Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making

™ ER P

Patricia H. Werhane Brian Moriarty BRIDGE PA

www.corporate-ethics.org

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BRIDGE PAPERS™ Uniting best thinking with leading business practice. CONTENTS

Foreword ...... 2

Introduction ...... 3

A Deﬁnition of Moral Imagination ...... 3

Rhinoceros Armor: Narratives and Frameworks ...... 4 O-Rings and Ice Water

Social Roles ...... 8

Moral Imagination as a Window to a Better Framework ...... 10

Implications and Takeaways for Managers ...... 15

Tought Leader Commentary™ withKlaus M. Leisinger ...... 17

About the Authors ...... 19

Notes ...... 21 FOREWORD

Te Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics is an independent entity established in partnership with Business Roundtable—an association of chief executive officers of leading corporations with more than $5 trillion in annual revenues and nearly 10 million employees—and leading academics from America’s best business schools. Te Institute brings together leaders from business and academia to fulfill its mission to renew and enhance the link between ethical behavior and business practice through executive education programs, practitioner- focused research, and outreach. Institute Bridge Papers™ put the best thinking of academic and business leaders into the hands of practicing managers. Bridge Papers™ convey concepts from leading edge academic research in the field of business ethics in a format that today’s managers can integrate into their daily business decision making. Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making is an Institute Bridge Paper™ based upon the research of Academic Advisor Patricia H. Wer- hane. It shows how exercising moral imagination can help prevent business disasters and empower managers to make better decisions. Te accompanying Tought Leader Commentary™ with Klaus M. Leisinger, chief executive officer of the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Devel- opment, provides insight for business leaders by suggesting applications of moral imagination, social engagement, and leadership development that are essential for the sustainable success of organizations, particularly in the environment of increasing globalization.

2 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS INTRODUCTION A DEFINITION OF MORAL IMAGINATION During periods of large-scale corporate scandals, it is easy to forget that busi- Successful companies are usually hotbeds ness is essentially a moral enterprise—it of imagination—especially with regard to is about working together to create value. the innovation of products, services, and We find it easy to focus most of our operations that are required for success- attention on the specific persons involved fully competing in the marketplace. in wrongdoing, proclaiming these “few Concerns over a lack of imagination in bad apples” to be the sole cause of cor- business, however, have little to do with the porate malfeasance, while failing to overall quantity of imagination and much investigate carefully better ways to make more to do with the quality of imagination decisions. being exercised regularly in the workplace. Tere are, however, two key problems Why do successful companies often ignore with this approach. First, we find our- the ethical dimensions of their processes, selves stuck with only a partial story that decisions, and actions? acknowledges the symptoms (e.g., various Te problem is not a one-time weak- frauds and scandals) but neglects accurately ness of will but something more akin to diagnosing and treating their root cause. moral amnesia—a habitual inability to Second, we see this perpetuates the error of viewing economics and ethics as two distinct forms of discourse in describ- Concerns over a lack of imagi- ing management and corporate practices. nation in business, however, Tis “separation thesis” forces false dilemmas onto business practitioners, creating have little to do with the overall the illusion that doing well and doing good quantity of imagination and are often incompatible. Neither widespread ignorance of ethi- much more to do with the qual- cal theory, nor a lack of moral reasoning ity of imagination being exer- skills, nor a deficiency in regulatory law is sufficient in explaining why ordinary, cised regularly in the workplace. decent, intelligent employees sometimes engage in questionable activities or why the remember or learn from one’s own and activities sometimes are encouraged or even others’ past mistakes and a failure to trans- instigated by the climate or culture of the fer that knowledge when fresh challenges companies they manage. arise. If we really hope to account for moral Moral imagination includes an aware- success and failure in business, we need ness of the various dimensions embedded to recognize and appreciate the vital role in a particular situation—in particular, of moral imagination that managers use the moral and ethical ones. It entails the in everyday decision making, along with ability to understand one’s situation from available options they disregard or fail to a number of perspectives. Moral imagina- recognize. tion enables managers to recognize a set of options that may not be obvious from within the overarching organizational

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 3 framework; evaluate these options from a 1. Beginning not with the general but with a moral point of view; and actualize them. particular situation; Moral imagination is the ability to 2. Entailing the ability to disengage from one’s discover and evaluate possibilities within a primary framework or to extend or adapt particular set of circumstances by question- that framework in a meaningful way; ing and expanding one’s operative mental 3. Dealing not merely with fantasies but framework. In managerial moral decision with possibilities or ideals that are viable making, moral imagination entails perceiv- and actualizable. Such possibilities have a ing the norms, social roles, and relation- normative or prescriptive character; they are ships entwined in any situation. concerned with what one ought to do. Developing moral imagination requires a heightened awareness of contextual Narratives and frameworks are tools moral dilemmas and the active engagement that we share that help us interpret our environment and understand our role within a community. Tey are interpre- Moral imagination is the abil- tive lenses that enable us to work together toward common goals, and they provide ity to discover and evaluate pos- us with a point of view—a grounds upon sibilities within a particular set which we can reason, make decisions, and form judgments. of circumstances by questioning and expanding one’s operative RHINOCEROS ARMOR: mental framework. NARRATIVES AND FRAMEWORKS of additional perspectives toward these dilemmas that enables managers to reframe When one narrative becomes dominant, them and discover better, economically we appeal to that story for reinforcement viable and morally justifiable solutions. of the facts, assuming it represents what Te concept of moral imagination is actually happened even though it may found at the root of our free enterprise sys- have distorting effects. tem. Scottish economist and philosopher It is morally important to understand Adam Smith writes: “When I sympathize, the constructive nature and limits of narra- I place myself in another’s situation, not tives. Such is illustrated by Dennis Gioia’s because of how that situation feels to me report of his activities as recall coordinator or might affect me, but rather as if I were at the Ford Motor Company during the that person. I project myself into another’s Pinto era. experience…” As Smith indicates, moral Between 1973 and 1975, Gioia was in imagination is about putting ourselves charge of recalling defective automobiles at into the shoes of the various stakeholders Ford. He had always thought of himself as in order to develop a strategy for aligning an extremely moral and socially responsible them in practice in ways that are mutually person. Yet, when Gioia became intimately beneficial. familiar with problems related to the Moral imagination differs from other Pinto—specifically, that they were catching forms of free reflection because it is on fire in low-speed accidents, resulting in grounded in practice and distinguished by injuries and deaths—he did not advocate the following three characteristics:

