Whose Summit? Whose Information Society?

Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Developing countries and civil society at the World Summit on the Information Society Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Developing countries and civil society at the World Summit on the Information Society

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Graphic design: MONOCROMO [email protected] Phone: +598 (2) 400 1685 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Developing countries and civil society at the World Summit on the Information Society

by D AVID SOUTER

with additional research by ABIODUN JAGUN AUTHOR: DAVID SOUTER RESEARCH PARTNER: ABIODUN JAGUN

This report has been written for the Association for Abiodun Jagun was the principal research partner Progressive Communications (APC) by David Souter. for this report.

DAVID SOUTER is an independent expert on information ABI JAGUN earned her Ph.D. from the University of and communication technology (ICT) and information Strathclyde in 2006 with a thesis on the subject of and communications in development (ICD) issues. He “Telecommunications and the Structure of Economic directs the specialist consultancy ict Development Organisations”. As well as academic experience in Nigeria Associates ltd, which he formed in 2003. He has led and Britain, she has worked in the Nigerian office of the projects on a wide range of issues involving information, international consultancy Accenture, and has undertaken communications and international development for research projects with David Souter for the World Bank clients including the World Bank, the United Nations and the United Nations Development Programme. She Development Programme, the European Commission, currently spends half her time working with APC as ICT the UK Department for International Development (DFID) Policy Research Officer for the African region and her and a number of civil society and private sector remaining time as Lecturer, Information Systems and organisations. He is also Visiting Professor in Development, in the Institute for Development Policy Communications Management at the University of Management at the University of Manchester. Strathclyde and a Visiting Research Associate of the Department of Media and Communications, London School of Economics. From 1995 to 2003, he was Chief Executive of the Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation. In 2002, he coordinated the research team for the “Louder Voices” enquiry, which researched developing country participation in international ICT decision-making for DFID and the G8 DOT Force.

David Souter has worked with APC for a number of years, as a research partner and consultant on ICT and ICD issues. He led APC’s analytical work on participation in the World Summit on the Information Society, reported in this study, and is currently working with APC on multistakeholder initiatives within the framework of the Internet Governance Forum. TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...... 7

SECTION A: BACKGROUND

1. Introduction ...... 17

2. The “Louder Voices” report: a summary ...... 20

3. WSIS: an account ...... 22

SECTION B: ANALYSIS

4. WSIS organisation and structure ...... 37

5. WSIS and its issues ...... 47

6. WSIS and developing countries ...... 61

7. WSIS and civil society ...... 72

SECTION C: RECOMMENDATIONS

8. Conclusions and recommendations ...... 91

ANNEXES

Annex 1: Participation in WSIS summits...... 113

Annex 2: Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG ...... 118

Annex 3: WSIS outcome document “commitments” ...... 121

Annex 4: References ...... 124 6 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? executive Summary

Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Developing countries and civil society at the World Summit on the Information Society

THIS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE REPORT IS ADAPTED FROM A SUMMARY PUBLISHED AS A SEPARATE DOCUMENT DURING THE FIRST MEETING OF THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM IN OCTOBER/NOVEMBER 2006. IT PROVIDES AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MAIN REPORT ONLY, AND DOES NOT INCLUDE ALL OF THE ISSUES RAISED IN THAT REPORT.

Introduction

The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS - decision-making in general and makes recommendations was the largest single activity in international discus- to all main actors about how future decision-making might sion of information and communication technologies become more inclusive of developing countries, non-gov- (ICTs) during the past ten years – at least in scale. It ernmental actors and their concerns. In particular, it revis- absorbed a great deal of time and other resources of its the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report on de- international organisations, governments, civil society veloping country involvement in decision-making, pub- organisations and businesses over a four-year period lished at the G8 summit in 2002, which identified a series (2001-2005). It produced four documents setting out of weaknesses in both international organisations and aspirations for the information society. It provided a national policymaking processes which contributed to framework for international debate on infrastructure fi- poor participation – and it asks how these have and have nance and Internet governance. But it received only lim- not changed as a result of WSIS. ited public attention and failed to bridge the paradigm This study drew on five main sources of evidence: gap between the worlds of information technology and international development. • Participant observation of the WSIS process throughout its four-year period, by the principal author, David This report summarises a study of developing country and Souter, and research associate, Abiodun Jagun civil society participation and influence in WSIS that was commissioned by the Association for Progressive Commu- • Desk research, particularly the documentation pro- nications (APC). As well as analysing participation, the duced within the WSIS process by all stakeholders, study looked at the impact of WSIS on international ICT including developing countries and civil society

Excecutive Summary 7 • Questionnaires and interviews with many individual Development Programme (UNDP) rather than the techno- participants in WSIS preparatory committees cratic ITU. An underlying tension between broader devel- (PrepComs) and in the two summit sessions (Geneva, opment goals and goals of the ICT sector lasted through- 2003; Tunis, 2005) out WSIS. Some within the ITU also saw the summit as an opportunity for it to redesign itself and broaden its man- • Detailed interviews with forty key actors in the WSIS date from telecommunications to wider information tech- process nology and information society issues. This was opposed • Case studies of experience in five developing coun- by some ITU members, other international agencies and tries - Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya. non-governmental organisations (NGOs). This executive summary briefly summarises the main is- The first phase of WSIS, up to the Geneva summit in 2003, sues, conclusions and recommendations of the report. It developed two general texts - a Declaration of Principles does not include all of the issues covered in the main re- and a Plan of Action. These texts were agreed in negotia- port that follows. tions between governments, though other stakeholders sought to influence them with varying degrees of success. The WSIS story The Declaration sets out the summit’s (considerable) aspirations for the role of ICTs in transforming social and The origins of WSIS lay in a decision taken, without de- economic life. The Plan of Action brings together many bate, at the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)’s different issues and identifies possible areas for interna- 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference, calling on the ITU to or- tional action, together with suggested actions on which ganise a world summit on the information society. It is agreement could be reached. These included targets re- doubtful if ITU delegates expected this to be a global sum- lated to the Millennium Development Goals. mit of the kind which the United Nations holds regularly A number of issues proved contentious during the first on different issues, but that is what WSIS became when it phase, including the right of non-governmental stakehold- won the backing of other UN agencies. ers to take part in WSIS negotiations, and issues concern- There is a standard process for the organisation of world ing information and communication rights (particularly summits. The summit meeting itself is the last stage of a their relationship to fundamental agreements such as the prolonged process of negotiation, and is primarily an op- Universal Declaration of Human Rights). Two issues, how- portunity for heads of state and government to make public ever, proved intractable and were referred to separate fora statements and commit their countries to a formal decla- established by the UN Secretary-General, which met be- ration. The real work takes place in complex discussions tween the first and second WSIS phases. over the previous year or two, in a series of regional meetings and preparatory committees (or PrepComs). These are • The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) was where the text that is eventually signed is hammered out, initially concerned with a proposal to establish a Dig- and in which disputes are either resolved or shelved. ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), supported by many African WSIS mostly followed this standard structure, but its or- governments, but opposed by donors. Its remit ex- ganisation differed from the standard model in two main tended, however, to ICT infrastructure finance in gen- ways. eral, and its conclusions were mostly concerned with this. The TFFM worked along conventional UN task force Firstly, it was organised in two phases - one two-year phase lines, in which limited representatives of interested par- leading to the first summit meeting in Geneva in Decem- ties reviewed issues on the basis of consultants’ reports. ber 2003, another to the second summit meeting in Tunis • The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) in November 2005. This was justified as an opportunity to was concerned with anxieties expressed, primarily by devote separate discussions to (firstly) principles and (sec- developing countries, about the way the Internet op- ondly) implementation - though the underlying reason was erated – in particular, the perception that critical as- failure to choose between two willing hosts. There were pects of the Internet (particularly the Internet Corpo- therefore five regional meetings during the first phase and ration for Assigned Names and Numbers, ICANN), four during the second; as well as three full PrepComs and which governs domain identities, and the root server a number of additional meetings in each phase. system) were ultimately controlled by the United Secondly, WSIS was organised by a technical agency of States, rather than a conventional international or in- the United Nations, the ITU, rather than by the UN’s center-governmental forum. It adopted innovative work- tral organisation. This was not uncontroversial. The “in- ing methods, in which a wide range of participants from formation society” includes wide-ranging cultural and de- the whole range of stakeholder groups worked to- velopmental issues which many considered the responsi- gether to resolve differences and establish a common bility of agencies like UNESCO and the United Nations frame of reference for further negotiations.

