Yugoslavia and the World, 1978 Europe [DIR-5-'78]
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1978/No. 43 by Dennison I. Rusinow Yugoslavia and the World, 1978 Europe [DIR-5-'78]
A Yugoslav Party Congress, although its focus countries and parties that are jealous of their is primarily domestic, provides an occasion for a independence, is the Soviet Union. Those who quadrennial review of the state of the world, and resist this danger are defenders of peace as well of Yugoslavia's place in the world, as the Yugo- as their own independence and are in need of one slav leadership sees and wishes others to see it. another, in consultation and in action. Their The Eleventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of representatives are therefore particularly wel- Communists (hereafter called the LCY), held in come at Tito's Court in Belgrade, which was the Belgrade from June 20 to 23, 1978, presented first to cry a pox on both "Western" imperialism such a review and in its documents and discus- and "Eastern" hegemonism, and where the sions anticipated two events of the later summer doyen of nonalignment and of independent that once again put 86-year-old President Josip Communism has experience and wisdom to offer Broz Tito's picture on the front pages of the and is still bold in his own defiance of Super- world press. The first of these was the July powers and the politics of blocs. Those who argue meeting in Belgrade of foreign ministers or their instead that the Soviet Union is the natural ally deputies representing 117 members, "observers," and protector of all "progressive and anti-impe- and "guests" of the nonaligned movement, its rialist forces" are the witting or unwitting lackeys task to prepare for the sixth summit conference of hegemonism. They must be isolated politically, of the nonaligned, in Havana in September 1979. and the falsity of their argument must be The second, beginning with appropriate if exposed. accidental symbolism on the tenth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia The Party in Congress and Current World (August 21, 1968), was an official visit by Hua Affairs Kuo-feng, Chairman of the Communist Party of The principal image the Eleventh Congress of China and archenemy of the rulers of Russia. the LCY sought to project, as described in a com- panion A UFS Report focusing on the domestic None of these happenings will have been aspects of the message, was of a stable Yugo- pleasing to those in charge of Soviet foreign slavia in an unstable world. This, the delegates policythe third merely because it happened, heard and read and repeated, is a country with and the first two because of the balance of what problems of its own, to be sure, but one whose was said and done. As a matter of courtesy and regime's and peoples' self-satisfied self-confi- caution no literally anti-Soviet word was spoken, dence about the future is qualified primarily by but the tenor of the Yugoslav position at all three concern over the potential effects of events meetings was clear: all great power corrupts into beyond their borders and control. What is going imperialism or hegemonism and all Great Powers on out thereretreat from dtente, renewed Cold therefore tend to be imperialist or hegemonist, War, and consequently increased Superpower but the most dangerous at the moment, at least tensions and competition for enlarged spheres of for the nonaligned and the smaller Communist influencecan at worst lead to more regional 2/DIR-5-'78 wars or even a global one and must at least all ears clearly the warmest welcome. Others re- threaten the stability and independence of other ceiving identifiably above-average levels of countries, especially in the nonaligned Third applausewith observers inevitably disagreeing World, and this includes Yugoslavia. about the rank-orderincluded the Romanians, Hungarians, and Poles (but definitely not the In Congress speeches and documents that dis- staunchly pro-Soviet and "hard-line" East bloc cussed the affairs of this unstable world beyond parties" the Czechoslovak, Bulgarian, and East Yugoslavia's frontiers the sections that attracted German), the Spanish and other "Eurocommu- most attention in the foreign press were those nist" delegations, and the Soviet delegation itself that attacked Soviet policies or those of its allies, (led by Politburo member Fjodor D. Kulakov, particularly Cubaalthough, as part of the who was considered a possible successor to courtesy and caution referred to above, it was an Leonid Brezhnev until his sudden death the unwritten rule of the Congress that the targets of following month).4 When Kardelj went on to such criticism should never actually be named. read the list of Parties that had sent greetings While other and sometimes counterbalancing instead of delegations, he was interrupted by themes were thereby largely ignored (e.g., the another round of demonstrative applause for the "crisis of world capitalism," Yugoslav advocacy Chinese Party, which never sends guest delega- of a new international economic order, or the tions to foreign Party Congresses but whose letter listing of [Western] imperialism and neocolonial- of greetings was portentously warm and flatter- ism alongside [Soviet] hegemonism as forms of ing. oppression and threats to peace), this emphasis accurately reflected the Congress's principal Finally, the fact that the Yugoslav Congress foreign policy message and what its organizers was taking place on the eve of two important most wanted the world to hearas evident in the anniversariesthe thirtieth anniversary of Yugo- way Yugoslav officials assigned to assist foreign slavia's expulsion from Stalin's Cominform on correspondents drew their attention to passages June 28, 1948, and the tenth anniversary of the that were most critical of Soviet policies. These Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August were particularly to be found in speeches to the 1968can resonably be assumed to have been in Congress commission on foreign affairsa by the back of everyone's mind, although the 1948 senior officials, which by tradition function as an one was mentioned only fleetingly and 1968 not authoritative exegesis of selected passages from at all. the Gospel of Tito's keynote speech. The con- clusion of the Belgrade correspondent of The In view of all this, the subjects on which Yugo- Times, Dessa Trevisan, in her report of June 25 slav views challenged those of the Soviet Union was typical and justified at least for the 1970s: deserve pride of place in a summary of the prin- "Never before have the Yugoslavs made the cipal foreign affairs topics discussed by the Con- message more blunt and never before have the gress. differences with the Soviet Union, both ideo- logical and practical, been greater." The Current Deterioration in U.S.