Introduction Chapter 1

Notes

Introduction

1. If you doubt that, take a look at pages 382– 83 of The Global Competitiveness Report 2013– 14, published by the World Economic Forum and available at http:// www3 .weforum .org /docs /WEF _GlobalCompetitivenessReport _2013 - 14 .pdf. 2. The details are in Chapter 1. 3. Benjamin Franklin’s tongue- in- cheek advice to the British, Rules by Which a Great Empire May Be Reduced to a Small One, ought still to be obligatory reading in the corridors of power. Not surprisingly, his advice to those wanting to lose their empire focused on mistreating the “remotest provinces” since—in his view— “a great Empire, like great Cake, is most easily diminished at the Edges.” First published in The Public Advertiser on September 11, 1773—that 9/11 date again— the advice is readily available at http:// nationalhumanitiescenter .org /pds /makingrev /crisis /text9 /franklingreatempire .pdf. 4. Initially, Sean Doyle, Benjamin Gionet, Alexandra Gray, Bradley Harper, Tom Hotchkiss, Justin Hutton, Christian Mattia, William McClure, Edgar Mer- cado, Nirali Parikh, Hardin Patrick, Luke Perry, Justen Robinett, Peter Shames, Donald Song, Curtis Vann, and Victoria White. Later, Kyle Adams, Emily Anderson, Doug Baker, Bryce Delgrande, Meghan Fallon, Caroline Fisher, Jeremy Hefter, Mickey Herman, John Ho, Lin Ingabire, Travis McCall, Alex Mole, Colton Morrish, Catherine Mudd, Joey Polychronis, Alexis Shklar, Ken- dall Stempel, Caroline Stoupnitzky, and Harrison Waddill.

Chapter 1

1. For a fuller account, see David Coates, Making the Progressive Case: Towards a Stronger U.S. Economy. New York: Continuum, 2011, pp. 114– 19. 2. This is the title of his 1963 book published in New York by Basic. 3. S. M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double- Edged Sword. New York: W. W. Norton, 1996, p. 26. 4. Thomas Madden, Empires of Trust. New York: Dutton, 2008. 5. Olaf Gersemann, Cowboy Capitalism: European Myths, American Realities. Washington DC: Cato Institute, 2004. 6. Newt Gingrich, A Nation like No Other: Why American Exceptionalism Matters. Washington DC: Regnery, 2011, pp. 13 and 230. 220 Notes

7. Editors, “After the Attack . . . The War on Terrorism,” Monthly Review, Novem- ber 2001, p. 1. 8. Quoted in Jack A. Smith, “Look Out, Obama Seems to Be Planning for a Lot More War,” posted on AlterNet, May 8, 2010: available at http://www .alternet .org /story /146787. 9. This is from Robert Reich, America’s Biggest Jobs Program— the U.S. Military, posted August 12, 2012: available at http:// robertreich .org /post /938938180. 10. Peter Van Buren, “Imperial Reconstruction and Its Discontents,” posted on TomDispatch, August 16, 2012: available at http://www .tomdispatch .com / blog /175583. 11. On this, see Chalmers Johnson, “10 Needed Steps for Obama to Start Disman- tling America’s Gigantic, Destructive Military Empire,” posted on AlterNet, August 25, 2010: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /147964. For the counterargument that base construction is limited and without sig- nificance, see Vaclav Smil, Why America Is Not a New Rome. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, p. 49. 12. Van Buren, Imperial Reconstruction. 13. Dan Froomkin, “U.S. to Hand over Iraq Bases, Equipment Worth Billions,” posted on The Huffington Post, September 26, 2011: available at http://www .huffingtonpost .com /2011 /09 /26 /iraq - withdrawal - us - bases - equipment _n _975463 .html. 14. Ibid. 15. Nick Turse, “The Secret War in 120 Countries,” The Nation, August 4, 2011: available at http://www .tomdispatch .com /post /175426 /nick _turse _a _secret _war _in _120 _countries. 16. Juan Cole, “The Age of American Shadow Power,” The Nation, April 30, 2012: available at http:// www .thenation .com /article /167353 /age - american - shadow - power. 17. Seamas Milne, “America’s Murderous Drone Campaign Is Fuelling Ter- ror,” The Guardian, May 30, 2012: available at http:// www .guardian .co .uk / commentisfree /2012 /may /29 /americas - drone - campaign - terror. For the data on civilian and noncombatant deaths, see the reports by Amnesty Interna- tional and the UN, reported in Craig Whitlock, “Drone Strikes Killing More Civilians than U.S. Admits, Human Rights Group Says,” The Washington Post, October 22, 2013: available at http:// www .washingtonpost .com /world / national - security /drone - strikes - killing - more - civilians - than - us - admits - human -rights -groups -say /2013 /10 /21 /a99cbe78 -3a81 -11e3 -b7ba -503fb5822c3e _story .html. 18. See Scott Shane, “Debate Aside, Number of Drone Strikes Drops Sharply,” The New York Times, May 21, 2013: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2013 /05 / 22 /us /debate - aside - drone - strikes - drop - sharply .html ?pagewanted = all. 19. Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power. New York: Broadway, 2013, p. 206. 20. Jim Hightower and Phillip Frazer, “Our Taxes Pay Spies to Work for Rich Shareholders—and Pay for the Privatization of War Itself,” Lowdown, 14(4), Notes 221

April 2012, drawing on work by Dana Priest and William Arkin, available at http:// www .projects .washingtonpost .com /top - secret - projects. 21. Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At What Risk? Washington, DC, February 2011: available at http:// www .wartimecontracting .gov. 22. Robert J. Lieber, Power and Willpower in the American Future. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 124. 23. Julian Barnes and Nathan Hodge, “Military Faces Historic Shift,” The Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2012 (the data are for 2009). 24. According to figures released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “World military spending reached a record $1,738 billion in 2011 . . . The United States accounted for 41 percent of that, or $711 billion.” Law- rence Wittner, “The Shame of Nations: A New Record Is Set on Spending on War,” posted on The Huffington Post, April 24, 2012: available at https://www .commondreams .org /view /2012 /04 /23 - 2. 25. Barney Frank, “The New Mandate on Defense,” Democracy Journal, Winter 2013, p. 51. 26. Data are from War Resisters League, Where Your Income Tax Money Really Goes. New York: War Resisters League, 2011. 27. If you factor in the $3–4 trillion also spent on veterans, the total bill for the decade since 2001 might run to as high as $11 trillion. All this is in Chris Hellman, “The Pentagon’s Spending Spree,” posted on TomDispatch, August 16, 2011: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /blog /175431. For the Stiglitz calculation, increasing his original cost estimate in his jointly written (with Linda Bilmes) The Three Trillion Dollar War (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), see Joseph Stiglitz, “The U.S. Response to 9/11 Cost Us Far More than the Attacks Themselves,” posted on AlterNet, September 6, 2011: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /152309. 28. Dylan Matthews, “America’s Secret Intelligence Budget, in 11 (Nay, 13) Charts,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2013: available at http://www .washingtonpost .com /blogs /wonkblog /wp /2013 /08 /29 /your - cheat - sheet - to - americas - secret - intelligence - budget / ?wpisrc = nl _wonk _b. 29. Joshua Holland, “Five Eye-Opening Facts about Our Bloated Post-9/11 ‘Defense’ Spending,” posted on AlterNet, May 28, 2011: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /151119 /five _eye -opening _facts _about _our _bloated _post - 9 _11 _ %27defense %27 _spending. 30. See, for details, Coates, Making the Progressive Case, p. 154. 31. See Dean Baker, “Does Paul Ryan Know What’s in His Budget?,” posted on NationofChange, August 20, 2012: available at http://www .nationofchange .org /does - paul - ryan - know - what - s - his - budget - 1345475290. 32. From 2007 to March 2014, there was not a month without fatalities among US troops engaged in combat. Data are at iCasualties: http:// icasualties .org /OEF. 33. Dan Froomkin, “How Many U.S. Soldiers Were Wounded in Iraq? Guess Again,” posted on The Huffington Post, December 30, 2012: available at 222 Notes

http:// www .huffingtonpost .com /dan - froomkin /iraq - soldiers - wounded _b _1176276 .html. 34. See Mac McClelland, “Hearts and Minds,” Mother Jones, January/February 2013, pp. 17– 27, 64. 35. Ernesto Londono, “Military Suicides Rise to a Record 349, Topping Number of Troops Killed in Combat,” The Washington Post, January 14, 2013: available at http:// www .washingtonpost .com /world /national - security /military - suicides -rise -to -a -record -349 -topping -number -of -troops -killed -in -combat /2013 /01 / 14 /e604e6b4 - 5e8c - 11e2 - 9940 - 6fc488f3fecd _story .html. 36. Data are reported in Ashley Curtin, “Comprehensive Study Shows Need for Better Veterans Suicide Prevention,” posted on NationofChange, February 7, 2013: available at http:// www .nationofchange .org /comprehensive - study - shows - need - better - veterans - suicide - prevention - 1360248744. 37. On these widely varying estimates, see Nora Eisenberg, “10 Hard Truths about War for Veterans Day (and Every Other Day),” posted on AlterNet, November 11 2010: available at http:// www /alternet .org /story /148818. 38. Matthew Duss and Peter Juul, “$806 Billion Spent for Hundreds of Thousands to Be Killed and Wounded: The Staggering True Costs of the Iraq War,” posted on AlterNet, December 15, 2011: available at http://www .alternet .org /story / 153429. Michael Mann has slightly lower figures for deaths (500,000) but slightly higher figures for refugees—internal 2.5 million, external 2.5 million— from a total population of 30 million. Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 4. New York: Penguin, 2013, p. 298. 39. Congressional Budget Office, Federal Support for Research and Development, June 2007: available at http:// www .cbo .gov /publication /18750. 40. See Tom Engelhardt, “A Record of Unparalleled Failure,” posted on TomDis- patch, June 10, 2014: available at http://www .tomdispatch .com /post /175854 / tomgram %3A _engelhardt, _a _record _of _unparalleled _failure. 41. Alfred W. McCoy, “Fatal Florescence: Europe’s Decolonization and America’s Decline,” in Alfred W. McCoy, Joseph M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (eds.), Endless Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, p. 22. 42. “United States GDP Growth Rate,” Trading Economics, available at http:// www .tradingeconomics .com /united - states /gdp - growth. 43. See Coates, Making the Progressive Case, appendix 1; and David Coates, Answer- ing Back: Liberal Responses to Conservative Arguments. New York: Continuum, 2010, chapter 10. 44. Sebastian Mallaby, “The US Labor Market Doesn’t Work,” The Financial Times, August 21, 2012: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /08d1eeae - ead3 - 11e1 - 984b - 00144feab49a .html #axzz2GvFW2wkX. 45. “Income for working- age households fell over the 2000– 2007 business cycle (the first time in any cycle in the post-war period) and then were battered by the great recession we’re still effectively in.” Lawrence Mishel, “What Does Health Care Have to Do with the Wage Slowdown? Not Much,” posted on the EPI blog, August 26, 2012: available at http:// www .epi .org /blog /health - care - wage - slowdown. Notes 223

46. The data are from McKinsey. The report is Edward Luce’s, “Can America Regain Most Dynamic Labor Market Mantle?,” The Financial Times, Decem- ber 11, 2011: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /6327a7f4 - 21bb - 11e1 - 8b93 - 00144feabdc0 .html #axzz2HQ9RvZXS. 47. “North Carolina and the Global Economy,” Duke University, available at http:// www .duke .edu /web /mms190 /furniture /dimensions .html. 48. “Made in the USA Group 6,” US Bureau of Industry and Security, available at http:// www .bis .doc .gov /defenseindustrialbaseprograms /osies / defmarketresearchrpts /texreport _ch2 .html. 49. Robert E. Scott, “The China Toll,” EPI Briefing Paper #345. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, August 23, 2012: available at https:// groups .google .com /forum / ?fromgroups = # !topic /clipping - do - arthur /9pA9ZZCMdds. 50. Robert E. Scott, “Growing U.S. Trade Deficit with China Cost 2.8 Million Jobs between 2001 and 2010,” EPI Briefing Paper #323. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, September 20, 2011: available at http://www .epi .org /publication /growing - trade - deficit - china - cost - 2 - 8 - million. 51. David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States,” American Economic Review, 103(6), 2013, pp. 2121– 68: available at http:// economics .mit .edu /files /6613. 52. “World University Rankings 2012-2013,” available at http://www .timeshigher education .co .uk /world - university - rankings /2012 - 13 /world - ranking. 53. For the general case, see David Mason, The End of the American Century. Lan- ham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010, pp. 65– 71. 54. Donna Cooper, Adam Hersh, and Ann O’Leary, The Competition That Really Matters. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress and The Center for the Next Generation, August 2012: available at http://www .americanprogress .org /issues /economy /report /2012 /08 /21 /11983 /the -competition -that -really - matters. 55. OECD, Programme for International Student Assessment: Results from PISA 2012— Country Note: United States of America. Geneva, December 3, 2013: available at http:// neatoday .org /2013 /12 /03 /what - do - the - 2012 - pisa - scores - tell - us - about - u - s - schools. 56. See Diane Ravitch, “Do Our Public Schools Threaten National Security?,” The New York Review of Books, June 7, 2012: available at http:// www .nybooks .com /articles /archives /2012 /jun /07 /do - our - public - schools - threaten - national - security / ?pagination = false. 57. Chris Hedges, “Why the United States Is Destroying Its Education System,” posted on truthgig, May 1, 2012: available at http:// www .truthdig .com / report /item /why _the _united _states _is _destroying _her _education _system _20110410. 58. OECD, Building a High- Quality Teaching Profession: Lessons from around the World, available at http://www .oecd .org /fr /edu /prescolaireetscolaire / programmeinternationalpourlesuividesacquisdeselevespisa /buildingahigh - qualityteachingprofessionlessonsfromaroundtheworld .htm. 224 Notes