8 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The second phase of WSIS agreed not to reopen discussion interaction with the actual decision-making work which the of the first phase texts and so was almost entirely concerned ITU and Internet governance bodies engaged in during the with these two deferred issues and with the question of fol- four years it took place, and it had even less interaction with low-up activity. In practice, issues of infrastructure finance other significant international fora of importance to com- were resolved relatively quickly, and the final year of the munications (such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)). WSIS process was overwhelmingly concerned with Internet Prior international discourse on information, communica- governance. Both issues are described further below. tions and development, such as the work of the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) and a variety of UN agen- The final outputs of the WSIS process were two further cies, did not greatly inform WSIS debates either. WSIS was documents, the Tunis Commitment, reiterating the first not, overall, seen as a significant decision-making body by summit’s conclusions, and the Tunis Agenda, drawing out industrial countries, which were, by and large, represented the second summit’s conclusions on infrastructure finance at a much lower level than developing countries in WSIS and Internet governance and setting out follow-up proce- processes and at the two summit meetings. dures for implementation. Secondly, the central role of the ITU had an important im- The following sections of this summary in turn review the pact on the nature of participation and discussion in WSIS. findings of the APC WSIS study concerning the organisa- The ITU is essentially a technical agency and had little ex- tion of WSIS, the issues discussed, and the participation pertise in the wider rights, development and political ques- of developing country and civil society actors in them. tions that profoundly affected discussions at WSIS. Al- though it sought to address these weaknesses, and al- The organisation of WSIS though other UN agencies were also involved in overall WSIS management, the fact that the ITU led the process Global summits are expensive ways of doing international meant that governments tended to give lead responsibil- business. They require large investments in time and ity for their own participation to ministries of communica- money, especially for the governments of smaller coun- tions rather than to central or developmental ministries. tries and for non-governmental actors, and they raise high WSIS therefore did very little to reduce the “paradigm gap” expectations. Because they rely on global consensus, how- between ICT specialists and mainstream development ever, they often get bogged down in controversial detail communities which has become a significant concern for and are less likely to innovate than more informal fora. the development community. They are usually thought to be best at forcing governments to confront intractable problems of fundamental impor- Thirdly, the two-phase approach failed to deliver. Rather than tance at the most senior level, but less good at develop- enabling the discussion to move from principles in phase ing strategies to meet new opportunities. one to implementation in phase two, agreement on the main development and societal issues in phase one stifled fur- Kofi Annan’s view, expressed at the opening of the Geneva ther discussion about them in phase two. Many important summit, that “This summit is unique: where most global developments in ICTs and their application in development conferences focus on global threats, this one will consider occurred in the four-year WSIS period, but these are barely how best to use a new global asset,” was, therefore, not reflected in its final outcome documents. Many in develop- seen by everyone as positive. Although little voiced in pub- ment agencies felt that these were already outdated as they lic at the time the UN General Assembly agreed to hold were agreed. Four years is, in any case, a long time to spend WSIS, there was a good deal of scepticism amongst inter- discussing a sector as fast-moving as ICTs. Those who ar- national officials and (particularly) industrial country gov- gue that the second phase was, in effect, a world summit ernments about the merits of a world summit on the infor- on Internet governance are not far from the mark; and the mation society. Many others were concerned about the limited nature of that outcome leaves a big question mark cost - both in general and to their own organisations. over the merits of a two-phase summit. While some partici- Many different interests therefore came together in the pants feel quite strongly that the two-phase approach fa- WSIS process, and it was always going to be difficult for cilitated networking and understanding among participants, the secretariat, managed by the ITU, and the summit proc- this was at high cost, and it is unlikely that the WSIS expe- ess as a whole to meet the different aspirations and ex- rience will encourage the UN to repeat it in future. pectations of different stakeholder groups. What implica- Finally, a number of important organisational issues arose tions did these factors have on the way in which different concerning the participation of non-governmental stake- stakeholders behaved and the summit itself evolved? The holders (the private sector and civil society), in the sum- study draws conclusions around this in four main areas. mit itself and in the two “interim fora”, the TFFM and the Firstly, the interaction between WSIS and other decision- WGIG. Multistakeholder principles were adopted in the making fora was poor. Although it did involve the ITU and WSIS texts but contested in WSIS negotiations. The TFFM did address issues of Internet governance, it had very little and the WGIG adopted very different ways of working with

Excecutive Summary 9 different stakeholders. The WGIG’s very open approach to have happened. For reasons discussed above, WSIS was non-governmental actors has been seen as a potential attended by ICT professionals rather than development model for future dialogue in other international issues – a specialists. Its overall ethos encouraged enthusiasts to point discussed further below. participate, and sceptics to stay away. The process used to gather input for inclusion in the outcome documents made it easier to construct lists of aspirations and desid- WSIS issues erata than to analyse the evidence and draw priorities. Summit statements often emphasise rhetoric over realism, WSIS meant different things to different people. Prima and avoid addressing issues of contention. The result, in facie, a World Summit on the Information Society might WSIS’ case, was text that reflected the views of ICD behave been expected to address issues of importance in lievers without addressing the concerns of sceptics. many aspects of all societies. The concept, after all, implies a comprehensive transformation of society and This is not to say that WSIS did not build awareness and economy, comparable to that following the Industrial Revo- understanding of the potential importance of ICTs in devel- lution. In practice, WSIS did not address the “Information opment. Many in developing country governments, in par- Society” on this grand scale but focused on a much nar- ticular, stress how much more familiar they became with rower range of issues - the relationship between ICTs and the issues as a result of exposure through WSIS and how fundamental rights, that between ICTs and development, much more importance is now attached to them by their infrastructure finance and Internet governance. It paid governments. At the same time, however, WSIS did nothing much more attention to developing countries than to in- to convince multilateral agencies and bilateral donors of the dustrial countries. At most, therefore, it might be called a case for ICD. It has not led to widespread new commitments summit on aspects of the information society rather than in the ICD field, and some agencies have made reductions on the information society per se. on past engagement. It seems possible that WSIS may come to be seen as the highpoint of ICD enthusiasm rather than a The relationship between information and fundamental stimulus to new development initiatives. human rights was contested from the start of the WSIS process when some governments sought to exclude ex- One exception to this conclusion is the area of infrastruc- plicit references to binding rights agreements from draft ture finance. The proposal for a Digital Solidarity Fund WSIS texts. Although references to fundamental rights during the first phase of the summit posed a significant were eventually included, the underlying tensions be- problem for donors since it sought a reallocation of devel- tween freedom of expression and government authority opment finance outside the terms of the global develop- remained throughout the summit, and were put in ment consensus represented by the Monterrey Conven- sharper focus by arguments over freedom of expression tion and the Millennium Development Goals. ICT infrastruc- in the second host country, Tunisia. The WSIS texts do ture, in this consensus, was considered adequately ad- not discuss rights issues in any substance, and do not dressed by the private sector, and to many in donor agen- address the potential which ICTs have for adjusting the cies support for the DSF looked like an attempt to secure balance of rights and responsibilities between citizens funding for the ICT sector at the expense of other develop- and governments. ment priorities (such as power, water, health and education). The dispute here was almost enough to prevent The WSIS texts on the role of ICTs in development are also agreement on a draft text being reached before the first disappointing. WSIS overall had a strongly pro-ICD (infor- phase summit opened its plenary session. mation and communications in development) ethos, but its texts do not reflect the fact that this ethos is not univer- In this case, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms de- sally shared within the development community. While the veloped an approach which recognised that access in some WSIS texts therefore emphasised the potential, as they geographical areas and some types of ICT infrastructure saw it, for ICTs to engender a step change in countries’ could not be financed by the private sector alone and that ability to overcome development challenges, the Millen- international and/or public finance would also be required. nium Review Summit, held just a couple of months before This was accompanied by a move to support African ICT the Tunis summit, had almost nothing to say about ICTs in infrastructure by the World Bank and the European Union, its review of progress towards achieving the Millennium and together these proved sufficient to enable global Development Goals. agreement on the issue to be reached at an early stage in Many who work at the interface of ICTs and development the second phase of WSIS. The Digital Solidarity Fund pro- policy see this as an opportunity missed, and regret the posal was transformed into a small voluntary organisation. fact that WSIS failed to create a genuine dialogue between A consensus, therefore, was quickly reached – with the ICT and development communities, or between ICD enthu- result that the significance of the shift in thinking about siasts and sceptics. There are many reasons why this might infrastructure finance has been missed by many.

