VOLUME 13, ISSUE 1, 2021

LIAISONA JOURNAL OF CIVIL-MILITARY DISASTER MANAGEMENT & HUMANITARIAN RELIEF COLLABORATIONS HA/DR Implications in the Era of Great Power Competition

Exploring Taiwan's HADR Capability

U.S. Maritime Grand Strategy in the Indian, Arctic Oceans

Protecting Civilians Still Matters in Great-Power Conflict CONTENTS

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12 Exploring Taiwan's HADR Capabilities 24 China's Strategic Calculus Explore how Taiwan can play a more active role in regional This article addresses how Afghanistan may shift its strategic humanitarian assistance disaster relief and how the U.S. and outlook to meet the shift in its strategic outlook to meet the allies can cooperate more with Taiwan in this domain. shift in Beijing's behavior, which is part of a broader strategy to expand and consolidate its influence in Central, South, and Western Asia. 32 US Maritime Grand Strategy 38 GPC in Aleutian Archipelago With the Chinese Communist Party’s errant behavior in mind, With no U.S. Navy surface ships in the Aleutians and no the United States must challenge China’s expansive maritime permanent U.S. Coast Guard bases, the United States is strategy which will grow from a focus in the South China Sea powerless to stop ongoing incursions by Russian warships in to a focus in the Indian and Arctic Oceans. the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone which disrupt commerce and intimidate local Americans. ON THE COVER Photo illustration by Rufino E. Ballesteros

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48 Global Pandemic and GPC 56 Climate Instability The U.S. Department of Defense is a critical participant and Civil-military organizations can utilize their skill sets to enabler in the ongoing global competition for influence. help bolster partner capabilities and prepare them to face the Humanitarian assistance is a form of global competition. If challenges of climate change. Doing so may be vital to ensure this was not the case before the global pandemic, it certainly is they remain capable partners. now. 60 Protecting Civilians During Conflict 64 Deconflicting in Syria Preventing civilian harm is a strategic, long-term investment in An examination of the Humanitarian Notification Systems peace and stability. Reducing risks to civilians in a large-scale for Deconfliction (HNS4D) used in Syria where humanitarian conflict will directly affect the sustainability of post-war peace. organizations give the geographic locations of their sites and movements to a coordinating body who then shares the coordinates with those involved with the conflict for protection.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 3 LIAISON VOLUME 13, ISSUE 1, 2021 Editor Theanne Tangen

Assistant Editor Gabriela Capestany

Graphic Designer Rufino E. Ballesteros DIRECTORY Please direct all inquiries to: Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) 10 New GPC Program Building 76 465 Hornet Avenue Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam 12 Taiwan's HADR Capabilities Hawaii, 96860-3503

Phone: 001-808-472-0518 24 China's Strategic Calculus

Website: https://www.cfe-dmha.org 32 US Maritime Strategy LIAISON is a publication of the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and 38 GPC in Aleutian Archipelago Humanitarian Assistance (CFE-DM) and serves to inform its diverse audience of current and emerging issues related to civil-military 48 Global Pandemic and GPC relations across the broad spectrum of disaster relief in order to enhance understanding Climate instability among civilian and military practitioners and 56 policy makers. Protecting Civilians During Conflict Content is prepared in accordance with the 60 Associated Press Style Guide. Contributions are welcomed and highly encouraged. The editor 64 Deconflicting in Syria reserves the right to make editorial changes to any material submitted as deemed necessary. 72 Simplifying Adaptive Complex Crises The authors in this issue of LIAISON are entirely responsible for opinions expressed in their articles. These opinions are not to be construed 78 References as official views of, or endorsed by, CFE-DM, any of its partners, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. IN EVERY ISSUE

In addition to the Liaison staff and contributing 5 The Director’s Letter authors, the editor thanks the following people 6 Contributors whose efforts made the publication possible: Joseph Martin, Doug Wallace, James Kenwolf, 9 Letters to the Editor Rochelle Naeole-Adams, Jesse Wolfe, Beth Gerry, Rod Macalintal, Alice Tsai, Joshua Szimonisz, Trevor Monroe, Lloyd Puckett, Ranya Ghadban, Amy Gorey, Joyce Blanchard, Gregg St. Pierre, Casey Johnson, Stephanie Liu, Kenya Bostic, Clyde Louchez, Andrea Ciletti, Victoria Hart, Alberto Morales, Leigh Sholler, Ralph Mamiya, and Jenney Pantenburg. Official U.S. Navy file photo of ships and submarines participating in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 2012 in formation in the waters around the Hawaiian Islands. (Photo by MCC Keith DeVinney)

4 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 LETTER FROM THE DIRECTOR JOSEPH MARTIN, SES

y introduction to this of others – a radical notion for a edition of the Liaison historically isolationist country – will use a historical remains a bedrock of U.S. foreign contextM to frame the modern-day policy and the humanitarian Great Powers Competition and the action we carry out and support role humanitarian assistance plays across the globe. Yet, if core tenets in it. underpinning America’s approach On the morning of June 24, 1948 to strategic competition remain the Soviet Army occupying East constant, both the competitors Germany severed all rail, road, and and the field of play have altered canal links into Allied-controlled considerably, with the Asia- Berlin. Food, electricity, coal: all at Pacific region and the U.S.- China once everything was cut off in an relationship front and center for the effort to force the western zone of foreseeable future. the divided city to submit to the Soviet Union. With these dynamics in mind, this issue of the For the first week or so it looked like the Liaison leads with several articles exploring our maneuver might work and the Soviets would take regional partnerships and humanitarian assistance/ control. However, western air force commanders disaster relief (HADR) through the lens of the hurriedly organized perhaps the greatest so-called Great Power Competition. These are humanitarian airlift in history. For the next 11 especially timely pieces, as the recently declassified months the U.S. and its British, French, Canadian, U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategic Framework makes clear, Australian, New Zealand, and South African allies America is seeking not only to sustain but to also flew more than a quarter million relief flights – expand collaboration with regional countries on landing every 30 seconds – into the besieged city. peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disaster The Berlin Airlift accomplished many things: It response, and global health. Consistent with our provided life-sustaining humanitarian assistance, seven plus decades of ensuring a free and open led the Soviets to lift their blockade the following Asia-Pacific, these partnerships – especially in May, and spurred the allies’ formation of the NATO the HADR realm – are not about forcing states to alliance and the eventual inclusion of West Germany choose between the U.S. and China, but ensuring within the alliance. Less tangibly, this civil-military the rights- and rules-based system that underwrites humanitarian action revealed the centrality of values their freedom of choice. From West Berlin to the and partnerships in the post-WWII competitive South China Sea, this values- and partnership- space. based approach to strategic competition may be (as As Peter Sichel, an American official serving in Churchill once remarked of democracy) the worst Berlin, recalled more than 70 years later, “Up until option … except everything else that has been tried. then, Berliners saw the Americans as occupiers … The blockade changed that. They saw that we were all in this together, that we were trying to keep the Aloha, city alive, and so we went from this relationship of considerable animosity to them seeing us as their allies.” The dawning realization that we could advance American interests by serving the needs

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 5 CONTRIBUTORS Dr. Atal Ahmadzai has a PhD in Global Affairs with concentration on environmental and human security. His specialization and research fall within the thematic intersection of climate change, resource conflicts, and development. With multilingual proficiency Dr. Ahmadzai’s regional expertise is focused on Center, South, and Western Asia. He has years of field work experience and first-hand knowledge on issues pertaining to resource conflict, terrorism, and underdevelopment. In addition, Dr. Ahmadzai has years of teaching experience at different educational institutions including Rutgers University, Seton Hall University, New Jersey City University (NJCU), and University of Arizona. He has taught course including but not limited to Human Security, Terrorism and Counterterrorism, Politics of Global Development, Globalization and Governance, International Politics, American Politics, and Research Methodologies. See article, page 24. Dr. Atal Ahmadzai

Dr. Deon Canyon joined the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in 2016 after working at the University of Hawaii, Curtin University and James Cook University where he focused on global health protection, health security and crisis management. A Hawai‘i resident since 2011, he is well regarded as a crisis scholar for his work on vector-borne disease, bioterrorism preparedness, crisis management auditing, and crisis leadership. He has published over 175 peer-reviewed journal articles, book chapters, conference papers, and books and conference papers and has reviewed for over 40 journals, served on several editorial boards, and is a Fellow of the Australasian College of Tropical Medicine. Having been a Papua New Guinea citizen Canyon speaks Tok Pisin, Bislama, and Solomon Pijin, and is well acquainted with the traditional practices and cultural norms of Pacific Islanders and Australian Aboriginals. Dr. Deon Canyon See article, page 72.

U.S. Army Reserve Lt. Col. Hugh Dougalas serves as the Governance and Participation Section Leader of the 351st Civil Affairs Command in Mountain View, California. He graduated from Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College with a Bachelor of Science degree in Geology and attended Loyola Marymount University where he earned a Master's Degree in Civil (Water Resources) Engineering. As an undergraduate he participated in Air Force ROTC and after serving in the Air National Guard separated from the Military and commenced a civilian career in designing and constructing soil and groundwater remediation systems for an environmental engineering and consulting firm. After 9/11, Hugh re-entered Military Service commissioning as an Army Sanitary Engineer and later transferred to the Civil Affairs Branch. He was deployed twice to Iraq in support of stabilization and reconstruction operations and was appointed a 38G Military Government Specialist with a Public Water and Lt. Col. Hugh Dougalas Sanitation skill identifier. Hugh Dougalas is the son of a West Point graduate and career Infantry Officer. As an "Army Brat," Hugh grew up all over the world. See article, page 38.

U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Hendrick has served as the G9 (Civil-Military Operations) NCOIC at 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command in Daegu, Republic of Korea since 2018. Previously he served in 7th Infantry Division and the 84th Civil Affairs Battalion. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in English from National University and a Master of Arts in International Relations with a Security Policy Focus from St. Mary’s University of San Antonio. He has been active duty Civil Affairs since 2014. He is proficient in Korean, and taught English in Japan prior to joining the Army. See article, page 56.

Sgt. 1st Class Paul Hendrick

6 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 U.S. Army Reserve Col. Bradford “Brad” Hughes is a former Master Army Aviator and UH-60 Maintenance Test Pilot. In 2018 he transferred to the Civil Affairs branch and was appointed a 38G Military Government Specialist with a Transportation skill identifier. He currently serves as the Functional Specialty Chief for the 351st Civil Affairs Command in Mountain View, California. In this role he leads a team of subject matter experts employing both military and civilian-acquired skills to synchronize Army capabilities with host-nation, interagency, and indigenous populations to improve outcomes across complex human domain systems. As a civilian Hughes is the Director of Operations for an on-demand helicopter charter company serving Central Texas. He also works as a Technology Transfer Consultant providing clients intellectual property management and market-based recommendation about patenting, marketing, and licensing. He graduated from Dickinson College with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and has a Master of Science in Technology Commercialization from the University Col. Bradford Hughes of Texas at Austin. See article, page 38.

Casey Johnson works for the Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, as an advisor in the Plans, Programs, and Analysis branch. He recently worked at the Department of State’s Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations in Washington, D.C. Where he led global research on countering violent extremism. Prior to that he lived and worked in Afghanistan for eight years with the United States Institute of Peace and other local organizations conducting research on the Taliban and advising the U.S. military on stabilization efforts. He is a graduate of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. See article, page 12.

Casey Johnson

U.S. Army Maj. Mike Karlson is currently a Civil Military Operations Center Chief in the 83d Civil Affairs Battalion. He received his commission as a Transportation Officer through the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in 2008. He holds a MA in Strategic Security Studies from the National Defense University, a MA in Organizational Leadership from Brandman University, and a BA in Psychology from the Virginia Military Institute. He is on the editorial board of the Civil Affairs Association's Eunomia Journal. He has served in both conventional and Special Operations Civil Affairs organizations since 2014 and has operational experiences in Afghanistan and several countries throughout the Indo-Pacific region. See article, page 48.

Maj. Mike Karlson

Daniel R. Mahanty is the director of the U.S. program at Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC). Prior to joining CIVIC Dan spent 16 years at the U.S. Department of State. In 2012 he created and led the Office of Security and Human Rights in the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, where he oversaw efforts to integrate human rights in U.S. security assistance and arms sales, advance the prevention of recruitment and use of child soldiers, and promote policies related to protecting civilians in conflict. Dan holds a Masters from Georgetown in U.S. National Security Policy and a Bachelors in Economics from George Mason University. He is a Colin L. Powell Fellow, a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations, a Truman National Security Fellow, and served on the board of advisors for the NGO, “Women LEAD Nepal.” Daniel Mahanty See article, page 60.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 7 CONTRIBUTORS U.S. Navy Capt. Kim McCann joined the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in March 2019 as a Military Professor. She is a licensed attorney who serves as Judge Advocate in the U.S. Navy. She has a Juris Doctor degree from Texas Tech School of Law and a Master of Laws in National Security Law (with distinction) from Georgetown University Law Center. Her assignments include U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Special Operations Command Pacific, Submarine Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet, and Carrier Strike Group SEVEN. See article, page 32.

Capt. Kim McCann

U.S. Navy Capt. Jim McMullin is a Navy Foreign Area Officer who served at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies from December 2018 to December 2020. His research interests include maritime security cooperation, maritime fusion centers, and China. He is currently assigned to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. See article, page 32.

Capt. Jim McMullin

Sara Miller is a humanitarian aid worker with experience working on emergency response programs in the Middle East and South America. Based in Amman, Jordan, she worked on the Syria crisis for a major NGO. Sara also has spent substantial time working in Ecuador and Thailand. She is currently working as a Desk Officer for the NGO Americares focusing on emergency COVID-19 medical relief in Peru. Sara holds a bachelor’s degree from Lewis & Clark College in Portland, OR and a master’s degree from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. At Fletcher, her thesis research focused on civilian-military coordination mechanisms in complex emergencies and the intersections between military actors and humanitarian response. See article, page 64. Sara Miller

Annie Shiel is the Senior Advisor for U.S. Policy and Advocacy with Center for Civilians in Conflict (CIVIC) and a Research Program Manager with Stanford University where she conducts research, policy analysis, advocacy, and coalition building around civilian harm from U.S. military operations and security assistance. Prior to her work with CIVIC and Stanford, she spent three years at the Department of State where she worked on human rights, civilian protection, and security sector reform as a founding member of DRL’s Office of Security and Human Rights. She is also a Truman National Security Fellow. Annie holds a Master of International Policy from Stanford University and a BA in International Development from McGill University. See article, page 60.

Annie Shiel

8 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Wade Turvold joined the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in 2019 after a 30-year career serving in the U.S. Navy as a Naval Flight Officer flying the P-3C and P-8A aircraft. He was privileged to serve in two educational assignments during this time: the U.S. Navy Senior Service Representative and Director National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College, and the U.S. Navy Exchange Directing Staff at the Joint Services Command and Staff College, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom in Shrivenham, England. Turvold graduated with Merit from the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland in 1989 where he earned a Bachelor of Science Degree. He graduated with Distinction from the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island in 2000 where he earned a Master of Arts degree. He completed numerous deployments throughout his career to the Indo-Pacific region, the Middle East, and Europe. Mr. Wade Turvold Turvold has participated in combat operations in Somalia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. See article, page 32.

LIAISON welcomes article submissions

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Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 9 A new graduate certificate program in Great Power Competition (GPC) at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, California, is providing the initial cohort of 31 Navy and Marine Corps students with the history and context of GPC, supporting a deeper understanding of its strategic implications. It’s just one of several GPC-related programs now in campus. (Illustration by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nathan K. Serpico) New Program Provides Context, History to Great Power Competition

By Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Nathan K. Serpico t’s four weeks into the first course of a brand- In addition to the new program, recent events like new distance learning graduate certificate the virtual Secretary of the Navy Guest Lecture with program in Great Power Competition (GPC) the former commander of U.S. Strategic Command at Ithe Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, retired Adm. Cecil Haney on the subject of “Great California, 31 Navy and Marine Corps students Power Competition in the Cognitive Age” and an are already recognizing the role of the program in additional maritime security certificate focused on understanding the deeper, strategic implications of maritime domain challenges are leading to a full GPC. spectrum of GPC-related educational opportunities. With the recent release of the CNO’s 2021 “The GPC DL Certificate is well-situated to Navigation Plan and the Tri-Service Maritime respond to recent strategic documents that are all Strategy, NPS is continuing to advance GPC centered around the DOD’s strategic shift to GPC,” programs across the virtual and physical campus. said Cmdr. Paul Rasmussen, National Security

10 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Affairs (NSA) Department Program Office, adding, Competition in briefs, discussions, and training, so “particularly in educating the leaders charged to I thought it would be professionally enhancing to develop and execute this strategy.” pursue a broader and deeper understanding of the Within the GPC certificate program the NSA topic,” noted Cmdr. Sean Welch, an NPS DL student Department included an education skill requirement serving at Commander, Submarine Squadron 15. aimed at “analyzing the factors shaping the new “At my current command, the information from era of increasing geopolitical competition among the course will help me add to any discussions, the major powers” and “understanding Chinese training, or briefs on the current GPC environment,” and Russian activities he added. “At my and potential U.S. The various courses will analyze the tools next command, it response across all China and Russia use to further their will help me lead dimensions of power those discussions.” including diplomacy, interests in various regions of the world In today’s digital economic competition, and in cyberspace as well as discuss the age it is imperative influence campaigns, for leaders to and traditional military range of possible U.S. and allied responses stay current as force.” to peer-nation behavior. information According to U.S. can change and Marine Corps Maj. Shane Kraft, an NPS DL spread throughout the world in a few clicks of a student serving as the Executive Officer for Marine keyboard. For leaders who consistently deepen their Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU) 3, the understanding of GPC and allow their subordinates course has offered him an opportunity to analyze to follow suit, the program helps them to lead a more the history behind current global contention adept crew ready to respond. which has improved his understanding of strategic “As a senior officer, this broader understanding relationships in the modern world. of great power competition is foundational for “I feel that pursuing a comprehensive understanding and acting within today’s strategic understanding of global, geopolitical interactions environment,” said DL student Navy Capt. Chris is important for any service member, and this Cavanaugh. “In my situation as the Submarine Force curriculum is an opportunity to develop that officer community manager,” Cavanaugh explained, knowledge,” said Kraft. “participating in an NPS distance learning program While the term “Great Power Competition” can is giving me a firsthand perspective on how best to cover a wide spectrum of topics, program organizers integrate advanced education opportunities into have developed a curriculum for students to officer career paths.” understand the nature of GPC historically as well Due to a strong demand, Rasmussen noted that as its current dynamics. The objective is to have NPS is offering an in-resident version of the GPC students learn and understand the core motivations Certificate. The course is slated to begin in the behind peer adversaries (like China and Russia) and upcoming Spring Quarter with registration already the political, economic, and defense challenges they open. present. The various courses will analyze the tools The next cohort for the DL version of the GPC China and Russia use to further their interests in Certificate is set to begin in July with the hope of various regions of the world and in cyberspace as opening up the program to Air Force and Army well as discuss the range of possible U.S. and allied active-duty personnel as well as DOD civilians. responses to peer-nation behavior. For more information on the program, and A microcosm of NPS as a whole, the core goal to submit an application package, contact NSA of the curriculum is to deepen the critical-thinking Program Officer Cmdr. Paul Rasmussen at skills of its military officer students. [email protected]. “I am often exposed to aspects of Great Power

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 11 Taiwan's HADR Posture: Context, Capacity and GPC Implications By Casey Johnson

Forward by Dr. Lukas Filler oday’s Great Power Competition is sensitivities, increased collaboration between the ultimately about convincing nations either U.S. and Taiwan militaries focused on improving to continue supporting an international responses to large scale emergencies on Taiwan and systemT governed according to liberal democratic other locations shouldn’t be especially provocative. values and norms or to endorse a vision of global Militaries are particularly well suited for HADR due governance that relegates rule of law and individual to similar processes and requirements. More effective rights. In a liberal, democratic system, Humanitarian cooperation on providing humanitarian relief doesn’t Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) is guided by involve improved offensive/defensive weapons need and delivered without favor. As such, Taiwan’s capability so shouldn’t generate concern about interest in expanding its civilian and military HADR emboldening Taiwan independence. capabilities should be encouraged and supported. Military HADR not only makes practical sense to If done strategically and in line with International relieve suffering but, as Joseph Nye has said, “Effective Humanitarian Law, Taiwan’s efforts would both strategies in the real world are a mix of hard and soft embody and reflect the liberal democratic principles of power.” He calls this “smart power.” HADR offers enlightened self-interest and save lives. militaries non-violent opportunities to meaningfully For Taiwan, such an approach might involve contribute to Great Power Competition. First, each improving its domestic capacity - which includes side is trying to outdo the other in providing innocent interoperability with partners - as well as focusing civilians relief from suffering and destruction rather on opportunities to assist vulnerable, smaller, than inflicting these upon them as a byproduct of democratic-leaning countries in the region. violent competition. Second, it is one of the few Though important to be mindful of larger political activities where security and economics intersect

12 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Beautiful landscape and cityscape of Taipei 101 building and architecture in the city. (Adobe stock Photo by Siraphol)

such that military actions offer material value that can effectively compete against traditional economic incentives. And finally, it is something of a litmus test for the competing governance models because its inherent humanitarian nature enables espoused values to be compared to those demonstrated through action (or inaction as the case may be). This paper provides a timely look at the ways in which Taiwan can play a more active role in regional HADR and how the U.S. and allies can cooperate more with Taiwan in this domain. - Dr. Lucas Filler Acting Director, China Strategic Focus Group, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 13 Bottom Line up Front

