DOCSLIB.ORG

Notes to the Introduction 1. Chalmers Johnson, the Industrial Policy Debate

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Notes to the Introduction 1. Chalmers Johnson, the Industrial Policy Debate Notes Notes to the Introduction 1. Chalmers Johnson, The Industrial Policy Debate (San Francisco, Cal.: Institute of Contemporary Studies, 1984), p. 2. 2. Stuart Bruchey, Enterprise: The Dynamic Economy of a Free People (Cam- bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 208. 3. B. Guy Peters, American Public Policy: Promise and Performance (Chatham, r-u: Chatham House, 1993), pp.174-5. 4. Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations (New York: Dutton, 1964). 5. David Ricardo, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (Lon- don: Dent, 1973). For contemporary neoclassical economists, see: Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962); Jagdish Bhagwati, Lectures: International Trade (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1983); Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988); Jagdish Bhagwati and Hugh Patrick (eds), Aggressive Unilateralism (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1990); Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991). 6. Quoted in Stephen Bailey, Congress Makes a Law (New York: Colum- bia University Press, 1950), p. 6. 7. John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936). 8. Robert Kuttner, "Economists Really Should Get Out More Often," Business Week, April 24, 1989; Clyde Prestowitz, Alan Tonelson, and Robert Jerome, "The Last Gasp of GATTism," Harvard Business Re- view, March-April 1991, p. 134; Laura D'Andrea Tyson, Who's Bash- ing Whom? Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1992), p. 3. 9. John Frendreis and Raymond Tatalovich, The Modern Presidency and Economic Policy (Itasca, IL.: F. E. Peacock Press, 1994), p. 170. 10. Robert B. Reich, The Next American Frontier (New York: Times Books, 1983), p. 233. 11. Johnson, Industrial Policy, p. 8. 12. Quoted in Johnson, ibid., p. 18. 13. Martin and Susan Tolchin, Selling our Security: The Erosion of America's Assets (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992). 14. For discussions of strategic trade theory, see: Paul Krugman, "New Theories of Trade among Industrial Countries," American Economic Review, 73, May 1983; R. W. Jones (ed.), International Trade: Surveys of Theory and Policy (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1986); Klaus Stegemann, "Policy Rivalry among Industrial States: What Can We Learn from Models of Strategic Trade Policy," International Organiza- tion, 43: 1 (Winter 1989); Helen V. Milner and David B. Yoffie, 241 242 Notes "Between Free Trade and Protectionism: Strategic Trade Policy and a Theory of Corporate Trade Demands," International Organization, 43: 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 239-73. 15. Tyson, Who's Bashing Whom? (Washington, DC: Institute for Interna- tional Economics, 1992), p. 250. 16. "Report and Recommendations of the Senate Republican Task Force on Industrial Competitiveness and International Trade," March 16, 1983, p. 1. 17. US Congress, House Energy and Commerce Committee," Report on HR 4360, reprinted as House Report 98-697, part 2, p. 23, quoted in Robert W. Russell, "Congress and the Proposed Industrial Policy Struc- tures," in Claude Barfield and William Schambra (eds), The Politics of Industrial Policy (Washington, DC: American Enterprise, 1986), pp. 319, 324. Notes to Chapter 1: Steel and Automobiles 1. Paul A. Tiffany, The Decline of American Steel: How Management, Labor, and Government Went Wrong (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 117. 2. William T. Hogan, Economic History of the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, 5 vols (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971); Kenneth Warren, The American Steel Industry, 1950-1970, A Geographical Inter- pretation (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Robert W. Crandall, The US Steel Industry in Recurrent Crisis (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1981); Donald F. Barnett and Louis Schorsch, Steel, Upheaval in a Basic Industry (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1983); William Scheurman, The Steel Crisis: The Economics and Politics of a Declining Industry (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986). 3. "Impromptu Remarks of the President," in AISI Yearbook, 1925 (New York: AISI, 1925), p. 222. 4. Tiffany, Decline of American Steel, p. 85. 5. Edward N. Hurley, "Cooperation and Efficiency in Developing our Foreign Trade," in AISI Yearbook, 1916 (New York: AISI, 1916), p. 192. 6. Gerald T. White, Billions for Defense: Government Financing by the Defense Plant Corporation during World War II (University of Alabama Press, 1980); Richard A. Lauderbaugh, American Steel Makers and the Coming of the Second World War (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Research Press, 1980), pp. 123-4. In 1945, Washington sold off its steel plants to private industry at a fraction of its costs. 7. AlSI, Annual Statistical Report (cited years); Duncan Burn, The Steel Industry, 1939-1959 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), p. 132. 