10 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? No-one expected WSIS to be preoccupied by Internet gov- role in Summit negotiations. It is important, in this con- ernance when the summit was first mooted. Some argue text, not to confuse the increased influence of a few major that it was an issue waiting in the wings for the right occa- developing countries with any change in influence for the sion to come along; others that its prominence was largely developing world as a whole, particularly LDCs. the result of political factors concerning different coun- Across WSIS overall, national delegations were largely tries’ relations with the United States. A central aspect of made up of diplomats and telecommunications sector pro- the question is the fact that, almost uniquely in human fessionals. Geneva diplomatic missions and home-based history, the Internet has become very important, very diplomats tended to play the main role in formal negotia- quickly, with very little government or inter-governmental tions, as in other international agreements regardless of involvement. For most governments, this was an anomaly sector. National policy discourse was usually led by com- in need of resolution (though for some governments and munications ministries and, diplomats aside, a lot of del- much of civil society and the private sector it was a posi- egations were made up mostly of people from the tradi- tive factor that should be preserved). Here, then, were two tional telecommunications establishment (the communi- principal contests of authority: between governments and cations ministry and regulator and the incumbent fixed non-governmental agencies, and between those govern- network operator). Mobile networks, the Internet commu- ments perceived to have authority over the Internet world- nity and private sector operators were poorly represented, wide (principally the United States) and those feeling they if at all, in most delegations, and there were also few par- had none at home. ticipants from mainstream development ministries. This issue remained highly politicised and contentious to Women were also under-represented. the very end of WSIS. Although substantial and consen- A few, but only a few, developing countries included civil sual, the WGIG’s report did not secure the same consen- society representatives in their delegations, while some sus within WSIS as that of the TFFM. The final outcome – strongly opposed the presence of civil society representa- compromises on “enhanced cooperation” within existing tives, even as observers, in formal negotiations – which, Internet governance and the creation of an Internet Gov- in all summits, are inter-governmental in character. Na- ernance Forum with substantial scope but insignificant tional case studies carried out for this report showed con- powers – left the issues largely in the air. One way of look- siderable variation, too, in the extent of consultation and ing at this suggests that it represents another step within participation in WSIS discourse at a national level. In many the Internet’s long-term evolution – a step that continues countries, policymaking remained largely within the nar- the erosion of its original North American identity, rather row confines of government ICT officials; though in some, than the revolutionary step that some desired; perhaps such as Kenya, civil society and private sector actors played also a step that tends to bring the Internet further within a significant part. Media attention to WSIS was minimal in the ambit of government or inter-governmental oversight. most cases. But the arguments over Internet governance were in no sense resolved by WSIS and will continue in the future. The regional conferences did not play as great a part in the WSIS process as the preparatory committees. The fact that they were continental in scale may have inhibited at- Developing country participation tention to detail, where sub-regional conferences might have made a bigger contribution. The African regional con- Summits differ from conventional, permanent international ferences were both vibrant events, with substantial civil decision-making fora, such as the ITU and the WTO, in society input and impact. Others were less dynamic, and many ways – not least because they are more politicised Europe did not even bother with a regional conference in and because their outcomes usually have less immediate the second phase. practical effect. Less expertise is needed to participate effectively in summits, while the need for consensus WSIS was, ultimately, a one-off event, in which develop- (rather than majority vote) also gives more weight to ing country participation was more substantial and as- smaller and less powerful countries. sertive than it is in permanent ICT decision-making fora such as the ITU and the WTO. Partly, this was because Nevertheless, developing country participation in WSIS summit dynamics make it easier for developing countries varied markedly in scale. The Internet governance debate to manage their participation; partly because industrial in particular provided a platform for a small number of countries did not see WSIS as a priority. Few interview- larger developing countries to assert their influence and ees for the study, however, felt that WSIS had significantly authority, in a way comparable with similar new alignments changed the balance of power in ongoing policy debates in (for example) WTO negotiations. Smaller countries and in permanent decision-making fora, likely outcomes aris- LDCs (Least Developed Countries), by contrast, tended to ing from them, or their arrangements for participation, be more concerned with specific development questions, except where Internet governance is concerned. The ITU such as infrastructure finance, and played a less politicised discussed some WSIS-related changes at its November

Excecutive Summary 11 2006 Plenipotenary Conference, but it is not yet clear how In the Geneva phase of WSIS, civil society had a wider these – and the ITU’s own identity – will develop. range of issues to discuss. The whole character of the “information society” seemed up for grabs, and there were In practice, the report concludes that the institutional dy- points of principle to argue on a wide range of issues namics of participation require much more substantial around which civil society could coalesce. The hostility of changes in both international institutions and national some government delegations to civil society’s presence policymaking processes if they are to enhance develop- also fostered a sense of community and solidarity. Civil ing country participation – a conclusion very much in line society engagement focused on rights issues, and had with that of the “Louder Voices” report. While WSIS raised relatively little impact on the text on development. These awareness of ICT and ICD issues in many countries, at least factors were less apparent in the Tunis phase, which fo- amongst government officials and some NGOs, it did not cused much more narrowly on Internet governance. How- facilitate capacity-building or change policymaking rela- ever, this was an issue in which civil society found other tionships at a national level. Unless those weaknesses are ways of influencing outcomes – in the WGIG, for example, addressed, many developing countries will find it as diffi- and through dialogue with those government delegates cult to represent their priorities effectively in future in spe- who shared many of the Internet community’s objectives. cialist ICT decision-making fora as they did before WSIS, The quality of civil society organisation was weaker in the which might be considered another opportunity missed. second phase, but the Internet Governance Caucus provided a powerful instrument to advance positions which it Civil society participation shared with the Internet community. On the whole, therefore, the space for civil society participation in WSIS was One of the most important “Louder Voices” conclusions sufficient to ensure that most civil society organisations concerned the extent of private sector and civil society felt there was more value in constructive engagement than participation in ICT policy. Because of the way ICTs and in opposition. Caucusing played an important role in de- particularly the Internet have evolved, much relevant ex- veloping civil society overviews and in strategy and tac- pertise resides in the private sector and civil society rather tics, as it has at other recent summits. than in government. Civil society participation in WSIS PrepComs and, to a lesser Although some governments opposed this, the WSIS out- extent, the Geneva and Tunis summit sessions, was, like come texts make much of the importance of multistake- that of governments, concentrated amongst those with par- holder involvement – the principle, as the Geneva Plan of ticular ICT/ICD interests. Few mainstream development or Action puts it, that “the effective participation of govern- human rights NGOs attended any part of the process, and ments and all stakeholders is vital in developing the Infor- this greatly weakened civil society’s capacity to contribute mation Society[,] requiring cooperation and partnerships to the development agenda. Developing countries were also among all of them.”1 disproportionately under-represented in civil society participation – partly because of lack of resources, partly be- Civil society involvement in summits has increased over cause few civil society organisations in developing coun- the years, sometimes including the holding of “alterna- tries had tracked information society issues in the past, and tive” summits alongside the main event. No such alterna- partly because those which had were less likely to be in- tive happened in the case of WSIS, but the summit did cluded in their own national discourse on WSIS issues. represent a significant advance in civil society participation. The ITU’s lack of experience with civil society may The costs and benefits of civil society participation in WSIS have fostered this, by giving more autonomy and respon- are still debated. The financial cost and opportunity cost sibility to a civil society bureau within the secretariat, just in personnel time were very considerable for those organi- as its extensive experience with the private sector may sations that took WSIS seriously. Policy gains, in terms of have opened spaces for that stakeholder group. Neverthe- WSIS outcomes, were limited. Where gains were made was less, the opening stages of the first summit phase were in extending organisations’ understanding of issues and dominated by arguments about the rights of civil society in their building networks outside their own regions and and the private sector to participate – arguments which specialisms that would not otherwise have been available helped the two non-governmental stakeholder groups to to them. The value of this should not be underestimated, build more of a common understanding between them than though it is questionable how well these networks can they had contrived elsewhere. (This was also helped by very survive without the focus that WSIS PrepComs provided effective coordination of private sector participation.) for them.