• Taiwan is a relatively sophisticated Countries Recognizing ROC Countries Receiving ROC Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief as of October Foreign Assistance in (HADR) actor in a strategic location with 2020 (15) 2019 (37) the civ-mil capacity to respond to disasters Latin America & Caribbean and assist U.S. allies in risk reduction Guatemala Guatemala efforts. In fact, Taiwan’s reputation for Haiti Haiti HADR competence is one of the few foreign Honduras Honduras Paraguay Paraguay assistance advantages it holds over the PRC. Nicaragua Nicaragua These capacities are underused because of Belize Belize Taiwan’s ambiguous status, its own fragmented Saint Lucia Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Saint Vincent and the approach to foreign aid, and public sentiment Grenadines Grenadines that generally favors prioritizing spending on Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Kitts and Nevis coastal defenses. Ecuador • Taiwan should be encouraged to do more East Asia & Pacific HADR regionally, particularly in Oceania, to Marshall Islands Marshall Islands counter nascent Chinese advances. Taiwan is Palau Palau Tuvalu Tuvalu well positioned to adapt its ongoing resilience Nauru Nauru and disaster prevention work from Central Thailand America and the Caribbean to the South Cambodia Indonesia Pacific. Taiwan has the ability to lead disaster Philippines response exercises, conduct GIS risk mapping, Kiribati and generally serve as a leader in disaster Solomon Islands relief expertise in Oceania. Such efforts Papua New Guinea Fiji would directly support emerging U.S. disaster prevention and broader foreign aid efforts in West Asia & Africa the region. Eswatini Eswatini Uganda • Conversely, a major disaster on Taiwan such Saudi Arabia as a typhoon may provide an opening for Tunisia Turkey either U.S. forces or the PRC to establish at Lebanon least a temporary presence on the island via Jordan an HADR response. The U.S. should work Bahrain with Taiwan to a) standardize an island-wide Central Asia & Europe incident management system and b) increase Vatican City Bosnia and Herzegovina Taiwan-U.S. disaster response interoperability, Serbia particularly reception and departure center Romania Bulgaria activities. These efforts would have positive Moldova humanitarian outcomes and mitigate the Ukraine potential for Chinese malign influence. Turkmenistan Figure 1: Official Recognition vs Foreign Aid Recipients; derived from ICFD 2019 Annual Report and Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

14 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 19 Taiwan’s International Humanitarian Assistance Policy: The Limits of “Dollar Diplomacy” Taiwan has provided international development Takeaways assistance since 1959, but only became involved in international humanitarian assistance/disaster • Efforts to include Taiwan in multi-lateral relief (HADR) in the 1990s. From the start, Taiwan’s humanitarian or donor coordination HADR, like its foreign aid writ large, was driven by bodies will trigger pro forma PRC the island’s desire for international status – both objections and may ultimately be bilateral recognition and a seat in international fora less productive—in terms of regional like the World Health Organization. Taiwan traded humanitarian outcomes and efforts to discretionary funding for diplomatic recognition, a check Chinese influence through soft policy that came to be known as “dollar diplomacy.” power—than pursuing bilateral (US- The approach didn’t work. Taiwan lost seven of Taiwan) or tri-lateral (e.g., US - Taiwan + 30 diplomatic allies to Beijing from 2000-2008 and a 3rd Country) civ-mil HADR efforts. its entry into meaningful UN bodies was consistently • On the domestic front, if a major blocked by the PRC. In 2008, the Ma Ying-jeou humanitarian disaster were to strike administration struck an unofficial diplomatic Taiwan, the absence of direct recourse to truce with China to not poach each other’s official the UN to manage medium- and long- allies. In response, Beijing dropped its objections term relief efforts is an opportunity for and effectively threw Taiwan the bone of “observer the U.S. to increase its influence through status” at the World Health Assembly while immediate civ-mil disaster response as continuing to block any real inclusion in regional or well as longer term disaster preparedness international humanitarian aid bodies. and joint training. Failure to respond Under a more assertive Tsai Ing-wen may provide an opening for China to administration, the Republic of China (ROC) establish a military presence on the island continues to channel overseas assistance to a and amplify sovereignty claims. fragmented and diminishing number of nations, mostly (though not exclusively) to “diplomatic allies.”1 Taiwan still has no direct access to UN Taiwan International humanitarian agencies – either as a means of Development and directing its external assistance or, critically, to Cooperation Fund coordinate multi-lateral assistance in the event of a (ICDF). HADR is catastrophic event on the Island.2 China watchers one of four core predict the PRC will only ratchet up efforts to freeze overseas cooperation out Taiwan diplomatically in the years to come. categories4 and is usually among the smallest of As such, the relatively little HADR that Taiwan these, accounting for only 8% of the $55m foreign currently undertakes could become increasingly assistance budget in 2019. After a five-year decline, contentious, especially in the South Pacific where actual humanitarian assistance expenditure Chinese strategic investment is running up against increased to approximately $960,333 in 2019 though the less threatening and more suitable “small-nation budgeted HA has remained flat along with broader to small-nation” approach that Taiwan offers.3 foreign aid expenditure (fig. 2). Taiwan’s defense budget is expected to jump about 10% from $14 Foreign HADR Funding and Priorities: Technical billion to $15.4 billion in 2021. Official foreign Assistance with Limited Resources aid stagnation is driven by at least two factors: The ROC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs realization that foreign assistance was not going channels humanitarian assistance through the to move the needle on bilateral recognition in the

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 15 face of China’s aggressive trade, Taiwan's Overseas HA/DR (USD) investment and conciliatory loans, and a “Taiwan first” 2,500,000 2,194,521 public demanding attention to core defense and domestic 2,000,000 economic issues. 1,615,635 1,500,000 Yet, while official aid figures have dipped or flatlined, 1,000,000 960,333 private monetary donations 713,860 for humanitarian issues 500,000 remain relatively high. For example, Taiwanese citizens 0 privately donated $4,492,600 to 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 Philippine victims of Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 suggesting that Budgeted HA Actual HA while the public may be wary Figure 2: Approximate ROC Overseas Humanitarian Assistance in USD; derived from Taiwan of foreign aid overall, it is more ICDF annual reporting. accepting of HADR missions. 5 Within its current international HADR portfolio, the ICDF prioritizes providing Using Technology to Increase Health Literacy humanitarian assistance to “international refugees and Health Care Access for Refugees in Turkey or countries hit by natural disasters.” Recent implemented by Center for Sustainable assistance to these two groups falls into three Development, Columbia University sectors: reconstruction, disaster preparedness/ prevention, and health. This mainly comes in the form of technical assistance.6 The focus on HADR technical assistance is driven by limited budgets and comparative expertise, as well as the experience of In addition to the non-governmental investing in infrastructure only to have it transferred implementers like Mercy Corps and Action Against to mainland China if/when the beneficiary country Hunger listed above, ICDF has cooperated with and switches diplomatic recognition to the PRC. Some funded World Vision for over 10 years, particularly illustrative HADR programs from 2019: on efforts within the INDOPACOM AOR across disasters like Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, Solomon Central Sulawesi Earthquake Islands flooding in 2014, and the 2015 Nepal WASH Support Program Earthquake. (Indonesia), implemented by Mercy Corps NGO and Civilian Authorities Yet, much of Taiwan’s overseas HADR comes from non-governmental volunteer organizations not funded through the ICDF.7 Improvement of Solid Among the Waste Management for largest of these Host Communities and is the Tzu Chi Syrian Refugees in Jordan, Foundation, a implemented by Action Buddhist volunteer Against Hunger organization that

16 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 provides second-line disaster response in over 99 rescue units (known as the International Search countries/regions. Tzu Chi’s HADR efforts overlap and Rescue Operations Taiwan). The organization with, but are not constrained by, Taiwan MOFA has responded to in Nepal, Malaysia, and Japan. and ICDF priority countries. Tzu Chi is also one of Members of the organization include volunteers and Taiwan’s most active domestic HADR organizations. emergency response specialists, comprised of retired In the first ten months of 2020, it responded to over military personnel, academics, and people from 1,700 disasters or emergencies in Taiwan alone with community groups. a network of 60,000 to 70,000 volunteer disaster Finally, Taiwan has a start- responders tapping into 49 disaster preparedness of-the-art search and rescue centers across the country. “We pride ourselves in facility built in 2010 and run being the first ones in and the last ones to leave in a by the National Fire Agency disaster or emergency situation,” Tzu Chi’s Taiwan (NFA). The NFA is situated disaster response coordinator told CFE-DM.8 under the Ministry of Interior Besides Tzu Chi, the most active Taiwanese NGOs and serves as Taiwan’s de and civil society organizations with both a domestic facto lead agency for domestic and international presence and proven track record disaster response. The NFA’s in HADR are: search and rescue facility can train 700 people at a time. The 2.7 square mile campus includes Taiwan Root Medical Peace 13 training sites to practice 66 kinds of rescue Corps: a private medical scenarios.9 Though the center’s primary objective services and health education is increasing domestic preparedness and response, NGO. Taiwan Root has it also hosts foreign civilian disaster response responded to foreign personnel for training. The NFA is also home to disaster relief efforts such the National Special Search and Rescue (NSSAR) as Typhoon Haiyan and has branch, a team of 75 highly trained SAR experts with been conducting COVID-19 access to state of the art equipment. In addition to missions domestically. domestic response, NSSAR has deployed abroad to Indonesia, El Salvador, Iran, and Sichuan, China.10 Taiwan Red Cross: though not officially recognized by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, TRC has responded to disaster throughout the region and at home and has received funding from international donors including USAID.

International Headquarters S.A.R Taiwan: Composed of hundreds of volunteers, International Headquarters S.A.R. Taiwan has 97 local branches in Taiwan and two USAID/OFDA Regional Advisor Brian Heidel and Taiwan Red Cross staff survey earthquake damage in Taiwan's Institute city, Feb. 2016. international search and (Photo by American Institute in Taiwan)

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 17 Takeaways • Taiwan’s limited HADR budget and focus on technical assistance is an opportunity rather than a problem. Taiwan should be encouraged to lean into its technical assistance and relative expertise but develop a more coherent and targeted regional focus instead of spreading itself thin globally.

• Like China, Taiwan is a relatively new actor in the South Pacific: the ROC has longer and stronger ties with Saudi Arabia than it does with the Solomon Islands, for example, but could be a welcome counter-weight to naked Chinese self-interest among a community of nations with evergreen sovereignty concerns. China is the third largest source of foreign aid in the South Pacific behind the U.S. and Australia. The Solomon Islands and Kiribati switched recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in September 2019 but a recent Lowy Institute analysis concluded: China “has found it harder to maintain its momentum in the South Pacific as it become a more familiar development partner … Chinese debt in particular is being further scrutinized by pacific leaders … and no Pacific nation except Vanuatu has taken on new debt from China since 2018. This has been driven by a number of factors including a recognition of subpar quality and inflated pricing.”11

• Getting Taiwan to consolidate its foreign assistance strategically in the South Pacific would require public U.S. support, perhaps in the form of a joint U.S.-Taiwan Disaster Reduction Program to the Pacific islands. The program would focus on core needs and issues of concern such as climate change adaptation, flood control, and the development of response and coordination mechanisms in line with Taiwan’s expertise and U.S. priorities.

• Where Taiwan has political difficulties accessing countries, it could increase the use of its National Fire Agency SAR facility to train first-responders from neighbors it has assisted in the past like the Philippines and Indonesia. These efforts could be initiated through the U.S.-Japan-Taiwan jointly supported Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF). As the U.S. expands its foreign aid in Oceania in the coming years it should look for and facilitate opportunities for first responders from these countries to receive training in Taiwan.

Military HADR: A Larger Role Envisioned for However, during the period of quasi- Taiwan’s Armed Forces rapprochement with China under the Ma Taiwan’s international HADR has historically administration and as a result of the central depended on the U.S. for political, diplomatic, and authorities’ fumbling response to Typhoon Morakot logistical support to access disaster areas, particularly in 2009, the National Defense Act was amended in Latin America and the Caribbean but also to add disaster relief and assistance as one of the conflict-affected populations in Iraq, Afghanistan, core missions of the armed forces. This initiative and now Jordan. Political and logistical factors have empowered the armed services to proactively engage limited the ROC’s ability to conduct larger scale in disaster prevention and relief operations and military-led relief efforts. to mobilize reserve forces as needed, essentially

18 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 450 mandating HADR operations as a 424 new mission priority for Taiwan’s AIRLIFT 400 Ton military.12 Taiwan’s armed forces 361 352 have since carried out a well- 350 336 coordinated relief operation with 300 its navy, air force and NGOs on the ground during Typhoon 250 238 228 Haiyan in the Philippines in 200 2013. In July 2014 Taiwan’s 165 Ministry of National Defense 150 played a domestic support role 95 100 in mobilizing military resources 57 60 in response to the Kaohsiung gas 50 13 explosion. 6 0 5.5 In 2014, the opposition 0 Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) issued a Defense Policy “Blue Paper” on Humanitarian 30000 Assistance and Disaster Relief. The 27600 SEALIFT paper begins with a forward by the Ton now sitting President Tsai Ingwen 25000 and outlines a robust role for

Taiwan’s military in the execution 20000 of HADR at home and abroad 16500 citing its air and sea lift capacities 15150 15000 14200 (tables 3, 4) as the third largest in the region (excluding China) and 10000 the island’s strategic location in 8000 a disaster-prone neighborhood 6380 6000 to justify an increased regional 5000 4500 HADR role. The report 2000 concludes: “Taiwan possesses 0 0 0 0 0 sufficient hardware capacities and geographical advantages that can make its HADR missions Figure 3, 4: Taiwan's airlift and sealift capacity according to estimates by the Taiwanese more effective than other nations New Frontier Foundation Defense Policy Advisory Committee as of Dec. 2014. in the region” but that “the lack of institutionalized coordination and cooperation mechanisms will still delay exercises.” The paper also lays out ambitious plans the arrival of assistance.” As such, the Blue Paper for a 10,000-ton hospital ship and the buildup notes that Taiwan is eager to “seek out possible Taiping Island as the “forward base for humanitarian participation in bi- or multi-lateral training and assistance and disaster relief missions.”14

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 19 Takeaways • Much like its civilian humanitarian efforts, Taiwan’s military disaster relief walks a tightrope between domestic public opinion focused on core national defense and other domestic priorities while simultaneously using humanitarianism as a cover for military advancements and territorial claims (such as describing Taiping as a humanitarian forward base).

• Regardless of political posturing, Taiwan’s regional humanitarianism is now intertwined with naval expansion. In the near term, the U.S. should focus on bi- or perhaps tri-lateral naval HADR exercises with Taiwan that include the combat support ship Panshih.

The hospital ship remains on paper, but in Though much of the initial publicity surrounding 2015 Taiwan launched the 20,000 ton supply and the Panshih focused on the ships regional HADR combat support ship, Panshih. The AOE has an potential it has not yet responded to a disaster. 8,000 nautical mile range, accommodates SH-60 and CH47D helicopters, is equipped with advanced medical capacities, including an operating room and three isolation wards, and has offensive capabilities.15

Panshih (AOE-532) Shipped at No.3 East Pier of Zuoying Naval Base (Wikipedia Commons photo)

20 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Disaster Risk and Response at Home: Is the PRC a) Three or more hazards (top 15 based on land area) Waiting for a Humanitarian Crisis in Taiwan? Country Percent of Percent of Max. Total Area Population Number of Taiwan is a small island with high population Exposed Exposed Hazards and urban density. In a disaster-prone region, Taiwan, China 73.1 73.1 4 Taiwan has by some estimates the highest level of Costa Rica 36.8 41.1 4 vulnerability. Seventy-three percent of the island’s Vanuatu 28.8 20.5 3 territory and population are exposed to three Philippines 22.3 36.4 5 or more natural hazards, notably earthquakes, Guatemala 21.3 40.8 5 Ecuador 13.9 23.9 5 landslides, and floods induced by typhoons (fig 5). Chile 12.9 54.0 4 According to a 2005 World Bank study, Taiwan Japan 10.5 15.3 4 ranks at the top of both mortality and economic risk from multiple hazard exposure.16 If and how Figure 5: Countries Most Exposed to Multiple Hazards (World Bank) risk has changed over the last 15 years is difficult to 21, 1999, caused 2,415 deaths and more than 11,000 assess because most country-level risk assessments injuries. A 2016 study found that in eight cities, don’t parse the island from mainland China in including half of the capital of Taipei, structural their analyses. Disaster risks with GPC implications issues and soil liquefaction render even small include events that are large enough to require a earthquakes a significant hazard.17 sustained multi-national response and/or those with specific cross strait dimensions including, but not Typhoons: Taiwan sits on a main path of typhoons limited to: generated in Pacific and 3 to 4 approach or make landfall yearly. Associated strong winds, violent Earthquakes: Taiwan and its offshore territory rains, landslides, and storm surges catastrophically is situated on a significant seismic zone. More than impact the island. A combination of rapid 180 earthquakes of M6.0 or greater have occurred urbanization, improper land use, and rivers with in Taiwan in the last century, with 26 of those some of the steepest slopes and largest discharge events exceeding M7.0, including the M7.6 Chi Chi areas in the world worsen flood problems and earthquake that struck central Taiwan on September complicate response.18

Nuclear: Though a nuclear power plant incident in Taiwan is not particularly probable, and less so following the ruling DPP’s closure of several plants, a meltdown would create complex security disaster rather than an “all hazards” approach that issues given both Taiwan’s ambiguous international assigns responsibility accord to the type of response status and its proximity to mainland China. Taiwan needed.22 Other assessments of Taiwan’s Disaster has four nuclear reactors in two operational Response capability have highlighted the need nuclear power plants, another two reactors at a for greater civil society and NGO participation in decommissioned plant, and two more unfinished drills and exercises.23 NGOs like Tzu Chi say that reactors at a plant that was cancelled.19 A worst case improvements have been made in recent years in nuclear scenario involves a Level Seven (Chernobyl this regard, citing training and exercises convened or Fukushima scale) accident at either of Taiwan’s by the NFA in 2020 as a step in the right direction.24 two operational nuclear power plants. In particular, The NFA also leads reception and departure the Kuosheng plant in the north has 40 million center (RDC) operations to process and coordinate people inside a 30km radius, including large sections incoming international HADR. The 2020 National- of the city of Taipei.20 A meltdown at Kuosheng level Disaster Response Exercise in September, would require an immediate evacuation 30 times supported by the Liaison Affairs Section of the larger than Chernobyl or Fukushima.21 American Institute in Taiwan, focused heavily on this international support aspect of disaster response Taiwan’s Response Capability in Taiwan. An after action review of these RDC Though Taiwan lacks a FEMA-like apex disaster exercises found that “Taiwan has a well scripted response body, the National Fire Agency (NFA) is domestic response policy and process, but work recognized as the de facto interagency leader for needs to be done in formalizing relief procedures large-scale, all-hazards disasters. The NFA manages between Taiwan and assisting countries.”25 More the Central Emergency Operations Center and broadly, the NFA recently requested U.S. assistance 22 local Emergency Operations Centers and leads in developing standard operating procedures Taiwan’s annual National Earthquake Exercise to better institutionalize what is at present a and community level Disaster Response Exercises. personality-dependent system of disaster response.26 Importantly, the NFA (and the Ministry of Interior in which it is located), rather than the Ministry of If an Emergency Occurred on Taiwan, How Would National Defense, would be the point of contact the PRC Respond? for U.S. military HADR support. CBRN National Since its initial involvement in HADR in 2002, response capacity remains limited. The official China has been risk adverse, in part to avoid regulatory institute, the Atomic Energy Council exposing the PLA as inept on the world stage.27 (AEC) and its subordinate Institute of Nuclear In 2013, China’s Peace Ark hospital ship arrived Energy Research have about 1,000 professionals who in the Philippines 18 days after Typhoon Haiyan may be deployed in response. However, Taiwan’s made landfall and then only treated about seven civilian capacity would be insufficient to deal with patients. The Peace Ark debacle followed an initial off-site contingencies leaving the three chemical, pledge of only $100,000 in relief for a disaster that biological, radioactive and nuclear (CBRN) groups affected 11 million and killed over 6,000. China within the Taiwan Army as the main reserve of also responded slowly and with limited resources professional forces to carry out decontamination. to the 2015 Nepal earthquake. 28 For nations that A recent assessment of Taiwan’s domestic do not figure in China’s strategic calculus or have disaster response capacity noted the high quality strained relations with Beijing, HADR usually takes of its material and human resources but found no the form of (relatively scant) monetary assistance standardized, nationally-recognized system for often administered through the UN or Red Cross incident management and a stove-piped “single in a show of internationalism. Conversely, if there hazard” approach that divides responsibilities is a strong national interest or if Chinese citizens or between various ministries based on the type of diaspora are involved, the PRC has responded with

22 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 significant financial and military resources.29 Taiwan undoubtedly falls into the latter category. Assisting Taiwan with HADR would provide the Takeaways opportunity for China to re-affirm its sovereignty claim over Taiwan as it did in 1999 by demanding • If China sees an outright invasion that the UN and assisting countries obtain its of Beijing as too risky, it would permission prior to rendering assistance in the probably welcome the opportunity aftermath of the Chi Chi earthquake. Legally, the to assert sovereignty—if not outright PLA’s HADR unit would make the case that it has control—through an HADR the right to stay on an island it claims as Chinese response. In this case, China’s territory and any abrupt or pressured withdrawal actions not only in Hong Kong would damage China’s territorial claim. On the other but against ethnic Uighurs may hand, if the scale of the disaster is so overwhelming it be instructive. The CCP did not requires a truly multi-lateral support mission, there suddenly order an occupation of could be room for limited joint cooperation between Xinjiang; it used the internationally- the U.S. and China out of humanitarian necessity. acceptable pretext of countering terrorism and violent extremism Conclusion and then turned a real – but really Taiwan’s HADR efforts to date have been very small – security threat into an limited but the island is expanding its ambitions opportunity to subjugate an entire and capabilities. This is a welcome development ethnic minority. The Xi regime built at a time when disaster risk remains high across a domestic legal architecture to the region and China has been both unable and support its actions and went so far as unwilling to respond. Even with all the baggage to quote the U.N.’s own countering associated with Taiwan’s status and standing vis-a- violent extremism language to justify vis China, its HADR can fill a gap going forward. As disappearing and “re-educating” one analyst explained: “Taiwan’s assistance in the millions of its own citizens. region falls squarely between Japan’s and China’s in • If the risk of a nuclear disaster is low terms of quality and desirability.”30 Yet, as Taiwan’s and getting lower, the risk of China military seeks a greater role in regional HADR using even a moderate disaster operations, its humanitarianism will inevitably as a pretext not to invade but to become more entwined in regional security issues. reestablish sovereignty under the USINDOPACOM is in a position to shape this guise of humanitarianism may be dynamic to our advantage. First, by initiating joint high and getting higher. This will training exercises with the goal of responding require more engagement from directly to a disaster on Taiwan with civilian and the U.S. to transfer knowledge on, military support, and second, by encouraging for instance, incident management Taiwan to refocus its scattershot global foreign systems, as well as ensuring aid back to the region, and then drilling down on that Taiwan is well prepared to thematic and geographic areas (e.g., HADR in seamlessly receive US assistance South Pacific) where it still maintains a comparative as needed. In a larger sense, there advantage over China. is need for the U.S. to map out the various opportunities that exist for References, See page 78 the PRC to establish a presence on Taiwan going forward.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 23 The Evolving Significance of Afghanistan in China's Strategic Calculus: From an Insignificant 'Backyard' to a Consequential Geostrategic Hub

Additionally, China perceives the U.S. posture in Central Asia as a potential threat to its interests. These emerging rivalries reinforce Afghanistan’s geo-strategic significance rendering it susceptible to a milieu of contested interests and engagements. For By Dr. Atal Ahmadzai Afghanistan to reverse the historic curse of its geo- strategic location, it must overcome the pressure of Paradoxical to its historic no-interest policy, competing big powers in the larger strategic arenas by China’s projection of strategic influence in focusing on domestic issues. Rather than historic and Afghanistan has become increasingly visible. This geographic determinism, structural changes through shift in Beijing’s behavior is part of a broader strategy the development of its own resources, industries, to expand and consolidate its influence in Central, and capacities should drive Afghanistan’s strategic South, and Western Asia. Such a policy revision in outlook. To realize this vision, support from the U.S. China’s strategic calculus transforms Afghanistan is crucial to maintaining security and democratic into a geo-strategic ‘backyard’ that consolidates institutions, promoting civic education, and creating China’s influential position in the country. a responsible and accountable political setting.