8. AISI, Annual Statistical Report (cited years). 9. The Statistical History of the United States: From Colonial Times to the Notes 243 Present (New York: Basic Books, 1976; Series D 970-85), p. 179. 10. US Senate, 90th Congr., 1st Sess., Committee on Finance, Commit- tee Print, Steel Imports (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 299-304; Gerald Manners, The Changing World Market for Iron Ore, 1950-1980 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 99. See also, Robert A. Pollard, European Security and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-1950 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985); William Lockwood, The Economic Development ofjapan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1954), pp. 64-77; Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982); William S. Borden, The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Trade Recovery, 1947-1955 (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984), pp. 176-87; David A. Baldwin, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger, 1966). 11. AISI, Annual Statistical Report (cited years). 12. Otto Eckstein and Gary Fromm, "Steel and Postwar Inflation," Study Paper No.2, US Congress, JEC, 86th Congr., 1st Sess., Materials Pre- pared in Connection with the Study of Employment, Growth, and Prices Levels (Washington, DC: Governing Printing Office, 1959); Bureau of Labor Statistics, US Congress, JEC, 88th Congr., 1st Sess., Hear- ings, Steel Prices, Unit Costs, and Foreign Competition (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 35. 13. Walter Adams, "The Steel Industry," in Walter Adams (ed.), The Struc- ture of American Industry, 5th edn (New York: Macmillan, 1977), p. 1l0. 14. Walter Adams and J. B. Dirlam, "Big Steel, Invention and Innova- tion," QJl-arterlyJoumal of Economics, 80 (May 1966), pp. 167-89; Edwin Mansfield, Industrial Research and Technological Innovation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1968), pp. 83-108; Tiffany, Decline of American Stee~ p. 133. 15. US Steel Corporation, Steel and Inflation, Fact vs. Fiction (New York: US Steel Corporation, 1958), pp. 181-5; Manners, Changing World Market for Iron Ore, pp. 24-5. 16. US Congress, JEC, 88th Congress, 1st Sess., Hearings, Steel Prices, Unit Costs, Profits, and Foreign Competition (Washington, DC: Govern- ment Printing Office, 1963), PP. 124-5. 17. Robert Crandall, "Investment and Productivity Growth in the Steel Industry: Some Implications for Industrial Policy," in Walter H. Goldberg (ed.), Ailing Steel: The Transatlantic (btaTTel (New York: St Martin's Press, 1986), p. 193. 18. Tiffany, Decline of American Stee~ p. 116. 19. AISI, Annual Statistical Reports (1965), p. 8. 20. AISI, Annual Statistical Reports (1970); Barnett and Schorsch, Steel, Upheaval in a Basic Industry. 21. Thomas R. Howell et al., Steel and the State: Government's Intervention and Steel's Structural Crisis (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp.502-3. 22. Howell, ibid., p. 503. 244 Notes 23. John Holusha, "Why American Steel is Big Again," New York Times, July 21, 1994. 24. Jonathan Hinks, "A Comeback for Big Steel in the US," New York Times, March 31, 1992; John Holusha, "Steel Mini-Mills could Bring Boon or Blood Bath," New York Times, May 30, 1995; John Holusha, "Big Steelmakers Shape Up," New York Times, April 16, 1996. 25. John Rae, The American Automobile Industry (Boston: Twayne, 1984), pp. 18, 17. 26. US Federal Trade Commission, Report on the Motor Vehicle Industry (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939), pp. 29, 632. 27. Mira Wilkins, "Multinational Automobile Enterprises and Regulation: An Historical Overview," in Douglas H. Ginsberg and William J. Abernathy (eds), Government, Technology, and the Future of the Ameri- can Automobile (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 224-8. 28. Robert Thomas, An Analysis of the Pattern of Growth in the Automobile Industry (New York: Ayer, 1977), p. 324; see also, Rae, American Auto- mobile Industry, pp. 61, 63, 69; Harold C. Katz, The Decline of Competi- tion in the Autombile Industry, 1920-1940 (New York: Arno Press, 1977). 29. Sydney Fine, The Automobile under the Blue Label (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 19. 30. Freedom's Arsenal: The Story of the Automotive Council for War Production (Detroit: Automobile Manufacturers Association, 1950), p. 193. 31. Rae, American Automobile Industry, p. 96. 32. See William Nester, Japanese Industrial Targeting: The Neomercantilist Path to Economic Superpower (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), pp.99-118. 33. Rae, American Automobile Industy,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • America's Empire of Bases