-Soviet Relations Ordinary delegates meanwhile indicated their In his keynote speech on the opening day Tito own sentiments, at the opening plenary session, issued a solemn appeal to both superpowers: by their usual method of apportioning their applauseone aspect of their behavior that The threat of an outbreak of war not only at a cannot be disciplined, since it is collectively local level but even on a world scale cannot be anonymousas Edvard Kardelj, presiding, read excluded I am not saying that the situation is the list of foreign guest delegations and their the same as in 1961, when the Belgrade Confer- leaders. Enrico Berlinguer, head of the Italian ence of Nonaligned Countries appealed to the Communist Party, a symbol of "Eurocommu- two great powers to start a dialogue and negotia- nism," and significantly the most senior foreign tion. Yet it seems reasonable at the present Communist at the Congress, received what was to moment to call on the two sides to make serious DI R-5-'78/3 efforts to transcend the present unsatisfactory and more circumspect references to the same situation This is their historical responsibility subject found in Tito's keynote speech. before the international community. An introductory section listed the virtues of To these ends, Tito continued, a revival of nonalignment6 and meticulously used the plural d6tente as a bitlateral arrangement based on "great powers" in referring to current efforts to existing blocs and largely limited to Europe (a split the movement and co-opt its members into limitation that was an important subtheme in spheres of influenceefforts also said to have Congress discussion of the subject) is not enough. contributed to the aggravation of existing con- D6tente must be extended to the rest of the world flicts among individual nonaligneds, sometimes and to other dimensions of multilateral inter- leading to war. Then Mini6 came to his main national and interregional relations, including point. "Of all the pressures from the outside and acceptance of the need for a new international within the nonaligned movement," he said, "I economic order.5 think that the most damaging are those aimed at imposing a so-called reorientation of the move- This much, which did not apportion blame for ment, that is, a change in the character of its role "the present unsatisfactory situation," was and purposes." These pressures, "which gener- explicit. Implicit or deducible from various pas: ally come from the left," seek to divide the non- sages and speeches by others was the conclusion aligned countries into "progressive" (or "radi- that, while the two Superpowers share respon- cal") and "conservative" (or "moderate") cate- sibility for the deterioration in their bilateral gories, condemning the latter as having gone soft relations and for nonacceptance of a new eco- on imperialism and colonialism and arguing that nomic order (see below for this last), it is the "the socialist countries" (i.e., the Soviet bloc) are Soviet Union and at least one of its allies that are "the natural allies" of the "progressive" coun- chiefly to blame for the revival and extension of tries. "We," said Mini6, "cannot understand or the Cold War in the Third World in general and accept the stubborn insistence of some that the in Africa in particular. The consequences, as character and role of the movement should be so described at the Congress, include the aggrava- altered that it limits itself only to the struggle tion of local conflicts and the arms race, the de- against imperialism, colonialism, and neocolo- stabilization of regimes, the undermining of re- nialism, but not against hegemonism and other cently achieved independence, and the risk of a forms of foreign domination. Even less can we wider war. Its most insidious aspect, treated next understand views and efforts to reorient the as a separate subject because of the importance movement so that one of the existing blocs is the Congress attributed to it, lies in attempts to proclaimed a natural ally in the struggle against split the nonaligned movement, assigning those the other." of its members selectively defined as "progres- sive" to a Soviet bloc tendentiously defined as Mini6 offered two arguments for this Yugoslav their "natural" allies and protectors. position. He admitted that in theory, given their Marxist principles, the "socialist countries" Attempts to Split the Nonaligned Movement should support the goals of the nonaligned move- This theme, mentioned by Tito and in all Con- ment, but noted that in the real world of power gress documents concerned with international politics and of different views and conflicts affairs, received particular attention in what among Communist states and parties this is far foreign ministry officials and other Yugoslav from always the case. It is therefore wiser for the observers identified as the most important speech nonaligned to continue their traditional policy of made to the Congress's commission on supporting and accepting support from either of international relations. By Milo Mini6, lately the blocs on an ad hoc basis, depending on whose Secretary for Foreign Affairs and now apparently policy on individual issues is consonant with the to be the Party Presidency's principal spokesman independence, nonalignment, and other interests in this area, it provided (in the tradition de- of the nonaligned. His second and more revealing scribed above) an authoritative exegesis of briefer argument is the Yugoslav view of "hegemonism" 4/DIR-5-,'78
as a threat that is overlooked, either deliberately grade's Sava Center where the Congress was or out of ignorance, by the self-defined "radical" meeting. His and other Congress speeches nonaligneds who see the Soviet Union as a repeating his thesis in fact anticipated the more natural ally. "According to our perceptions," dramatic and explicit Cuban-Yugoslav clash Mini said, "hegemonism as a form of foreign which was to take place at that meeting, as de- domination is appearing ever more frequently in tailed below. Even more recently, Chinese Party international relations." Even worse, and as a Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has endorsed the Yugo- result of the crisis and declining of traditional slav position on this question by repeating it as [Western] imperialism, "it may happen, and is a China's own during his August 1978 visit to likely prospect, that hegemonism in the historic Yugoslavia. Much more on the subject will un- sense will become a kind of successor to those doubtedly be heard between now and the sixth forms of domination and exploitation that are meeting of nonaligned heads of state and gov- gradually exiting from the historical stage--as ernment in Havana. colonialism is doing today, for example--under the pressure of the struggle of peoples for a "Democratic Relations" among Communist democratic and progressive transformation of Parties international and social relations and despite the Accentuating the positive here and leaving powerful resistance of forces that support them." criticism of Soviet behavior to be sought largely In these circumstances, Marxists and other pro- "between the lines," Congress documents and gressives in the nonaligned countries must not be speeches stressed the historical value of the 1976 confused by the similarities between their goals East Berlin conference of European Communist and the systems ostensibly prevailing in one of Parties and praised the "Eurocommunist" and the blocs, since hegemonism is "independent of Japanese Parties for developing their own inde- the character of the social order and the ideo- pendent political and ideological lines (see below logical orientation of its carriers." for more on this last). Aleksandar Grli6kov, the chief Yugoslav negotiator at Berlin and in the In all of this, Minie concluded pointedly, the long, difficult preparations for that meeting, Yugoslavs know what they are talking about: doggedly kept to the same approach in a pre- "Our position on the question of hegemonism Congress press conference at which Soviet cor- derives from our experience that we have gained respondents persistently tried to corner him into over the past three decades, a period in which we a negative evaluation of Soviet-Yugoslav Party have at various times been exposed to acute relations,z pressures, both from imperialism and from hegemonism, that have threatened the inde- The Berlin conference, it will be recalled, pendence of our country and our independent formally endorsed Yugoslav (and "Eurocommu- course of socialist development." nist") positions concerning the independence and equality of each Communist Party, mutual non- With "hegemonism" as a now universally interference and respect for different views, each recognized codeword for Soviet imperialism, with Party's exclusive "responsibility to its own the Cuban regime (itself deeply involved in working class and nation," and "voluntary coop- Africa) as the nonaligned movement's principal eration and internationalist solidarity" in place exponent of the views that Yugoslavia is of the ill-famed phrase "proletarian inter- opposing, and for those who remember that