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Language Ai As in ‘Aisle’ I’D Like to See the Këflun Mayet Ëfeullëgallō Room
© Lonely Planet Publications 378 www.lonelyplanet.com ETHIOPIAN AMHARIC •• Accommodation 379 u as in ‘flute’ but shorter Does it include kursënëm yicheumëral? ay as the ‘ai’ in ‘bait’ breakfast? Language ai as in ‘aisle’ I’d like to see the këflun mayet ëfeullëgallō room. Consonants Can I see a different lela këfël mayet ëchëlallō? THE ETHIOPIC SYLLABARY ch as in ‘church’ room? CONTENTS The unique Ethiopic script is the basis for g as in ‘get’ I leave tomorrow. neugeu ëhedallō the alphabets of Amharic, Tigrinya and gw as in ‘Gwen’ Ethiopian Amharic 378 Tigré. The basic Ethiopic syllabary has 26 h as in ‘hit’; at the end of a sentence it’s CONVERSATION & ESSENTIALS Pronunciation 378 characters; Amharic includes another seven, like a short puff of breath Hello/Greetings. tenastëllën (lit: ‘may you be Accommodation 379 and Tigrinya another five characters to kw as the ‘q’ in ‘queen’ given health’) Conversation & Essentials 379 cover sounds that are specific to those j as in ‘jump’ Hello. seulam (lit: ‘peace be with you’) Directions 380 languages. s as in ‘plus’ (never a ‘z’ sound) Hello. tadiyass (inf) LANGUAGE Health 380 The alphabet is made up of root characters sh as in ‘shirt’ How are you? deuhna neuh? (m) Emergencies – Amharic 380 representing consonants. By adding lines or z as in ‘zoo’ deuhna neush? (f) Language Difficulties 380 circles (representing the vowel sounds) to ny as the ‘ni’ in ‘onion’ deuhna not? (pol) LANGUAGE Numbers 380 these characters, seven different syllables r a rolled ‘r’ deuhna nachu? (pl) Shopping & Services 381 can be generated for each consonant (eg ha, ’ a glottal stop, ie a momentary closing I’m fine. -
A Mobile Based Tigrigna Language Learning Tool
PAPER A MOBILE BASED TIGRIGNA LANGUAGE LEARNING TOOL A Mobile Based Tigrigna Language Learning Tool http://dx.doi.org/10.3991/ijim.v9i2.4322 Hailay Kidu University of Gondar, Gondar, Ethiopia Abstract—Mobile learning (ML) refers to the use of mobile Currently many people visit Tigray - or hope to do so and handheld IT devices such as Personal Digital Assistants one day - because of the remarkable manner in which (PDAs), mobile telephones, laptops and tablet PC technolo- ancient historical traditions have been preserved. There- gies, in teaching and learning. Mobile learning is a new form fore anybody who wishes to visit or stay in Tigray and in of learning, using mobile network and tools, expanding Eritrea can learn the language for communication in for- digital learning channel, gaining educational information, mal class from schools, colleges or Universities. But there educational resources and educational services anytime, is no why that provides learning out of the formal class anywhere .Mobile phone is superior to a computer in porta- [2][3]. bility. This technology also facilitates the learning by your- Tigrigna is the third most spoken language in Ethiopia, self process. Learning without teacher is easy in this scenar- after Amharic and Oromo, and by far the most spoken in io. The technology encourages learn anytime and anywhere. Eritrea. It is also spoken by large immigrant communities Learning a language is different from any other subject as it around the world, in countries including Sudan, Saudi combines explicit learning of vocabulary and language rules Arabia, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom, with unconscious skills development in the fluent applica- tion of both these things. -
Summerised G.C.R. Compelled
A Global Study Country report On Yemen Submitted to: Gujarat Technological University Guided By: Dr. N. M. Munshi Prof. S. A. Munshi Prof. L. T. Dharmwani Prepared By: MBA Second Year Students Group 11-20, Batch: 2011-2012 Through N. R. Vekaria Institute of Business Management Studies,Junagadh. 1 INDEX SR.NO. TOPIC PAGE NO. 1. OVERVIEW OF YEMEN 3 – 20 2. INTRODUCTION OF SECTOR 21 – 26 3 STUDY ON HEALTHCARE SECTOR 27 – 52 STUDY ON INFRASTRUCTURE 4 53 – 79 SECTOR STUDY ON PHARMACEUTICAL 5 80 – 109 SECTOR 6 CONCLUSION 110 - 113 2 Overview Of Yemen 3 1. Demographic profile of Yemen Religion Religion in Yemen consists primarily of two principals Islamic religious groups; 53% of the Muslim population is Sunniand 45% is Shi'a according to the UNHCR. Sunnis are primarily Shafi'i but also include significant groups of Malikis and Hanbalis. Shi'is are primarily Zaidis and also have significant minorities of Twelver Shias and Musta'ali Western Isma'ili Shias (see Shia Population of the Middle East). 4 Health care Despite the significant progress Yemen has made to expand and improve its health care system over the past decade, the system remains severely underdeveloped. Total expenditures on health care in 2004 constituted 5% of gross domestic product. In that same year, the per capita expenditure for health care was very low compared with other Middle Eastern countries—US$34 per capita according to the World Health Organization. According to the World Bank, the number of doctors in Yemen rose by an average of more than 7% between 1995 and 2000, but as of 2004 there were still only three doctors per 10,000 persons. -
Ethnolinguistic Favoritism in African Politics