4 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS ordering a recall. In fact, he drove a Pinto imagine a wider range of possible issues, and even sold one to his sister. consequences, and solutions. Sometimes Gioia eventually came to view his managers and institutions become trapped decision not to recall the Pinto as a moral in their historical framework or a frame- failure—a failure to think outside his pre- work perpetuated by their organization, vailing background narrative or script at the corporate culture, or tradition. Even if point of decision. “My own schematized managers are only vaguely aware of their (scripted) knowledge influenced me to per- particular framework, it can drive their ceive recall issues in terms of the prevailing decision making to preclude taking into decision environment and to unconsciously account moral concerns. A powerful and overlook key features of the Pinto case,” pervasive framework sometimes allows or Gioia said, “mainly because they did not fit even encourages managers to overestimate an existing script.”2 While personal moral- their powers and abilities. ity was very important to Gioia, he admits A point of view can become etched that the framing narrative of his workplace indelibly in our brain even though it actu- “did not include ethical dimensions.”3 Te ally misrepresents experienced phenomena. moral mistake here was that there were Art historian E. H. Gombrich pointed other, better choices—albeit ones outside out that sixteenth-century artist Albrecht the purview of Gioia’s framing narrative— he could have made. Background narratives provide us with Sometimes managers confuse frameworks for understanding the world reality with what they want and our place in it. We are not simply the characters in these narratives; we are also it to be. their authors. It is important to recognize that we have a role both in making adjust- Durer’s depiction of a rhino with a heavy ments to our narrative frameworks and coat of armor served as a model render- in trying to connect our stories to those ing of the animal in natural history books within other groups. When we mistakenly until the eighteenth century, though rhinos view our narrative frameworks as static, do not exhibit armor. Similarly, an early we not only risk moral laziness, but we 1598 engraving depicting a whale with also may miss opportunities to reshape in ears served as a model for numerous whale very positive ways our narratives and roles images as depicted by later artists; however, therein. whales are earless.4 Narratives can confuse, bias, and invent Narratives or mental models can func- what we take to be data, facts, or even tion as specific framing scripts or mini- truths. Tis same lens, like the eyepiece of belief systems in specific kinds of situations a telescope, which allows us to view a par- or within the culture of institutions such as ticular element in our field of vision with corporations. When a single story serves as precision, can also prevent us from seeing the prototype, it can mold new information other things up close. to fit within its framework thus shaping Sometimes managers confuse reality the facts. As was the case of Gioia and the with what they want it to be. Sometimes Ford Pinto, this can occur even if other individuals lack a sense of the variety of valid, yet contradictory, interpretations exist possibilities and the moral consequences or other equally verifiable facts contradict of their decisions as well as the ability to the prototype narrative.

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 5 O-Rings and Ice Water Te Tylenol story illustrates how a framing narrative can become a posi- All companies have narratives—mission tive driving force for moral imagination. statements, principles, and core values— J&J executives made decisions that were that communicate the identity and not obvious and could even be viewed as purpose of the firm to its stakeholders, violating the precepts of good marketing especially the employees. A story that practices. Likewise, they insisted that their defines a firm’s purpose, mission, and val- customers’ safety should be the primary ues can empower managers to search for decision driver, questioning their legal and identify new opportunities that fit counsel who was afraid that this action within the company’s moral framework would be perceived as an admission of guilt. and handle unforeseen crises. Te ability of J&J executives to use Having a narrative that is alive within moral imagination in the midst of a severe the organization before a crisis hits can crisis was no accident—on the contrary, help managers avoid disaster. For example, it was largely the result of the firm’s most people are familiar with the Johnson longstanding commitment to the moral & Johnson ( J&J) Tylenol case. In 1982, development of its employees. What is of after a number of poisoning incidents critical importance, yet sometimes over- involving Tylenol capsules, J&J CEO looked in the Tylenol case, is that J&J had James Burke, in consultation with his top been holding an ongoing series of “chal- managers, withdrew Tylenol capsules from lenge meetings,” where individuals at all levels in the company were encouraged to speak up if they felt the company was not Having a narrative that is living the values embodied in the credo. Tese challenge meetings served as a moral alive within the organiza- exercise for J&J employees and managers, tion before a crisis hits can help who became accustomed to putting them- managers avoid disaster. selves in the shoes of their stakeholders. When the Tylenol crisis hit, imagining the perspective of a customer was indeed a “no the market even though the company was brainer” because it was already an estab- not at fault for the poisonings. lished habit and part of the organizational When Burke and his leadership team culture. made the difficult decision to pull Tylenol We must note that narratives should capsules off store shelves, most experts did be somewhat flexible and open to new not believe that the company would ever interpretations and situations if they are to recapture its share of the pain medica- help a company thrive over the long term. tion market—although this did eventu- A senior executive participating in an Insti- ally happen. Given the company’s credo, tute ethics seminar claimed that his com- which states in its first lines, “We believe pany had for many years a great reputation our first responsibility is to doctors, nurses for ethical business practice—one that was and patients, to mothers and to all others firmly woven into the company’s history. who use our products and services,” Burke When evidence of some financial malfea- and his leadership team, however, described sance began to appear at the firm, senior their decision, which lost J&J an estimated managers were not prepared and did not $500 million, as a “no brainer.”5 react as quickly as they could have because

6 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS they were so accustomed to resting upon the solid rocket booster project for NASA the company’s history. “No one believed at the Marshall Space Center described something like this could happen here,” the evidence of erosion to both the primary executive said. and the secondary O-rings as “accepted Any leader who thinks her organization and indeed expected—and no longer is immune to moral and ethical problems considered an anomaly.” After numerous stands upon thin ground. Moral disasters successful launches, NASA officials may can happen even if there is no intent to do have begun to think that the agency was harm by any of the parties involved—a fact that is illuminated by the Challenger case. Te Challenger space shuttle was a joint Moral disasters can happen project of NASA and a number of highly regarded subcontractors including Mor- even if there is no intent to ton Tiokol, a corporation created by the do harm by any of the parties merger of two reputable companies. Before 1986, there had been only one accident involved—a fact that is illumi- during the history of NASA’s spaceflights, nated by the Challenger case. and 24 previous launches of space shuttles constructed almost identically to the Challenger had proceeded without prob- invincible and that the space shuttle was a lems. Despite NASA’s fine safety record perfect, even risk-free vehicle. Te con- and Tiokol’s expertise in space travel, sequences of accepting this narrative are on January 28, 1986, which was the 25th obvious. mission of the space shuttle program, the Tis aura of confidence was not the sole Challenger exploded within 60 seconds factor, however, that led to the Challenger of liftoff.6 Everyone on board was killed, disaster. Another problem involved the including the first schoolteacher to journey ways in which different parties framed risk into space. measurement, resulting in radically differ- Te Challenger explosion has been ent perceptions of the dangers of the space traced to the failure of the O-rings—the shuttles. seals in the connecting joint between the Richard Feynman, a Nobel Prize two segments of the rocket booster—to physicist and member of the Rogers Com- seal one of the boosters. According to testi- mission, interviewed a number of NASA mony given to the Rogers Commission, the officials, engineers, and managers after the group appointed to investigate the disaster, explosion and found that their various esti- from the very beginning of the rocket mates of the probability of booster failure booster’s development, Morton Tiokol ranged from as high as 1 in 10 to as low as engineers had worried about the flexibil- 1 in 10,000. ity and the strength of the O-ring seal- Te project managers and the engineers ing mechanism. Roger Boisjoly, Morton had different frameworks for understand- Tiokol’s leading expert on booster seals, ing and assessing risk. No one in either sent memos to his superiors at Tiokol group, however, realized that the words warning of the weakness of the O-ring they were using had very different mean- configuration. ings and implications for members of the Following the seventeenth successful other group. shuttle flight, Larry Mulloy, the manager of