59. See page 129 of “Chapter 5: Finland: Slow and Steady Reform for Consistently High Results,” in OECD, Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Educa- tion: Lessons from PISA for the United States: available at http:// www .oecd .org / pisa /46623978 .pdf. 60. Thomas B Moorhead, Deputy Undersecretary for International Labor Affairs, US Department of Labor, speaking at Labor Markets in the 21st Century, Wash- ington, DC, February 22, 2002: available at http:// www .dol .gov /ilab /media / reports /otla /labormarkskills /labormarkskills .htm # .UOx2pawQgpA. 61. Andreas Schleicher, The Economics of Knowledge: Why Education Is Key to Europe’s Success, Brussels, the Lisbon Council policy brief, 2006, p. 2; available at http:// www .oecd .org /dataoecd /43 /11 /36278531 .pdf. 62. Fareed Zakaria, “The Hard Truth about Going Soft,” October 6, 2011: available at http:// fareedzakaria .com /tag /united - states /page /2. 63. Ylan Q. Mui and Suzy Khimm, “College Dropouts Have Debts but No Degree,” The Washington Post, May 28, 2012: available at http://articles .washingtonpost .com /2012 -05 -28 /business /35458439 _1 _college -dropouts -student -debt -tops - college - students. 64. On the controversy, read Daniel Costa, “STEM Labor Shortages?,” EPI Policy Memorandum #195, November 19, 2012: available at http://www .epi .org /publication /pm195 - stem - labor - shortages - microsoft - report - distorts /; and Brad Smith, “How to Reduce America’s Talent Deficit,” The Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2012: available at http:// online .wsj .com /article / SB10000872396390443675404578058163640361032 .html. 65. Data are from a report by the Center for Labor Market Studies, Northeast- ern University Boston, “High School Dropout Crisis Continues in US, Study Finds,” CNN, May 5, 2009, available at http:// www .cnn .com /2009 /US /05 /05 / dropout .rate .study /index .html ?eref = ib _us. 66. Joe Klein, “Learning That Works,” Time, May 14, 2012: available at http:// www .time .com /time /magazine /article /0 ,9171 ,2113794 ,00 .html. 67. See David Ashton and Francis Green, Education, Training and the Global Econ- omy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997. 68. Data are from the Center for the Study of Education Policy at Illinois State University, cited in Catherine Rampell, “Where the Jobs Are, the Training May Not Be,” The New York Times, March 1, 2012: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2012 /03 /02 /business /dealbook /state - cutbacks - curb - training - in - jobs - critical - to - economy .html? _r = 0. 69. Thomas A. Hemphill and Mark J. Perry, “U.S. Manufacturing and the Skills Crisis,” The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2012: available at http://online .wsj .com /article /SB10001424052970204880404577230870671588412 .html. 70. Ayşegül Şahin, Joseph Song, Giorgio Topa, and Giovanni L. Violante, “Mis- match Unemployment,” NBER Working Paper No. 18265, August 2012: available at http:// www .nber .org /papers /w18265. Notes 225

71. The National Academies, Rising above the Gathering Storm, Revisited: Rapidly Approaching Category 5, Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2010, pp. 65– 66. 72. Published in 2013, and available at http://dx .doi .org /10 .1787 /9789264204904 - en. 73. Tyler Cowen, The Great Stagnation. New York: Dutton, 2011. 74. Gary Pisano and Willy C. Shih, “Restoring American Competitiveness,” Har- vard Business Review, July 2009: available at http://hbr .org /2009 /07 /restoring - american - competitiveness /ar /1. 75. “Science and Engineering Indicators 2014,” National Science Foundation, available at http:// www .nsf .gov /statistics /seind14 /index .cfm /overview /c0i .htm. 76. Byron Wien, “America’s Decline Will Not Be Easily Reversed,” The Financial Times, August 11, 2008: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /a1cfa9e8 - 66e8 - 11dd - 808f - 0000779fd18c .html #axzz2HQ9RvZXS. 77. Thomas Friedman, “Facts and Folly,” The New York Times, March 29, 2006: available at http:// news .google .com /newspapers ?nid = 1891 & dat = 20060402 & id = 5nspAAAAIBAJ & sjid = Z9gEAAAAIBAJ & pg = 1575 ,105620. 78. CRS Report for Congress, America COMPETES Act: Programs, Funding and Selected Issues, January 22, 2008, p. 7. 79. National Academies, Office of News and Publications, U.S. Competitive Position Has Further Declined in Past Five Years, released September 23, 2010: available at http:// www8 .nationalacademies .org /onpinews /newsitem .aspx ?RecordID = 12999. 80. These data are in the 2011 Report to Congress of the U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission: available at http:// www .uscc .gov /content / 2011 - annual - report - congress. 81. For the data on labor costs as the prime driver of outsourcing, see Alex Lach, “5 Facts about Overseas Outsourcing,” Center for American Progress, July 9, 2012: available at http://www .americanprogress .org /issues /labor /news /2012 /07 /09 / 11898 /5 - facts - about - overseas - outsourcing. 82. Data are from the Commerce Department, cited in David Wessel, “Big U.S. Firms Shift Hiring Abroad,” The Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2011: available at http:// online .wsj .com /article /SB10001424052748704821704576270783611823972 .html. 83. Sudeep Reddy, “Domestic-Based Multinationals Hiring Overseas,” The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2013: available at http://online .wsj .com /article / SB10001424127887324763404578430960988848252 .html. 84. Robert Reich, “The Problem Isn’t Outsourcing. It’s That the Prosperity of Big Business Has Become Disconnected from the Well- Being of Most Americans,” posted on NationofChange, July 24, 2012: available at http:// robertreich .org / post /27527895909. 85. Harold Meyerson, “Business Is Booming,” The American Prospect, March 2011, p. 12: available at http:// prospect .org /article /business - booming - 0. 86. Robert E. Scott, “NAFTA’s Legacy,” EPI Briefing Paper #173. Washing- ton, DC: Economic Policy Institute, September 28, 2006: available at 226 Notes

http:// www .beaconschool .org / ~lmoscow /12th %20grade /readings %2012 / UNITED %20STATES %20NAFTA .htm. 87. Clyde Prestowitz, The Betrayal of American Prosperity. New York: Free Press, 2010, p. 277. 88. “Top Five U.S. Exports to China in 2009,” USITC DataWeb: available at http:// dataweb .usitc .gov. 89. “Textile industry contributions peaked in 1948, reaching approximately 1.95% of GDP. The apparel industry’s peak contribution occurred in 1947 and 1948, when it contributed 1.36% to GDP each year. By contrast, in 2001 the textile and apparel industries contributed 0.22% and 0.23% respectively.” US Depart- ment of Commerce, The U.S. Textile and Apparel Industries: An Industrial Base Assessment: accessed August 28, 2012. 90. The output and productivity figures are for 1997– 2007. The source is John Gapper, “America’s Turbulent Job Flight,” The Financial Times, July 28, 2011: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /1d467a7c - b883 - 11e0 - 8206 - 00144feabdc0 .html #axzz2HQ9RvZXS. 91. Justin R. Pierce and Peter K. Schott, Concording U.S. Harmonized System Cat- egories Over Time, NBER Working Paper No. 14837: available at ipl.econ .duke .edu /seminars /system /files /seminars /215 .pdf. 92. Lach, “5 Facts about Overseas Outsourcing.” 93. See Barry Lynn and Phillip Longman, “Who Broke America’s Job Machine?,” Washington Monthly, March 4, 2010: available at http://www .washingtonmonthly .com /features /2010 /1003 .lynn - longman .html. 94. In 2012, total health spending made up 17.9 percent of US GDP. 95. Michael Ettlinger and Kate Gordon, The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing. Washington, DC: Center for American Progress, April 2011: available at http:// www .americanprogress .org /issues /labor /report /2011 /04 /07 / 9427 /the - importance - and - promise - of - american - manufacturing. 96. Ibid. 97. Coates, Making the Progressive Case, p. 71. 98. Josh Bivens, “Squandering the Blue-Collar Advantage,” EPI Briefing Paper #229. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, February 12, 2009: available at http:// www .epi .org /publication /bp229. 99. Bureau of Labor Statistics, International Comparison of Hourly Compensation Costs in Manufacturing, 2010. US Department of Labor, December 21, 2011. 100. Steven Rattner, “Let’s Admit It: Globalization Has Losers,” The New York Times, October 15, 2011: available at http:// www .nytimes .com /2011 /10 /16 / opinion /sunday /lets - admit - it - globalization - has - losers .html. Steven Rattner was Obama’s “auto czar,” overseeing the restructuring that accompanied the bailout in 2009. See also Michael Fletcher, “In Rust Belt, Manufacturers Add Jobs, but Factory Pay Isn’t What It Used to Be,” The Washington Post, May 17, 2011: available at http:// articles .washingtonpost .com /2011 - 05 - 17 /business / 35264283 _1 _new - jobs - american - products - prospective - workers. 101. David Leonhardt and Kevin Quealy, “The American Middle Class Is No Longer the World’s Richest,” posted on NYTimes, April 22, 2014: available Notes 227

at http:// www .nytimes .com /2014 /04 /23 /upshot /the - american - middle - class - is - no - longer - the - worlds - richest .html? _r = 0. 102. “Average Annual Hours Actually Worked per Worker,” OECD.StatExtracts, September 15, 2014: available at http:// stats .oecd .org /Index .aspx ?DatasetCode = ANHRS. 103. American men ranked last in life expectancy in the 17 countries, and women next to last. The report is US Health in International Perspective: Shorter Lives, Poorer Health, available at http:// pnhp .org /blog /2013 /01 /11 /u - s - health - in - international - perspective - shorter - lives - poorer - health. 104. In 2013, the ratio was 295.9:1. See Lawrence Mishel and Alyssa Davis, “CEO Pay Continues to Rise as Typical Workers Are Paid Less,” EPI Briefing Paper #380. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, June 12, 2014: available at http:// www .epi .org /publication /ceo - pay - continues - to - rise. 105. Trends in the Distribution of Household Income between 1979 and 2011, Wash- ington, DC: Congressional Budget Office, October 2011. 106. Paul Buchheit, “Five Facts about Inequality for Anyone Thinking of Voting Republican,” posted on The Huffington Post, October 29, 2012: available at http:// www .nationofchange .org /five - facts - about - inequality - anyone - thinking - voting - republican - 1351518477. 107. Data are in the Pew Economic Mobility Project, Pursuing the American Dream, August 2012: available at http:// www .pewtrusts .org /our _work _report _detail .aspx ?id = 85899403846. 108. Emily Beller and Michael Hout, “Intergenerational Social Mobility: The United States in Comparative Perspective,” The Future of Children, 16(2), 2006, 19– 36. 109. Lawrence Mishel, Josh Bivens, Elise Gould, and Heidi Shierholz, The State of Working America, 12th ed. Washington, DC: Economic Policy Institute, 2012, p. 152. 110. Peter Edelman, “The State of Poverty in America,” The American Prospect, June 22, 2012: available at http:// prospect .org /article /state - poverty - america. 111. Brandon Roberts, Deborah Povich, and Mark Mather, “Low Income Work- ing Families: The Growing Economic Gap,” Working Poor Families Project, Policy Brief Winter 2012–13 , p. 1: available at http://inequality .org /topreads / lowincome - working - families - growing - economic - gap. 112. Five years after the 2008 crisis, one in five American workers was still working part- time, most of them for lack of a better full- time job. On this, see Lynn Stu- art Parramore, “Half Lives: Why the Part-Time Economy Is Bad for Everyone,” posted on AlterNet, June 9, 2013: available at http:// www .alternet .org /labor / part - time - jobs - and - economy. 113. The poverty rate among white Americans in 2011 was 9.9 percent. Among African Americans, the poverty rate was 27.4 percent, and among Hispanic Americans it was 26.6 percent. See David Coates, Pursuing the Progressive Case? Observing Obama in Real Time. Bloomington: iUniverse, 2013, p. 142. 228 Notes

114. The Pew Center on the States, One in 100: Behind Bars in America 2008, available at http:// www .pewtrusts .org /en /research - and - analysis /reports /2008 /02 /28 / one - in - 100 - behind - bars - in - america - 2008. 115. Rebecca Ruiz, “Eyes on the Prize,” The American Prospect, January/February 2011: available at http:// prospect .org /article /eyes - prize. 116. Steven Raphael, “Explaining the Rise in U.S. Incarceration Rates,” Criminology & Public Policy, 8(1), 2009, p. 87. 117. See David Lapido, “The Rise of America’s Prison-Industrial Complex,” New Left Review, January/February 2001, pp. 109– 23; and Hannah Holleman, Robert W. McChesney, John Bellamy Foster, and R. Jamil Jonna, “The Penal State in an Age of Crisis,” Monthly Review, 61(2), June 2009, pp. 1– 17. 118. Ethan Nadelmann, “It’s Time to End American Exceptionalism When It Comes to Putting Citizens Behind Bars,” AlterNet, May 1, 2014: available at http:// www .alternet .org /drugs /its -time -end -american -exceptionalism -when -it - comes - putting - citizens - behind - bars. Also, The National Research Council, The Growth of Incarceration in the United States: Exploring Causes and Consequences. Washington, DC: National Academies, 2014. 119. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Color- blindness. New York: New Press, 2011. 120. This is the thesis of the Boston Consulting Group in their report Made in America Again: Why Manufacturing Will Return to the U.S. Boston, August 2011: available at http:// www .bcg .com /documents /file84471 .pdf. 121. This is from Ettlinger and Gordon, The Importance and Promise of American Manufacturing, p. 2. 122. Eric M. Fattor, American Empire and the Arsenal of Entertainment. New York. Palgrave Macmillan, 2014. 123. Ezra Klein, “American Decline Is a Mirage in a World That’s Rising,” posted on Bloomberg, May 16, 2012: available at http://www .bloomberg .com /news /2012 - 05 - 16 /american - decline - a - mirage - in - a - world - that - s - rising .html. 124. Robert Kagan, “Not Fade Away: Against the Myth of American Decline,” Brookings, January 30, 2012: available at http:// www .brookings .edu /research / opinions /2012 /01 /17 - us - power - kagan. 125. Howard Friedman, The Measure of a Nation. New York: Prometheus, 2012, pp. 208– 9. 126. Geoffrey Hodgson, The Myth of American Exceptionalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, pp. 128– 90. 127. This is the title of the volume by Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, published in New York by Farrar, Straus and Giroux in 2011.

