Struck by bomb in Battle of Bismarck Sea, Japanese merchantman burns fiercely, March 2, 1943 (U.S. Army/National Archives and Records Administration)
Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era Lessons from the Battle of the Bismarck Sea
By Ben Ho
reat Power competition is back such as China and Russia seeking to Operations Admiral John M. Richard- after a hiatus of over a quarter challenge the current U.S.-led world son contends in the 2016 A Design for G of a century since the end of order.1 These two documents are in line Maintaining Maritime Superiority that the Cold War. The United States has with what various individuals in and “Russia and China both have advanced acknowledged this fact with the release outside of the U.S. defense establish- their military capabilities to act as global of the 2017 National Security Strategy ment have been asserting in recent years powers,” adding that their “goals are and the 2018 National Defense Strat- about the state of international geopoli- backed by a growing arsenal of high- egy, which speak of revisionist powers tics. For instance, former Chief of Naval end warfighting capabilities, many of which are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities.”2 In the same vein, the Ben Ho is an Associate Research Fellow in the Military Studies Program at the S. Rajaratnam School of 2018 edition of this strategic docu- International Studies at the Nanyang Technology University, Singapore. ment, Version 2.0, notes that “China
96 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 and Russia seek to accumulate power Map. Battle of the Bismarck Sea at America’s expense and may imperil the diplomatic, economic, and military bonds that link the United States to its allies and partners and that “while rarely rising to the level of conflict, Chinese and Russian actions are frequently confrontational.”3 Admiral Richardson also stresses in the 2016 document that naval combat must address “‘blue-water’ scenarios far from land and power projection ashore in a highly ‘informationalized’ and con- tested environment.”4 This contested environment is invariably framed by the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) chal- lenge that Beijing and Moscow pose to U.S. maritime dominance. Indeed, Admiral Richardson stresses in Version 2.0 that the U.S. military’s “competitive advantage has shrunk and in some areas, Japanese ship movements (black) and Allied air attacks (red) during the battle is gone altogether.”5 How best to deal with this state of af- Source: Douglas MacArthur, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, vol. 2, pt. 1 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), plate 51. fairs has been a major debate in the U.S. national security community in recent is widely regarded as the quintessential several hundred kilometers away, the years. Defense thinkers often look to his- access-denial platform, it can be similarly Allies were fighting to defend the crucial tory to solve current military problems, deployed to circumvent the A2/AD New Guinean city of Port Moresby and insights from a less popular but barrier. In the same vein, while Beijing that could be used to threaten Australia crucial engagement during World War II may employ an A2/AD strategy to keep should it fall into Japanese hands. With in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA) enemies far away from its shores, the the successful defense of Port Moresby, could guide Pentagon leaders toward concept can be turned on its head to keep the Allies went on the offensive in mitigating this threat. This is the almost the People’s Republic of China bottled up New Guinea with the goal of neutral- forgotten Battle of the Bismarck Sea within the so-called First Island Chain.7 izing Rabaul. Following the decision in of March 2–4, 1943, which saw Allied This article begins with a brief account January 1943 to withdraw from Guadal- airpower decimating the Japanese convoy of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and canal, Tokyo decided to focus its efforts designated Operation 81 in the waters off then works through the three lessons in the SWPA on the New Guinea cam- New Guinea.6 delineated above with brief policy recom- paign. Therein lies the strategic context Three insights from the battle stand mendations vis-à-vis each of them. of the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. out: General Douglas MacArthur called Historical Narrative the Battle of the Bismarck Sea “one of the land-based aircraft can play a key role •• Despite the overwhelming success of most complete and annihilating combats in maritime interdiction the Americans at the Battle