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 7 Due to these misunderstandings, critical Tis employee reports to a manager who information was misinterpreted. On the in turn is responsible for oversight of night before the launch, engineers were an entire team. Likewise, the customer asked to prove that the O-rings would fail service division of the firm has a specified at temperatures below 50 degrees. Engi- relationship with the sales department neers typically interpret lack of proof that and with the leadership of the firm. something will fail as evidence of a greater Roles carry with them expectations, risk. In this case, the managers interpreted rights and duties, norms, and ideals that are the engineers’ inability to prove on short either explicit or implicit. Sometimes these notice that the O-rings would fail in low rights and duties are legally or contractu- temperatures as an increased likelihood of ally defined. Most people adhere to these success. Without realizing it, the engineers expectations most of the time, which per- and managers were talking in circles. mits an amount of predictability to human While the engineers neglected to behavior. answer the question about O-ring failure Ordinarily there are good moral reasons from a managerial perspective, the manag- for acting according to a role’s demands or ers similarly failed to understand the engi- ideals. For example, a father who ignores neers’ silence as a reason for serious concern his children or a manager who does not about launch safety; neither realized its take seriously her fiduciary responsibilities failure to communicate. to her company under most circumstances Both groups suffered from what is judged to be negligent and immoral— philosopher Michael Davis has termed both by the standards of role morality and “microscopic vision”—focusing on a narrow judgment of a common sense perspective.7 range of phenomena or data without imag- Tere are, however, cases where roles them- ining how others might understand the selves can become morally problematic. same data differently. Tis failure to com- In the Challenger disaster, all people municate was made explicit when Richard involved were well meaning and acting Feynman dropped an O-ring into a glass of within the normative expectations of their ice water during the Rogers Commission roles. Despite their good intentions and hearings. Te O-ring cracked. concerns about the risk associated with O-rings, the engineers at Morton Tiokol SOCIAL ROLES who protested the launch internally did not “blow the whistle” to top management at Tiokol or NASA before the launch took One useful function that narratives and place. Perhaps it is because the engineers frameworks provide to the process of viewed their role as providers of data, lack- value creation is a division of responsi- ing power as final decision makers. Social bility. Everyone in an organization has roles provide a degree of predictability to a role or number of roles that define human behavior within an organization, various relationships between indi- but a rigid understanding of roles lim- viduals, individuals and organizations, its habits of behavior in ways that fail to layers of the organization, and organiza- empower employees and managers to deal tions themselves. For example, a person effectively with unanticipated situations or employed as a customer service represen- crises. tative may be assigned certain responsi- Another problem with social roles— bilities related to customer satisfaction. one that is of special significance for

8 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS managers—is how they can structure sibility for the actions of others evaporated authority within organizations. Many man- before both the law and public sentiment. agers conceive of good leadership as being When the fraud became public, prosecu- primarily about motivating employees to tors failed to accept Vinson’s assertion that do what they want them to do. Some- she was only following orders, and rather times obedience to authority is part of the than risk indictment, she ended up negoti- problem. Te truth, as based on widely- ating a guilty plea as a co-conspirator in the cited human behavior research conducted fraud.10 by Yale Professor Stanley Milgram, is that Leaders often fail to recognize that individuals will often carry out instructions employee obedience usually has little to do that are absurd, immoral, dangerous, or with their own brilliance, values, experience, life-threatening when given by a person in or ability to lead—it is primarily due to authority. their position of recognized authority. Te Tis phenomenon is as relevant today in problem is not simply the phenomenon of organizations as it was previously in Mil- obedience to authority; it is also an issue of gram’s research lab. Obedience on the part leadership. Leaders can become so involved of middle managers enabled the $11 billion fraud at WorldCom, the largest in corporate history. To her credit, Betty Vinson, a ...individuals will often carry senior manager in WorldCom’s accounting division, initially refused to follow orders out instructions that are absurd, when she was asked to make improper immoral, dangerous, or life- accounting adjustments—in the amount of $828 million—in order to help the com- threatening when given by a pany leaders convince Wall Street investors person in authority. and analysts that it had met the quarterly earnings numbers these executives had predicted.8 In the financial quarters fol- in their roles and accompanying expecta- lowing the initial fraud, Vinson, who was tions that their decisions reflect what they concerned about jeopardizing the financial perceive to be their own role responsibili- well-being of her family should she leave ties. When this happens, leaders may fail her position at WorldCom, eventually to examine how their directives are being complied with these directives. Over the interpreted and implemented several layers next two years, Vinson and dozens of other down within the organization. WorldCom employees repeatedly created Te truth is that employee obedience fraudulent accounting records, even though can sometimes destroy a company. At they knew it was a dishonest and absurd Enron and WorldCom, employees ordered way of doing business. Scott Sullivan, to “hit the numbers” did so—even at the WorldCom’s CFO and a chief architect of expense of the truth and ultimately—at the fraud, tried to assuage employee anxiety the expense of their firms and all of their related to this activity by saying that, “noth- stakeholders. ing they had done was illegal and that he would assume all responsibility.”9 While Sullivan may have been credited with such sweeping authority within WorldCom’s culture, his illusory power to take respon-