Chapter 2

1. Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 1. Notes 229

2. Cited in Niall Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire?,” Foreign Affairs, 82(5), 2003, pp. 154– 61. 3. Ibid. 4. Earl C. Ravenal, “What’s an Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America’s Foreign Policy,” Critical Review, 21(1), 2009, pp. 21– 75. 5. This is in Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, American Umpire. Cambridge, MA: Har- vard University Press, 2013, p. 17. 6. Andrew Hurrell, “Pax Americana or the Empire of Insecurity?,” International Review of the Asia- Pacific, 5, 2005, pp. 153– 76. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Bradley A. Thayer, “The Case for the American Empire,” in Christopher Layne and Bradley A. Thayer (eds.), American Empire: A Debate. London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 3, 5, and 7. 10. Max Boot, “The Case for American Empire,” The Weekly Standard, October 15, 2001: available at http:// ontology .buffalo .edu /smith /courses01 /rrtw /boot .htm. 11. Josef Joffe, The Myth of America’s Decline. New York: Liveright, 2014, pp. 219, 246, 252, and 267. 12. Thomas F. Madden, Empires of Trust. New York: Dutton, 2008. 13. Robert Kagan, “The Benevolent Empire,” Foreign Policy, 111, 1998, pp. 24–35. 14. Cited in James Chase, “Imperial America and the Common Interest,” World Policy Journal, 19(1), 2002, p. 1. 15. Dimitri Simes, “America’s Imperial Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs, 82(6), 2003, p. 93. For why the United States is not popular abroad, see Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stokes, America against the World: How We Are Different and Why We Are Disliked. New York: Henry Holt, 2006; and Andrei S. Markovits, Uncouth Nation: Why Europe Dislikes America. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. 16. Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, Arc of Empire. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012, p. 251. 17. Reported in Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back in Town: Or America’s Imperial Temptation— Again,” Millennium, 32(1), 2003, p. 11. 18. Michael Ignatieff, “Nation- building Lite,” The New York Times, July 28, 2002: available at http:// www .nytimes .com /2002 /07 /28 /magazine /nation - building - lite .html ?pagewanted = all & src = pm. 19. Cox, “The Empire’s Back.” 20. Michael Cox, “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine,” Review of Interna- tional Studies, 30(4), 2004, p. 592. 21. Michael Cox, “Empire by Denial? Debating US Power,” Security Dialogue, 35(2), 2004, p. 230. 22. Elliot A. Cohen, “History and the Hyperpower,” Foreign Affairs, 83(4), July/ August 2004, p. 56. 23. Ferguson, “Hegemony or Empire?” 24. Cox, “The Empire’s Back,” p. 7. 230 Notes

25. Cited in ibid., p. 9. 26. Bryan Mabee, “Discourses of Empire; the US ‘Empire,’ Globalization and International Relations,” Third World Quarterly, 25(8), 2004, p. 1373. 27. Noam Chomsky, “U.S.—A Leading Terrorist State,” Monthly Review, 53(6), 2001, 14– 15. 28. Harry Magdoff, Imperialism without Colonies. New York: Monthly Review, 2003. 29. Michael Mann, Incoherent Empire. London: Verso, 2003. 30. Paul Attwood, War and Empire: The American Way of Life. New York: Pluto, 2010. 31. Perry Anderson, “Imperium,” New Left Review, 83, September–October 2013, pp 1– 71. 32. Walden Bello, Dilemmas of Domination: The Unmaking of the American Empire. New York: Metropolitan, 2005. 33. Oliver Stone and Peter Kuznick, The Untold Story of the United States. New York: Gallery, 2012. 34. David Edwards, “Noam Chomsky: America’s Decline Is Real—and Increasingly Self- Inflicted,” posted on AlterNet, February 14, 2012: available at http:// www .rawstory .com /rs /2012 /02 /14 /chomsky -the -american -decline -is -increasingly - self - inflicted. 35. Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America’s Last Hope. New York: Metropolitan, 2010, p. 109. 36. Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American Exceptionalism. New York: Metropolitan, 2008, pp. 2– 4. 37. Tom Engelhardt, “Are We Going Down Like the Soviets?,” posted on AlterNet, June 21, 2010: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /147261. 38. Bacevich, The Limits of Power, p. 6. 39. See note 37. 40. Noam Chomsky, “Noam Chomsky on the Dangers of American Empire and Why the US Continues to Be Bin Laden’s Best Ally,” posted on AlterNet, Sep- tember 6, 2011: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /152308. 41. Andrew Bacevich, “Why We Can’t Win the ‘War on Terror,’” posted on Alter- Net, October 10, 2010: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /148456. 42. Andrew Bacevich, “Uncle Sam, Global Gangster,” posted on TomDispatch, February 19, 2012: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /blog /175505. 43. Terrence McNally and Andrew Bacevich, “America’s Empire and Endless Wars Are Destroying the World, and Ruining Our Great Country,” AlterNet, Sep- tember 6, 2010: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /148094. 44. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer- sity Press, 2000, pp. xiii–xiv. For critiques, see Gopal Balakrishnan, Debating Empire. London: Verso, 2003. 45. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “Global Capitalism and American Empire,” in Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (eds.), The New Imperial Challenge: The Socialist Register 2004. London: Merlin, 2003, p. 4. 46. Ibid., p. 13. Notes 231

47. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “Theorizing American Empire,” in Amy Bar- tholomew (ed.), Empire’s Law. London: Pluto, 2006, p. 21. 48. Leo Panitch, Martijn Konings, Sam Gindin, and Scott Aquanno, “The Political Economy of the Subprime Crisis,” in Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds.), American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance, 2nd ed. Hound- mills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. x. 49. Sam Gindin, “Empire’s Contradictions, Our Weaknesses: The Empire Stum- bles On,” posted on A Socialist Project e- bulletin, 57, September 17, 2007. 50. Eliot A. Cohen, “History and the Hyperpower,” p. 50. 51. Charles S. Maier, Among Empires. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 24 and 31. 52. Michael Doyle, Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 19. 53. Maier, Among Empires, p. 7. 54. Ronald Gregor Suny, “Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. New York: New Press, 2006, p. 73. 55. Ibid., p. 74. 56. Alexander Motyl, Revolutions, Nations, Empires. New York: Columbia Univer- sity Press, 1999, p. 124. 57. Maier, Among Empires, p. 5. 58. Calhoun et al., Lessons of Empire, p. 2. 59. All this is in George Steinmetz, “Return to Empire: The New U.S. Imperial- ism in Comparative Historical Perspective,” Sociological Theory, 23(4), 2005, 339– 67. 60. George Steinmetz, “Imperialism or Colonialism? From Windhoek to Wash- ington, by Way of Basra,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Lessons of Empire. New York: New Press, 2006, pp. 135– 56. 61. George Steinmetz, “Return to Empire,” p. 340. 62. Doyle, Empires, p. 45. 63. Herfried Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States. Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 5. 64. Ibid., p. 6. 65. See, for example, Deepak Lal’s In Defense of Empires. Washington, DC: AEI, 2004. Also Niall Ferguson, Colossus. New York: Penguin, 2004, pp. 169– 99. 66. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 3. 67. Motyl, Revolutions, p. 128. 68. Go, Patterns of Empire, p. 207. 69. Münkler, Empires, pp. 68 and 72. 70. Ferguson, “Empires with Expiration Dates,” Foreign Policy, 156, September– October, 2006, p. 48. 71. On the longevity of the Ottoman Empire, see Karen Barkey, Empire of Differ- ence: The Ottomans in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2008. 232 Notes

72. We will later learn to call this “The Silence of Pizarro” (see Chapters 4 and 7). 73. Colin Read, The Rise and Fall of an Economic Empire. New York: Palgrave Mac- millan, 2010, p. 200. 74. Ibid., p. 340. 75. Steinmitz, “Return to Empire,” p. 349. 76. Michael Cox, “The Bush Doctrine and the Lessons of History,” in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity, 2004, pp. 33– 34. 77. P. Eric Louw, Roots of the Pax Americana. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2010, p. 2. 78. On this, see Cox, “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 34, culmi- nating in the statement, “If this was not imperialism by any other name, then it is difficult to think what might be.” 79. Go, Patterns of Empire, p. 26. 80. Robert Gilpin calls this “The American System,” and describes its key characteristics in his essay, “The Rise of American Hegemony,” in Patrick Karl O’Brien and Armand Cleese (eds.), Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941– 2000. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, pp. 165– 82. See also David Coates, Running the Country. Milton Keynes, England: Open University Press, 1995, pp. 16–20. The case for treating this hegemony as imperial has recently been put best by P. Eric Louw, Pax Americana, pp. 1– 27. 81. This is what G. John Ikenberry called an “American hegemonic order with ‘liberal’ characteristics . . . built around multilateralism, alliance partnership, strategic restraint, collective security, and institutional and ruled- based relation- ships,” in his essay, “Liberal Hegemony or Empire? American Power in the Age of Unipolarity,” in Held and Koenig- Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 21st Century, p. 85. Ikenberry is here using the term “liberal” in its European (i.e., free market) not American (i.e., progressive) sense. 82. Maier, Among Empires, p. 8. Maier has this hegemony going through three stages, p. 274. 83. There is a large and important literature on the similarities and differences between the British and the American periods of global dominance, and on whether therefore there are lessons to be gleaned from one for the other. We will come back to this question in Chapter 6. In the meantime, see David Lake, “British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline,” in Jeffry A. Frieden and David Lake (eds.), International Political Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. London: Routledge, 2000; and the essays gathered by O’Brien and Clesse, Two Hegemonies. 84. Cox, “Empire, Imperialism and the Bush Doctrine,” p. 586. 85. Chalmers Jonson, “737 U.S. Military Bases = Global Empire,” posted on Alter- Net, February 18, 2007: available at http://www .alternet .org /story /47998 /737 _u .s. _military _bases_ %3D _global _empire. 86. David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, “Introduction: Wither American Power?,” in Held and Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 21st Cen- tury, p. 3. Notes 233

87. Doug Stokes, “The Heart of Empire? Theorising US Empire in an Era of Trans- national Capitalism,” New Political Economy, 26(2), 2005, p. 224. 88. See, for example, Michael Cox, “The Empire’s Back”; Philip S Golub, “Imperial Politics, Imperial Will and the Crisis of U.S. Hegemony,” Review of Interna- tional Political Economy, 11(4), 2004, pp. 763– 86; and Louw, Pax Americana, pp. 239– 64. 89. Bacevich, The Limits of Power, pp. 3– 8. 90. Steinmitz, “Return to Empire,” p. 348. He immediately qualified his observa- tion in this way: “But the United States has long perceived greater advantages in informal and indirect imperialism as opposed to direct colonialism; Iraq was released into ostensible self- sovereignty in mid- 2004.” 91. There is now a vast literature on the foreign policy of George W. Bush, much of it written in the midst of the policy fights that broke out on both sides of the Atlantic and designed to shape the outcome of those fights. For my contribution, see David Coates and Joel Krieger (with Rhiannon Vickers), Blair’s War. Cambridge: Polity, 2004. 92. Tony Smith, A Pact with the Devil: Washington’s Bid for World Supremacy and the Betrayal of the American Promise. New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 195– 236. 93. On this, see Nick Turse and Tom Engelhardt, Terminator Planet: The First His- tory of Drone Warfare, 2001–2050 . CreateSpace Independent Publishing Plat- form (May 24, 2012). On the cyberspace dimensions of this new American military technology, see David E. Sanger, Confront and Conceal: Obama’s Secret Wars and Surprising Use of American Power. New York: Crown, 2012. 94. Andrew Bacevich, Washington Rules: America’s Path to Permanent War. New York: Metropolitan, 2010. 95. In evidence to the House Foreign Relations Committee, January 20, 2013: available at http://www .state .gov /secretary /rm /2013 /01 /203192 .htm. 96. The case is also made in a book much favored by the president, Robert Kagan, The World America Made. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2012.

Chapter 3

1. See Jean- Michel David, The Roman Conquest of Italy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. 2. Harry Sidebottom, “Roman Imperialism: The Changed Outward Trajectory of the Roman Empire,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 54(3), 2005, p. 315. 3. Ibid. 4. Timothy Parsons, The Rule of Empires. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 29. 5. Simon James, Rome and the Sword. London: Thames and Hudson, 2011, p. 282. 6. Sidebottom, “Roman Imperialism,” p. 329. 7. Ibid., p. 320. 8. On this, see Michael Doyle, Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 93– 97; Herfried Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination 234 Notes

from Ancient Rome to the United States. Cambridge: Polity, 2007, pp. 47– 48 and 70– 73. 9. On this, see Sidebottom, “Roman Imperialism.” 10. M. I. Finley, “Manpower and the Fall of Rome,” in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen, 1970, p. 85. 11. Details in James, Rome and the Sword, pp. 261– 63. 12. Bryan Ward-Perkins, The Fall of Rome. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 2. 13. Ramsey McMullen, “The Power of the Roman Empire,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 55(4), 2006, p. 471. 14. Donald Kagan (ed.), “Introduction,” The End of the Roman Empire. Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1992, p. 2. 15. Peter Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 439. 16. “210 Reasons for the Decline of the Roman Empire,” University of Texas: available at http:// www .utexas .edu /courses /rome /210reasons .html. 17. Gibbon, quoted in Kagan, The End of the Roman Empire, p. 4. 18. Cited by John Matthews, “Gibbon and the Later Roman Empire: Causes and Circumstances,” in Rosamund McKitterick and Ronald Quinault (eds.), Edward Gibbon and Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 13. 19. Cited in Harold James, The Roman Predicament. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni- versity Press, 2006, p. 11. 20. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 443. 21. Cited in Adrian Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009, p. 18. 22. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 450. 23. Ibid., p. 436. 24. Goldsworthy, How Rome Fell, p. 406. 25. Ibid., p. 414. 26. Ibid., p. 415. 27. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 445. 28. Cullen Murphy, Are We Rome? The Fall of an Empire and the Fate of America. Boston: Mainer, 2007, p. 32. 29. Richard Mansfield Haywood, The Myth of Rome’s Fall. London: Alvin Redman, 1958, pp. 18– 25. 30. Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad, and Eric Rudeng, “On the Decline and Fall of Empires: The Roman Empire and Western Imperialism Compared,” Review, 4(1), 1980, p. 95. 31. For details, see the classic study by A. H. Jones, The Later Roman Empire: 284– 602, Volume 2. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964, pp. 1053– 58. 32. Haywood, The Myth of Rome’s Fall, pp. 102– 3. 33. Doyle, Empires, p. 101. Notes 235

34. On this, see H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970, pp. 196– 264; and Martin Albrow, Bureaucracy. London: Pall Mall, 1970. 35. Stephen Mitchell, A History of the Later Roman Empire: AD 284– 641. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007, p. 169. 36. Ibid., p. 55. 37. On this, see Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames and Hudson, 2003, pp. 46– 59. 38. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 417. 39. Haywood, The Myth of Rome’s Fall, p. 120. 40. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 279. 41. Ibid., p. 280. 42. Ibid., pp. 283 and 285. 43. Ibid., p. 292. 44. Ibid., p. 285. 45. Aldo Schiavone, The End of the Past: Ancient Rome and the Modern West. Cam- bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000, pp. 181 and 171. 46. Doyle, Empires, p. 86. 47. Perry Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism. London: Verso, 1974, p. 56. 48. The details are in David, The Roman Conquest of Italy, pp. 94– 95. 49. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, p. 60. 50. Parsons, The Rule of Empires, p. 31. 51. Ibid., p. 61. 52. Schiavone, The End of the Past, p. 38. 53. Peter Temin, “The Labor Market of the Early Roman Empire,” Journal of Inter- disciplinary History, 34(3), 2004, p. 526. 54. Schiavone, The End of the Past, pp. 122– 23. 55. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, p. 59. 56. Galtung et al., “On the Decline and Fall of Empires,” p. 100. 57. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981, pp. 453–54. The only exceptions to this loss of legal rights linked to class position were soldiers and veterans because of the vital role the army played in maintaining internal order and external defense (pp. 461– 62 for details). 58. Schiavone, The End of the Past, pp. 131– 46, 140, and 197. 59. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, p. 80. 60. Peter Temin, “The Economy of the Early Roman Empire,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(1), 2006, p. 134. 61. Galtung et al., “On the Decline and Fall of Empires,” p. 102. On the rural exodus, see David, The Roman Conquest of Italy, p. 95. 62. Temin, “The Economy,” p. 135. 63. Parsons, The Rule of Empires, p. 31. 64. Schiavone, The End of the Past, p. 39. 236 Notes