of Midway, of all time.”8 Similarly, one Japanese we must innovate and improvise •• the Japanese were still a force to be navy captain termed his country’s defeat to deal with current and urgent reckoned with in the Pacific after June in the battle as “unbelievable,” adding problems 1942, especially in the SWPA of opera- that “never was there such a debacle.”9 the enemy should be overwhelmed •• tions where they were ensconced in Operation 81 consisted of eight troop with multidomain threats. several key bases such as Rabaul. In transports and a similar number of de- While one can argue that the Allies at August 1942, the United States went stroyers as protective escorts.10 There were the Bismarck Sea engagement were more on the strategic offensive, with Marines 6,900 Japanese soldiers traveling with the akin to the A2/AD force by today’s defi- capturing Guadalcanal in the Solomon convoy from Rabaul, and they were meant nition of the term, their actions during the Islands. Over the next 6 months, the to be reinforcements for the vital garrison battle and the lessons learned are relevant Americans were embroiled in a fiercely in Lae, New Guinea, from which imperial to today’s counter-A2/AD forces. After fought campaign that saw both sides forces were trying to halt the Allied offen- all, the concept of A2/AD can work both taking heavy losses, but that the United sive in that former Australian territory (see ways. To illustrate, while the submarine States ultimately won. Concurrently, and map). Some 100 Japanese fighter planes
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 97 Part of cowling for B-25 bomber motor is assembled in engine department of North American Aviation’s plant in Inglewood, California, October 1942 (Library of Congress/Alfred T. Palmer) provided air cover for the convoy, though One scholar opines that the battle was during a conflict with a Great Power. the numbers overhead differed at vari- the turning point of the protracted New One student of the Bismarck Sea ous times. Operation 81 was detected on Guinea campaign, calling it the cam- engagement contends that it “still March 1, 1943, and almost 100 U.S. and paign’s “Midway.”11 In the same vein, stands as a striking example of the Australian bombers attacked the convoy in the authoritative postwar U.S. Strategic deadly effectiveness of land-based air the following days. Bombing Survey notes that regarding power against naval targets.”13 As the When the smoke had cleared, all the the SWPA, “From 1 March 1943 to the Allies did not have any aircraft carriers transports and four destroyers had been end of the war, the enemy remained on or major surface combatants in the area sunk. Of the 6,900 Japanese troops with the defensive, strategically and tactically, of operations at that time, aircraft flying the convoy, only 1,200 made it to Lae, except for desperate counterattacks by from New Guinea bases undertook while another 2,700 were rescued and separate and isolated units.”12 the task almost entirely of interdicting returned to Rabaul, from where they had Japanese convoy Operation 81. Prior come. The rest were killed. On the other Lesson One: Land-Based to the battle, the in-theater Allied air hand, the Allies lost only a handful of air- Aircraft Can Play a Key Role forces that comprised the U.S. Fifth craft. The Battle of the Bismarck Sea was in Maritime Interdiction Air Force and Royal Australian Air Japan’s last air offensive in the SWPA, This lesson is especially relevant today Force Command had a mixed record and it set the stage for the Allied offensive given the debate over how the United in attacking ships.14 The Battle of the in that theater from June 1943 onward. States could best fight for sea control Bismarck Sea changed that, and using
98 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 tactics employed during the engage- commercial shipping exacted by shore- lines of communication open. Indeed, ment, the Allies prevented subsequent based airpower is higher when accounting the vast expanses of the Pacific Ocean Japanese attempts at reinforcing their for the fact that sea mines, laid mainly by and the limited number of friendly bases positions in New Guinea. USAAF B-29 bombers, accounted for in that theater—for instance, Guam is While the Battle of the Bismarck Sea another 9.3 percent.18 over 2,000 kilometers away from the arguably marked the apogee of land- Land-based airpower proved its East and South China seas—would mean based aviation in the antisurface warfare worth in ASuW during World War II, that there will be a premium placed on (ASuW) role during World War II, there and Pentagon thinkers would do well to the extended