nationalism" favored by the Soviet Party and its Yugoslavia's own struggle to remain independent stauncher allies. In subsequent months authori- of Soviet dictation is precisely Minie's "three tative Yugoslav spokesmen, including Grli6kov, decades" old this summer, the full meaning of have on several occasions accused some unnamed his sermon is unambiguously clear. Minie him- but easily identified signers of the East Berlin self said that the problems he was discussing President Tito "entertains Chinese Chairman Hua must be on the agenda for the meeting of non- Kuo-feng with a ride in an electric cart, on a sightseeing aligned foreign ministers that was to take place tour of the island of Vangha, one of the Brionis, the the following month in the same halls of Bel- President's summer residence, August 28, 1978. DI R-5-'78/'5 meeting's concluding document of ignoring the sponsibility only to its own working class," Tito pledges it contained by attempting to re-establish was the first "Eurocommunist" (by 1948) and the an international Communist organization or a Yugoslav Communists are all in favor and glad to "leading Party and state" with implicit authority have friends. For their own country, however, over other parties. Ostensibly bland reaffirma- they must regard renunciation of "the dictator- tions of the East Berlin meeting at the Party ship of the proletariat" and acceptance of a Congress will have been understood in the con- multiparty system by some "Eurocommunist" text of these complaints by all who listened, Parties as potentially dangerous doctrines, quite including Soviet bloc and West European guest possibly appropriate in Western Europe's delegations and Chinese embassy officials pre- "bourgeois democracies" but ,totally unac- paring briefing papers for their Chairman's visit ceptable in Yugoslavia. to Belgrade. Pronouncements on "Eurocommunism" by "Eurocommunism" Tito and others at the Eleventh Congress were The Yugoslav Party must tread warily here. therefore carefully circumspect, and the term Insofar as "Eurocommunism" stands for inde- itself was seldom used. The resolution on inter- pendence of Moscow, the right of each Party to national affairs adopted by the Congress, re- "chart its own road to socialism," and its "re- ferring specifically to "some Communist Parties 6/DIR-5-'78
in Western Europe and the Communist Party of this basic orientation by a number of Communist Japan," put it this way: "The League of Com- Parties in Western Europe and in some other munists of Yugoslavia supports positive trends in parts of the world. That does not mean that the workers' movement asserting the autonomy between us and them, as between us and other of parties and the diversity of roads and forms of Communist Parties, there are no differences of the struggle for socialism and contributing to the views on some questions. However, these differ- consolidation of socialism as a worldwide ences, which we consider natural, cannot put in process." Tito in his keynote speech called it a question our support for the independence of "positive tendency" that each Party in its choice of roads to socialism and the building ofsocialism, nor should it hinder the many communist and workers' parties, for development of mutual cooperation, which today example in Western Europe, have emerged as (in our view) can only develop on the basis of important national political forces. They have equality, voluntary choice, and mutual respect autonomously and creatively elaborated their for different views and interests. concept of the struggle for socialism in the con- crete historical conditions of the contemporary The Macedonian Question Again crisis of capitalism. In doing so they have in- Qualifying an otherwise generally positive augurated an active dialogue on an equalfooting evaluation of Yugoslav relations with six of the with other democratic and progressive forces country's seven neighbors (always excepting Taken as a whole, it is a progressive phenomenon Albania, although even here positive develop- ofseeking new ways ofstrugglefor socialism. ments in trade and cultural relations were stressed), the Basic Theses for the Congress, Then, however, he introduced a cautionary note commission speeches, and the Resolution on that was probably addressed as much to Santiago international affairs all noted sadly that three of Carillo, head of the Spanish Party and the most them are in one way or another mistreating the anti-Leninist and anti-Soviet of "Eurocommu- Yugoslav minorities within their borders: Slo- nism," as it was to Moscow: venes and Croats in Austria and Macedonians in Bulgaria and Greece. The Theses were even- This at the same time confirms that the struggle handed in their criticism of the three countries, for socialism will continue evolving in different but the Resolution, drafted more recently and so forms, that there are no universal "models" and presumably recording second thoughts, came that no concrete historical experience can have a down hard on Bulgaria. Cooperation between the universal significance. Any attempt "at absolu- two countries, the Resolution declared, is tization of one's experience and any tendency to hampered by "the unchanged policy of Bulgaria impose it upon others hardly contributes to the towards the Macedonian national minority in success ofthe struggle 8 Bulgaria and towards the Macedonian nation as a whole." The LCY and the Yugoslav state con- Speeches in the Congress commission on inter- sider that Bulgarian treatment of their Mace- national affairs were as usual a degree more donian minority "is in contradiction to the candid. Boko $iljegovi6, who gave the intro- United Nations Charter and the Final Act of the ductory speech at the first session of the commis- Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-opera- sion, noted that "an ever larger number of Com- tion in Europe." munist Parties" are opting for "their own strategy and vision of socialist society, conform- Bulgarian insistence that there is no such thing ing to the specific conditions in their own coun- as a Macedonian nation, either in Yugoslav tries," and added: Macedonia or as a minority in Bulgarian (Pirin) Macedonia, is an old story and a perennial Understandably the League of Communists of reason for poor relations and periodic polemics Yugoslavia, which already for decades has stub- between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. The polemics bornly fought for new relations in the workers' invariably become serious on either of two occa- movement [among Communist Parties], salutes sions, which somehow usually coincide" whenever DIR-5-'78/7
Yugoslav-Soviet relations are on a downward was ostentatiously ignored by the Yugoslav curve and whenever the Bulgarians celebrate an regime and press (which reported other parts of anniversary of their liberation from Ottoman rule Zhivkov's speech) until Bulgarian officials as a result of the 1878 Russo-Turkish War and publicly complained about the allegations made Treaty of San Stefano.9 San Stefano created a at the Congress and the insult and purported "Greater Bulgaria" that included what is now Yugoslav territorial claims implicit in the silence Yugoslav Macedonia, largely populated by South that had greeted their leader's proposal. Their Slavs whom Bulgarian nationalists have always complaints included a statement by Dimiter claimed as a part of the Bulgarian nation. San Stanishev, a Central Committee Secretary who Stefano's Greater Bulgaria was never actually had led the Bulgarian guest delegation to the established (the other Powers intervened to stop Yugoslav Congress, that "there has never been what they considered a dangerous expansion of and there is not at present a Macedonian Russian power and rewrote the Treaty at the national minority in Bulgaria." Congress of Berlin that same summer), but it has never been forgotten in Bulgaria... or in Yugo- The Yugoslavs responded by recalling that in slavia. the Bulgarian census of 1956, taken during