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Home , Albanian mafia, Azem Hajdari, Bar massacre, Hekuran Isai, Lulzim Basha, Politics of Kosovo

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN REVIEW

Volume 10, 2016

REVIEWS ABOUT AND by Antonia Young University of Bradford, UK and Colgate University, NY

ISSN 1752–7503

10.1515/caeer-2017-0003

© 2016 CEER

First publication Central and Eastern European Review

REVIEWS ABOUT ALBANIA AND KOSOVO By Antonia Young University of Bradford

Fred C. Abrahams, Modern Albania: from dictatorship to democracy in , University Press, New York and : New York University Press, 2015. Pp. 345. ISBN: 978–l–4798–3809–7.

Jana Arsovska, Decoding Albanian . Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. 289 pp. ISBN 978–0–520–28281–0.

Blendi Fevziu, : the Iron Fist of Albania. London: I. B. Tauris, 2016. 300 pp.

Nicola Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic Nationalism: the Great Powers of World War I and the Emergence of Albanian Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2012. 338 pp . ISBN: 978–1–84885–368–3.

Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the between Nationalism and Transnationalism. Oxford and New York: OUP, 2016. 198 pp. ISBN: 978–0–19–046250–5.

Sabrina P. Ramet, Albert Simkus and Ola Listhaug (eds.). Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: History, Politics and Value Transformation Budapest and New York: ECU Press, 2015. 449 pp. ISBN 978–963–386–073–1

Shannon Woodcock, Life is War: Surviving Dictatorship in Communist Albania. Bristol: Hammer/on Press, Bristol, England, 20l6. 223 pp. ISBN: 978–l–9l0849– 03–3.

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Jana Arsovska, Decoding Albanian Organized Crime. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015. 289 pp. ISBN 978–0–520–28281–0.

The Macedonian author was eleven years old when her country, Yugoslavia, was drawn into devastating conflict. Shortly after, Albania’s strict Stalinist regime crumbled and almost a quarter of its population emigrated in the following decade. Arsovska opened a café-bar in Macedonia in 2001, one of the most violent periods of the former Yugoslav . The enterprise only lasted for four months, since Arsovska became a victim of violence and by local criminal groups. State protection was not strong enough to resolve the situation; however the experiences served Arsovska in her future career as a professor of international criminal justice, and author of this book which analyses the dynamic relationship between culture, politics and organized crime. There are 300,000 Gheg speakers in Albania, and 1.4m in Kosovo. Arsovska considers that Tosk speakers (in southern Albania) are viewed as better educated. This assessment may be due to the fact that Tosk was declared the official under Communism in Albania, where their first University was founded, in , in 1957. However, in the centuries prior to that, the seat of Albanian intellectual life was Shkodër, Northern Albania, and Peja/Peć and Prizren in Western Kosovo. Arsovska observes that ‘ethnic Albanian human trafficking networks quickly gained a reputation for being exceptionally violent’, and from her sources, noted that the Albanian is considered the most powerful, even in comparison to Russian, Chinese and Nigerian organized criminal enterprises. This is partly due to the fact that many have a military or Communist background from the former regimes. Organized crime during Communism was widespread in Albania, and with the fall, many who were previously in authority, were able to use their contacts. For example, the abolition of the in the early 1990s left about 10,000 agents unemployed; some became involved in organized criminal activity, such that the political, commercial, and criminal had merged. The Council of Europe and Europol have repeatedly found these peopel to be a major threat to the European Union because of their extreme violence and the fact that they had graduated from simple criminal service providers to working within the highest echelons of international organized crime. ’s Drug Trafficking 2006 63

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‘wanted’ list, names over 500 ethnic for serious drug trafficking charges. There are claims that Albanians have formed alliances and accords with the , though the author considers that such links are weak, and such claims are sensationalized. Likewise myths claiming that the is composed of 15– 20 clan-based groups, strictly obeying codes, hierarchically structured and secretive, are all over emphasized, whereas she finds that in fact the organized crime groups do work mainly amongst extended family groups, with occasional reference to the Kanun; they do tend to have a main leader but without according him excessive power—these groups tend to fall apart if this leader is killed or jailed. The author provides a useful table of myths versus realities concerning Albanian organized criminal organizations (227–8). There is a chapter outlining the life of many Albanian criminals, and especially those belonging to gangs, as well as organized crime in the Balkans and its political dimensions. Arsovska provides a table outlining a wide range of factors which influence criminals’ decision-making, showing that simply acquiring a large income goes far from explaining motivation for criminal activity. She also claims that their culture accords praise to those bringing funds to the family, without questioning the source. ‘Firearms play a crucial role in the execution of violent crimes, and they represent power, masculinity, and, above all, honor for many Albanians, both offenders and ordinary citizens.’ This is supported by many Albanian proverbs (given on p.220) reinforcing a love of guns. Arsovska tells of meeting an offender who boasted that for one wedding alone he spent over 1,000 euros on ammunition—and at the end of the celebration one older invitee complimented him on his shooting skills Arsovska observes that during the unstable years following Albania’s descent into anarchy in the mid-to-late 1990s proactive criminals saw an opportunity to establish ties by sending money to powerful politicians, businessmen and influential members of Albanian society. Aldo Bare, the most notorious, managed to be ‘set free’ or ‘left alone’ by judges and prosecutors because of his political connections and violent reputation. His group operated with impunity until his arrest in 2006. The disaster of the Pyramid schemes forced the country’s transition from totalitarian regime instead of to democracy, into corruption, privatization fraud, protection rackets, violence, and other forms of organized crime. ’s rapturously greeted success as the first elected Prime Minister after the fall of Communism, ensured control of all the country’s key posts in the ministries, police 64

Central and Eastern European Review and SHIK such that they were filled by his northerner family and clan members, with the express aim ‘to neutralize the political opposition represented by the Socialist Party’ (32). With the failure of Pyramid schemes, over 550,000 small arms, 839 million rounds of ammunition and 16 million explosive devices were looted from army stockpiles. Those who lost money became intensively involved in illegal activity. Arsovska notes that violent groups created small armies for protection, and to impose their influence on Albanian citizens; rivalries between criminal gangs and individuals increased. Extortion, kidnapping and corruption became commonplace. In 1997, 1,542 murders were reported by police, which, while unprecedented, may not have given the full account. At this time most cases of entrepreneurial illicit activities were not even identified as offences, and rarely classified as organized crime. Arsovska is very dismissive of Kosovo Albanian nonviolent efforts for over a decade, from the early 1980’s, in response to increasing of Serb rule and their final genocidal treatment (very fully documented in numerous books, for example Noel Malcolm’s Kosovo: a Short History, NYU Press, 1999 and witness reports, for example Fred Abrahams et al for Human Rights Watch, A Village Destroyed, May 14, 1999: War Crimes in Kosovo, University of California Press, 1999—and forthcoming translation of a Kosovar book published in 2009, giving women’s eye-witness accounts: History of Terror: 1998–1999, Crime Dossier—Women’s Stories). There is no reference to the extreme Albanian suffering through to June l999. Her focus on KLA’s ‘dark side’, is not balanced by describing the extremely vicious treatment of Kosovars by Serb military and police. The author relates that when the KLA formally disbanded, some commanders changed hats and moved into politics, some into crime. The Kosovo Protection Service (KPS) was formed including 25,000 former KLA combatants, and was frequently accused of extorting money from businessmen under the guise of ‘taxes’. Journalist Peter Schwartz claimed in 2005 that former Kosovar Albanian criminals won a reputation as politicians abroad, and enjoyed parliamentary immunity at home, and the protection of international law abroad. Arsovska over-generalizes, even sensationalizes the situation in both Albania and Kosovo in her statement: ‘One should never forget that both in Albania and Kosovo, a generation of young people grew up in states run by thieves and murderers, which no doubt affected their outlook and contributed to the creation of so-called criminogenic, or crime permeated societies. Consequently, today a thin line divides politics, business, and organized 65

Central and Eastern European Review crime structures in Kosovo and Albania’ (53). She should be aware, that in Kosovo, where Albanians were expelled, all through the 1990’s from public office and teaching, they set up parallel schools and hospitals. Women were a particularly strong force at the time in maintaining any kind of normality. Rebirth of the Kanun, which is considered by some to be the foundation of Albanian culture, has led, the author believes, to confused thinking. Is this the cause or the result of the fact that in Albania, women’s salaries are between 20–50% lower than those of men, who own 92% of all property? Kanun mentality has been particularly strong in Northern Albania such that parts have been ‘beyond the reach of law for years, and sticking to one’s clan has been an essential survival tool for people from these areas’. She discusses surveys showing that Albanians do consider religion important, even though few practice it. She claims that this, combined with political instability and a breakdown of norms, helps in understanding the drastic rise of organized crime in the post-communist Albanian context. Neoliberalism and globalization have contributed to the spread of materialistic values, global anomie, and economic misconduct. According to Article 906 of the Kanun, even a wound deserves repayment and Article 601 gives eight instances where a man can be seen to be dishonoured (and thus deserve revenge). Arsovska discusses husbands’ rites according to Kanun, and quotes from a 1992 article by E. Hafizullah noting that ‘Gender-based subordination has been deeply embedded in the consciousness of Albanian men and women, and it was generally regarded as a natural consequence of biological difference between the two sexes’. Thus equality cannot be legislated and can only be achieved when economic, social, cultural and psychological dimension of society have been transformed. Domestic violence is viewed as a private matter—women who denounce their husbands, bring shame to their families and even their communities. The media sympathizes with perpetrators; thus the violence commonly continues. Arsovska describes three phases of Albanian migration, following the fall of Communism. In the first years, 1991–2, approximately 300,000 Albanians left the country. Between 1992–6 the number was repeated, though most of these entered other countries illegally. The third phase, 1996-8, following the disaster of the failed Pyramid schemes, approximately another 70,000 left Albania. By 2000 approximately 150,000 Albanians were in , accounting for 6% of its population. Many immigrants in , unable to find jobs, turned to crime. This created a vicious 66