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 9 MORAL IMAGINATION AS tion proves successful in the long term, A WINDOW TO A BETTER aligning employees with activities more traditionally associated with the role of FRAMEWORK physicians should be viewed as a reasonable business decision. Health benefits firms that fail to positively impact the health Crises may be unavoidable, but disaster is of their members will cease to exist, and not. In the unfortunate cases of the Ford WellPoint’s initiative may help insulate the Pinto, the Challenger, and WorldCom, firm from such a risk. better choices were available. Te man- Sometimes moral imagination can agers in these organizations—ordinary, enable firms to in effect reinvent their own decent people—however, were unprac- products. Since its launch in June 2005, ticed in the habit of moral imagination, web-based mapping application Google which could have led to alternate solu- Earth has gained over 200 million sub- tions. scribers.13 Most visitors use the sight rec- Moral imagination enables one to assess reationally to zoom in and out on detailed a situation, evaluate the present and new satellite images of the earth. In April 2007, possibilities, and create decisions that are however, Google transformed percep- not narrowly embedded in a restricted con- tions of its already-popular application by text or confined by a certain point of view. deciding to form a joint initiative with Te Typically, this means stepping back from U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. Te one’s role in an organization and using venture, the Genocide Prevention Mapping imagination to consider a situation from an Initiative, highlights the ongoing genocide unfamiliar perspective. in the Darfur region of Western Sudan In April 2007, WellPoint—a U.S.- with the social aim of increasing public based health benefits company with over awareness of—and sympathy for—the 34 million members, whose stated mission plight of the victims. is “to improve the lives of the people we Visitors to Google Earth who focus serve and the health of our communi- the tool on the Darfur region encounter ties” —decided to take the unprecedented various graphic symbols that link to up-to- step of linking employee compensation date information on the crisis, including to success in improving the health of its “video footage, photographs, and eyewit- 11 members. In order to assess the health of ness testimony.” An image of “red flames its members, WellPoint developed a set of brings up a place that has been destroyed; metrics based on a combination of national yellow-and-red flames show a village only standards and company-devised indicators. partially damaged.”14 As explained by John Metrics for customers with diabetes, for Prendergast, a senior advisor for the Inter- example, will “help to measure if they are national crisis group, the crisis in Darfur “is getting necessary eye exams, maintaining David versus Goliath, and Google Earth their blood sugar level to reduce complica- just gave David a stone for his slingshot.”15 tions and having their blood pressure level 12 In this imaginative act, which exceeds controlled.” typical expectations of a business, Google Te logic behind this initiative is demonstrated leadership by expanding the to actively engage all employees in the range and type of value creation initially primary purpose of the firm, which is envisioned for its own product. to improve the health of those it serves. Creative moral imagination helps us to Whether or not this act of moral imagina-

10 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS project beyond the constraints of particu- customer satisfaction stalwarts like Nord- lar narrative frameworks, roles, or biases. strom at number five and UPS at number While moral imagination is a critical first eight.18 By the time the magazine was step, it cannot in itself transform a crisis published on March 5, 2007, however, into a success. Just because we imagine a BusinessWeek had decided to remove Jet- certain moral possibility does not mean Blue from its rankings list due to a recent that it is our best path or that it is even headline-grabbing customer service disaster achievable in actuality. at the airline.19 For this reason, moral imagination must JetBlue’s operations infrastructure and go hand-in-hand with practical moral personnel training, which had proved suf- reasoning, which enables a manager to con- ficient under normal conditions, failed to textualize potential scenarios and decisions respond and adapt adequately to challenges resulting from an ice storm that crippled much of the Eastern United States on Feb- . . . moral imagination must go ruary 14, 2007. Te storm “left a large por- tion of the airline’s 11,000 pilots and flight hand-in-hand with practical attendants far from where they needed to moral reasoning, which enables be to operate the planes, and JetBlue lacked the staff to find them and tell them where a manager to contextualize to go.”20 Tis operations disaster caused potential scenarios and decisions some customers to be stranded in planes on the tarmac for up to 10 hours and led in terms of values, principles, to the cancellation of roughly 1,000 flights and moral norms. within the next four days.21 As one well-known ethics expert, Rush- worth M. Kidder, was quick to point out, in terms of values, principles, and moral “stranding tens of thousands of passen- norms. Moral imagination is most likely to gers, many of them parents with children, be employed successfully by purpose-driven starting long-planned vacations during the organizations having values statements President Day school holidays … isn’t just a alive within their culture. business failure; it’s a moral calamity.”22 It is From its founding in 1999 through the a moral calamity precisely because JetBlue first six weeks of 2007, JetBlue Airways lacked the moral imagination to prepare for had experienced a meteoric rise, garner- a scenario that was not only predictable, but ing a multitude of loyal customers based arguably, inevitable. No one knows with largely upon a reputation for exemplifying certainty when and where a devastating the firm’s core value of “bringing humanity storm will hit, but sooner or later transpor- back to air travel and making the experi- tation companies serving large areas are ence of flying happier and easier.”16 bound to face such a crisis. Te discount airline was heralded as While JetBlue’s lack of disaster prepa- much for its friendly service and passen- ration prior to the storm demonstrates ger amenities as it was for its inexpensive a culpable lack of imagination, the firm’s flights.17 In BusinessWeek’s first customer response after the disaster is an exemplary service ranking of global firms, JetBlue was case of moral imagination in action. Jet- listed at number four—based on survey Blue’s CEO and founder, David Neeleman, data gathered in 2006—rated higher than immediately issued public apologies via

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 11 opinion of what went wrong and how they could a video on the company Web site and on fx it. She engaged me in a dialogue about the YouTube, via an email sent to all custom- steps the airline was considering and sought ers, and via other public forums such as late my opinion on whether the measures would night talk shows and numerous interviews be enough. She thanked me for my help and with print, broadcast, and Web media. patience and asked me to give the airline a Neeleman admitted that he was “humili- second chance. They got it.24 ated and mortified” by his company’s failure to handle the crisis, and he promised Just six days after the ice storm, JetBlue the airline would act quickly to build the fulfilled Neeleman’s promise by issuing a operational capacity to handle future crises. cutting edge customer bill of rights that agrees to compensate passengers who experience lengthy delays.25 Neeleman’s While JetBlue’s lack of disaster stated goal in voluntarily making his firm responsible for compensating postponed preparation prior to the storm passengers was to create a policy “more demonstrates a culpable lack of aggressive than any airline lobbyist would let congress do.”26 imagination, the firm’s response As with Christopher Kercher, ini- after the disaster is an exem- tial reactions to JetBlue’s imaginative response—which included a much plary case of moral imagination improved operational performance when in action. the next major winter storm hit only a month after the February 14 disaster— were highly positive. Within two week He also promised to compensate customers after the disaster, a significant number of who experienced delays due to a “control- investment firms had “upgraded Jetblue’s lable irregularity.”23 shares to a ‘buy,’” and 80% of the visitors Neeleman’s words were embodied by who responded to a poll on BusinessWeek’s company action on several fronts, some Web site said they would have opted to of which exhibited moral imagination, as keep the airline at number four in the 27 JetBlue developed innovative responses magazine’s customer service rankings. to a new environment where they were While Google’s active moral imagina- attempting to win back customer trust. tion resulted in a new use for their product Christopher Kercher, a JetBlue passenger and JetBlue’s exercises of moral imagina- stranded during the ice storm describes one tion led to innovations in organizational aspect of this exceptional response: structure and policies, employing moral Not only did the airline move quickly to imagination can also have a positive impact apologize, accept full responsibility, and on product quality and trust. Actions taken proactively introduce a passenger’s bill of rights by Te New York Times in the wake of the (all effectively communicated by e-mail from Jayson Blair scandal exemplify this latter CEO David Neeleman), but they actually had concept. someone call me to apologize. When I wasn’t For the last century Te New York available, they even e-mailed me to fnd out Times—sometimes referred to as the when would be the best time to speak with me. “Gray Lady” for its accurate and objective When they reached me, the caller was not reporting—has enjoyed a reputation as some outsourced telemarketer working from a one of the world’s most respected source of script. Instead, she actually asked me for my news information.

