than 60 books on broadened their work to include views and ideas national security topics and critique them, based from such nonacademics as Gen Tommy Franks, on the outcome of real-world events. This may former commander of US Central Command; At- seem a rather simple task, but several qualities set lantic Monthly magazine’s Robert Kaplan; and News- their book apart from what might at first glance ap- week correspondent Fareed Zakaria. Seeing the Ele- pear to be a basic review of the literature. phant belongs in the library of anyone with an First, the summaries are superb. Although I interest in international affairs. Those who have have not read all of the books addressed in Seeing not been able to read the works reviewed in this the Elephant, Binnendijk and Kugler’s summaries of book will get a firm foundation in recent thinking those I have read are exactly right. They discuss the about national security studies, while experts can authors’ arguments and rationale without giving use Seeing the Elephant to refresh their memories on short shrift to the subtleties of those arguments, important ideas in the field. thus providing the reader with a very thorough un- Lt Col James J. McNally, USAF, Retired derstanding of each author’s ideas. Tampa, Florida The second quality that sets this book apart is its organization. The title refers to the parable of the blind men, each of whom touches a different part Airpower in Small Wars: Fighting Insurgents and of an elephant and tries to describe the whole. The Terrorists by James S. Corum and Wray R. Johnson. reviewed books are arranged in a series of sub- University Press of Kansas (http://www.kansaspress groups that involve different parts of the national .ku.edu), 2502 Westbrooke Circle, Lawrence, security elephant. An introductory chapter defines Kansas 66045-4444, 2003, 560 pages, $24.95 terms and lays out the structure of the study. Chap- (softcover). ters 2 and 3 divide works into two camps: (1) “neo- Kantian” for books that describe/prescribe a world Irregular warfare seems to be the hot topic of heading for the peaceful spread of democratic gov- late in the Air Force. Unfortunately, we as a service ernments (e.g., Francis Fukuyama’s The End of His- have suffered from a lack of good books to educate tory and the Last Man), and (2) “neo-Hobbesian” for ourselves on this subject. Airpower in Small Wars of- books that espouse a traditional realist view of the fers a solution, however. Authors James Corum and world (e.g., Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civiliza- Wray Johnson, both former instructors at Air Uni- tions and the Remaking of World Order). Chapter 4 versity’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies (now deals with books that address the impact of the In- the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies), ternet and other aspects of technology on national wrote this book to fill the void in serious research security (e.g., Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat: about airpower’s role in small wars. They provide a A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century). Chapter 5 comprehensive history of that topic for American discusses books about US grand strategy, including military officers and policy makers. In this endeavor, Joseph Nye’s Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Corum and Johnson succeed brilliantly. Politics. Chapter 6 addresses varying US defense The book covers this specialized role of airpower strategies, including such works as Max Boot’s Sav- in the twentieth century, from Pershing’s expedi- age Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American tion in 1916 to the Israelis’ operations against the Power and Wesley Clark’s Waging Modern War: Bos- Palestinians in 2000. The 10 chapters provide a nia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat. In the last chap- broad survey of airpower’s role in small wars, cover- ter, which summarizes information from the previ- ing the European colonial wars, Vietnam, Latin ous six chapters, Binnendijk and Kugler put forth America, and the Middle East. The authors note their own ideas for US national security policy and that the US Army first used airplanes against an ir-

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regular opponent during the Mexican Punitive Ex- 8. Small wars are intelligence intensive. pedition of 1916. Ultimately however, the US Ma- rine Corps was the first to take the use of airpower 9. Airpower provides the flexibility and initiative in small wars seriously. Sometimes called “State De- that are normally the advantage of the guerrilla. partment troops in small wars” (p. 11), the marines 10. Small wars are long wars. had extensive experience that led to the publication of the Small Wars Manual, a classic 1940s-era 11. The United States and its allies must put Marine Corps manual highlighting lessons learned more effort into small wars training. in small wars of the twentieth century. I highly recommend Airpower in Small Wars not Airpower in Small Wars provides a fantastic per- only for members of the Air Force’s special opera- spective on the enduring use of airpower, empha- tions community but also for all Airmen who con- sizing that our current interest is nothing new. Un- tribute or will contribute to the “long war.” fortunately, it also underscores the fact that we have frequently not learned the lessons of history. One Lt Col Michael C. Grub, USAF of my favorite passages comes from the authors’ ex- Hurlburt Field, Florida amination of the British experience in managing Iraq after the First World War: “If the British government had had a carefully crafted grand strategic Tempered Steel: The Three Wars of Triple Air Force plan to alienate the three major groups in Iraq Cross Winner Jim Kasler by Perry D. Luckett (Kurds, Shiite Muslims, and Sunni Muslims) and to and Charles L. Byler. Potomac Books (http:// force the whole country into rebellion against their www.potomacbooksinc.com), 22841 Quicksilver British occupiers, they could not have succeeded Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, 2005, 320 pages, more handily” (p. 54). Apparently, history has a $22.36 (hardcover), $15.16 (softcover) (2006). way of repeating itself. This book records the successes of airpower when it is used correctly as well I’ve never known of another book’s title and sub- as its failings when it is misused. title that described its protagonist so well. Tempered Corum and Johnson offer the reader superb his- Steel: The Three Wars of Triple Air Force Cross Winner torical background for decision making in current Jim Kasler chronicles the heroic life of this Air Force and future irregular wars; indeed, their book serves colonel, a jet-fighter ace during the Korean War as a useful “lessons learned” primer for Air Force and the only Airman in history to receive three Air leadership. In fact, every Airman involved in plan- Force Crosses. This biography is a gripping account ning or employing airpower in current and future of a man whose unparalleled commitment to “ser- irregular wars should print out and post the 11 les- vice before self” is something we should all emulate. sons they mention in the conclusion (pp. 425–37): Written by biographers Perry D. Luckett, a retired Air Force communications officer, and Charles 1. A comprehensive strategy is essential. L. Byler, an Air Force veteran who served under 2. The support role of airpower (e.g., recon- Kasler in 1965, Tempered Steel reads more like a Holly- naissance, transport, and so on) is usually the wood thriller than an ordinary biography. The au- most important and effective mission in a thors’ extensive research of Kasler’s life is very ap- guerrilla war. parent, and their powerful writing thrusts the reader into the tail-gun turret of a B-29 with the 3. The ground attack role of airpower becomes 18-year-old two-striper over Japan and, later, into more important when the war becomes con- the torture chambers of North Vietnam’s Hanoi ventional. Hilton with the now-40-year-old lieutenant colonel. 4. Bombing civilians is ineffective and counter- Luckett and Byler take the reader on a journey productive. through Jim Kasler’s life, from his humble birth to an ordinary family in a small Midwestern town, 5. There is an important role for the high-tech through his amazing frontline battle experiences aspect of airpower in small wars. in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. By delving deeply 6. There is an important role for the low-tech into Kasler’s life, showing the reader where the aspect of airpower in small wars. man behind the three Air Force Crosses came from, they successfully avoid writing a typical military bi- 7. Effective joint operations are essential for the ography that chronicles only the defining moments effective use of airpower. of a war hero’s life on the battlefield. For example,