Central and Eastern European Review circle of media stereotyping, affecting ability of Albanians to find housing, jobs, forcing them into ghettoes and low paying jobs and then crime. A 2008 source notes that 42% of all inmates serving sentences in Greek penitentiaries, were Albanian. Arsovska discusses the term ‘mafia’ and how it is applied to Italian organized crime, to which the Albanian ‘mafia’ is often likened. She finds that the Albanians have less of a hierarchy, less long-lasting groups and less in the way of initiation rites, but that they are harder to infiltrate due to their loyalty to one another and concern with the unmanliness of acting as informers. Albanian criminal organizations are much more highly involved than others in using violence. Unlike other mafia groups, Albanian groups evolve more spontaneously, and dissolve when leaders are imprisoned or killed The UN Palmero Convention (2000) defined an Organized Criminal Group as ‘a group of three or more persons that was randomly formed; existing for a period of time acting in concert with the aim of committing at least one crime punishable by at least four years’ incarceration; in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit’. There is a very useful list provided (129) which charts 48 organized crime groups by clan and the 13 nearest towns in which they have operated between 1991–2007. Groups based in Tirana, Durres and Vlora mostly consist of around 30 persons. Another useful list is that of kanun rights of household and clan heads (146). Albanian gangs are spurred by ‘The need to show off and impress people … may be considered an outcome of the pathological materialism present in Albanian society and the social pressure to be rich, famous, and tough’ (166). Albanian large fighting or criminal groups create their own emotional zone, pumping one another up, thus reducing their own fear, yet instilling fear in observers. The Kanun is seen to reaffirm the need for toughness, honour and masculinity, which has ‘perpetuated homophobic and exclusionary masculinity’. The suspicion of being an informant constitutes the blackest mark against manliness. Judges have increasingly become targets of brutal mafia attacks (176); Albanian pimps have the worst reputation for violence in Europe. Trafficked victims rarely dare to say anything against traffickers—for fear that revenge will be taken on their families. The English language French action film, Taken (about trafficking) was made in 2012. In the years 1992–2007 it is estimated that 400 girls were trafficked from Berat alone. Furthermore it is estimated that 30,000 Albanian women have been 67

Central and Eastern European Review trafficked abroad, 15,000 to and 6,000 to —30% of them were under 18. A Belgian study found that two thirds of these women had been tricked by promises of marriage. Most traffickers are from southern Albania, often abducting northerners. In these cases they try to ascertain that there are no brothers or fathers, to avoid revenge attack. 2013 Lazarat, in southern Albania produced as much as $ 6 billion worth of marijuana every year, almost one third of Albania’s GDP. In Kosovo, Naser Kelmendi, like Bare, benefitted from highly politicized, unstable, and emotionally charged environments. Unemployment in Kosovo in 2004 was 54 %. Materialistic values from the West, combined with weak social and state institutions and overall confusion, turned many Albanians, the author claims, to criminal innovation. According to a UNDP report, in Kosovo, two in three households have guns, some more than one. One in five school students is armed. Kosovo is ranked, in a 2008 study 0.76 on the Gender Development index, the lowest in the Balkan region. A 2007 report by Berlin Institute for European Policy noted that fifteen to twenty family clans control almost all substantial key social positions and are closely linked to prominent political decision-makers. Arsovska relates that the Director of the Islamic Heritage Research Foundation claims that there is a threat to Kosovo’s religious harmony by imported fundamentalism, changing family structures, and fostering the expansion of radical Islam. Promoters of fundamentalism took advantage of devastation after war to provide free education and support to desperate people—50 new mosques were promised, and over 100 reportedly already built illegally by Kuwaiti based Islamic organization claiming to be doing charitable work, but its NGO is listed as a terrorist organization by the US. Some of these young men joined jihad to fight in Syria. 90% of Yugoslavia’s arms were produced domestically. The arms industry was one of its most flourishing economic sectors. Yugoslavia maintained one of Europe’s largest armies. These assets were inherited by as the last remaining of the six former that made up Yugoslavia. The author describes the criminal activities of a number of Albanians in the US, some are descendants of pre-1991 immigrants, some who were already criminals in Albania before emigrating with the mass exoduses of early 1990s from Albania, or

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Central and Eastern European Review slightly later from Kosovo. She also notes that younger criminals have little fear, and are unconcerned about prison sentences; their greatest fear is of deportation. Almir Rrapo was extradited to US in 2005 due to murder and kidnapping in 2011; at the time he was employed as senior administrative assistant to the deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Albania. In 2009 the FBI admitted that Albanian organized crime was becoming harder to deal with. A new generation of ethnic Albanian criminals have links to other international organized criminal groups. This is an important book, but if read in isolation could lead to a very warped view of Albanians. I have to refute the claim that ‘the terrible economic situation has led to the creation of “sworn virgins”’. Arsovska claims to be quoting Greg McDonald who mentioned ‘sworn virgins’ in an article he wrote on trafficking, but has exaggerated a part of his explanation. Quotations from the UK Home Office of 2004 would now be considered somewhat outdated about some authorities joining brutal trafficking networks. HO issues guidelines annually, most recently in June 2015. The most misleading error is the incorrect date given for the renowned ‘’, which dates from 1389, not 1939 as noted on p.43. There has been no use of enclitics for Albanian placenames, and for example Laç has been shortened simply to La (80). The book is enhanced by several relevant photos and an extensive bibliography

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Fred C. Abrahams, Modern Albania: from dictatorship to democracy in Europe, New York University Press, New York and London: New York University Press, 2015. 345 pp. ISBN: 978–l–4798–3809–7.

As a Human Rights activist and writer, with particular interest in Albania, Abrahams was very well placed to follow up on his many former informants from all different walks of life, political backgrounds and eras, and to analyse retrospectively events which he had seen unfolding during the previous two decades. A few of those whom he asked to interview, refused. One was , a staunch Communist leader who had ordered police to beat student protesters in the first year of protest, another was Sali Berisha. However, Abrahams gained insights from others who knew him. Sabit Brokaj, for example, a member of Hoxha’s medical team, knew Berisha in this capacity, and assessed him as a man with anger, jealousy and a hunger for power. As he rose to power, he was seen by those in power in the US to be disciplined, smart, charismatic and a good English-speaker. As a Northerner, Berisha was also seen to have strong ties with the Albanians of Kosovo, and thus a strong player in the difficult ongoing negotiations in Yugoslavia. Abrahams explains that Yugoslavia was the first state to recognize the Albanian government. In 1948, the Albanian parliament voted to become Yugoslavia’s seventh Republic; but with Yugoslavia’s break with the later that year, Albania’s 40-year dictator, Enver Hoxha, broke the country’s ties, and started his reign of terror by having forty-six of the Communist Party leaders executed for their suspected ties to Yugoslavia. Although many more were to follow, Sulo Gradeci, once one of Hoxha’s five bodyguards, informed Abrahams that there was never an attempt on Hoxha’s life. Abrahams describes the slow changes after Hoxha’s death in 1985. His successor, followed a ‘Congress of Continuity’, allowing farmers to own two sheep, but of the same sex. In 1987 gave 50 million marks for development in return for diplomatic relations, gave credit for hydroelectric plant, and Italy provided some modest aid. Gradually political jokes emerged. Students became more daring in their dress, wearing once forbidden jeans. Meanwhile Party leaders denounced Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost and tried to ban the media from reporting on the fall of the and the fall of Communism in Romania. However from 1988, many were able to hear Voice of America. With the 70