24 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 ince establishing bilateral relationships with latter was over the bid of becoming the vanguard of Afghanistan in 1955, China’s engagement communism in the developing world. These events in Afghanistan has never been as active pushed Afghanistan more towards China’s new andS diverse as it has become in recent years. rivals: India and the USSR. China, however, kept its From military assistance to initiating economic neutral or no interest policy. cooperation and engaging in peace processes, After the communist revolution in Kabul China has diversified its interests and strategic (followed by the Soviet invasion in 1979), China engagements in Afghanistan.1 Recently, it has realigned its Afghan policy in the backdrop of the emboldened its strategic advances by encouraging U.S. containment strategy. It was intended to hold Afghanistan to follow the precedent set by the Sino- back the USSR’s expansionism in the Middle East Pakistan cooperation model.2 and South Asia and to stand in the way of Soviet The scope of these engagements may be trivial, hegemony. Later in the mid-80s, after embracing the however, in the backdrop of uncertain political and Reagan Doctrine of rolling back Soviet influence and security settings in Afghanistan and the emerging toppling the USSR’s backed socialist states around international milieu characterized by the down spiral the world, China operationalized its anti-Soviet relationship between the U.S. and China, such an agenda in Afghanistan. unprecedented shift in China’s strategic posture China started training and providing arms to raises questions. the Afghan Mujahideen and other fighters that Is such shift part of a ‘New Great Game’ in the poured in from all over the Muslim world to the region for China’s global economic and geo-strategic Afghanistan-Pakistan region to fight against the aspirations? Is it moving towards realignment of USSR.6 In addition to sending military trainers the region’s balance of power and hegemony? Is to Pakistan to train Afghan fighters, China also China using Afghanistan as a stepping stone for established training camps in its Xinjiang province broader regional strategic, economic, and political to train Uighur fighters for the Afghan Jihad.7 In endeavors? Or simply, is it a political marriage of response, the government in Kabul blamed Beijing convenience between the two neighbors for their for subversive activity against the Afghan republic.8 respective concerns and insecurities? Eventually, China's Afghan Jihad strategy To explore this enigma it is important to take a backfired. In the late 1980s, upon the withdrawal brief retrospective look at China’s relationships with of the USSR from Afghanistan and the subsequent Afghanistan. This provides crucial analytical context collapse of the USSR, the trained Uighur militants for scrutinizing China’s current strategic aspirations started returning home to Xinjiang. There, they that drive its evolving priorities and interests in the militarized the East Turkistan freedom movements. volatile and crowded Afghan strategic theater. China once again returned to its no-interest policy towards Afghanistan. A Brief History of Sino-Afghan Strategic Relations During the Taliban regime, China yet again After establishing diplomatic relationships in increased its engagements in Afghanistan.9 The 1955, the two neighbors officially demarcated their motive was the existence of Uighur separatist tiny and inhabited border at the end of the Wakhan training camps in Taliban-controlled areas. Corridor in 1963.3 In the same year, China and Reportedly, these camps were established under the Pakistan had signed the Sino-Pakistan Boundary direct instruction of Osama bin Laden in order to Agreement4 which set the stage for their future open a new Jihadi front in Xinjiang.10 As it did not long-term strategic and economic alliances. The officially recognize their Islamic Emirates, China had two border agreements by China were preceded by engaged with the Taliban largely through Pakistan. two strategic events for the country: The Sino-Indo However, it did not help. China continued to have war of 1962 and the ideological Sino-Soviet split problems with the activities of Uighur militants of 1963. The former was over a border while the in the historic region of East Turkistan-Xinjiang.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 25 Despite their denial, the Taliban never gave up military cooperation mechanisms with Afghanistan, on harboring Uighur fighters up until late 2001, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. These three countries when their Emirate was defeated by U.S. military neighbor the Chinese region Xinjiang. In sum, intervention. China has already created physical infrastructure In the post-9/11 international military and and multilateral cooperation mechanisms—namely developmental interventions in Afghanistan, China's the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination engagement and contributions to the global efforts Mechanism in Counter-Terrorism (QCCM)— of stabilizing the country have remained minimal. that can fully buffer Afghanistan should the latter In the years following the intervention, the U.S. descend into chaos. Such protective and preventative repeatedly encouraged China to increase its share measures have the potential to minimize the of engagements and responsibility in Afghanistan. movement of terrorists between the two neighbors. China avoided having an increased share. While Secondly, looking at China’s support to terrorist largely remaining a bystander, China did however, groups in South Asia, mainly those with an anti- jump on the bandwagon and used the global anti- India agenda,15 it does not seem that the mainstream terrorism dynamism to curtail the anti-China terrorist organizations in the region pose imminent terrorist groups.11 China did not invest in the war on existential threats to China. China’s transactional terror, but it did get a free ride. relationships with terrorist groups stationed in South Considering the historic trajectory of the two Asia is not an anomaly, but a pattern. China has countries' relationships, Afghanistan has largely conceptualized terrorism, more specifically Islamic remained of marginal interest in China's strategic terrorism, through a narrow angle of domestic calculus. The exception is when it was able to actors. While China itself blames other powers of bandwagon on other power's strategic imperatives playing a “double standard” on the East Turkistan in Afghanistan. However, with the emerging pattern problem,16 its own narrow perspective on Islamic of Chinese behavior and strategic posture in the terrorism drives the country’s treacherous anti- region, it seems that China has adopted a new terrorism strategies. strategic outlook towards its neighbor. With China's On many occasions China showed supportive newly transformed audacious regional and global behavior towards terrorist organizations that are geo-strategic aspirations and economic interests, based in Pakistan including Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), Afghanistan may have become its new arena for Jaish Muhammad, and Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), all of its strategic maneuvers towards regional and which focus on operating in India. An early Islamic transregional strategic hegemony. oracle (Ghazwa-e-Hind, which means “Raid of India”) accompanied by contested and controversial Is It All About Terrorism? interpretations drives the India-focused terrorist Justifying the evolving interests and engagements motivation of these groups. On several occasions in Afghanistan, Chinese officials often resort to the China has blocked efforts to pressure Pakistan to potential terrorist threats to its Xinjiang province cease its support for these groups.17 In addition, from Afghanistan.12 Such a concern overshadows all evidence suggests that China has been in business other interests of China in Afghanistan.13 However, with terrorist organizations that largely target three considerations fog the validity of Chinese Western interests including the Taliban’s Haqqani justification of its emerging strategic adventurism in Network, Hezbollah, and even Syrian terrorist Afghanistan. groups.18 First, China has adequately invested in securing its Thirdly, since the initiation of the War on borders with Afghanistan. It has established military Terror in late 2001, China’s behavior towards outposts not just on its own territory but reportedly and contribution to tackling global terrorism has in the Tajik and Afghan sides of the borders remained opportunistic. It has started with its initial as well.14 On top of that, China has established opposition to U.S. intervention in Afghanistan.

26 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Subsequently, in terms of both security contributions bilateral and multilateral cooperation and and developmental interventions, China’s support coordination mechanisms, China did not fully for the U.S.-led global intervention in Afghanistan integrate Afghanistan in its strategic calculus. has remained nominal at best. However, the war Afghanistan is still an observer member of the provided China with a free ride and a dictum to Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In 2012 the two advance its domestic repression. It operationalized countries agreed to upgrade their bilateral relations the global consensus on the war on terror in to a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership.22 But in oppressing its own Uighur Muslim population to the the following year as both countries forged to deepen extent of genocide.19 their Strategic and Cooperative Partnership it was Furthermore, China’s lip service to the war on never officially formulated and established.23 terror in Afghanistan also had a strategic reason. China, unlike most of its neighbors, did While it provided minimum tangible support to the not integrate Afghanistan in its broad-based cause in Afghanistan, the direct and the opportunity economic initiatives. In 2013 China inaugurated costs of the war for the U.S. gave China the its transcontinental infrastructure Belt and Road comparative advantage to invest more in asserting Initiative (BRI): a multi-regional infrastructure its economic and military power outwards.20 China’s network connecting over 60 countries in different total investment stock by the end of 2017 was 400 regions of the world. Afghanistan, however, was million.21 The tangible costs of the war for the not integrated into it.24 It is despite the fact that the U.S. is in the trillions. As such, this gave China the country has geo-strategic comparative advantage economic and political resources to systematically in offering the shortest road access to South Asia, emerge as a competing power and eventually initiate Persia, and the Middle East.35 supplanting the U.S. from the region. In subsequent years the two countries signed several agreements that have the potential to Beijing’s Confusing Messages to Kabul improve Afghanistan’s land, air, and cyber China’s Afghan policy has been in transformation connectivity, including the Digital Silk Road, since 2012. From abstentions during the 2002- the Kabul-Urumqi air corridor, and the Sino- 12 period to diverse strategic engagements, the Afghanistan Special Railway. However, Beijing has revisionism of its policy is a welcomed move for kept Kabul perplexed, if not frustrated, about its Afghanistan. Initially, what instigated China’s unwillingness to integrate Afghanistan into the BRI. change in policy was its concerns related to possible In addition, Beijing security initiatives and eventualities of any precipitous withdrawal of narratives are dubious. In 2016 China collaborated the international forces from the country. In the Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan into the subsequent years, parallel with emphasizing the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination need for a responsible and orderly withdrawal of Mechanism in Counter-Terrorism (QCCM).25 The foreign forces from Afghanistan, China has initiated QCCM is a new counterterrorist, international, and to create an enabling and conducive to strategic regional security mechanism between the armed maneuvering environment. It has deployed and forces of the four countries. Subsequently, China expanded its economic, diplomatic, and military assisted Kabul in building a mountain brigade in instruments in Afghanistan to secure its vital the Wakhan Corridor.26 China also established interests. However, Beijing’s new dynamism came military outposts on the Tajik side of the border with puzzling messages to Kabul. This has shrouded of the Wakhan Corridor. All of these measures are the nature and type of its interests and strategic goals facilitated by China to safeguard its weak link (the in the country largely in secrecy. Xinjiang province) from the ‘three evils’—terrorism, China, as with almost all its neighbors, has separatism, and religious extremism—directed from established bilateral partnerships with Afghanistan. the borders of these countries. While the two countries have established different Despite establishing the multilateral anti-

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 27 terrorism coordination mechanism China is among their first deadly encounter in decades.30 a few countries that have maintained cordial China’s border security in the Himalayas is crucial relations with the Taliban.27 Furthermore, as one of for its BRI’s flagship China-Pakistan Economic the few countries that have strategic leverage over Corridor (CPEC). Linking China to two ports on Pakistan, China does not seem willing to use its the Sea of Oman— Gwadar and Karachi— CPEC influence in curtailing Islamabad’s patronage to the will open new inland energy channels for the Taliban’s terrorism. Reportedly, China explicitly country which will reduce its heavy dependency on told Kabul that it will not exert pressure on the Southeast Asian seaborne energy corridor of Pakistan pertaining to its support to the Taliban.28 Malacca Strait. The CPEC does not pass through Such admission should have been alarming for Afghanistan though three indirect links make it Kabul regarding China’s strategic outlook towards strategically relevant. Afghanistan. CPEC is facing an existential threat from the In general, while China’s willingness and Baloch insurgency in Pakistan. Originated by dynamism in engaging with Afghanistan is resource distribution injustice, the insurgency has undoubtedly welcomed in Kabul, China’s openly opposed Chinese exploitative practices of overcautious and puzzling strategic maneuvers resource grab in Baluchistan province, the homeland indicate that Afghanistan is still its strategic of the Baloch ethnic group that is also home to the conundrum. On one hand, China has responsively Gwadar Port. Pakistan accuses Afghanistan and reduced the potential security threats directed India for covertly supporting the Baloch insurgency, from the borders of Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and a claim obstinately denied by both Kabul and Delhi. Pakistan to its western periphery. On the other In addition, CPEC also faces a legal challenge hand, China remains cautious about increasing its from India. On its course, CPEC passes through economic and political stakes in Afghanistan. But Gilgit-Baltistan, a contested region between India in the backdrop of the downward spiral of U.S.- and Pakistan. Considering it a disputed territory in China relationships that started with the trade Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, India lays its opposition war and intensified with the spread of COVID-19, to CPEC based on claims of territorial sovereignty.31 China’s strategic calculus about Afghanistan China denies India’s claim. Since Delhi has such appears to be changing. Afghanistan is becoming strong and friendly strategic links with Kabul this part of a broader envisioned picture of China’s raises red flags for China’s heavy investment in strategic domain. CPEC. Reportedly, China has explicitly told Afghan officials that it will not use its influence on Pakistan Afghanistan in a Broader Perspective to open its border with India for the Afghan cargo.32 Lately, China’s geopolitical ambitions in South Thirdly, by attempting to ostracize India from and Western Asia have become apparent. These the Afghan strategic theater, China is trying to initiatives further reinforce Afghanistan’s geo- disrupt the implementation of the Turkmenistan- strategic significance within China’s strategic Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline (TAPI) calculus. and the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA-1000) In late July the Chinese premier proposed power line transmission projects. If completed, both a multimodal trans-Himalayan corridor of projects will open Central Asia’s vast gas and energy China with Afghanistan, Nepal, and Pakistan. markets for India which will challenge the monopoly He encouraged the two landlocked countries, in the region envisioned by China. Afghanistan and Nepal, to follow the model of the China’s anti-India rhetoric has expanded to Sino-Pakistan cooperation.29 Around the same western Asia too. Earlier in the summer it was time in South Asia, China began to intensify its reported that China and Iran are finalizing a incursions of strategic heights up in the Himalayas sweeping economic and military partnership.33 along the disputed Indo-China border that caused Iran’s Chabahar seaport on the Gulf of Oman

28 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 offers China another option to diversify its energy socialized with the fact that in its backyard lies the channels. Concurrent to the news, Iran unexpectedly so-called ‘graveyard of empires.’ It also knows that suspended India from the USD 400 million 500- the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan is mile Chabahar-Zahedan railway project that undeniably critical for its westward expansionism. extends to Central Asia through Afghanistan. This Furthermore, China has itself experienced the route reduced Afghanistan’s dependency on the consequences of a power vacuum in Afghanistan. Karachi port in Pakistan. It also has the potential In addition to security implications, a chaotic and to provide India with much-needed alternative failed Afghanistan is counterproductive for China’s access to Central Asia. By excluding India from the economic and strategic initiatives in Central, South, project its access link to Central Asia is in jeopardy. and Western Asia. While China will not be willing With China’s attempt to circumvent India’s role in to have a destabilized Afghanistan in its backyard, Afghanistan and Central Asia, Afghanistan’s geo- it will try to keep the country economically and strategic significance becomes more susceptible to politically susceptible so as to bully it into its manipulation and politicization. strategic sphere of influence by economic, security, Towards Central Asia, the downwards spiral of and political manipulation. U.S.-China relations and the U.S. rapprochement The Chinese model of economic practices, to Central Asian republics will further drag largely in the developing world, is not based on Afghanistan into China’s strategic calculus. A mutual benefits but on a ‘debt trap.’ As an emerging contested and embattled region will jeopardize global powerhouse China will use its comparative China’s BRI. The U.S. Strategy for Central Asia advantages—proximity; financial and economic 2019-25 seeks and promotes closer ties and interventions, and strategic influence— as a means connectivity between Afghanistan and Central Asian towards systematically co-opting Afghanistan into republics as regional stabilizing factors.34 However, its sphere of influence. Towards that end, China in the face of its deteriorating relations with the U.S., will maintain and cautiously expand its diverse China will presume that any effort towards realizing instruments of economic, diplomatic, and military such a policy goal is a threat to its interests in the engagement in the country. But will it occur region. This will further push Afghanistan into a without resistance? No. Afghanistan, in addition contested geo-strategic milieu. to its historic precedent of being hostile to global and regional hegemonic power, has structural Conclusion contradictions for China. In the post-9/11 world, Afghanistan was First, China’s strategic closeness with Pakistan, considered as one of few places where the U.S. and is a country that seeks ‘strategic depth’ in China could remain in strategic synergy however Afghanistan. China’s failure or refusal to assert this seems to no longer be the case. Although pressure on Pakistan to give up its political and terrorism is still the imminent threat in Afghanistan military patronage to the Taliban and the notorious it is no longer the dominating global threat. Haqqani Network will make it challenging for Emerging rivalries of global and regional powers China to gain the confidence of Afghans. Secondly, are on the horizon with strategic implications for Afghanistan’s historic cultural and strategic relations different regions, including Afghanistan. Located with India will make it a strategic troublesome at the crossroads of crucial strategic regions, game for China to upset Delhi-Kabul dynamics and the emerging rivalries reinforce its geo-strategic subsequently to circumvent India from Afghanistan. significance into conflicting and opposing strategic Third, the heavy investment of the U.S. and other calculations. Afghanistan appears to be one of the Western powers in the last 20 years to rehabilitate theaters of a new ‘Great Game’ between China, the Afghanistan’s strategic institutions is a disadvantage U.S., and its neighbors, including India. for China in competing to hold ground in China, by its geographic proximity, is well Afghanistan. The strategic and technical connections

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 29 of these institutions with their founding supporters republics. That said, Afghanistan can only utilize this will cost China a pariah image. unique geostrategic advantage to its benefit through Within the prospective new ‘Great Game’ will enhancing its exporting capacity. Afghanistan’s geo-strategic location continue to However, to change the course of history by not be its curse? More so than any actor of the Game falling victim to the emerging regional and power it depends on the Afghans themselves. While the rivalries, Afghanistan as a state must change its country is landlocked it sits on riches of untapped fundamental perspective. It needs to overcome its deposits of natural resources. As an agrarian society historic tendencies and aspirations of playing in the country has relatively adequate freshwater the big and crowded strategic theaters. An active resources to realize its food security and food safety and robust diplomacy of non-alignment and a nets. Its rivers flow to all neighboring countries. redirection of its strategic attention to domestic Afghanistan has unmatched potential in terms of issues can realize this goal. Without doing its human resources as it is one of the youngest nations homework and building its own strengths it does in terms of population demographics. not seem practical and even rational for the country On top of that, it has strategic advantages. It is to have a fair and favorable playing ground in large the gateway to the vast lands of Central Asia. As arenas. It is imperative for Afghanistan to redirect a nation, it has trustworthy and benign political its efforts words developing its own resources, and close cultural relationships with Central Asian industries, and capacities. 30 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Afghan and coalition security force members prepare to depart to a mission that arrested a Haqqani facilitator in Pul-e 'Alam District, Logar province, Jan. 28, 2013. The detained Haqqani facilitator was a financier who funded multiple Haqqani cells operating in Pul-e 'Alam district. He coordinated the purchase and transfer of weapons with Taliban and Haqqani senior leaders. (U.S Army photo by Pfc. Coty M. Kuhn)

Since the U.S. is one of the main stakeholders in rapidly-progressing military, economic, and Afghanistan’s security, China’s regional and global diplomatic power. As such, Afghanistan’s shaky aspirations should no longer be a strategic dilemma. democracy which is prone to global and regional Its actions are indicative of a primacy strategy. China terrorism combined with the Taliban’s ideological is expanding its sphere of influence through its totalitarianism and religious fundamentalism economic power and geopolitical influence towards can easily destabilize and become a threat to U.S. its Western frontier. Liberal internationalism is not interests in the region. Supporting the Afghan a practical approach for the emerging political and republic by building upon democratic and civic strategic situation in these regions. China’s interests institutions, promoting civic education, continuing and aspirations are moving towards the opposite strategic support to security institutions, and end of that of the U.S. Seeking common ground with facilitating a domestic political environment that China in the region does not seem to be a productive is conductive to participation, accountability and policy. transparency, is essential to prevent Afghanistan China is audaciously moving forward by from becoming another casualty in the sphere of limiting freedom and spreading and consolidating the emerging ideological and strategic competing political oppression. Around the globe and in the powers. region, authoritarian, corrupt, reckless regimes References, See page 79 and non-state actors bandwagon around China’s

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 31 Before It's Too Late:

By Kimberley B. McCann, James A. McMullin, and Wade D. Turvold

he United States, along with others who China was recently accused of implementing forced support the tenets of a free and open sterilization of its minority Muslim populations. Pacific, must plan now for the Chinese Finally, and perhaps most alarming, India asserts CommunistT Party’s (CCP) expansionist activities to that China instigated the June 2020 border clash move beyond the South China Sea. The legitimacy with India in the Galwan Valley that resulted in the of the CCP depends on a growing economy which death of 20 Indian soldiers.2 will cause the People’s Republic of China (PRC) With the CCP’s errant behavior in mind, the to explore new markets and seek to dominate United States must challenge China’s expansive resources to its North and West. As a result, the maritime strategy which will grow from a focus in CCP’s voracious appetite will soon be focused the South China Sea to a focus in the Indian and on the Indian and Arctic Ocean regions. The Arctic Oceans. The CCP’s consistently belligerent CCP’s consistent behavior in the South China Sea and overreaching behavior in the South China Sea demonstrates that it seeks to upend the rules-based leaves no doubt as to its modus operandi in these international order in other maritime frontiers. The new regions. Due to this, the creation and execution consequences of such behavior would be disastrous of a U.S. maritime grand strategy has never been for the free and open Indo-Pacific concept. more important. The United States must continue The CCP’s unlawful aggression and coercive to collaborate with allies and friends to enforce the actions during the COVID-19 global pandemic Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy and proactively forebodingly highlight its determination to achieve address China’s expansion into new geographic its objectives at all costs. For example, the CCP areas. Getting and staying ahead of China’s maritime recently abandoned its promises regarding Hong aspirations is vital due to their importance to the Kong by enacting security measures that effectively world's free use of the sea and the global economy. outlaw dissent and subject Hong Kong’s citizens to China is aggressively seeking to upend the rules- mainland China’s prosecution.1 China also enacted based international order at the expense of littoral trade barriers to Australia for challenging the PRC’s states in the Indian Ocean region. The signs cannot handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. In addition, be ignored.