striking reach of Air Force were also several other cases of terrestrial bear this in mind and let it complement “heavies.” airpower successfully attacking ships U.S. naval power in the quest to attain As much of the Joint Concept for during that conflict. Witness the deadli- maritime dominance in this age of Great Access and Maneuver in the Global ness of the Luftwaffe’s Focke-Wulf Fw Power rivalry. Terrestrial airpower could Commons (JAM-GC) is classified, one 200 Condor during the initial stages of help in efforts to nullify the surface war- may never know the true extent to which the Battle of the North Atlantic. This ship component of an adversary’s A2/ the Air Force is involved in the maritime medium bomber posed such a threat AD system. After all, land-based aircraft interdiction portfolio. What is known, to Allied convoys that British Premier possess a number of advantages over however, is that the Air Force has not Winston Churchill called it the “scourge their sea-based counterparts, especially in been practicing maritime strike frequently of the Atlantic.” Indeed, two retired terms of range and payload. To illustrate, since the end of the Cold War.19 This senior U.S. Navy officers, Wayne P. the mainstay U.S. naval strike fighter, state of affairs should be addressed. Hughes and Robert P. Girrier, assert the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, can Hughes and Girrier maintain that the that Luftwaffe head Hermann Goering’s deploy with a few antiship missiles out to neglect of dedicated training to this focus on land operations meant that several hundred kilometers away. In stark mission during World War II had con- “the service did not take as seriously the contrast, the Air Force’s intercontinental- tributed to the limitations of land-based ship-attack remit.”15 Consequently, “the ranged B-1B Lancer can carry up to 24 air against shipping during that conflict.20 possibility that Germany might wake up of the newly inducted long-range antiship This situation could well replicate itself to the opportunity haunted the harried missiles (LRASMs). With the Lancer set during a conflict involving the United Royal Navy throughout much of the to remain in service into the early 2030s, States and a Great Power adversary. war.”16 In the Pacific theater, Japanese the United States will retain a potent Given its long-range bomber capabilities, navy medium bombers flying from long-range ASuW capability for over a the Air Force should therefore seek to Indochinese bases decimated British decade with the B-1B/LRASM com- entrench itself more firmly in the ASuW Force Z with the sinking of the Prince of bination. Indeed, given the increasing business. The introduction of a standoff Wales and Repulse, marking the first oc- significance of the maritime domain, joint shallow-water mine capability to its B-52 casion where capital ships were sunk by force chiefs should also seriously consider complement that was shown during aircraft while they were under way at sea. the possibility of arming the upcoming Exercise Valiant Shield 2018 is a step in Allied land-based bombers proved equally B-21 Raider strategic bomber with anti- the right direction, as was the integration devastating during the campaign to ship weapons such as the LRASM. of the LRASM with the Air Force’s B-1B retake the Philippines from the Japanese. Another shortfall that sea-based air bombers.21 At the November 1944 Battle of Ormoc has is that U.S. carrier strike groups What should follow naturally from Bay, U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) me- (CSGs) may not be located near a crisis this is perhaps new iterations of the dium bombers inflicted substantial losses spot and may require a few days’ steam- Resultant Fury exercise that was held in on a Japanese troop convoy. ing to reach their destination. With 2004 and demonstrated the capability Moreover, the significance of Allied midair refueling, Air Force long-range of Air Force heavy bombers to attack land-based airpower in the ASuW role bombers based even in the continental moving targets at sea with laser-guided during the Pacific War is often under- United States can, however, provide pres- bombs.22 Future Resultant Fury–like stated as it is commonly believed that ence, albeit temporary, in most parts of drills would do well to incorporate the sea-based aviation was the key player in the world within half a day. To be certain, LRASM and more challenging conditions this respect. To be sure, carrier planes critics can argue that heavy bombers like so as to simulate a major war contin- were behind the destruction of much the B-1B by themselves are highly vul- gency. Such are the