Central and Eastern European Review collapse of the Eastern European market, Alia was forced to adapt. There was an easing up on the private sale of vegetables and some livestock. The people of Shkodër were the first to demonstrate against the regime. Of about 400 demonstrators arrested, 11 of them were sentenced to up to 12 years in prison. Abrahams recounts further events that occurred prior to the fall of Alia’s regime, and the storming of foreign embassies followed by the exodus of thousands of Albanians in September 1990. It was the students in Tirana who kept up the opposition to the government, as described in detail by Abrahams. A leader of the students was from Tropoja, who was to play a major part in the political changes. Alia enrolled the assistance of Berisha in dealing with the students (contrary to general wisdom, Berisha never was one of Hoxha’s cardiologists, although he came close to joining that medical team). At p. 58, Abrahams outlines various possible reasons why when Berisha and Hajdari first met, Berisha urged Hajdari to push for political pluralism, rather than just simple student demands (such as better dormitories and food). It is noted that theirs was a complicated and deteriorating relationship for the following eight years, eventually causing Hajdari to spend time in the US to avoid arrest in Albania. Later, on his return, in parliament Hajdari was assassinated on 14th September 1998, leaving bloodfeuds still alive today. By December 1990, in spite of considerable student protest, very few of their concerns were reported in the local press, yet on 11 Decembe 1990, Alia announced that pluralism would be legalized. As a result of a meeting of students and professors, on 12 December 1990, Gramoz Pashko called up Reuters in Vienna to announce the founding of the Democratic Party of Albania. There followed some disagreements between students and others (professors and intellectuals), the former ready for much more radical action, the latter in favour of more cautious change. That latter group gained Alia’s trust. It took four days to gather the 300 signatures needed to submit to the Minister of Justice, for recognition of the new party. Urban support was strong; but the majority of rural dwellers were suspicious of such drastic change. A false rumour that Italy was giving visas freely, set people from all over Albania travelling to the coast, where they commandeered any possible form of boat. The reception in Italy, however, was brutal. The Americans, with no Embassy, worked from the Dajti Hotel. (The Dajti had been Albania’s top hotel for visiting diplomats and Albanian Socialist Party leaders.) Secretary of State James Baker

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Central and Eastern European Review visited for a few hours on 22 June 1991 ‘and set the stage for US Albanian relations over the next 20 years’. What is remarkable about the collapse of Communism in Albania, is that only four people lost their lives at the start of the dramatic changes. Later greater loss of life followed, between December 1991 and February 1992, ‘the time of dark forces’ when approximately 45 died from street violence. A later and much more widespread period of violence came with the fall of the Pyramid schemes. In the first half of 1997, about 2,000 people died after the opening up of all Albania’s armouries. Looters were able to take more than six hundred thousand weapons and l.5 billion rounds of ammunition As Abrahams notes, the business of building any new state is much harder than dismantling an old one, and Albania was no exception. At the opening of parliament in April 1992, Pjeter Arbnori, just released from 28 years of political imprisonment, became Speaker. On p. 114, Abrahams analyses how Berisha, using a Communist model, right from this start, manipulated Party and parliament to allow him maximum power at all levels. Many joined his Party in order to get scholarships, jobs and business deals, many dubious. Some of these participants were turning to criminal activity, including sanctions busting with oil deals to Milošević. According to one OSCE report, Albania supplied more fuel to Yugoslavia than all other countries combined. Abrahams met the unofficial Albanian Ambassador to the UK, Alexander Duma who was the son of the man who had held the title before World War II. For a year until a new Ambassador was appointed, he fulfilled the role from his home. Until his election in 1992, Berisha stressed the need for reconciliation with opponents, but following his election success he started to punish former Communist leaders, calling them the ‘red mafia’. ‘Revenge and accusations replaced reconciliation and debate’. The new Intelligence Service (SHIK) was answerable only to Berisha. With his dictatorial stance, he lost support to a new group forming the Democratic Alliance, members of whom he set the SHIK to undermine. In October 1993, students published the first edition of their Reporteri which was shut down by the University only four days later. This was in pre-internet days, which allowed for much greater state control. Abrahams took to reporting to Human Rights Watch, the increasing oppression he observed, with Berisha’s total control of the courts, judges and prosecutors. In 1994 the trial began of Alia and nine other former Communist leaders. The judge was 25 years old, the prosecutor 28. This and 72

Central and Eastern European Review other trials were barely reported at the time. It took a long period for the outside world to hear this negative news of the newly founded democracy in Albania. Abrahams observes that the arrest of five ethnic Greeks on charges of espionage in April, 1994, marked the beginning of Berishs’s later downfall. In response to Berisha’s charge, Greece retaliated and expelled 20,000 Albanians working there without legal documents. Abrahams sees that this act also created the rift between the US and Berisha. When the five were given prison sentences, Greece expelled another 70,000 Albanians. Abrahams completed a Report for Human Rights Watch in 1996, which while acknowledging monumental change, also reported on police abuse, press restrictions and lack of independent courts. The 1996 elections roused suspicions of fraudulence internationally, but Berisha rejected all allegations. Early praise for Albania’s compliance with the IMF and the World Bank, noted that by 1993, Albania had the fastest growing economy in Europe. Many factors were hidden: Abrahams was told that officials at Albania’s Statistic Institute ‘inflated numbers to please the president’; there were also huge personal remittances from abroad, both from the diaspora and from those who had gone to work in Italy and Greece, and aid supplied from several countries. There was also money flowing from illegal trade: the of oil, arms and drugs. The development of pyramid investment schemes started around 1994, and absorbed much of the wealth gained, at least seventeen such schemes were known to exist in Albania by 1997. Abrahams features the head of the largest of these schemes, VEFA Holding, Vehbi Alimuçaj, who claimed to be Albania’s first millionaire. Despite outside warnings against the pyramid schemes, Berisha and the government, themselves profiting from them and did nothing to control them; rather it was aa confederacy of collusion’. The crash of the pyramid schemes came in early 1997 when the government ordered the arrest of the head of the Xhaferri ‘charitable foundation’ scheme, primarily since Xhaferri himself, a southerner, was a leftist sympathizer with the Socialist Party. Over 100 of his supporters were also arrested. Abrahams explains a dual use of a two-fingers-and-thumb sign—in Albania, a new as anti-government sign (voiding the two-finger V sign which had indicated victory for democracy). However the former sign, in Kosovo was made by Serbs to show their dominance. Developments in the early months of 1997 are very confusing (and the subject of a whole book by Fatos Lubonja, The False Apocalypse).

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A new, even more desperate exodus followed the violent results of the failed pyramid schemes, where up to two thirds of the population lost most of their life savings in hopes of the extraordinary and unrealistic returns which they had been promised. Many fled to Italy, others less fortunate drowned in the attempt. The solution to the anarchy which engulfed Albania from March, 1997, was sought through an internationally monitored election. I was one of the four hundred and seventy-five monitors from thirty-two countries under the direction of OSCE’s Franz Vranitzky of Austria, who had a very hard job, especially with Berisha, attempting to hinder the election. After the Socialists were voted in in 1997, Abrahams observed that whereas the Democratic Party under Berisha had stolen through blue-collar (at border posts and ministries), Nano’s leadership turned to white collar crime through tenders and licenses. In relation to US/Albanian links, SHIK ran its first major operation with the CIA in 1998, capturing five suspected members of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, who were later returned to Egypt. Abrahams sees a link between this and the bombs which exploded at the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. A chapter is devoted to the assassination of the aforementioned MP, Azem Hajdari, outside the parliament building. At first the Democratic Party accused for the killing and riots ensued. Nano fled for 24 hours, while others, heeded advice from several world leaders and the head of OSCE, Dan Eveerts, that nothing would be gained through violence. The reason for the assassination has never been fully clarified, though the remaining outstanding bloodfeud involves family members. Nonetheless, three men from Tropoja were accused, one in absentia. Hajdari’s short temper and involvement in crime were well known. In 1991, when Ibrahim made his first trip to Tirana, he was met not only by Ramiz Alia’s Communist representative, but by Berisha and other DP opposition leaders. Abrahams notes that was leader of the first small (KLA) group in 1992, remaining in a leadership role right through the 1999 War. Its first public action was in response to the killing, by Serbs, of a teacher in the village of Lluasha. Berisha was not prepared openly to give assistance to the KLA, whereas Nano, back in power, was more inclined to help them, though at the same time trying to appease US demands for nonviolence. He even agreed to meet Milosević in Crete—the first meeting of Serbian and Albanian leaders 74

Central and Eastern European Review in 50 years. Meanwhile Haliti worked through individuals in various institutions gaining support for the KLA. Fatos Klosi of the SHIK helped negotiate trust between Haliti and the CIA, such that where most countries regarded the KLA as terrorists, the US collaborated within limits with them as a liberation force. The KLA refused offers of help from Iran and any Islamic groups. Haliti even agreed to buy US guns and made promises not to use violence outside Kosovo and even promised not to use illegal sources to fund the war. In return the US never put the KLA on their list of terrorist organizations. The Raçak massacre of Albanians by Serbs in January 1999 was the last straw for the US and UK, although the other NATO allies wanted to give Milošević one more chance. At the Rambouillet conference in February, Abrahams describes how Serbian delegates kept the Albanians awake with their noisy drinking and singing. Under Prime Minister Majko, American (the Atlantic Brigade) and other recruits went through Albania to Kosovo, having first trained in one of two training grounds in Albania. In 2010, a Council of Europe report called for trials for some members of the KLA for war crimes, naming Xhavit Haliti and . By 2002, Abrahams notes that 25% of Albanians lived below the poverty line. For the 2005 parliamentary election, both leaders, Nano and Berisha, had accumulated great wealth and hired American consultants with ties to the Republican Party. Abrahams was informed by an advisor to the Socialist Party that votes could be bought for between $l.50 and $4. Abrahams cites reports that in 2006, the CIA used Albania as a rendition destination for some prisoners released from Guantanamo. He also uncovers the major financial deals concerning the construction, by an American company, of the new highway from the port of Durres, through the northern mountains to Kosovo, over which the Albanian minister who signed the deal, Lulzim Basha was later indicted for fraud, but the case was dismissed on ‘shaky rulings’. By 2009, following an election that year, corruption was no less rife; American Ambassador Withers noted: ‘It has come very much to our attention that there is a strong undercurrent of people tied to organized crime that participated and/or were involved in the three major parties, the Democratic Party, the Socialist Party and the Movement for Social Integration, all have MPs with links to organized crime’ (289). 75