65. Anderson, Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, pp. 81– 82. Also Schiavone, The End of the Past, pp. 99– 107 and 185– 203. 66. Charles S. Maier, Among Empires. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006, p. 272– 73. 67. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 34. 68. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 413. 69. On this, see McMullen, “The Power of the Roman Empire,” p. 476. For a discussion of the reliability of this number, see Averil Cameron, The Medieval World in Late Antiquity AD 395– 600. New York: Routledge, 2012, p. 98. 70. Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 35. 71. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 413. 72. Schiavone, The End of the Past, pp. 198– 99. 73. Aurelio Barboni, “The Economic Problems of the Roman Empire at the Time of Its Decline,” in Carlo M. Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen, 1970, p. 55. 74. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 339. 75. See James, The Roman Predicament, pp. 287 and 289. 76. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle, pp. 502– 3. 77. Haywood, The Myth of Rome’s Fall, p. 109. On how modern societies fully mobilize for war but ancient societies could not (because of primitive technology and low standards of living), see Finley, “Manpower and the Fall of Rome,” p. 88. 78. Barboni, “The Economic Problems,” p. 73. 79. Ibid., pp. 81– 83. 80. It was not always voluntary, hence the Social War in the early part of the last century BC. On this, see David, The Roman Conquest of Italy, pp. 140– 56. 81. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 62. 82. Schiavone, The End of the Past, p. 8. 83. Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 36. 84. Finley, “Manpower and the Fall of Rome,” p. 89. 85. Details in Schiavone, The End of the Past, pp. 124– 37. 86. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 283. 87. Barboni, “The Economic Problems,” pp. 48– 49. 88. Peter Heather challenges this interpretation, putting greater emphasis on the loss of territory (and therefore taxation) to barbarians in the last decades of the western empire. Heather, The Fall of the Roman Empire, p. 341. 89. Barboni, “The Economic Problems,” p. 52. 90. Doyle, Empires, p. 102. 91. “Even during the first century of the Empire, when the emperors were trying to rule all the people with justice, there seems to have been no idea of relin- quishing the privileged position of Italy as the mistress of the Imperial system, dominating the subject provinces and receiving tribute from them.” Haywood, The Myth of Rome’s Fall, p. 26. 92. Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 40. Notes 237

93. Amy Chua, Day of Empire. New York: Doubleday, 2007, pp. 51– 52. 94. Chua, Day of Empire, pp. 56– 57. 95. Ibid., p. 149. 96. Vaclav Smil, Why America Is Not a New Rome. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010, pp. 54, 29, 41, 104, 105, 146, and 158, respectively. 97. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 416. 98. Kimberley Kagan, “Hegemony, Not Empire,” The Weekly Standard, May 6, 2002: available at http:// www .weeklystandard .com /Content /Protected /Articles / 000 /000 /001 /183amzus .asp. 99. Robert Cox, “Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order,” New Political Economy, 9(3), 2004, p. 311. 100. Thomas Madden, Empires of Trust. New York: Dutton, 2008, p. 295. 101. Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 37. 102. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 279. 103. Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army, p. 416. 104. Parsons, The Rule of Empires, p. 23. 105. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 290. 106. Murphy, Are We Rome?, pp. 17– 21. This list is based on Smil, Why America Is Not a New Rome, p. 24. 107. Murphy, Are We Rome?, book cover. 108. Steven Strauss, “Is Our Republic Ending? 8 Striking Parallels between the Fall of Rome and the U.S.,” posted on AlterNet, December 26, 2012: available at http:// www .alternet .org /economy /our - republic - ending - 8 - striking - parallels - between - fall - rome - and - us. 109. Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic. New York: Metropolitan, 2006, pp. 55 and 279. 110. Paul Kennedy, “Rome Offers Obama Lesson in Limits,” The Financial Times, December 30, 2009: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /cb49b92a - f4af - 11de - 9cba - 00144feab49a .html. 111. Galtung et al., “On the Decline and Fall of Empires.” 112. See Morris Berman, The Twilight of American Culture. New York: W. W. Nor- ton, 2000, pp. 91– 90. 113. Niall Ferguson, Colossus. New York: Penguin, 2004, p. viii. 114. Madden, Empires of Trust; and Chua, Day of Empire. 115. James, The Roman Predicament, p. 61. 116. Martijn Konings, “American Finance and Empire in Historical Perspective,” in Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds.), American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance. Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, pp. 67– 68. 117. Murphy, Are We Rome?, p. 1. 118. “Rome lived on its principal till ruin stared it in the face. Industry is the only true source of wealth, and there was no industry in Rome. By day the Ostia Road was crowded with carts and muleteers, carrying to the great city the silks and spices of the East, the marble of Asia Minor, the timber of the Atlas, the grain of Africa and Egypt—and the carts brought nothing out but loads of 238 Notes

dung. That was their return cargo.” Winwoode Reade, quoted in Clyde Pre- stowitz, The Betrayal of American Prosperity. New York: Free Press, 2010, p. 1.

Chapter 4

1. The details are in John Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469– 1716. New York: Penguin, 2002, pp. 135– 36 and 138– 39. 2. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 120. 3. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 62. 4. The story has recently been retold in Hugh Thomas, The Golden Empire: Spain, Charles V, and the Creation of America. New York: Random House, 2010. The Philippines (Spain’s most distant colony) was added in 1565. 5. Katherine Deagan, “Dynamics of Imperial Adjustment in Spanish America: Ideology and Social Integration,” in Susan Alcock, Terence D’Altroy, Kathleen Morrison, and Carla Sinopoli (eds.), Empires: Perspectives from Archaeology and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 179. 6. Timothy Parsons, The Rule of Empires. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 116. 7. Deagan, “Dynamics of Imperial Adjustment,” p. 179. 8. The details are in Stephen R. Bown, 1494: How a Family Feud in Medieval Spain Divided the World in Half. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2011. 9. Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?,” Past and Pres- ent, 81, November, 1978, p. 25; and Dennis O. Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis and the Decline of Spain (Castile),” Journal of Economic History, 42, March, 1982, p. 144. 10. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 59. 11. Frederick Cooper, “Empires Multiplied: A Review Essay,” Comparative Studies in Society and History, 46(2), 2004, p. 264. 12. Michael Doyle, Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986, p. 118. 13. Ibid. 14. John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400– 2000. New York: Bloomsbury, 2008, pp. 62– 63. 15. Ibid., p. 97. 16. Ibid. 17. Herfried Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States. Cambridge: Polity, 2007, pp. 35– 36 and 74. 18. Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973, p. 65. 19. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: Verso, 1974, p. 74. 20. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 44. 21. When Spain and France clashed in Italy in the 1520s, no army was bigger than 30,000 men. A century later, the Spanish armies commanded by Philip IV contained 300,000 men. Ibid., p. 45. Notes 239

22. Kamen, “The Decline of Spain,” p. 511. 23. Anderson, Lineages, p. 62. 24. Davis, The Rise, p. 67. 25. Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis,” p. 146 for details. 26. Ibid. 27. Davis, The Rise, p. 68. 28. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 183. 29. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 43. 30. The distinction is again Elliott’s, Imperial Spain, p. 211. 31. Ibid., p. 406. 32. Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 206– 7 for all the material in this paragraph. 33. Ibid., p. 207. 34. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 46. 35. Kamen, “The Decline of Spain,” pp. 508– 9. 36. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 264. 37. There were apparently as many as 45 mutinies in the Spanish armies in the Netherlands between 1572 and 1607, all triggered by the inability of the Span- ish crown to pay them. This is in Charles Mann, 1493. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011, p. 28. 38. Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power: The United States’ Debt in Historical Perspective,” International Relations, 21(3), 2007, p. 310. 39. Yedor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007, p. 43. 40. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 48. 41. Cited in Keith Thomas, “The Empires of Elliott,” The New York Review of Books, February 21, 2013, p. 30. 42. John H. Elliott, “The Decline of Spain,” Past and Present, 20, November, 1961, p. 60. 43. Anderson, Lineages, p. 63. 44. Davis, The Rise, p. 61. 45. On this, see Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis,” pp. 139– 47. 46. Jaime Vicens Vives, “The Decline of Spain in the Seventeenth Century,” in Carlo Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen, 1970, p. 121. 47. Davis, The Rise, p. 149. 48. “The present picture of the Castilian population . . . suggests a rapid increase slackening off towards the end of the sixteenth century, and then a catastrophic loss at the very end of the century, followed by a further loss of 90,000 inhabit- ants through the expulsion of the Moriscos.” Elliott, “The Decline,” p. 60. 49. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 294. 50. Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis,” p. 145. 51. Ibid., p. 142. 52. Ibid., p. 141. 53. Details are in Elliott, “The Decline,” p. 68. 54. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 292. 240 Notes

55. Vives, “The Decline of Spain,” p. 145. 56. Data in ibid., pp. 137– 38. 57. Anderson, Lineages, p. 72. 58. Data in Vives, “The Decline of Spain,” pp. 139– 40. 59. Earl J. Hamilton, “Revisions in Economic History: VIII.—The Decline of Spain,” The Economic History Review, 8(2), 1938, pp. 168– 79. 60. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 110. 61. The expulsion of the Jews in four months in 1492 saw the departure of maybe 150,000 of the 200,000 practicing Jews and previous conversos living in the states ruled by Isabella and Ferdinand— many of them “men of standing in the Church, the administration and in the world of finance.” Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 109. 62. Ibid., p. 216. 63. Ibid., p. 110. 64. Kamen, “The Decline of Spain,” p. 497. 65. Tzevtan Todorov, The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other. New York: HarperPerennial, 1984, p. 49. 66. Doyle, Empires, p. 59. 67. See Gabriel Paquette, “Historical Reviews: The Dissolution of the Spanish Atlantic Monarchy,” The Historical Journal, 52(1), 2009, pp. 175– 212. 68. Doyle, Empires, p. 120. 69. Ibid., p. 121. 70. This logic need not delay us long here, because whatever else the United States may or may not have, it does not have colonies far from its shores populated by émigré Americans. Modern empires of the colonial kind invariably did have such settlers—men and women whose self-preservation in the colonial setting invariably required that the structure of empire remain firmly intact. To the degree that ruling groups in the “mother country” eventually found the main- tenance of colonial control beyond them for whatever reason, and so no longer in their interests, the relations between colonial settlers and the imperial government invariably soured. The starkest examples of that souring in recent times include the increasing tensions between Northern Ireland Protestants and London- based governments after the outbreak of The Troubles in 1968, between white settlers and London in what is now Zimbabwe but was then Southern Rhodesia, and between Algerian settlers and the de Gaulle government under the Fifth French Republic in 1958. The first generated Protestant paramilitary strikes against the IRA, the second generated a Unilateral Decla- ration of Independence by white settlers under Ian Smith, and the third the Organisation de l’armée secrète (OAS) attempts at de Gaulle’s assassination. 71. J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 383. 72. The details are in Paquette, “Historical Reviews,” pp. 183– 87. 73. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 13. 74. William S. Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire. Houndmills, Eng- land: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 2. 75. Hamilton, “Revisions in Economic History: VIII,” p. 179. Notes 241 Chapter 5

1. For a similar use of the British experience to deepen understanding of the Rus- sian Empire, see Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 89– 127. 2. In September 2014, the union narrowly survived a referendum on Scottish independence: 55 percent of Scottish voters preferring to stay in the United Kingdom, but 45 percent voting to leave. 3. The empire expanded between 1815 and 1865, largely unnoticed, “at an annual average pace of about 100,000 square miles.” Kennedy, The Rise, p. 155. 4. Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 170. 5. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 226. 6. “During the imperial century [1815– 1914] Great Britain added approximately 10 million square miles of territory and roughly 400 million people to its overseas empire.” Timothy Parsons, The British Imperial Century, 1815–1914: A World History Perspective. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999, p. 3. 7. Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 15. 8. Ibid. 9. John Darwin, The Empire Project. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 58. 10. Ibid., p. 1. 11. The claim was always false, of course, since it was initially made quite correctly about the Spanish Empire. 12. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 224. 13. David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century. London: Longman, 1991, p. 24. 14. Ibid., p. 29. 15. Cited in “The British Empire: Pondering the Past,” The Economist, September 15, 2012. 16. Ibid. 17. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914– 90. London: Longman, 1993, p. 3. 18. Perry Anderson. “Figures of Descent,” New Left Review, 161, January/February, 1987, p. 32. 19. Darwin, Empire Project, p. 37. 20. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 305. 21. Darwin, Empire Project, p. 10. 22. Andrew Gamble, “Hegemony and Decline: Britain and the United States,” in Patrick O’Brien and Armand Cleese (eds.), Two Hegemonies: Britain 1846– 1914 and the United States 1941– 2001. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, p. 131. 23. Y. Cassis, “British Finance: Success and Controversy,” in J. J. van Helten and Y. Cassis (eds.), Capitalism in a Mature Economy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1990, p. 1. 242 Notes

24. There is a list in Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power. New York: Basic, 2004, p. xxv. 25. On this, see Francois Crouzet, “Mercantilism, War and the Rise of British Power,” in O’Brien and Cleese, Two Hegemonies, pp. 67– 85. 26. Go, Patterns of Empire, p. 173. 27. Anderson, “Figures of Descent,” p. 37. The other two were that “it played no role in the development of the basic grid of physical communication in the new age, the railway system” and “it deferred any public education long after universal elementary education had become established elsewhere.” 28. Post- 1858, it was an army of 700,000 troops— one- third British, two- thirds Indian. John Darwin, “Britain’s Empires,” in Sarah Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives. Oxford: Blackwell, 2008, p. 12. 29. Parsons, Rule of Empires, p. 221. 30. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 155. 31. Patrick O’Brien, “Imperialism and the Rise and Decline of the British Econ- omy 1688– 1989,” New Left Review, 238, November– December, 1999, p. 15. 32. For an overview of the British Empire at its peak, see Alfred W. McCoy, “Fatal Florescence,” in Alfred W. McCoy, Joseph M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (eds.), Endless Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, pp. 8– 9. 33. Crouzet, “Mercantilism,” p. 68. 34. Doyle, Empires, p. 258. 35. Ibid., pp. 258– 59. 36. Patrick O’Brien, “The Pax Britannica and American Hegemony: Precedent, Antecedent, or Just Another History?,” in O’Brien and Cleese, Two Hegemo- nies, p. 15. 37. Doyle, Empires, p. 261. 38. Darwin, “Britain’s Empires,” p. 19. 39. O’Brien, “The Pax Britannica,” p. 53. 40. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 33. 41. This is the actual title of John Gallagher’s influential essay, published under that title by Cambridge University Press in 1982. 42. Andrew Gamble, Britain in Decline, 4th ed. London: Macmillan, 1994, p. xiv. 43. Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 11. 44. BIS Economics Paper 10b, Manufacturing in the UK: Supplementary Analysis, December 2010, p. 2. 45. Data in David Coates, Models of Capitalism: Growth & Stagnation in the Mod- ern Era. Cambridge: Polity, 2000, p. 3. 46. Eurostat news release 186/2011, December 2011. 47. Gamble, Britain in Decline, p. xviii. 48. Corelli Barnett, The Lost Victory. London: Macmillan, 1995, p. 7. 49. Colin Read, The Rise and Fall of an Economic Empire: With Lessons for Aspiring Economies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 200. 50. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1962, p. 363. Notes 243