1 Geneva Plan of Action, section C1, article 8.

12 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? After WSIS technical complexities involved. There are some other international issues which are similarly complex and politi- The final question to be asked of WSIS concerns its fol- cised, and where issues are poorly understood, but rela- low-up processes. These can be divided into three groups. tively few. These would be much more susceptible to this a. Some overview implementation processes were set in approach than issues which do not share all these charac- place, reporting to the UN General Assembly, as with teristics. other summits. b. In the case of Internet governance, ambiguous com- Conclusion promises were reached to foster “enhanced cooperation” in order “to enable governments, on an equal What lasting impact has WSIS had on the “information footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in society” and on developing country and civil society par- international public policy issues pertaining to the ticipation? Internet,”2 and to establish a multistakeholder Almost a year on from the Tunis summit, it is difficult to Internet Governance Forum with no substantive pow- see that WSIS has had a lasting impact on the issues it ers but extensive scope. discussed, with the exception of Internet governance. The c. A list of eleven “action lines” was established (with a quality of its development texts was poor. Much more sig- further eight subsidiary lines) to undertake otherwise nificant documents and initiatives in this context have been unspecified “multi-stakeholder implementation at the written and undertaken outside the WSIS framework dur- international level.”3 ing the past five years than within it. WSIS does seem to Internet governance developments have continued to at- have drawn more attention to the lack of evidence and criti- tract the interest and attention of all stakeholder groups, cal evaluation available concerning ICT’s impact on devel- principally because the issues remain unresolved. They will opment, and to the paradigm gap between ICT and devel- continue to do so, and Internet governance institutions will opment professionals. Some international agencies are continue to change, as they have done throughout the now seeking to address these. Many developing country Internet’s history. How they change is yet unclear, but the governments were made more aware of ICT issues by WSIS, profile of Internet governance has become and will remain and ICT and ICD are being included in more Poverty Re- much more substantial as a result of its politicisation in duction Strategies. There has also been a shift, following the WSIS process. The breadth and quality of discourse at the TFFM, in thinking about infrastructure finance. How- the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum met ever, these developments do not represent a revolution in with a very positive response from most participants. thinking about the information society of the kind that WSIS’ advocates had hoped to see. The WSIS texts on wider information society issues are far from the cutting edge of development thinking, and are At an institutional level, WSIS has not had a significant proving of little interest to those who are seriously engaged impact on the deliberations or processes of most existing in ICD. The first round of action line meetings held in May permanent international ICT decision-making fora. WSIS 2006 was very poorly attended and produced little in the did allow the ITU to push the boundaries of its mandate way of new initiatives. It seems unlikely that these will of- beyond telecommunications towards the information so- fer any significant legacy for WSIS, which is likely to re- ciety to some extent, but within limits. If anything, the WSIS main largely a stand-alone event in the history of ICT/ICD. process probably increased hostility to the idea of it playing a major role in Internet governance, rather than ad- One significant question which is often asked is whether vancing the case for this. The scope for the ITU extending the WGIG experience of multistakeholder participation of- its developmental role is constrained by both its own mem- fers a model for use in other international fora. The report bers’ wishes and those of other agencies within the UN concludes that this is possible, but in limited contexts. The system. The ambiguous compromise on Internet govern- WGIG was concerned with an area of international governance reached in Tunis will be played out over some time to ance in which governments and inter-governmental institu- come. The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” and the tions were not predominant. Multistakeholder participation role of the Internet Governance Forum are yet unclear; but and processes were easier to instigate, therefore, because WSIS is likely to mark a stage in the evolution of Internet they did not challenge existing (inter-)governmental author- management which itself is likely to see increased gov- ity. The WGIG’s process – as a genuinely “working” group ernment involvement alongside that of its historic stake- of diverse individuals – was also particularly suited to holders. The action lines on development issues set up as an issue which was both complex and highly politicised part of WSIS follow-up do not seem likely to make a sig- and where many disputants were largely ignorant of the nificant or lasting contribution.

2 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 69. 3 ibid., article 108.

Excecutive Summary 13 Developing country participation in WSIS was significantly In some countries, civil society organisations also im- higher than in other ICT decision-making fora, but WSIS proved relationships with national governments, on which did not in fact make significant decisions. The more asser- they may be able to build in future. tive role played by some larger developing countries may follow through to other fora, notably in Internet govern- Finally, the WSIS texts strongly emphasised the value of ance, but WSIS has not equipped smaller and less well- multistakeholder participation and, though many govern- resourced developing countries to participate more effec- ments remain uncomfortable about it, this will make fu- tively in permanent fora like the ITU and WTO, which will ture attempts to exclude civil society and the private sec- have more lasting influence than WSIS. Institutional tor more contentious. Experience with the Internet Gov- changes in the way those organisations manage their proc- ernance Forum will be telling here: a successful Forum will esses and national changes to improve the quality, scope advance the case for multistakeholder participation, but and inclusiveness of national policy debates are still fun- failure will be used against the principle. damental to enabling developing countries to articulate In the coming period, APC will work with its partners and their issues and concerns more effectively in permanent other organisations to build on the WSIS experience, as decision-making fora. The dominance of WSIS delegations described in this report, in order to improve developing by ICT professionals, and the very limited participation of country and civil society participation in future interna- development specialists, meant that WSIS did little to ad- tional ICT decision-making. New fora like the Internet Gov- dress the paradigm gap between these communities in as ernance Forum and long-standing institutions like the ITU well as outside developing countries. will both play an important part in this work. There is still Civil society participation in WSIS was significant, and a great need for capacity-building which creates better some feel that it was both more cooperative and more as- understanding and develops new resources; for better sertive than in many previous summits. WSIS did illustrate, networking and experience-sharing, particularly among however, that civil society, like government, faces a para- and between developing countries; and for improved dia- digm gap between organisations interested in ICT/ICD logue between different stakeholder communities. The (which participated in the summit) and mainstream de- WSIS experience has helped APC and other organisations velopment and rights agencies (which did not). Northern to think through their own objectives and priorities in this civil society was also more strongly represented than its area and to develop new initiatives. If this leads to more Southern counterparts. Civil society’s main gains lay in effective and more inclusive participation in the future, increased understanding and networking, but these were then that will be a positive and lasting outcome from this

bought at a high cost and their sustainability is uncertain. particular World Summit.

14 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? main report

Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Developing countries and civil society at the World Summit on the Information Society

by D AVID SOUTER

with additional research by ABIODUN JAGUN

section a Background

section b Analysis

section c Recommendations

15 16 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? section a

Background

chapter 1 Introduction chapter 2 The “Louder Voices” report: a summary chapter 3 WSIS: an account

chapter 1 Introduction

The World Summit on the Information Society - WSIS in This report considers the participation of developing brief - was the major event in international discourse on countries and non-governmental actors (principally civil information and communications technologies (ICTs) and society) in the WSIS experience - the Summit itself and their role in development during the first five years of the its lengthy preparatory process - and in its two main sub- 21st century. Held in two preparatory phases, from 2001 sidiary fora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms to the first summit event in Geneva in December 2003, and (TFFM) and the Working Group on Internet Governance from then until the second summit event in Tunis in No- (WGIG). It was commissioned by the Association for Pro- vember 2005, it preoccupied much of the time and many gressive Communications (APC), an international network of the resources available for ICT and ICD (information and of civil society organisations, to assess the impact of communications in development) issues in development WSIS in the light of two earlier reports on developing agencies, government departments and civil society. While country participation in international ICT decision-mak- the long-term impact of WSIS on actual decision-making ing: the “Louder Voices” report prepared for the G8 Dig- is as yet unclear, its final documents are likely to be cited ital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) in 2002 (summa- for many years as representing a critical point in that evo- rised in chapter 2), and an initial study of African partici- lution - much as the report of the 1984/5 Maitland Com- pation in the first phase of WSIS, commissioned by APC mission (formally the Independent Commission for World in 2004. The author of this report was closely involved in Wide Telecommunications Development), “The Missing both of these studies. Link”, was cited at WSIS itself.

Section A . Background 17 This study is not intended as a comprehensive assessment • SSSECTIONECTIONECTION B of the report analyses the WSIS experience of WSIS, though substantial attention is paid to WSIS’ over- in the light of the research undertaken for the study. all impact and outcomes in chapters 3, 4 and 5. Its main -CHAPTER 4 presents an overview assessment of purposes are: WSIS and its associated fora from the perspective 1. To observe and comment on the nature, content and of organisational and institutional structure. extent of developing country and civil society participa- -CHAPTER 5 presents a comparable assessment of tion in and impact on WSIS and its subsidiary fora. the Summit process’ impact on the four main the- 2. To consider whether these are likely to have a lasting matic issues which it considered with any sub- impact on international ICT decision-making processes. stance - the role of ICTs in development, the relationship between the information society1 and hu- 3. To make recommendations to the WSIS follow-up proc- man rights, financing mechanisms for ICT deploy- ess, to international organisations themselves, to government, and Internet governance. ments, civil society and the private sector about ways in which international discourse can be made more inclusive -CHAPTERS 4 and 5 both review participation in gen- of developing countries and non-governmental actors. eral, by different stakeholder groups, within the WSIS structure and WSIS debates. It is also not intended as a comprehensive study of civil society participation in the WSIS process as a whole. Civil -CHAPTER 6 looks in more depth at the involvement of society engagement with WSIS was widespread and di- developing countries in these discussions, in the light verse, and involved a variety of mechanisms, both tradi- of the observations of the “Louder Voices” report, tional and innovative. While the report does give civil so- and suggests conclusions from these for the future. ciety experience considerable assessment, particularly in -CHAPTER 7 considers the involvement of non-gov- Chapter 7, the focus of this assessment is on the relation- ernmental stakeholders, particularly civil society, ship between civil society and decision-making processes and likewise suggests conclusions about their fu- rather than the internal mechanisms of civil society en- ture engagement in international ICT issues. gagement. • SSSECTIONECTIONECTION C (CHAPTER 8) of the report draws conclusions Research for the study was undertaken during the second from the study and presents recommendations to in- phase of WSIS (from January 2004 to November 2005), ter-governmental, governmental, civil society and and particularly during the six month period following the other stakeholders concerning future ICT/ICD issues Tunis summit (November 2005 to May 2006). The report and multistakeholder practice overall. It also puts for- was drafted in May and June 2006, and published in March ward specific recommendations concerning the WSIS 2007. A summary, included as the Executive Summary to follow-up process. These conclusions and recommen- this report, was published at the first meeting of the dations, like the preceding analysis, are the responsi- Internet Governance Forum in November 2006. bility of the author, and do not necessarily coincide with those of APC or its member-organisations. Structure of the report Methodology This report is organised as follows: This study is the result of a prolonged period of assess- • SSSECTIONECTIONECTION A of the report sets the overall framework for ment and analysis. Five principal methodologies were used the study, as follows: during this period. -CHAPTER 1 includes this introduction and an account of the methodology used in the study. Firstly, the study draws on the personal involvement of the author and research partner, as participant observers, in -CHAPTER 2 summarises the findings of the “Louder the WSIS process, and that of APC personnel who played Voices” report, which raised a series of questions a significant role in WSIS civil society fora. In line with their concerning developing country and multistake- responsibilities to this study, the author and research part- holder participation whose continued relevance is ner did not play any direct role in seeking to influence any tested by the research. part of the WSIS process, while the experience of APC per- -CHAPTER 3 presents an overall account of the sonnel was more interventionist. WSIS process, from the point at which a summit was first proposed at the Plenipotentiary Confer- ence of the International Telecommunication Un- 1 There is debate about whether the term “information society” should be capitalised (“Information Society”) or not. Those who favour ion in 1998 to the publication of the final outcome capitalisation tend, on the whole, to grant more transforming power to documents of the Tunis summit session in No- the concept than those who do not. In this report, capitals have been used where the text explicitly refers to this grander vision (as it does in vember 2005. the name of WSIS itself); but not in the text as a whole.