    Volume 1 | Issue 5 | Article ID 2029 | May 23, 2003 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus America's Empire of Bases Chalmers Johnson America's Empire of Bases weapons for the armed forces or, like the now well-publicized Kellogg, Brown & Root by Chalmers Johnson company, a subsidiary of the Halliburton Corporation of Houston, undertake contract As distinct from other peoples, most Americans services to build and maintain our far-flung do not recognize -- or do not want to recognize outposts. One task of such contractors is to -- that the United States dominates the world keep uniformed members of the imperium through its military power. Due to government housed in comfortable quarters, well fed, secrecy, our citizens are often ignorant of the amused, and supplied with enjoyable, fact that our garrisons encircle the planet. This affordable vacation facilities. Whole sectors of vast network of American bases on every the American economy have come to rely on continent except Antarctica actually constitutes the military for sales. On the eve of our second a new form of empire -- an empire of bases with war on Iraq, for example, while the Defense its own geography not likely to be taught in any Department was ordering up an extra ration of high school geography class. Without grasping cruise missiles and depleted-uranium armor- the dimensions of this globe-girdlingpiercing tank shells, it also acquired 273,000 Baseworld, one can't begin to understand the bottles of Native Tan sunblock, almost triple its size and nature of our imperial aspirations or 1999 order and undoubtedly a boon to the the degree to which a new kind of militarism is supplier, Control Supply Company of Tulsa, undermining our constitutional order.
    [Show full text]
  • European Journal of American Studies, 2-2 | 2007 Taking up the White Man’S Burden? American Empire and the Question of History 2
    European journal of American studies 2-2 | 2007 Autumn 2007 Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History Johan Höglund Electronic version URL: https://journals.openedition.org/ejas/1542 DOI: 10.4000/ejas.1542 ISSN: 1991-9336 Publisher European Association for American Studies Electronic reference Johan Höglund, “Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History”, European journal of American studies [Online], 2-2 | 2007, document 5, Online since 14 December 2007, connection on 08 July 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/ejas/1542 ; DOI: https://doi.org/ 10.4000/ejas.1542 This text was automatically generated on 8 July 2021. Creative Commons License Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History 1 Taking up the White Man’s Burden? American Empire and the Question of History Johan Höglund 1. Introduction 1 If Britain obtained its empire in ''a fit of absence of mind,'' as Sir John Seeley once remarked,1 the United States has acquired its empire in a state of deep denial, or so Michael Ignatieff argued in an article from 2003.2 It would seem that this denial characterizes large portions of the American public and most members of the current Presidential administration. However, an increasing number of political and historical writers and journalists have begun to discuss the notion that the United States may, after all, resemble a traditional empire.3 2 The two Bush administrations have been forced to react to this notion on a number of occasions.
    [Show full text]
  • Models of the Developmental State
    Models of the developmental state Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira Abstract This paper seeks to understand the developmental state and its historical role in industrial revolutions and afterwards. First, the developmental state is defined as an alternative to the liberal state. Second, it is argued that industrial revolutions have always taken place within the framework of a developmental state. Third, four models of developmental states are defined according to the point in time at which the industrial revolution took place and the central or peripheral character of the country. Fourth, the paper describes how the state withdraws partially from the economy after the industrial revolution, but the developmental state continues to have a major role in directing industrial policy and in conducting an active macroeconomic policy. Keywords Public administration, economic planning, macroeconomics, liberalism, nationalism, economic policy, economic development JEL classification O10, O11, O19 Author Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira is an Emeritus Professor with the Department of Economics of the Sao Paulo School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation, Brazil. Email: [email protected]. 36 CEPAL Review N° 128 • August 2019 I. Introduction In the 1950s, Brazilian political scientists and economists identified “developmentalism” as a set of political ideas and economic strategies that drove Brazil’s rapid industrialization and underpinned the coalition of social classes identified with national development. Hélio Jaguaribe (1962, p. 208) stated in the early 1960s that “the core thesis of developmentalism is that the promotion of economic development and the consolidation of nationality stand as two correlated aspects of a single emancipatory process”. Through “national developmentalism”, which would become the established term for the country’s development strategy, Brazilian society was successfully overcoming the patrimonial state that characterized its politics until 1930.