51. Bernard Elbaum and William Lazonick, The Decline of the British Economy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 7. 52. “During the first decades of the twentieth century, proprietary capitalism gave way to managerial capitalism as the dominant engine of industrial development . . . Proprietary capitalism proved inadequate to deal with the technological complexities and the attendant high fixed costs of the new industrial era.” William Lazonick, Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 27. 53. Details in Lazonick, Business Organization, pp. 45– 46. 54. Alex Callinicos, “Exception or Symptom? The British Crisis and the World System,” New Left Review, 169, May/June, 1988, p. 103. 55. Anderson, “Figures of Descent,” p. 42. 56. W. B. Walker, “Britain’s Industrial Performance 1850– 1950: A Failure to Adjust,” in Keith Pavitt (ed.), Technological Innovation and British Economic Performance. London: Macmillan, 1980, p. 27. 57. Robert Boyer, “Capital-Labour Relations in OECD Countries: From Fordist Golden Age to Contrasted National Trajectories,” in J. Schor (ed.), Capital, the State and Labour. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1996; and Ian Clark, “Employment Resistance to the Fordist Production Process: ‘Flawed Fordism’ in Post-War Britain,” Contemporary British History, 15(2), 2001, pp. 28– 52. 58. For the distinction between positive and negative deindustrialization, see David Coates, The Question of UK Decline. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester- Wheatsheaf, 1994, pp. 10–12; and Bob Rowthorn, “Deindustrialization in Britain,” in R. Martin and B. Rowthorn (eds.), The Geography of Deindustrialization. Lon- don: Macmillan, 1986, p. 23. 59. Bob Rowthorn and John Wells, De-industrialization and Foreign Trade. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, p. 91. 60. Although the general adherence to the gold standard in the late nineteenth century was more accidental than planned, that to the dollar between 1944 and 1971 was the reverse! (O’Brien, “The Pax Britannica,” p. 24). 61. Bob Jessop, “The Transformation of the State in Post-War Britain,” in R. Scase (ed.), The State in Western Capitalism. London: Croom Helm, 1997, p. 30. 62. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 157. 63. Sam Aaronovitch and Ron Smith (with Jean Gardiner and Roger Moore), The Political Economy of British Capitalism. London: McGraw- Hill, 1981, p. 61. 64. David Coates, “The Character and Origin of Britain’s Economic Decline,” in David Coates and John Hillard (eds.), The Economic Decline of Modern Britain: The Debate between Left and Right. Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986, pp. 270–71. See also Coates, The Question of UK Decline, pp. 153– 62. 65. Anderson, “Figures of Descent,” p. 42. “In the century between 1815 and 1914, Britain was a net capital exporter in all but three years (1840, 1842 and 1847).” Hans Overbeek, Global Capitalism and National Decline: The Thatcher Decade in Perspective. London: Unwin Hyman, 1990, p. 40. 66. Anderson, “Figures of Descent,” p. 34. 67. Ibid., p. 57. 244 Notes

68. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 1688– 1914. London: Longman, 1993, p. 44 (also in their Crisis and Deconstruction, p. 298). 69. Cain and Hopkins, Innovation and Expansion 1688– 1914, pp. 15, 23, 34, 45– 46. 70. Porter, Empire and Superempire, pp. 50– 52. 71. David Currie and Ron Smith, “Economic Trends and Crisis in the UK Econ- omy,” in Coates and Hillard (eds.), Economic Decline, p. 226. 72. The term “liberal” is used here in its European (not American) sense. To be liberal is to follow Adam Smith, who disliked large government and favored deregulated market forces. The United States uses the term to mean “progressive” and understands it to be exactly the reverse of a European “liberal.” 73. David Edgerton, “Liberal Militarism and the British State,” New Left Review, 185, January/February, 1991, p. 141. 74. See Andrew Thompson, “Empire and the British State,” in S. E. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2008, pp. 42– 43. 75. John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688– 1783. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990, p. 40. 76. Ibid., p. 36. 77. Details in Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, p. 11. 78. Darwin, “Britain’s Empires,” p. 257. 79. Sir John Fisher, quoted in Reynolds, “Britain’s Empires,” p. 8. 80. Quoted in John Hobson, “Two Hegemonies or One: A Historical-Sociological Critique of Hegemonic Stabilisation Theory,” in O’Brien and Cleese, Two Hegemonies, p. 311. 81. David Edgerton, Warfare State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, p. 23. 82. Ibid., p. 66. 83. Malcolm Chalmers, Paying for Defense. London: Pluto, 1985, p. 1. 84. John Lovering, “Military Expenditure and the Restructuring of Capitalism: The Military Industry in Britain,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 14(4), 1990, p. 455. 85. Edgerton, Warfare State, p. 70. 86. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 482. 87. Details in Dan Milmo, “BAE Revenues Hit by Drop in US and UK Demand,” The Guardian, August 2, 2012: available at http:// www .theguardian .com / business /2012 /aug /02 /bae - revenues - fall - uk - us. 88. The term is Edgerton’s, Warfare State. 89. Kiran Stacey, “UK Defence Spending to Fall below NATO Target, Says Research,” The Financial Times, June 15, 2014: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s / 0 /81907de8 - f089 - 11e3 - 8f3d - 00144feabdc0 .html #axzz35NQ69pVB. Also Ron Smith, Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money. London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 103. 90. Edgerton, “Liberal Militarism,” p. 164. Notes 245

91. Tim Radford, “Military Dominates UK Science, Says Report,” The Guardian, January 20, 2005. 92. Edgerton, “Liberal Militarism,” p. 164. 93. David Coates, Models of Capitalism, pp. 199– 201; Smith, Military Economics, pp. 159– 71; Lovering, “Military Expenditure,” p. 453. 94. Stephen Blank, “The Impact of Foreign Economic Policy,” in Coates and Hill- ard (eds.), Economic Decline, p. 207. 95. On this, see Simon Lee, “British Culture and Economic Decline,” in Andrew Cox et al., The Political Economy of Modern Britain. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997, pp. 98– 100. 96. On this, see Simon Lee, “Industrial Policy and British Decline,” in ibid., pp. 108– 65. 97. David Edgerton, “Liberal Militarism,” pp. 140– 41. 98. Ben Fine and Lawrence Harris, The Peculiarities of the British Economy. Lon- don: Lawrence and Wishart, 1985, p. 243. 99. For a strident critique of what he termed “illusions of grandeur,” see Sidney Pollard, The Wasting of the British Economy, pp. 135– 40 and 185– 86. 100. Corelli Barnett, “British Economic Decline, 1900–1980,” in O’Brien and Cleese, Two Hegemonies, pp. 144– 45. 101. Ibid., pp. 143– 44. 102. Gamble, “Hegemony and Decline,” p. 139. 103. Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis. New York: Henry Holt, 2006, pp. 79 and 87. 104. This is in Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 120. 105. John Darwin, Unfinished Empire. New York: Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 26. 106. See David Anderson, “Atoning for the Sins of Empire,” The New York Times, June 12, 2013: available at http:// www .nytimes .com /2013 /06 /13 /opinion / atoning - for - the - sins - of - empire .html? _r = 0. And more generally, see Richard Gott, Britain’s Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt. London: Verso, 2011. 107. Coates and Krieger (with Vickers), Blair’s War. Cambridge: Polity, 2004, pp. 92– 129. 108. See David Coates, “Seen from Below: Labor in the Story of Capitalism,” http:// www .davidcoates .net /wp - content /uploads /2010 /05 /Class - forces - doc .docx. 109. See Simon Hoggart, “Labour Sabres Still Rattle Loudest for the Falk- lands, 30 Years On,” The Guardian, February 20, 2012: available at http:// www .theguardian .com /politics /2012 /feb /20 /falklands - defence - hammond - commons. 110. Corelli Barnett, The Audit of War. New York: Macmillan, 1986; and The Col- lapse of British Power. Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1994, pp. 19– 68. 111. Martin J. Weiner, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit 1850– 1980. New York: Penguin, 1985, p. 157. 112. David Marquand, The Unprincipled Society. London: Cape, 1988, p. 8. 113. Chalmers Johnson for one— while recognizing the bloody carnage associated with the reluctant British retreat from empire in both South Asia and then 246 Notes

Africa— still gave the British credit for what he termed “choosing democracy over imperialism.” Johnson, Nemesis, pp. 279. 114. For the Kenya story, see Parsons, Rule of Empires, pp. 289– 350. 115. Ibid., p. 345. 116. Porter, Empire and Superempire, pp. 85– 86. 117. Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. London, 1952, chapter 1.

Chapter 6

1. For the debate on whether the Soviet period is best understood as one of “empire building” or “nation building,” see Ronald Grigor Suny, “Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Coo- per, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and Ameri- can Power. New York: New Press, 2006, pp. 85– 91. 2. William C. Wohlforth, “The Russian-Soviet Empire: A Test of Neo-realism,” in Michael Cox, Tim Dunne, and Ken Booth (eds.), Empires, Systems and States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 213. 3. On this, see Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 224. 4. Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 191. It is worth remembering that “by the early twentieth century there were far more Muslims in the Russian than the Ottoman empire.” (ibid., p. 355) A similar tension marked the end of the Soviet Empire (on this, see Kennedy, The Rise, p. 502). 5. Brendan Sims, Europe: The Struggle for Supremacy from 1453 to the Present. New York: Basic, 2013, p. 175. 6. Lieven, Empire, p. 262. 7. Sims, Europe, p. 179. 8. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers. London: Unwin Hyman, 1988, p. 170. 9. Lieven, Empire, p. 287. 10. Ibid. 11. John Darwin, After Tamerlane: The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400– 2000. New York: Bloomsbury, 2008, p. 400. 12. See Ronald Grigor Suny, “Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Les- sons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. New York: New Press, 2006, p. 86; Burbank and Cooper, Empires in World History, p. 396. 13. Darwin, After Tamerlane, pp. 124– 25. 14. Details in Tom Kemp, Industrialization in Nineteenth Century Europe. London: Longman, 1969, pp. 119– 57. 15. Lieven, Empire, p. 270. 16. Ibid., pp. 269– 70. 17. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 95. Notes 247

18. On this, see Lieven, Empire, pp. 213– 17. 19. Cited in Lieven, Empire, p. 220. 20. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 174. 21. Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 1979, p. 91. 22. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 233. 23. Kemp, Industrialization, p. 124. 24. Ibid., p. 137. 25. Ibid., p. 156. 26. See Alec Nove, “The Fall of Empires— Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Geir Lundestad (ed.), The Fall of Great Powers. Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1994, pp. 129– 32. 27. For the details on Russia’s relative economic and military backwardness in 1914, see Kennedy, The Rise, pp. 232– 42. 28. Baruch Knei-Paz, The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 108– 74. 29. Cited in Knei- Paz, Leon Trotsky, pp. 140 and 143. 30. Suny, “Learning from Empire,” p. 87. 31. Vladislav M. Zubok, “The Collapse of the Soviet Union: Leadership, Elites, and Legitimacy,” in Lundestad, Fall of Great Powers, p. 158. 32. Suny, “Learning from Empire,” p. 86. 33. This is the title of the famous work by Milovan Dilas, published in 1957, which was so significant at the time because of his position in the Yugoslav Commu- nist Party. 34. See Anne Applebaum, Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe 1944– 1956. New York: Doubleday, 2012. 35. Defense spending by the USSR increased from $722 million to $5429 million between 1930 and 1938, a rate of increase outmatched only by Germany itself (Kennedy, The Rise, p. 296). 36. On the scale and costs of all this, see Kennedy, The Rise, pp. 322– 23. 37. Ibid., p. 363. 38. Ibid., p. 384. 39. Ron Smith, Military Economics: The Interaction of Power and Money. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 93. 40. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 362. 41. Ibid., pp. 498– 99. 42. Leon Trotsky, 1905. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971, p. 52. 43. Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007, p. 83. 44. Ibid., p. 89. 45. For the economic dilemmas faced by the Bolsheviks prior to the 1930s, see Richard B. Day, Leon Trotsky and the Politics of Economic Isolation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973. 46. Stephen Kotkin, Armageddon Averted: The Soviet Collapse, 1970– 2000. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 61. 248 Notes

47. On this, see Gaidar, Collapse, p. 77. 48. Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, p. 17. 49. Ibid., p. 40. 50. Gaidar, Collapse, pp. 95– 96. 51. Kennedy, The Rise, p. 499. 52. Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, p. 188. 53. Herman Münckler, Empires. Cambridge: Polity, 2005, p. 3. 54. See Applebaum, Iron Curtain, for the brutality. 55. Details in Nove, “Fall of Empires,” p. 137. 56. Lieven, Empire, p. 332. 57. Nove, “Fall of Empires,” p. 138. 58. Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, p. 3. 59. Ibid., p. 178. 60. Zubok, “Collapse of the Soviet Union,” p. 158. 61. Nove, “Fall of Empires,” p. 142. 62. Brian Landers, Empires Apart: A History of American and Russian Imperialism. New York: Pegasus, 2010. 63. Lieven, Empire, p. 311. 64. Ibid., p. 318. 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid., p. 319. 67. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Metropolitan, 2000, p. 219.

Chapter 7

1. As cited earlier: Michael Doyle, Empires. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986; John Darwin, After Tamberlane. New York: Bloomsbury, 2000; Charles Maier, Among Empires. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006; Her- man Münckler, Empires. Cambridge: Polity, 2005; Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, Empires in World History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. 2. Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism, p. 311. 3. Carlo Cipolla (ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires. London: Methuen, 1970, p. 1. 4. Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 207– 45. 5. Ibid., p. 236. 6. Quoted in Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2007, p. 7. 7. N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, Book II, Chapter 4. 8. Dominic Lieven, Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000, p. 315. 9. Ronald Grigor Suny, “Learning from Empire: Russia and the Soviet Union,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Lessons of Notes 249

Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. New York: New Press, 2006, pp. 73 and 79. 10. Cited in Timothy Parsons, The Rule of Empires. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 349. 11. Adrian Goldsworthy, The Complete Roman Army. London: Thames and Hud- son, 2003, pp. 418 and 423. 12. Cipolla, Economic Decline, p. 11. 13. Ibid. 14. Quoted in Malcolm Chalmers, Paying for Defence: Military Spending and British Decline. London: Pluto, 1985, p. 13. 15. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback, pp. 11– 12. 16. Niall Ferguson is probably the best example of this, emphasizing the positive role of the British Empire. On this, see Niall Ferguson, Empire. New York: Basic, 2004. 17. For this argument applied to the British Empire, see John Darwin, Unfin- ished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain. New York: Bloomsbury, 2012, pp. 401– 2. 18. Colin Read, The Rise and Fall of an Economic Empire: With Lessons for Aspiring Economies. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 200.