18 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Secondly, the study’s desk research makes use of the ex- The terms “interviews” and “interviewees”, where used tensive WSIS literature, particularly that available through in this report, refer to evidence derived from the whole of the WSIS website2 and documentation from other inter- this diverse range of inputs – questionnaires and informal national and civil society organisations. conversations, formal telephone interviews and contributions to case study research. All interviews, whether in Thirdly, questionnaire and interview research was under- person or by telephone, were conducted on the undertaken by the project research partner and APC colleagues standing that no comments would be attributed to any during two fora of the second WSIS phase - the Africa re- individual. This led to a very rich resource of comment and gional meeting in Accra, Ghana and the second global pre- opinion, on which the report draws extensively. Some in- paratory committee meeting in Geneva, both held during terviewees asked that the fact that they were interviewed February 2005. The author and research partner also con- for the project should not be made public. For this reason, ducted short interviews and informally discussed the is- a list of interviewees is not included in this report. sues concerned in the report with a wide range of participants during the third preparatory committee meeting of The author of the report would like to thank all those who the second phase (in September 2005) and during the have contributed to the study. In particular, he would like Tunis summit in November 2005. to thank Anriette Esterhuysen, Karen Banks and Willie Currie at APC, who commissioned the work and provided Fourthly, the author conducted approximately forty hour- exemplary support throughout; Abiodun Jagun, whose sup- long interviews with key figures in the WSIS process, from porting research work including compilation of Annex 4 all stakeholder groups, during the four month period af- added greatly to the enjoyability as well as the quality of ter the conclusion of the Tunis summit (December 2005 to the work; Lishan Adam, Valeria Betancourt, Rekha Jain and March 2006). These interviews included personnel within Partha Sarker, who undertook the country case studies; the organisation and political leadership of WSIS and its Alison Souter, who provided additional research support; associated fora, from relevant UN and other international and all of those who generously gave their time and their organisations, a number of bilateral national delegations opinions during an exceptionally rewarding series of tel- and development agencies, civil society organisations, the ephone and face-to-face interviews. As noted above, the private sector and the Internet community. conclusions and recommendations of the report - and any

Finally, the study draws on a series of five case studies of errors - are the responsibility of the author. experience in individual countries which were undertaken for the project by independent experts. These case studies - of Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya - are summarised in written reports, copies of which are available online3.

2 www.itu.int/wsis 3 At rights.apc.org/documents/wsis_research

Section A . Background 19 chapter 2 The “Louder Voices” report: a summary

This investigation of developing country and civil society The Executive Summary of the “Louder Voices” report is participation in WSIS and associated processes follows the summarised in the following paragraphs, in which italicised “Louder Voices” enquiry which was undertaken for the UK text represents direct quotation from the text of the re- Department for International Development (DFID) and the port. The issues raised here are key matters for consid- G8 DOT Force in 2002.4 This chapter briefly summarises eration in this investigation, and are reviewed in depth later the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” report. These con- in this report, particularly in Chapter 6. clusions raised important research questions which lay at 1. Four key challenges were identified by the “Louder the heart of this project, and form the basis for part of the Voices” report: analysis in chapters 6 and 7. I. First, most developing countries are members of The “Louder Voices” enquiry had four main objectives: established international organisations with ICT • To map international decision-making issues, proc- responsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and are esses and fora concerned with ICTs usually represented at their meetings. However, • To assess the effectiveness of developing country par- there is not as yet an effective connection between ticipation in these fora the agendas of these organisations, their decisions, and the international development goals set • To identify obstacles facing developing countries at the out in the UN Millennium Declaration. … In spite national, regional and global levels of considerable effort, there is still a “missing link” • To recommend actions that could be taken by devel- between ICT and development at the international oping countries themselves, international organisa- policy level. tions and the DOT Force implementation network to overcome these obstacles. II. Second, developing countries have very little presence or influence in the many voluntary, private, It focused on three major international ICT decision-mak- and not-for-profit decision-making fora that have ing fora (the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), been set up in recent years to standardise and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Internet Cor- manage the Internet and other new ICTs. They have poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)) and none at all in areas where standards are deter- used a combination of interview evidence, case studies of mined de facto by market power. Although the re- six developing countries (Brazil, India, Nepal, South Af- sults of some of this work are fed into traditional rica, Tanzania and Zambia) and analysis of specific policy international fora … it is clear that developing issues to draw conclusions about the state of developing countries are increasingly excluded from interna- country participation at that time. tional decision-making at the technical level.

The analysis set out in the “Louder Voices” report provides III. Third, the experience of many developed and some an important starting point for the present study. Although, developing countries shows that technical and like all international summits, WSIS represented a discon- policy capacity go hand in hand, so that it is diffi- tinuity in the normal pattern of international decision-mak- cult to develop one without the other. Given ing on the issues with which it was concerned, participants’ present asymmetries in technical capacity, it is engagement with it was predicated on their existing lev- essential for developing countries to set priorities els of involvement, expertise and priorities. This provides among international ICT issues and concentrate an opportunity for the present study to assess how the their limited resources on building technical and history of developing country and civil society participa- policy capacity in the areas that are most critical tion (assessed in the “Louder Voices” report) affected par- to their development goals. ticipation in the WSIS process and the course that WSIS itself took; how WSIS adjusted to and altered constraints IV. Fourth, … effective participation is not limited to what on participation, and what lasting impact WSIS may have happens before and during meetings. The goal of on international ICT decision-making in future. inclusion means that developing countries must assess the effect of decisions made by international 4 Its report can be found at www.eldis.org/static/DOC10107.htm. ICT fora on their own development objectives….

20 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? 2. There was consensus among those consulted for the 4. A number of recommendations were made in the [“Louder Voices”] study that it is not possible to “Louder Voices” report aimed at addressing these de- strengthen participation by developing countries in ficiencies. In relation to the national dimension, de- international ICT decision-making fora without first veloping country governments were recommended to: strengthening their capacity to make and implement a. improve information flows and policy coordination ICT policy at the national and regional levels. Three between different government departments and critical aspects were identified within this national di- agencies with ICT responsibilities; mension of under-representation and ineffective participation: b. promote informed public discussion and debate through both general and specialised media; I. lack of policy awareness, at all levels of government and citizenship, of the potential role of ICTs c. include all relevant stakeholders in policy-making in development; on an issue-by-issue basis; II. lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT issues, d. encourage participation of experts from the pri- particularly in respect of emerging technologies vate sector and civil society in national delegations and new policy areas - such as migration from cir- to international decision-making fora; cuit-switched to IP networks and indeed Internet e. share information, expertise and experience on a issues in general; regional and sub-regional basis; III. weaknesses in national and regional policymaking f. implement knowledge management techniques to processes, including: ensure that information gained through participa- i. lack of political leadership; tion in international ICT decision-making fora is captured, disseminated to relevant stakeholders, ii. absence of national ICT strategies; and made accessible to other interested parties iii. ineffective coordination between different through the media; … and government departments and agencies g. review their current practices with respect to meet- with ICT responsibilities; ing preparation, delegate selection, participation, iv. lack of private sector and civil society accountability and follow-up, with a view to en- participation in national decision-making; suring that these … result in the most effective use of financial resources through the optimum de- v. inadequate preparation for international ployment of technical and policy capacity. meetings; and 5. International agencies, meanwhile, were recom- vi. ineffective use of financial and human mended to: resources. a. promote awareness of the role that ICTs can (and 3. There was also consensus among those consulted for can not) play in development by providing com- the [“Louder Voices”] study that action to strengthen prehensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in- the ICT policy capacity of developing countries must formation on … their activities; ... be accompanied by action to level the policy playing field so as to ensure that the needs of developing coun- b. provide independent, authoritative technical/ tries are on the agenda of international ICT fora and policy research and analysis of the major issues that they are included in decision-making processes. to be decided; Three critical aspects were, likewise, identified within c. diversify the location of meetings and ensure that this international dimension of under-representation their procedures allow all sources of developing and ineffective participation: country policy and technical capacity to participate in decision-making, whether they come from gov- I. lack of easy, affordable and timely access to infor- ernment, the private sector or not-for-profit organi- mation about ICT-related issues, decision-making sations. fora and processes; These issues - concerning both developing countries and II. logistical problems, including the frequency and multistakeholder participation - are central to the investi- location of international meetings and restrictions gation in this report. Chapters 6 and 7 review the conclu- on participation (for example, by private sector and sions of the “Louder Voices” report concerning develop- civil society experts); ing countries and civil society, respectively, in the light of III. ineffective use of financial resources available to the evidence uncovered by the current investigation into

support participation. the impact of the WSIS process.