options provided by of the imperial fleet. The U.S. Strategic nerable to enemy fighters, but the long a long-range bomber force. In fact, the Bombing Survey reveals, however, that striking reach of their weapons (such as noted defense analyst Robert Haddick land-based aircraft accounted for 14.5 the LRASM) would enable them to stay has argued rather heretically for the U.S. percent of Japanese merchantmen losses, farther out within any A2/AD envelope. Navy to possess such a capability to bet- which is only slightly lower than the cor- Moreover, the socioeconomic well-being ter counter China’s burgeoning A2/ responding figure of 16.3 percent for of America’s key strategic rival, China, AD edifice.23 In the same vein, other carrier aviation.17 The toll on Japanese is highly dependent on keeping its sea commentators, echoing former Deputy
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 99 Defense Secretary Robert Work, have was a testament to adaptability,” adding for Maintaining Maritime Superiority called for the B-1B being transferred to that “the weapons and tactics perfected in that due to budgetary pressures in the the Navy as a “sea control bomber” that the first months of 1943 were a tremen- foreseeable future, “[we] will not be able focuses on maritime strike rather than dous success because Fifth Air Force’s to ‘buy’ our way out of the challenges we being retired in the 2030s.24 airmen quickly and willingly adapted face,” adding that “the budget environ- themselves and their aircraft to the battle ment will force tough choices but must Lesson Two: Innovate and at hand.”27 also inspire new thinking.”34 And new Improvise to Deal with Current The lesson from this aspect of the thinking was exactly what the Allies in the and Urgent Problems Bismarck Sea engagement vis-à-vis the SWPA did in March 1943, much to the The next takeaway from the Battle counter-A2/AD discourse is that inno- detriment of Japanese convoy Operation of the Bismarck Sea is that innova- vating and making do with what one has 81. Modern U.S. Armed Forces have tion and improvisation could be key on hand could make much operational gone down this path of innovation and in allowing one side to gain an edge sense because they could mitigate—at improvisation before, with one good in military competition. The battle is least in the short term—some of the example being the transformation of four noted for the perfection of emerging shortfalls that the U.S. Navy is currently Ohio-class strategic submarines into cruise tactics that Allied fliers adopted against facing. There are currently doubts over missile platforms. Modifying the SM-6 Japanese vessels. One innovative tactic the survivability of U.S. CSGs in the surface-to-air missile to have a ship-attack used was skip-bombing, whereby an face of modern A2/AD capabilities. For capability is another.35 At the end of the airplane dropped its bombs from a low instance, there is much talk about U.S. day, while it is well and good to have new altitude so that their forward trajec- carrier strike aircraft lacking the range to platforms and systems, there is a need tory would make them skip along the strike at an adversary without exposing to, in the words of former Chairman of sea surface like a stone and impact on their motherships to threats.28 The Navy the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joseph Dunford, the side of the enemy ship. To be sure, has taken steps to address this capability “get the right balance between today’s skip-bombing was not entirely new, as gap with the upcoming MQ-25 Stingray capabilities and tomorrow’s capabilities the British had used it in the European unmanned aerial tanker, but it will take so we can maintain that competitive theater with some success; however, the many years before it comes into active advantage.”36 first decisive use of this tactic had to service. Reinstating the mothballed S-3 All in all, the Battle of the Bismarck be credited to the Allies who perfected Viking to serve as an aerial tanker is an- Sea shows how having bold thinkers who it during the Battle of the Bismarck other sensible measure being put forth to can improvise and overcome the chal- Sea.25 Allied airmen also modified the mitigate the A2/AD conundrum,29 as is lenges presented by the enemy on the B-25 Mitchell medium bomber to help the proposal to retrofit the SM-6 surface- battlefield is a force multiplier. However, it suppress enemy antiaircraft fire as it to-air missile to the F/A-18 Hornet to in today’s dynamic and rapidly advancing made its low-level attacking run. This enhance its counter-air capabilities.30 In world, technologies that are new today involved installing