32 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 US Maritime Grand Strategy Before It's Too Late: in the Indian, Arctic Oceans

Multinational navy ships and a submarine steam in formation during a group sail off the coast of Hawaii during Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2020, August 21, 2020. (Royal Canadian Navy photo by MS Dan Bard)

The South China Sea no question of its intent when the Chinese Embassy China’s actions in the South China Sea clearly in Manila tweeted: “China’s position is consistent, demonstrate its intent to ignore international law clear and firm. The South China Sea arbitration and in the maritime domain and ultimately try to alter so-called award are illegal and invalid.”5 the existing rules-based international order. Beijing Beijing continues its strategy of claiming to continues to claim it has historical rights to most of support international law as it bullies its neighbors to the South China Sea based on a map created by the accept unfavorable agreements that undermine their then-Republic of China in 1947. This claim ignores sovereign rights. Beijing is currently participating the unambiguous 2016 ruling by the International in talks with the Association of Southeast Asian Tribunal on the Law of the Sea that found there was Nations (ASEAN) regarding a Code of Conduct for no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to the region. As the slow-moving discussions have resources—in excess of the rights provided for by languished due to the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the has exploited the pandemic by flexing its muscles Sea— within the sea areas falling within China’s against the same ASEAN neighbors with whom claimed ‘nine-dash line.’3 Even while the case was in- it purports to seek peaceful resolutions. China’s progress, Beijing continued to build artificial islands bullying actions in the South China Sea are an in the South China Sea. Beijing has reclaimed 3,200 unfortunate but predictable part of Beijing’s strategy acres of land since late 2015, more than all other especially considering what then-PRC Foreign claimants combined in the past forty years.4 Since the Minister Yang Jiechi told his ASEAN counterparts in tribunal’s final ruling and despite pressure from the 2010: “China is a big country and other countries are international community to follow international law, small countries and that is just a fact.”6 Beijing continues to build military infrastructure on Since the emergence of COVID-19, China’s the artificial islands it illegally constructed within maritime activities have continued to escalate the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ). tensions within the South China Sea. To begin, Recently, in response to a Philippine government a Chinese Coast Guard vessel rammed and sank appeal for compliance with the tribunal, Beijing left a Vietnamese fishing vessel resulting in a formal

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 33 complaint by Vietnam. During the same month, China dispatched its survey vessel Haiyang Dizhi 8, accompanied by a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, into Malaysia’s claimed EEZ for petroleum exploration. This is the same ship that entered Vietnam’s claimed EEZ in 2019 for the same purpose. China also used Coast Guard and maritime militia vessels to harass Malaysia’s resupply vessels that were supporting lawful exploration within its own EEZ. These unlawful incidents all occurred with the backdrop of China establishing headquarters facilities in both the Spratly and Paracel Islands and announcing it is demarcating the South China Sea into governed districts as if it is China’s territory. Beijing is using similar intimidation tactics in the East China Sea. Chinese ships have been operating in the contiguous zone of Japan’s Senkaku Islands for a record length of time.7 Moreover, incursions are at an all-time high since the start of the pandemic.8 These actions accompanied an equally high number of Chinese intrusions into Japanese airspace during the same period. China’s behavior in its near-abroad clearly signals its intent for other maritime regions.

The Arctic Ocean “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world, as no nation has sovereignty over it … China must plan an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”9 Chinese Admiral Yin Zhuo wrote these words in March 2010 and offered China’s plain view of the technologies to support Arctic exploration, shipping, Arctic. China has been surprisingly transparent, and mining.10 Furthermore, China seeks to partner although probably not wholly forthright, about with Arctic nations to build the “Polar Silk Road.” its intentions in the Arctic region which include This transportation corridor will provide China technological advancements and partnerships. with access to resources, shipping routes, and China clarified its intentions in its Arctic infrastructure. Policy published in January 2018.10 China’s draw The Arctic region may contain 13 percent (90 to the region includes the potential for access to billion barrels) of the world’s undiscovered crude oil energy and natural resources along with shorter, and 30 percent of the world’s undiscovered natural cheaper, and safer sea passages between Asia and gas. As the world’s largest oil and gas importer China Europe. Consequently, the Arctic region promises desires to exploit these untapped energy resources alternatives to some of China’s key challenges.11 in the Arctic.12 However, since the majority of The Arctic Council awarded China with observer these natural resources are located in other nations’ status in 2013 and, despite Beijing being 3,000 km Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) China will have to from the Arctic Circle, China has declared itself partner with Arctic States to access these resources. to be a “Near-Arctic State”.10 China is developing Shipping these resources by using Arctic sea routes

34 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 (Adobe Stock image by Maxim P)

will also enable China to become more economically enhanced use of the Arctic. efficient. Like the Maritime Silk Road, the “Polar Silk China relies heavily upon exports and imports to Road” will require China to seek partnerships with grow its economy and China’s use of Polar shipping Arctic States that possess both the Arctic EEZs and routes would dramatically lower the shipment time, the Arctic territory to support China’s ambitions distance, and cost of these resources. Vessels sailing with physical, economic, and policy infrastructure. from Europe to East Asia travel 21,000 km through China obtained just such a partnership in April 2019 three maritime chokepoints (the Suez Canal, the when Russia and China announced plans to connect Bab-el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Malacca) for the Northern Sea Route with China’s Maritime approximately 48 days.13 Using the Northern Sea Silk Road.14 If this partnership matures, China will Route that hugs the coast of Russia would cut the gain access to Russia’s vast polar infrastructure of distance to 12,800 km and the transit time by 10 to icebreakers, ports, roads, and rail lines. 15 days. China values the cost savings that Polar In May 2019 U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo passages offer and the strategic value of avoiding cautioned other members of the Arctic Council to be three crucial maritime chokepoints. China also wary that China may attempt to transform the Arctic desires to develop infrastructure to complement its Ocean as it did the South China Sea.15 China has

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 35 informed the world of its plans for the Arctic Ocean the ability to inhibit information flows throughout so there is no reason to doubt its aspirations in this the region. In addition to establishing its basing strategic region. The world should not, however, network, China is actively engaging with Bangladesh, accept China’s attempt to frame its entrance into Myanmar, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius, the Arctic as benevolent. In its white paper, Beijing and is trying to establish dual-use port facilities in states its approach to Arctic affairs will be through Iran.19 Simultaneously, China is increasing its naval law-based governance, international cooperation, presence in the region. In addition to counterpiracy and commitment to maintaining a peaceful, deployments in the Gulf of Aden, China routinely secure, and stable Arctic order.10 Unfortunately, deploys guided-missile ships, amphibious landing China’s idea of supporting a rules-based order and ships, submarines, and intelligence collection international cooperation is clearly displayed and vessels to the Indian Ocean.20 China’s motives are well-documented through its nefarious behavior in to advance its own development and could threaten the South China Sea. Indian and U.S. interests.21 China’s methods include expanding its One The Indian Ocean Belt One Road economic lines of communication Retired Commodore Anil Jai Singh, Indian across the Eurasian continent and through the Navy, Vice President of the Indian Maritime Indian Ocean into Europe thereby encircling India Foundation, put it bluntly and accurately: “Once and establishing a relationship of suzerainty with China consolidates its domination of the South participating states along the way. Perhaps most China Sea, it will attempt to do so in the Indian importantly, the ability to attain sea control in Ocean.”16 The Indian Ocean is strategically located the Indian Ocean will enable China to address the in the world’s most significant economic corridor fact that most of its resources traverse through the and it contributes to half of the surface area of the Strait of Malacca—its 'Malacca Dilemma'— and region currently labeled the Indo-Pacific. It is also thereby ensure that resources continue to flow to, the epicenter of global trade with half of the world’s and finished products flow from, ports in the PRC. underway commercial vessels and two-thirds of the China’s designs on the Indian Ocean are evident and world’s oil transits through it.17 Using an approach it will not be satisfied until it obtains hegemony over from famous sea power theorist Alfred Thayer the entire region. Mahan, China is thoughtfully developing its basing network in the Indian Ocean region. It mainly Recommendations and Conclusion portrays the network as a non-military adjunct China’s recent increased aggressive state behavior to its One Belt One Road initiative, using similar in the face of the global COVID-19 pandemic is reasoning as it once did with features in the South alarming. However, this conduct is useful in that China Sea. China has established a full-service base it telegraphs China’s real strategic intent to extend in Djibouti, leased the port of Hambantota in Sri state dominion into the Indian Ocean region and Lanka through the most visible instance of debt-trap exercise authority over the region’s littoral states. diplomacy, and runs the extensive port complex at China will do this by controlling the sea lines of Gwadar in Pakistan using a Chinese state-owned communication and the information within the enterprise.18 region. The implications for the United States and Beyond its robust relationship with its likeminded allies and partners are clear. China is Pakistan, China is developing security ties and consolidating unilateral control of the South China conducting electronic surveillance through its Sea and preparing the Indian Ocean as the next telecommunications company Huawei in several geopolitical maritime battlespace. The Indian Ocean littoral states. China then leverages the resulting will become the next frontline in global competition. economic and informational advantage for This is also true in the Arctic Ocean region to some diplomatic advantage, collects intelligence, and gains extent.

36 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 “If one day China should change her color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it.” Deng Xiaoping 1974 speech to the United Nations

The United States, India, and others must military approaches. prepare now or risk a repeat of what has happened The United States should capitalize and expand in the South China Sea. U.S. Secretary of State upon the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act23 and the Mike Pompeo declared on July 13, 2020: “We are Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative Act24 to making clear: Beijing’s claims to offshore resources ensure that both fully support partners in the Indian across most of the South China Sea are completely Ocean region. By investing in these enterprises and unlawful, as is its campaign of bullying to control working with partner states, U.S. military strategy them.”6 India’s Ministry of External Affairs for the region can expand beyond Freedom of spokesperson similarly announced on July 16, 2020 Navigation Operations. Lastly, the U.S. Department that the “South China Sea is a part of [the] global of Defense must continue to prioritize and resource commons. India has an abiding interest in peace and efforts in the Indo-Pacific to bring sufficient stability in the region.”22 These statements were long quantities of advanced weapons and well-trained overdue as China consolidates its gains there and the forces to the region. United States must get ahead in the Arctic Ocean In the Arctic region the United States should work and the Indian Ocean regions. with its North American ally (Canada), its European The United States should immediately work with allies (the Arctic States of the Arctic Council), and its ally the United Kingdom, as well as Mauritius even Russia, to moderate China’s Arctic behavior, and other regional powers, to secure the Indian and to ensure China’s entry into the Arctic does not Ocean basing rights in Diego Garcia well into the follow the destructive trajectory that it did in the future. China is actively establishing its perimeter South China Sea. of bases in the region and the United States must The United States still has time to step forward not lose its access to the centrally and strategically with likeminded partners to ensure the world retains located base in Diego Garcia. This U.S. base should lawful, unhindered access to the Arctic Ocean and complement India’s emerging bases in the Andaman the Indian Ocean, South Asian states remain free and Nicobar Islands. The United States must also from China’s subversion and coercion, and the area continue to develop the Quadrilateral Strategic remains a sanctuary within the free and open Indo- Dialogue (Quad) with allies Australia and Japan, Pacific region. Nevertheless, time is running out and and especially with India (its major defense partner) soon China will shift its predatory gaze to the Indian to anticipate the emerging situation in the Indian Ocean region. The United States must act now Ocean. The Quad should focus on diplomatic efforts, before it’s too late. economic investment, and information initiatives to References, See page 80 proactively engage the South Asia region as well as

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 37 Civil-Military Engagement in the Aleutian Archipelago: Implications for the US - China Great Power Competition

By Col. Bradford Hughes and Lt. Col. Hugh Dougalas

Military Government Specialists and Civil annually through the thawing Northern Sea Route Information Management experts from the 351 by 2030. With no U.S. Navy surface ships in the Civil Affairs Command, Functional Specialty Aleutians, and no permanent U.S. Coast Guard bases, Team recently completed a report commissioned the United States is powerless to stop ongoing by the United States Department of Defense to incursions by Russian warships in the U.S. Exclusive assess crucial civil considerations for the city of Economic Zone which disrupt commerce and Unalaska, Alaska located on Unalaska Island and intimidate local Americans. If something is not done neighboring Amaknak Island in the Aleutian Islands soon the USA will be on the sidelines in the new Arctic off mainland Alaska "Gold Rush" while Russia and China reap enormous Through interviews with key personnel profits which they disproportionately convert to and reconnaissance of domestic resources and military assets to threaten the United States and its effects, the team collected relevant details and allies around the globe. material information related to the Island’s civil everal years ago, China began its Belt and capability. These data informed each expert’s Road Initiative (BRI). Also known as the professional opinion as to the present situation of One Belt/One Road Program, the main the component (i.e. economic development, public goalS of the BRI is to ensure that China continues works and utilities, public communications, public to increase its global influence. While the ruling transportation, public administration, environmental Chinese Communist Party claims that its foreign management, and public health). From the report, the investment in port infrastructure and (to a lesser strategic importance of Unalaska as it relates to Multi extent) airports, roads, and rail systems in poor Domain Operations and the competition continuum countries near the Indian Oceans is strictly becomes apparent. civilian in nature, few honest observers deny the Currently 30% of the Russian economy is derived construction’s martial flavor and China’s attempt from the Arctic, and China will ship nearly $1 trillion to “weaponize” commerce. While Chinese ports

38 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Kyaukpyu in Indian Ocean. For comparison, if that same ship Myanmar, and Gwadar in Pakistan are not fortified were to sail in a “clockwise” direction and utilize and soldiers of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) what is called the Northern Sea Route, it would are not widespread, under Chinese law all ports, only travel 8,500 miles, reducing the distance by whether abroad or at home, are designed to PLA approximately 20% as well as avoiding canal user standards and support the Party’s civil-military fees, typically $700,000 for a fully loaded 20,000 TEU fusion principle. While the party claims that these vessel (twenty-foot equivalent, the ocean freight military elements are necessary to safeguard Chinese industry standard unit for cargo quantification. workers engaged in port construction and to support At present, the Arctic’s navigation season extends anti-piracy operations, these claims are rejected as 20-30 days per year. However, as sea ice diminishes, deliberately downplaying China’s geostrategic aims it is anticipated that the Arctic’s navigability will and the ready logistical support these ports can steadily increase to reach 90-100 days within the provide to the PLA. next 40 years. Chinese shippers will not likely cede this portion of the earth’s waterways and be A Sino-centric Indian Ocean has huge implications content with taking the longer, more expensive for the U.S. and like-minded states and prompts route. Having tasted success in transforming the the question: Will China attempt to duplicate Indian Ocean into an ersatz “Chinese lake,” the these efforts elsewhere? Chinese Communist Party’s appetite, in the words Consider that an ocean-going vessel sailing from of Francois Rabelais, “grows with the eating” and an Rotterdam, The Netherlands (Europe’s largest port) Arctic BRI should be anticipated and countered. It to Shanghai, China (the world’s busiest) covers a is in this setting that the Bering Strait and Alaska’s distance of approximately 10,500 nautical miles and Aleutian Islands become a focus for civil-military completes transit of the Suez Canal when making coordination and humanitarian assistance in the a “counterclockwise” trip and sailing through the context of great power competition.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 39 What follows is a brief description of a civil medicine, emergency response, law and governance, reconnaissance mission to the Island of Unalaska public diplomacy, environmental remediation, recently completed by the 351st Civil Affairs natural resource management, engineering, Command (CACOM) in Mountain View, California construction, transportation and logistics, medical and some insights and lessons learned following its care, finance, and economics. Twelve of the 13 execution. For more than 25 years the Office of the Soldiers traveled to Unalaska while one officer Secretary of Defense has managed the Innovative with extensive experience in fiber optics and Readiness Training (IRT) program. This program advanced networking performed connectivity and features creative pairing of the needs of American communications assessments virtually. communities with military training requirements The IRT Mission offered Civil Affairs Soldiers designed to improve deployment readiness. As unmatched training opportunities in Core municipalities, counties, states, and sovereign Competencies and Functions such as Civil tribes experiencing stagnant or diminishing Engagement, Civil Reconnaissance, and Civil budgets attempt to meet challenges in the areas Information Management and obliged the SMEs to of cybersecurity, transportation, medical care, navigate the complex human terrain of the Island of environmental remediation, economic development, Unalaska. The Qawalangin Tribe manages its affairs and infrastructure rehabilitation and upgrade they through a Tribal Council while the City of Unalaska may request assistance in the form of expertise and exercises its authority through an elected mayor, consultation. This can be provided at no cost to the a city manager, and public service departments community by licensed professionals serving in the such as police and public works. In addition, Active Duty, Guard, and Reserve of the United States The Ounalashka Corporation, an Alaska Native military. Corporation formed after passage of the Alaska The Qawalangin Tribe is a small Native Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA), population that has occupied the Island of Unalaska has jurisdiction in the area of land use and leasing. (among the largest of the Aleutian Archipelago) This tri-partite arrangement can complicate civil for nearly 9,500 years. In 2015, the Tribe—one of undertakings as overlapping responsibilities can get 229 recognized by the Federal Government under in the way of each group operating to the best of the jurisdiction of the Alaska Regional Office of the their abilities. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs—applied for Civil Simply reaching Unalaska proved difficult. Affairs assessment of the Island of Unalaska and in Remote and subject to weather which frequently August of 2020 OSD approved the IRT application. grounds incoming and outbound aircraft the Island To execute the IRT Mission, 351st CACOM decided is accessible by small planes which typically carry upon a two-phase operation to Unalaska. The first no more than six passengers per flight. In meeting phase, a Leaders’ Reconnaissance, was completed this challenge, Soldiers gained valuable experience in 21-26 July as three Officers traveled to the Island complicated personnel movement. The worldwide and engaged key civilian leaders and conducted COVID-19 pandemic presented an additional, cursory reconnaissance of transportation nodes and significant obstacle. The State of Alaska’s “Keep infrastructure components. Based on the Leaders’ COVID Out of Alaska” program required all persons Reconnaissance, 351st CACOM planned a follow- entering the state to provide negative results from on mission of Subject Matter Experts (SME) and Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) testing performed assembled a “battle roster” of 13 SMEs organic to within 72 hours of arrival in Alaska or be subjected the Command’s Functional Specialty Team (FxSP) to 14 days of quarantine. FxSP Soldiers—Reservists possessing expertise which aligned with the Tribe’s residing in various locales across the country where and the Island’s identified challenges. Soldiers testing protocols and availability vary—were able to comprising the IRT Team were educated and meet testing requirements and enter Alaska without trained in the areas of public health and preventive incident.