Section A . Background 21 chapter 3 WSIS: an account

WSIS was a world summit within the UN tradition of world that follows. It also summarises the content of the main summits - though with some distinctive features of its own. outputs of the WSIS process, including WSIS’ two interim This section of the report gives a narrative account of the fora, the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) and WSIS process and provides the foundation for the analysis the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG).

WSIS TIMELINE 2001 – 2005

REGIONAL CONFERENCES PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS) • African: Bamako (Mali), 25-30 May 2002 • PrepCom 1, Geneva 1-5 July 2002 • Pan European: Bucharest (Romania), 7-9 • PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-28 February 2003 November 2002 • Intersessional, Paris 15-18 July 2003 • Asia Pacific: Tokyo (Japan), 13-15 January • PrepCom 3, Geneva 15-26 September 2003 2003 • PrepCom 3A, Geneva 10-14 November • Latin America and the Caribbean: Bávaro 2003 (Dominican Rep.), 29-31 January 2003 • PrepCom 3B, Geneva 5-6 and 9 December • Western Asia: Beirut (Lebanon), 4-6 2003 February 2003

FIRST PHASE OF WSIS Geneva, 10-12 December 2003

REGIONAL CONFERENCES PREPARATORY CONFERENCES (PREPCOMS) • Western Asia: Damascus (Syria), 22-23 • PrepCom 1, Hammamet (Tunisia) 24-26 November 2004 June 2004 • Africa: Accra (Ghana), 2-4 February 2005 • PrepCom 2, Geneva 17-25 February 2005 • Asia-Pacific: Tehran (Iran), 31 May-2 June • PrepCom 3: Geneva 19-30 September 2005 2005 and Tunis (Tunisia) 13-15 November 2005 • Latin America and the Caribbean: Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), 8-10 June 2005

SUBREGIONAL CONFERENCES • II Bishkek-Moscow Regional Conference on the Information Society: 16-18 November 2004, Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) • Pan-Arab Conference on WSIS-Phase II: 8- 10 May 2005, Cairo (Egypt)

SECOND PHASE OF WSIS Tunis, 16-18 November 2005

22 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The nature of WSIS

WSIS’ formal origins lie in a resolution, calling for “a world (the historic role of the ITU’s Telecommunication Develop- summit on the information society,” presented by the gov- ment Bureau) to the role of a wider range of information ernment of Tunisia and passed without discussion during and communication technologies in social and economic the final session of the International Telecommunication development - or, to put it another way, from the “infor- Union (ITU)’s 1998 Plenipotentiary Conference in Minnea- mation society” as an outcome of telecommunications to polis. The objectives of the proposed summit would in- the “information society” as a transforming social phenom- clude: enon.

• establishing an overall framework identifying, with the Nevertheless, the fact that the ITU was the Summit’s lead contribution of all partners, a joint and harmonised agency meant that invitations to participate were handled understanding of the information society; by ministries of communications (which deal with national • drawing up a strategic plan of action for concerted relations with the ITU) rather than central planning minis- development of the information society by defining an tries (as might have happened if the Summit had been led agenda covering the objectives to be achieved and the by the UNDP or another part of the central United Nations resources to be mobilised; organisation) or ministries of information (which might have followed a UNESCO lead). This had a significant im- • identifying the roles of the various partners to ensure pact on participation in national delegations, which is dis- smooth coordination of the establishment in practice cussed in Chapter 6. Though, as in most UN summits, ne- 5 of the information society in all Member States. gotiations were led by diplomats - usually those based in This proposal was transmuted into an information society national missions to the United Nations - those diplomats summit along conventional UN summit lines – probably were advised primarily by technical and technological spe- much grander and more elaborate than participants in cialists from the telecoms sector, who understood the ways Minneapolis had envisaged - by the UN Administrative of the ITU, rather than by mainstream development spe- Committee on Coordination (now known as the UN Chief cialists. Many participants felt that this contributed to an Executives Board), where it was enthusiastically received emphasis on ICTs, particularly technologies, rather than by a number of other UN agencies with wider development on the information society in its wider sense, in many of objectives, notably UNESCO. The General Assembly finally WSIS’ deliberations, and to some of the difficulties which adopted a resolution endorsing WSIS as a formal summit WSIS advocates had in promoting its objectives within the in December 2001, by which time the Summit’s momen- mainstream development community. There were also ten- tum was well underway. sions between the ITU and some other UN agencies, governments and non-governmental stakeholders who sus- These slightly-clouded origins of WSIS raised a number of pected it of using the Summit to try and establish a cen- institutional issues which were to have implications for the tral governance role for itself towards the information so- future WSIS process, and which are discussed in Chapter 4. ciety or the Internet. Potential rivalries between UN agencies over the management of WSIS were addressed by allocating responsibility There were two other distinctive features of WSIS in com- for the organisation and administration of WSIS primarily parison with other UN summits. to the ITU, supported by a High-Level Summit Organising The first was the decision to hold it in two parts - the first Committee including the heads (in practice, the repre- in Geneva in December 2003, the second in Tunis in No- sentatives) of some twenty United Nations agencies plus vember 2005. Whatever justifications were offered after- the World Bank and World Trade Organisation. An Execu- wards, this resulted from unwillingness within the UN sys- tive Secretariat was established at the ITU in Geneva and tem to choose between two competing offers to host the staffed substantially through ITU personnel. summit. Some advantages could be claimed for this arrangement - for example, a division of work between Two factors, here, were of particular significance. Firstly, phases devoted to (a) principles and (b) implementation - there was, initially in particular, a tension between the pri- and enthusiasts for WSIS made the most of these. Others marily technological approach to the Summit espoused by cited disadvantages - the scope for deferment of decisions the ITU, and the more developmental approach of UN agen- at the end of the first phase, a particular concern in such a cies with wider developmental roles. Most interviewees who rapidly moving development sector, and the increased cost were engaged in this process felt that the wider UN family for the UN system and all summit participants. had successfully shifted the emphasis in WSIS’ formal objectives from “the development of telecommunications” The second distinctive feature, cited by UN Secretary-Gen- eral Kofi Annan in his opening speech to the Geneva summit, was the topic under consideration: “This summit is 5 Resolution 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, 1998, available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html. unique,” he said. “Where most global conferences focus

Section A . Background 23 on global threats, this one will consider how best to use a Both phases of the Summit – those leading up to Geneva new global asset.”6 in December 2003 and Tunis in November 2005 - were built around series of regional and global preparatory meetings. Although his speech actually dwelt on the “digital divide” The first phase included five regional meetings, held as (a problem) rather than on “digital opportunity”, this re- follows: mark raises a significant question about the efficacy of UN summits, in particular whether they are as useful in deal- • African region, held in Mali, May 2002 ing with opportunities (particularly fast-moving ones or • Pan-European region, held in Romania, November ones that have developed outside the established param- 2002 eters of international governance) as they are in dealing • Asia-Pacific region, held in Japan, January 2003 with problems. This question is considered in Chapter 4. • Latin American and Caribbean region, held in the Do- Certainly, much of the second phase of the summit was minican Republic, January 2003 concerned with specific problems, rather than opportuni- • Western Asia [Middle East] region, held in Lebanon, ties – specifically, with the difficulty of financing ICT de- 2003. ployment and with the absence of traditional governance mechanisms for the Internet (the latter seen as a problem An assessment of the African regional conference is in- by many governments, but as a positive advantage by cluded in Chapter 6. some other participants). However, the public ethos of WSIS was strongly positive about the perceived benefits More important than these regional conferences, however, of ICTs for development. It marked a highpoint - and, it was the series of preparatory committees, or PrepComs, may turn out (see Chapter 5), the beginning of a downturn held in Geneva, which were the primary negotiating fora - in the enthusiasm for ICTs as a, if not the, key instrument for the Summit texts: the space within which commitments for economic and social development which had emerged were agreed and where contentious issues were disputed. within parts of the ICT professional and development com- Three PrepComs were scheduled: in July 2002, February munities during the preceding five years.7 2003 and September 2003, though the third PrepCom had to be reconvened twice, in November 2003 and immedi- ately before the Geneva summit meeting in December Summit processes 2003, in order to deal with unresolved issues. An “intersessional meeting” and an “informal meeting on World summits are complex and lengthy processes. While content and themes” were also held in Paris in July 2003 the media often give the impression that key decisions are and Geneva in September 2003 respectively, in an attempt taken at the actual summit meetings themselves, the final to expedite agreement.8 summit meetings are in reality little more than opportunities for heads of government to make formal commitments, Within the negotiating process, a system of formal and in speech and signature, to agreements that have been informal caucuses brought together groups with common reached during months of prior negotiations (though they interests - whether governments (for example, in Africa), also provide the opportunity to reach some form of con- civil society advocates (for example, on gender issues) or sensus at the highest level on issues that have proved ut- loose issue-oriented associations (such as the Internet terly intractable in negotiations). The WSIS process was Governance caucus). Caucuses discussed and promoted perhaps more elaborate than most because of its two- draft text, seeking to incorporate their ideas and language phase structure. into the documents under discussion at the inter-governmental level. They also coordinated lobbying on their issues of concern. Much of the effectiveness of participants The first summit phase in the summit as a whole depended on the skills and resources available to them for this caucusing activity. The first summit phase began with the establishment of a WSIS Executive Secretariat, within the ITU, in 2001. This These PrepComs were the primary arenas in which WSIS secretariat, including ITU and other personnel, developed issues were contested. The first of them brought to the a preparatory process aimed at negotiating the Summit’s fore two critical issues which were to remain contentious output documents through a process of engagement, con- throughout the first summit phase: the participation of non- sultation and negotiation. governmental actors in the negotiating process, and the relationship between human rights, freedoms of information and expression and the information society. Indeed,