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the authors explore the relationship with his wife, velopment, so has he. I only wish that the book had Martha, from the time that she “didn’t want to date appeared before 2005. Such a powerful and com- a little guy” (p. 17) through their happy marriage, pelling life story deserved to be told much sooner. which produced three children, to those times when Tempered Steel is an absolutely riveting account of his family followed him around the country as he Jim Kasler, a true American hero. I enthusiastically serves his nation wherever he is needed. Luckett recommend it to anyone, young and old, military and Byler also expose the reader to major turning or civilian. Any American with a pulse will have a points, such as the moment the nineteen-year-old hard time putting this book down, so pick a Satur- Kasler realized his calling in life, sitting in the blis- day and clear your schedule because once you start ter gunner’s seat of a B-29 Superfortress, returning reading, you won’t stop until you are sure that Col- to base after a successful bombing mission in Japan: onel Kasler makes it out of Vietnam alive. “[He was] looking out over Saipan as they cruised home, when a P-51 fighter came swooping up and Cadet David L. Morgan, USAF popped right in beside them. The pilot waved at Air Force ROTC, University of Houston him, then peeled off in a roll. Jim thought, Now that’s the way to fly!From that moment, Jim knew he wanted to be a fighter pilot” (p. 13). The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons If ever there was an Air Force equivalent to Sav- of Appeasing Hitler by Jeffrey Record. Potomac ing Private Ryan, this is it. The book describes every Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com), moment in such minute detail that the reader can almost feel Kasler’s excitement and adrenaline 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, Virginia 20166, rush as he destroys his fifth MiG over Korea and 2006, 160 pages, $19.96 (hardcover). shouts over his radio, “Casey, I’m an Ace!” (p. 36). The writing is so convincing and powerful that we Say what you will, hindsight is not always 20/20. can almost feel the intense pain that Kasler felt, So argues Jeffrey Record in his book The Specter of cringing as he endures literally hundreds of hours Munich. It seems that many US leaders—both mili- of torture, be it by shackling, whipping, starvation, tary and civilian—like to invoke the Anglo-French or physical beatings for refusing to sell out his appeasement of Hitler’s Nazi Germany at the Mu- country by participating in North Vietnamese pro- nich conference of September–October 1938. The paganda. The agony he endures is evident as he author begins with a brief look at America’s current writes to his beloved wife while broken and bat- war and then drives the introduction through a his- tered, huddled in a jail cell in North Vietnam, pray- torical review of leaders who have invoked Munich, ing that he would someday see her again: “What I starting with Harry Truman. do or what I am would mean nothing without you To be sure, this book is not kind to the adminis- to share it with me. I have relived our life step by tration of Pres. George W. Bush, but the reader will step in my daydreams and found it a wonderful ex- need to push past that and look at the valuable perience to look back on our years together. I know analysis Record presents in his chapters. He argues we are going to have just as many more” (p. 121). that significant errors occurred in the Anglo-French I imagine that Luckett and Byler were at least handling of Hitler’s expansionist policies from the somewhat apprehensive when they took on this mid-1930s through the first declaration of war— project. After all, it isn’t every day that a writer at- errors that, if corrected, might have significantly tempts to tell the story of a one-man Air Force or a (certainly partially) changed history. Record hinges man who went to Korea as an obscure lieutenant most of his book on these key points (p. 8) and but left with considerable renown. proceeds to apply them to current and future en- Kasler received praise from other notable Vietnam deavors, noting that leaders must War heroes such as Senator John McCain, who stated in an interview, “I mean this with the utmost sincerity. 1. correctly gauge enemy intentions and capa- I was no hero. I was privileged to serve in the com- bilities, pany of heroes . . . like Jim Kasler. They were the ones who sustained me . . . who will always be my 2. have public support for risky military action, heroes” (p. 180). I believe that the authors have 3. ensure consistency between diplomatic objec- done a commendable job, and, judging by Colonel tives and military force posture, Kasler’s own contributions in an appendix (“Per- sonal Reflection”), where he speaks on everything 4. have a reasonable quantitative balance of from the antiwar movement to future aircraft de- strategic ends and means,

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5. properly balance offensive and defensive ca- tary leaders, in our capacity to advise our civilian pabilities, and leadership of military capabilities and utility in a particular scenario, we too should take these rec- 6. be predictable (and remain so) in threaten- ommendations and observations equally to heart. ing and using force. Hindsight isn’t always 20/20. It’s easy to criticize It’s reassuring that the author first seeks to put decisions of the past by pointing to follow-on events. British and French actions in the context of the It’s much more difficult to put ourselves in a deci- time, successfully arguing in chapter 2 (almost half sion maker’s place and time, knowing only what he of the book!) that public opinion tied the hands of or she knew at that moment, and only then objec- Neville Chamberlain and the Anglo-French team tively ask if we would have done something differ- (such as that was at the time). He observes that ently. The same holds true today. Learning from the past, today’s and tomorrow’s leaders need to be it is difficult to underestimate the influence of the certain of the information upon which they base slaughter of 1914–1918 on official and public opinion their decisions lest they repeat the same mistakes. in Europe during the 1920s and 1930s. . . . The war The Specter of Munich is a good read—I strongly rec- had an especially profound impact on opinion in the primary appeasing power of the 1930s, Britain, where ommend it. vivid memories of the lost comrades and loved ones Maj Paul G. Niesen, USAF, Retired and the special horrors of trench warfare bred an elec- Scott AFB, Illinois torate of which significant segments were either paci- fist or unwilling to contemplate the use of force (pp. 13–14). Silver Wings, Golden Valor: The USAF Remembers In France, where World War I was a demographic Korea edited by Dr. Richard P. Hallion. Air Force disaster (p. 15), public opinion fared no better. Historical Studies Office (http://www.airforce A number of other factors, all of which Record history.hq.af.mil/publications.htm), Publications discusses in depth, led to the Anglo-French deci- Division, 3 Brookley Avenue, Box 94, Bolling sions leading up to World War II. In the end, all of AFB, Washington, DC 20032-5000, 2006, 131 pages these political, military, and psychological aspects (softcover). Department of Defense personnel and combined to deny British and French leaders any organizations may request printed copies of Air realistic possibility that the Western democracies Force History Office publications free of charge could or would act effectively against Hitler in time (e-mail: [email protected]). to thwart the outbreak of another world war in Eu- Electronic version available free at https://www rope (p. 65). The author continues, observing that, .airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/full in hindsight, condemning appeasement is easy; text/silverwingsgoldenvalor.pdf. however, looking through British and French eyes during the time, he notes that leaders were work- Silver Wings, Golden Valor records the proceeding not to start World War II but to avoid war— ings of the Air Force’s commemorative symposium though not at any cost (p. 65). on the Korean War, held on 7 June 2000. Spon- Record also points out that Hitler was not with- sored by the Air Force History and Museums Pro- out error. Overconfidence in his country’s capabili- gram, Air Force Legislative Liaison, and Air Force ties perhaps constituted his greatest mistake. By Association, this symposium “attempt[ed] to set pushing past the limits of German power, Hitler the record straight” on Korea as an “absolutely vital propelled Germany into a lost war. victory” in the 40-year-long history of the Cold War, The book’s remaining pages explore why ap- checking communism’s spread (p. 2). peasement failed and why current and future world The book’s contributors touch just briefly on leaders should be careful to avoid incorrectly in- lessons learned from the Korean conflict and how voking Munich. More importantly, Record suggests they have been used since. Gen Michael E. Ryan what world leaders should do, and avoid doing, to remarks that investments in technology prior to the prevent the same series of mistakes from happen- 1950s had “residual effects” as the United States en- ing again. The 1930s offer some valuable lessons tered Korea (p. 14), allowing the Air Force to proj- for leaders today and the future. The analysis that ect power in the Pacific with three numbered air follows in chapter 4 is compelling. forces and over 1,000 aircraft spread from Guam to In the final chapter, Record makes a number of the Philippines. However, the book fails to list the recommendations and observations that any leader, investments that allowed this expression of Ameri- present or future, would do well to review. As mili- can airpower and the ways it became today’s expe-

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ditionary air and space power. Nevertheless, in Ko- we must constantly learn from our successes and rea the Air Force gained dominance and superiority failures, and we must cultivate what Dr. Hallion points that carried forward to the war in Kosovo, marking to as the most important lesson of Korea—the re- the “beginning of an unbroken record of U.S. air solve that allows Airmen to continue providing un- superiority,” according to the Honorable F. Whitten paralleled global vigilance, reach, and power. Peters, former secretary of the Air Force (p. 18). This air superiority permitted the freedom to at- R. Ray Ortensie tack and maneuver at any time and place of our Randolph AFB, Texas choosing. Air interdiction damaged roads and bridges, thus halting communist forces in 1950 and again in 1951 after Chinese intervention. Heirpower! Eight Basic Habits of Exceptionally One of the key discussions during the sympo- Powerful Lieutenants by CMSgt Bob Vásquez, sium addressed the air dominance that denied USAF, retired. Air University Press (http://www North Korea “the ability to use its own attack avia- .maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress), 131 West tion forces” and that gave the Air Force virtual im- Shumacher Avenue, Maxwell AFB, Alabama punity in conducting attacks against northern tar- 36112-5962, 2006, 88 pages, $8.50 (softcover). gets (p. 28). Introduction of the North American Available free from http://www.maxwell.af.mil/ F-86 Sabre—the world’s first operational swept- au/aul/aupress/Books/Vasquez/vasquez.pdf. back-wing fighter—played a significant role in achieving this dominance. Lt Gen William E. Brown Retired chief master sergeant Bob Vásquez’s book Jr., a Sabre pilot with the 334th Fighter-Interceptor Heirpower! is the perfect guide to help new second Squadron during the war, outlines five factors that lieutenants break bad habits so they can become ef- allowed Sabres to down 793 MiGs at a cost of only fective officers. Chief Vásquez, who has worked with 78 US aircraft. However, as Lt Gen Arnold Braswell many lieutenants fresh out of the Reserve Officer observes, in the beginning, not only the number of Training Corps (ROTC), officers’ training school, enemy aircraft but also the performance of MiG-15 and the Air Force Academy, made many observations Fagots threatened our air dominance. General during his 30 years of service and became very fa- Braswell declares that the one true way to attain miliar with young officers’ flaws. Unsurprisingly such dominance lies in implementing “realistic and then, his very well written book contains numerous continuous training” along with maintaining a useful tips and examples. For instance, in chapter 1 “long-range, ground attack” capability (p. 32). In he covers first impressions, recalling how things im- Lt Gen Lynwood E. Clark’s estimation, the new mediately started off on the wrong foot upon meeting theories and theorists who “developed the new a new lieutenant, whom he describes as “look[ing] combat airplanes and new combat tactics that ulti- terrible” (p. 5). Even though the lieutenant had the mately became standard” practices within the Air appropriate leadership skills and abilities, the man- Force represent the greatest contribution made in ner in which he presented himself to the chief and Korea (p. 55). But Silver Wings, Golden Valor fails to those within the organization was unprofessional. elaborate upon these new theories and theorists The author constantly surprised me with bril- that led to standardized practices. liant analogies. I found myself thinking, “Wow! I Importantly, in the final discussion Lt Gen never would have thought of it that way!” For ex- Chuck Heflebower notes that Airmen need to learn ample, making a point about attitude in chapter 3, from the past and make appropriate changes in he discusses the difference between a thermometer today’s practices, citing the example of close air and a thermostat, the former obviously measuring support (CAS) during the war. Making use of les- temperature and the latter controlling it. He asks, sons from the North African campaign during “Would you prefer be a thermometer, an instru- World War II, Airmen developed and pioneered ment that assesses the environment . . . or . . . a the CAS we have today. However, the book fails to thermostat, controlling those external things that explain the nature of these lessons and the way they bombard you and can influence you?” (p. 17). This contributed to the development of CAS. inspired me to begin taking charge of those events An excellent work that helps readers remember that could distort my performance as an ROTC ca- the more than 1,840 Air Force casualties during the det and eventually as a lieutenant. One statement Korean War and that gives them a better under- of his particularly touched me: “If you’re my lieu- standing of an often-neglected aspect of the service’s tenant, I’m not going to let anyone or anything history, Silver Wings, Golden Valor belongs on the harm you! I’m responsible for your success” (p. 61). bookshelf of every serious aviation historian. Today Such a comment clearly shows loyalty and devotion.