40 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 U.S. Army Reserve Col. Bradford Hughes, functional specialty team chief, Lt. Col. Hugh Dougalas, governance and participation section chief, and Capt. Sarah Robinson, public health nurse from the 351st Civil Affairs Command Functional Specialty Team (FxSP) disembark from a Piper Navajo (PA-31) aircraft at the Dutch Harbor (Unalaska), Alaska airport during Innovative Readiness Training Civil-Military Partnership Leaders’ Reconnaissance, July 22. (Photo by Maj. Sean Deipach)

SMEs named to the battle roster prepared for the quarries, fire stations, police stations, roads, bridges, IRT Mission by identifying critical members of the cultural centers, churches, and a geothermal energy Island community. Once these formal and informal production site. Soldiers attended an Unalaska City leaders were identified, FxSP Soldiers began making Council meeting, an Ounalashka Corporate Board contact with their on-Island counterparts which meeting, a Qawalangin Tribal Council meeting, a consisted of entities such as Iliuliuk Family and briefing by Ty Moore of the Alaska World Affairs Health Services Clinic providers, City of Unalaska Council (an Arctic geopolitical and strategic forum), Assistant City Manager, City of Unalaska Director and met with Officers assigned to the Alex Haley, the of Planning, Qawalangin Tribal Operations and largest Medium Endurance Cutter in the U.S. Coast Finance Director, and Oonalaska Wellness Center Guard’s fleet docked at Dutch Harbor while on a personnel, among others. Together they scheduled Bering Sea cruise from its home port of Kodiak. meetings and developed an agenda for site visits. In addition, FxSP Soldiers observed the dignified Additionally, IRT Soldiers reviewed reports disposal of the remains of a 65-foot long fin whale prepared by various consultants hired by the Tribe, which washed upon a local beach. This solemn Corporation, and Municipality over the last 25 event, a ceremonial practice in which the Unangan years. These preparatory tasks provided real-world, (the Native population’s name for itself) have tactical experience in collecting information to better engaged for generations, is typically closed to the understand the operational environment. public with invitation limited to Aleutian Natives. Upon arrival in Unalaska, SMEs completed Maintaining a respectful distance aboard a separate site reconnaissance of public health clinics, water vessel, FxSP Soldiers were honored to be present. supply systems, wastewater treatment facilities, Other significant events took place during solid waste management sites (landfill), docks, the time that FxSP Soldiers were present on the

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 41 U.S. Army Reserve Lt. Col. Eric Christeson (2nd from left), Maj. Tulsi Gabbard (center), and Lt. Col. Hugh Dougalas Governance team members from the 351st Civil Affairs Command Functional Specialty Team (FxSP) engage with a Qawalangin Tribe (Q-Tribe) Young Leader during the Innovative Readiness Training Civil-Military Partnership Subject Matter Expert Assessment, Aug. 25. (Photo by Sean Delpech)

Island including a signing ceremony in which the for enhancing, sustaining, and/or establishing the Tribe, Municipality, and Corporation executed physical and administrative resources necessary a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for a functioning society and individual human committing each to greater cooperation and flourishing. Each expert’s professional opinion enhanced synchronization of effort and the City of was presented in a formal report employing the Unalaska’s commitment to purchase electricity from SBAR – Situation (brief statement of the problem), a geothermal energy production project, something Background (pertinent information related to the which is now in progress. problem), Assessment (analysis and consideration, While exhaustive evaluations were beyond the SME’s findings), and Recommendations the scope of the mission, SME assessments were (advice, actions endorsed by the SME) – format thorough and drew upon interviews with key which provides an effective means of accurate personnel and reconnaissance of domestic resources transfer of information. While this format is most and effects. The forward-deployed team collected commonly utilized by nurses and physicians, the relevant details and material information related to SBAR format lent itself well to the IRT Mission and the Island’s civil capability and adequately captured the report prepared by FxSP Soldiers was provided the present situation of structures, capabilities, to the Qawalangin Tribe for its use in planning and organizations to allow Functional Specialty and executing civil capacity reinforcement and Team members to formulate recommendations enhancement.

42 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 An unintended yet critical feature of the report But it is security that trumps all other concerns is the recognition of the strategic importance of and makes Unalaska a significant contestant in the Unalaska as it relates to Multi-Domain Operations Great Power Competition. Chinese warships have and the Great Power Competition continuum. recently encroached upon Unalaska and residents Unalaska is blessed with natural beauty even express concerns for their security. They view though it is treeless due to persistent high winds; forward projection of American force as essential. its situation in a geologically dynamic region has Assessing their strategic location, residents believe created stunning landscapes with great, jagged peaks their Island to be an attractive site for a permanent and cirques, horns, and other glacial features. The U.S. Navy and/or Coast Guard installation. In island is home to abundant sea life as the adjacent addition to its position, Unalaska’s primary Bering Sea yields bountiful king crab, salmon, advantage is its undeveloped, naturally occurring pollock, halibut and other seafood which has made harbors Beaver Inlet and Agamgik Bay. These bodies Dutch Harbor the world’s number one fishing port. of water feature great depth eliminating the need The local population has a rich culture and many for exhaustive dredging efforts, remain ice-free Aleut traditions such as fabricating bentwood visors, throughout the year, and feature very low tidal range paddling ikyaks, fish drying/curing, and berry (the difference in height between successive high and picking and preserving are honored and maintained, low tides). Unalaska’s consistent, thick cloud cover enriching the culture for Island residents, Native is also a benefit as it would likely thwart adversary and entrant alike. Despite all this, the inhabitants airborne reconnaissance. of Unalaska face myriad challenges: economic For many observers of geopolitics and diversification and expansion, communication/ international relations, energy security is national connectivity, environmental remediation, and security. On Unalaska reliable energy is key to security. attracting the forward power projection Island The community seeks to improve economic inhabitants seek; the lack of sufficient electric opportunities for its citizens. Presently, fishing is power to support American military presence has the dominant industry and when seafood prices fall, thus far frustrated residents’ efforts to enhance severe recession sets in. Diversification is critical their security. However, with adequate power to shielding residents from the present “feast or available—particularly green/renewable energy famine" milieu. such as geothermally-generated electricity which is Cell phone service and internet connectivity consistent with U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) are poor. Accessing the internet is expensive and objectives—the forward positioning of Coast Guard bandwidth is severely limited. This situation has or Navy assets on Unalaska becomes more plausible. cascading effects: absence of high-speed internet In preparing for on-Island civil reconnaissance, precludes effective telemedicine which means that FxSP personnel reviewed geologic reports which air travel to Anchorage for any care beyond basic investigated the Aleutian Islands’ frequent medicine is necessary. Online education for college earthquakes, nearly 50 volcanoes, numerous hot credit and professional development is effectively springs, and plentiful fumaroles which populate the impossible. area. With each successive expedition, beginning Prior military activities, including wartime events, with Veniaminof’s in 1840, Grewingk’s in 1850 past and (to a lesser extent) present, fishing industry and continuing with the U.S. War Department’s practices, and aging infrastructure assets have request to the U.S. Geological Survey to investigate degraded soil, surface water, groundwater, and near- the Aleutian Islands in 1945, understanding of the shore ocean water quality. Remediation of these structure and composition of the Aleutian Islands’ natural resources is beyond the local technical and petrology, seismicity, and stratigraphy has increased. financial capability and Federal and State support for As a result, utilizing subsurface activity in the affecting clean-up is insufficient. generation of electricity has emerged as a realistic

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 43 albeit a long-term objective of the U.S. Department unloading and storage areas. of Energy (DoE) and the State of Alaska Energy Construction in the sensitive Authority (AEA). Makushin Volcano, a nearly environment of the Aleutian 6,000 foot tall truncated stratovolcano (a conical, Islands is a major concern to steeply sloped peak) located roughly 16 miles west all parties. To ensure a “light across Unalaska Bay from the City of Unalaska has footprint” construction will be been particularly enticing to geothermal energy accomplished employing a net specialists. zero approach and innovative Starting in the early 1980’s, geothermal energy use of geotextiles. Engineered conversion to electricity at Makushin Volcano has fill materials will be produced been investigated with experts performing feasibility at the site with neither import studies and pilot tests and developing preliminary earth material brought onto designs. In each case the proposed project was the Island nor excavation abandoned before construction began due to high spoil shipped from it. Builders start-up costs and difficulties in negotiating land use intend to keep earthwork agreements and royalty distribution. and grading to a minimum A present endeavor, which 351st CACOM and when they're able to, Soldiers assessed during the IRT Mission, is return locally-derived fill to underway and differs from earlier attempts in several its original location and upon significant ways. Firstly, a public-private partnership completion of construction known as OCCP has been formed by the Ounalashka restore currently existing Corporation (OC) and Chena Power, LLC (CP). vegetation to its natural This partnership joins the Alaska Native Village condition. Corporation for Unalaska (the major landholder Mr. Givey Kochanowski, on the Island) and Chena Power LLC (a Fairbanks, Program Manager for DoE Alaska energy firm). Secondly, the City of Unalaska Office of Indian Energy has signed a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) Policy and Programs, and Mr. with OCCP. With the City Council’s adoption of Bernie Karl, President of Chena Power, were on-site Resolution 2020-55 the City committed to purchase to discuss the project at length. Ms. Natalie Cale, approximately 100,000,000 kilowatt-hours (kWh) Ounalashka Corporation General Counsel, provided per year at an approximate cost of $16,300,000 per 351st CACOM Soldiers with letters of intent from year for the next 30 years. Lastly, DoE Office of approximately 20 Unalaska business owners and Indian Energy Policy and Programs has indicated operators for review. In these letters many of its support for the project and OCCP’s securing Unalaska’s various commercial enterprises express of a loan from DoE of between $300,000,000 to their support for the project and offer assurances $500,000,000 is expected. that once the new electrical service becomes available FxSP personnel conducted both walking and each will subscribe to it, reflecting positively on the aerial reconnaissance of the project site including project’s likelihood for financial success. a helicopter flight into the volcano’s caldera and Technical feasibility of the project is indicated inspected the resource confirmation well Makushin and Chena Energy possesses a proven record of ST-1 which was advanced to a depth of 1,949 feet geothermal energy development and utilization. below existing ground surface on the lower slopes The firm’s Chena Hot Springs Resort in Fairbanks of Makushin Volcano. Additionally, FxSP SMEs is noteworthy for its use of sustainable energy and reviewed construction plans and paid particular advanced geothermal utilization. With the August attention to earthwork and grading relating to 2020 execution of the MoU between the City of roads, structures, and equipment and material Unalaska, the Qawalangin Tribe of Unalaska,

44 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Unalaska - Dutch Harbor. (Adobe stock photo by Bummi100) and the Ounalashka Corporation (in which the Conducting Civil-Military Operations (CMO) is a Island’s tri-partite administration committed to skill that is learned through the soles of the feet greater coordination), any organizational and/or Generally well-educated professionals possessing bureaucratic impediments during the lifespan of the vast experience in their disciplines (engineering, project should be readily overcome. medicine, finance, etc.) comprised the 351st With sufficient dependable power available, CACOM FxSP. In addition, many of the Soldiers Unalaska can host a permanent U.S. Military on the IRT Team have had lengthy military careers, presence, the Island’s population can feel more serving in Civil Affairs units for a considerable secure, the Northern Sea Route can be protected, time. However, wearing the distinctive unit insignia and any future Chinese moves in the present Great on the sleeve which indicates the Soldier is a U.S. Power Competition can be checked. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) asset is not the same as Conclusions boots-on-the-ground CMO. Many Soldiers assigned Several useful lessons can be shared with other to CA units have not performed tactical missions; military personnel performing Civil-Military their service limited to fulfilling an advisory and/ Operations, disaster response, and/or humanitarian or support role. While this service is honorable and assistance in the context of Great Power indispensable it alone cannot fully prepare a Soldier Competition: for CA operations in the field.

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 45 Several members of the IRT Team were diplomacy to inform the residents of Unalaska uncomfortable with the tactical environment of its location, a CMOC was, in fact established. and found the mission objectives nebulous at Throughout the IRT Team’s stay on the Island first. However, like countless American Soldiers and enforcing the maintenance of proper person- before them, they quickly adapted and learned to to-person spacing, Soldiers used the CMOC for be “comfortable with the discomfort.” As they briefings, working group meetings, and more. The performed reconnaissance and engaged the Island’s one-stop-shop for civil-to-military interaction, the elected leadership and everyday citizens, each CMOC became the trademark feature of the IRT began to define his role in the operation and take Mission and crucial to its success. individual action to ensure success. This experience bespeaks the utility of the “real Early and continuous engagement with non- world” as a training environment. To be adequately governmental organizations (NGOs), even if prepared to perform humanitarian assistance and/ they’re small clubs or groups, contributes to or disaster response, Civil Affairs Soldiers should be success in conducting CMO provided opportunities for authentic civil-military The Samoan community of Unalaska represents engagement and their leaders should seek and only a fraction of the Island’s population and vigorously pursue such missions. mission planning did not consider a program of formal outreach to these residents. However, The Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) is during an initial introductory “town hall” meeting not just a good idea; it’s essential to conducting shortly after 351st CACOM Soldiers arrived on the CMO Island, it was discovered that one of the SMEs is of 351st CACOM Soldiers were housed during Samoan origin. This ancestral connection formed an their stay on Unalaska at the Grand Aleutian Hotel immediate bridge between the small Samoan group in Dutch Harbor, Alaska. Following an outbreak and, via the individual Soldier, to the larger IRT of COVID-19 on a Bering Sea commercial fishing Team as a whole. vessel the Island’s only other hotel was designated Civil Information Management (CIM) is a key a quarantine location and used to house infected feature of any population-centric operation, be fishermen removed from their ship. A second it disaster response, humanitarian assistance, or outbreak on another ship led to approximately another relevant action. The Samoans readily half of the Grand Aleutian’s rooms also being used furnished unvarnished feedback and instantaneous for quarantine. Soldiers were directed by hotel “atmospherics” likely due to their comfort in management to follow strict public health protocols engaging with the particular Soldier with whom while within the structure and take a circuitous they shared heritage. These citizens of Unalaska route when entering and exiting their rooms. Here it spoke frankly and provided invaluable insights should be noted that these measures proved effective in performing civil assessments and formulating as no infections occurred among the IRT Team. appropriate recommendations. In some cases they However, the loss of the Grand Aleutian Hotel’s were able to represent a minority opinion that may meeting and conference rooms for use in conducting have otherwise gone unconsidered. IRT business represented a significant challenge. If ever Civil Affairs Soldiers were to conclude that The Army’s Functional Specialty Team (FxSP) establishing a Civil Military Operations Center Task Organization contributes to the efficient (CMOC) would be imprudent, surely this occasion conduct of CMO would be it. But with the rapid assistance of local The Civil Affairs branch provides the U.S. carpenters who fabricated plexiglass barriers Army with wide-ranging proficiencies. FM 3-57, which were placed throughout the small office Civil Affairs Operations was published by the U.S. space available in the hotel and conducting public Government so that Army Commanders possess

46 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 U.S. Army Reserve Soldiers from the 351st Civil Affairs Command Functional Specialty Team (FxSP) pose for a photo with Unalaska, Alaska community stakeholders during the Innovative Readiness Training Civil-Military Partnership Subject Matter Expert Assessment, Unalaska, Alaska, Aug. 27, 2020. (Photo by Maj. Sean Delpech) the information necessary for the integration of should participate in analysis, evaluation, and Civil Affairs in support of unified land operations, dissemination of information describes these capabilities as “overarching.” It is Civil Information Management (CIM) not unreasonable for even an experienced leader to enhances situational awareness and improves the say, “Well, that’s nice, but what do I do with these understanding of the operational environment Soldiers?” for all elements, both civilian and military. The For the 351st CACOM IRT Mission to Unalaska IRT Mission to Unalaska demonstrated the force- the Command selected SMEs from the 18 military multiplying value of a well-functioning CIM Cell government specialist capabilities and 8 other as daily production of empirical, user-friendly tools Army capabilities nested within 16 functional ensured that both civil administration and military specialties aligned with the 5 functional specialty personnel in the field were properly apprised of areas framework (such as a Functional Specialty strategic implications of all aspects of the mission. Team, FxSP). Owing to this sound task organization, The 351st CACOM CIM Cell set conditions for IRT Mission planners were able to quickly and success by affording a precise operational picture of appropriately staff the team of SMEs, demonstrating ground conditions and later, as SMEs prepared the the utility of the military government structure and final written report, CIM assets furnished abundant capability as directed in DODD 5100.01 and DODD open-source research providing background, 2000.13. analysis, and recommendations.

Civil Information Management (CIM) is not the CIM Cell’s task alone; all stakeholders

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 47 The Global Pandemic and Humanitarian Competition By Maj. Mike Karlson

he white hull and emblazoned red media claims of treating over 2,000 patients, crosses of a naval hospital ship conducting numerous surgeries, and donating make it virtually impossible to much-needed medical supplies.1 However, the miss.T Anyone looking out over the waters of numbers tell only a part of the story. This was the Leyte Gulf in southeastern Philippines on the first mission of its kind for the ship, her December 10, 2013 might have seen one such crew, and their country. The Peace Ark would ship sailing home. It had been an extremely be jubilantly welcomed to her home port in the busy 16 days for the crew, with Chinese People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Chinese Navy hospital ship Peace Ark (866) during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2016. (Photo by U.S. Navy Combat Camera photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class Ace Rheaume)

48 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 A Super-Typhoon country began immediate coordination with their What exactly had the PRC’s hospital ship the Filipino counterparts to deliver food and water to Peace Ark responded to? Super-Typhoon Haiyan some of the most affected areas.5 Then-Secretary of devastated the central Philippines on November Defense Chuck Hagel ordered the aircraft carrier 8, 2013 leaving an estimated “6,000 dead, 27,022 USS George Washington and its thousands of injured and 1,779 missing.”2 The Philippines is a sailors, numerous aircraft, and onboard medical country used to natural disasters however this was facilities to participate in the growing response.6 This one of the most powerful recorded typhoons of all action was hardly unprecedented. The USS Abraham time. It triggered an unprecedented international Lincoln had been ordered to support the Indian response, the first “system-wide response on the Ocean Tsunami Response off the coast of Aceh, part of the international humanitarian community Indonesia in 2004.7 The United States demonstrated [also known as a Level-3 activation] for a sudden its commitment to the region and its role as a onset natural disaster.”3 The United States’ response responsible power in the wake of Super-Typhoon was immediate and multi-faceted. The United Haiyan, as it had done before. Several years and one States Agency for International Development’s global pandemic later, however, could not paint a (USAID) Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance more different view of the international world order. (OFDA) “activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) and corresponding Washington, Shining City(ies) on the Hill? D.C.- based Response Management Team (RMT).”4 The contrast between the United States’ disaster Private donations from American citizens poured in response described in the previous section and the and numerous U.S. relief agencies independent of ongoing disaster within its own borders is stark. the government response sprang into action. The U.S. has had over 25 million COVID-19 cases The United States military forces already in the and over 400,000 COVID-19-related deaths since the U.S. Center for Disease Control (CDC) began collating national data in January 2020.8 The global pandemic continues to wreak havoc socially and economically, and also poses significant threats to the international security environment. UN Secretary General António Guterres was frank in his assessment, stating COVID-19 “has hindered international, regional and national conflict resolution efforts, exactly when they are needed most.”9

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 49 Countries are withdrawing into themselves, The use of humanitarian assistance by a state actor closing borders, and looking for others to blame. in order to influence global perception is certainly The U.S. has not escaped this search for culpability. not exclusive to China. Russia delivered medical Some argue that “the COVID-19 pandemic is the supplies to the United States in April 2020 under the first major international crisis since World War auspices of “humanitarian aid” and “free assistance.” II for which the United States has not served as Russia then charged the U.S. for these supplies the global leader for spearheading, organizing, or and eventually agreed to a reciprocal donation of implementing an international response.”10 The medical supplies which were received a few months United States’ domestic political landscape and later.16 Russia and the PRC’s increasing use of associated transitions at all levels of government soft power coupled with targeted misinformation have also affected international perceptions campaigns intend to sew doubt about the United regarding its position as a global superpower. States’ willingness and ability to be a world leader. The Biden administration plans to reverse The United States needs to proactively address these much of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda, significant challenges or it risks ceding influence at however, that will take some time as they conduct a a time when it is needed the most. “Our enemies strategic review of U.S. foreign policy interests and have proven they can score points on us physically, assess those relationships.11 The perceived impacts economically, diplomatically, and through of the Trump administration’s foreign policy have numerous cyber means. We cannot be afraid to created sharp divides amongst analysts. Proponents spend money on offensive teams to stop them before of the Trump administration argue that the U.S. has they can execute their next long-yardage play.”17 The assumed a greater role in global leadership, pointing U.S. Department of Defense has a role on offense, to its tough stance on China and the 2017 National however not in the way some might imagine. The Security Strategy’s (NSS) emphasis on partnerships fact is its continuous presence throughout the and alliances as evidence.12 Critics of the Trump world makes it a far more consistent and reliable administration argue that the U.S. has become representation of the U.S. commitment to being a increasingly isolationist, citing the administration’s global leader than errant tweets from Washington withdrawal from international agreements like the and divisive political commentary. Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Iran nuclear The DoD is a critical participant and enabler agreement, and the World Health Organization in the ongoing global competition for influence. (WHO).13 The diversity of opinion regarding the Humanitarian assistance is a form of global last four years of US foreign policy underscores competition. If this was not the case before the confusion and uncertainty regarding the future global pandemic, it is certainly a reality now. This of America’s standing in the world. Traditional is a reality that China and Russia have already rivals like the PRC and Russia have identified accepted and operationalized. The U.S. DoD can these perceived gaps in U.S. global leadership and be a force multiplier in the humanitarian assistance attempted to take advantage of the COVID-19 landscape of the future by viewing it as a form of pandemic to further their own interests. competition; understanding and influencing the The PRC is on track to provide the most information domain and strengthening its alliances humanitarian assistance in its history in response and partnerships. to the COVID-19 pandemic.14 However, it would be naïve to view this assistance at face value. Competition and Humanitarian Assistance “A Stanford study documenting Chinese state- The 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) affiliated Twitter accounts reveals a systematic describes the world through the lens of Great Power effort to promote China’s delivery of aid while Competition (GPC). There is a lot of literature and downplaying its receipt of aid, an attempt to draw ongoing debate on the specific meaning(s) and attention away from accusations of culpability.”15 implications of GPC, however, it generally refers