Ethnolinguistic Favoritism in African Politics Andrew Dickensy 10 August 2016 I document evidence of ethnic favoritism in 164 language groups across 35 African countries using a new computerized lexicostatistical measure of relative similarity between each language group and their incumbent national leader. I measure patronage with night light lu- minosity, and estimate a positive effect of linguistic similarity off of changes in the ethnolinguistic identity of a leader. Identification of this effect comes from exogenous within-group time-variation among lan- guage groups partitioned across national borders. I then corroborate this evidence using survey data and establish that the benefits of fa- voritism result from a region's associated ethnolinguistic identity and not that of the individual respondent. yYork University, Department of Economics, Toronto, ON. E-mail: [email protected]. I am indebted to Nippe Lagerl¨offor his encouragement and detailed feedback throughout this project. I thank Matthew Gentzkow and two anonymous referees for helpful sugges- tions that have greatly improved this paper. I also thank Tasso Adamopoulos, Greg Casey, Mario Carillo, Berta Esteve-Volart, Rapha¨elFranck, Oded Galor, Fernando Leibovici, Ste- lios Michalopoulos, Stein Monteiro, Laura Salisbury, Ben Sand, Assaf Sarid and David Weil for helpful comments, in addition to seminar participants at the Brown University Macro Lunch, the Royal Economic Society's 2nd Symposium for Junior Researches, the PODER Summer School on \New Data in Development Economics", the Canadian Economics As- sociation Annual Conference and York University. This research is funded by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada. All errors are my own. 1 Introduction Ethnolinguistic group affiliation is a salient marker of identity in Africa. -
Essays on the Economics of Ethnolinguistic Differences
Essays on the Economics of Ethnolinguistic Differences Andrew C. Dickens A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY GRADUATE PROGRAM IN ECONOMICS YORK UNIVERSITY TORONTO, ONTARIO APRIL 2017 c Andrew C. Dickens, 2017 Abstract In this dissertation, I study the origins and economic consequences of ethnolinguistic differences. To quantify these differences, I construct a lexicostatistical measure of linguistic distance. I use this measure to study two different outcomes: ethnic politics and cross-country idea flows. I then take the economic importance of ethnolinguistic differences as given, and explore the geographic foundation of these differences. In chapter 1, I document evidence of ethnic favoritism in 35 sub-Saharan countries. I use lexi- costatistical distance to quantify the similarity between an ethnic group and the national leader’s ethnic identity. I find that a one standard deviation increase in similarity yields a 2 percent in- crease in group-level GDP per capita. I then use the continuity of lexicostatistical similarity to show that favoritism exists among groups that are not coethnic to the leader, where the mean ef- fect of non-coethnic similarity is one quarter the size of the coethnic effect. I relate these results to the literature on coalition building, and provide evidence that ethnicity is a guiding principle behind high-level government appointments. In chapter 2, I use book translations data to capture cross-country idea flows. It has been conjectured that income gaps are smaller between ancestrally related countries because they com- municate more ideas. -
Ethnolinguistic Favoritism in African Politics ONLINE APPENDIX
Ethnolinguistic Favoritism in African Politics ONLINE APPENDIX Andrew Dickensy For publication in the American Economic Journal: Applied Economics yBrock University, Department of Economics, 1812 Sir Issac Brock Way, L2S 3A2, St. Catharines, ON, Canada (email: [email protected]). 1 A Data Descriptions, Sources and Summary Statistics A.1 Regional-Level Data Description and Sources Country-language groups: Geo-referenced country-language group data comes from the World Language Mapping System (WLMS). These data map information from each language in the Ethnologue to the corresponding polygon. When calculating averages within these language group polygons, I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic projection. Source: http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/ Linguistic similarity: I construct two measures of linguistic similarity: lexicostatistical similarity from the Automatic Similarity Judgement Program (ASJP), and cladistic similar- ity using Ethnologue data from the WLMS. I use these to measure the similarity between each language group and the ethnolinguistic identity of that country's national leader. I discuss how I assign a leader's ethnolinguistic identity in Section 1 of the paper. Source: http://asjp.clld.org and http://www.worldgeodatasets.com/language/ Night lights: Night light intensity comes from the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). My measure of night lights is calculated by averaging across pixels that fall within each WLMS country-language group polygon for each year the night light data is available (1992-2013). To minimize area distortions I use the Africa Albers Equal Area Conic pro- jection. In some years data is available for two separate satellites, and in all such cases the correlation between the two is greater than 99% in my sample. -
The Politics of Language in Eritrea: Equality of Languages Vs