    [Show full text]
  • Models of Developmental State
    1 Working 426 Setembro de 2016 Paper Models of developmental state Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira Os artigos dos Textos para Discussão da Escola de Economia de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas são de inteira responsabilidade dos autores e não refletem necessariamente a opinião da FGV-EESP. É permitida a reprodução total ou parcial dos artigos, desde que creditada a fonte. Escola de Economia de São Paulo da Fundação Getulio Vargas FGV-EESP www.eesp.fgv.br TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 426 • SETEMBRO DE 2016 • 1 Models of developmental state Luiz Carlos Bresser-Pereira July 2016. Abstract. This paper searches to understand the developmental state and its historical role in the industrial revolution and after it. First, the developmental state is defined as an alternative to the liberal state. Second, it was in the framework of a developmental state that industrial revolutions took place, and four models of developmental state are defined. Third, after the industrial revolution, the state withdraws partially from the economy, but the developmental state continues to have a major role in assuring the general conditions that make competitive the competent business enterprises in each country – in conducing an active macroeconomic policy, particularly an exchange rate policy, in coordinating the non-competitive industries, and in conducing strategic industrial and technological policy. The paper concludes by comparing developmentalism with nationalism. Key words: Developmental state, developmentalism, economic liberalism, nationalism Resumo. Este artigo busca compreender o Estado desenvolvimentista e seu papel histórico na revolução industrial e depois dela. Em primeiro lugar, o Estado desenvolvimentista é definido como uma alternativa para o Estado liberal.
    [Show full text]
  • Recent U.S. Foreign Policy
    Recent U.S. Foreign Policy Two takes on “Empire” Bacevich – Take One American Empire from the End of the Cold War to 9/11 • “Globalization “Is” the international system that replaced the Cold War • The “desired” NSC-68 state of affairs – US economic (dollar), cultural, military and political “hegemony • The sense of “unlimited opportunities – a new global order • Claim – US policy derived from “American Exceptionalism • No to power politics ---to achieve values • No to War -- use force in measured amounts • No to limits -- Resources were no constraint The 1991 Gulf War • The War to establish a new world order – get rid of tyrants and demonstrate US military superiority --- dissuade challengers and get those not in line with the new world order in line • War a military success but little else • New problems brewing and old ones lingering • War lords (Somalia) • Terrorism (bin Laden) • Tyrants (Iraq, N. Korea, Serbia) • Revolutionary regimes (Iran) • Destabilized old empire (Russia) • Ethnic conflicts ((Rwanda, Congo, Bosnia) • As a result in the 90s the US ended up using military force more and less Gunboats and Gurkhas – the militarization of US Foreign Policy • Note our claim is that of course gunboats and gurkhas is nothing new and the militarization of US FP started long ago • Bacevich argues that in the 90s US force was heavily used (Yes) -- in Albrights language “the indispensible nation” -- but puts Somalia – low to no causalities and play to US military strengths • Gunboats – cruise missiles and precision munitions (Iraq, Bosnia,
    [Show full text]
  • A Socialist, Feminist, and Anti-Racist Journal on the Theory
    ISSN: 1941-0832 Unpacking the Invisible Military Backpack: 56 Suggestions for Teaching about War by David Vine “KIMBERLY RIVERA” BY MAZATL. WAR IS TRAUMA IS A PORTFOLIO OF HANDMADE PRINTS PRODUCED BY THE JUSTSEEDS ARTISTS’ COOPERATIVE IN COLLABORATION WITH THE IRAQ VETERANS AGAINST THE WAR (IVAW). RADICAL TEACHER 12 http://radicalteacher.library.pitt.edu No. 117 (Summer 2020) DOI 10.5195/rt.2020.791 e’ve failed in teaching about war. Anyone who military-style backpacks, flyovers, and camouflage linked to teaches in the United States must acknowledge the 3.1 million or more who may have died in the ongoing W that we’ve failed to teach about war broadly wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Pakistan, and Yemen, enough, consistently enough, and with the sense of urgency alone?7 demanded by the death, injury, and destruction that nearly While my aim is not to overstretch the invisible two decades of continuous U.S. warfare have inflicted. backpack metaphor, the ability to live one’s life with little There are many reasons that there’s relatively little awareness of the Post-9/11 Wars while others suffer the public awareness about the wars the U.S. military has been daily effects of those wars is a privilege. War and the waging since shortly after September 11, 2001. The lack of political, economic, and sociocultural processes that make a draft or tax increases to pay for the Post-9/11 Wars, war possible are invisible to most U.S. Americans. Because limited media coverage, and government propaganda and war and militarization are, as anthropologist Catherine Lutz lies1 about the wars have played roles in making the conflicts says, “hidden in plain sight,” educators can help make war nearly invisible to most in the United States.