50 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 “Our enemies have proven they can score points on us physically, economically, diplomatically, and through numerous cyber means. We cannot be afraid to spend money on offensive teams to stop them before they can execute their next long-yardage play.” Jason Howk Afghanistan Policy Advisor

to “a return to states using military, economic, and The Annex suggests that IW is “a struggle among social tools not to support a cooperative system state and non-state actors to influence populations but to best each other.”18 The inevitable result of and affect legitimacy.”21 The annex aims to maintain ambiguous terms of strategic reference is each hard-fought lessons from decades of irregular entity of the United States government viewing conflict and describes the need to “make permanent and defining GPC through its own lens. The DoD, the mindset and capabilities necessary to succeed in for example, naturally views armed conflict as the its current irregular warfare mission sets.”22 Tough type of competition it should focus on. The DoD and realistic training is essential to cultivating an has subsequently spent much of its organizational IW mindset. The United States Army places uses energy preparing for Large Scale Combat Operations its Combat Training Centers (CTC) to prepare (LSCO) however this is a potentially flawed premise. units for future operations, however, the emphasis LSCO assumes “that the coordinated is still on readiness for LSCO.23 Special Operations force of arms brings with it command of the units train on IW missions and core competencies environment.”19 Twenty-plus years of experiential at CTC rotations and Special Operations Forces data in Afghanistan and throughout the Middle East (SOF)-specific exercises, but the mindset required directly challenges this assumption. The elephant to succeed in this type of environment should be in the room, so to speak, seems to suggest that ubiquitous to conventional and SOF forces alike. contemporary “victory” is not a decisive military Conventional forces should be trained to operation followed by a ticker tape parade down the encounter the realities of the modern battlefield. streets of New York City. A former Army Foreign One such reality is that the United States does not Affairs Officer and current Afghanistan policy have a proprietary relationship with the delivery of advisor posits a different version of victory, writing, humanitarian assistance in conflict zones. “The Afghan people are the only ones that can Modern conflict is far more complex than assign victory or defeat to this war. They do so by “good guys and bad guys” or “blue squares and sustaining human rights and democratic principles red diamonds.” Syria provides a contemporary while constantly building a secure environment for example of this and the case of Russia’s use of soft education, healthcare, and other societal advances to power there is compelling. Russia has used several occur.”20 What then—aside from LSCO—could or state-affiliated humanitarian organizations such should the DoD focus on? as the Russian Humanitarian Mission and Center The DoD provides an answer to this question with for Reconciliation of Conflicting Sides in Syria the publication of the Irregular Warfare (IW) Annex (CRCSS) to advance its own political interests and to the National Defense Strategy (NDS) last year. buy loyalty.24 It would be euphemistic and inaccurate

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 51 Russia's military prepares to distribute food in a government-controlled area of Idlib, Syria in 2018. (Photo by AFP)

to suggest that the United States does not also Information and Humanitarian Assistance view humanitarian assistance25 as an opportunity Misinformation is a powerful tool used by improve its own image in conflict zones. However, a state and non-state competitors alike against the key distinction between the United States and state United States. The global pandemic seems to have actors like Russia lies in the closeness of its militaries exacerbated this trend. Russian media outlets have to the direction and funding of humanitarian asserted that the coronavirus was really a creation of assistance. The United States military often does “U.S. pharmaceutical companies that were spreading provide essential logistical support to humanitarian rumors about the virus to drum up business”27 operations and also works hand in hand with the amongst other fraudulent claims. The U.S. DoD has United States Agency for International Development continuously worked with “the State Department, (USAID) and international organizations like the allies, partners and other agencies”28 to mitigate United Nations (UN) to ensure the delivery of aid is these misinformation campaigns. The effort to held accountable to humanitarian principles based counter misinformation is particularly critical for on overall need and basic human rights. Russian when the U.S. DoD it finds itself abroad working humanitarian assistance is only accountable to within the borders of another sovereign state. the interests of the Russian Federation.26 Russia Oftentimes the U.S. DoD can find itself in a and China will continue to employ humanitarian position where it is the only counterweight to a assistance as a form of state competition to downward trending opinion of the United States advance their own interests. The U.S. DoD needs aboard. The Republic of Korea (ROK) provides to condition its organizations and leaders to view a perfect case study in this. The Korean word for humanitarian assistance from state competitors like the United States directly translates to “beautiful Russia and China with a critical eye. Failing to do so country.” This historically high-regard for the risks potentially overlooking efforts to undermine U.S. has been challenged over the past year as U.S. strategic interests around the world. South Koreans watch “B-roll of lines of Americans

52 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 wrapped around buildings waiting for COVID-19 historically strong defense relationship underscores testing or graphs depicting an exponential growth the importance of maintaining strong public of pandemic deaths.”29 Perceptions of the U.S. relations abroad for the U.S. DoD. The global coronavirus response are almost solely responsible pandemic has altered the public information for an increasingly negative view of the U.S. by South landscape creating conditions which actors like Koreans. Favorability ratings of the United States Russia and China aim to exploit. The sentiment have “dropped from 80 percent in 2018 to 59 percent belayed in the introduction regarding a perceived in 2020, according to Pew Research Center.”30 absence of U.S. international leadership during the Conversely, the defense relationship between the global pandemic suggests that a different approach is ROK and the U.S. has been reaffirmed to be strong required to counter negative perceptions. It is more and mutually important. The newly confirmed important than ever to highlight the work that goes U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, recently on to advance democracy and strengthen global spoke with South Korea’s Defense Minister Suh security. Wook. The two agreed that the “Seoul-Washington The fact is, the United States has continued alliance is more important than ever and promised to work throughout the world to combat the to cooperate on improving the relationship, as well coronavirus with its allies and partners. The DoD as openly communicate on relevant issues.”31 The is often involved in these efforts with other U.S. U.S. military command in South Korea, United and host nation partners. This is true in South States Forces Korea (USFK), has maintained a Korea, where the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment disciplined and strict response to the coronavirus Command (19 ESC) conducted multiple disinfection and is routinely reported on by Korean news outlets. operations with the South Korean 2nd Operational “USFK has maintained the Health Protection Command (2OC) in the city of Daegu. The two Condition (HPCON) Charlie, or HPCON C, the organizations “disinfected an apartment complex third-highest virus warning level in its five-tier that had recently been struck with a large number system, for all areas of South Korea,” according to of cases of COVID-19. Both sides arrived, donned Yonhap news.32 their gear, and received a safety brief in both Korean The dichotomy between variable South and English. Because of the training they had Korean public opinion on the United States and a received beforehand, both sides were coordinated in equipment and execution of the disinfection operations.”33 The United States has provided funding and medical supplies to the Guyanese government to combat the coronavirus with the Guyanese Ministry of Health and a host of other partners.34 U.S. military personnel have also worked with Guyanese and international organizations to distribute this aid and conduct medical subject matter expert exchanges A Civil Affairs Team (F/83d CA BN) deployed to Guyana meets with an officer from Guyana's (SMEE). Presidential Guard Service to discuss upcoming subject matter expert exchanges (SMEE) and the delivery of donated medical supplies to inhibit the spread of COVID-19. (Courtesy photo)

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 53 The U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) has The U.S. DoD has continued to work with its continued to work with the State Department to partners and allies abroad throughout the global provide medical training and equipment to its pandemic. Stephanie Hammond, the former acting partners in the region. Three African countries deputy assistant secretary of defense for stability and have stood up Level-II hospitals in response to the humanitarian affairs stated, “What distinguishes coronavirus as a direct result of this partnership.35 us from the response of other actors, particularly The best way to counter misinformation is with China, is that the U.S. commitment is enduring,” better information. The U.S. Defense Department, referring to the ongoing coronavirus response in deployed worldwide, is ideally postured to bring this October of last year.40 This commitment to alliances information to the forefront of the conversation. has endured despite the coronavirus. The U.S. If more stories like the ones previously mentioned Defense Department plans to conduct a myriad of reached broader audiences it would be a direct and multilateral military exercises around the world compelling counterargument to those that decry throughout 2021. These multilateral exercises are U.S. isolationism during the global pandemic. vital opportunities to strengthen relationships for mutual security and disaster response preparedness Partners and Humanitarian Assistance alike. Russia and China have increasingly used The DoD’s reliance on the strength of its humanitarian assistance and misinformation to partnerships is expected to continue under the new undermine the U.S. and its western allies however Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin. He has been these efforts are not without weakness. It is true, for described as a “staunch advocate for strong alliances example, that the PRC has increased its participation and partnerships”41 and has referred to alliances in international humanitarian assistance exercises and coalitions as “the new centers of gravity.”42 and responses but these efforts have oftentimes These alliances and partnerships will continue to undermined the overall international response and be critical, especially in the realm of international violated humanitarian norms and principles. humanitarian assistance exercises and operations. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) contingent Proponents of realism in the context of international during the 2015 Nepal humanitarian assistance relations theory might be tempted to underestimate operation “refused to allow other foreign military soft power initiatives like humanitarian assistance. responders access to its area of operations out However, the global pandemic has underscored of concern that doing so might damage China’s the fact that “foreign policies of great and small image, effectively treating its response sector like powers are principally driven by internal political ‘sovereign territory’.”36 Beijing has consistently pressures from their own citizens to protect them refused to work with other countries, international from external threats such as diseases.”43 Enduring organizations like the United Nations, and partnerships will be increasingly important to oftentimes willfully disregarded international norms providing this protection in an interconnected for military participation in humanitarian assistance world. operations.37 Russia’s soft power efforts are similarly unilateral and ineffective. After COVID-19 A closer examination of Russian humanitarian It remains difficult to imagine a “post-COVID” assistance in Syria shows “98 percent (239) of the world. The social, economic, and political effects 244 locations the CRCSS visited in Syria between of the global pandemic will continue to be felt for November 2018 and April 2020 were only ever generations to come. In an ironic way, the long symbolically served”38 with only Aleppo and Deir periods of forced isolation have emphasized what Ez Zor City receiving sustained Russian aid.39 The it means to be human, as one writer noted, “The soft power weaknesses of the PRC and Russia are the pandemic has underlined the extent to which digital strength of the United States and its allies. interaction is no substitute for the real thing.”44

54 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 2 U.S. Army Maj. Mike Karlson, the author of this article, and two Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) officers at the 2017 South Asia Regional Civil Affairs Subject Matter Expert Exchange (SARCAS). (Courtesy photo)

History may provide a portal through which one United States Department of Defense needs to adapt can view a future world after the coronavirus. “The a more holistic view and approach toward “offense” terrible mortality, social distancing and economic to counter these threats. Its role in humanitarian hardship resulting from the 1918-19 Spanish flu assistance operations provides an excellent epidemic that followed the war were shaping forces opportunity to do so. in both the doom-laden experiments of modernism The U.S Defense Department needs to train and the high hedonism of the jazz age.”45 The its service members to spot and understand shared theme between these two observations, one how competitors like Russia and China use contemporary and the other historical, is on the the humanitarian landscape to further its own prominence of our biological need to connect with interests and undermine U.S. strategy abroad. other human beings. Understanding and influencing the information It can be tempting and even cathartic to try and domain is critical to ensuring U.S. soft power efforts escape the subjective nature of humanity through an abroad are communicated and resonates with a overreliance on impersonal political theory. broad international audience. Lastly, alliances and Terms like Great Power Competition emphasize partnerships will be critical to maintaining U.S. the preeminence of the state as the legitimate source leadership in the international world order. The of power in the 21st Century. The behaviors of global pandemic has forced millions of people states like Russia and China seem to challenge the around the world to navigate their daily lives, from U.S. position as a global superpower and leader. important milestones to the mundane, in nearly They use misinformation and their own form of total isolation. Strength in the future will be defined soft power, specifically humanitarian assistance, to by the enduring commitment of friends, and a undermine the U.S. and its allies. These activities willingness to seek out and include new ones. have increased throughout the global pandemic. The References, See page 81

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 55 Civil-Military Operations and Climate Instability

(Adobe stock image by Amornchaijj) By U.S. Army Sgt. 1st Class Paul Hendrick

n the 75th General Assembly of the United a vaccine is uncertain but together, between the Nations, Secretary-General Antonio Guterres possibility of herd-immunity and vaccination, there said, “COVID-19 is not only a wake-up call, is a possible end in sight. In a matter of years the it isI a dress rehearsal for the world of challenges to COVID-19 response will become a historic model of come.” how to respond to a pandemic and the “new normal” The challenges faced by COVID-19 are pervasive, response to the virus may become a thing of the past. affecting the entire global population and almost However, Secretary-General Guterres cites every aspect of daily human life. The timeline for COVID-19 as an unexpected “fifth horseman”

56 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 2 alongside other challenges, such as the “existential Rather than taking a reactive stance to the effects climate crisis,” that we face.1 Combating climate of climate change on civil societies throughout the change will require a global response that involves world, civil-military organizations can work with redesigning economies, cities, infrastructures, and partners in vulnerable areas before threats create industries. Research indicates that even if the world instability. The phrase “climate instability” can be alters its emissions, it could take up to 25-30 years used to refer to the destabilizing effects climate before global temperatures respond.2 Regardless of change has on governance, and draw upon sources the actions the world takes today the planet is on that outline anticipated effects of climate change. course to maintain current climate change patterns The goal is to enable civil-military organizations for decades to come. a way to incorporate disaster preparation and An important lesson for civil-military response with other operations. organizations to learn from the recent global pandemic is the need to conduct disaster response Climate Change as a Security Issue concurrently with other operations. Rather than Climate change's effects will not uniformly suspending normal operations and shifting focus affect the nations of the world. The IPCC predicts completely to disaster response, organizations must Southeast Asia to see an increase in flooding, learn to balance competing demands of ongoing while it predicts West Africa and the Sahel to see a operations while conducting disaster response. combination of drought followed by intensive rain As climate change progresses and natural disasters and runoff causing floods.6 This can disrupt societies become more intense and common, disaster by creating food security challenges and economic response will truly become the “new normal” for challenges, especially for the poorest in society. the foreseeable future. Looking at what the climate The U.S. National Intelligence Council assesses change induced “new normal” may entail can be that a range of global hazards including extreme done by examining the types of challenges and weather, food insecurity, pollution, and health natural disasters that science expects climate change infrastructure challenges are regional and global to cause. security threats.7 Countries such as the United This line of thinking examines how civil-military States have the wealth and governance capabilities responses can include climate change response into to respond to this. Poor countries, countries with normal operations to mitigate the impacts climate weak governance, and areas already experiencing change has on governance instability as part of the conflict will see challenges that are more significant. climate changes that will likely see more frequent as The United Nations Development Program argues well as more intense natural disasters. that in Arab countries, “rapid population and In 2017, Hurricane Harvey flooded Houston, TX, urban growth, political instability and widespread tying Hurricane Katrina for the costliest storm to poverty, make it among the world’s most vulnerable hit America at $125 billion dollars.3 Climate change regions to climate change.”8 Failing to address the models predict higher storm surge levels, more additional challenges climate change will pose in rainfall from tropical storms, and greater intensity of the future risks undermining military efforts to tropical storms.4 Storms like these are not the only support governance and stabilize the region. Military threats from climate change. The Intergovernmental objectives will not last if climate change erodes a Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts “risks region’s means of living. to health, livelihoods, food security, water supply, Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) often human security, and economic growth are projected profit from weak or failed states. Weak states provide to increase with global warming.”5 space in which VEOs can operate with less worry These changes have the potential to disrupt that a police or military force will infringe upon their agricultural practices and food supplies, displace activities. Climate change presents unique challenges large numbers of people, and cause civil strife. to societies around the world however VEOs may

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 57 be able to take advantage of this when governments society if governments are not prepared to handle it fail to meet the needs of their people. Water and civil-military organizations are uniquely capable shortages are likely to be more common which has of identifying these threats. the potential for states and non-state actors to use In addition to understanding the climate control of water supplies as a weapon, as Al-Shabaab challenges a partner nation faces, it is important to already has in Somalia.9 As rainfall patterns change understand which capabilities the local government and water scarcity becomes more normalized, water can use to address this. If the government does as a weapon may become more commonplace. not believe it is able to handle a disaster response, However the threat extends far beyond VEOs. civil-military organizations can bring in subject matter experts to advise the country and develop Identifying and Mitigating Emerging Threats their capabilities. They should do this in an effort No organization is incapable of combating to prevent the causes of instability rather than as climate change by itself. However, civil-military reactionary measures after a disaster. organizations are uniquely capable within the armed By developing partner capabilities for handling forces to combat this challenge. These efforts should climate instability, civil-military organizations can start with assessing local populations wherever reduce the likelihood that extremist organizations operations take place. Without understanding how will gain a foothold. Nations able to maintain sound climate change may affect a partner nation it is governance will be able to prevent instability from impossible to build a strategy for addressing it. Civil- taking hold. This will help them be better prepared military organizations should incorporate climate to face the negative impacts of climate change. By change impacts into analysis prior to deploying to a proactively preparing partners for challenges that region in order to understand how climate change have not fully surfaced, civil-military organizations may contribute to instability in that area. Upon can bolster their partners and prevent a deterioration deployment, teams can assess what impact there is of their capabilities. to people on the ground. They can then determine In addition to helping the governments directly, whether this affects military operations and then civil-military organizations enable partner nation disseminate the information to aid organizations and militaries to respond to climate change and any other partners that may be able to help address natural disasters. They can identify capabilities the issue. Climate change threatens to disrupt civil and gaps in preparedness as well as utilize security

58 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 cooperation and security assistance programs to governance. bring in funding and training for partner nation By conducting on the ground assessments of forces. This will assist their own government in the partner nation’s response to a disaster, civil- handling climate instability. The ultimate goal military organizations can coordinate with other is for civil-military organizations to enable the agencies and organizations to bring in the necessary partner nation military to assist their government support. The ultimate purpose of these efforts is in handling climate instability without outside to return the government to a stable state where it assistance. Any military role in addressing climate can maintain control and prevent interference in change will likely ultimately transfer to the hands its governance. Climate change may cause civilians of a nonmilitary entity. Training partner nations to be dislocated due to sea level rise, local flooding, to handle potential climate instability not only desertification, or any number of challenges. Civil- enhances their capabilities, it also builds the citizens military organizations can determine the extent of of that country’s trust in their government’s ability the problem and analyze how these issues can affect to handle complex problems. local governance. Science predicts climate change to have significant Countering Existing Threats impacts on food and agriculture throughout the Some nations will not be able to handle a disaster, world and climate change models forecast global even with training and preparations. Catastrophic food prices rising by anywhere from 3-84% by events can wreak havoc on wealthy nations such 2050.10 Civil-military organizations can assess how as with Hurricanes Katrina and Harvey and their this will affect the partner nation and what sort of effects on the United States. For low-income threat this poses to stability. If a government cannot countries, these events can overwhelm the local keep food readily available to its population, there is government’s capabilities. It will be vital for civil- no hope for long-term stability. The U.S. should take military organizations to be rapidly deployable measures to ensure its partners do not face these and capable of handling crisis response such as challenges alone and assist whenever possible. conducting humanitarian relief. Civil-military organizations can execute humanitarian assistance Conclusion to aid with immediate disaster response and enable Combating climate instability is a complex partner nations to recover and maintain capable problem that will require efforts beyond the abilities of most countries. Wealthy nations may be able Marines with Charlie to adequately adapt and overcome its challenges, Company, 4th Reconnaissance Battalion, 4th Marine Division, but low-income countries in areas that face a high Marine Forces Reserve, along degree of impact from climate change may face with a member of the Texas Highway Patrol and Texas unprecedented challenges to their ability to govern State Guard, patrol past a effectively. This can become a national security issue, flooded house in Houston, not only for the country directly affected but for the Texas, Aug. 31, 2017. Hurricane Harvey landed Aug. region as well. When a nation no longer effectively 25, 2017, flooding thousands governs its people the door is left open for outside of homes and displaced over 30,000 people. (Photo by U.S. entities to step in, be it extremist organizations Marine Corps photo by Lance or regional rivals. Civil-military organizations Cpl. Niles Lee) can utilize their skill sets to help bolster partner capabilities and prepare them to face the challenges of climate change. Doing so may be vital to ensure they remain capable partners. References, See page 82

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 59 (Adobe stock photo by Prazis Images) Protecting Civilians Still Matters in the Great Power Conflict By Daniel R. Mahanty and Annie Shiel

s the U.S. military shifts its focus from considered in training, planning, and executing U.S. counterinsurgency to large-scale combat military operations. against near-peer competitors, the value of When speed is the difference between winning preventingA civilian harm in the battle for “hearts and and losing a first engagement, the tactical patience, minds” has been largely displaced by an emphasis time, and resources needed to prevent, investigate, on the speed and decisiveness needed to survive first and remedy civilian harm can actually be cast as contact with a major military power. costly vulnerabilities especially in a near-peer or FM 3-0, the Army’s new field manual, focuses peer conflict when the stakes may be existential. almost entirely on deterring and defeating a major Yet in the military's haste to shed real or perceived adversary predicting a war “more chaotic, intense, constraints on flexibility and speed, military leaders and highly destructive than those the Army has would be wise to consider the many reasons why it experienced in the past several decades.” Far more should preserve its proficiency in preventing and than an abstraction, the changes set in motion mitigating civilian harm. by this shift are likely to change how civilians are In his often-cited “tactical directive” of 2009,

60 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Gen. Stanley McChrystal, then the commander of geared more toward responding rapidly to domestic NATO forces in Afghanistan, put it this way: “We political and media scrutiny than to reconciling must avoid the trap of winning tactical victories – harm with those directly affected. The practice of but suffering strategic defeats – by causing civilian providing condolence payments all but stopped: casualties or excessive damage and thus alienating the United States made only two known payments the people.” The military developed standard tactics during Operation Inherent Resolve even after the and processes to suit including the formal tracking liberation of previously ISIS-held areas of Iraq and and investigation of civilian casualty reports, Syria. disbursement of condolence payments to victims It was tempting to attribute the changes to and their families, and operational reforms such as President Trump’s push for increased aggression limits to nighttime aerial and ground operations in – matched by newly relaxed constraints on the Afghanistan. rules of engagement or delegation of targeting Although this approach was not universally authorities – or even his own stated disregard for popular among the rank and file, a growing body human life. Little doubt remains that the location of research supported its strategic wisdom. Andrew of fighting—in densely populated cities—greatly Shaver and Jacob Shapiro examined local responses complicated efforts to protect civilians from the to civilian harm in Iraq from 2007 to 2008 finding direct and indirect effects of the air war. But the that civilians shared less intelligence with U.S. campaign’s intensity may also be explained by the and allied forces in response to accidental civilian fact that, as the Army’s Gen. Stephen Townsend harm. Former Army Col. Chris Kolenda and his noted, ISIS in Iraq and Syria was organized more co-authors assessed “with high confidence” that like a conventional military than an insurgency. “civilian harm by U.S., international and Afghan With over 30,000 fighters at its peak, ISIS controlled forces contributed significantly to the growth of lines of communication, governed territory, and the Taliban” and weakened “the legitimacy of the used heavy armor and artillery. In some ways the U.S. mission.” In 2016 President Obama signed U.S.-led campaign and its features of speed and an Executive Order establishing the objective of overwhelming force suggested a return to the reducing civilian casualties as U.S. government combined arms operations needed to win a major policy. After a decade and a half of protracted conventional war. counterinsurgency operations the concept of civilian The Pentagon’s counter-ISIS strategy, while casualties mitigation seemed to achieve a status of primarily motivated by the defeat of an adversary, institutional and policy permanence on the basis of also appeared to replace the “instrumentalist- sound, strategic rationale. strategic” logic of protecting individual civilians as But during the campaign against ISIS, U.S. a matter of COIN strategy with the “humanitarian- rhetoric and practice around civilian harm utilitarian logic” of saving many by moving faster mitigation changed. The fighting was more intense and more assertively. While American commanders than the previous decade as entire cities were still took measures to avoid civilian casualties, ravaged. In less than five months the Marines including the use of precision munitions and alone fired 35,000 artillery shells, more than in any sophisticated targeting measures, they also justified American conflict since the Vietnam War. Coalition the coalition’s relentless bombardment by pointing officials say their airstrikes killed 1,190 civilians to the threat ISIS posed to civilians. “The best way — though independent estimates put the actual … to put an end to this human suffering, is to win toll, conservatively, between 7,500 and 11,800. As in Mosul and win in Raqqa and do it fast,” Gen. the death toll soared, the processes developed to Townsend said in March 2017. Though anecdotal, track, investigate, remedy, and learn from civilian statements like this are consistent with a doctrinal harm were replaced by expedited protocols better approach that emphasizes the benefits of winning able to manage large volumes of allegations and quickly in part for the humanitarian benefits of