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In December, 2010, Albania won visa free travel within the EU. Abrahams notes that the 2013 election was not so much for or the Socialist Party, but against the authoritarianism which had been so oppressive under Berisha for so long. The country’s financial situation worsened, partly due to lessening remittances from families in Greece and Italy. Unemployment rose to 15.6 %. But worse is the fact that state institutions are weak, while the judiciary is corrupt and politicized. The much coveted EU membership is still not within the grasp of Albania. By 2014, despite apparent development in Tirana, in the periphery, or to most other cities, let alone the rural areas, blackouts and muddy roads prevail. ‘The poverty rate—people living on less than about $1.25 per day—was 12.4%. Violence remains common on the streets and in homes, with women and children bearing the brunt’. As he recognises in his Introduction, Abrahams’s work has three specific limitations He has focused on the capital, Tirana; he deals primarily with men who dominate Albania’s public life; and thirdly the he mostly explores Albania’s relationship with the US, but gives less attention to other countries (he believes that Albania is the only country outside the US that has a statue of Georg W. Bush). The book, with Abraham’s unique and continuous observation, is enhanced with many contemporary photos from various sources. It would have been useful to have more reference to exact years of various events in the text—or a listed chronology.

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Blendi Fevziu, Enver Hoxha: the Iron Fist of Albania. London: I. B. Tauris, 2016. 300 pp.

Besides Enver Hoxha’s own 13 autobiographical books and Jon Halliday’s The Artful Albanian: the Memoirs of Enver Hoxha (1986), this must be the first comprehensive book in English covering the life of Albania’s paranoid dictator and the extraordinarily powerful and negative impact he had on so many lives. Fevziu has gained access to a very wide range of relevant material which in its translated form makes for fascinating if horrifying reading. Additionally he has spoken to many who knew Hoxha and many more who suffered from his crushing rule. With so many sources, Fevziu is able to analyse Hoxha’s prolific writing and to refute many of his self-aggrandizing claims. For example Fevziu questions Hoxha’s role at the 1941 founding meeting of the Communist Party of Albania, at a time when he had gained very little interest from contemporary political leaders. Hoxha took total control of the country’s Communist Party from 1944, leaving a continued legacy for another five years after his death in 1985. Fevziu has collected exact numbers of those killed and imprisoned during the 46 years of his extreme regime:

‘In that time 5,037 men and 450 women were executed, 16,788 men and 7,367 women were convicted and sentenced to three to 35 years of imprisonment, terms which were often extended by reconvictions in jail, 70,000 people were interned and 354 foreign national were executed by firing squad, of whom 95 were Albanians from Kosovo.’ (259)

A Foreword to the book is supplied by Robert Elsie, who explains that when this book came out in Albanian in 2011, it went to five or six editions enjoying a greater publishing success than any other book on Albanian history; at the same time the book was burned in four or five cities, though it was unclear whether these were all in protest to the book (seen simply as the embodiment of Enver Hoxha), or to its contents, by the few ageing supporters of his regime—for it is true that with the extremely rapid change to ‘Democracy’, many of the old people who had worked for a pittance all their lives in the expectation of a meager pension in their old age, became disenfranchised from even this.

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By the time of his death, the author notes, Albania had become the third poorest country in the world. During his student life in Paris and Brussels, Hoxha became involved in communism. On return to Albania he made his living as a teaching assistant, but lost his job when the French Lycee he had attended shut down and re-opened as an Italian language school. Fevziu explains that it may have been Hoxha’s lack of strong political background and unthreatening, and thus uninvolved in internal disputes, that he was seen as an acceptable as a key leader in the new CPA. To accompany the English-language edition, additions were made in the form of a chronology of Hoxha’s life and a glossary containing brief details of approximately 340 of the principle figures mentioned in the book.

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Nicola Guy, The Birth of Albania: Ethnic Nationalism: the Great Powers of World War I and the Emergence of Albanian Independence. London: I. B. Tauris, 2012. 338 pp . ISBN: 978–1–84885–368–3.

Published shortly before Albania’s centenary of existence (in 2012), Nicola Guy provides an intricately detailed account of the wide ranging issues that were involved to get to that point, followed by the numerous issues that threatened Albania’s independence through to 1921 by which time British foreign policy had become more sympathetic. Guy introduces the book by heeding the work of Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery who identify three key issues for any élite seeking to deploy a national independence programme: building the newly emergent state, establishing the state’s participation in the international community and defining the nation’s identity. The author describes the situation of small states in the Great Power system; it is in this context that the book focuses on Albania from 1917. Guy starts the book by clarifying the emergence of an Albanian identity in 1912, in respect of national ambitions and linguistic nationalism, outlining the cultural awakenings of 1874–1908, and the part played by the Young Turk revolution. She notes that literacy rates were very low and that therefore relevant publications were more widely read outside the area that is now Albania. During and following the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, the prime involvement of the Great Powers is seen to be their concern for a balance of power, much less for the peoples involved. Guy notes that during these negotiations, the approach to initial independence was defined by the Great Powers’ representatives (i.e. the Triple Entente of Russia, France and Britain; the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy) as being: to protect their own interests and to decide the Albanian boundaries both during the Balkan Wars and the London conferences. The frontiers of Albania were discussed with regard to ethnic boundaries (in terms of languages spoken). London was chosen as the venue for the conferences, as being the least contentious capital of the six Powers. None of the countries under discussion had representatives included. Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary claimed to be impartial concerning specific Great Power demands, working only to ensure a balance of power in the region, yet at the same time to preserve the Entente; he feared that if Russia were to leave, further 79

Central and Eastern European Review war would be more likely. By 1914, with five of the six Great Powers at war, the Commission on boundaries was left in abeyance. The book covers the 6-month rule of the German Prince Wilhelm of Wied, whose regime collapsed partly as a result of Austro-Italian rivalry. With the departure of Wied and the disintegration of that Albanian state, Italy, Greece, Serbia and seized the opportunity to stake their own claims on various parts of Albania. Even had an interest in the situation. Guy identifies three phases of Albanian reactions to World War One: first, while they were left to their own devices and involved counter-revolutionary (and pro-Ottoman) forces, as the Great Power states withdrew their diplomatic representation. In the second phase during which various foreign armies invaded territories previously determined to be Albania; in the third phase Albanians resolved again to push for their national ambitions. This led to the evolution of four Albanian factions, divided mainly by tribal and geographical principles, with religion of only secondary importance. These factions were the Senate of Central Albania, Essad Pasha, the Union of Kruja (all three Muslim), and the Albania Committee under Bib Doda (Caholic). Guy considers that the historian, Joseph Swire provides the most detailed, if muddled and confusing, account of this period. Austrian occupation started in January 1916. Essad Pasha’s nephew, Ahmed bej Zogu, aged only 21 years, led a group siding with the Austrians in Northern Albania. In l917, the , occupying parts of the South, constructed 200 miles of good roads and 50 miles of rail track as well as hospitals, schools and national newspapers. The war saw the Serbs retreat, but later (in 1918) they occupied Scutari (Shkodër) and shortly were replaced by a French squadron The Peace Conference of Paris of 1919–20 should finally have resolved Albania’s borders—it was given two years of preparation. Guy discusses the various issues affecting each of the Great Powers’ involvement in trying to resolve the situation to fit with their own foreign policies. However. Albania itself found little recognition at the Conference, with a position weaker even that that of the Yugoslavs. Furthermore Albania was no longer recognized internationally as an independent state. There was something of a breakthrough in January, l920, when Britain and France reached agreement on working for a settlement of the Adriatic problems. Shortly after that, President Woodrow Wilson secured the reinstatement of an ethnically-based settlement for Albania. 80

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After the First World War, the Albanian government was no longer recognized by any other country, and Guy points out that four fifths of the country was occupied, by the French, the Serbs and the Italians. With a very low literacy rate, most Albanians focused on local, tribal or family concerns, further ensured by the various restrictions on travel between the different areas of occupation. Guy suggests that this was the reason that more impetus for change came from Albanians outside Albania, in Kosovo and in the diaspora. Tirana was chosen as the capital city due to its centrality and inland location, yet with good transport links to Durres. In the Ambassadors’ Conference in Paris in 1920, the Albanians were more assertive and more cohesive in their demands for independence. With their admittance to the League of Nations, they acquired much wider recognition and support. Lord Robert Cecil also supported Albania’s independence. Albania was the only country to be unanimously accepted by the League of Nations. In spite of this, it took another year before Britain accepted Albania’s independence. After 1921, Britain was more sympathetic towards Albania, but when Italy invaded in 1939, no assistance was offered by London. Even after independence was accepted, Albania’s borders were still not agreed. The author concludes that had the Great Powers given Albania support with adequate funding, military backing and without international and foreign intrigue, either in l914 or after l926, the country could have developed into a modern and fully functioning (though small) state. As a published Ph.D thesis, the book is very well researched (providing 773 endnotes, conveniently numbered consecutively through the book, facilitating checking them alongside reading the book). The book is enhanced with 4 maps showing contemporary border changes, 28 contemporary images (photographs and drawings) which are neither listed nor numbered. However, for such a very well researched book which provides useful readers’ aids in the form of so many endnotes, a Who’s Who of prominent characters of the period, four maps showing the changing borders assigned to Albania up to 1926 and almost 20 pages of bibliography, it is surprising that no Chronology is included, possibly because it would be just too complicated to demonstrate in a single timeline the myriad of relevant overlapping issues.