a brief period of official Bulgarian recognition that 1978 is the centenary of the events of 1878 and there was such a minority, 187,789 of Bulgaria's is being appropriately commemorated through- 8 million and 178,862 of Pirin Macedonia's out Bulgaria, complete with laudatory references 281,000 inhabitants were recorded as "Mace- to San Stefano as an act that momentarily united donian"a figure reduced to 8,750 in Bulgaria all Bulgarians in a single state and to a century of and only 1,500 in the Pirin district in the census fraternal Russian support for Bulgarian national of 1965 and to none anywhere in that of 1975. As aspirations. Rightly or wrongly, the Yugoslavs for Zhivkov's offer, the Yugoslav response here have again interpreted this as irredentism and a was to give the press copies of three documents latent Bulgarian territorial claim to Yugoslav drafted in preparation for a Tito-Zhivkov Macedoniawhich Bulgaria in fact occupied meeting in Sofia in September 1976: a joint and annexed in both World Wars. The Yugoslavs declaration pledging all-around cooperation, also appear to believe, again as usual, that the including Party relations; a "solemn declaration" latest Bulgarian "campaign" is sponsored by the that neither country had "any territorial preten- Soviet Union as a form of pressure on Yugoslavia. sions" against the other and reaffirming mutual respect for "territorial integrity and the inviola- The Bulgarians reply that it is the Yugoslavs bility of existing frontiers"; and another pair of who are making a "campaign," and that its "solemn declarations," one to be made by each nature suggests it is the Yugoslavs who nurture government before its own national assembly, territorial ambitionsagainst Pirin Macedonia. concerning the rights of the Bulgarian minority The Bulgarian regime also attempted to take in Yugoslavia and those of the Macedonian preventive action in anticipation of what would minority in Bulgaria. Because the three were a be said at the Yugoslav Party Congress. In a package, and Zhivkov would not agree to the speech delivered during a visit to Pirin Mace- third, none of them was signed or published. donia on June 15, one week before the Belgrade Zhivkov was now in effect proposing to revive the Congress opened, Bulgarian President and Party second, knowing that the third is the one that the Secretary Todor Zhivkov offered to come to Bel- Yugoslavs still consider important; his offer, the grade "tomorrow" and join Tito in signing a joint Yugoslav foreign ministry's press spokesman told declaration mutually renouncing territorial a briefing, should therefore be considered merely claims and reaffirming the inviolability of an effort "to create an impression." existing frontiers. Zhivkov's speech once again failed to mention the existence of a Macedonian Since then, this latest round of Yugoslav- minority among his Blagoevgrad audience or a Bulgarian polemics over Macedonia has sim- Macedonian nation across the nearby Yugoslav mered on, with the Yugoslav press doing most of border. For this reason, it was said later, the offer the shouting and the Bulgarians generally pre- 8/DI R-5-'78
serving a dignified silence. Most outside ob- the former West German Chancellor and head of servers have concluded that the Yugoslav auth- the West German Social-Democratic Party who orities had over-reacted to Bulgarian centenary is now chairman of both the Socialist Inter- speeches and publications and were continuing national and a Western European agency con- to do so, at least in part to please their own cerned with ways to improve "North-South" re- Macedonians, but that Bulgaria's Soviet patrons lationsand who was an important friend of would not be displeased by either Bulgarian Yugoslavia in years past. Brandt's personal sentiments or Yugoslav nervousness. Meanwhile, double engagement is generally considered one veteran Balkan correspondents like Viktor Meier reason why the Socialist International has been of the Frankfurter Algemeine and Paul Lendvai showing increased interest in the Third World, of the Financial Times and Die Presse, revisiting its problems, and its non-Communist Parties of Pirin Macedonia for an "update" on local re- the Left. Somewhat ironically in view of the actions, were again told that there ain't nobody Yugoslav Party's concern over Soviet influence in here but us Bulgarians but got no reply at all to the same region and its former attitude and polit- the question: what happened to the 179,000 ical debts to the SI, to several of its members, and Macedonians who were here in 19567 to Brandt personally, this interest and its possible consequences have now earned Yugoslav con- demnation. Thus the Eleventh Congress's Draft Two other foreign policy themes discussed by Resolution on international affairs, after praising the Congress could not be interpreted as "anti- (alleged) increased emphasis on "socialist goals Soviet"" and values" by individual European socialist and social-democratic parties and "phenomena indi- The Socialist International cating a weakening of social-democratic dog- Most criticism of alleged attempts to split the matism and of the crudest forms of anticommu- nonaligned movement and force its members to nism," continued" take sides in a revived Cold War was addressed to the Soviet Union and Cuba, as has been seen. In recent years, however, activity has intensified Occasionally, however, another and at first in strengthening the Socialist International as the glance curious agency was also accused of pur- international center of socialist and social- suing a similar policy, this time with anti-Com- democratic parties and in expanding its political munist rather than pro-Soviet motives. and ideological influence, particularly among the parties and movements ofthe nonaligned and the The Socialist (or Second) International, a developing countries. Such activity of the feared or revered political force until it fell apart Socialist International is not conducive to the over the question of its member parties' attitudes required faster liquidation of division and con- to their countries' declarations of war in 1914 flicts in the international workers' movement, and was eclipsed by the Communist Third Inter- and may even involve attempts to introduce ideo- national after 1919, has long been little more logical and bloc divisions among the nonaligned than a cozy, unnoticed club for occasional get- countries togethers by the leaders of Europe's socialist and social-democratic parties. The Yugoslavs them- A New International Economic Order selves flirted with it in the early day_s of their It was incidentally significant that this theme lonely post-1948 isolation and attacks by "the was almost totally ignored in Western and inter- world Communist movement," but soon found national news agency reports from the Congress. relations with individual members like the As one news agency correspondent said when I British Labour and Italian Socialist Parties more commented on his failure to mention Tito's own useful as tokens of their acceptability to at least lengthy references to the need for a new inter- the non-Communist European Left. Lately, how- national economic order as a major and pressing ever, the "SI" has been showing new signs of life world problem: "Our subscribers aren't inter- and of a quest for a mission, a development usu- ested in that subject and wouldn't print it if I ally associated with the person of Willy Brandt, wrote it." What about subscribers in the Third DIR-5-'78/9