eight forward-firing the same vein, introducing the airborne could be outdated and replaced in a year 0.50-caliber machine guns on the plane early warning and control variant of the or two, so there is a definite need for that enabled it to carry out a combina- V-22 Osprey is one way to enhance the thinkers who can keep pace with these tion strafing/bombing attack. The A-20 survivability of U.S. amphibious forces changes or even think one step ahead Havoc light bomber was similarly modi- against access-denial threats.31 Seemingly in the quest to attain and maintain the fied to have six 0.50-caliber weapons heretical ideas, such as that of converting edge. In this light, the following observa- firing ahead. Prior to this, heavy merchant ships into cruise missile shoot- tion cannot be truer: “Innovative teams bombers such as the B-17 Flying For- ers, should also be assessed.32 After all, in and individuals able to integrate current tress were used in the low-level antiship- an operationally challenging and uncer- resources in new ways or to creatively ping role in the SWPA, but they were tain milieu like today’s, all options should make the most of technological advances vulnerable to antiaircraft fire given their be considered. are critical for corporate and government lack of forward-firing guns to suppress What is viable about such proposals is success in solving wicked problems. . . . enemy gunners.26 that they are not about the introduction If we cannot find those solutions, others The results of these innovations were of entirely new capabilities—a process will do so and lead the way into a disrup- devastating for Operation 81, as the straf- that is invariably drawn out and expen- tive future.”37 ing runs of these up-gunned bombers sive—but about making do with what caused significant topside casualties and one has at hand. In a nod to this line of Lesson Three: Overwhelm damage among Japanese ships, leaving reasoning, the National Security Strategy the Enemy with Massed them more vulnerable to bombing runs. contends that “Where possible, we must and Multidimensional/ Writing about the U.S. contribution to improve existing systems to maximize Vectored Threats the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, Matthew returns on prior investments.”33 Similarly, Robert Kaplan once stated, “Never Rodman fittingly notes that “the battle Admiral Richardson stresses in A Design provide your adversary with only a few
100 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Air Force B-1B Lancer, assigned to 37th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron and deployed from Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, lands at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, as part of continuous bomber presence mission, December 4, 2017 (U.S. Air Force/Richard P. Ebensberger)
problems to solve . . . because if you involving antiaccess and counter-anti- RAAF Beaufighters.42 The effectiveness do, he’ll solve them.”38 Several decades access forces, he stresses.40 of the multipronged Allied attacks was before the noted strategic affairs com- While the Bismarck Sea encounter such that one pilot described Japanese mentator made this point, U.S. and does not evince a cross-domain approach defensive fire at his plane during the Australian fliers coupled this maxim in the true sense of the term given its encounter as “practically nil.”43 Hence, of overwhelming the enemy together predominant airplane-versus-ship nature, according to Rodman, the Bismarck Sea with the innovations just described to it does show the benefits of a multidi- operation was “a triumph of coordinated devastate Japanese forces during the rectional modus operandi. During the bomber assault against a determined and Battle of the Bismarck Sea. Therein lies battle, Allied aircraft executed their well-defended enemy convoy. With the the third and final lesson from the battle coordinated attacks from various heights incorporation of modified medium and vis-à-vis maintaining U.S. maritime to befuddle as well as diffuse enemy light bombers designed specifically for dominance: joint force leaders should defenses. To illustrate, there were air- low-altitude attack, other platforms could draw up operational concepts that lever- craft dropping ordnance from medium move back to higher altitudes. As a result, age mass and different dimensions to altitude. While these bombs were less the Japanese convoy found it almost defeat the enemy in a sea-control fight. likely to hit Japanese vessels, the convoy impossible to mount a proper defense, In other words, they should harness was forced to break defensive formation simply overwhelmed by