12 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS On May 11, 2003 a front-page, 7,561- Keller who had been passed over in favor word story in the Times reported that: of Raines two years earlier, largely because A staff reporter for The New York Times Raines was viewed by Sulzberger as being committed frequent acts of journalistic fraud more innovative.31 while covering signifcant news events in recent Keller proved to be more of a revolu- months, an investigation by Times journalists tionary leader than anyone had anticipated. has found. The widespread fabrication and Within the Times he made so many execu- plagiarism represent a profound betrayal of tive changes that after his first 18 months, trust and a low point in the 152-year history of the newspaper. “two-thirds of all newsroom workers … [reported] to a new boss.”32 The reporter, Jayson Blair, 27, misled readers Perhaps Keller’s most daring innova- and Times colleagues with dispatches that tion, however, was to appoint Daniel purported to be from Maryland, Texas and Okrent, a former editor at Life and Time other states, when often he was far away, magazines, to an 18-month, non-renew- in New York. He fabricated comments. He able term as the first public editor of the concocted scenes. He lifted material from 33 other newspapers and wire services. He Times. Okrent’s role demanded that he selected details from photographs to create maintain an external perspective on the the impression he had been somewhere or Times while serving as the “designated 34 seen someone, when he had not.28 representative of the newspaper’s readers.” In his role as public editor or In all, Blair was found to have fab- ombudsman, Okrent did not report to ricated at least 36 of the 73 articles he management—essentially, he could not authored during his tenure at the Times. It be fired—he was given full access to the is important to note, however, that despite newsroom and “an unfettered opportunity the Times’s thorough investigation and to address readers’ comments about the lengthy reporting on the Blair scandal, it Times’s coverage, to raise questions of his was not the newspaper that broke the story. own, and to write about such matters in Te Times was scooped by the San commentaries that would be published in Antonio Express-News whose editor, the newspaper as often as he saw fit.”35 For Robert Rivard sent an email to Howell the first time in its history, Te New York Raines and Managing Editor Gerald Boyd Times would regularly include stories not on April 29, 2003, requesting that they reviewed by any of its editors. “acknowledge publicly that the Times Te reason for placing Okrent in this wrongfully appropriated reporter Macarena newly created post was not just to restore 29 Hernandez’s work.” When this accusation the trust of the paper’s readers, it was also against the Times and one of its reporters, part of an effort to repair problems that Jayson Blair, became public the following had become endemic in the culture of the day, other newspapers began to issue addi- newsroom. Te Times’s initial inquiry on tional complaints about Blair’s unacknowl- the Blair scandal outlines multiple “signs edged purloining of their stories. of trouble” that were available to the Times Publisher Arthur Sulzberger, whose upper management before disaster struck. family has owned and managed the paper A number of reporters and editors who since 1896, fired the chief editor Howell had grown concerned over the regularity

Rainesin the wake of this scandal—less of errors in Blair’s stories reported their than two years after he had taken the “misgivings about [his] reporting skills, 30 helm. In July 2003, Sulzberger replaced maturity and behavior” to newsroom Raines with former managing editor Bill

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 13 administrators, including a terse email from easy for staff reporters to accept. As Harold metropolitan editor John Landman stating: Evans, former editor of the Sunday Times “We have to stop Jayson from writing for of London has noted, “It is hardly inspira- the Times. Right now.”36 tional to be identified in a column in one’s It was also common knowledge among own paper as variously ‘nasty,’ ‘arrogant,’ fellow reporters that Blair improperly used ‘unfair,’ ‘dysfunctional,’ ‘ideological,’ ‘credu- his expense account and company vehicles lous,’ ‘condescending’”—all terms which for personal activities.37 Given the long list Okrent used during his tenure.41 of warning signs, why did the Times fail Despite these difficulties, Evans to take the actions necessary to protect its acknowledges that if a public editor had most valuable asset, the trust of its read- been in place during Howell Raines’s ers? None of the newsroom administrators tenure, “it is quite likely that … he would stood to benefit from Blair’s misdeeds—in have detected significant tremors before the fact, many of them were seriously harmed by them. A strong culture of professional ethics Creative moral imagination and values was present at Te New York Times leading up to the Blair scandal— helps managers criticize their however, as Howell Raines had noted, the own and others’ points of view Times also suffered from a “defining myth of effortless superiority.”38 Tis myth or and generate adequate alterna- narrative—based upon the Times’s history tives. of excellence and seemingly validated by a slew of Pulitzers—made it difficult for managers to see that the type of journalistic earthquakes …. Te fault lines were there fraud committed by Blair could actually before Raines took over.”42 Te morally take place within their culture. imaginative step of giving one’s critics a While strong organizational cultures are voice—and a very public soapbox—helped a good defense against most ethical failings, to break the enchantment of the Times’s the Achilles heel is their susceptibility to myth of invincible superiority, not only what psychologists term groupthink—“a restoring trust in the current paper, but strong concurrence-seeking tendency that also helping to ensure that future problems interferes with effective decision making.” 39 would not go unchecked as they did in the In particular, groupthink fosters the illusion case of Jayson Blair. that an organization lacks certain vulner- Creative imagination facilitates the abilities or is inherently more moral than ability to envision and actualize novel pos- others.40 What was missing at the Times sibilities through a fresh point of view or was a highly developed moral imagina- conceptual scheme. Creative moral imagi- tion that would have enabled managers to nation helps managers criticize their own critique and correct the sense of superior- and others’ points of view and generate ity that prevented the paper from making adequate alternatives. Ed Keller and David effective decisions to halt a tiny blaze of Neeleman freed their imaginations from misdeeds before they became an inferno. traditional mindsets in order to see that Keller’s decision to give a critic unre- other options were in fact available. stricted access and a regular, unedited Moral decision making is a dynamic column in the Times could not have been process, one which calls for an imagina-