Chapter 8

1. Richard Sylla, quoted in Go, Patterns of Empire, pp. 35– 36. 2. Julian Go, “Imperial Power and Its Limits: America’s Colonial Empire in the Early Twentieth Century,” in Craig Calhoun, Frederick Cooper, and Kevin W. Moore (eds.), Lessons of Empire: Imperial Histories and American Power. New York: New Press, 2006, p. 204. 3. “Americans caused the death of an estimated 250,000 Filipinos in their last true imperial adventure in the early twentieth century without causing much of an outcry.” Michael Mann, “The First Failed Empire of This Century,” in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds.), American Power in the 21st Century. Cambridge: Polity, 2004, p. 74. 4. Michael H. Hunt and Steven I. Levine, Arc of Empire. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012, pp. 4 and 275– 76. 5. On this, see Andrew Gamble, “Hegemony and Decline: Britain and the United States,” in Patrick O’Brien and Armand Cleese (eds.), Two Hegemonies: Brit- ain 1846–1914 and the United States 1941–2001 . Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002, pp. 127– 40. 6. Quoted in Brett Reilly, “Entangled Empires: Europe’s Decolonization and Eisenhower’s System of Subordinate Elites,” in Alfred W. McCoy, Joseph M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (eds.), Endless Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, p. 358. 7. The case against any simple reading of inevitable American decline off its Brit- ish predecessor is most powerfully put by David Lake in “British and American Hegemony Compared: Lessons for the Current Era of Decline,” in Jeffry A. 250 Notes

Frieden and David Lake (eds.), International Political Economy Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth. New York: St Martin’s, 2000, pp. 106– 22. 8. For the Pax America as the external face of a fragile, postwar social structure of accumulation that included an internal capital-labor accord, see David Gor- don, “Chickens Coming Home to Roost,” in M. Bernstein and D. E. Adler (eds.), Understanding American Economic Decline. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1994, pp. 34– 76. 9. Julian Go, Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 127. 10. Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 162. 11. Jack Snyder, “Imperial Temptations,” The National Interest, Spring 2003, pp. 29– 40. 12. Sheldon Pollock, “Empire and Imitation,” in Calhoun et al., Lessons of Empire, p. 186. 13. Snyder lists eight such myths: “the most general of the myths of Empire is that the attacker has an inherent advantage . . . Empires also become over- stretched when they view their enemies as paper tigers, capable of becoming fiercely threatening if appeased, but easily crumpled by a resolute attack . . . Another myth of Empire is that states tend to jump on the bandwagon with threatening or forceful powers . . . A closely related myth is the big stick theory of making friends by threatening them . . . Another common myth of empire is the famous domino theory. According to this conception, small setbacks at the periphery of the empire will tend to snowball into an unstoppable chain of defeats that will ultimately threaten the imperial core . . . Most of the central myths of empire focus on a comparison of the alleged costs of offensive versus defensive strategies. In addition, myths that exaggerate the benefits of imperial expansion sometimes play an important role in strategic debates . . . The final myth of empire is that in strategy there are no trade-offs.” Snyder, “Imperial Temptations.” 14. On this, see Go, Patterns of Empire, p. 207. His alternative formulation is hegemonic ascendancy, maturity and decline. p. xx. 15. The Congressional Budget Office, quoted in Mattea Kramer, “A People’s Budget for Tax Day,” posted on TomDispatch, April 11, 2013: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /post /175686 /tomgram %3A _mattea _kramer, _a _people %27s _budget _for _tax _day. 16. David Gilson, “Don’t Tread on Me,” Mother Jones, January/February 2014, p. 27. 17. David Coates, Models of Capitalism: Growth & Stagnation in the Modern Era. Cambridge: Polity, 2000. pp. 201– 10. 18. David Edgerton, “Liberal Militarism and the British State,” New Left Review, 185, 1991. 19. Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism, cited in Models of Capitalism, p. 204. 20. Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett- Pelier, The U.S. Employment Effects of Mili- tary and Domestic Spending Priorities: 2011 Update. PERI, University of Notes 251

Massachusetts, Amherst, December 2011, p. 3: available at http:// www .peri .umass .edu /236 /hash /0b0ce6af7ff999b11745825d80aca0b8 /publication /489. 21. Aaron B. O’Connell, “The Permanent Militarization of America,” The New York Times, November 5, 2012: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2012 /11 / 05 /opinion /the - permanent - militarization - of - america .html ?pagewanted = all. 22. Robert Pollin and Heidi Garrett- Pelier, “Benefits of a Slimmer Pentagon,” The Nation, May 28, 2012: available at http:// www .thenation .com /authors /robert - pollin. 23. On this, see Rebecca U. Thorpe, The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012. 24. The quote and the company data in detail are in David Vine, “Baseworld Profi- teering,” posted on TomDispatch.com, May 14, 2013: available at http://www .tomdispatch .com /blog /175699. 25. Darren Samuelsohn and Anna Palmer, “Defense Industry Finds Few Old Friends on Hill,” posted on Politico, February 25, 2013: available at http:// www .politico .com /story /2013 /02 /defense -industry -finds -few -old -friends -on - hill - 87991 .html. 26. Chalmers Johnson, Nemesis. New York: Henry Holt, 2006, p. 9. 27. O’Connell, “Permanent Militarization.” 28. Tom Engelhardt, “The Pentagon as a Global NRA,” posted on TomDispatch .com January 13, 2013: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /blog / 175637. 29. The US army remains by far the largest developer of labor skills in the entire American economy. 30. Alfred W. McCoy, “Fatal Florescence,” in Alfred W. McCoy, Joseph M. Fradera, and Stephen Jacobson (eds.), Endless Empire. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012, p. 27. On the murky details, see pp. 26– 31. 31. Robert Scheer, “America’s Global Torture Network,” posted on The Huffing- ton Post, February 8, 2013: available at http://www .truthdig .com /report /item / americas _global _torture _network _20130207. 32. Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition, February 22, 2012: available at http:// www .opensocietyfoundations .org /reports /globalizing - torture - cia - secret - detention - and - extraordinary - rendition. 33. Nick Turse, “The Hidden History of Water Torture,” posted on TomDispatch .com February 24, 2013: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /blog / 175653. 34. Porter, Empire and Superempire, p. 120. 35. Department of Justice White Paper, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed against a U.S. Citizen Who Is a Senior Operational Leader of Al- Qa’ida or an Associated Force, February 2013: available at http:// jolt .law .harvard .edu /digest / national -security /department -of -justice -white -paper -reveals -united -states - position - on -lethal - force - operations - targeting - u - s - citizens - abroad. 36. Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power. New York: Broadway, 2013, p. 246. 252 Notes

37. “Search Results: Iraq,” FreedomHouse: available at http://www .freedomhouse .org /search /Iraq. 38. Mehdi Hasan, “The Hawks Were Wrong: Iraq Is Worse off Now Saddam Is Gone—But at What Cost?,” The New Statesman, February 14, 2013: available at http:// www .newstatesman .com /politics /2013 /02 /hawkswere - wrong - iraq - worse - now. See also Matt Bradley and Ali A. Nabhan, “Violence Reverses Gains In Iraq,” The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2013: available at http:// online .wsj .com /news /articles /SB10001424052702304682504579153773333835510. 39. Gideon Rachman, “The West Has Lost in Afghanistan,” The Financial Times, March 26, 2012: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /ae13198c - 74e1 - 11e1 - ab8b - 00144feab49a .html #axzz2c8QT3bMX. 40. See Scott Shane, “Debate Aside, Number of Drone Strikes Drops Sharply,” The New York Times, May 21, 2013: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2013 /05 / 22 /us /debate - aside - drone - strikes - drop - sharply .html ?pagewanted = all. 41. James Meikle, “Jimmy Carter Savages US Foreign Policy over Drone Strikes,” The Guardian, June 26, 2012: available at http://www .guardian .co .uk /world / 2012 /jun /25 /jimmy - carter - drone - strikes. 42. Ernesto Londoño, “Drones Cause ‘Growing Hatred of America,’ Bipartisan Senate Panel Told,” The Washington Post, April 24, 2013: available at http:// articles .washingtonpost .com /2013 -04 -23 /world /38764755 _1 _drone -strike - drone - program - yemenis. 43. Fred Banfman, “Obama’s Secret Wars: How Our Shady Counter-Terrorism Policies Are More Dangerous Than Terrorism,” posted on AlterNet, July 13, 2013: available at http:// www .alternet .org /story /151596 /obama %27s _secret _wars %3A _how _our _shady _counter - terrorism _policies _are _more _dangerous _than _terrorism. 44. Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. New York: Metropolitan, 2000, p. xvi. 45. For details, see Nick Turse, The Changing Face of Empire: Special Ops, Drones, Spires, Proxy Fighters, Secret Bases, and Cyberwarfare. New York: Haymarket, 2012. 46. For details, see Juan Cole, “The Age of American Shadow Power,” The Nation, April 30, 2012: available at http:// www .thenation .com /article /167353 /age - american - shadow - power. 47. Herfried Münkler, Empires: The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the United States. Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 159. 48. Robert Cox, “Beyond Empire and Terror: Critical Reflections on the Political Economy of World Order,” New Political Economy, 9(3), 2004, pp. 311– 12. 49. For details, see Simon Reich, The Fruits of Fascism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univer- sity Press, 1990, pp. 174– 75. 50. Sam Gindin, “Empire’s Contradictions, Our Weaknesses; The Empire Stum- bles On,” The Bullet, no. 57, September 17, 2007: available at http:// mrzine .monthlyreview .org /2007 /gindin220907p .html. 51. Doug Stokes, “The Heart of Empire? Theorising US Empire in an Era of Trans- national Capitalism,” Third World Quarterly, 26(2), 2005, p. 230. Notes 253

52. Ibid., p. 231. 53. Cox, “Beyond Empire and Terror,” pp. 319– 20. 54. Colin Crouch, “Privatized Keynesianism,” British Journal of Politics and Inter- national Relations, 11(3), 2009, pp. 382– 99. 55. Herman Schwartz, Subprime Nation: American Power, Global Capital and the Housing Bubble. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009, pp. 3– 4. 56. Cox, “Beyond Empire and Terror,” p. 312. 57. Lawrence Summers, “The United States and the Global Adjustment Process,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2004: available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?researchid=200. 58. Helen Thompson, “Debt and Power: The United States in Historical Perspec- tive,” International Relations, 21(3), 2007, p. 316. 59. Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin, “Superintending Global Capital,” New Left Review, 35, September/October, 2005, p. 117. 60. Leo Panitch and Martijn Konings (eds.), American Empire and the Political Economy of Global Finance. Houndmills, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008, p. 39 61. Schwartz, Subprime Nation. 62. See, for example, Vassilis K. Fouskas and Bülent Gŏkay, The Fall of the US Empire. London: Pluto, 2012. 63. John Cassidy, “What Good Is Wall Street?,” The New Yorker, November 29, 2010: available at http:// www .newyorker .com /reporting /2010 /11 /29 / 101129fa _fact _cassidy. 64. Ibid. 65. On this, see David Coates, Answering Back: Liberal Responses to Conservative Arguments. New York: Continuum, 2010, pp. 230–72; and David Coates, Making the Progressive Case: Towards a Stronger U.S. Economy. New York: Con- tinuum, 2011, pp. 160– 88. 66. Heidi Shierholz, Alyssa Davis, and Will Kimball, The Class of 2014. Wash- ington, DC: Economic Policy Institute: available at http:// www .epi .org / publication /class - of - 2014. 67. Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Annual Report 2012, After the Fall: available at http:// www .stlouisfed .org /publications /ar /2012 /pages /ar12 _1 .cfm. 68. Adam Hudson, “The Astonishing Collapse of Black and Latino Household Wealth,” posted on AlterNet, June 3, 2013: available at http:// www .alternet .org / print /economy /black - and - latino - household - wealth - has - collapsed. 69. Details in Robert Kuttner, “The Cost of Financial Favoritism,” The Ameri- can Prospect, March 2012: available at http:// prospect .org /article /cost - financial - favoritism. 70. Nicole Allan, “Where the Money Went,” The Atlantic, April 2013: available at http:// theatlantic .datinggroud .com /magazine /archive /2013 /04 /where - the - money - went /309269. 71. Schwartz, Subprime Nation, p. 18. 72. Didem Tüzemen and Jonathan Willis, “The Vanishing Middle: Job Polarization and Workers’ Response to the Decline in Middle-Skill Jobs,” Federal Reserve 254 Notes

Bank of Kansas, Economic Review, First Quarter 2013: available at http:// www .kc .frb .org /publications /research /er /13q1 .cfm. 73. Peter Beinart, The Icarus Syndrome: A History of American Hubris. New York: Harper, 2010, p. 379. 74. Cited in Ann Laura Stoller, “Imperial Formations and the Opacities of Rule,” in Calhoun et al., Lessons of Empire, p. 57. 75. Cited in Porter, Empire and Superempire, p. 93. 76. Quoted in Morris Berman, Why America Failed. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley, 2012, p. 167. 77. Porter, Empire and Superempire, p. 93. 78. See Pew Research, Public Sees U.S. Power Declining as Support for Global Engage- ment Slips. Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, December 3, 2013: available at http:// www .people - press .org /2013 /12 /03 / public - sees - u - s - power - declining - as - support - for - global - engagement - slips. 79. Hunt and Levine, Arc of Empire, p. 3. As they put it later in the book, “The American public was tolerant of empire at bargain- basement prices. But when the costs started to rise, support began to fall” (p. 258). 80. Beinart, Icarus Syndrome, p. 381. 81. Hunt and Levine, Arc of Empire, p. 278. 82. Beinart, Icarus Syndrome, p. 389. 83. Berman, Why America Failed, p. xii. 84. Chris Hedges, Empire of Illusion: The End of Literacy and the Triumph of Spec- tacle. New York: Nation, 2009, p. 45. 85. On this, see William Astore, “Bread and Circuses in Rome and America,” posted on The Huffington Post, June 10, 2013: available at http://www .huffingtonpost .com /william - astore /bread - and - circuses - in - rom _b _3414248 .html. 86. Kristen Gwynne, “Survey: 48% of Christians Believe Jesus Is Coming Back in Next 40 Years,” posted on AlterNet March 31, 2013: available at http://www .alternet .org /survey - 48 - us - christians - believe - jesus - coming - back - next - 40 - years. 87. Hedges, Empire of Illusion, p. 189. See also his “The Folly of Empire,” posted on NationOfChange, October 15, 2013: available at http:// www .truthdig .com / report /item /the _folly _of _empire _20131014. 88. Morris Berman, The Twilight of American Culture. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000, pp. 19 and 159– 60. 89. Morris Berman, Dark Ages America. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006, p. 2. 90. Ibid., p. 304.