World itself?. "They are relatively unimportant; the interest of each individual country and bring most of our newspapers and income are in about a juster distribution of world revenue. This Europe and North America." Although in a way would open up new avenues of development and a separate subject, this silence and the reason progress in the world at large." So far, the prin- offered for it are also a part of "North-South" cipal impediments to such negotiation and relations in the light of (1) Third World com- agreement are "the lack of specific measures for plaints about dependence on culturocentric and the elimination of bloc groupings" (which means allegedly prejudiced "Western" news agencies the East-West problem), "intensification of the for news about and of interest to their own coun- contradictions imminent in international eco- tries and consequent demands for some form of nomic relations due to the activity of new international journalistic order, and (2) multinational companies," and short-sighted complaints everywhere about misinformation efforts by "the economically advanced couno and lack of information in the media as a major tries...to preserve ,.a_cquiredz advantages and problem for those who consider an informed and dominant positions.' substantive "North-South dialogue" about the international economic order to be a matter of Nothing new or specific here, and the emphasis increasing urgency. and phrasing given the subject, in the presence of numerous guest delegations from Africa, Asia, Nonacceptance of such a dialogue as a sub- and Latin America, was no doubt motivated in theme in discussions of United States and Soviet part by a desire to reaffirm Yugoslavia's delinquencies in foreign affairs has already been solidarity with the Group of 77, the nonaligned noted, but the subject received much additional countries, and "the South" in general. For emphasis in its own right. Views expressed at the Yugoslavia this may be an issue of greater sen- Congress were standard and predictable, which is sitivity in the future. As a European country of no doubt another reason they were not con- white-skinned peoples, Yugoslavia has always sidered newsworthy. "Existing international eco- been an odd and somewhat lonely member of the nomic relations," the Draft Resolution declared, nonaligned and other primarily non-European "wherein the differences between the developed groupings that constitute its primary inter- and the developing countries are being continu- national associations and a major base for a role ously reproduced and enhanced, constitute one on the world political stage that has been dis- of the most dangerous sources of international proportionate to its size and military or economic tensions and friction, as well as being one of the strength. So far Yugoslavia's Europeanness and gravest problems confronting the international minor absolute and relative military-economic community." The answer to this and other "con- importance have been more than counterbal- tradictions that have accumulated in the world anced by Tito's enormous prestige as a founder economy" lies in "the concept of a new inter- and universally respected spokesman of the national economic order," particularly as articu- nonaligned. But after Tito? And in the context of lated by the "Group of 77" in the United Nations the Cuban-led campaign for a "reorientation" of and at the fifth conference of heads of state from nonalignment that the Yugoslavs have so heavily the nonaligned countries in Colombo in 1976. committed themselves to opposing? The way to achieve it is "through international negotiation and accord, leading to comprehen- Meanwhile, however, nonspecificity, propa- sive international economic cooperation on the gandistic phrases, and the "Yugocentricity" of basis of equal benefit and in accordance with the Yugoslav reasons for speaking with a loud voice sovereign control of each country over its natural in conceiving and advocating a "new inter- wealth, equality, and the consideration of the national economic order" need not (and should interests of all countries of the world." All, both not?) detract from the strength of the case that developed and developing, would thereby benefit they and others are presenting. from "an appropriate structural transformation of the world economy, above all a new inter- national division of labor, which would operate in 10/DIR-5-'78
Other topics in current world affairs were also as noted above, the Congress's discussion of discussed at the Eleventh Congress, including topics such as nonalignment and such marginalia various "flashpoints of crisis" like the Middle as particularly warm applause for the Chinese East and Cyprus (well-known Yugoslav views Party's letter of greeting anticipated more were repeated here), an end to the arms race dramatic headlines produced by the Belgrade through negotiations "leading to general and meeting of nonaligned foreign ministers in July total disarmament under strict and effective and Chairman Hua's visit in August. international supervision" (closer to Soviet than to Western phrasing on this subject), and the 1977-78 Belgrade conference to review imple- The Voices of Belgrade and Havana mentation of the Helsinki "Final Act" of 1975 (it At the July 25-30 meeting of nonalignment's accomplished little but as much as could be foreign ministers the polemics and disagreements expected in difficult circumstances, and at least were so acute that the meeting itself had to be it kept Helsinki alive). Such subjects rounded out prolonged for a day to allow key delegations, the official Yugoslav view of the world in 1978, meeting informally and privately, to draft a final but the ones described in more detail in this document that all could accept with only a few Report were the priority themes. In addition and formal reservations. During the public debate the DIR-5-'78/11
representatives of Somalia, Egypt, and several progressive." For the nonaligned, Castro insisted, others among nonalignment's 86 full members "there cannot be neutrality between progressive were more openly anti-Cuban than the Yugo- countries and reactionary countries," and if the slavs, proposing either Cuba's expulsion from the obviously correct choice of support for and by the movement (for which there is neither a precedent former leads to defections from the movement it nor provision in nonalignment's largely unwritten does not matter, since nonalignment "should be rules) or at least that the 1979 nonaligned characterized by its quality and not by the num- summit should be moved from Havana to some- ber of members." It also did not pass unnoticed where else (which would be more than a gesture in Belgrade that the Cuban leader listed himself of pique and censure, since the host for a non- among the founders of nonalignment, along with aligned meeting acts as its secretariat in the Nasser, Nehru, and Nkrumah (all dead), but planning stage as well, an influential role). ostentatiously did not mention Tito--although Although Yugoslavia joined the majority in Castro was not in fact around during the move- opposing both these propositions and there were ment's formative stage or present at the first also other issues with other protagonists to (Belgrade) nonaligned summit in 1961 !3 dramatize the movement's present multifaceted disunity, the meeting as a whole was in essence a Perhaps the finest speech of the Belgrade Yugoslav-Cuban duel for the soul of nonalign- meeting was by Singapore's foreign minister, ment. Sinnthamby Radjaratnam, who even-handedly damned both Superpowers for once again pres- The Yugoslav hosts, with Tito, Mini6, suring the nonaligned to take sides and manipu- Grli6kov, and Foreign Secretary Josip Vrhovec lating them in proxy wars. Suggesting self-criti- all present at various stages to demonstrate the cism by nonaligneds who go along with this game importance they were attributing to the gather- and also impoverish themselves with massive ing, repeated the views and arguments that Mini6 arms purchases, he warned that "the Third had presented to the Party Congress in the same World War has already begunin the Third building one month earlier. Although not physi- World." Others, including ministers from some cally present, Fidel Castro himself restated the "radical" members like North Korea and Cuban position in a major speech delivered in Angola, apparently agreed with such firm re- Santiago de Cuba on July 27 and