6 The Secretary-General’s speech is at www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/ coverage/statements/opening/annan.html. 7 This enthusiasm might be dated from the Kananaskis OECD (Organisa- tion for Economic Cooperation and Development) summit in 2000, 8 Records of the first phase preparatory meetings can be accessed at which launched the G8 Digital Opportunity Task Force or DOT Force. www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory/index.html.

24 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? much of the time of the first two PrepComs was taken up rights and freedoms of expression in the proposed sum- not with issues of substance but with the question of who mit texts while others (notably the European Union, the should have the right to take part in discussing them. Nordic countries and Canada) sought to maintain them. In the event, human rights language was included in the Ge- The key issue here was the nature of international deci- neva texts, with some limiting references to national cir- sion-making. The United Nations and its family of agen- cumstances and cultures, while UN Secretary-General Kofi cies are inter-governmental in character, set up to enable Annan emphasised in his opening speech that “the right governments to coordinate activities and resolve disputes to freedom of opinion and expression is fundamental to amongst themselves, not to engage in debate with non- development, democracy and peace, and must remain a governmental entities. This inter-governmental character touchstone for our work ahead.”9 has been jealously guarded by many governments, particularly those of post-colonial countries which have seen The main development text of the Geneva output docu- equal participation in UN bodies as an important symbol ments was formulated through an iterative process dur- of nationhood. Over the years, however, non-governmen- ing the course of the first summit phase. The ITU invited tal organisations have gained some space within UN sum- governments to submit ideas about the role of ICTs in de- mit processes - initially through the UN’s formal mecha- velopment, and these were incorporated in a draft text, nism for civil society representation, the Economic and which was then refined in negotiation. This process has Social Council (ECOSOC); latterly, in some cases, through its problems. Communications ministries were not neces- more innovative means. Some UN agencies have paid sub- sarily the right agencies to put forward development is- stantial attention to civil society organisations in their own sues, and not all of them discussed their input with devel- work, while others - including the ITU - have had to create opment ministries. Geneva-based diplomats, too, lacked increasing space for the private sector as it has taken on expertise in development issues, however skilled they roles previously considered provinces of government. might be at negotiating texts. While the texts that were negotiated could be seen as comprehensive in scope and The dispute over non-governmental representation was a were relatively uncontested in detail, they have been criti- continuous undercurrent throughout the WSIS process. cised, not least (in private) by many of those involved in Some governments, mostly from developing countries, their negotiation, for the following reasons: were implacably opposed to any non-governmental agencies participating in or even being present during negotia- a. That they are aspirational in tone, unprioritised and tions. Others, mostly industrialised countries, were either over-optimistic about the potential for ICTs to trans- relaxed or positive about private sector and civil society form society involvement. Tensions frequently boiled over. Civil society b. That they are focused on the supply of technology and the private sector shared a common set of interests in rather than demand-driven, grassroots development representation, even though their views on content often objectives differed, and were able to secure limited speaking rights. c. That they are insufficiently integrated with the UN sys- However, their more effective participation lay behind the tem’s key international development agreements - the scenes, in liaising with sympathetic official delegates and Millennium Development Goals (which are referenced seeking to nuance debate in the directions that they fa- significantly in the Geneva texts) and the Monterrey voured. In the event, there was significantly more multi- Consensus on the overall development, trade and aid stakeholder participation in WSIS than in previous UN relationship – and with the outcome documents of summits, and multistakeholder principles were supported other social summits. in both Geneva and Tunis outcome documents. While there was relatively little argument over aspirational Human rights and freedoms of expression were also context during the first summit negotiations, there was sub- tentious throughout the summit process. It has become stantial argument over its implications, in particular where conventional for UN summit declarations to reaffirm core the allocation of development funds was concerned. In- principles derived from previous UN statements, including deed, disputes over financing mechanisms almost pre- the freedom of expression principles set out in Article 19 vented agreement being reached on draft texts before the of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Some gov- opening session of the Geneva summit in December 2003. ernments have been unenthusiastic about this repetition of human rights language and its implications for summit The critical point of dispute here was a proposal for a Dig- declarations. This issue was more than usually significant ital Solidarity Fund (DSF), a new UN fund specifically dedi- in WSIS because of the obvious relationship between the cated to financing ICT infrastructure and applications, information society, ICTs and freedoms of expression, and which was put forward by the President of Senegal, because of earlier UN debates about the meaning of a Abdoulaye Wade. This attracted extensive African and “right to communicate”. A few governments (notably Chi- na’s) sought to omit or constrain references to human 9 www.itu.int/wsis/geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.

Section A . Background 25 some other developing country support, reinforced per- processes established by the UN system - processes which haps by the fact that participation in WSIS delegations and give governments authority and which, at least in theory, the development of WSIS policies were led by communi- give weak governments and governments of smaller states cations ministries rather than those with broad responsi- an equal say with those that are more powerful or more bility for the allocation of national development resources secure. Many participants in the WSIS process also as- (such as ministries of finance and economic planning). sumed, wrongly, that one Internet governance body, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers Donor countries, however, were almost unanimously op- (ICANN), had far more wide-ranging powers to govern the posed to the DSF proposal. They were unconvinced that a Internet than are actually within its remit. new mechanism was either needed or desirable; indeed, it conflicted with their general view that ICTs should be These issues were complicated by the history of the mainstreamed within development (i.e. inserted into Internet, in particular its origins in the United States’ mili- health, education, agriculture and other mainstream pro- tary and academic community. As a result of this history, grammes) rather than treated as a sector in itself. They key Internet institutions (such as ICANN) and facilities were unconvinced that development funds should be di- (such as the root server system) were located in the US verted into ICTs from other areas of development activity, and, to many, appeared therefore to be subject to US con- particularly as demand for this was not coming from de- trol - an impression that was strengthened rather than velopment ministries or apparent in either the Millennium weakened by US officials’ unwillingness to recognise the Development Goals or the Poverty Reduction Strategies basis for other governments’ concern. The Bush adminis- being negotiated by many Least Developed Countries. Fi- tration’s controversial interventions in international politi- nally, they were unconvinced that a new UN agency would cal and economic affairs – particularly, many interviewees spend resources in this area more effectively than the ex- observed, the Iraq war which began in March 2003 - helped isting mechanisms which they supported, including their to politicise this issue, making it, for some countries and own bilateral programmes. participants, as much about the United States as about the Internet itself: it certainly provided a vehicle for anti- This dispute took the third PrepCom of the first summit Americanism. As with financing mechanisms, Internet gov- phase to the brink, minutes from the close of negotiations. ernance issues proved too intractable for resolution dur- Only at the very last minute, at the insistence of the Swiss ing the first phase of the summit and the final PrepCom PrepCom chair, did the proponents of the DSF back down agreed to defer them to a working group that would meet and agree to the establishment of a Task Force to investi- between the first and second summit phases. gate the need for such a fund rather than force a dispute in the summit itself over whether one should be established. Geneva summit output documents The other major dispute during the first summit phase - Having negotiated these last-minute crises, the Geneva which became the major issue during the second phase - summit was held, amid an air of some relief, in December concerned the governance of the Internet. 2003. For many participants, particularly from civil soci- The question of Internet governance has many facets, and ety, the most important or useful dimension was the space was the subject of much misunderstanding during the WSIS that Geneva provided for networking, including a success- period. One dimension of this was the fact that the Internet’s ful exhibition and meeting area known as the ICT for De- 10 emergence as a significant social and economic force had velopment Platform. This “summit fringe” is reviewed in occurred outside the framework of traditional inter-govern- Chapter 7 of this report. mental authority. Much of the Internet was and is un- The first phase of the summit ended with the publication governed; much of what it is today was developed by those of two core documents: the Geneva Declaration of Princi- who were suspicious of government and capable of using ples and the Geneva Plan of Action. As implied above, these Internet technologies to bypass any that might be imposed documents were the outcome of protracted negotiations on it; much of the governance that does exist (managing during the first phase PrepComs, and only finally agreed, resources such as domain names, developing protocols, at a specially reconvened PrepCom, with minutes to spare etc.) is based on participative rather than inter-governmen- before midnight on the day before the summit opened. tal models, very different from those within the UN system. Many people - including many in the Internet community The Declaration of Principles111111 is an aspirational text which itself, the private sector and industrial countries in par- incorporates different, sometimes contradictory, visions ticular - believe the Internet’s dynamism to be dependent on this very lack of governance. Others, particularly developing country governments, have been wary of some- 10 See www.ict-4d.org/about.htm. thing highly unpredictable and uncontrolled and feel that 11 The Declaration of Principles is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/ it should be brought within the conventional governance documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|0.