Chapter 9

1. For a parallel argument with an environmental twist, see James Gustave Speth, America the Possible: Manifesto for a New Economy. New Haven, CT: Yale Uni- versity Press, 2012. See also Michael Moran, The Reckoning: Debt, Democracy and the Future of American Power. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 201– 18; and David Coates, Making the Progressive Case. 2. Richard Haass, Foreign Policy Begins at Home. New York: Basic, 2013, p. 1. Notes 255

3. See Gerald F. Seib, “Public Turns Skeptical of Wars,” The Wall Street Jour- nal, September 17, 2013: available at http:// stream .wsj .com /story /syria /SS - 2 - 34182 /SS - 2 - 328768. 4. “McCain Town Hall Erupts With Opposition to Syria Strike,” Fox News Insider, September 6, 2013: available at http:// foxnewsinsider .com /2014 /03 / 10 /john - mccain - arizona - town - hall - erupts - opposition - syria - strike. 5. Barney Frank, “The New Mandate on Defense,” Democracy Journal, Winter, 2013, pp. 50 and 53. 6. Gideon Rachman, “The World Would Miss the American Policeman,” The Financial Times, September 2, 2013: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s / 0 /fdbfa06c - 13ba - 11e3 - 9289 - 00144feabdc0 .html #axzz2gtA00nPg. 7. On this, see Thomas L. Friedman, “It’s Not Just about Obama,” The New York Times, May 3, 2014: available at http:// www .nytimes .com /2014 /05 /04 / opinion /sunday /friedman - its - not - just - about - obama .html? _r = 0. 8. See Mattea Kramer and Miriam Pemberton, “Downsizing the Military Mis- sion, Upsizing the Peacetime One,” posted on TomDispatch, September 19, 2013: available at http:// www .tomdispatch .com /post /175749. 9. See Anthony J. Principi, “Wounded Vets Deserve Better,” The Wall Street Journal, August 29, 2013: available at http:// online .wsj .com /article / SB10001424127887324653004578652600179575338 .html. 10. Bret Stephens, “The Retreat Doctrine,” The Wall Street Journal, May 28, 2013: available at http:// online .wsj .com /article /SB10001424127887323855 804578508984038618290 .html. 11. Eliot Cohen, “American Withdrawal and Global Disorder,” The Wall Street Journal, March 20, 2013: available at http:// online .wsj .com /article / SB10001424127887324196204578300262454939952 .html. 12. In Joseph Lieberman and John Kyl, “The Danger of Repeating the Cycle of American Isolationism,” The Washington Post, April 25, 2013: available at http:// articles .washingtonpost .com /2013 - 04 - 25 /opinions /38817519 _1 _world - war - ii - u - s - aid - retreat. 13. On this, see P. Eric Louw, Roots of the Pax Americana. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2010, pp. 255– 61. 14. On this, see Bernard Porter, Empire and Superempire. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006, p. 170– 71. 15. Dimitri Simes, “America’s Imperial Dilemma,” Foreign Affairs, 82(6), 2003, p. 101. 16. Haass, Foreign Policy, p. 5. 17. Cited in the editorial, “The End of the Perpetual War,” The New York Times, May 23, 2013: available at http:// www .nytimes .com /2013 /05 /24 /opinion / obama - vows - to - end - of - the - perpetual - war .html ?pagewanted = all & _r = 0. 18. These possibilities are well discussed by David Cole, “The End of the War on Terror?,” The New York Review of Books, November 7, 2013, pp. 59– 62: available at http:// www .nybooks .com /articles /archives /2013 /nov /07 /end - war - terror. 256 Notes

19. The full text is available at http:// www .washingtonpost .com /politics /full - text -of -president -obamas -commencement -address -at -west -point /2014 /05 /28 / cfbcdcaa - e670 - 11e3 - afc6 - a1dd9407abcf _story .html. 20. Quoted in Bill Schneider, “Americans Tire of ‘World Police’ Role,” posted on The Huffington Post, September 9, 2013: available at http://www .huffingtonpost .com /bill - schneider /americans - tire - of - world - p _b _3894020 .html. 21. Martin Wolf, “Era of a Diminished Superpower,” The Financial Times, May 15, 2012: available at http:// www .ft .com /intl /cms /s /0 /5e8e3902 - 9db1 - 11e1 - 9a9e - 00144feabdc0 .html #axzz2gtA00nPg. 22. Chalmers Johnson, Dismantling the Empire: America’s Best Last Hope. New York: Henry Holt, 2010, pp. 194– 96. 23. Rachel Maddow, Drift: The Unmooring of American Military Power. New York: Broadway, 2013, pp. 249– 52. 24. Robert F. Worth, “Al Qaeda-Inspired Groups, Minus Goal of Striking U.S.,” The New York Times, October 27, 2012: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2012 /10 /28 /world /middleeast /al -qaeda -inspired -groups -minus -goal -of - striking - us .html ?pagewanted = all. 25. Johnson, Dismantling the Empire, p. 196. 26. Mark Helprin, “America’s Dangerous Rush to Shrink Its Military Power,” The Wall Street Journal, December 27, 2010: available at http://online .wsj .com / article /SB10001424052748703727804576017513713585854 .html. 27. Quote and data from Robin Greenwood and David Scharfstein, “The Growth of Finance,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), Spring 2013, pp. 3– 28. 28. William K. Black, “How the Servant Became a Predator: Finance’s Five Fatal Flaws,” posted on The Huffington Post, October 12, 2009: available at http:// www .huffingtonpost .com /william -k -black /how -the -servant -became -a _b _318010 .html. 29. Ibid. 30. Quoted in Lynn Stuart Parramore, “How Big Finance Crushes Innovation and Holds Back Our Economy,” posted on AlterNet, July 26, 2013: available at http:// www .alternet .org /economy /economy - innovation. 31. Robert J. Shiller, The Best, Brightest and Least Productive?, posted at Project- Syndicate, September 24, 2013: available at http:// www .project - syndicate .org / commentary /the - rent - seeking - problem - in - contemporary - finance - by - robert - j - shiller. 32. Robert Creamer, “The Dominance of the Financial Sector Has Become a Mor- tal Danger to Our Economic Security,” Huffington Post, March 18, 2010: available at http:// www .huffingtonpost .com /robert - creamer /the - dominance - of - the - fina _b _317310 .html. 33. See, for example, Steven Slivinski, The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government Subsidizes U.S. Businesses. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, May 2007: available at http:// www .cato .org /publications /policy - analysis /corporate - welfare - state - how - federal - government - subsidizes - us - businesses. Notes 257

34. Charles Fishman, “The Insourcing Boom,” The Atlantic, March 2013: available at http:// www .theatlantic .com /magazine /archive /2012 /12 /the - insourcing - boom /309166. 35. On this, see Robert J. Gordon, “Is U.S. Economic Growth Over? Faltering Innovation Confronts the Six Headwinds.” NBER Working Paper No. 18315, August 2012: available at http:// www .nber .org /papers /w18315. 36. Michael Elsby, Barry Hobijn, and Ayşegül Şahin, The Decline of the U.S. Labor Share. Washington, DC: Brookings, September 2013: available at http:// www .brookings .edu / ~ /media /Projects /BPEA /Fall %202013 /2013b %20elsby %20labor %20share .pdf. 37. President Obama, speaking in Illinois, July 24, 2013: speech available at http:// www .washingtonpost .com /blogs /wonkblog /wp /2013 /07 /24 /obamas -speech - on - the - economy. 38. Vaclav Smil, Made in the USA: The Rise and Retreat of US Manufacturing. Bos- ton: MIT Press, 2013. 39. See Jackie Calmes and Michael D. Shear, “Interview with President Obama,” The New York Times, July 17, 2013: available at http://www .nytimes .com /2013 / 07 /28 /us /politics /interview - with - president - obama .html ?pagewanted = all. 40. Lydia DePillis, “Mississippians Are the Fattest People in the Nation, and Also Have the Hardest Time Getting Fed,” The Washington Post, September 6, 2013: available at http:// www .washingtonpost .com /blogs /wonkblog /wp /2013 /09 /06 / mississippians - are - the - fattest - people - in - the - nation - and - also - have - the - hardest - time - getting - fed. 41. Howard Schneider, “Americans Are Fat, Stressed, and Unhealthy,” The Wash- ington Post, October 1, 2013: available at http://www .washingtonpost .com / blogs /wonkblog /wp /2013 /10 /01 /americans - are - fat - stressed - and - unhealthy. 42. See Claudio Sanchez, College Board “Concerned” about Low SAT Scores, NPR, September 26, 2013: available at http:// www .npr .org /2013 /09 /26 /226530184 / college - board - concerned - about - low - sat - scores. 43. David Coates, “Laying-off Teachers to Demonstrate How Much They Are Appreciated,” May 12, 2011: available at http://www .davidcoates .net /2011 /05 / 12 /laying - off - teachers - to - demonstrate - how - much - they - are - appreciated. 44. Lee Saunders, “America’s Class War: A Dispatch from the Front,” posted on The Huffington Post, June 20, 2013: available at http://www .huffingtonpost .com /lee - a - saunders /americas - class - war - a - disp _b _3461947 .html. 45. Lawrence Mishel, The CEO- to-Worker Compensation Ratio in 2012 of 273 Was Far above That of the Late 1990s and 14 Times the Ratio of 20:1 in 1965, Eco- nomic Snapshot, Economic Policy Institute, September 24, 2013: available at http://www .epi .org /publication /the - ceo - to - worker - compensation - ratio - in - 2012 - of - 273. 46. Data in Sean McElwee, “Awakening from the American Dream,” posted on The Huffington Post, July 3, 2013: available at http://www .huffingtonpost .com / sean - mcelwee /awakening - from - the - americ _b _3534107 .html. 258 Notes

47. David Coates, “The State of the Union Address – Taking the Longer View,” January 30, 2014: available at http:// www .davidcoates .net /2014 /01 /30 /the - state - of - the - union - address - taking - the - longer - view. 48. C. Wright Mill’s The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956) is still very much in charge in contemporary America. 49. For such a view from a radical perspective, see Morris Berman, Why America Failed: The Roots of Imperial Decline. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2012, pp. 162–63. As he put it earlier, “we are witnessing the suicide of a nation, a nation that hustled itself into the grave.” Ibid., p. 64. Subject Index

Adrianople, Battle of, 57, 59, 85 Bolivia, 83, 100 Afghanistan, 9–13, 15, 35, 39, 75, 107, Bosnia, 75 138, 140, 173, 180–81, 183, 200, Bourbons, Spanish, 93, 96, 100, 101–2 202, 205 Brazil, 16, 115 Algeria, 133 Bread and circuses, 66, 199 American: century, 15; DNA, 35, 46; Bretton Woods, 114 Dream, 22, 194; economic decline, British Empire: imperial mindset, 128– 1, 9, 30–31; Empire, 8, 33–40, 31; liberal militarism, 123–28; loss 45–50, 178; exceptionalism, 1, of, 113–17; loss of manufacturing 7–8; freedom, 29–30; hegemony, dominance, 117–19; retreat from 47, 48; new imperialism, 49; empire, 132–35; rise (economic), power, 183; power (benign), 111–13; rise (military), 110–11; 35–36, 195; power, resentment of, scale (formal), 105–8; scale 183; superempire, 47; superiority, (informal), 108–9; separation of 1, 7–8; supremacy, 1; three industry and finance, 119–23 empires, 46 Brunei, 125 Anti-Corn Law League, 112 Bureaucracy, 58–59, 70, 85–86 Antioch, 67 Burma, 113 Argentina, 100–101, 107, 153 Arms exports, 124–25, 207 Canada, 2, 26, 28, 40, 46, 106, 115, Assassinations, 39, 179 153 Augustan Threshold, 54, 72 Canary Islands, 83–84 Australia, 26, 28, 106 Capital export, 120 Austria, 82, 115, 138 Capital punishment, 31 Authorization to Use Military Force Capitulaciones, 84 Act, 180, 205 Catholic Church, the, 86, 102–3 Catholic Kings, the, 82 BAE Systems, 125, 126 Center-periphery relations, 41, 67–68, Balkans, 11, 50, 148 101 Baltic, 148 Central planning, 152 Bankers, 90–92 Child care, 29 Bases, 10, 38, 48, 125, 206 Chile, 83 Belgium, 115 China, 12, 17–21, 24–25, 27, 30–31, Belize, 125 55, 113, 115, 124–25, 138, 147, Benghazi, 203 153, 172, 184, 187–88, 197, 204, Berlin Wall, 47 211 Blowback, 62, 183 Christianity, 56, 74, 199 260 Subject Index

CIA, 10, 180 Korea), 16, 184, 186; superiority, City, the, 109, 121–23 111–13, 115–16 Civil wars, 57–58 Economy, rebalancing of, 208–14 Class: contradictions of, 71–72; Ecuador, 100 divisions, 193–94; issues of, 70–74 Education, 18–22, 198 Cold War, 16, 47, 145, 181–85, 207 Egypt, 107, 110 Colonial ingratitude, law of, 161–62 Elites, 70, 85 Columbia, 100 Empire: American and, 33–40, 45–50; Comintern, 146–47 borders of, 61; cost of, 1, 78; Commonwealth, the, 114 definition of, 40–45; dialectic Communeros, 87 of, 162; fall of, 44–45, 133; by Communism, 156 franchise, 83; hegemony and, 341; Conquistadores, 83, 99 lessons of, 2, 159–67; question Counter-Reformation, 82, 87, 98 of, 33–50; retreat from, 201–8; Crimea, the, 110, 138–39, 142, 203 varieties of, 42, 43, 45, 48 Crimean War, 139, 142 Encomienda system, 85 Cuba, 81, 102 Enlightened despotism, 102 Culture: arrogance, 31, 99, 128–30, Equality, need for, 214–17 141–42, 166–67, 194–97; Ethnic cleansing, 46, 140 degradation, 76, 77, 78, 97–100, Finance: fragility of, 189–90; growth 197–200; parochialism and, of, 209; need to shrink, 208–10; 134–35, 197; sclerosis of, 164; of regulation of, 201; in UK, 108–11, slavery, 64–65 119–23 Cyprus, 107, 114, 125, 132 Finance and Empire, 90–91, 187–91 Czechoslovakia, 140, 148, 154 Financial arbitrage, 164, 187–88 Financial crisis (2008), 17, 190–91 Debt, 18, 28, 89–93, 187 Financial terror, balance of, 188 Deindustrialization, 24–25, 118–19, Financialization, 188 192–94, 208 Finland, 20, 28, 115, 138–39 Democracy: support for, 179; threat Fiscal-military state (UK), 11–12 to, 178 Flawed Fordism, 118, 123 Denmark, 115 France, 12, 16, 25, 28, 46, 92, 106, Dictatorships, support for, 179 113, 115, 131, 137, 139, 142, 174 Dodd-Frank, 210 Free trade, 131, 186–87 Double lie, the, 147–48, 197 Double standard, 166, 195–96 Gender divisions, 193–94 Drones, 49, 182–83 General Motors, 26–27 Generational change, 22 Economic: backwardness, 142–43, Gentlemanly capitalism, 121–23 150–53; decline, 93–97, 165; Germany: contemporary, 12, 28, 115, development, 67; growth, dash for, 188; East, 148; pre-1945, 53, 82, 143; growth, new model of, 212– 87, 90, 92, 106, 113, 117, 120, 13; miracles, 16; reconstruction 130–31, 144, 146, 150; West, 16, (Germany), 16, 23, 184–85; 50, 184, 204 reconstruction (Japan), 16, 23, Ghana, 114 184, 186; reconstruction (South Gibraltar, 100, 107, 125 Subject Index 261

Glasnost, 155 Isolationism, 205 Governance, problems of, 58–60, Israel, 204–5 162–63 Italy, 16, 63, 67, 90, 106, 117 Grain imports, 67, 95, 153 Guam, 46, 81, 100, 172 Japan, 8, 14, 16, 28, 47, 120, 128, Guatemala, 173 130–31, 144, 173, 184–86, 188, Guerrilla warfare, 86, 132, 181 204 Gun lobby, 203 Jews, expulsion of, 97, 98 Gun ownership, 31 Jihad, 49 Jim Crow, 29 Habsburgs, 82 Hard power, limits of, 161–62, 207 Kenya, 114, 129, 132 Hegemony, 34, 45, 47, 48 Keynesianism, military, 209 Hidalgos, 89 Kosovo, 9 Holland, 106 Kulaks, 152 Hong Kong, 114, 125 Kuwait, 48 Hours worked, 27 Hubris, 31, 99, 128–30, 141–42, Labor: force, 17, 24; movement, 166–7, 194–97 moderation of, 40, 130; power of, Hungary, 82, 138, 140, 148, 154–55 26–30, 40; productivity, 28; skills, Huns, 57 21–22, 213 Labour Party, British, 130 Ideational inertia, 131 Labourism, British, 130 Illness, 27 Landowners, 58, 72, 84–85, 121, Imperial: closure, 198; preference, 121; 140–41, 151 presidency, 163; rationales, 129; Latifundia, 64, 85 trajectories, 160 Latvia, 140 Imperialism, 36–40, 77, 107, 108–11, Lebanon, 9, 173 134, 145, 157 Leninism, 145–46 Incarceration, rates of, 29, 31 Liberalism, classical, 131 Index, the, 98 Liberal militarism, 123–28 India, 16, 21, 27, 55, 106–7, 113, 115, Libya, 39 132, 157, 161 Lie, beautiful, 194–95 Indian Army, 110 Lie, double, 147–48, 198 Indispensable nation, the, 49–50, Life expectancy, 27–28 203–4, 205–6 Liquidationism, 155 Industrial policy, 210–14 Living standards, 65, 73, 149, 152–53 Industrial revolution, the, 112–13 Long eighteenth century, 113, 123–24 Industry ministry, 127–28, 210 Loss of industrial spirit, 130 Inequality, 25, 28, 97, 98 Luxembourg, 115 Institutional rigidities, 117–18, 166 International division of labor, 112 Malaya, 113, 132 International Monetary Fund, 114 Malta, 107 Iran, 31, 107 Malvinas (Falkland Islands), 100, 114, Iraq, 9–10, 12–14, 31, 39, 48–49, 114, 125, 130 173, 181, 183, 200, 202 Managerial capitalism, 118 Ireland, 105–6, 115, 124 Manchuria, 138 262 Subject Index