distributed in statements of nonalignment's nonalignment. Belgrade the following morning. A large part of With the Cubans and other pro-Soviet partici- Castro's two-hour oration, in which he also pants at last surrendering because they could attacked the United States and China and apply the offensive terms to a different target, the defended Cuba's military adventures in Africa, meeting's final document listed "hegemonism" was devoted to the Belgrade meeting, then in its and "expansionism"the latter an alternative third day. The nonaligned, Castro said, have pejorative for Moscow's behavior introduced at been infiltrated by "traitors, opportunists, the meeting by the Cambodians when the Viet- waverers, and those who sell their principles." namese and others started using "hegemonism" These people, in, agreement with the United to describe China rather than the Soviet Union States, "are upset by the firm, combative, and among the evils that the nonaligned pledge them- unwavering role of Cuba," and some nonaligned selves to oppose. (For the record, the full list now countries (15 of them, Castro specified without reads "imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, naming names) have accepted U.S. inducement racism including Zionism, and all forms of ex- "to oppose the role of Cuba in the nonaligned pansionism, foreign domination, and hegem- movement" and at Belgrade. Apparently as a ony." Most of the rest of the concluding docu- result, the movement itself has for the moment ment's 207 articles, incidentally, are a frequently become "amorphous, opportunistic, and lamed repetitious potpourri of sometimes dated "posi- rather than anti-imperialist, anticolonialist and tions on particular international issues" like the Presidents Tito and Hua Kuo-feng chat at Belgrade Middle East, southern Africa, Cyprus, Puerto White Palace shortly after arrival of the Chinese Rico, Korean reunification, etc. These are gen- Chairman in Belgrade, August 21, 1978. erally written in the hyperbolic language of 12/DIR-5-'78 radical movements, so that it is somewhat sur- nerable neighbor, also nervously condemned the prising that "moderate" members did not avail invasion in which Romania, alone among mem- themselves of their right to submit "reservations" bers of the Warsaw Pact, had avoided participa- to more of such articles than they did.)4 tion. In faraway Peking the Chinese joined the chorus of condemnation, but Premier Chou In this round of the struggle for the soul of En-lai discounted in advance the possibi!ity of nonalignment, Yugoslavia thereby seems to have help from China, if the Red Army were to roll on won on points and to have the support of a large through Bucharest to Belgrade, by issuing a not- majority of the movement. It is certain, however, so-cryptic warning that "distant water cannot that there will be a return and more decisive bout put out a fire." In any case, Chinese dislike of in Havana in 1979. The outcome there will un- Yugoslavia's ideological heresies was still so doubtedly be influenced by intervening develop- intense that there had not even been a Chinese ments in Africa and the way the respective Ambassador in Belgrade since 1956, although African roles of the two Superpowers are re- Romania was highly regarded in Peking for its garded by key nonaligned heads of state--per- neutrality in the Sino-Soviet quarrel. haps particularly those, like President Boume- dienne of Algeria, who are at present more gen- On August 21, 1978, precisely 10 years later, uinely "nonaligned" between the blocs than Chinese Party Chairman Hua Kuo-feng arrived Castro and the Vietnamese or (for example) the in Belgrade to begin a 9-day official visit to Yugo- Saudis and Kuwaitis on the other side.The same slavia, following 5 days in Romania and before a is likely to be true of the way China "plays its briefer stop in Iran on his way home. Hua was nonaligned card" (mixing the metaphor for the not exactly carrying a fire extinguisher, nor did sake of analogy with Washington's "playing the he emulate Nikita Khrushchev's performance at Chinese card")and China's own friends in the Belgrade airport in 1955 by apologizing for the movement. These now include Yugoslavia, and beastly things the Chinese had said about Yugo- during his visit to Belgrade the following month slavia in the past. The importance of his tour was Chairman Hua pointedly repeated Yugoslav at least for the moment primarily symbolic, and views of nonalignment as China's own. China'is as far from the Balkans in 1978 as it was in 1968. However, Hua's mere presence and Chairman Hua Comes Calling choice of hosts for his first trip to Europe, the On August 21, 1968, Soviet tanks rolled warmth of his welcome in both Romania and through Czechoslovakia to end "the Prague Yugoslavia, and his repetition of Chinese spring" and demonstrate the full meaning of warnings about "hegemony," pronounced in the Brezhnev's ex post facto (and never reiterated) Soviet Union's European front yard only days doctrine that the sovereignty of "socialist" states after the signing of a Sino-Japanese treaty that must be subject to Soviet-defined limitations. had defied explicit Soviet objections by using the Tito and his regime, who had applauded the same word, was quite enough for a Kremlin that Czechoslovak experiment with "socialism with a is anxiously registering each step of China's human face" and whose own more fulsome defi- dramatic post-Mao and anti-Soviet eruption on ance of Soviet dictation and models was then the world stage, precisely 20 years old, were outraged and alarmed. Tito sharply condemned an "aggres- Hua and his hosts, concerned to give the Soviet sion" which was "trampling Czechoslovak sover- Union as little pretext for reprisals as possible, eignty" in order "to stop a progressive evolution" did what they could to soften the blow. The Chi- in that country, declared that if Yugoslavia's in- nese leader tactfully refrained from attacking the dependence were also threatened "we shall know Soviet Union by name or even "inferentially, how to defend and protect it with all means," and except for those passing references to "hegemo- redeployed and reorganized his armed forces to 5 President Tito and Chinese Chairman Hua Kuo-feng show that he meant it. President Nicolae during a sightseeing walk on the island of Vangha, one of Ceauescu of Romania, then as now the Soviet the Brionis, the President's summer residence, August Union's circumspectly dissident ally and vul- 29, 1978. DIR-5-'78/13
nism." Both the Romanians and the Yugoslavs visits provided inadequate material for graver repeatedly insisted that their relationship with accusations, the Soviet media quoted instead China is directed against no one but is part of from Western press reports and commentaries their policies of peace and friendship with all and that did. especially with other socialist states. When the first public criticism appeared in the Soviet press, The Yugoslav and Romanian press and official Ceausescu even altered the program of the last spokesmen expressed astonishment at the inten- days of the Romanian visit, cutting back his sity of this hostile reaction and wonder that their public appearances with Hua and the space Soviet colleagues should quote "tendentious" devoted to Hua in the Romanian press. reporting in the capitalist press rather than what was actually said and reported in the host Moscow was not to be appeased or deluded in countries. Both these points were repeated by this way. The Soviet press and that of its loyalist Tito and Ceauescu themselves, in speeches co- European allies sharply criticized the Yugoslavs incidentally(?) delivered on the same day. "As and Romanians for merely listening to Hua with early as five years ago in Kiev," Tito told Slovene what was interpreted as approving silence. When Party leaders calling on him at a castle near the speeches of the three leaders and circumspect Ljubljana that is his second favorite vacation Romanian and Yugoslav media reporting of the retreat. "I told Brezhnev that we were working on 14/DIR-5-'78