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Although the majority of Heirpower! proved quite one can understand, the author moves smoothly insightful, a few areas fell short. For example, Chief from one event to another. The numerous pictures Vásquez occasionally repeats himself and avoids and descriptions permit readers to see the faces of getting straight to the point. Also, despite the fact the people mentioned in the work, which helps the that he addresses a young audience, its members narrative unfold naturally and quickly. are more sophisticated and mature than the aver- Although Mitchell was clearly outspoken con- age teenager to whom he frequently alludes in il- cerning the need for an independent Air Force, he lustrating his ideas. Nevertheless, because Chief went too far by declaring unequivocally that air- Bob Vásquez’s advice is hard to top, I highly recom- power would render the other services obsolete. mend Heirpower! to all current and future officers, Like any inflexible ideologue, he encountered much especially those just starting their careers. opposition, especially from the Navy. When he began accusing various officials of treason, he paid Cadet Luis Santiago the price by being court-martialed. Mitchell did Air Force ROTC, University of Houston not live to see his dream of an independent Air Force realized; neither did he experience the re- peated refutations of his claim that airpower could Billy Mitchell: “Stormy Petrel of the Air” by Roger G. win wars by itself. Miller. Air Force Historical Studies Office (http:// Billy Mitchell: “Stormy Petrel of the Air” is an enjoyable www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/publications.htm), book. I strongly recommend that anyone interested Publications Division, 3 Brookley Avenue, Box in airpower should read this fascinating and impor- 94, Bolling AFB, Washington, DC 20032-5000, tant addition to the many works about Billy Mitchell. 2004, 58 pages (softcover). Department of De- fense personnel and organizations may request Cadet Jennifer Walne printed copies of Air Force History Office publi- Air Force ROTC, University of Houston cations free of charge (e-mail: afhso.book.orders @pentagon.af.mil). Online version available free at https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/ Who Guards the Guardians and How: Democratic Publications/fulltext/Billy_Mitchell_Stormy Civil-Military Relations edited by Thomas C. _Petrel.pdf. Bruneau and Scott D. Tollefson. University of Texas Press (http://www.utexas.edu/utpress), By far one of the most significant figures in Air P.O. Box 7819, Austin, Texas 78713-7819, 2006, Force history, Billy Mitchell blazed a path for future 336 pages, $50.00 (hardcover). Airmen. He proved vital to airpower in its infancy, gaining the attention of the nation and key leaders. An enduring question in Western cultures, really Roger Miller captures Mitchell’s story comprehen- since the time of Plato, is how can modern states, sively and eloquently in Billy Mitchell: “Stormy Petrel especially fragile democracies, maximize the capa- of the Air.” bilities of their military and intelligence services Miller begins his book by setting the stage for without significant fear that they will usurp their the bombing of the former German battleship Ost- authorities and undermine the very state that cre- friesland, an exercise which, some argue, marked ated them? The field of civil-military relations has the pinnacle of Mitchell’s career. This action- suffered waning attention in academe in recent packed scene, depicting the validation of his idea years. Editors Thomas C. Bruneau and Scott D. that aircraft could sink battleships, grabs the read- Tollefson contribute to filling this gap in Who er’s attention. The book then provides background Guards the Guardians and How. information on Mitchell, providing insight into his This book makes a unique contribution in that future decisions and rationale for making them. it approaches the subject of civil-military relations Fortunately, it does so without bogging the reader from an institutional perspective, emphasizing the down with details about Mitchell’s childhood, giv- structures that work to ensure a balance between ing only the vital information necessary to under- military professionalism and civilian dominance. stand him. Bruneau and Tollefson have attracted contributors Miller describes the major events and people in- (political scientists, historians, and one “soldier- volved in Mitchell’s life, artfully putting readers philosopher”), all with experience with the military into the story and thereby allowing them to come and able to comment on a wide range of topics. to their own conclusions regarding Mitchell’s ac- The editors include chapters on the role of the tions. Explaining this history in language that any- military in a democracy, the relationship between

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legislatures and defense ministries, ways of reform- Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of ing intelligence establishments in new democracies, John Boyd by Frans P. B. Osinga. Routledge the budgeting process, and military education. In a (http://www.routledge.com), Taylor and Francis very lucid and approachable style, the work as a Group, 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, whole and each chapter separately serve as a primer Oxford OX14 4RN, United Kingdom, 2006, 336 to understanding contemporary issues in civil- pages, $125.00 (hardcover). military relations in emerging democratic states. Bruneau and Tollefson’s framing concept holds In Science, Strategy and War, Frans P. B. Osinga that any “correct” balance between democratic ci- explains the thinking, motivation, and creation be- vilian leadership and military effectiveness is sub- hind military strategist John Boyd’s theories. He ject to context. Looking more broadly, one realizes explores how Boyd arrived at conclusions and theo- that this is the heart of democratic governance: the rems that have defined American military tradecraft societal dynamism of any given place and time shapes in the twentieth century and that will undoubtedly democracy’s praxis. The contributors describe to us continue to motivate military thinking at all levels— the multiple institutional structures that may bring tactical, operational, and strategic—in the twenty- about that proper balance of civilian control and first century. Examining the papers and texts that military effectiveness. For example, chapter 2 out- Boyd read either as an Air Force officer or, later, as lines the de facto relationship between legislative- a defense consultant, Osinga assembles a near- oversight bodies and the militaries of several coun- complete picture of how his subject created pro- tries, concluding that in consolidating democracies, cesses, models, and, ultimately, such complex de- the legislatures play too limited a role in military signs as the observe, orient, decide, act (OODA) affairs. True to the character of the book, however, loop. By studying the lists that John Boyd recom- the chapter concludes with insights into changing mended to his audiences and the notes he left be- and ultimately improving the civilian-military dy- hind, the author allows readers to trace Boyd’s cre- namic. Of particular interest to me was chapter 6, ation of such theories as fourth-generation warfare which studied the importance of reforming intelli- and network-centric warfare. gence and security services in new democracies. Osinga organizes his text into four areas: (1) This is certainly an understudied aspect in the lit- Boyd’s professional background, (2) strategic and erature, though the inclusion of this interesting political settings in the United States, (3) Boyd’s study chapter presages that intelligence and security in- of military theory and history, and (4) his evolving stitutions may now be routinely considered in stud- interest in and study of scientific developments and ies of civil-military relations. In fact, agencies that theories. Since the English language falls short in operate in oftentimes shadowy realms are the pri- describing some intellectual pursuits, the author mary agents in postmodern conflict. This chapter uses the German word Zeitgeist throughout to ex- underscores their importance in any study of the plain how societal and scientific theorems influenced security sphere. Boyd’s thinking on a wide variety of matters. He Who Guards the Guardians and How focuses on how also shows that Boyd used a multidisciplined ap- consolidating democracies deal with the civilian- proach in his work, borrowing from such fields as military problematique, but all modern militaries and the psychology of human cognition, political science, intelligence services worldwide are now forced to systems theory, cybernetics, anthropology, econom- adapt to a range of missions inconceivable in an ics, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory. earlier era: peacekeeping, humanitarian opera- This elaborate book demands disciplined read- tions, antiterrorism, governance operations, and ing if one wishes to understand how Boyd con- institution building, to name but a very few. The structed his arguments, formulated his strategic effectiveness with which the services respond to discourse, and incorporated various scientific and these missions depends upon civilians fully qualified philosophical concepts from biology and social dis- to provide direction and resources. In short, these course. Osinga concludes with an examination of new missions require new, universal models and in- how themes, debates, and insights of the day influ- stitutions to advance civilian oversight. In Who enced or molded Boyd’s strategic thinking. Since Guards the Guardians and How, Bruneau, Tollefson, Boyd developed the OODA loop and other con- and their contributors help show policy makers and cepts in what historians have called the postmod- practitioners how to shape these new structures. ern world, cross-references to other events of the Lt Col Joseph L. Derdzinski, USAF day help provide perspective on ideas and motiva- US Air Force Academy tions that he labored so hard to develop.