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 61 doing so rather than an approach that emphasizes reasons to challenge these assumptions and to “tactical patience.” reassess the benefits of thinking more seriously The counter-ISIS campaign may foreshadow about civilians in the coming wars. As the military further change in the military’s approach to civilian undergoes its institutional transformation while harm on the battlefield especially as it shifts its also reportedly drafting its first policy on civilian gaze further from COIN and towards conflict with casualties, we offer some things to consider: peers and near-peers. How exactly this happens is No matter who the adversary or where the unknown. Gen. Mark Milley, the Army Chief of Staff battlefield, civilians will be there. Predicting the next and presumptive chairman of the Joint Chiefs, has war is a historically futile endeavor. But whether acknowledged the challenges associated with large- or not planners have misdiagnosed the most likely scale combat and emphasized the need for future future scenario, one thing is clear: the mythical, military leaders to be skilled in discriminatory fires civilian-free battlefield doesn’t exist in any of them. and ethical judgement. John Spencer, formerly of the Civilians will always have agency in war: they may Modern War Institute at West Point and a leading choose to fight, flee, or stay – any of which have voice on urban conflict, has called public attention significant bearing on the conduct and outcome to the calamitous effects of an Army ill-prepared for of war. The fact that it will be difficult to predict civilians' in future urban warfare. But these concerns which option they exercise is all the more reason to are not visibly or seriously represented in any major consider all of them. military planning document making it difficult to Perceptions of civilian harm will matter. Even assess how civilians feature in broader institutional beyond counterinsurgency, public perceptions of the planning assumptions for major combat operations legitimacy of U.S. operations will depend on how the of the future. There are only five mentions of non- U.S. military conducts itself and that conduct will be combatants in the 366-page FM 3-0 – down from 21 measured in large part by the experience of civilians. in the 2008 version – and three passing mentions of In a multi-domain future, information – including civilian casualties. The new manual also removes a evidence of civilian harm – could be a powerful section on the law of war and rules of engagement. weapon in hybrid influence operations as has already Anecdotes from military contacts indicate that occurred in Ukraine. Today’s rapid information civilians are conspicuously absent from today’s flow also means that war will be broadcast to the training and exercises focused on near-peer combat. American and global public. In the end, just as in When they are considered, civilians are assumed to the counter-ISIS campaign, the Pentagon may end have been evacuated – a bold assumption given the up spending time and energy justifying the war by assessed impossibility of major urban evacuations. defending its policy toward civilian harm – not only Perhaps the military is neglecting civilians in its to win local hearts and minds but also to maintain future conflict planning because it believes they the legitimacy of the operation in the midst of will not feature as contested instruments as they domestic and international scrutiny. have in recent counterinsurgency operations or Beware the lure of sharp war. The Civil War- that they will be present merely as a humanitarian era military theorist Francis Lieber is reported concern for others — that is, the State Department to have coined the term “sharp war”: “The more or USAID — to deal with. Meanwhile, the military vigorously wars are pursued, the better it is for may take for granted that commanders suitably humanity. Sharp wars are brief.” But “sharp war” trained in ethics and the laws of war and guided by a theory is complicated business. On the one hand highly capable corps of military judge advocates will there are strong ethical arguments to be made for suffice to ensure the legal and ethical integrity of the limiting the duration of war. But it’s not clear that force when confronted with the horrific dilemmas the intensity of war and its duration are necessarily, presented by a major war. or even typically, related in the way that the theory’s From our point of view there are a few good armchair proponents suggest. Moreover, the idea

62 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 that more “intense” war is better for civilians takes in ethical decision-making. The military should several assumptions for granted; for instance, that include civilians in its planning not only for civilians’ the military must make battlefield sacrifices in sake but also as a service to those in uniform who order to enhance precautions in the attack, or that have to make the toughest calls. Individuals will shorter, more intense war is better for civilians than face vexing ethical dilemmas when it comes to a protracted era of manageable violence. civilians on the battlefield. During the height of U.S. Preventing civilian harm is a strategic, long-term counterinsurgency operations, the military could investment in peace and stability. Reducing risks take ethical judgement by its leaders for granted to civilians in a large-scale conflict will directly because, as Joe Chapa recently articulated in a affect the sustainability of post-war peace. As J. brilliant article, strategy required it. But with each Boone Bartholomees, formerly of the U.S. Army passing year, fewer in every new class of leaders will War College, has noted, the United States tends have seen a combat tour in Afghanistan or Iraq; even to “win the war but lose the peace.” Failures to fewer will have been involved in decisions involving prevent and address civilian harm could negatively the life or death of non-combatants. It is one thing affect the legitimacy of peace or victory in the eyes to condition new recruits and leaders to be more of a population, increasing the risk of conflict decisive and lethal in their decision-making – it may and instability. Whether civilians are killed in altogether be harder to counsel prudence when it is counterterrorism operations or large-scale combat, most needed. the pain remains the same, as does the potential The consequences of war should be understood – for violent reprisal. Second- and third-order and publicly communicated – by policymakers. The effects of conflict on public health, sanitation, and large-scale conflicts envisioned by defense planners other essential services may also fuel protracted would be catastrophic for civilian and military lives humanitarian crises with similar results. War alike, regardless of the safeguards put in place. This is also fluid, with the potential for conflicts to reality must drive an informed public debate about oscillate between conventional methods and the the costs of war and what the country is willing to asymmetrical tactics of insurgencies. bear for what cause. Even as they strive to reduce U.S. military planning is also an export. Even civilian casualties, civilian and military leaders as the U.S. shifts it's planning towards readiness should be careful about overstating the extent to for near-peer conflict it will continue engaging which war can be sanitized as a means of assuaging with partners around the world through training, the public and force policymakers to own the gravity equipping, advising, and partnered operations, often of their decisions. The military should also be wary centered around internal conflict and insurgency. of contributing to threat inflation which the political For ethical and strategic reasons, the U.S. and its elite can use to justify military force. The more the partners have an abiding interest in ensuring that American public feels threatened, the more they our partners’ operations protect human rights and expect – and tolerate – in war. mitigate civilian harm. The U.S. military must not One of the favorite parlor games in Washington lose its proficiency in this area even as it shifts its is contemplating what the future of war holds. own training emphasis to conventional warfare. Entire conferences, magazines, and books have Values still matter. Protecting civilians been dedicated to the spectre of near-peer or hybrid acknowledges individual agency and human dignity, war, killer robots, swarming drones, cyber-attacks, concepts at the foundation of political liberalism and and little green men. But neglected in the analysis just war theory. It’s taken for granted that individual are the civilians who stand to lose the most in the military leaders fight from a place of morality and coming war, whatever form it takes. It may fall to that the U.S. military ethic is imbued with deep the military itself to ensure they are not forgotten moral sensibilities. But upholding moral values entirely. on a complex, lethal battlefield requires practice

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 63 The Conflict in Deconflicting: The Humanitarian Notification System for Deconfliction in Syria

By Sara Miller

n many parts of Syria, humanitarian workers humanitarian and military actors. One such tool, operate under the constant threat of attack. known as Humanitarian Notification Systems for In these locations (including all of northwest Deconfliction (HNS4D), have become increasingly Syria)I attacks often involve conflict with the military. common in complex emergencies. In a HNS4D, In Syria and around the globe, stakeholders from humanitarian organizations give the geographic across the humanitarian system look for ways to locations of their sites and movements to a protect their staff, sites, and civilians they serve. coordinating body who then shares the coordinates To contend with this enormous challenge the with those involved with the conflict. These international community has instituted formal “deconfliction lists” theoretically help militaries and informal coordination mechanisms between respect International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and

64 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 65 thesis at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy looks into the perceptions and use of the HNS4D in Syria. Through interviewing individuals associated with local Syrian organizations, international NGOs and organizations, governments, and militaries involved in the Syrian HNS4D, I examined how different stakeholders understand the deconfliction system and interact with it. Research participants spoke with me under the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of the topic and possible risk to those working inside Syria.

HNS4D Around the World As far back as the 1980s the U.S. government has worked with humanitarian partners to deconflict their movements amid hostilities. Individual organizations and governments ran iterations of temporary and informal notification systems with humanitarian agencies to deal with the specific situations presented in each conflict. In 2011 the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) implemented its first formal notification system in Libya in response to the NATO mandate for protection of civilians. OCHA operated the system for the duration of the conflict and stood it down at the end of the campaign. Today, formal humanitarian notification systems exist in six countries: Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan, Gaza, Yemen, and Syria. The United States government directly administers the systems in Iraq and Somalia, and OCHA runs the (Adobe stock image by Meysam Azarneshin) HNS4D in Afghanistan, Gaza, Yemen, and Syria. International organizations such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and NGOs such avoid striking humanitarian sites over the course as Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) often run their of their military operations. However, the system own coordination mechanisms directly with parties in Syria has raised considerable controversy with to the conflict, separate from any government or UN concerns over administration and privacy as well system. as humanitarians claiming certain parties to the conflict use the list as a de facto targeting guide. HNS4D in Syria Practically no formal research or documentation Since 2014, OCHA has facilitated the exists on the impact and efficacy of these systems deconfliction of humanitarian movements and sites despite the growing number of HNS4D around the in Syria affected by U.S. Coalition Forces’ operations. globe. This research that I conducted for my master’s The formation of the Syrian notification system as Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 65 AZEZ, SYRIA – MAY 19: Refugee camp for Syrian people in Burseya hill on May 19, 2019 in Azez, Syria. In the civil war that began in Syria in 2011, 12 million people were displaced. (Adobe stock photo by Hikrcn)

it exists today, however, was a gradual and largely changes: the establishment of the permanent reactive process. Throughout 2016 and 2017, the humanitarian notification unit in Amman and number of bombings of hospitals and other civilian stations in Gaziantep and Damascus to attempt to and humanitarian sites by Syrian and Russian forces1 provide real-time information. OCHA makes clear dramatically increased. Humanitarian organizations in their guidance that participating in the HNS4D searched for ways to contend with this increasing is voluntary for humanitarian organizations and threat and protect their staff and facilities. Many that submitting coordinates “does not guarantee NGOs looked at protection mechanisms that seemed the safety of personnel, facilities, or sites.”2 NGOs to work in other contexts: for example, the HNS4D wishing to participate in the system e-mail their in Yemen, established in 2015, as a possible solution coordinate details for movements or static locations in Syria. At the same time, the U.S. began advocating to OCHA according to a standard template and for the expansion of their existing mechanism, an OCHA then transmits the data to each participating idea which gained support among NGOs. Based on military party by e-mail. this interest and continued urging from the U.S. Unlike other humanitarian notification systems government, the UN initiated conversations with around the world, the HNS4D in Syria has sparked the Russian and Turkish governments to gauge their considerable discussion and controversy within interest in joining the mechanism. By 2018 OCHA the humanitarian and military communities. My had included the Russian Federation and Republic of research aimed to understand why this system in Turkey in the deconfliction system, codified a more particular faces so many challenges. formal HNS4D, and released documentation and guidance on how to submit coordinates. Deciding to Deconflict Despite establishing a more expansive notification No humanitarian worker I spoke with over the system the OCHA did not create a dedicated office course of my research believed that the HNS4D or assign full time staff to the Syrian system for in Syria actually protects aid workers. Opinions almost two years. Instead, staff with little formal shared with me ranged from thinking the system is training – and a high turnover rate – worked out of useless – that submitting coordinates does nothing the OCHA offices in Riyad near the Yemeni HNS4D at all – to being convinced that participating in the team. Only in the end of 2019 and the beginning of system increases the chance of Russian and Syrian 2020 did the system undergo significant operational forces targeting their sites. While participation in

66 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 67 the Syrian HNS4D was never as widespread as in Council that “in the current environment, Yemen, many aid workers that initially deconflicted deconfliction is not proving effective in helping stopped when it became apparent that participating to protect those who utilize the system.”3 My did not necessarily equate with protection. conversations with UN workers echoed these Despite the universally negative view of the sentiments. Despite questioning if the mechanism system, many organizations still choose to should exist, however, OCHA continues to run it participate. The question naturally follows, if and recently invested significant time and effort humanitarians responding in Syria do not believe in overhauling system procedures and moving the the HNS4D can protect their sites and instead deconfliction unit to Amman, Jordan. Many of could potentially put their staff at greater risk, why my NGO and UN research participants believed continue using it? Some organizations struggling that pressure from the U.S. has in part ensured the to find ways of protecting their staff see the system’s continuity. The U.S. government sees value humanitarian deconfliction system as the only in humanitarian notification and has pushed for its available option. Many of my research participants implementation and expansion, including in Syria. described the HNS4D as the only alternative Both publicly and in my research interviews, the U.S. available to extend duty of care to their staff. Other government has expressed that notification systems humanitarians use the HNS4D selectively, like only are important tools that work well in areas of conflict deconflicting sites in areas of the country without and that they recommend their implementation and Russian and Syrian airstrikes. Multiple aid workers use around the world. I spoke with additionally explained that they only share coordinate information for sites they believe Protection or Accountability? Damascus already knows about but keep smaller NGOs continue to use the HNS4D for more than or newer facilities that the Syrian authorities are the hope of protection. In fact, most organizations unaware of off of the list. that still submit coordinates and have advocated Many at UN OCHA share NGOs loss of faith in for the continuation of the system do so in the the HNS4D. The very organization administering hope that it will lead to some sort of attribution and the system has publicly declared that the system is accountability for the attacks. ineffective. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, The humanitarians I interviewed consistently Mark Lowcock, stated before the UN Security told me that since the deconfliction system does not

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 67 protect them; the purpose of the system is (or should became apparent that humanitarians responding be) to hold parties to the conflict accountable for to the Syria crisis have very different views on what targeting humanitarian sites. Some aid workers think information the UN shares about their organizations that the system currently includes an obligation and whether they anonymize the data. In response for the UN to hold parties to conflict accountable to my questions about how the deconfliction system if they strike sites on the list. Others explained to works and follow-up questions about anonymity, me that while no obligation exists, the system could participants responded with a wide range of still be an accountability tool now or in future contradictory answers. investigations. Some aid workers expressed that OCHA Despite the staunch belief from humanitarians anonymized all information shared through the that the system can or does provide some humanitarian deconfliction system while others accountability, mixed messages from OCHA believed that the information shared with parties complicates the issue. OCHA has never publicly to the conflict depended on which military was promised to use the deconfliction system for involved or the specific kind of location data accountability and no system currently exists to shared. Still, other aid workers expressed doubts investigate attacks. During interviews, UN workers over whether OCHA anonymized the data at all. told me in no uncertain terms that the Syrian Individuals who were unsure if OCHA shared system would not be used for accountability and organization names cited this as a central concern no deconfliction lists had ever been used for this when trying to decide if their organization should purpose. However, OCHA’s 2018 working paper use or continue to utilize the system. The rest of on humanitarian deconfliction includes language the research participants believed that OCHA does that an HNS4D “may include a commitment to not anonymize the data shared with parties to the investigate violations of the protected nature of conflict, some even sharing specific examples of humanitarian locations that have been notified how the lack of anonymity affected their staff and within the framework of the HNS4D, and/or organizations. an announcement to publicly hold accountable Information from OCHA has done little to party/ies found responsible for such attacks.” clarify these issues. According to the 2018 OCHA Documentation such as this hinting at the working paper on HNS4D, “OCHA cannot send possibility of an accountability mechanism adds the information anonymized, i.e., without proper to the confusion and conflicting messages that identification of the requesting party.”5 Publicly and humanitarians said they receive from OCHA and privately, the UN has said they both anonymize makes it difficult for organizations to understand and do not anonymize information. This leaves their participation with it. Many organizations humanitarian organizations in an impossible continue sharing their coordinates expecting some position as they try to understand what information sort of accountability or consequences for parties OCHA sends. to the conflict that target deconflicted sites. These This poses a significant problem for diverging understandings of the deconfliction humanitarians choosing whether to engage with the mechanism have led to heightened frustrations as deconfliction system. Since the Syrian government organizations use the system for a reason it currently considers aid workers operating in opposition- cannot perform. controlled areas to be terrorists, organizations fear military forces are using this rationale to target Anonymity their staff. As such, humanitarian organizations Throughout my interviews, research participants and personnel working outside of government- spoke about the types of information they believe controlled territory go to huge lengths to protect are shared with parties to the conflict through the their identities in these areas. Organizations that HNS4D and the anonymity of that information. It work in both government and opposition-controlled

68 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 areas face additional complexity as they consider the Before the UN and the Security Council, Russian safety of staff in both regions. These organizations representatives have repeatedly used incorrect sometimes operate under different names across coordinates as an excuse for striking what they the country. From talking with humanitarians and claim are legitimate military targets. At a September UN staff and reading the limited documentation 2019 press conference, Russian representative to on OCHA’s deconfliction policies, it is still unclear the UN Vassily Nebenzia characterized the HNS4D what data OCHA shares with parties to the conflict. as “lots of instances of deliberate misinformation. For humanitarian organizations operating in First, the coordinates in the list that we received Syria, knowing what information about them failed to match factual location of the reported is provided to each military is a serious security deconfliction facilities … no one can verify what is issue. The organizations that participate in the actually located at these coordinates. But still they system already worry that the coordinate data are reported as deconflicted sites. But what do many might be used to find and bomb their sites based of these facilities really represent?”7 This is not solely on their humanitarian status. Russian and only a technical issue but one that has led parties Syrian forces’ history of targeting hospitals and to the conflict to target what should be protected other humanitarian and civilian locations make sites claiming organizations have lied about their this an omnipresent concern. The further potential humanitarian nature. The resulting political that OCHA shares organizations’ identities with ramifications are far reaching and produce further parties to the conflict only increases humanitarians’ deterioration of trust in NGOs ability to share apprehension. accurate information.

Data Errors Recommendations The essence of the notification system’s While my work focused on Syria, this unique and success rests on coordinates accurately locating messy conflict has revealed several concerns and humanitarian sites. Incorrect data poses a significant potential weaknesses in HNS4D in general. Based on problem for the militaries trying to operationalize my research I make some broad recommendations the information and parties participating in the about humanitarian notification systems. system trusting one another. Unfortunately, NGOs have not consistently provided precise coordinate 1. Consider if a humanitarian deconfliction information to the deconfliction list and have used system is the appropriate tool for the context a wide variety of coordinate systems, many of which Humanitarian deconfliction systems can only do not integrate easily with militaries targeting. protect aid workers and facilities as far as the This, compounded with an absence of guidance or military parties to the conflict are willing to use the training, leads to many errors. Further, it is unclear if information to inform their targeting and respect OCHA routinely checks coordinates before sending IHL. Given this fact, these mechanisms may not them. The most recent guidance on coordinate work in every conflict situation. A HNS4D can be a submission states that “OCHA will not verify valuable tool where the belligerents involved actively the data / information provided. Organisations avoid striking humanitarians. In this case, a neutral are required to verify the accuracy of their data third party (such as OCHA) can play a valuable role / information prior to submission to OCHA.”6 in coordinating information from humanitarians These compounding factors have caused significant and responding to concerns from both parties to the problems. conflict and aid organizations. Reporting accurate coordinates is important Implementing a deconfliction system in a context not only for militaries’ practical application but where parties to the conflict purposefully and also because the Russians routinely use these strategically target civilians and humanitarians can types of errors to justify their targeting practices. easily put aid workers in danger. If a belligerent is

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 69 known to attack humanitarians then handing them that organizations submit accurate coordinate data a list of coordinates could be akin to handing them a that can be easily integrated into military systems. targeting list, creating enormous potential for abuse. Implementing an HNS4D as a reaction rather This situation additionally puts the organization than proactively again leads to potentially serious coordinating the HNS4D in a difficult political misunderstandings, political complications, and position. Humanitarian deconfliction systems have mistrust. become the go-to tool around the world to help protect aid workers; UN Civil-Military Coordination 4. Establish an accountability system when handbooks now list HNS4D as an essential tool deconflicted sites are struck in situations of armed conflict.8 However, the Humanitarian deconfliction systems should existence of a humanitarian response in a conflict build-in accountability procedures in case parties environment should not automatically lead to to the conflict strike sites on the list. This process deconfliction. Governments, militaries, international would ideally include clear triggers for investigative organizations, and NGOs should have conversations measures to ascertain the facts of the strike, to consider whether a HNS4D is an appropriate consequences to hold the relevant party responsible, choice. If a system is stood up, stakeholders should and follow-up to prevent future mistakes. periodically review its efficacy and decide whether An accountability system, however, would the system should continue. be most effective where parties to the conflict make their best faith effort to avoid targeting 2. Agree on a unified understanding of the humanitarians. This underlines the importance of system’s purpose and limitations my first recommendation: to carefully consider if a If the decision has been made to run a HNS4D, HNS4D is appropriate for a given context. coordination should include conversations with all stakeholders about the system’s purpose and 5. Maintain full transparency of how and what limitations. If different groups have conflicting ideas information is shared with parties to the conflict about the system’s objective, it has little potential as well as verification of humanitarian sites for success as one party may always feel the system The group coordinating the deconfliction system is not working. This has been clearly demonstrated should try and maintain complete transparency in Syria with the issues over protection and with stakeholders about what information is shared accountability. Clear communication over the with parties to the conflict and how this process intended purpose and what the system will not do takes place. Humanitarian organizations must make can set the HNS4D up for success and avoid future difficult decisions in deciding where to operate when misunderstandings. working in situations of conflict. Aid workers need to know what information is being shared and with 3. Create clear processes and the operational whom to confront the complex politics and security capacity to carry them out environments in which they work. Standing-up a humanitarian notification system Additionally, the organization coordinating a must be a coordinated and purposeful process. Any HNS4D must maintain transparency with parties systems put into place, such as standards for which to the conflict about the humanitarian status of the coordinate systems are used or how to submit the sites on the deconfliction list. Belligerents must trust location data, must be explicit. Additionally, there that sites on the list are genuinely humanitarian. must be enough staff in the coordinating body to To do this, all stakeholders must have clarity that keep up with information, check the accuracy of not only the coordinate information is correct but data before it is sent to parties to the conflict, and trust the coordinating body can guarantee that the liaise with all stakeholders. Taking the time to sites and movements on the list are not legitimate intentionally put systems in place can help ensure military targets.