improving relations between Yugoslavia and under Communism the future is certain but the China I also said that generally speaking one past is unpredictable. In recent times the Yugo- should make efforts to improve relations among slavs, in this once again more like "us" than like various states, especially socialist ones, even "them," merely re-edit ite.g., selecting differ- where this seemed impossible." In view of this ent sources or interpretations to support a and because "we have done nothing that was changed evaluation of individuals or events directed against the Soviet Union or other coun- rather than expunging them from the record and tries," he was "indeed surprised" that Hua's visit creating "nonpersons" and "nonevents.") Tito's "has evoked an unfavorable reaction in the references to 1948, to Mao's view of 1948, and to Soviet Union and that the Soviet Press is attack- Mao's own and earlier than previously reported ing Yugoslavia and Romania," to this end initiative in inviting Tito to China were clearly "persistently quoting speculations published in designed to impute more longevity and consis- various Western countries and designed to stir up tency to the Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement and a quarrel between us and the Soviet Union." to Chinese awareness of common Sino-Yugoslav interests than is generally recognized. Other Elsewhere in his remarks, however, Tito him- references to the history of Sino-Yugoslav rela- self indulged in some counterjabs at Moscow, tions and the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions explicitly recalling the events of 1948 (the in Tito's and Hua's speeches and Yugoslav com- thirtieth anniversary of which had heretofore mentaries emphasized the two regimes' similar passed tactfully unnoticed at high official level) origins in independent Communist-led national and in the process implicitly admitting the liberation struggles and the enduring nature of obvious, namely that there is a connection be- their common interests, particularly in "the tween the present Sino-Yugoslav rapprochement struggle for socialism" (albeit in different forms) and at least past Soviet threats to Yugoslavia. and against (Soviet) efforts to impose a single Referring to trade agreements signed with the center and a single road on all those engaged in Chinese during Hua's visit, for example, Tito that struggle. In these selective readings from said that "it is well known that we are interested history both sides conveniently overlooked, in comprehensive development of economic without ever denying, two decades of almost un- cooperation with other countries. We don't want remitting Sino-Yugoslav polemics on almost to depend on one side alone because in the time every subject and Mao's continuing deep dislike of Stalin, who annulled all agreements overnight, of Yugoslav heresies even when ideological we have already burned our fingers once." Again, polemics tapered off and interstate relations speaking of the background to Hua's visit and began to improve after 1968. making the point that Mao Tse-tung himself had in October 1975 extended the invitation that took Such selectivity was more than normal diplo- Tito to Peking in August 1977, he added: "Chair- matic and particular Oriental courtesy by Near man Hua Kuo-feng also told me that Mao Eastern hosts and Far Eastern guests, who at the Tse-tung suggested five years ago [i.e., in 1973] same time and with deliberate ostentation made that I should be invited for a visit, emphasizing no secret of present disagreements on some that Yugoslavia was right in 1948. Mao said this issues, for example the inevitability of a major at that time in the inner circle, [but] they did not war in the future, which is proclaimed by Peking state it publicly out of regard for the atmosphere but denied by Belgrade. The other purposes of prevailing between China and the Soviet this strategy are easily inferred. First, and only Union."6 for the Yugoslavs, joint affirmation of the basic similarities between the Chinese and Yugoslav This last remark is interesting for another revolutions and of common historic and current reason, as part of a minor but meaningful Sino- interests, both anti-"imperialist" and anti- Yugoslav effort to re-edit history for contem- "hegemonist" and deriving in large part from porary political purposes. (Other Communist those similarities, brings to an end three decades regimes notoriously rewrite history for such pur- of Yugoslav disappointment and perplexity poses, which has inspired the witticism that because these commonalities were not recognized DIR-5-'78/15
in China. As a result of this blindness, for the With fairies in short supply these days, the Yugoslavs a consequence in turn of perverse most that can be predicted with certainty is that Chinese ideological dogmatism, a country that Hua's calls will not have been a one-day sensa- should have been Yugoslavia's natural and de- tion without consequences, that the Yugoslavs sirable friend (doubly desirable because it is and Romanians will continue to reassure the powerful and because it is Communist) instead Soviet Union that receiving him was not an anti- chose to be an enemy and kept to this posture Soviet act, and that Moscow will not believe them long after the great Sino-Soviet rift should have and will attempt counteraction, probably in- made its absurdity even more apparent. Now, at cluding stepped up wooing of Albania, China's last, this has all been put right. Secondly and for former but now estranged Balkan client. both parties, Tito's and Hua's re-edited version of Sino-Yugoslav history carries a message to One can also assume that Chairman Hua's Moscow. The message is that the rapprochement planned visit to Western Europe in 1979, with the between China and Yugoslavia is no momentary edge of total novelty taken off by this year's visit tactical maneuver in a Chinese diplomatic offen- to Eastern Europe, and barring other surprises, sive and war of nerves with the Soviet Union. It is will be unlikely to capture as large headlines as instead a belated recognition of common inter- his Balkan calls or as many astonished descrip- ests that were there all along and that endure, tions of his amiability, energy, and world-states- and for this reason the rapprochement will also manlike sophistication. If you've seen one part of endure and grow in strength and effect. Europe you haven't seen it all, but Europe is Europe. Mao's successor in France or Britain is For the moment at least, Hua's visit to the in a way less provocative and no more shocking Balkans is, to reiterate, a primarily symbolic than Mao's successor in Yugoslavia, a more event, Its concrete results, at least on the public sensitive area in Soviet eyes and a country that record, were largely limited to the signing of Mao also considered capitalist and an agent of some new technological cooperation and trade Western imperialism. Columbus's second voyage agreements of minor significancealthough the was also not the sensation of his first, except Chairman was preceded in both Romania and perhaps for the peoples he did not discover the Yugoslavia by Chinese military delegations first time. having a good look at defense capabilities, needs, (September 1978) and potential suppliers, and in Yugoslavia by Chinese study groups interested in the system of workers' and social self-management that Mao so thoroughly hated. Neither the Romanians nor the Yugoslavs have much reason to go farther and faster in their relations with China at this stage and sound geopolitical and geostrategic reasons not to. The time has not yet come for the realization of a popular East European joke of recent years: offered the fulfillment of three wishes by a fairy, a citizen of any one of these countries (the choice depending on the nation- ality of the person telling the story) asks that China's armies should occupy his country and then go away again on three successive occasions. Asked why by the astonished fairy, our East European replies: "Because to do it they will have to march through the Soviet Union six times!"7 16/DIR-5-'78