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Ina Merdjanova, Rediscovering the Umma: Muslims in the Balkans between Nationalism and Transntationalism. Oxford and New York: OUP, 2016. 198 pp. ISBN: 978–0–19–046250–5.

Influenced by childhood memories of playing with Turkish children in her grandparents’ Pomak (Slav speaking Muslims) home village of Silestra, Bulgaria, and appreciating her Muslim roots, Ina Merdjanova felt particular sympathy for the suffering of Bosnian and Kosovar Muslims during the 1990s dismemberment of Yugoslavia. Merdjanova discusses the relations between Islam and nationalism in the Balkans from two different perspectives; firstly after the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, secondly in the aftermath of the Cold War. Furthermore, the author considers the very different developments in different areas of the Balkans. In first considering the Ottoman legacy, Merdjanova traces the Muslim presence in Southeast Europe back to the 10th and 11th centuries. Earlier writers (Neol Malcolm and others) have shown that although actual violence was not used in conversion, those who did not convert were forced to pay high taxes if they did not, resulting in their converting. However, Merdjanova finds that forced conversion was not a regular practice, except in occasional child levies (devshirme) whereby Christian children (usually not more than one per family) were taken by the Ottomans, converted to Islam and trained as soldiers in the elite Janissary troops (as in the case of Albania’s hero, ). However, Christians and Jews, although enjoying some protection, were nonetheless considered second class citizens. On the other hand, Greece, even in the present day does not grant legal status to the ethnic minority of Turkish Muslims in Eastern Thrace. Merdjanova explains that from the 1970s and 1980s, developed the idea of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, with Turkey as central to both the Balkans and Central Asia. Bektashism gained influence from the 17th century, especially in Albania where its openness to Christian practices and folk customs flourished. Albania has the highest proportion of Muslims in their population in the Balkans, with over two million (though, as many have pointed out, ‘the religion of Albania is Albanianism’); has the lowest at almost 50,000. Linguistically there are over four million Albanian speaking Muslims in the Balkans, two and a half million Slavic speaking Muslim, just over one million Turkish speaking Muslims and 300,000 Roma speaking 82

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Muslims. Hundreds of thousands of Turks left the Balkans for Turkey, in several waves, some by choice, but most of them coerced or forced during the 20th Century (p.10). Merdjanova discusses the situation of Muslims in each of the Balkan countries. In Bulgaria, the 1960s and 1970s were the periods of most extreme state attempts to assimilate their Turkish minorities, banning the use of the Turkish language. Despite all attempts, by 1992 (as a sociological survey found), 41.7 percent of Muslims claimed to be ‘deeply religious1. Around 350 mosques have been built in Bulgaria since the fall of Communism. Bosnian Muslims have a strong tradition, supported under the Hapsburg Empire, and thus still strongly held throughout the time, that Bosnia was a part of Yugoslavia. There are Islamic educational institutions based on the earlier traditions in Bosnia. Merdjanova clarifies the position of Bosnian Muslims in the former Yugoslavia, observing that Bosnia was headquarters for all Yugoslav Muslims— traditionally stable and well established and developing their own path (37). In Albania, the 70 percent Muslim population is divided between Sunni (55%) and Bektashi (15%). There are Sufi brotherhoods within the Sunni realm. When the Bektashis were legally abolished in Turkey in 1925, they moved their centre to Albania where it remained until 1945. During the over four decades of Hoxha’s rule in Albania, the country was secular; he even claimed the country to be atheist from 1967 until the collapse of Communism in 1991. In 1993, President Berisha declared Albania a secular state. After the fall of Communism in Albania in 1991, about 520 mosques were built or rebuilt. The Sunnis and Bektashis see themselves as different communities, but all religious groups tolerate all others ‘This tolerance seems to be related to their long history of multi-confessionality as well as to a traditionally pragmatic attitude to religion’ (p 41). Merdjanova finds that the religions in Albania divide along political lines: the Catholics and Bektashi with the Democratic Party and the Sunni Muslims and the Orthodox, with the Socialist Party. In Kosovo, the first Albanian language university was founded in 1970. Sufism in Kosovo is seen as a marker of Albanian national identity. As with the Albanian Muslims, Kosovar Muslims are keen not to be identified with Gulf States and Arab League extremist Islamic groups. 218 mosques were destroyed in the 1997– 99 conflict, most of which have now been reconstructed.

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The Ohrid Agreement of 2001, safeguarded the rights of Albanians in Macedonia, guaranteeing education in the Albanian language and representation in government and in the police force. A very useful table on p. 48 sets out comparisons of the situation in those Balkan countries with a significant Muslim population. The author finds that Sufi brotherhoods spearheaded the spread of Islam in the region, with individual preachers traversing communal boundaries, with interaction with Turkey until the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924. Merdjanova gives a description of the notion of the umma (the global community of believers) (p.56) as ‘diffuse but powerful, promoted through features in the Islamic religious practice, which remind Muslims of their shared duties and identity across political boundaries’. When the Al-Muhajiroun extremist group tried to go to the assistance of the KLA in Kosova, they were turned down and the KLA was at pains to distance itsef, while the Serbs were quick to claim the involvement of extremists in the KLA. Merdjanova notes that Muslims in Egypt, Iran and Malaysia were more concerned about the fate of their Muslim brothers in Bosnia during the war of 1995, than were those in Bulgaria. When it came to material aid, given alongside the restructuring of power positions, there was often competition for resources. Although the building of mosques was accepted (though the Saudi mosques were very bare, unlike the ornate ones they were used to in Albania and Kosova), aid for a medresa was refused as they did not wish to follow outsiders’ teaching. However, the author warns against ill-considered responses to extremist Islamicists, suggesting that they should not be discarded with unsubstantiated allegations. Following 9/11, the Balkan states engaged in expelling individuals and closing down suspect Islamic organisations. Local Islamic groups took greater control of the training of imams and other religious personnel. Islamic communities throughout the region have been working out strategies against radical influences (71). Albanians preserve good relations with other religions in Albania. They turn to Turkey (Europe), rather than further afield, and shun suggestions of Sharia law. Radical Islam has neither historical roots nor a social base in the Balkans. Turkish is the lingua franca of Muslims in the Balkans. Merdjanova devotes a chapter to ‘Islam and Women in the Balkans’, noting that it is a topic which has rather been ignored, with the exception of 3 writers whom she names: Tone Bringa on Bosnian village women, Cornelia Sorabji on urban 84

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Bosnian women and Kirsten Ghodsee on the Pomaks in post-communist Bulgaria (the country with the most Pomaks)—there are currently estimated to be about 200– 270,000, about 3% of Bulgaria’s population. She might also have mentioned the important contribution edited by Zilka Spahi-Šiljak, Conesting Female, Feminist and Muslim Identiteies: Post Socialist Contexts of and Kosovo (published by the Bosnia and Herzegoina Library, Sarajevo, 2012) Religious law was abolished in Yugoslavia in 1946 and in Albania in 1928, but this appears not to have changed the values and attitudes of Muslims in those countries, especially the patriarchal attitudes towards women and their social and economic marginalization. Womens’ immense suffering in the wars in Bosnia and Kosova further added to the masculinization of culture (p.86). Merdjanova notes that the family has a sacred significance in Islam and that it ‘can be invested with ideological meanings and placed at the center of struggles to strengthen communal identities. Within such struggles, the place and role of women frequently has central positions through which the parameters of a professed moral order are endorsed, and the boundaries of community reinforced’. It would have been of interest here to investigate the role of the women’s movement, especially in Kosovo at this time. In Bosnia, before 1991, 27% of all marriages were mixed. After 1991, some extremist Muslims censured such marriages, and claimed that the children born in them were as deplorable as those born from rape. Six pages are devoted to discussion about the veil and headscarves and the influence of the medresas and religious teaching in Bosnia which perpetuated the exclusion of women from public life, these exclusions did not exist in Albania. However, mysticism represented a sphere outside the household where women could find a space for self-expression, even though this is little recognized in the legal religious system. Unfortunately women’s participation in NGOs has tended to lead to the promotion of traditional views about women’s roles and duties. While local women themselves may support the traditional religious role for women, religious leaders allow them little credit, supporting their institutional role. Another chapter is devoted to the Balkan Muslim discourse on a ‘European Islam’. At the time of writing, there were about 17 million Muslims spread across Western European countries (only half of these in the Balkans. Merdjanova discusses issues related to economic, political and cultural integration of Muslims in countries where they are minorities and their concerns about building mosques and cemeteries, 85