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This outstanding text suffers from one flaw that strated perseverance and improved capability as has become pervasive in the literature: the use of they faced and endured heavy losses, bad weather, endnotes rather than footnotes, which requires the and tough German defenses that were growing in- reader to look up explanations to the text by flip- creasingly effective. ping between pages—a tiresome exercise. In this There is a macabre monotony to this story: time of computer-aided capabilities, this book’s de- sometimes success (the destruction of Hamburg), sign can use some improvement. Nonetheless, any more often mixed results (the Dams Raid), but, fan of John Boyd should own Science, Strategy and most of all, grinding losses. Wilson focuses on the War—not a biography but truly a scholarly, in-depth human element—the individual experience. This examination of this Airman’s thoughts, research, reader was struck by the youth of the Bomber Com- and concepts. Any modern strategist will want a copy. mand crews, their multinational origins, and, most Capt Gilles Van Nederveen, USAF, Retired of all, their persistence, despite knowing that the Centreville, Virginia odds of survival were against them. The author also reveals aspects that have generally been avoided or neglected, such as friendly fire from British bullets and bombs, cowardice (“lack of Bomber Boys: The RAF Offensive of 1943 by Kevin moral fiber”), and inadequate equipment—specifi- Wilson. Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Orion Pub- cally, the Sterling bomber, Monica (a radar- lishing Group (http://www.orionbooks.co.uk), detection device that unwittingly revealed the bomb- 5 Upper St. Martin’s Lane, London, WC2H 9EA, er’s position to German night fighters), and the 2005, 464 pages, $39.95 (hardcover), $12.95 lack of ventral bomber protection. Wilson offers a (softcover) (2006). very broad account, from the aviators’ harrowing experiences during flight, through attempts to The bombing of Germany during World War II evade capture, actual capture, and survival at sea, remains controversial more than 60 years after the to life in Britain between missions. The overall con- war. However, no one disputes that the bombing text, much less well told, is one of a unit driving was long, large, and costly. During the five-year campaign, British Bomber Command’s bombers toward the brink of disaster as it suffers crippling and (later) American heavy bombers unloaded 1.4 losses in air battles over Germany. In brief, Bomber million tons of bombs on Germany, wreaking havoc Command was engaged in and losing a war of attri- on that country and killing at least a half million tion while suffering its Passchendaele of World War German civilians. During this effort, the two Ameri- II. As the author correctly notes, for all of their sac- can strategic-bombing units (Eighth and Fifteenth rifice and effort, the men of Bomber Command Air Forces) lost 6,500 heavy bombers and suffered received poor treatment in the postwar years from 60,000 aircrew casualties while Bomber Command both their government and people. Certainly, they losses amounted to 8,000 bombers and 64,000 were not accorded the honors and praise they so operational-aircrew casualties. richly deserved for their achievement, devotion, Journalist Kevin Wilson has written a long, sym- and sacrifice. pathetic account of Bomber Command’s opera- Wilson’s approach and book title force a com- tions against Germany in 1943. The author bases parison of Bomber Boys with an excellent book on his study primarily on interviews he conducted, RAF Fighter Command in the Battle of Britain that along with documents and secondary sources. The has a similar title and approach: Patrick Bishop’s approach is chronological and anecdotal, seen Fighter Boys: The Battle of Britain, 1940 (2003). Un- mostly through the eyes of the aircrews. fortunately, for a variety of reasons, Wilson’s effort Bomber Command began 1943 with high hopes. does not measure up. Clearly, bomber operations During that year, the unit’s accelerated bomber lack the glamour of fighter combat, and the Battle and training production allowed it to increase its of Britain has a clear focus, in contrast to the much numbers but, more importantly, replace older longer and diverse bombing campaign. But the au- bombers with the superb Lancaster. As a result, al- thor has created his own problems. By centering on though Bomber Command flew only 10 percent 1943, Wilson drops the reader into the middle of a more sorties in 1943 than during the previous year, long, complex, and changing story. His writing is its larger force and the greater number of Lancast- often strained and overdone at points; further- ers permitted the ambitious Royal Air Force (RAF) more, his great reliance on the words of the par- to increase bomb delivery on Germany more than ticipants makes for difficult reading. The strict threefold. During that year, the British demon- chronological method is partially to blame.

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In addition, the British and RAF jargon and major battles in World War II as a B-24 copilot. slang can be difficult for American readers to deci- Later in his career, he flew BT-13s, B-52s, and C-47s. pher. The long text seems to cover the subject but Stein shares memories of daring missions, some does so again and again. This book required but comical incidents, moral dilemmas, and the fellow- lacked a skilled editor to focus and consolidate ship and friendship he experienced in the Air Force. these numerous, similar vignettes. The length and At the end of the war, Stein elected to stay in the repetition of the book, along with the complexity Army Air Forces since he had dreamed of becom- of the story, demand some analysis and synthesis, ing a military pilot. He later spent a year in Viet- both of which are sadly lacking. Bomber Boys certainly nam as an operations officer for the 360th Tactical will give most readers a feel for British strategic- Electronic Warfare Squadron, which used refitted bombing operations in 1943 from the aircrews’ C-47s to monitor and locate Vietcong units. Al- point of view, but I doubt that the benefits of gain- though the corruption he encountered in that or- ing this perspective are worth the cost of the vol- ganization disgusted him, he ended his career as ume or the effort required to read it. The bombing inspector general of the Civil Air Patrol. campaign, Bomber Command, and, most espe- One of my favorite scenes in Into the Wild Blue cially, the bomber boys deserve better. Yonder occurred during a routine training mission when Stein accidentally cut off a four-star general Kenneth P. Werrell in the traffic pattern. Specifically, another B-17 flew Christiansburg, Virginia in front of him so that he could not land. Thinking that the pilot was just another instructor, he turned inside of him on the base leg so that he could not Into the Wild Blue Yonder: My Life in the Air Force land either. Just as Stein committed to his turn, he by Allan T. Stein. Texas A&M University Press discovered that the pilot of the other B-17 was Gen Consortium (http://www.tamu.edu/upress), John John Cannon, who was yelling at the tower, “Get his H. Lindsey Building, Lewis Street, 4354 TAMU, number! Get his number!” (p. 83). Stein put his College Station, Texas 77843-4354, 2005, 200 plane on high cruise power and headed south as pages, $29.95 (hardcover). fast as he could. General Cannon chased him for a while, but Stein’s plane was lighter and faster. After Allan Stein’s Into the Wild Blue Yonder is an excel- landing, the general made a big deal about the in- lent book about Airmen in World War II. It offers cident, but no one admitted to it. Cannon retired everything from moments when enlisted personnel soon after, and Stein was never disciplined. He jok- play tricks on the officers to more sober instances ingly says, “In the Air Force you have never really when comrades never return from their missions. lived until you have cut a four-star general out of Stein recounts his life using short stories in the traffic pattern” (p. 83). chronological order, starting with memories of his Not all occasions were fun and games though. uncle—a pilot in the American Expeditionary During Stein’s time as an airdrome officer, he re- Forces. The author was inspired to share his stories ceived a call from a tower operator one night about by his wife’s great-grandfather, who kept a diary a B-17 that had crashed south of Barksdale and was during the Civil War. Stein believed that future gen- burning. Stein asked around to see if any of his pi- erations would benefit from what he had learned lots had taken off that night, and he was told no. during his life. He was puzzled about where the B-17 had come Called to active duty when he was a junior at from. By this time, all the maintenance crews were Texas A&M University in 1943, Stein was recruited reporting for duty, so Stein asked the line chief in as an aviation cadet, but because of the large num- charge if any B-17s were missing from the hangar. ber of candidates, some were sent back to college The line chief could account for all but one. An to await an opening at the San Antonio Aviation investigation revealed that two crew chiefs had Cadet Classification Center. The author does not drunk heavily and decided that if a cadet could fly speak much of his commissioning, but we do know a B-17, they could too. They went to their planes that he joined the Coast Artillery Enlisted Reserve and were going to fly formation. One of them so- under the assumption that he would stay in college. bered up and realized that if he took off, he would This marked the beginning of a fascinating Air either end up in jail or the cemetery. The other Force career. B-17 crew chief died. After training, Stein reported to Lubbock Army Stein also spent six weeks on grave-registration Air Field to receive his assignment. He eventually duty, a program whereby the United States brought logged over 347 combat hours and served in eight men who had been killed and buried in foreign