14 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS tive response by managers encountering While the role and circumstance of new situations that do not easily fit within corporations differ, most firms would an existing narrative or framework. Moral recognize serious benefits from develop- judgments are not always clear—more ing and “routinizing” the exercise of moral often than not they are a result of a deli- imagination in the daily work routine of cate balance of context, evaluations of the their employees. Moral imagination is not situation, and the presence or absence of just about avoiding disasters—it is about imagination. creating value through new products, ser- Te moral decision-making process is vices, processes, and organizations. Because seldom complete, since moral judgments of this close alignment to innovation, are at best partial or temporary solutions. moral imagination could financially benefit Tese solutions are, however, also start- companies facing the challenge of organic ing points or models for future sets of growth. decisions. Each new set of decisions is an Four Key Issues: opportunity for moral growth, an occasion to further develop a moral imagination that Managers interested in fostering moral perceives the nuances of a situation, chal- imagination may use the following key lenges the framework or narrative in which issues and accompanying recommendations the event is embedded, and imagines how as starting points. that situation and other situations might be 1. Failure to speak a common different. language Nothing short of a very active free- playing imagination will enable us to Different professions or areas within the distance ourselves from our scripts, roles, or same organization may exhibit very differ- narratives to envision new and better possi- ent ways of framing issues. Te Challenger bilities. Moral imagination entails an ability disaster happened in part because Tiokol’s to consider a situation from the perspec- managers failed to understand the engi- tives of various stakeholders—a facility that neers’ definition of risk; one of the senior can help managers avoid the ethical trap managers overrode the engineers protest; of confusing reality with what they want and Tiokol signed off on the launch. it to be. Leaders will better prepare their RECOMMENDATION: organizations for the unanticipated situa- Organizations—particularly large tions they will inevitably face by expanding global ones—need to include individuals the notion of managerial responsibility to who understand and can translate multiple include moral imagination as a cultural frameworks. In order to make good deci- practice and value. sions, firms must develop common systems that facilitate interaction between the vari- IMPLICATIONS AND TAKE- ous narratives and mental models. AWAYS FOR MANAGERS 2. Obedience to authority Sometimes obedience to authority contrib- Moral imagination can be taught and utes to moral disaster. Individuals, when developed inside cubicles as well as in the given a set of instructions by a person in board room. It should be a key factor in authority, will often carry out these instructions, even when they are absurd, immoral, developing the next generation of corpo- dangerous, or life-threatening.43 rate leaders.

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 15 RECOMMENDATION: RECOMMENDATION: A) Creating a culture of pushback— A) Internalizing critics may be the like Johnson & Johnson’s challenge best safeguard for organizational integrity. meetings—can be an effective method for If external critics are breaking “bad news” leaders. Tis does not happen organically; it about the company, it may be too late to must be built in from the top of the organi- fix any problems. External perspectives are zation. A tone must exist at the top that key to avoiding groupthink. Communica- actively seeks out and listens to internal tions and public relations personnel serve voices of dissent. an important, ethical role by listening to B) Shared responsibility can be and engaging stakeholders outside the firm. achieved when individuals author and par- Whenever it takes a publicly visible crisis to ticipate in their own history and narratives. make a firm sensitive to ethics issues within No matter a person’s place in an organiza- a company, it must be viewed as a cultural tion, each person is responsible for helping and management failure. to build or change the culture. If something B) Reaping the benefits of diversity is disturbing about a company, individu- with regard to race, gender, cultural back- als should envision how they can become ground, and personality/modes of thinking change agents. and expressing one’s self is of great value. 3. The lesser of two evils Tese differences, when recognized, can help an organization to develop internal When faced with a difficult choice, we leaders who can criticize the organization. often may feel forced to choose between C) Consulting other leaders outside the the lesser of two evils, figuring that the firm is a great benefit to those in leadership moral response is to choose the option that positions. It provides insight and an oppor- does the least harm. tunity for conversation about difficult ethics RECOMMENDATION: issues. Likewise, the Business Roundtable It is precisely when it seems there is no Institute for Corporate Ethics’s CEO Eth- good option among our available choices ics Seminars operate on the principle that that we should think outside our current the corner office can be a lonely place— role and framework and imagine what a especially with regard to ethics issues—and good choice or a better story might look that there is great benefit to be had from like. Te real choice is not simply between leaders of different firms engaging in the lesser of two evils, but between accept- conversations about ethical issues with one ing this framework, turning a blind eye to another. other possibilities and to our own responsibility, or imagining and searching for a better answer. 4. Groupthink

Groupthink occurs when a community narrative is so powerful that it remains unquestioned. It can lead to illusions of invulnerability or moral superiority, which create organizational blind spots, crippling an individual’s ability to make good decisions.

16 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS A THOUGHT LEADER COMMENTARY™ with Klaus M. Leisinger, Chief Executive Ofﬁcer, the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development

Q: Te Novartis Foundation for Sustainable Development is widely admired and respected as one of the leading organizations in the private sector for international development and sustainable improvement. What advice would you give to a new CEO or executive leader who is interested in embedding ethics into the business decision making of his/her ﬁrm? NDATION U

Klaus M. Leisinger: If he or she is commit- FO

ted to the subject beyond lip service—which TIS R A is not to be taken for granted—I would ﬁrst V O

suggest including business ethics content in F N O all corporate governance elements: codes of conduct; responsibility guidelines; target set- TESY UR O

ting; performance appraisals; bonus systems; C and reporting, with great emphasis placed on all Klaus M. Leisinger internal education and management development courses. For all of these elements I would reading, debating, and working with case stud- look externally toward leading institutions that ies as well as sending team members to ethics can offer assistance. seminars. What is lacking today are the struc- Content-wise, I would suggest training that tured approaches combining business ethics includes a mixture of “orientation knowledge” issues with acquiring competence in intercul- and case studies, i.e. teaching some “basics” of tural management. moral philosophy and giving some annotated, required reading as homework, as well as work- Q: Globalization and the tremendous growth ing through case studies and discussing them of emerging economies create new sets of ethi- together. Case studies should come as close as cal challenges for business leaders—namely, the possible to the “real business world” and focus firm’s ability to unite different cultural frame- on complex situations and dilemmas, such as works. How does your leadership team ensure prisoner’s dilemmas. If and when any past cor- that international partners become aligned with porate misconduct occurred, I would use that respect to culture and practice? also as a case study. Leisinger: One of the most difficult issues to deal with is the number of attitudes and ways Q: In recent years, executives have become of conduct that “go without saying” in each increasingly aware of the importance of devel- specific foreign culture—but are unacceptable oping ethical cultures at their companies. How from the perspective of international norms does your organization foster the moral devel- such as the Universal Declaration of Human opment of employees? Rights.44 Te challenge here is to respect local Leisinger: First of all, it is important to make culture and practice as far as they are compati- sure that responsible behavior does not neces- ble with an enlightened “international conduct,” sitate moral heroism but is encouraged by while drawing a clear line where the rights of appropriate corporate codes of conduct, cor- others are violated either through discrimina- porate responsibility guidelines, and a coherent tion or neglect of legitimate entitlements. It is incentive system. Beyond that, we encourage in this area that “moral imagination” comes into