Central and Eastern European Review training imams, their distinctive dietary requirements and prayer facilities in public institutions and controversies over wearing headscarves, etc. They have received some recognition in all countries, but have had difficulty in obtaining state support comparable to that given other religious minorities. In the UK, at the time of writing, the Islamic Human Rights Commission found 80% of Muslims polled, felt harassed and discriminated against, up from 35% in 1999. Unfortunately this is likely to have increased enormously following the disastrous Brexit referendum of 2016. A table on p. 108 compares the situation of Muslims in the Balkan countries with those in Western European countries. Britain, Germany and France have attempted to centralize Councils of the Muslim Faith. However, these have not been popular with the Muslims in those countries. The classical dichotomy of dar-al-Islam (the land of Islam) and da al-harb (the land of war) are concepts that do not translate well into European contexts, and could lead to unwanted difficulties. A well respected influential Muslim intellectual, Tariq Ramadan, declares that Muslims should take from European civilization that which fits the Muslim religion and contribute to the organizational economic and political affairs of European societies. In the two Balkan countries with the highest proportion of Muslims (Albania and Kosovo), there are no religious classes in public schools, nor is there any reported discrimination against girls wearing the hijab. In the 1990s, the Albanian Bektashis applied for membership of the World Council of Churches, claiming that they are ‘as much Christian as they are Muslim’. Balkan Muslims enjoy inclusive and participatory lives, and are known to be peaceful, nonviolent, civic, embracing internal pluralism of various Islamic trends. They have adjusted to the various systems of governance under which they have lived for centuries, whereas Muslims newly settling in Europe are having to negotiate their social position under great stress. Merdjanova considers that the flow of intellectual exchange on European Islam has been directed from Western Europe, rather than from the Balkans or from the Middle East. The extensive (almost 50 pages) of Notes, gives further useful insight into the main topic. Here can be found for example, the different terms; Bosniak (Bošnjak) for Bosnian Muslims and (Bosanac) Bosnian as a Bosnian citizen; and mention of the Non-aligned movement, founded by Tito in 1961 in Yugoslavia which was supportive of peaceful integration. It would have been useful for the book’s map to show areas and percentages of Muslim habitation in the Balkans.

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Sabrina P. Ramet, Albert Simkus and Ola Listhaug (eds.). Civic and Uncivic Values in Kosovo: History, Politics and Value Transformation Budapest and New York: ECU Press, 2015. 449 pp. ISBN 978–963–386–073–1

As sixth in the series Civic and Uncivic Values in the Yugoslav Successor States, this volume, through an impressive group of contributors, gives a very informative overview of Kosovo from many perspectives at the time of writing (most contributions appear to have been completed by 2012). Sabrina Ramet in her introduction notes that between 1990–95, about 130,000 Albanians were removed from positions of responsibility. Serb ‘colonists’ offered free housing to Serbs and Montenegrins (similar colonization took place in the 1930s, when about 60,000 Serbs and Montenegrins were offered homes). The Serbian government rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, but by March 2013, 19 countries had established embassies in Prishtina. Ramet outlines eight central civic values to be covered in the book: 1.Protection from harm, 2. Tolerance of ethnic, racial religious and sexual minorities, 3. Equality, 4. Reasonableness, 5. Readiness to change one’s mind, 6. Empathy, 7. Truthfulness, and 8. Engagement. She outlines Kosovo’s five stages of recent history, starting with: the Founding , in 1878. The final section of the book looks at wider problems: Anton Beiber outlines Kosovo as an International Problem; Steinar Bryn queries whether Dialogue can make a difference; and Sabrina Ramet and Albert Simkus conclude the study by analysing the Roots of Instability and the prerequisites of Stability in Kosovo. Roberto Morozzo della Rocca outlines the history for the Albanian struggle for independence from 1878 to 1999. He notes was one of the last to emerge from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and that, with the exception of a few isolated patriots, most Kosovar Albanians had no wish to break away from the Ottoman Empire with whom they shared the Muslim religion. It was the movement of people from the time of the Berlin Conference in 1878 and the Balkan wars of 1912– 13 which affected demographics. From 1930 onward, the Belgrade government tried to persuade the Ankara government to take 400,000 Albanians; by 1938, the ‘assisted’ exodus—Turkey’s plan was to place them in Kurdistan to weaken Kurdish control, was interrupted by World War II. In 1943 the invading Nazis created the ‘Skanderbeg’ division, made up of 6,500 Muslim Albanians, and created a Greater Albania. Tito in 1945 worked to create a ‘weak Serbia strong Yugoslavia’, a multi- 87

Central and Eastern European Review national state. The chapter ends with the era of Milošević. Della Rocca concludes by noting that until the mid-nineteenth century, ‘Albanians and Serbs had always maintained good neighbourly relations’ (52) Oliver Jens Schmitt wrote the chapter on Historiography in Post-Independence Kosovo. He notes that in the ‘950s, most authors on Kosovo were South Slavs; that only in three volumes were Albanian summaries updated. However, this was reversed in the 1970s, until the 1981 riots, though they reflected either official state ideology or secular Albanian nationalism. The main themes the Kosovar Albanian historians dealt with reflected four topics: the Illyro-Albanian continuity; Skanderbeg’s state-building; the national rebirth (Relindja) and partisan guerilla movements in World War II, where the interpretation had to follow Yugoslav narratives. The next generation of historians was trained by highly politicized teachers. Serbian history of Kosovo accentuated Greek culture, boosting Orthodoxy. Some chose to follow Albanian history according to Enverist Albania. Others created a new Albanian history, especially concerning Albanians who had been left outside the Albanian national state, founded in 1912. Historian Muhamet Pirraku, born in the area in 1944 and jailed in 1981–82, gave a speech on the 50th anniversary of the Albanological Institute in Prishtina (2003), concerned with the atmosphere four years after the withdrawal of Serbian authorities and paramilitary groups. Pirraku claims Prishtina as the center of Albanian culture and society. Edi Shukriu developed the theory of ancient Kosovar history starting with the creation of Dardanian state in the fourth century BC, with a development in stages to Medieval Arbër and Modern Shqiptar. Jusuf Bajrakttari is Kosovo’s most prominent historian, portraying Kosovo as an Albanian society with little reference to Serbs. James Pettifer’s chapter covers British Policy towards the Kosova liberation Army (KLA) 1999–2000. Once the Dayton Accords were signed (but with no reference to Kosovo), much British secret and foreign intelligence gathering wound down, whereas the US continued to maintain interest. He sees British Policy in a 3- phase development, the last phase beginning with the Albanian armed uprising of 1997, when the anarchy in Albania came as a shock to European governments (but was better understood, Pettifer claims, in the US). Zachary Irwin writes on the Uprising and intervention, 1998–99, using figures to demonstrate the role of all the stakeholders at play and how they interacted following Milošević’s scorn for values essential for sustainability. This 88

Central and Eastern European Review brought Kosovo to the brink and further provoked the Albanian uprising in 1998. He discusses NATOs involvement in the Rambouillet talks, and how at Dayton, Milošević made informal promises about Kosovar self-governance. By March (presumably 1998, though the year is not specified), US Special envoy, Robert Gelbard remarked that the KLA was ‘without question a terrorist group’ (until that time, they had provided invaluable information to US diplomats). The Reçak massacre on 15th January, 1999 was the crucial turning point for international action, leading to NATO’s first airstrikes on 29th March. By the end of the bombing on June 10th, about 10,000 Albanians ad been killed and almost a million (60% of the population) were displaced. Thereafter NATO helped to establish peace in Kosovo. Although there has been much criticism of the intervention, it may be claimed that where interventions save more human rights than they damage, they are legitimate. Johanna Deimel’s contribution completes the first section of the book (History of Kosovo) in discussing The International Presence in Kosovo, 1999–2000. She considers the legalities and responsibilities involved, and points out that it took 10 years before the first judgments were made at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to make decisions concerning war crimes committed by high-ranking Serbian politicians. She provides figures showing the hierarchy and the makeup of the international presence of UNMIK, which she describes as a neo- colonial power, and gives a critique of the whole organization, noting that by 2007, there were almost 50,000 unsolved civil cases pending before the municipal courts in Kosovo, up 3,000 from the beginning of the year. The second section of the book, on politics of Kosovo, starts with Altug Gunal’s chapter focusing on the Development of the Political System since February, 2008. He notes that besides the influential actors in the political area: leaders of political parties, other top party members and top officials of international organizations residing in Kosovo, top bureaucrats and the US Ambassador to Kosovo, it is generally accepted that leaders of organized crime networks and their strong clans have some influence too. Electors are influenced more by leaders’ personalities, charisma or regional affinity. Other than the AKR party, all the main political parties respect the preservation of social and religious values and tradition, together with standing against abortion and same-sex marriage. Gunal outlines the aims of the main parties, and the lead up to the declaration of Independence. The last election before the declaration of Independence had a low turnout. However, in the next election, in 89