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countries during World War II back to their fami- ganizations such as the Organization of American lies. Stein escorted the bodies of the fallen Air States and the Arab League. Force men home. He explains that this duty was The first section summarizes current trends of one of the most difficult but rewarding he ever had. thought on the nature and management of con- Overall, Into the Wild Blue Yonder was intriguing flict. In addition, it details international -and re and enjoyable. All of the author’s vivid, exciting gional organizations involved in mediation and narratives brought back memories of times when I conflict resolution. The authors briefly touch on used to sit with my mom and listen to her stories causes of conflict, citing the Cold War, decoloniza- about my grandfather’s Air Force career. I strongly tion, and ethnic strife as major areas of concern recommend this book to anyone who has an inter- during the last 60 years. They give terrorism only est in flying or simply wants to know more about superficial treatment as a fringe phenomenon. Fur- the Air Force. Allan Stein’s life story makes for an thermore, Bercovitch and Fretter analyze patterns insightful and enjoyable read, especially for anyone of conflict, concluding that “although the absolute who wants to become a military pilot. number of conflicts have risen, the number of conflicts in progress have been declining since the mid- Cadet Philip T. McCombs 1980s” (p. 9). Additionally, patterns show that the Air Force ROTC, University of Houston two most strife-ridden areas of the world are Africa and the Middle East. The authors point to territory and sovereignty Regional Guide to International Conflict and Man- as the two main causes of war (p. 10). Additionally, agement from 1945 to 2003 by Jacob Bercovitch although countries are willing to go to war, research and Judith Fretter. CQ Press (http://www.cqpress points out that of 343 conflicts, only 50 resulted in .com), 1255 22nd Street, NW, Suite 400, Wash- victory for one side or the other (p. 11). On the ington, DC 20037, 2004, 400 pages, $118.00 other hand, over one-third have been partly resolved (hardcover). due to some form of negotiation. One needs conflict management because war is expensive and be- Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter’s Regional cause of the adverse effect on the lives and econo- Guide to International Conflict and Management from mies of individual countries and those in the 1945 to 2003 is a must-have for people framing the region. In a majority of cases, regional organiza- environment of their next potential deployment. tions must deal with pleas to rebuild war-ravaged This book serves not only as a reference of more areas. The authors’ view of conflict management than 343 conflicts in the post–World War II era but rests on the assumption that conflict cannot be also as a primer on managing international con- controlled but only managed or resolved (p. 13). flict. The authors, instructors at the University of Therefore, it is crucial to develop an appreciation Canterbury in New Zealand, started the project over for methods of conflict resolution. 20 years ago and have continually updated conflict Methods of conflict management, which are as summaries. Their adept handling of a subject of such varied as the causes of conflict, include diplomatic, large scope is reflected in the regional and chrono- legal, and political means. In turn, styles of resolu- logical breakdown of individual incidents. Regional tion include bargaining, mediation, observer/fact- Guide highlights spikes in tensions between coun- finding missions, peacekeeping, shuttle diplomacy, tries as well as situations that precipitated violence. and international forums for airing complaints. The authors note that conflict contains single or The legal arena makes use of arbitration and adju- multiple parts of interstate armed conflicts, inter- dication; however, international law seriously re- nationalized civil wars, and militarized disputes. tards success. Historically speaking, third-party me- They divide the book into three general divisions: diation and negotiation have proven most effective, an overview of international conflict, regional but fewer than 43 percent of conflicts are success- breakdowns of conflicts, and appendices. The first fully arbitrated. On the other hand, the success 50 pages give careful attention to management of rate of conflict resolution is not much better, stand- international conflict; the next 250, the bulk of the ing at roughly 50 percent. work, include summaries of the world’s conflicts The heart of the book, the summaries of indi- (which indicate whether or not mediation was at- vidual conflict, reveals excruciating detail. The au- tempted and whether or not it succeeded), divided thors examine each region, paying attention to the into regions of the world; and the final 40 pages or regional political environment, trends of conflict, so consist of reference material, including explana- and avenues of mediation available or pursued in tions of the United Nations and major regional or- the past. The shortest summaries are about 300

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words in length whereas those for some topics are nature of warfare, and the Air Force agrees in prin- four times that long. Each summary adequately ad- ciple with the plan, provided that the tenets of air- dresses each conflict without bias. power are maintained. Third, enemy land forces Lastly, the appendices contain a wealth of infor- (regular or irregular) constitute the critical target mation, including a chronological listing of conflicts set. To defeat those forces, we need to improve the since 1945, fact sheets on major international orga- air-land partnership to field a more flexible and ca- nizations, and a plethora of reference sources. The pable air-ground team that leverages each other’s bibliography lists a wide range of books covering unique capabilities. If the reader accepts these as- over 50 years of the history of international conflict. sumptions, the study expertly reveals significant is- Regional Guide to International Conflict and Man- sues that both services must address through new agement from 1945 to 2003 takes on the daunting task doctrine, organization, tactics, and procedures to of shedding light on the conflict-management pro- ensure the successful implementation of the Army’s cess and succeeds in doing so. The authors’ profes- transformation plan. sional treatment of research material is reflected in By detailing recent battlefield trends, the study their use of primary and secondary documents. reveals the parochial seams that exist between the They deliver an evenhanded analysis and give neu- Army and Air Force, which, if not corrected, will tral treatment to polarizing topics. Offering readers inhibit the Army’s plan. Placement and use of the points of departure for further academic inquiry, fire support coordination line during Operation this book is a valuable resource for people serious Iraqi Freedom represents just one example of this about being prepared for deployments and conflict seam. The authors correctly argue for replacing management. this antiquated line with an area concept such as kill-box interdiction, and their description of the Capt Daniel L. Magruder Jr., USAF latter as practiced during Operation Allied Force Hurlburt Field, Florida and Iraqi Freedom aptly explains why this method of coordinating air and ground operations is superior to traditional control measures. Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground The authors use the Operation Enduring Free- Partnership by Bruce R. Pirnie et al. RAND dom and Iraqi Freedom case studies to address or- (http://www.rand.org/publications/index.html��), ganizational and doctrinal issues that inhibited mu- 1776 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, tually enabling air-ground operations. However, California 90407-2138, 2005, 214 pages, $25.00 they should have delved deeper into the Iraqi Free- (softcover). Available free from http://www dom case study. The air-ground architecture of I .rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND Marine Expeditionary Force’s area of responsibility _MG301.pdf. (AOR) demonstrated a potential way ahead for such operations. The study as written leaves readers The US Air Force contracted with RAND’s Proj- to draw their own conclusions. In my case, I identi- ect Air Force, a federally funded research and de- fied lack of trust as the most critical element inhib- velopment center, to study and recommend ways to iting mutually enabling air-ground operations in V improve the relationship between airpower and Corps’ AOR. The study’s description of why kill-box land power. Specifically, the authors address three interdiction proved difficult there but succeeded questions concerning close air support and its rele- in I Marine Expeditionary Force’s AOR is compel- vance for the future battlefield: (1) How should air ling. The authors expose the organizational seams attack and ground maneuver be integrated? (2) between the two services that, if not corrected, will How should the terminal attack control function inhibit them from achieving a joint, interdepen- be executed? (3) How should ground maneuver / dent force. This example should prompt readers fires and air attack be deconflicted? To answer and, more importantly, leaders of the Army / Air these questions, the authors effectively use three Force to ask more probing questions about why this case studies to formulate their observations and disparity existed. However, the US Navy and its sig- make recommendations for the Air Force and nificant contribution of carrier-based aviation and Army to improve their air-ground partnership. surface fires are not examined. This capability must The study is balanced and comprehensive, un- be considered in order for ground forces to fully derpinned by three assumptions. First, experiences leverage airpower dominance in conventional and in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan indicate an anemic irregular warfare. air-ground partnership. Second, the Army’s trans- Beyond Close Air Support succinctly addresses the formation plan correctly recognizes the changing hole left in battlefield command and control (C2)