70 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 Conclusions lives. However, regardless of the best intentions As humanitarians respond to increasing numbers behind standing-up these systems, there are cases of complex emergencies around the globe they where a HNS4D may put the very people the system continue facing serious risks. In these contexts, intends to safeguard in danger. Deconfliction in NGOs, international organizations, governments, Syria has highlighted many ways in which these and many militaries all try their best to find ways systems can go wrong and has offered policy to protect aid workers, leading to the creation of makers, militaries, and humanitarian actors alike a mechanisms like a HNS4D. There may be cases cautionary tale. where humanitarian deconfliction is precisely the Syria will not be the last humanitarian emergency right tool for the job; where with deliberate decisions and will not be the last time stakeholders must and careful implementation they can save many consider how to protect the civilians caught in the crossfire. Destroyed buildings next to a mosque in the city of Aleppo in Syria In an ideal world, humanitarian deconfliction (Adobe Stock photo By Ali Albahri) would work wherever aid workers and military actors occupy the same space. Unfortunately, if the HNS4D in Syria has taught us one lesson, it is that deconflicting is not a one-size-fits-all solution. References, See page 82

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 71 (Adobe Stock image by Alphaspirit) Strategic Approaches to Simplifying Complex Adaptive Crises By Dr. Deon Canyon

Complexity and Systems Thinking has been to accelerate the development of current We live and work in a world that is shrinking challenges and the emergence of novel challenges. due to interconnectivity but growing in terms Security challenges are fraught with complexity and of relationship diversity. Jostling world powers, have many of the attributes of complex adaptive enlarging economies, emerging technology, systems. nefarious disruption, increased rate of change, and Take radicalization for instance: inspired by an rapid diffusion of new innovations into society all act increasing multitude of factors including disparity, to increase threat, urgency and uncertainty.1,2,3 The inequality, economics, democratization, civil impact of this dynamic on the security environment strife, population movement and interventions

72 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 of many kinds from military, religious, corporate direction of an organization require consideration and political entities. Stakeholders with different of the future and are circumscribed by complexity, values, priorities and views may explain the issue uncertainty, novelty and ambiguity.13 Decisions in numerous ways. There are never simple answers concerning complex adaptive problems are never and the multitude of problem roots are intertwined easy because of a disconnect between expected and and codependent. Every solution is a one-time pilot actual outcomes. Uncertain complex situations that causes the problem to mutate into another render decision makers incapable of determining form with no known, tested solution. There is no what will lead an organization to victory.14 Managing certainty inaction; the risks are unpredictable and this dynamic is increasingly recognized as an there is an inability to explain what is going on solely essential leadership quality. by reference to the behavior of each component. Ideally, decision makers would assess all possible Systems thinking is the only way to begin to get a decision outcomes and select the most efficacious grip on this situation. option.15 However, in a complex situation, the Systems theory recognizes that the dynamic cognitive limitations of the human mind result in interactions of many elements play a role in shaping the creation of a simplified model of the problem systems. It provides insight into complex systems of and full rationality is never achieved.16,17 all types and explains the occurrence of constantly Effective decision making in government requires changing emergent behaviors that manifest due to an evaluation of potential social impacts and system interactions.4,5 A section of systems theory, outcomes. In a complex system any component known as complex adaptive systems (CAS), was may be a positive, neutral or disruptive force that described by scientists as a means of explaining non- impacts on services and political sustainability. linear adaptation in the natural environment such Unfortunately, decision makers often shy away as economies, brain biology and immune systems.6 from taking the time to understanding complexity A fundamental feature of CAS is that simple and default to characterizing complex problems interactions between individual elements at a micro in terms of simple linear relationships with the level can lead to very complex behaviors at a macro expectation that the future will be a continuation of level.7 the present.18,19,20 While practical advances have been slow to This is why traditional risk assessment materialize, proponents believe that CAS concepts, processes and problem-solving models—designed such as systems emergence, could contribute for noncomplex, linear systems—often fail to significantly to our understanding of how decisions provide adequate solutions initially and are not affect larger social system dynamics8 or even recommended in situations where a problem provide opportunities for crisis scholars to explore continually evolves due to complexity. Risk the interactions between system elements that assessment approaches that include an evaluation of are related to the emergence of resilience.9 This is probability are also not recommended for any crisis because CAS is perfect for analyzing systems that deemed low probability. fluctuate between the extremes of stability and chaos Natural simplification strategies are known as and that are “moving targets.”10 Resilience itself is a heuristics. They include various methods that help goal rather than an endpoint for every community is people deal with complex situations by moving on a path of constant adaptive improvement. forward instead of delaying important decisions due As a result,11 any system based on crisis resilience to information overload and inability to ascertain is adaptive, open and responsive to feedback a safe level of risk.21,22 However, heuristics limit the learning loops from previous crises.12 quality of decision making in complex circumstances characterized by high risk, high stakes, uncertainty Strategic Thinking and urgency because the uncertainty is either Decisions that concern the overall strategy and simplified, minimized through overconfidence,

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 73 or ignored through commitment or confirmation He said, “Reports that say that something hasn't bias.23 happened are always interesting to me, because as Rather than struggle with deciphering a novel we know, there are known knowns; there are things uncertain situation, gaining awareness of inherent we know we know. We also know there are known cognitive limitations—recognizing biases and unknowns; that is to say we know there are some making strategic decisions with insight and things we do not know. But there are also unknown confidence—decision makers often default to an unknowns -- the ones we don't know we don't assumption that they are in possession of complete know. And if one looks throughout the history of understanding of a complex system due to previous our country and other free countries, it is the latter experience, knowledge, and historic information.24 category that tend to be the difficult ones.”25 Thus, a more systematic approach is required. Dangerous rationalizations or assumptions can dramatically increase the exposure of an Strategic Simplicity organization to risk.26 One of these is assuming that “Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication” is a you know enough about a problem when you make quote that has been attributed to Leonardo da Vinci a decision. This is dangerous because the lower and it has been grossly misused by those seeking right quadrant of the Johari Window represents an easy way out. Simplicity as a first resort in a information that is unknown to all parties. If it is complex situation is nothing more than laziness small then risk of unforeseen events is low, but if and foolishness. Complex situations and problems it is large then risks abound. Going to war with demand serious attention and a concerted significant a country about which you know little is a great effort is required to understand them as much as is example of huge unknown and therefore unassessed possible. Only after a full appreciation of complexity risk. In a complex situation, always reveal what you does clever simplicity become sophisticated. Some of can to minimize the Hidden quadrant and interact the means of achieving notable simplicity follow. with all relevant stakeholders to minimize the Blind quadrant. Improve Awareness of Information In 1955, Luft and Ingham created the Johari Broaden Analysis Window model to illustrate and improve self- Every crisis demands a broadening of analysis awareness and mutual understanding between and an expansion of options. However, crises often individuals within and between groups. The model have the exact opposite effect. During periods of consists of a four-quadrant matrix with the ranges stress and uncertainty individuals and organizations being known and unknown vs self and others (See typically narrow their analysis which results in the Figure 1). consideration of fewer options. One of the features In 2002, United States Secretary of Defense of most crises that is initially denied or resisted most Donald Rumsfeld made the Johari Window famous vigorously is that of ethical action. Unfortunately, when referring to the lack of evidence linking the the longer an organization procrastinates the government of Iraq with the supply of weapons of adoption of ethical actions the greater the chance mass destruction to terrorist groups. is that the initial crisis will grow and that the

Known to you Known to you Public/Open Blind Spots Known to others Information that you and others know Information you do not know, but others know Hidden Unknown Unknown to others Information that you know but other do not Information that you and others do not know

Figure 1

74 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 “Simplicity is the ultimate sophistication." Leonardo da Vinci

organization will be perceived as a villain. Since can be categorized into major families according ethical action is usually adopted or forced in the end, to basic similarities in preparedness and response the fault lies in organizations misunderstanding the requirements. Where a typical approach to crisis different aspects of a complex problem which can management is to plan for a few specific crises, lead to decisions that result in more problems. often within the same crisis family, a comprehensive To avoid bad decisions organizations must approach would include plans for at least one look at problems from different perspectives specific crisis in each crisis family. High-resilience which requires an understanding of the body of organizations prepare for a broader selection of knowledge27 associated with each perspective and crisis families. a senior level person who can coordinate the use Mitroff and Anagnos28 provide six reasons to of this knowledge. All problems have significant support this approach: aspects from each of four perspectives and a failure 1. Most organizations plan for crises in only one to consider one or more of them almost guarantees or two families and focus on natural disasters such as bad decisions: wildfire, earthquake or flood. 1. Scientific/Technical/Impersonal knowledge 2. Organizations that broaden their preparations concerns how and why things are the way they are. for crises other than natural disasters most often do This basic knowledge is brought to bear on scientific it only for crisis that are specific to their industry. and technical problems and is the foundation for For instance: restaurants will prepare for food most professional careers. contamination, petroleum industries will prepare 2. Interpersonal knowledge relates to how for explosions and hospitals will prepare for people socialize, connect and relate to each other in infection outbreaks. Such crises are considered a families, institutions and communities. normal and routine part of the industry since they 3. Existential knowledge refers to basic questions are unfortunately part of their regular operating such as “Why am I here?” “What is my purpose?” experience. “How can I make sense of this crisis?” “Do I need to 3. Organizations must revisit their plans because change to adapt?” crises continually evolve and major crises occur 4. Systemic knowledge concerns identifying our not only because of what an organization knows, place in the systems in which we exist, how our anticipates, and plans for, but just as much because actions and ideas in the micro context transfer to the of what it does not know and does not anticipate. macro, and pattern recognition. 4. Every organization should plan for the All four perspectives are not equally important in occurrence of at least one crisis in each of the all problems although in principle they are present crisis families because each type can happen to any in all problems. If one of these perspectives is organization. Failing to plan for any of the major overlooked or downplayed during problem analysis, crisis families is not safe. our understanding of the problem will be incomplete 5. Planning for every specific type of crisis within and solutions may omit essential elements. each of the families is impossible and unnecessary, and planning for only those types of crises that Prepare for Categories of Threats Rather Than have been experienced, according to traditional Individual Threats risk assessment outcomes, is shortsighted. No crisis There are many different types of crises, but they ever follows a predictable path and no crisis plan

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 75 ever works entirely as intended so it is acceptable to can generate meaningful outcomes. It came from prepare for the occurrence of at least one type within studies on natural ecosystems which are more each of the families. The most valuable aspect of this predictable and less complex than human social process is that people think about unthinkable crises systems. In a complex human system all the agents prior to their occurrence. Leaders who anticipate the and their relationships are almost never entirely unthinkable are not paralyzed when it occurs. and accurately known and they are often in flux 6. In a more complex world, any crisis can set off with new agents and relationships developing over a secondary crisis or even a cascade of subsidiary time. The method is interesting but would be almost crises. Every crisis is thus capable of being both the impossible to implement when applied to a security cause and the effect of any other crisis. The best problem that behaved like a complex adaptive organizations prepare for individual crises and the system. simultaneous occurrence of multiple crises. This is done by studying past crises and looking for patterns Narrow focus by identifying driving forces and interconnections between them. Systems System mapping exercises use tools such as causal mapping is useful in this context to understand how loops, domain mapping and systems mapping crises unfold over time and how their effects are felt to identify stakeholders, processes, structures both within and beyond the organization. and functions (the who, how, what and why) in order to improve and develop awareness of Narrow Focus Through Discard complex problems. These tools provide the basis Eric Berlow presented a Ted talk on natural for identifying and categorizing basic trends and ecosystems entitled “Simplifying complexity” and information that are driving future change. stated that, for any problem with many moving parts Driving forces tend to fall into the four categories that all influence one another, the more complex the of politics, economics, society and culture, science problem - the more resistant it seems to change - the and technology denoted by the acronym PEST. easier it may be to understand and solve. More in-depth analyses may include consideration This talk explored how embracing complexity of environmental, legal and regulatory, and ethical can lead to simple answers, how complexity theory drivers (STEEPLE). Analysis of change drivers helps us harness more creativity to solve difficult is useful in identifying and categorizing basic problems, how complex systems can be mapped to trends and information about a range of different identify their most influential agents, and how can contextual issues that influence the future.29,30 In we use our knowledge of ecosystems to help solve business, PEST analyses are often used analyze societal problems. According to Berlow, the answer the macro environment around organizations to to overcoming the challenges of complex systems understand market growth or decline.31 is simpler than you think. Through his research In the context of security strategies a PEST he demonstrates that “the more you embrace analysis can help us understand the external drivers complexity, the better chance you have of finding that potentially affect outcomes. The process simple answers.” simplifies a complex problem by producing a list of Using Berlow’s method, a complex system can drivers that require consideration when formulating be simplified using metrics and other technology a new strategy or intervention. tools that help visualize and reduce complexity. All elements in a model that are more than three steps Narrow Focus Through Framing away from a particular issue under examination are A very different approach to resolving complex discarded and the complexity is thus deleted. issues relates to consequence manipulation and While the approach sounds convincing, it management where the objective is to minimize requires the identification of all agents and their negative impact and maximize positive impact on relationships within a problem system before it one’s own organization and vice versa for targeted

76 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 stakeholders. There are three levels of framing. The for spilling oil into the Gulf of Mexico they were first is dictated by the type of entity involved, the punished by society. second by the nature of interest in the entity, and d. Failure: Casting a problem as a serious the third by the nature of the messaging desired. The disturbance that is symptomatic of deep political and framing of an event is very powerful and may have a system failure. For instance: observe the jockeying direct impact on the fate of politicians, policies and of political parties when elections come close. They even institutions. take certain issues and frame them as catastrophic 1. Entity: At its most basic level, framing is failures to demonstrate why voters should vote a a product of the type of organization involved. certain way. Of key importance is the nature of the crisis, e. Violation: One of the most powerful framing the culture of the organization, the mission and methods involves casting the problem as a violation vision of the organization, and the leadership of a core value. For instance: the right to bear psychology. For instance: an Ebola outbreak would arms in the U.S. is a core value that overrides any be framed differently by a health clinic, police, argument to limit arms. Likewise, the #MeToo non-governmental organizations, government, and movement gained powerful traction as it tapped into commercial entities. the core values of equality and fairness. 2. Interest: Each entity is motivated by f. Denial: Complete obfuscation is attempted significantly different interests, aspirations, and by some organizations as a means of sweeping a goals. They may strive for regulatory alignment, problem under the carpet. It is attempted often, profit, influence and power, or environmental especially by corporations and governments, but has protection. These stakeholder perspectives fall devastating outcomes if the truth becomes known. under the broad STEEPLES categories of society, technology, environment, economic, political, Conclusion legislative, ethical, and security. For instance: climate Crisis leaders and managers require a sound change may be viewed as a science problem, a understanding of complex situations which is communication problem, an operational problem, best achieved by using proven tools that require an existential problem, a pollution problem, a systems thinking. The automatic inclination of transnational cooperation problem, among others. many executive decision makers to prefer simple 3. Messaging: approaches and solutions renders them crisis prone. a. Silver-lining: The most common type of Inadequate investment in understanding the entities, message is one that casts a complex problem in a relationships, and potential social impacts and positive light. For instance: management of a natural outcomes in a situation can only result in subpar disaster provides experience necessary to do better decisions that have a higher chance of failure. In next time, which is a sign of growth. a complex crisis, any component of the system b. One-off: Casting a problem as a one-off may be a positive, neutral, or disruptive force that stand-alone disturbance is equivalent to one of the impacts on services and political sustainability. dangerous rationalizations mentioned earlier. The Crises demand serious attention and a significant premise is that we are not to blame because this effort is required to understand them as much as is never happened before and we don’t need to change possible. Once executives understand the complexity because it will never happen again. of a crisis it is their job to identify suitable methods c. Blame: Constructing blame as being that simplify the situation for the purpose of making concentrated with certain other stakeholders or more effective and sophisticated decisions. being dispersed among a network of stakeholders is References, See page 83 a common tactic for shifting a problem onto other people’s shoulders that does not always work. For instance: when BP tried to blame their subcontractor

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance 77 REFERENCES

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78 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 The Evolving Significance of Afghanistan in China’s February 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ Strategic Calculus: From an Insignificant ‘Backyard’ asia_pacificincentral-asias- forbidding-highlands-a-quiet-newcomer- to a Consequential Geostrategic Hub - Page 24 chinesetroops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9-a759- 2b8541bbbe20_ story.html *This article is republished from the Security Nexus online 15 Kugelman, Michael. Masood Azhar Is China’s Favorite Terrorist: journal at apcss.org Beijing’s U.N. block sent a signal—and a warning—to Pakistan. Foreign Policy. March 21, 2019. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/21/masood- 1 Katzman, Kenneth. Thomas, Clayton. “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban azhar-is-chinas-favorite-terrorist/ Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy”. Congressional Research Service. 16 ChinaDaily. No Double Standard on Terrorism. November 7-5700. 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80 LIAISON Volume 13, Issue 1 July 16, 2020. https://www.timesnownews.com/india/article/india- 14 Jacob Kurtzer, “China’s Humanitarian Aid: Cooperation amidst challenges-china-s-claims-on-south-china-sea- says-it-is-a-part-of- Competition.” n.d. Www.Csis.org. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas- global-commons/622649. humanitarian-aid-cooperation-amidst-competition. 23 U.S. Congress. Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 ‌15 Ibid. Washington DC: U.S. Congress, December 31, 2018. https://www. 16 Daniel Cassady., 2020. The U.S. Has Thrown Out Faulty congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/2736/text. Ventilators Russia Sent As Pandemic Aid. [online] Forbes. Available at: 24 U.S. Congress. Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative Act of [Accessed congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2865/text. 30 November 2020]. 17 Jason Criss Howk / Jan 12, “If the Pentagon Is on Defense, The Global Pandemic and Humanitarian Competition - Who's on Offense?,” ClearanceJobs, January 12, 2021, https://news. Page 48 clearancejobs.com/2021/01/12/if-the-pentagon-is-on-defense-whos-on- offense/. 1 “China’s Peace Ark Leaves Philippines - Philippines.” n.d. 18 Jack MacLennan, “The Problem with Great-Power Competition,” ReliefWeb. https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/chinas-peace-ark- Modern War Institute, May 1, 2020, https://mwi.usma.edu/problem- leaves-philippines. great-power-competition/. ‌2 “2013 Typhoon Haiyan: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help.” 2018. 19 Ibid. World Vision. November 9, 2018. https://www.worldvision.org/disaster- 20 Jason Criss Howk / Jan 5, “America Already Won in Afghanistan relief-news-stories/2013-typhoon-haiyan-facts#Philippines. But We Missed the Victory,” ClearanceJobs, January 5, 2021, https:// ‌3 Phillip Dy et al., The Typhoon Haiyan Response: Strengthening news.clearancejobs.com/2021/01/05/america-already-won-in- Coordination among Philippine Government, Civil Society, and afghanistan-but-we-missed-the-victory/. International Actors, (Harvard Kennedy School, Program on Crisis 21 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2020 Irregular Warfare Leadership, 2016), https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/ Annex to the National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC: Department centers/research-initiatives/crisisleadership/files/Dy_and_Stephens.pdf. of Defense, 2020), https://media.defense.gov/2020/Oct/02/2002510472/- 4 United States Agency for International Development, Philippines 1/-1/0/Irregular-Warfare-Annex-to-the-National-Defense-Strategy- – Typhoon Yolanda / Haiyan, Fact Sheet #1, Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Summary.PDF. 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Then Covid Happened.,” POLITICO (POLITICO, December 4, 2020), 11 Amy Mackinnon Robbie Gramer, “What to Expect in Biden's https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/12/02/the-us-is-no- First 100 Days in Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy, January 19, 2021, longer-a-more-developed-country-than-us-442407. https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/19/biden-first-100-days-foreign- 30 Ibid. policy-china-russia-europe-trump-climate-change/. 31 “South Korean, US Defense Chiefs Reaffirm Alliance in Phone 12 Congressional Research Service, U.S. Role in the World: Talks,” koreatimes, January 24, 2021, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/ Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional www/nation/2021/01/205_302957.html. Research Service, 2020), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44891.pdf. 32 “US Forces Korea Issues Movement Restriction Order for Kunsan 13 Ibid. Base over Virus Cases,” koreatimes, January 22, 2021, http://www.

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