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2010 the Movement for Self-Determination brought new enthusiasm to voters. Gunal sees it as a good omen that under the PDK minorities acquired eight ministries. In the next election (2011), Aifeta Jahjaga took the second highest vote ratio. She was the first female and the first non-partisan and the youngest president ever elected in Kosovo. Other topics covered are the structure of the Assembly of Kosovo and the end of the International supervision of the country, followed by the challenges to Kosovar political life. The chapter culminates by outlining corruption of the Kosovar political system. Florian Bieber’s chapter is concerned with the Serbs of Kosovo. This community, Bieber points out, is extremely isolated, and now a largely rural group. The historical significance of Kosovo for Serb national identity has been a source of myth-making, especially since the nineteenth century. From that time, tensions with Kosovar Albanians increased. The balance of power began to shift away from Serbs in Kosovo in the 1970s. More Albanians joined the League of Communists and achieved high office; the Serb proportion of the population declined at this time. The level of distance between the two ethnicities was higher than elsewhere in Yugoslavia. Bieber does not seem to attribute the drastic changes of the 1980s to Tito’s death in 1980, not even mentioning his name, although Tito had held Yugoslavia together and prevented the Serbs from dominating politically. The 1981 student demonstrations in Prishtina were interpreted by the Church as evidence of anti-Serb violence, thereafter violence against Albanians increased and Milošević used all manner of means to oppress the Albanians, expulsion from government jobs, including all teaching. The lead up to and progress of the 1999 war are covered elsewhere in the book. Returning to the situation of Serbs in Kosovo after the war, Bieber outlines their decimation, fragmentation and vulnerability and the reliance on Serbia, especially financially, which led to ample opportunities for abuse and corruption and organized crime, especially in Northern Kosovo, which is neither under full international or Kosovo jurisdiction. They have 10 seats reserved for them in parliament, which critics see as a way of giving Belgrade direct control within the Kosovar government, ensuring that the recent history will not be forgotten. Nita Luci and Linda Gusia, discuss Civic Engagement, Emancipation and Transformations of the Gendered Public in Kosovo. Martial law was declared in Kosovo in 1989, forcing mass dismissals of Albanian workers from civil life. However through the strength of family and community as institutions, there quickly 90

Central and Eastern European Review emerged a parallel structure as a centre of civil and national resistance. Sevdije Ahmeti, a founder member of the Independent Women’s Association (re-named the LDK Women’s Forum in 1995), with others countered the negative stereotypes produced in the Yugoslav media, of Albanian women. Their work in the parallel systems of schooling and medicine as well as in organizing non-violent protests responding to police violence, was very empowering to women. It was disillusioning that after the 1999 War, the incoming masses of foreign ‘experts’, ignored the strength of the women’s movement, instead handing power to men who had fought in the war. The authors estimate that property ownership amongst women is now only 2%, and that working women have to conceal pregnancy for fear of losing their jobs. They conclude by noting that despite the strategy of having 30% participation of women in parliament, there is not a single female mayor, nor do women hold leadership or decision-making positions in local government, and that ‘Women’s civic engagement and contribution in Kosovo has been continuously silenced by mainstream remembrance and historical accounts’ (216). The final chapter of this section, written by Dušan Janić, considers Northern Kosovo and Regional Cooperation. Northern Kosovo refers to three municipalities with an ethnic Serb majority, located North of the Ibar River—Zubin Potok, Leposavić, and Zevčan, with a total population between 55–65,000. He describes the parallel institutions of the Albanians during the 1992–95 period under Serbian oppression, and of the Serbians after 1999; the latter were required (though not legally bound) to be dismantled or integrated into the Provisional Institutions of Self- Government (PSIG). The author notes that, despite its small population, the issues involved threaten to destabilize not only Kosovo, but the much wider region of surrounding countries. He then outlines the various strategies developed to deal with the situation up to 2012. One is the normalization of relations between the two sides and free movement of goods. In December 2012 there was an agreement between Serbia and Kosovo, on how to collect customs duty, but the Northern Kosovo Serbs opposed it. Janjić describes this lack of willingness to participate in any regional cooperation by Northern Kosovo, as a ‘black hole’, not only in Kosovo, but in the whole of the Balkans. The third section of the book focuses on Values and Value Transformations. The most fascinating chapter of the book is Shkëlzen Gashi’s on Kosovo’s history of the period 1912–2000 as portrayed in textbooks in Kosovo and in Serbia. For every 91

Central and Eastern European Review period, Gashi outlines the two opposite perspectives, and often the total absence on one or other side, and always contest concerning numbers. Among the major events contested that are discussed are, the Albanian uprising of 1912 followed by independence; Kosova under Austrian/Bulgarian rule; the Albanian Kaçak movement; the Legal Society for the Defence of Islam; Agrarian reforms and the displacements; Kosova under Italian/German/Bulgarian rule; the liberaton and reoccupation of Kosova; the 1974 constitution; civil resistance in Kosova; the peaceful and the military factions of 1988–89; the Rambouillet Conference; the NATO intervention, war crimes, Kosova Independence;. In his conclusion, Gashi discusses further the possession of the territory; the crimes committed by the other side; silent collaboration; distortion of aims; and the merging of different strands of thought. Kristen Ringdal analyses Civic Values in Kosovo within a European Perspective through the use of 12 figures. He takes his chapter heading from the concepts of Almond and Verba’s study of political attitudes and democracy, published in 1963. By comparing various other studies, Ringdal comes to the unsurprising conclusion that education is the most important variable in assessing social and political trust, social and interpersonal trust, political and cultural tolerance, gender role attitudes and religiosity. Albert Simkus and Shemsi Krasniqi explain in several pages, the methodology they use, along with nine figures to demonstrate their findings on the differences in values between and among Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo, coming to a very similar conclusion as Kristen Ringdal, that educational level is the major variable affecting outcomes over all others. Karin Drystad’s chapter, on the Political Support in Kosovo of its citizens points out some complications, for example that 20% of Kosovo’s residents have dual or even multiple citizenships. The surveys that Drystad uses, were made shortly before and shortly after Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 2008. The surveys she used did not include other minorities than Serb, thus omitting Turks, Gorani, Roma and Bosniaks. Her major conclusions are that 80% of Albanians, but only 20% of Serbs, are proud to be Kosovar. She found similar disproportions concerning satisfaction with the political system in Kosovo. Another conclusion is that citizens of new democracies have high expectations, but that they often become disappointed and apathetic when the expectations are not met in the short-term.

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Anton Bebler’s contribution ‘Kosovo as an International Problem’ is extremely informative concerning Kosovo’s place and its treatment by neighbours and others for the last 150 years. In particular Bebler focuses on three aspects; firstly to draw lessons from the developments in the 20th Century, secondly to examine the problems associated with Belgrade’s non-recognition of Kosovo’s independence and thirdly to discover how the past has influenced the application of the values essential for the sustainability of Kosovo’s statehood. Belgrade even gives Kosovo a different name, adding ‘i ’ (and thus K&M). At the conference of the Great Powers in 1913, Russia persuaded the other five members, to allow Serbia and Montenegro to keep extra territory, including Kosovo, despite the Powers’ knowledge of the Kosovars’ majority wishes. Bebler clarifies the illegality of all these and later Serbian actions. By 1974, Kosovar Albanians were the third largest nation in Yugoslavia (after Serbs and Croats). On p. 353, Bebler discusses the legitimacy of the NATO humanitarian intervention, as the ‘responsibility to protect’. Following this he argues that all of Serbia’s claims on Kosovo are ‘totally unacceptable as a justification of aggression’. He provides a table showing the situation arrived at in 2012 of Kosovo governance, noting that it has been expensive, complicated and confusing as well as ineffective, and suggesting the reasons for these. Despite the closing of the International Steering Group for Kosovo in September 2012, little change seems evident. Steinar Bryn’s chapter discusses the founding, development and use of the Nansen Dialogue Network. The Nansen Academy in Lillehammer was founded in 1938 as a counterforce to the dehumanizing forces of Nazism and Fascism. 50 years later, in 1995, the Academy invited 14 potential future leaders from Bosnia- Herzegovina to meet together to discuss their different views of the same events. Between 1995 and 2000, about 170 people from various communities of former- Yugoslavia were supported on 3-month long dialogue seminars. Shorter seminars were also run for those who were unable to spare 3 months. The dialogues are not supposed to be tools to solve problems and conflicts, but rather to improve understanding between parties in a given conflict. Where political negotiations are pressured by time and notoriety, the dialogues allow much more time and without the pressure to achieve absolute conclusions, but rather to build respect between parties who may never totally agree. Bryn suggests that the use of such dialogues would be useful at the beginning negotiations, by building trust and thus increasing the chances 93

Central and Eastern European Review for movement and more sustainable outcomes. He also discusses segregation versus integration, and provides a chart on four dimensions of peacebuilding. He mentions that more than 1,000 Kosovars lost their lives in the 1981 clashes. Now, he writes, there is no political spectrum in Kosovo, making it difficult to combat corruption, organized crime and thus to bring about stability. The Serb population of 3–6% is half what it was during the 1980s; nearly half of them are in Northern Kosovo. The low level of interest in voting—lowest among 47 countries—may reflect the fact that all the major political parties have very similar policy positions. This volume is invaluable both for those with little background knowledge of Kosovo and for those wishing to update their understanding of present-day Kosovo.