Manifest Destiny, 45, 194 Nobel Peace Prize, 50 Manufacturing: China and, 22–23; Nomenklatura, 165–66 decline of Castilian, 94–97; Norway, 28 hollowing out of, 25, 122–23; importance of, 25–26, 213–14; Obesity, 27, 213 loss of dominance, 117–19; OECD, 19, 20, 22 strengthening, 208–14; United Opportunity costs, 13, 177 States and, 22–26 Outsourcing, 24, 191–94 Marxism, 145–46, 156 Maternity leave, 29 Pakistan, 11, 39, 49 Mesta, 93, 95 Path dependency, 103 Mexico, 24, 27, 46, 83, 86, 100, 102, Patriot Act, 180 188 Pax Americana, 75 Middle class, 27–28, 75, 98–99, 208 Pax Britannica, 123 Military: bases, 10, 38, 48, 125, Pax Romana, 61, 71, 73, 75 206; casualties, 13–14, 89; Perestroika, 155 composition of, 60–61, 74, Permanent revolution, theory of, 89; control of, 60–62, 162–63; 145–46 cost of, 11–15, 87–93, 148–50; Persian Gulf, 9, 107 footprint, 9–11; multiplier and, Peru, 86 176; privatization and, 11; R&D, Philippines, 36, 46, 81, 100, 172–73 14, 125–26; size of, 9–10, 60, Pied-noirs, 132 70, 91, 141; spending on, 12, PISA, 19–20 175–76, 208; success of, 14–15, Plague, 94 180–81; superiority of, 15–16, Poverty, 28–29, 214–17 86, 88–89; technology and, 14, 176–77, 181 Preoccupied state, the, 183–87 Military-industrial complex, 127–28, Principate, 54, 83 141, 176–77, 178, 203 Prisons, secret, 10 Minimum wage, 29 Proprietary capitalism, 118 Monarchy, 54, 85, 81–83, 93, 96, 100, Prussia, 138 101–2, 105 Poland, 138, 140, 148, 154–55 Moriscos, 97 Portugal, 82–83, 96, 137 Multinational corporations, 24, Puerto Rico, 46, 81, 100, 172 186–87, 191–94 Punic Wars, 53 Pushback, 110, 132–33, 140, 148, 154, NAFTA, 24, 114 161, 180–83 NATO, 47 Navy, 110, 123–24 Racial divisions, 193–94 Nazi-Soviet Pact, 146 Racism, 99, 107 Neoconservatives, 48–49 Reagan era, 26–27 Netherlands, 90, 115 Reaping machine, 65 New class, the, 148 Red Army, 139, 146 New Labour, 126 Reformation, the, 82, 98 New Zealand, 28, 106 Reform from above, 142–43 Nigeria, 157 Rendition, 10 Subject Index 263

Research and development, 14, 23, 24, 148, 154; rise of empire, 139–40, 125–26 144–48 Rhodesia, 114 Spanish Empire: culture of, 97–100; Rome: armies, brutality of, 61–62, 76; economic underpinnings, 93–97; armies, changing composition of, finances of, 89–93; last rites of, 61; armies, size of, 68; civil wars, 100–103; longevity of, 84–86; 57–58; class and culture, 70–74; military and, 87–89; rise of, 82–84 debate on, 55–58; division of, Spark, theory of, 145–46 59–60; fall of Republic, 54, 167; Sri Lanka, 42 fiscal crisis, 66–67; parallels to Stagnation, the great, 23 United States, 74–79; problems State, fiscal crisis of, 66–70, 164 of governance, 58–60; sack of, STEM graduates, 20–21 55; slave-based economy, 62–66; Stolypin reforms, 152 western empire, 53–55 Subempires, 107–8, 134 Russian empire, 137–39, 140–42, Sudan, 107 151–52 Sweden, 28, 115, 216 Switzerland, 28 Syria, 53, 206 Samoa, 46, 172 Sardinia, 82 Taxation, 68, 69–70, 78, 89–93, 96 Scotland, 18, 105–6 Technology, 64–65, 67, 75 Second serfdom, the, 140–41, 151 Tercio, 88 Serfdom, abolition of, 142–43 Tertiary sector, 96 Settler colonialism, logic of, 103, 132 Textile industry, 24–25 Sheep farming, 93–94 Thatcher, contribution to world peace, Siberia, 139 52, 80, 104, 136, 168, 170 Sicily, 63, 82 Torture, 10, 129, 179 Silence of Pizarro, 99 Trade deficit, 17, 18, 24, 119 Silver, 83–84, 86, 90, 95 Singapore, 125 Ukraine, 139 Slave-based economies, problems of, Unemployment, 18, 190–91 62–66 United Kingdom, construction of, Slave rebellions, 72 105–6 Socialism in one country, 146 Urbanization, 66 Social mobility, 2, 28, 216 Utrecht, Treaty of, 88 Soft power, 207–8 Somalia, 9, 11, 35, 39, 173 V2 Rockets, 182 South Africa, 106, 110 Venezuela, 101 South Korea, 9, 16, 50, 172–73, 180, Versailles, Congress of, 139 184–86, 204 Vietnam, 9, 36, 48, 172–73, 176, 180 South Yemen, 11, 39, 49 Visigoths, 56, 57 Soviet Union: collapse of, 16, 38; crisis of legitimacy, 154–57, 158; Wages: increase in, 211–12, 216–17; in economic backwardness and, manufacturing, 25–26; Roman, 150–51, 152–53; military burden 64; in United States, 17, 20, and, 148–50; pushback, 140, 26–27, 187, 193 264 Subject Index

Wales, 105–6 Welfare provision, 29 Wall Street, 189–91 Westphalia, Treaty of, 88, 161 Walmart effect, 26, 208, 212 West Point, 205–6 War on poverty, 28 White dominions, the, 106 War on terror, 205 Winners curse, the, 44–45, 117, 167 Wars, 9, 48–49, 87–88, 110, 180, 181 Working class, 28, 149 Water mill, 65 Workshop of the world, the, 113 Name Index

Alexander I, 138, 141 Carville, James, 115 Allende, Salvador, 179 Cassidy, John, 189–90 Anderson, Perry, 38, 64, 65, 67, 89, Catherine II, 141 110, 121 Catherine the Great, 138 Attwood, Paul, 38 Chamberlain, Joseph, 122 Augustus, 54, 58 Charles III, 102 Charles V, 82, 87, 89–91, 93 Bacevich, Andrew, 38–39, 49 Cheney, Dick, 195 Barboni, Aurelio, 73 Chomsky, Noam, 38 Barnett, Corelli, 116, 128, 130–31 Chua, Amy, 73–74 Beinart, Peter, 194, 196–97 Churchill, Winston, 114, 116 Bello, Walden, 38 Cipolla, Carlo, 160, 166 Berger, Sandy, 33 Clinton, Hilary, 49 Berman, Morris, 77, 200 Cohen, Elliott, 37, 204 Bin Laden, Osama, 8–9, 38, 179–80, Columbus, Christopher, 82, 99 207 Constantine, 55, 66, 69 Blair, Tony, 114, 129, 194 Cooper, Frederick, 43, 159 Blank, Stephen, 127 Córdoba, Gonzalo de, 88 Blundell, Michael, 163 Cortés, 83, 86, 101–2 Bonaparte, Louis-Napoléon (Napoléon Cowen, Tyler, 23 III), 135 Cox, Michael, 36–37 Bonaparte, Napoléon, 87, 100, 112, 138, 161 Cox, Robert, 75, 183, 187 Boot, Max, 34–35 Creamer, Robert, 210 Branfman, Fred, 182 Cromwell, Oliver, 88 Bremmer, Paul, 49 Crouch, Colin, 187 Brezhnev, Leonard, 155–56 Crowley, Ambrose, 124 Brown, Gordon, 130 Burbank, Jane, 43, 159 Darwin, John, 86–87, 107–9, 113, 124, Bush, George Herbert, 195 139–40, 159 Bush, George W., 10, 37, 38, 114, Davis, Ralph, 87, 94 180–81, 195 Demandt, Alexander, 56 De Witte, Sergei, 143, 149 Cable, Vince, 127 Diocletian, 55, 59, 66, 69–70 Cain, P. J., 121–22, 160 Dostoyevsky, Fyodor Mikhailovich, 142 Caracalla, Emperor, 71 Doyle, Michael, 40–41, 44, 54, 62–63, Carter, Jimmy, 182 72–73, 85, 99, 159 266 Name Index

Edgerton, David, 123, 177 Ignatieff, Michael, 36–37 Edward VII, 105 Isabella, Queen of Castile, 82, 84, 88, Eisenhower, Dwight, 173, 177–78 98, 102 Elbaum, Bernard, 117 Ivan the Terrible, 138 Elliott, Sir John, 90–91, 93, 98, 101, 164 James, Simon, 54, 61–62, 71–72, Engelhardt, Tom, 38 76–77 Jefferson, Thomas, 100, 198 Ferdinand, King of Aragon, 82, 84, 88, Joffe, Josef, 34–35 98, 102 Johnson, Chalmers, 38, 48, 76–77, Ferguson, Niall, 37, 44, 77 129, 133, 158, 166, 178, 182, Franklin, Benjamin, 2 196, 207 Friedman, Howard, 31 Johnson, Lyndon, 28

Gaidar, Yegor, 92, 153 Kagan, Kimberly, 75 Galtung, Johan, 64 Kagan, Robert, 30–31, 35–36, 39 Gamble, Andrew, 115, 128 Kamen, Henry, 89, 92, 99, 167 Garrett-Peltier, Heidi, 177 Kennedy, Paul, 77, 89–90, 92, 111, George V, 105 125, 138, 143, 150, 153 Khrushchev, Nikita, 154–56 Gerschenkron, Alexander, 117 Konings, Martijn, 77 Gersemann, Olaf, 8 Kotkin, Stephen, 152–53, 156 Gibbons, Edward, 56–57, 159 Krauthammer, Charles, 30 Gindin, Sam, 39–40, 188–89, 191 Kyl, Jon, 204 Gingrich, Newt, 8 Go, Julian, 44, 160, 173–74 Landers, Brian, 157 Godunov, Boris, 138 Lazonick, William, 117 Goldsworthy, Adrian, 57–58, 60, 68, Lenin, Vladimir, 146–47, 156 75–76, 166 Lieberman, Joseph, 204 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 153, 155–58, 163 Lieven, Dominic, 139, 141, 155, Gordon, Robert J., 211 157–58, 161 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 7–8 Haass, Richard, 201, 205 Levine, Stephen, 36, 173 Hadrian, 54 Louis XIV, 87 Hamilton, Earl J., 94, 103 Louw, P. Eric, 46 Hardt, Michael, 39 Haywood, Richard Mansfield, 58, 69 Mabee, Bryan, 37 Heather, Peter, 57–58 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 161 Hedges, Chris, 199 Macmillan, Harold, 114 Helprin, Mark, 208 Madden, Thomas, 8, 34–35, 76–77 Hitler, Adolf, 182 Maddow, Rachel, 11, 180, 207 Hobson, J. A., 106 Magdoff, Harry, 38 Hopkins, A. G., 121–22, 160 Maier, Charles, 40–41, 67–68, 159 Hoskins, Geoffrey, 42 Mann, Michael, 38 Hunt, Michael, 36, 173 Marquand, David, 131 Hurrell, Andrew, 34 Marx, Karl, 135 Hussein, Saddam, 48, 180–81, 196 McCain, John, 202 Name Index 267

McCoy, Alfred, 15 Said, Edward, 195 McNally, Terrence, 39 Saunders, Lee, 216 Mitchell, Lawrence, 209 Scheer, Robert, 179 Mitchell, Stephen, 59 Schiavone, Aldo, 63–64, 66, 68 Motyl, Alexander, 41, 44 Schiller, Robert, 209 Münkler, Herfried, 43–44, 159 Schlesinger, Arthur, 36 Murphy, Cullen, 58, 76, 78 Schott, Peter K., 25 Schwartz, Herman, 187, 189, 191–92 Negri, Antonio, 39 Seeley, J. R., 37 Nelson, Lord, 100, 124 Simms, Brendan, 138 Nicholas II, 138 Simon, William, 216 Nove, Alec, 155–57 Smil, Vaclav, 74–75 Smith, Tony, 49 Obama, Barack, 10, 38, 50, 179, 206, Snyder, Jack, 174 212, 214 Spartacus, 72 Olivares, Count, 96 Stalin, Joseph, 139, 149–50, 156, 158 Steinmetz, George, 41, 45 Palin, Sarah, 154 Stephens, Bret, 203 Panitch, Leo, 39–40, 188–89, 191 Stokes, Doug, 48, 185 Parsons, Timothy, 83 Stone, Oliver, 38 Perot, Ross, 24 Strange, Susan, 77 Peter the Great, 138, 139 Summers, Lawrence, 188 Phillip II, 82, 87–93, 97 Suny, Ronald Grigor, 162 Phillip III, 97 Phillip of Burgundy, 82 Talleyrand, Charles-Maurice de, 161 Pierce, Justin R., 25 Thatcher, Margaret, 114 Piganoil, André, 57 Thayer, Bradley, 34–35 Pirenne, Henri, 55 Theodosius I, 59 Pizarro, 83, 99 Thompson, Helen, 92 Pollin, Robert, 177 Todorov, Tzvetan, 99 Pollock, Sheldon, 174 Trotsky, Leon, 145–46, 151 Porter, Bernard, 47, 106, 133–34, 174, 179 Valens, 59, 70 Pushkin, Alexander, 158 Walbank, F. W., 65 Rachman, Gideon, 181 Washington, George, 183 Read, Colin, 44, 117, 167 Weber, Max, 59 Reagan, Ronald, 2, 26–28, 195 Weiner, Martin, 130–31 Rhodes, Benjamin, 206 Romulus Augustus, 55 Yeltsin, Boris, 153 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 213 Rumsfeld, Donald, 2, 33, 181 Zakaria, Fareed, 20