    [Show full text]
  • The Banality of American Empire: the Curious Case of Guam, USA
    The Banality of American Empire: The Curious Case of Guam, USA MICHAEL LUJAN BEVACQUA, University of Guam MANUEL LUJAN CRUZ, Auckland University of Technology The headline of a 2004 New York Times article sums up well the curious existence of the island of Guam: “Looking for Friendly Base Overseas, Pentagon Finds It Already Has One.”1 Guam (Indigenous Chamoru name Guåhan), known as the “tip of America’s spear,” has played a crucial role in securing US strategic interests in the Asia Pacific region for more than a century. Guam is also one of only seventeen remaining coun- tries in the world that are recognized by the United Nations as colonies in need of decolonization. However, in media representations and critical discourse around US imperialism, Guam still occupies a paradoxical space both as a US military colony left over from the Victorian era that somehow does not signify colonialism or imperialism, and as a crucial military strategic partner that nevertheless remains invisible, or, worse, hypervisible, within US geopolitical imaginings. The island’s convoluted coloniality is thinly veiled by its status as an “unincorporated territory” of the US, as its citizens nominally benefit from many, though not all, privileges of US citizenship, while being denied any actual political power in Washington, DC, as well as in terms of their own immigration and borders. Further, as the so-called tip of America’s spear, the island is propagandized both internally and externally as being on the front lines of democracy, liberty, and freedom. Guam’s obscurity can be challenged by the concept of banality, which describes Guam’s paradoxical status and the investment of imperial power in erasing its signifi- cance on the world stage.
    [Show full text]
  • US Nation-Building in Afghanistan
    US Nation-Building in Afghanistan CONOR KEANE US Nation-Building in Afghanistan Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conlicts inside the US state. This book rectiies this weakness in commentary on Afghani- stan by exploring the signiicant role of these divisions in the US’s dificulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers’ understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush administration. It rejects the ‘rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions. Dr Conor Keane has degrees in law and politics, and a doctorate on nation- building in Afghanistan from Macquarie University. His research interests include counter terrorism, state building, bureaucratic politics and US foreign policy. He has published several articles on these topics in journals such as Armed Forces & Society and International Peacekeeping. US Nation-Building in Afghanistan Conor Keane First published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2016 Conor Keane The right of Conor Keane to be identiied as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
    [Show full text]
  • USF Center for the Pacific Rim
    Copyright 1988 -2005 USF Center for the Pacific Rim The Occasional Paper Series of the USF Center for the Pacific Rim :: www.pacificrim.usfca.edu Pacific Rim Report No. 11, September 1999 Why the U.S. - Japan Security Treaty is in Trouble by Chalmers Johnson, Ph.D. In this issue of Pacific Rim Report we are pleased to provide the text of a public talk given by Chalmers Johnson at the USF Center for the Pacific Rim on 23 Septermber 1999. Chalmers Johnson is president of the Japan Policy Research Institute, a non-profit research and public affairs organization devoted to public education concerning Japan and international relations in the Pacific. He taught for thirty years, 1962-1992, at the Berkeley and San Diego campuses of the University of California and held endowed chairs in Asian politics at both of them. At Berkeley he served as chairman of the Center for Chinese Studies and as chairman of the Department of Political Science. His B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. degrees in economics and political science are all from the University of California, Berkeley. He first visited Japan in 1953 as a U.S. Navy officer and has lived and worked there with his wife, the anthropologist Sheila K. Johnson, virtually every year since 1961. Chalmers Johnson has been honored with fellowships from the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council, and the Guggenheim Foundation; and in 1976 he was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has written numerous articles and reviews and some twelve books on Asian subjects, including Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power on the Chinese revolution, An Instance of Treason on Japan's most famous spy, Revolutionary Change on the theory of violent protest movements, and MITI and the Japanese Miracle on Japanese economic development.
