ANALYSIS PAPER Number 11, January 2007 THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR DANIEL L. BYMAN KENNETH M. POLLACK ANALYSIS PAPER Number 11, January 2007 THINGS FALL APART: CONTAINING THE SPILLOVER FROM AN IRAQI CIVIL WAR DANIEL L. BYMAN KENNETH M. POLLACK TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . .V ABBREVIATIONS . VII PREFACE . IX EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . .XIII THE AUTHORS . XXIII CIVIL WARS AND SPILLOVER . 1 POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONTAINING SPILLOVER . 29 AN UGLY PRACTICE RUN . 49 APPENDICES: CIVIL WAR CASES EXAMINED AND CIVIL WAR INDICATORS A. AFGHANISTAN . 53 B. CONGO . 69 C. LEBANON . 81 D. SOMALIA . 103 E. YUGOSLAVIA . 113 F. G ENERAL INDICATIONS AND WARNING OF ALL-OUT CIVIL WAR . 131 T HE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION III ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS his study represents the culmination of con- Stimson Center; Ivo Daalder, Khalid Koser, Michael Tsiderable labor over the course of the past year, O’Hanlon, and Carlos Pascual of the Brookings Insti- and as can only be the case there were many people tution, and Martin S. Indyk, Bruce Riedel, and Tamara whose assistance proved invaluable. We benefi ted from Cofman Wittes of the Saban Center, provided us with outstanding support for our research. Sara Moller, at penetrating insights into our various case studies as Georgetown University, and Irena Sargsyan, at the Sa- well as trenchant criticisms of the study itself. In addi- ban Center, served as our principal research assistants tion, we presented versions of this work to a range of during this time and their efforts defy superlatives. We experts in the U.S. military and intelligence commu- simply could not have completed this task without nities at various times during 2006. While we cannot them. They, in turn, were assisted by Brad Humphries, thank them all by name, their reactions, suggestions, Bilal Saab, and Blair Trimble at the Saban Center, all of and even disagreements were critical to us in refi ning whom took up their own pieces of our research with our treatment of this subject. energy, enthusiasm, and effi ciency. Andrew Apostolou of the Saban Center did his usual A great many of our colleagues were willing to provide superb job of editing this monster, and Chris Kru- extremely useful comments on our work at various pinski handled the layout with her usual style—and stages. Rochelle Davis of Georgetown; Bernard Har- unusual speed—to ensure that it was produced in a borne of the World Bank; Emile El-Hokayem of the timely fashion. T HE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION V ABBREVIATIONS ACR ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT AMAL AFWAJ AL-MUQAWAMA AL-LUBNANIYA (BATTALIONS OF THE LEBANESE RESISTANCE) BCT BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM BOSNIA BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GCC GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL GDP GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GIA GROUPE ISLAMIQUE ARMÉ (ARMED ISLAMIC GROUP) IDP INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSON IRA IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY IRGC IRANIAN REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS CORPS IRP ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE PARTY KDP KURDISTAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY KLA KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY LTTE LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM NATO NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION NGO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION NSC NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL OPEC ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES PC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE PKK PARTIYA KARKERÊN KURDISTAN (KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY) PLA PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY PLO PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION PUK PATRIOTIC UNION OF KURDISTAN RCT MARINE REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM RPF RWANDAN PATRIOTIC FRONT SCIRI THE SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ SLA SOUTH LEBANON ARMY UAE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES UNHCR UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES UNITA UNIÃO NACIONAL PELA INDEPENDÊNCIA TOTAL DE ANGOLA (NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA) UNITAF UNIFIED TASK FORCE UNOSOM UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN SOMALIA UNPROFOR UNITED NATIONS PROTECTION FORCE WFP WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME T HE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION VII PREFACE ith each passing day, Iraq sinks deeper into an all-out civil war can still be averted, albeit if only Wthe abyss of civil war. The history of such wars through Herculean exertions on the part of Washing- is that they are disastrous for all involved. Asking who ton and Baghdad, the warnings of history suggest that won most civil wars is a bit like asking who “won” the perhaps we too are simply repeating the same mistakes