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 17 play—and this Bridge Paper™ is an excellent Wrong attitudes can be found in all camps; introduction into this subject. mistakes and misjudgments can be found with all committed actors—so can good will, innova- Q: In the last decade, some corporations have tive thinking, and moral imagination. Achieving begun engaging external stakeholders such as concrete and measurable successes by bring- NGOs. Some have argued that this helps com- ing committed actors with their resources into panies manage risk by being more attuned to “solution teams” for global development and approaching social changes that can impact the sustainability issues could support a “climate business. How might increased social engage- change” on all sides and create the synergies ment also lead to new business opportunities? needed to achieve the Millennium Develop- Leisinger: It is obvious that dialogue and ment Goals. cooperation with external stakeholders such as NGOs can create awareness about crucial social Q: We have known for some time now what realities that would otherwise remain outside kinds of personalities help people thrive in the “silo” in which managers think, reflect, leadership functions—be they in business, and decide. Complex tasks also need coopera- politics, or civil society—in order to achieve tion from different actors with different skills, what a great majority of global citizens desire experience, resources, and value premises – even to have accomplished in the global economic, more so with work in the social, intercultural, social, and ecological sphere. But where do we and moral sphere. In my professional experi- find such holistic personalities, and how can we ence, however, some of the most prominent make sure they are entrusted with the top jobs NGOs are—for a variety of reasons—not read- in their institutions? ily available to cooperate with “Big Business” Leisinger: I work on the assumption that there due to negative stereotypes with regard to the is a comparable moral “Gauss-distribution” “moral state of affairs” in multinational enter- (normal, bell-shaped curve) of people engaged prises. As partnerships in social engagement in business, politics, and civil society. Hence need to be robust and guided by a minimum we have some “geniuses” and “saints” on the of unité de doctrine, such engagements are more right-hand side of the distribution and some easily requested than filled with sustainable “dopes” and “crooks” on the opposite end of life. Whether or not new business opportuni- the distribution. Te vast majority in-between ties can arise—such as “bottom of the pyramid” constitutes ordinary and decent people, neither approaches—depends on the business sector. “deniers” nor “leaders.” From a moral viewpoint, an “average” company can only mature to an Q: What is the greatest area of opportunity “excellent” company if and when business ethi- that you envision on the horizon for your orga- cal issues are reflected in all its corporate gover- nization or mission objectives? What are the nance elements. Under such conditions, acting most difficult aspects of the problem that you ethically is no longer a restriction in an other- would like to help solve? wise morally indifferent corporate environment Leisinger: For the Novartis Foundation for but a systemic part of what the company strives Sustainable Development, the greatest area of for. One of the consequences will be that pro- opportunity is the high international aware- motions are not exclusively linked to economic ness focused on the importance of achieving results such as “more inventory (stock) turn- the United Nations’s Millennium Development over” or “increased profits” but also as a result Goals.45 Tere is a growing awareness that it is of the integrity with which these results were an illusion to believe any of the huge and com- achieved. Looking for the “right” people and plex global issues can be solved without or even placing them in morally sensitive responsibil- against “business.” Te most difficult aspect of ity areas is one of the biggest challenges for the the problem we would like to help solve is to sustainable success of any business enterprise. further “moral imagination” on all sides and with all partners looking for concrete solutions.

18 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Moral Imagination and Manage- BRIAN MORIARTY is Associate ment Decision Making Director for Communications at the Busi- ness Roundtable Institute for Corporate PATRICIA H. WERHANE is an Ethics (the Institute), an independent Academic Advisor with the Business business ethics center that operates in Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics. partnership with Business Roundtable— She is the Wicklander Chair in Business an association of 160 CEOs from leading Ethics and Director of the Institute for companies—and leading scholars from top Business and Professional Ethics at DePaul business schools. He directs the organiza- University. tion’s communications and media relations Professor Werhane is the founder and activities and manages the Institute’s joint former editor-in-chief of Business Ethics initiative with the Arthur W. Page Society Quarterly, the leading journal of business on public trust in business. He is a co- ethics. She is a founding member and past author of the report, Te Dynamics of Public president of the Society for Business Ethics Trust in Business—Emerging Opportunities and, in 2001, was elected to the Executive for Leaders. Committee of the Association for Practi- Moriarty manages the Institute’s Book cal and Professional Ethics. As the Ruﬃn Series in Ethics and Leadership and has Professor of Business Ethics and Senior authored articles, book chapters, and white Fellow of the Olsson Center for Applied papers on the topic of corporate ethics. He Ethics at the Darden School of Business, has served on selection committees for a Professor Werhane taught there from 1993 variety of business ethics awards. Previ- – 2009. She also served on the faculties of ously, he was part of the communications Loyola University Chicago and Dartmouth and marketing team at the University of College. Her book, Moral Imagination and Virginia’s Darden School of Business. Management Decision-Making, was chosen Outstanding Book in 2004 by the Acad- emy of Management in the Social Issues in Management Division.

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 19 Thought Leader Commentary™ Rights and Business. Professor Leisinger served as invited lecturer or guest profes- KLAUS M. LEISINGER heads sor at several Swiss and German universi- the Novartis Foundation for Sustainable ties, as well as at the University of Notre Develop ment as Chief Executive Officer Dame, DePaul University, the MIT Sloan and President of its Board of Trustees. Te School of Management (Cambridge), and Foundation (www.novartisfoundation.com) Harvard University. He is a member of the has consul tative status with the Social and European Acade my of Sciences and Arts Economic Council of the United Nations and has published comprehensively; several and is considered unique amongst private of his books were translated into Chinese, sector foundations. Portuguese, and English. Leisinger’s professional career brought Leisinger has held and still holds several him to East Africa as CEO of the former advisory positions in a number of national Ciba Pharmaceuticals Regional Office, and international organi za tions, such as where he was responsible for the business the United Nations Global Compact, the in 12 East African countries for several United Nations Development Pro gram years. After his return to headquarters in (UNDP), the World Bank (CGIAR), Switzerland, he headed the company’s Asian Development Bank as well as Interna tional Relations department. During Economic Com mission for Latin America that term, Leisinger profoundly engaged in (ECLA), and the UN Economic and Social corporate responsibility issues and actively Council. Among others, he chairs the Board promoted a corporate culture of public of Trustees of the Ger man Business Ethics dialogue. Te extensive relationships and Network. Between September 2005 and networks he estab lished over many years December 2006, Leisinger served as Special with stakeholders in international devel- Advisor to the United Nations Secretary opment policy and cooperation as well as General for the UN Global Compact, at business ethics and academic circles still that time Kofi Annan. He continues to work down to the present day and serve be a member in the UN Global Compact as a mutual sounding-board for issues Human Rights Working Group (chaired by relevant to Novartis and its Foundation. Mary Robinson). For his sustained engage- Additionally, Lei singer has been the head of ment “pro pace et justitia” as well as for his the company’s philanthropy and develop- academic work in Business Ethics he was ment assistance pro grams for more than 25 awarded a “doctor honoris causa” in theol- years. Under his guidance, corporate social ogy by the university of Fribourg (Switzer- investment initiatives pursued a coherent land). strategic direc tion and adopted a mission that has benefited millions of poor people in developing countries in very concrete ways, be it through the cure of leprosy and other diseases, agricultural devel opment, or socio-economic development. In addition to his position at the Novar- tis Foundation, Leisinger is Professor of Sociology at the Uni vers i ty of Basel where he teaches Business Ethics, Corporate Social Responsibility, as well as Human