    [Show full text]
  • Japan, Asian-Paciªc Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism
    Japan and Asian-Paciªc Security Japan, Asian-Paciªc Peter J. Katzenstein Security, and the Case and Nobuo Okawara for Analytical Eclecticism In recent years Interna- tional Security has published a large number of articles and exchanges articulat- ing the advantages and shortcomings of different analytical perspectives in 1 international relations. Controversies about the merits of neoliberalism, con- structivism, rationalism, and realism have become an accepted part of both scholarly debate and graduate teaching. Peter J. Katzenstein is the Walter S. Carpenter, Jr. Professor of International Studies at Cornell University. Nobuo Okawara is Professor of Political Studies at Kyushu University. Without saddling them for any of the remaining errors of omission or commission, we would like to thank for their criticisms, comments, and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article: Amitav Acharya, Thomas Berger, Robert Bullock, Thomas Christensen, Susanne Feske, Michael Green, Walter Hatch, Brian Job, Chalmers Johnson, Alastair Iain Johnston, Kozo Kato, Robert Keohane, Stephen Krasner, Ellis Krauss, David Leheny, T.J. Pempel, Richard Samuels, Keiichi Tsunekawa, and Robert Uriu, as well as members of seminars at the University of California, San Diego, Cornell University, and Aoyama Gakuin University. We are also very much indebted to two anon- ymous reviewers for their criticisms and suggestions and to a large number of Japanese and Chinese government ofªcials and policy advisers for generously sharing their time with us. 1. On neoliberalism, see John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” In- ternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 5–49; Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Mar- tin, “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory,” International Security, Vol.
    [Show full text]
  • The Military-Industrial Complex and American Democracy
    Volume 6 | Issue 7 | Article ID 2834 | Jul 02, 2008 The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus The Military-Industrial Complex and American Democracy Chalmers Johnson The Military-Industrial Complex andthe present moment, public opinion has usually American Democracy assumed that it involved more or less equitable relations -- often termed a "partnership" -- Chalmers Johnson between the high command and civilian overlords of the United States military and Most Americans have a rough idea what the privately-owned, for-profit manufacturing and term "military-industrial complex" means when service enterprises. Unfortunately, the truth of they come across it in a newspaper or hear a the matter is that, from the time they first politician mention it. President Dwight D. emerged, these relations were never equitable. Eisenhower introduced the idea to the public in his farewell address of January 17, 1961. "Our In the formative years of the military-industrial military organization today bears little relation complex, the public still deeply distrusted to that known by any of my predecessors in privately owned industrial firms because of the peacetime," he said, "or indeed by the fighting way they had contributed to the Great men of World War II and Korea... We have been Depression. Thus, the leading role in the newly compelled to create a permanent armaments emerging relationship was played by the industry of vast proportions... We must not fail official governmental sector. A deeply popular, to comprehend its grave implications... We charismatic president, FDR sponsored these must guard against the acquisition ofpublic-private relationships. They gained unwarranted influence, whether sought or further legitimacy because their purpose was to unsought, by the military-industrial complex." rearm the country, as well as allied nations around the world, against the gathering forces YouTube recording of fascism.
    [Show full text]
  • “Developmental State”? Administrative Procedure Reform in Japan and Korea
    DISMANTLING THE “DEVELOPMENTAL STATE”? ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE REFORM IN JAPAN AND KOREA Tom Ginsburg+ INTRODUCTION At least until the “Asian Crisis” of 1997, the post-World War II bureaucracies in Northeast Asia were generally considered to be among the most powerful and effective states in history. The conventional story held that so-called “developmental states” presided over miraculous economic growth that transformed Japan, Korea and Taiwan from the ruins of war into industrial powerhouses.1 According to this view, these states directed economic growth using a variety of activist mechanisms, rather than simply providing an enabling environment for capitalism as required by liberal ideology.2 By fostering close links among elite administrators, big business and politicians, these states were able to pursue high-growth policies with relatively little interference from actors outside the dominant coalition.3 + Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. For helpful comments on earlier and related drafts, the author would like to thank Kyong Whan Ahn, Hong Sik Cho, Nancy Combs, Sam Ginsburg, Joon-Hyung Hong, Robert Kagan, Mark Levin, Curtis Milhaupt, Bronwen Morgan, Luke Nottage, J. Mark Ramseyer, Eric B. Rasmusen, Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Hitoshi Ushijima, and participants at the Fourth Sho Sato Conference on “Legal Reform and Socio-Legal Change in Japan,” at Boalt Hall School of Law, November 4-5, 1999. Thanks to Claudia Acosta and Rebecca Shieh for research assistance. 1 See WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE (1993). 2 See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, JAPAN: WHO GOVERNS: THE RISE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE (1995); ROBERT WADE, GOVERNING THE MARKET: ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN EAST ASIAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (1990); ALICE AMSDEN, ASIA’S NEXT GIANT: SOUTH KOREA AND LATE INDUSTRIALIZATION (1989); ULRIKE SCHAEDE, COOPERATIVE CAPITALISM (2000).
    [Show full text]