the multiaxis, cross-domain synergy, which, in the and take evasive action.41 This essentially multialtitude bomber attacks.”44 words of Sam J. Tangredi, is “the ability “kicked the door open” for the devastat- The amassing of airpower against to strike the enemy simultaneously or ing skip-bombing and strafing runs at Japanese convoy Operation 81 also con- sequentially from dominant positions in low altitudes. According to the official tributed significantly to Allied victory. all combat mediums or domains in such Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) re- Prior to the engagement, few Allied air a way that operations in each domain lease on the battle, “Enemy crews were attacks involved coordinated multisquad- provide mutual support for each slain beside their guns, deck cargo burst ron action.45 The Battle of the Bismarck other.”39 This synergy (or lack of it) will into flame, superstructures toppled and Sea, however, involved 16 squadrons, determine the outcome of any scenario burned” as a result of strafing runs by and the various waves of attackers were
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 101 F/A-18E Super Hornet assigned to “Eagles” of strike fighter squadron 115 transits Bismarck Sea en route to Royal Australian Air Force Base Townsville, Queensland, Australia, during exercise Black Dagger, March 24, 2016 (U.S. Navy/Chris Pagenkopf) coordinated to strike just moments apart, joint force planners must dare to think quest to negate U.S. military superiority delivering a large pulse of firepower to differently. In this respect, the National in wartime. For instance, the People’s the enemy.46 In fact, much of the devasta- Defense Strategy is right on the mark Liberation Army (PLA) is believed to tion the Japanese suffered took place on when it argues for “chang[ing] . . . the have drawn up plans involving forces at- the morning of March 3—just 1 day of way we organize and employ forces” tacking from multiple dimensions—land, the entire battle. and “developing operational concepts to surface, sub-surface, and air—and vectors Today, many believe that the U.S. sharpen our competitive advantages and to overwhelm U.S. maritime forces. This military has lost the ability to overwhelm enhance our lethality.”47 That being said, involves pitting high-density, cheaper, enemies. Part of that mindset is likely the U.S. naval forces must plan for challeng- and more expendable assets against the lack of resistance encountered during op- ing the integrated, layered defenses of U.S. Navy battle force, which largely has erations carried out after 2001. Another near-peer rivals, and this is far removed the opposite of these characteristics and reason is the collective U.S. obsession from handling the relatively weak systems the magazine capacities of which could be with fewer numbers of large, highly of extremist groups and Third World depleted rapidly during a high-intensity expensive—read much less expendable— nations. To this end, Washington should missile exchange. James Holmes and platforms. How can you present massed, reconsider the U.S. way of war that Toshi Yoshihara note that “PLA satura- multidimensional/vectored threats to emphasizes qualities such as agility and tion attacks will involve the concerted the enemy when you simply do not have precision over overwhelming force à la use of cruise, ballistic, and hypersonic enough numbers? the application of Allied airpower during missiles; aerial attack from manned and With the return of Great Power the Battle of the Bismarck Sea. unmanned warplanes, mines; torpedo competition and the concomitant quest The likes of China and Russia are attack; electronic warfare and cyber war- to reestablish maritime dominance, emphasizing the latter attribute in their fare.”48 As an example, they postulate that
102 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 an aerial missile attack “would compel Syria, where U.S., British, and French Nevertheless, the fundamental challenges U.S. tacticians to look skyward while air and naval forces attacked the Bashar presented by a Great Power competitor Kilo-class diesel boats loosed salvoes of al-Asad regime from the Mediterranean, remain the same, and the battle offers wake-homing torpedoes . . . against U.S. Red Sea, and Persian Gulf. After the op- ample food for thought for Pentagon surface combatants from below.”49 In eration, Admiral Richardson stated that leaders in terms of coming up with a vi- fact, this scenario somehow mirrors what the U.S. Navy was studying the lessons able operational concept (think JAM-GC happened during the opening stages of learned to better prep itself for higher and related concepts), not