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but falls short in recommendations to fill this critical Semmes: Rebel Raider by John M. Taylor. Potomac gap. Concepts such as joint air-ground command Books (http://www.potomacbooksinc.com/Books/ and control are a tremendous first step to fill the Features.aspx ), 22841 Quicksilver Drive, Dulles, joint C2 void; however, more can be done to extend Virginia 20166, 2003, 128 pages, $15.96 (hard- redundant, tactical-level C2 throughout the battle- cover), $10.36 (softcover) (2005). field. As part of their training, US Navy forward air controllers (airborne) (FAC[A]) crews earn qualifi- The two best-known naval battles of the Civil cations as ground joint terminal attack controllers War are the clash of the first ironclads at Hampton (JTAC). This critical skill can be leveraged through Roads, Virginia, in April 1862 and the engagement opening Army air liaison officer tours for these of- between the USS Kearsarge and the CSS Alabama off ficers. Why not explore the potential for Strike the French coast in June 1864. These battles repre- Eagle crews to operate as airborne FACs and air- sented two aspects of the Confederacy’s naval strategy ground battle managers who operate as an extension to overcome the Union’s naval superiority: use of the air support operations center? As FAC(A)s, ironclad warships to sink the Union’s wooden ships F-15E crews can leverage their two-man crew, tre- blockading Southern ports, and use commerce mendous weapons load, and time on station while raiders to divert Union warships from the blockade simultaneously operating as natural extensions of to protect Union merchant ships. The strategy failed Air Force JTACs and Army joint fires observers because the Confederacy did not have the indus- (JFO). This would further ease the burden on these trial base to produce large numbers of ironclads, high-demand, low-density career fields and comple- and the commerce raiders, of which the CSS Alabama ment single-seat capability currently employed in was the best known, failed to draw many Union war- the F-16 and A-10 communities. ships away from the blockade. Interestingly, many The study comprehensively addresses shortfalls Civil War students would recognize the ship more in sourcing current JTAC requirements and accu- than they would its chivalric commander, Capt rately predicts problems with sourcing JTACs Raphael Semmes, the subject of this biography. needed by the Air Force to support the Army’s bri- John Taylor, son of Gen Maxwell D. Taylor and gade modular construct. The authors are on the author of a number of books and articles, especially mark by recommending disaggregating some JTAC on the Civil War, has written an informative and functions to qualified soldiers. The Army–Air Force lively biography, a concise treatment of his well- JFO program is maturing and will address this find- regarded, full-length biography of Semmes. As cap- ing as long as it is properly networked and coordi- tain of the CSS Sumter and the CSS Alabama, nated. Qualifying Army AH-64 pilots as FAC(A)s in Semmes, in just two cruises, struck fear into the the same way as Marine Corps AH-1W pilots will hearts of Union merchant sailors and shipowners force a closer integration of rotary-wing aircraft, with the capture of nearly 100 Union merchant and fixed-wing aircraft will also help disaggregate ships valued at $6 million—about 36 percent of the JTAC functions—applicable in conventional as well merchant shipping destroyed by the Confederate as irregular warfare. Navy. Southerners revered Semmes as a hero, and The leadership of the Army, Air Force, and Navy the Union sailors he captured generally respected should study Beyond Close Air Support and use it as him. However, Northerners, especially the mer- the basis for meaningful discussion to address cur- chants and shipowners financially hurt by his esca- rent challenges in air-ground integration. Even if pades on the high seas, reviled him as a pirate. only a few of the study’s recommendations are ad- Born in Maryland in 1809 and orphaned at age opted in the form of joint manning and doctrine, 10, Semmes received his naval commission in 1826 our land and air forces will take a step in the right and served on several naval vessels before the Civil direction towards building mutually enabling air- War. During his shore duties, he studied and prac- ground operations. However, institutionalizing ha- ticed law to supplement his naval officer’s pay. In bitual working relationships between ground forces 1841 Semmes purchased land near Mobile, Ala- and air forces of all four services instead of the of- bama, while he was stationed at the Pensacola naval ten ad hoc associations offers the solution to achiev- base and ultimately came to consider Alabama his ing joint interdependence and regaining trust. The home. During the Mexican War, Semmes spent authors of this book got it right. The real question time in a blockade ship off the Mexican coast and is, will the Army and Air Force? ashore with Gen William Worth, Gen Winfield Scott’s deputy. His experience with artillery and keen eye Col Lawrence R. Roberts, USMC for topography resulted in honorable mention by Eglin AFB, Florida General Worth on three occasions.

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In 1861 Semmes resigned from the US Navy and support national interests; many are highly classi- accepted a commission with the Confederate Navy. fied and not meant for the general public. A com- From June 1861 to March 1862, he commanded mon, accepted means of providing a level of secrecy the CSS Sumter from the Caribbean, to the Brazilian involves assigning code names to them. and West African coasts, and finally to Gibraltar, William Arkin, a military analyst with NBC News capturing 18 Union merchantmen while being and an independent journalist with impressive cre- pursued by six Union warships. From August 1862 dentials, has taken on this massive subject with a to June 1864, Semmes, in the sleek, black-hulled, solitary vengeance stretched out over years. The re- British-made, and British-manned Alabama, roamed sult is his book Code Names. Arkin’s premise is that the oceans with impunity, outmaneuvering the su- too many of these activities and relations hide be- perior Union Navy until that fateful June day. After hind a cover of national secrecy, that no one knows losing the Alabama off the French coast, Semmes their long-term implications, and that almost no returned to the South, commanded the James River discussion or debate exists on the home front. Squadron, and, in the last days of the Civil War, Equally damning is the fact that America has like served as an army brigadier general. (The latter ap- arrangements with other nations who respond bi- pointment made him the only officer to hold flag laterally and unilaterally in similar fashion. If the rank in two services.) The war over, Semmes’s fame United States wants to remain the beacon of de- soon faded, and he died in 1877. Yet in 1894, Kaiser mocracy and fairness to its citizens and the rest of Wilhelm II remarked that Semmes was the greatest the world, this situation is more than Arkin is will- admiral of the nineteenth century. ing to accept. He strongly believes that an informed Although the book, written for Potomac Books’ citizenry is a prerequisite to wise decision making Military Profiles series, is a mere 105 pages of text, by its elected and appointed leaders. the reader gets an excellent view of Semmes, the The code-naming of US military operations be- CSS Alabama, and commerce raiding on the high gan in the Second World War, primarily for reasons seas during the Civil War. From time to time, I de- of operational security. As the complexity of the tected a hint of partiality for Semmes by the author, war expanded, compilation of code-word lists num- but, generally speaking, Taylor provides a fairly ob- bering in the tens of thousands uniquely identified jective look at one of the more famous (or infa- a vast range of operations and projects. After the mous, depending on the reader’s regional point of war, code-naming became the norm during the view) naval commanders and certainly the most fa- prolonged Cold War—but done with the intention mous warship of the Civil War period. The only of garnering public support for the war. Although a other criticism I have is that Taylor presents the number of these names have carried over to the epic clash between the Kearsarge and the Alabama in present, efforts have occurred to restrict their use the book’s first chapter, which made reading the and limit their exposure. According to Arkin, the rest of the book somewhat anticlimactic. Still, I government and military after 9/11 have gone over highly recommend this short biography to anyone the top by shutting down the openness that was interested in either the Civil War or naval warfare. standard operating procedure for so many years. Using a variety of sources to put together his en- Dr. Robert B. Kane tries in Code Names, Arkin lists over 3,000 code Eglin AFB, Florida names of sensitive military programs and operations. At the same time, he takes pains not to di- vulge any information that would cause grave dam- Code Names: Deciphering U.S. Military Plans, Pro- age to national security or put at risk any individuals grams and Operations in the 9/11 World by associated with the projects. Despite such assur- William M. Arkin. Steerforth Press (http://www ances, a number of senior national security and .steerforth.com), 25 Lebanon Street, Hanover, military officials have not welcomed his revelations New Hampshire 03755, 2005, 624 pages, $27.95 with open arms. (hardcover). Arkin divides this comprehensive book into four parts. Part 1, “Cast of Characters,” includes brief In the post-9/11 era, much has changed in the descriptions of the main US government depart- way the United States and other Western countries ments, agencies, commands, and organizations operate as they fight the global war on terror mentioned in the code-names dictionary. Part 2, (GWOT). Government agencies, defense organiza- “Country-by-Country Directory,” highlights US mil- tions, and intelligence communities within the itary and intelligence relations worldwide, break- GWOT have set up programs and operations that ing each country down by US command, agree-