NOTES
1. D.I. Rusinow, "Notes from a Yugoslav Party Con- spondent, who noted that "the League of Communists of gress" [DIR-4-'78], A UFS Reports, 1978/No. 41, Europe. Yugoslavia, together with the Communists of France, Italy, and Spain, also outlined a new line at the Berlin 2. In addition to the mimeo. Magnetofonske beleke conference," and who asked for the Yugoslav view of the {stenographic reports) of speeches in the Congress com- deletion of "Leninism" from the name of the Spanish mission concerned with international relations, see Tito's Communist Party, Grlidkov's answer, translated from an keynote speech, The LCYin the Struggle for the Further unofficial transcript of the Conference: Development of Socialist Self-Managing and Nonaligned Yugoslavia, pp. 11-32, the Draft THESES for the Con- The Berlin conference and its document were ac- gress, pp. 263-289, and the draft resolution entitled The cepted by consensus by_all the attending parties The LCY in the Struggle for Peace, Equitable International basic characteristic of the post-Berlin period is actually Co-operation and Socialism in the World, passim {all the continuation of the dialogue. And in this, understand- published in English translation as brochures by Socialist ably, consensus provides the basic principle, No one, no Thought and Practice, June 1978). Except where other- Communist Party, came to the Berlin conference with wise noted, all quotations in this Report are my transla- intention to change his policy and his conceptions. Or to tions from the unedited Magnetofonske beleke. deny his interests. Each Communist Party at the Berlin conference came with its own conceptions, its own 3. Except for the opening and closing plenary sessions, interests, and accordingly the views that it was possible the four-day Congress met in six commissions {political to endorse by consensus in a synthesis of the Berlin con- system, Party matters, economy, education and culture, ference were those that were at that moment and on that foreign policy, and national defense), where both leaders principle acceptable to all the parties. We view positively and ordinary delegates discuss the appropriate sections the continuation of the dialogue both on the problems of of Tito's and other Congress reports and draft resolu- the dictatorship of the proletariat and on the problems of tions. For comments on the nature of these "debates," see the meaning and content of proletarian internationalism, the companion Report cited in Note 1. and on all other problems concerning which it was known and is known that the Communist parties of Europe are 4. I happened to be sitting among a group of domestic divided in their doctrinal-ideological views. guests of the Congress whom I identified as elderly As for the Spanish Party's deletion of the term Bosnian veterans of the Partisan war and who atypically "Marxist-Leninist Party" from its name, Grlikov said their warmest to the Soviet gave applause delegation. "that is the business of the Spanish Party," and he would the same answer if he were asked instead why the 5. Pp. 15-17 of Tito's keynote speech {see Note 2}. give Spanish or any other Communist Party does not adopt the Yugoslav principle of self-management. 6. Minid's list is of some interest in view of the disputed as well as virtues of He named importance nonalignment. 8. Tito's 18ff; the citation from the Draft six ways in which he claimed that the nonaligned move- speech, pp. Resolution on international affairs is from pp. 16ff. ment has been a powerful and positive influence: (1) as "an essential factor in the democratization of interna- 9. My 1968 survey of the history of the problem, "The tional relations" (meaning recognition of small powers as Macedonian Question Never Dies" [DIR-3-'68], A UFS the equal of great ones in international political head- Reports, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XV, No. 3, 1968, counting); (2) as "one of the most significant forces commemorates the last serious outbreak of such fighting imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, polemics, which took place on the occasion of Bulgarian hegemonism, and other forms of foreign domination"; (3) celebrations of the ninetieth anniversary of the Treaty of as "the leading force" in advocating "active peaceful San Stefano and while Soviet criticism of reforms in coexistence" between conflicting ideological and socio- Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia was rattling nerves in political systems; (4) as "the force that unites the efforts Belgrade as well as Prague. of the nonaligned countries and developing countries as a whole in the struggle for a new international economic 10. Zhivkov himself declined to answer the same question system and more rapid development of developing coun- {merely saying "we have had other censuses") when it tries"; (5) as "an independent international force...that was asked, with specific reference to Lendvai's reports, denies bloc divisions"; and (6) as "the initiator" in 1961 of during a press conference in Vienna on September 21, at the process that is now called dtente and the chief con- the end of an official visit to Austria. Other post-Congress temporary proponent of its extension to the whole world developments in the dispute are usefully summarized by as "universal active peaceful coexistence." Slobodan Stankovi( in Radio Free Europe Background Reports {Yugoslavia), nos. 148 {July 3), 155 {July 10), 165 7. Typical of GrliSkov's evasions and the Yugoslav {July 21), 174 {August 3), and 176 {August 8, 1978); also strategy was his reply to a question by a Spanish corre- RFE's Bulgarian Situation Report No. 11, June 28, 1978. DIR-5-'78/17
Bulgarian census figures cited in this Report, based on a 15. For reactions at the time, see Rusinow, "Yugoslavia collation of sources, differ from those given by most and Stalin's Successors, 1968-69" [DIR-7-'69], A UFS authors, who frequently confuse all-Bulgarian and Reports, Southeast Europe Series, Vol. XVI, No. 7, 1969, Blagoevgrad district figures. and for a current reappraisal of this period and Yugoslav foreign policy in general, including reservations concern- 11. The Draft Resolution {see Note 2), p. 18. ing the "Brezhnev Doctrines," see Fred Warner Neal, "Yugoslav Foreign Policy [FWN.l-'78], A UFS Reports, 12. All quotes ibid., pp. 9-11. 1978/No. 24, Europe. 13. Addressing the meeting in Belgrade on the day after 16. Talk with Slovene leaders at Brdo kod Kranja, Castro's speech, the Cuban foreign minister tactfully September 7, published in the Yugoslav press on Sep- corrected his chief on this point by naming Tito first tember 9. Cf. Slobodan Stankovic, "Tito Criticizes Mos- among the movement's founders and reducing Cuba's role cow on Hua's Visit," and "Yugoslav-Soviet Polemics over to a "participant at the first conference." {Quotations Hua's Visit," RFE Background Reports {Yugoslavia), from Castro's speech and the Belgrade meeting in this Nos. 199, 193 {September 4 and 12, 1978}. Report are from press accounts, particularly the thorough and well-informed reports of La Stampa corre- 17. I recall, as a sign of changing times, another joke that spondent Frane Barbieri, a Yugoslav journalist and was popular in these same places 15 years ago, when former editor of the Belgrade news magazine NIN who is China stood for other things in East European eyes. incidentally the inventor of the term "Eurocommunism.") Question: Why do we Poles {or Czechoslovaks or Ro- manians or...) love the Soviet Union so much? Answer: 14. The complete text, along with Tito's opening and Because it's nice to have a buffer state between us and Vrhovec's closing speeches can be found in Review of China. International Affairs (Belgrade), double number 680-1 {August 5-20, 1978).