only as a the Battle of the Bismarck Sea, when intensity conflict.52 One hopes the Service warfighting implement but also to act as medium-altitude bombing runs paved the has noted that the three-pronged, three- a deterrent during peacetime against A2/ way for the low-level devastating attacks dimensional (there was also a submarine AD-centric near-peer rivals. discussed earlier in this article. Therefore, involved) nature of the attack had con- All in all, the three key takeaways of Washington would do well to take a cue tributed to the overwhelming of Syrian the Battle of the Bismarck Sea may seem from Beijing in its endeavor to obtain air defenses, much like Allied aircraft trite at first glance, but a deeper look maritime superiority in the face of A2/ did during the Battle of the Bismarck will arguably show their worth in the AD and adopt even more actively a cross- Sea 76 years ago. All that being said, the discourse to preserve the exalted U.S. domain approach to maritime operations. Army and the Air Force have publicly status of primus inter pares in the mari- After all, such an approach would greatly committed to MDO, but the Navy has time domain. Going forward, Admiral facilitate breaking the “walls” of an A2/ not.53 This situation does not bode well Richardson in Version 2.0 has alluded to AD-centric peer competitor, such as its for the U.S. military’s goal of achieving a large-scale exercise in 2020 that will integrated air defense systems. cross-domain synergy, as MDO cannot seek to test the Distributed Maritime Fortunately, the United States has become an official joint concept of all the Operations concept, as well as deliver an taken a few tentative steps in the right Services and it will not be encapsulated in “initial cross-domain solution.”55 While direction. For a start, U.S. ground forces, the joint force’s budgeting, procurement, not much is currently known about the which have hitherto been left out of and doctrine.54 exercise, the joint force would do well the counter-A2/AD calculus, are finally to incorporate, if possible, land-based being factored in. This can be seen in the Conclusion bombers as well as the capabilities of all promulgation of concepts such as the Military entities can be prone to inertia, Services into this particular drill as per the Marines Corps expeditionary advanced and the Armed Forces are no exception. first and third lessons, respectively. The base operations, where they would In the face of extant and emerging A2/ U.S. sea services have arguably lost their help the Navy establish sea control.50 It AD systems that could seriously under- high-end warfighting edge in the long also bears notice that the U.S. Army is mine U.S. control of the seas, Pentagon calm lee of the end of the Cold War. With forging into doctrine the multidomain leaders should step up their game in the military edge of the United States fast operations (MDO) concept that will see addressing this issue. To be sure, the eroding in relation to its strategic com- the Service operating against near-peer U.S. sea services have taken some action petitors, the Nation must adapt to this enemies in nonpermissive environments in this respect, but perhaps more could new reality by taking more appropriate across all domains—land, sea, air, space, be done. To this end, while it is always measures or risk coming to grief. JFQ and cyber.51 In a nod to this new concept, good to think of novel ideas, it is often the Army fired an antiship missile at a instructive to look to history, especially sea target during the 2018 Rim of the some of its less famous episodes, for Notes Pacific exercise. Facing the possibility takeaways. Indeed, such lessons are of 1 of attack from different dimensions, the immense value and free for learning, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White adversary’s operational and tactical pic- provided they are considered. House, 2017), 2, available at
JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020 Ho 103 (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval cvAIoKR3lCz5zszLI3_gZiU6EJ0-5Jj8Y12t5K- 40 Ibid., 182. Operations, December 2018), 3. 8ouYE>. 41 Gilbert, The Battle of the Bismarck Sea, 4 Richardson, A Design for Maintaining 25 Matthew K. Rodman, A War of Their 46. Superiority, Version 1.0, 6. Own: Bombers Over the Southwest Pacific (Max- 42 Quoted in Alan Stephens, “The Battle of 5 Richardson, A Design for Maintaining well Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, the Bismarck Sea,” The Central Blue, March 2, Superiority, Version 2.0, 4. 2005), 36, available at 104 Recall / Attaining Maritime Superiority in an A2/AD Era JFQ 96, 1st Quarter 2020