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ments, assistance, bases and access, forces deployed, the efficacy of the use of torture, the importance of and applicable code names. Part 3, “Code Names maintaining the moral high ground, the erosion of Dictionary,” is an alphabetical listing of all the authority through racism, and tactical lessons of names in the book. Part 4 is a combination acro- this conflict. nym list and extended glossary. Readers will learn that on 8 May 1945, 5,000 Al- Despite being a thorn in many backsides, Arkin gerians carrying banners asking for Algerian inde- is qualified to write on the topic. After serving as an pendence were brutally crushed by a French colonial intelligence officer in the US Army, he became a administration attempting to maintain the status recognized defense and intelligence analyst. A pro- quo. Part of the suppression included killing 6,000 lific writer, he has authored or coauthored 10 Algerians in reprisal for the murder of 21 French books, over 500 articles, and numerous chapters settlers. A few of the Algerian officers who saw ser- for publications. His best-selling book Nuclear Battle vice in France’s colonial wars and in World War II fields: Global Links in the Arms Race(Ballinger, 1985), formed a cadre of discontented cells that would revealed locations of all US and foreign nuclear create the nucleus of the FLN, which committed bases worldwide. Arkin also has served as the senior atrocities to provoke reactions from French forces. military adviser to Human Rights Watch and as an Among their tactics, its members developed a terror adjunct faculty member at Air University’s School campaign of urban bombing in which women, sup- of Advanced Air and Space Studies. posedly French, left bombs in cafes in major cities. Who should or who will read this book? Argu- Wishing to concentrate on the Algerian insur- ably, its exposure of closely controlled programs, gency, France granted independence to Tunisia missions, and relations make it a must-read for people and Morocco in 1956. But these two nations be- opposed to US policies, including many of our op- came friendly border states to the FLN. Violence ponents on the international scene. More than increased, and the French started a call-up of likely, even these individuals won’t be able to read 180,000 conscripts that would become 3 million this work cover to cover. In essence Code Names is a troops in an eight-year war to suppress the Algerian gigantic index, just as the author intended. Dedi- nationalist movement. At this time, Gramont re- cated readers, including students of national secu- ceived a conscription notice in the United States. rity policies, will look for specific topics in small Morgan—winner of a Pulitzer prize in journal- doses or cover sections of interest in a measured, ism—offers keen journalistic insight in his book, incremental approach. discussing how torture for information affects both the terrorist as well as the person inflicting the Dr. Frank P. Donnini, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF, Retired harm, and addressing both his involvement in Newport News, Virginia brutal acts and the way he psychologically justified what he calls unimaginable barbarities. He also includes an insightful discussion of the FLN tactic of My Battle of Algiers: A Memoir by Ted Morgan. enforcing Islamic morals as a means of controlling Smithsonian Books, imprint of HarperCollins neighborhoods in Algiers. Morgan delves deeply (http://www.harpercollins.com/index.aspx), into the mechanics of both sides as they respond to 10 East 53rd Street, New York, New York 10022, each other’s tactics, which finally led Charles�� de 2006, 304 pages, $24.95 (hardcover), $14.95 Gaulle�� to grant Algeria independence in 1962. My (softcover) (2007). Battle of Algiers is an excellent book for people involved in counterterrorism or civil affairs. As the United States deals with counterinsurgency operations in the global war on terrorism, it LCDR Youssef Aboul-Enein, USN becomes vital to study past counterinsurgency op- North Potomac, Maryland erations. The mistakes and innovations of French forces in Algeria as well as the networks and innovations of their archrivals—the Algerian National Corky Meyer’s Flight Journal: Dodging Disasters— Liberation Front (FLN)—offer valuable bench- Just in Time by Corwin H. Meyer. Specialty Press marks in discussing counterinsurgency operations. (http://www.specialtypress.com), 39966 Grand Sanche�� de�� Gramont, now known as�� Ted Morgan, Avenue, North Branch, Minnesota 55056, 2006, an American living in New York City, fought this 252 pages, $27.95 (softcover). war as a newly minted second lieutenant in the French army from 1956 to 1957. My Battle of Algiers Want excitement? Try this scenario: you are fly- offers a realistic look at this conflict and discusses ing at 25,000 feet with another aircraft near you.

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You see that the other pilot has a glassy-eyed daze concert or otherwise, is one of the most vital po- and that he is wearing a defective oxygen mask. In litical dialogues going on today. 10 minutes, his aircraft will run out of fuel and In Uneasy Balance, Thomas Langston provides a ditch in the ocean, but you can’t communicate with structure for analysis by dividing the nation’s po- him. What do you do? litical and military history and then examining the Or do you like quick decisions at high speeds? process by which the United States and its military You are a pilot who is testing aircraft dive speed. realigned themselves against different emerging When you try to pull up, you have no control. As peacetime or wartime threats. Fraught with his- you pull the stick with both hands to increase alti- torical references, the narrative not only orients tude, the dive angle only increases. At 500 mph, you know you have under 10 seconds to live. What the reader but also provides the basis for any dis- do you do? cussion on policy decisions. Langston’s meticulous If you are looking for exciting pilot stories, read research pays major dividends, increasing the read- Corky Meyer’s Flight Journal. The cases above are just er’s understanding while adding value to the analy- two of the many emergencies Meyer faced in his sis and conclusions. 36-year career with Grumman Aircraft. In examining wars scattered across the spec- This book is autobiographical, but it focuses on trum of conflict, the author points to several im- technical flight evaluations of aircraft and the his- portant lessons regarding cooperation between tory of Grumman Aircraft rather than on Meyer’s those who make policy and those who put that personal life. Pilots should read this book because policy into action. Not one to let details slip, the author’s stories of surviving many difficult Langston also takes note of the interaction be- flights could serve as a flight-safety textbook. tween all players in the policy process. The role of When Meyer tells how he survived in-flight the public and the press is always considered in emergencies, he has a unique credibility. His long the “civil” part of civil-military relations—some- career and the many kinds of aircraft he has flown, thing frequently neglected by other analysts. from propellers to jets, give him a great store of knowledge and experience. Of course, Uneasy Balance covers the standard People who like Meyer’s articles in Flight Journal points of any examination of civil-military affairs: the and other magazines will enjoy this book, and so Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorga- will historians and aviation lovers. He includes nization Act of 1986, post-Vietnam restructuring, notes about and comparisons of the best-known the beginning and end of the military draft, and the World War II aircraft. Some readers may skim over end of the Cold War. However, the true value of the technical details but will appreciate Meyer’s Langston’s work lies in his case studies of earlier, readable tales, flying skill, and the divine interven- less-scrutinized conflicts, including the Spanish- tion he credits with helping him survive test-flight American War and the Philippine Insurrection. emergencies. Although Langston’s appraisal of past civil-military Maj Herman Reinhold, USAF, Retired alignments is in many ways sound, the conclusions Athens, New York and policy recommendations he includes in the end of the book seem rather idealistic. Such ideas as further reorienting the reserves towards homeland security, increasing preparation for peace op- Uneasy Balance: Civil-Military Relations in Peace- time America since 1783 by Thomas S. Langston. erations, and further accommodating American Johns Hopkins University Press (http://www society’s intolerance of casualties are attractive but .press.jhu.edu), 2715 North Charles Street, Bal- ultimately drastic and, as a result, unworkable. The timore, Maryland 21218-4363, 2003, 208 pages, author acknowledges possible obstacles posed by $39.95 (hardcover). the Iraq war but does not examine them in detail. However, to his credit, Langston assails utopian as- Over time, the relationship between the United sumptions about the changing nature of war and States and its military has been extremely varied. remains firmly grounded in reality. Uneasy Balance The same Army that once threatened to stage a is a compact, well-researched, and revealing work on coup in Newburgh, New York, in 1783 is now con- how America’s military relates to the rest of society. sidered by many to be one of the most trusted institutions in the country. How military and civilian 1st Lt Kevin M. Hullihan, USAF leadership work to reach the same goals, either in Malmstrom AFB, Montana

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Thunder over the Horizon: From V-2 Rockets to the United States put together its force of nuclear Ballistic Missiles by Clayton K. S. Chun. Praeger ballistic missiles, starting with the Thor and Jupi- Security International, imprint of Greenwood ter systems shortly after the launch of Sputnik I/II Publishing Group (http://www.greenwood.com/ by the Soviet Union in 1957. By this time, the psi), 88 Post Road West, P.O. Box 5007, West- Eisenhower administration, feeling that the United port, Connecticut 06881-5007, 2006, 240 pages, States had fallen far behind the Soviet Union in $49.95 (hardcover). ballistic-missile design and production, triggered the race to build bigger, faster, and better missiles At times it’s hard to imagine that the Cold War than the Soviets. This jump in missile technology has been over for almost two decades. Although directly supported the manned space program of Clayton Chun’s book Thunder over the Horizon isn’t solely committed to the history of the Cold War, it the 1960s. does provide the reader with an introduction to bal- A chapter on the Cuban missile crisis not only listic missiles and their effect on that conflict. The recounts the events of that crisis but also describes author describes these concerns and the way they some of the chess-like policy decisions made by the have molded not only US foreign policy but also the United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba, with the pos- international policies of nearly all world regimes. session of ballistic missiles representing the key piece Chun speaks with a high level of credibility, hav- to winning or losing the game. In another chapter, ing served as a missile-launch officer and author of Chun writes about the war between Iran and Iraq several titles relating to military power. He brings and each country’s attempt to modify existing mis- his knowledge of ballistic missiles to the reader in a siles in order to gain the upper hand. By the end of way that makes historical events relevant to current the war, the ballistic missile had not necessarily be- world events. In the first chapter, which includes come what both countries wanted—an accurate several photographs and diagrams, Chun intro- weapon capable of destroying distant targets. The duces the reader to the whos, whats, and hows of author points out one key concern that has persisted ballistic missiles and their operation. Topics in- since the Germans’ development of the V-2: that clude flight phases, liquid motors, solid motors, without proper guidance and propulsion, the ballis- and guidance systems, and the first chapter’s sum- tic missile becomes a terror weapon difficult to de- mary deals with problems encountered in building fend against and difficult to make accurate. these missiles. The author does not go into difficult A chapter on proliferation that describes cur- engineering detail, and most readers will be re- rent ballistic-missile ownership and capability is not lieved to know that he uses no mathematical equa- just a simple laundry list but includes a brief history tions to describe any aspect of his subject, instead choosing to give the reader a fundamental knowl- of each nation and its rationale for acquiring such edge of ballistic missiles. capability. The following chapter, on national Proceeding from these basics, Chun takes the strategy and policy, covers our interaction with reader on a journey through the history of these these countries and how their ownership of missiles weapons, starting with the German V-2 in World affects those relationships. Chun concludes the War II, noting the difficulties in both building and book with a chapter on technology and the part it defending against it. The major construction prob- has played in shaping our history, noting the rivalry lems the Germans experienced—mainly propul- between air-delivered weapons and ballistic missiles sion and guidance—are the same ones countries during the era of Strategic Air Command. face today. Even though the Allies did not consider I recommend Thunder over the Horizon to anyone the V-2 a very accurate weapon, they nevertheless interested in either learning about ballistic missiles had to deal with the threat it posed, throwing con- or expanding his or her knowledge of these weap- siderable resources against the manufacturing, as- ons. Even though the Cold War is over, these mis- sembly, and launch sites that supported the missiles still play an important part in world politics, sile—resources they could have used elsewhere. especially in light of the current situation in both The book also offers a history of the Cold War Iran and North Korea. between the United States and Soviet Union, again addressing the difficulty of building and de- Maj Jeffrey James, USAF fending against ballistic missiles and relating how Mountain House, California