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Shannon Woodcock, Life is War: Surviving Dictatorship in Communist Albania. Bristol: HammerOn Press, Bristol, England, 2016. 223 pp. ISBN: 978–1–910849– 03–3.

It is widely accepted that the draconian Communist rule in Albania was the most extreme of all the European Communist countries. But few can understand the extent of that misrule, and importantly, its lasting effects even now, a quarter of a century after the regime fell. Shannon Woodcock, an Australian historian who had already spent several years in Albania, a fluent Albanian speaker, was well placed to devote six months in 2010, immersing herself in the lives of many Albanians of various ages and from various social and geographical areas of the country. The purpose was to get a vivid picture of life for the ordinary people under Hoxha’s increasingly diabolical rule, and then present it in this book. Her interviewees were self-selected as she made herself available to anyone (through a wide network of potential informants) for as long as anyone wished to talk to her. Sometimes known as the Autobiographical Narrative Interview, her method enabled a reflective space allowing her subjects to express, communicate and work through their painful and confusing past experiences, with the positive aim of contributing to the larger project: the oral history of a people coming out of a half century of severe oppression and unwarranted punishment. In another recent book, Blendi Fevziu’s Enver Hoxha: the Iron Fist of Albania (2011) now published, in English gave a vivid picture of the many who were in power during Hoxha’s regime, most of whom fell from power, and suffered severely. He describes the purging of the many groups of ‘enemies of the people’: the religious leaders, the aristocracy and the intelligentsia. Susan Pritchett Post gave a picture of women’s lives during the Communist era, in her Women in Modern Albania: Firsthand Accounts of Culture and Conditions from Over 200 Interviews, and from Fatos Lubonja’s Second Sentence: Inside the Albanian , we gain a horrendous picture of the lives of political prisoners of the time. Woodcock’s perceptive reporting from her many hours of discussion with Albania’s ‘ordinary’ people adds immensely to increase our understanding of the regime’s constant and unreasonable pressures in every aspect of life. She met many families who had members who had been executed.

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Although the book contains interviews with eight individuals, these also involve many others, their families, friends and even those less friendly. She explains that in 1990, there were approximately 40,000 people in forced labour camps throughout Albania and about 26,000 in jails. Tens of thousands more were living in internal exile, shunned by a terrorized populace. Many had been born into this situation, but even the collapse of the regime in 1991 did not bring relief to everyone. Even those who had a ‘good biografi’ had to steer their lives extremely cautiously in order to retain their relative privileges (eligibility to higher education, possibility to have some choice in employment, and, even in a few cases, place of habitation). By contrast, Woodcock explains, by having these exemplary proletariat living alongside those named ‘enemies of the people’ was the regime’s method of total control. Additionally trials and executions were made public, though some people were taken, without warning, from their families, convicted and executed at night and their bodies never found. The first personality introduced in the book is a Vlach shepherd, Thoma Ҁaraoshi. He was from a formerly quite wealthy family, his grandfather having built up his flock of sheep by 1939, to 2,000 and employing other shepherds to care for them. Under Communism, Vlachs, a nomadic people, were forced to settle and were relieved of their flocks. Thoma mentioned that a cousin of his managed to escape from Albania in 1956 with 1,000 sheep (reported in The Times on 11th September that year). Woodcock found that in the 1960s the number of informants in the population for the secret service, the Sigurimi, increased from one in seven people to one in three, which of course included some of everyone’s family members, leading to all kinds of false accusations, often simply to fend off the possibility of being informed on oneself To speak against the government in any way merited a 10 year jail sentence. The regime relied on a culture of constant criticism and counter-criticism. Very often, as Lubonja also told, from bitter experience, the victim was not even informed for what his sentence was given, and even when the sentence was completed, it could be extended without any explanation. Mevlude Dema’s father was one of the founders of the education system in Tirana and his family part of Tirana’s former pre-war social elite. Although he engaged in the underground Communist movement against Fascist occupation, he refused to use a gun. With such a family background, Mevlude and her seven brothers 96

Central and Eastern European Review and sisters earned ‘bad biographis’. Although a successful and talented chemist, Mevlude was not allowed any of the privileges normally accorded to high powered state employees. For example she was not exempted from the annual zbor (20-day annual military training). Zbor, as Aksion (compulsory ‘voluntary’ manual work, demanded of the whole population on a weekly, or sometimes long-term, basis). Both these mandatory activities, often on futile projects, were seen to be ways of the regime ensuring that people’s time was fully occupied. During the time of Chinese collaboration (1961–78), Melvude worked with Chinese chemists, conversing in Russian. One of Melvude’s brothers attempted to escape from Albania in 1977. They never heard from him after having been told he had attempted to swim from Pogradec to Ohrid in Yugoslavia. However, Melvude was expected to disown him; by refusing to do so, her salary was cut—she thinks she was not sent into exile simply because her work was of too great importance to the government. The family members were never able to find out what happened to her brother, probably killed by the regime. Even now it is not possible to find reliable sources for disappearances. Diana Keçi, a lively and popular woman, started school in 1967, the year that Albania’s official policy of atheism was enforced. She remembers her great love of books and sympathetic librarians, children’s summer camps. She was from a poor family, and the five children each had turns at the summer camps. They learned about the external threats to Albania with constant reports used to mobilize patriotism amongst the youth. Having a good biografi, Diana participated in the highly choreographed May Day parades. As she grew up, her father felt able to trust her with some of the truth about the regime they lived under, causing Diana to feel she was living two separate lives. By the time she attended university, Diana met children from Communist ruling families living in ‘the bloc’ (a large area in central Tirana, of superior homes, out of bounds for any but the privileged living there—now housing many international organizations). At the same time, in the university, fletë-rrufe notices were posted, publicly shaming named individuals for such violations of ideological requirements as the use of make-up, handbags, or trousers that were too flared. One day in 1982, Diana’s father was taken by the Directorate of State Security, but no explanation was given as to why, though it seemed his arrest was due to inferred political dissidence by lack of active support for the regime, rather than any

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Central and Eastern European Review specific act. From that time, Diana’s friends distanced themselves from her, for fear of contamination of their own biografis; even her boyfriend broke up with her. Albania was (and still is) a patriarchal society; although Hoxha claimed to liberate women, in fact they worked doubly hard—having emancipation through work, yet still being responsible for home-making and childrearing. Furthermore there were additional pressures on women blackmailed by men in positions of power, demanding sexual favours in return for food or travel permits. As Woodcock points out these were threats from within the social structures (whereas after 1991, threats to women moved to public spaces). She also observes that the Party perpetuated pre- existing hierarchies of ethnicity and gender in order to maintain social control, engineering population increase and economic growth. It is estimated that about 20% of the population were considered ‘enemies of the state’. In the present day, women’s chastity is still considered of prime importance for her and her husband’s families’ honour. The fear of rape in Albanian society is an effective way to terrify all women into submission. Liljana Majko’s story shows that apparently, contrary to Communist claims, there was prejudice against people of Roma descent. However, she did gain a place in 1971, at Elbasan University to study literature and language. This was a precarious time for intellectuals. In 1974, Todi Lubonja, Director of Albanian Radio and Television was imprisoned. Between 1973–75, eight ministers and 130 artists and intellectuals and their families were removed from their positions and executed. Liljana noticed that there were even more spies during the 1980s, than before. Professor Riza Hasa was born a kulak or deklasuar, born in exile, due to his grandfather’s support for the nationalists prior to the coming to power of the Communists. However, he managed to attend Tirana University. Once teaching, back in his hometown, Dragot, lesson plans had to include the goal of ‘increasing love for comrade Enver’. As elsewhere, teachers were forced to practice discrimination against those with the worst biografis. Woodcock observes that Hasa was unusual in his determination to discuss, and put in order, the wrongs of the past in order to work towards a better future. Jeras Naço had spent many years of his life searching for and finding, the bones of his father and his father’s friend, who had been taken and imprisoned when Jeras was just ten years old. It was only with the fall of Communism that he was free to pursue his desperate need to find and identify his father’s remains. By sharing his 98

Central and Eastern European Review story and his detailed evidence with Shannon Woodcock and her assistant Eriada Ҁela, he was able to overcome some of his sense of loss and grief. It emerges that most of those who were powerless at the fall from the 45 years of Communism are still the most marginalized, even persecuted, today. Likewise, those who had been the most powerful Party members before the 1990s were able to seize the most economic and social capital afterwards, thus taking the same superior roles, without apology, consolidating their positions in the new regime ‘while the workers they had dictated to fell further into dire poverty, without the cold comfort of ideological illusions’ (171). Woodcock observes that the traumas continue with the major political parties hiding information about the past and preventing procedures for restitution and compensation. There are photos, a map, and a bibliography further enhancing this very gripping presentation of hundreds of lives lived through Albania’s terrifying Communist period.

The Reviewer

Antonia Young is Honorary Research Fellow in the Division of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK. She is also Research Associate in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Colgate University, NY.

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