The Politics of Language In Eritrea: Equality Of Languages Vs. Bilingual Official Language Policy Redie Bereketeab The Nordic Africa Institute Uppsala, Sweden Email: [email protected] Redie Bereketeab is a researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppala, Sweden. He holds PhD in Sociology from the Department of Sociology at Uppsala University, Sweden. He has written several articles and book chapters. He is also the author of Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890-1991, the Red Sea Press (2007), and State Building in Post-liberation Eritrea: Challenges, achievements and potentials, Adonis & Abbey Publishers (2009). Acknowledgement I am indebted to Kidane Hagos and Phyllis O’Neil therefore I extend my thanks to both. I will also extend my thanks to the anonymous reviewers. Abstract The article analyzes the discourse of politics of language in Eritrea. It argues that the language debate in Eritrea over equality of languages and bilingual official language policy is more about power relations than about language per se. It relates to politics of identity that derive from the construction of two identity formations as understood by political elites. Equality of languages is based on ethnic identity, whereas official language is based on the construction of supra-ethnic civic identity. According to the constructivist bilingual official language Arabic and Tigrinya are supposed to represent two different socio-cultural identity formations, notably, Islamic-Arabic and Christian-Tigrinya. Consequently, the official language policy debate could be construed to derive from politics of power relation where two groups of elites supposedly representing the two identity formations are engaged in power competition reflecting real or imaginary socio-cultural cleavage of respective identity. -
Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization Tseggai Isaac
Comparative Civilizations Review Volume 59 Article 7 Number 59 Fall 2008 10-1-2008 Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization Tseggai Isaac Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr Recommended Citation Isaac, Tseggai (2008) "Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization," Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 59 : No. 59 , Article 7. Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol59/iss59/7 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the All Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected]. Isaac: Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization Isaac 99 Making the Case for Ethiopian Civilization TseggaiIsaac [email protected]. "Aunt Sally she's going to adopt me and civilize me." From The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, by Mark Twain, 1967, p. 487. Introduction The word "civilization" is defined by scholars and commentators in ways that are too general and imprecise. To some, it is a concept that implies sophisticated and refined life. Mark Twain's Huck Finn, a wayward youth, enjoyed free- spirited and unkempt life in the bushes and could not stand joining the society of learning, family, church, community and state. What Huck dreaded in fact is the exact definition of civilization given by scholars such as Matt Melko. According to Melko, civilization represents a "large and complex culture, usually distinguished from simple culture by greater control of environment, including the practice of agriculture on a large scale and the domestication of animals" Melko, 2007). -
The Status of the Constitution of Eritrea and the Transitional Government
23 October 2018 The Status of the Constitution of Eritrea and the Transitional Government “Today, 23 May 1997, on this historic date, after active popular participation, approve and solemnly ratify, through the Constituent Assembly, this Constitution as the fundamental law of our Sovereign and Independent State of Eritrea”. – Preamble, The Eritrean Constitution Drafted by a Constitutional Commission established under the auspices of the Transitional Government of Eritrea in 1993 and ratified by a duly established Constituent Assembly in May 1997, the Constitution of Eritrea entered into force upon its ratification on 23 May 1997. The Constitution thus remains legally in effect as of that date. The regime’s failure to implement, that is, to respect, adhere to and apply the Constitution upon its ratification is a calculated and deliberate political decision to pursue its own agenda of self-preservation and plunder. The Constitution was consecrated ‘as the fundamental law of our Sovereign and Independent State of Eritrea’ on 23 May 1997. In the opinion of legal scholars and constitutional lawyers, the Constitution has been legally in force and its provisions have a lawfully binding effect ever since its ratification in May 1997, irrespective of the status of its formal implementation. This character of the Constitution is explicitly stated in its Preamble. Yet, there has been widespread misunderstanding concerning this fundamental legal status of the Eritrean Constitution. The prevailing confusion in the public debate regarding its ‘non-implementation’ has operated to the benefit of the regime. The general confusion in the public debate emanates from three factors: (1) the regime’s failure to respect, adhere to and abide by the Constitution; (2) the meaning of ‘non-implementation’ of the Constitution; and (3) the claims of non-inclusion, by certain groups, in the exercise of constitution making. -