2008-4 Book Reviews.indd 125 10/27/08 9:07:08 AM ir and Space Power Journal, the US Air Force’s Web site http://www.af.mil/subscribe, selecting any Aprofessional journal, is published in English, of the Air and Space Power Journal language editions, Spanish, Portuguese, Arabic, French, and Chinese. entering your name and e-mail address, and then Each version is independent and has an editor—a clicking on the “submit” button. You will immedi- native speaker of the particular language and an ately receive an e‑mail asking you to reply in order to confirm your subscription. You won’t receive your expert in the region of coverage—who selects its subscription unless you reply to that message. Elec- content. We’re always looking for good, thought- tronic subscription is free. provoking articles up to 5,000 words in length, written in any of our published languages. All sub- missions will be edited in accordance with the Is Your Organization standards set forth in the Air University Style and Author Guide (available online at http://aupress Receiving Its Proper Number .maxwell.af.mil/Resources/style/austyle_guide of ASPJ Copies? .pdf). For details, please see our guidelines for sub- The following criteria guide the free distribu- mitting articles at http://www.airpower.maxwell.af tion of Air and Space Power Journal to military and .mil/airchronicles/howto1.html. You can contact government organizations. These criteria are only us by e-mail at [email protected]; regular mail planning factors—not absolute limits. If your or- at Air and Space Power Journal, 155 North Twining ganization has different needs, please contact Street, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6026; phone at DSN us at [email protected]. 493‑5322 (commercial [334] 953-5322); or fax at DSN 493-5811. • One copy for each general on active duty with the US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces. • One copy for every five active duty US Air Force of- Subscribing to ASPJ: ficers in grades second lieutenant through colonel. Both Printed and Electronic • One copy for each US Air Force or Air Reserve Forces Subscriptions Are Available office of public affairs. • Three copies for each Air Reserve Forces unit down Printed copy to squadron level. • The Journal is available free to all USAF organiza- • Three copies for each air attaché or advisory-group tions as described below in the section “Is Your Or- function. ganization Receiving Its Proper Number of ASPJ • One copy for each US Air Force or US government Copies?” Other US government and foreign military library. organizations may also receive the Journal for free by • Other US military, US government, or foreign mili- contacting the editor at [email protected]. tary organizations wishing to receive the Journal should • Nonmilitary and nongovernmental organizations may contact us at [email protected]. receive the Journal by contacting the Superintendent of Documents by any of the following methods: writ- If your organization is not receiving the desired ing to New Orders, Superintendent of Documents, number of copies, please contact us. c/o US Government Printing Office, P.O. Box 979050, St. Louis MO 63197-9000; calling (202) 512-1800 (voice), (866) 512-1800 (toll-free outside the DC area), Cumulative Article Index or (202) 512-2104 (fax); or visiting http://bookstore .gpo.gov/collections/military_ journals.jsp on the A cumulative index of ASPJ articles, listed alpha- Internet. The Journal’s official designation is AFRP betically by the author’s last name, is available at 10-1, Air and Space Power Journal, stock number 708- http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/ 007-00000-5. The cost is $32.00 ($44.80 for interna- aspjindex.html. tional mail). Major credit cards are accepted. The Editor Free electronic copy • You can receive the Journal electronically by logging on to the “Subscription Center” at the Air Force Link

126

Mission Debrief.indd 126 10/27/08 9:04:12 AM OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Gen Arthur J. Lichte (BS, Manhattan College; Lt Col Collin T. Ireton (USAFA; MS, Embry- Maj Brian E. A. Maue (BA, MBA, Michigan MS, University of Southern California) is the Riddle Aeronautical University) is the Air Force State University; MA, PhD, RAND) is an assis- commander of Air Mobility Command, Scott Materiel Command chief of Policies and Pro- tant professor of management in the United AFB, Illinois. The general attended under- cedures for Fighter, Trainer, and Unmanned States Air Force Academy’s Department of graduate pilot training at Sheppard AFB, Aircraft Systems as well as an F-16 experimental Management. He has been teaching manage- Texas. A command pilot with more than 4,000 flight-test pilot. Previously, he served as an ex- ment and policy concepts for eight semesters, flying hours in 12 aircraft, he has held com- perimental flight-test pilot and director of op- including one semester at the National Military mand positions at the squadron, group, and erations for the F-117 combined test force in Academy of Afghanistan. He has also served as wing levels. He also served as vice-commander Palmdale, California. Before that, he flew F-117s the lead data analyst for the chief of staff of the of United States Air Forces in Europe and as operationally and served as an assistant direc- Air Force’s 2002 Climate Survey. His opera- assistant vice-chief of staff and director, Air tor of operations for the 9th Fighter Squadron tional experience includes evaluating the com- Force Staff, Headquarters US Air Force, Wash- at Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Formerly, bat readiness of more than 200 missile-launch ington, DC. General Lichte is a graduate of Lieutenant Colonel Ireton was an experimental officers as a senior standardization/evaluation Squadron Officer School, Air Command and flight-test pilot in the A-10 and F-16 aircraft, crew commander at the 90th Operations Staff College, and National War College. serving as the developmental flight-test flight Group, F. E. Warren AFB, Wyoming, as well as commander for the A-10. He completed two launching a Minuteman III ICBM during overseas tours as an operational F-16 pilot and Glory Trip 161-GM. Major Maue has presented has amassed over 2,500 hours in 28 different his research on incentive policies at a variety types of aircraft. Lieutenant Colonel Ireton is of management and economics conferences. a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Air War College, and the USAF Test Pilot School.

Capt Adam E. Frey (BSc, Villanova University; JD, Ave Maria School of Law) is an assistant staff judge advocate at Eighth Air Force, Barks- dale AFB, Louisiana. Previously he served at Elmendorf AFB, Alaska, as the chief of labor law, defending the Air Force in civilian-labor lawsuits and union disputes. He also served as chief of claims, legal assistance, and civil law at Patrick AFB, Florida. In 2008 he deployed in support of the Office of Administrative Review for the Detention of Enemy Combatants in Arlington, Virginia, where he evaluated combatant-status review tribunals for the detainees at US Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Captain Frey is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.

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Bios - 2008-4.indd 127 10/27/08 9:05:37 AM Subscription to the Air and Space Power Journal for People Not Affiliated with the Military or Government

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subscription.indd 128 10/27/08 9:05:00 AM EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Gen John A. Shaud, USAF, Retired, Air Force Research Institute Lt Gen Bradley C. Hosmer, USAF, Retired Dr. J. Douglas Beason, Colonel, USAF, Retired, Los Alamos National Laboratory Dr. Alexander S. Cochran, Office of the Chief of Staff, US Army Prof. Thomas B. Grassey, US Naval Academy Lt Col Dave Mets, USAF, Retired, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (professor emeritus) http://www.af.mil

http://www.aetc.randolph.af

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Left to right: Lt Col Paul D. Berg, USAF, chief of professional journals; Lt Col Luis F. Fuentes, USAF, retired, editor of Air and Space Power Journal – Español; and Maj Gen Pedro R. Peña, chief of staff, Fuerza Aérea Dominicana (Dominican Republic Air Force) (6 August 2008, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic). General Peña was subsequently promoted to the rank of lieutenant general and named secretary of the armed forces.