20 BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE INSTITUTE FOR CORPORATE ETHICS NOTES

1. Patricia H. Werhane, Moral Imagination and Management Decision Making, Te Ruffin Series in Business Ethics, R. Edward Freeman, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 2. Dennis Gioia, “Pinto Fires and Personal Ethics: A script Analysis of Missed Opportunities,” Journal of Business Ethics 11 (1992): 385. 3. Gioia, 385. 4. E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 80–82. 5. Wendy K. Smith and Richard S. Tedlow, “James Burke: A Career in American Business,” Harvard University Graduate School of Business Case #9-389-1771989 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989). 6. Patricia H. Werhane, “Engineers and Management: Te Challenge of the Challenger Incident,” Journal of Business Ethics 10, (1991): 605–615. 7. Judith Andre, “Role Morality as a Complex Instance of Ordinary Morality,” American Philosophical Quarterly 28, (1991): 73–80. 8. Susan Pulliam, “Over the Line: A Staffer Ordered To Commit Fraud Balked, Ten Caved—Pushed by WorldCom Bosses, Accountant Betty Vinson Helped Cook the Books—A Confession at the Marriott,” Te Wall Street Journal, 23 June 2003, sec. A1. 9. Pulliam, A1. 10. Pulliam, A1. 11. Wellpoint Website: http://www.wellpoint.com/business/about_mission.asp. Wellpoint company news release, “WellPoint is Nation’s First Health Benefits Company to Measure the Health of its Members” (April 4, 2007): http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=130104&p=irol-newsArticle_ general&t=Regular&id=981192&. 12. Wellpoint company news release (April 4, 2007). 13. Nora Boustany, “Museum, Google Zoom In on Darfur,” Washington Post, 14 April 2007, sec. A10, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/13/AR2007041302189_pf.html. 14. Boustany, A1. 15. Quoted in Boutsany, A1. 16. David Neeleman, “An Apology from JetBlue Airways email message to customers,” February 22, 2007. 17. JetBlue Web site: http://www.jetblue.com/about/ourcompany/history/about_ourhistory.html. 18. Jenna McGregor, “Special Report: Customer Service Champs,” BusinessWeek, (5 March 2007): 54–58. 19. McGregor, 58. 20. Jeff Bailey, “Chief ‘Mortified’ by JetBlue Crisis,” Te New York Times, 19 February 2007, sec. 1. 21. Bailey, 2007. 22. Rushworth M. Kidder, “Ice, JetBlue, and the Collapse of Prudence,” Ethics Newsline, 20 February 2007, (www.globalethics.org/newsline/). 23. David Neeleman quoted by Bailey, 2007; JetBlue Airways Customer Bill of Rights, http://www.jetblue.com/about/ ourcompany/promise/index.html. 24. Christopher Kercher, “Readers Report,” BusinessWeek, (26 March 2007). 25. JetBlue News Release. “JetBlue Announces the JetBlue Customer Bill of Rights,” Feb. 20, 2007, http://investor.jetblue. com/phoenix.zhtml?c=131045&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=965052&highlight. 26. Neeleman as quoted by Bailey, 2007. 27. Terry Keenan, “JetBlue Damage Control,” FOX News, (27 February 2007); http://www.foxnews.com/ story/0,2933,255101,00.html; and Robert Trigaux, “Service is Knowing How to Say You’re Sorry,” St. Petersburg Times.

BRIDGE PAPER™: MORAL IMAGINATION AND MANAGEMENT DECISON MAKING 21 28. Dan Barry, David Barstow, Jonathan D. Glater, Adam Liptak, and Jacques Steinberg, “Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,” Te New York Times, 11 May 2003, sec. 1. 29. T.A. Badger, “San Antonio Express-News Claims New York Times Reporter Appropriated Material,” Associated Press, 30 April 2003. 30. Anthony Bianco, John Rossant, and Lauren Gard, “Te Future of Te New York Times; Publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr. Has His Hands Full: Weaker Earnings. A Changing Media World. A Scandal’s Aftermath. He Also Has an Ambitious Business Plan,” BusinessWeek 3916, no. 64 (17 January 2005). 31. Bianco et al, 2005. 32. Bianco et al, 2005. 33. “Interview: Journalist Daniel Okrent talks about being the ﬁrst ombudsman of Te New York Times,” Fresh Air, 17 May 2006. 34. Jacques Steinberg, “Te Times Chooses Veteran of Magazines and Publishing as Its First Public Editor,” Te New York Times, 27 October 2003. 35. Steinberg, 2003. 36. Dan Barry, David Barstow, Jonathan D. Glater, Adam Liptak, and Jacques Steinberg, “Times Reporter Who Resigned Leaves Long Trail of Deception,” Te New York Times, 11 May 2003, sec. 1. 37. Barry et al, 2003. 38. Howell Raines as quoted by Bianco et al, 2005. 39. Forsyth as cited in Arnold P. Goldstein, Te Psychology of Group Aggression, (Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, 2002), 32. 40. Goldstein, 34, 41. Harold Evans,“Eye on Te Times: Book Review of Public Editor #1: Te Collected Columns (With Reﬂections, Reconsiderations, and Even a Few Retractions) of the First Ombudsman of Te New York Times, by Daniel Okrent,” Te New York Times, 18 June 2006. 42. Evans, 2006. 43. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority (New York: HarperCollins, 1974). 44. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/), (accessed August 2009). 45. Novartis Foundation, “Making Aid Work,” (http://www.novartisfoundation.org/page/content/index.asp?MenuID =368&ID=1135&ConID=1135&Menu=3&Item=73) and the United Nations’ Millennium Goals: (http://www. un.org/millenniumgoals/), (accessed August 2009).

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