Nation Building, State Construction and Development in Africa : the Case Of
STUDY Nation Building, State Construction and Development in Africa The Case of Eritrea ANDEBRHAN WELDE GIORGIS April 2010 n About fifty years after the end of the colonial era, the prototype postcolonial African state remains weak and lacking in legitimacy, delivery and relevance. Conflicts, underdevelopment and climate change continue to undermine the people’s wellbeing and degrade the human condition in much of the continent. The prototype state is dysfunctional, insecure and fragile. n Independent Eritrea’s experience to date evinces a marked deficit in democratic governance. Significant lapses have disconnected policy and practice in nation building, state construction and development. Nineteen years post liberation, the state in Eritrea, like the prototype post- colonial African state, is in deep crisis. It has failed to provide for the needs, promote the well- being, cater to the aspirations and safeguard the security of the people. It is characterised by a crisis of legitimacy, delivery and relevance. A dismal record has dashed hopes that Eritrea would avoid the continent’s malaise and shine as the inspiring beacon of an African success story. n Lack of democratic governance has weakened nation building, undermined state construc- tion, and subverted socioeconomic development. Eritrea’s record to date indicates more a duplication of than an exception to the general African experience. This has been a cause of profound disappointment to the vision of building a democratic and progressive Eritrea that stands out as a bright star in the African constellation. n An internally driven, dynamic and developing process of democratic governance would un- derpin successful nation building, state reconstruction and development in Eritrea and Af- rica. -
Downloaded from Brill.Com10/01/2021 05:53:02PM Via Free Access 238 Magnet
African Journal of Legal Studies 8 (2015) 237–272 brill.com/ajls Constitution Making in Eritrea: Why It Is Necessary to Go Back to the Future Joseph Eliot Magnet Faculty of Law, University of Ottawa, 57 Louis Pasteur, Ottawa, ON, Canada K1N 6N5 [email protected] Abstract Eritrea went through a constitutional process from 1995 to 1997, which resulted in a text that provides for the rule of law, democratic institutions and human rights. The text was ratified by the National Assembly, but never implemented. The United Nations, the USA and the EU support the 1997 Constitution. They have called on Eritrea to “(i)mplement (it) fully and without further delay”. This recommendation is challenged here. Eritrea is multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-lingual. The 1997 Constitution creates a highly centralized Stalinist structure that experience teaches does not work in deeply diverse democracies. Eritrea requires a power sharing constitution, fabricated in a proper nego- tiated process. Implementing the 1997 Constitution would likely bring Eritrea’s two large nationalities into conflict with its eight smaller nationalities with high risk for vio- lent civil strife that could spill over into neighbouring countries. This is concerning for geopolitics and would be devastating for human rights. Keywords African constitutional law – comparative constitutional law – constitution making – constitutional law – constitutional design – Eritrea – Eritrea constitution … © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2�16 | doi 10.1163/17087384-12342064Downloaded from Brill.com10/01/2021 05:53:02PM via free access 238 Magnet Between the strong and the weak, between the rich and the poor, between master and servant, it is freedom that oppresses and the law that sets free. -
Eritrea Report
ERITREA REPORT APRIL 2005 Country Information and Policy Unit IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY DIRECTORATE HOME OFFICE, UNITED KINGDOM Eritrea April 2005 CONTENTS 1 Scope of Document 1.1 2 Geography 2.1 3 Economy 3.1 3.2 Petrol Rationing 3.5 Drought & Famine 4 History Foundations of Eritrea 4.1 Resistance to Ethiopian Rule 1952-1991 4.2 Independence 1993 & Transitional Government 4.4 The PFDJ and Constitutional Developments 4.7 Border Conflict with Ethiopia 1998-2000 4.13 Unresolved Border Demarcation 4.18 5 State Structures The Constitution 5.1 - Citizenship and Nationality 5.3 - Three Witnesses 5.12 - The 1993 Referendum 5.18 - Mixed Marriage & Mixed Birth 5.21 The Political System 5.26 The Judiciary 5.32 - Special Courts 5.39 Legal Rights/Detention 5.42 - Death Penalty 5.46 Internal Security 5.47 Prisons and Prison Conditions 5.49 The Military 5.55 - Draft Evaders 5.56 - Military Service 5.59 - Demobilisation 5.64 - Prisoners of War 5.66 Medical Services - General 5.67 - Specialist Facilities 5.75 - HIV/AIDS 5.78 - The Disabled 5.80 Educational System 5.83 Eritrea April 2005 6 Human Rights 6.A Human Rights – issues General 6.1 Freedom of Speech and of the Media - The Media 6.9 - Non Media Criticism 6.15 6.16 Freedom of Religion Religious Groups - 6.20 - Non-Sanctioned Religious Groups 6.27 - Jehovah’s Witnesses 6.30 - Muslims 6.40 Freedom of Assembly and Association 6.44 - Political Activists - Political Opposition 6.48 - Democratic Elections 6.53 - The G15 Group 6.56 - Supporters of the Ethiopian Derg Regime 6.64 - Supporters of the ELF