San Francisco earthquake. Unfortunately, we may soon of those caught up in past civil wars. be forced to confront how best we can avoid “losing” an Iraqi civil war. When we began this study in the spring of 2006, we made a list of indicators of when a state in civil strife passes Starting to answer that question is the purpose of this such a point of no return. We watched with dismay as study. We hope that the leaders of the United States the situation in Iraq worsened and indicator after indi- and Iraq will fi nd a way to stop what seems to be an cator went from our drawing board to Iraq’s daily reality irrevocable slide into all-out civil war. Given their re- (these indicators are contained in Appendix F). peated failures to do so, and how badly the situation had deteriorated by the time this report went to press, With this in mind, we set out to mine the history of re- however, we believe that the United States and its allies cent, similar internecine confl icts for lessons that might must begin thinking about how to deal with the conse- help the United States to devise a set of strategies to deal quences of massive failure in Iraq. with the looming prospect of a full-scale Iraqi civil war. We scrutinized the history of civil wars in Lebanon in During the course of the research for this study, one the 1970s and 1980s; Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, ominous fact that loomed large from the history was Croatia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, the Nagorno- that in previous civil wars there seemed to be a “point Karabakh confl ict, and Tajikistan during the 1990s; as of no return”—a moment when the psychological well as the confl icts in Congo and Somalia that rage to forces propelling civil war became irreversible—but this day (we present eight of these cases in fi ve appendi- that moment was never apparent to the participants ces to the paper to provide additional historical insight themselves. Historians looking back on a confl ict could for readers wishing to delve deeper into this question often agree on when that point was reached, but at the themselves). From these wars we distilled a set of lessons time those caught up in the struggle typically believed regarding how civil wars can affect the interests of other that solutions and alternative paths were still avail- countries, even distant ones like the United States, and able long after they had been overtaken by events. This then used those lessons to fashion a set of recommenda- should sober us to the possibility that it may already tions for how Washington might begin to develop a new be too late to save Iraq. While we want to believe that strategy for an Iraq caught up in all-out civil war. T HE SABAN CENTER AT THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION IX In doing so, we attempted to set aside our own feelings marks of creating quite severe spillover problems. By of sympathy and concern for the Iraqi people them- the same token, we also found that the commonly held selves. The only thing that the United States can do to belief that the best way to handle a civil war is to back help them is to prevent the descent into full-scale civil one side to help it win was equally mistaken. We found war. Once it has happened, the United States will have few cases of an outside country successfully helping failed them; and this self-same history makes frighten- one side or another to victory, and the outside power ingly clear that it is impossible for well-meaning out- usually suffered heavy costs in the process. siders to limit the humanitarian tragedies of an all-out civil war, unless they are willing to intervene massively Nevertheless, because we fear that the United States will to bring it to an end. We note that the commitments not have the option to avoid the problems that will be needed to end such a war are effectively the same re- created for U.S. strategic interests by Iraq’s descent into sources the United States and its allies are unwilling to all-out civil war, we have presented a series of U.S. policy commit today to prevent its outbreak. Consequently, choices that Washington might employ to do so. They we felt that we had to look past the tragedy that will be mostly amount to a reinforcing set of efforts designed visited upon the Iraqi people (for whose sake the Unit- to contain the likely spillover from this nightmare. Each ed States nominally launched the invasion in 2003), fl ows from one or more aspects of our analysis of the and instead consider how such a civil war could affect patterns of spillover from civil wars. They suggest that U.S. interests and what the United States could do to if the United States is skillful, determined, patient, and minimize those effects. lucky, it may be possible to limit the impact of an all-out Iraqi civil war. To be blunt, the same history suggests Our conclusions are not encouraging. We found that that it will be very, very diffi cult to do so. Few nations much of what is considered “conventional wisdom” that tried to contain spillover from an all-out civil war among Westerners about how to handle civil wars is were successful, and while they were all less powerful probably mistaken.