Washington University Law Review Volume 1966 Issue 3 January 1966 The Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus—A Critique Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview Recommended Citation The Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus—A Critique, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 345 (1966). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/4 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. THE PREMATURITY DOCTRINE IN HABEAS CORPUS- A CRITIQUE While the constitutional rights of persons charged with criminal offenses have been strengthened and expanded by recent Supreme Court decisions,' in some situations federal post-conviction remedies have not kept pace with this trend. This incongruity is most pronounced when a state or federal prisoner challenges a sentence which he has not commenced to serve, basing his challenge on an alleged violation of these rights.' If federal habeas cor- pus is the remedy utilized, and if the prisoner is currently serving a valid sentence, relief is denied because the request is "premature."'3 In this situa- tion, where the challenged sentence commences in futuro, other federal post- conviction remedies have been equally unsuccessful.4 While this note will deal primarily with the prematurity doctrine of federal habeas corpus, a re- view of these other remedies is necessary to demonstrate their inadequacy and the subsequent need for an abolition of the prematurity doctrine estab- lished by McNally v.