26 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? of the role of ICTs and the nature of an information soci- Goals (MDGs) agreed by the UN General Assembly in 2000, ety. Its oft-quoted opening words are these: and establish coherent follow-up mechanisms for the summit as a whole. This section of the Declaration included a We, the representatives of the peoples of the world … de- compromise statement on the Digital Solidarity Fund issue clare our common desire and commitment to build a peo- which had almost broken the summit during its final ple-centred, inclusive and development-oriented Informa- PrepCom meeting, and which referred back to the Geneva tion Society, where everyone can create, access, utilize and Principle described above. share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in … while appreciating ongoing ICT cooperation through promoting their sustainable development and improving various mechanisms, we invite all stakeholders to commit their quality of life.12 to the “Digital Solidarity Agenda” set forth in the Plan of Action. We are convinced that the worldwide agreed ob- It places this aspirational vision - which does not refer di- jective is to contribute to bridge the digital divide, pro- rectly in this opening to technology - within the context of mote access to ICTs, create digital opportunities, and ben- established UN agreements, from the Universal Declara- efit from the potential offered by ICTs for development.15 tion of Human Rights to the Millennium Declaration (which sets out the world community’s targets for poverty reduc- The Declaration of Principles also invited the UN Secre- tion, the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs). The tary-General to set up a working group on Internet gov- limits of ICTs’ potential are acknowledged but within a ernance, one of the two key fora addressing highly con- highly positive endorsement of their role: troversial issues between the first and second phases of the summit. We are aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and not as an end in themselves. Under favourable conditions, The stated purpose of the Geneva Plan of Action161616 was to: these technologies can be a powerful instrument, increas- [translate] the common vision and guiding principles of ing productivity, generating economic growth, job creation the Declaration … into concrete action lines to advance the and employability and improving the quality of life of all. achievement of the internationally-agreed development They can also promote dialogue among people, nations goals, including those in the Millennium Declaration, the and civilizations.13 Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Declaration The Declaration as a whole works through the implications and Plan of Implementation, by promoting the use of ICT- of these aspirations in different areas of activity, each of based products, networks, services and applications, and 17 which is subsequently developed in the associated Plan to help countries overcome the digital divide. of Action. It is notable that this first paragraph of the Plan of Action, Two significant operational or process principles were also unlike that of the Declaration of Principles, has an explic- adopted in the Declaration. itly technological focus. Indeed, the Plan of Action as a whole refers predominantly to ICTs rather than the infor- Firstly, the Declaration established a commitment to multi- mation society as its objective. stakeholder participation, which became known as the Geneva Principle: The Plan of Action sets out a number of “indicative targets [which] may serve as global references for improving con- We recognize that building an inclusive Information Soci- nectivity and access in the use of ICTs, … to be achieved by ety requires new forms of solidarity, partnership and co- 2015,” the target date also set for the majority of the MDGs. operation among governments and other stakeholders, i.e. These targets18 (listed in the box below) set both techno- the private sector, civil society and international organiza- logical and developmental goals, but these are less pre- tions. Realizing that the ambitious goal of this Declara- cise than those set in the MDGs - there is, for example, no tion - bridging the digital divide and ensuring harmonious, definition of what level or quality of “connectivity” is im- fair and equitable development for all - will require strong plied, or of what, precisely, “access” means. commitment by all stakeholders, we call for digital solidarity, both at national and international levels.14

Secondly, the Declaration included a commitment to cooperative international action to achieve the principles contained within it, relate these to the Millennium Development

15 ibid., section B11, article 61. 16 The Plan of Action is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/ 12 Declaration of Principles, 2003, section A, article 1. doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1160|0. 13 ibid., section A, article 9. 17 Geneva Plan of Action, 2003, section A, article 1. 14 ibid., section A, article 17. 18 ibid., section B, article 6.

Section A . Background 27 8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic diversity and local content GENEVA PLAN OF ACTION TARGETS FOR ACHIEVEMENT BY 2015 9. Media a. to connect villages with ICTs and establish 10. Ethical dimensions of the Information Society community access points; 11. International and regional cooperation.19 b. to connect universities, colleges, secondary These action lines eventually formed the basis for the WSIS schools and primary schools with ICTs; follow-up process agreed two years later in Tunis. c. to connect scientific and research centres with The text of much of the Plan of Action derived initially from ICTs; suggestions submitted by governments to the ITU, text re- d. to connect public libraries, cultural centres, lating to which was developed and agreed in negotiating museums, post offices and archives with ICTs; fora. The strength of this process is its inclusiveness, at e. to connect health centres and hospitals with least where those invited to participate are concerned. Its ICTs; weakness is a lack of prioritisation and as a result (as is often the case with such documents) these Plan of Action f. to connect all local and central government de- sections tend to list aspirations rather than establishing partments and establish websites and email the basis for an implementation programme. The section addresses; on capacity-building, for example, contains sixteen item- g. to adapt all primary and secondary school cur- ised points; that on the enabling environment eighteen. ricula to meet the challenges of the Informa- tion Society, taking into account national cir- In addition, much less attention was paid to the potential cumstances; downsides of information technology, than to its opportunities: there are a few words only, for example, on spam; h. to ensure that all of the world’s population very little on the use of ICTs in cyber or conventional crime; have access to television and radio services; nothing on the potential use of ICTs for government sur- i. to encourage the development of content and veillance and control. to put in place technical conditions in order to From the perspective of this study, two sections of the Plan facilitate the presence and use of all world lan- of Action are particularly important, those elaborating on guages on the Internet; the multistakeholder process and on the international j. to ensure that more than half the world’s inhab- “solidarity”/policy development agenda. itants have access to ICTs within their reach. The Plan of Action builds on the Declaration’s Geneva Prin- ciple by allocating roles to stakeholders, as follows:

The Plan of Action then describes a series of action lines a. Governments have a leading role in developing and in the following areas, each building on principles set out implementing comprehensive, forward looking and in the Declaration: sustainable national e-strategies. The private sector 1. The role of governments and all stakeholders in the and civil society, in dialogue with governments, have promotion of ICTs for development an important consultative role to play in devising national e-strategies. 2. Information and communication infrastructure: an essential foundation for the Information Society b. The commitment of the private sector is important in developing and diffusing information and communi- 3. Access to information and knowledge cation technologies (ICTs), for infrastructure, content 4. Capacity building and applications. The private sector is not only a mar- 5. Building confidence and security in the use of ICTs (in- ket player but also plays a role in a wider sustainable cluding such issues as privacy, information security development context. and spam) c. The commitment and involvement of civil society is 6. The enabling environment (both that required for ef- equally important in creating an equitable Information fective deployment of ICTs and that potentially facili- Society, and in implementing ICT-related initiatives for tated by ICTs) development. 7. ICT applications: benefits in all aspects of life - with d. International and regional institutions, including in- sections of text devoted to e-government, e-business, ternational financial institutions, have a key role in e-learning, e-health, e-employment, e-environment, e-

agriculture and e-science 19 ibid., section C.

28 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? integrating the use of ICTs in the development proc- The preparatory process for the second phase of the sum- ess and making available necessary resources for mit followed the model set during the first. Once again, a building the Information Society and for the evalua- series of regional meetings was held to enable prior dis- tion of the progress made.20 cussion of issues at a “continental” level (though this time the European region did not bother with a regional This statement of roles represents a compromise rather event):22 than a consensus - a form of words acceptable to those wishing to promote and those preferring to restrict multi- • Western Asia (Syria, November 2004) stakeholder participation in decision-making. Its implica- • Africa (Ghana, February 2005) tions are considered in Chapter 4. • Asia-Pacific (Iran, May/June 2005) The “Digital Solidarity Agenda” was also developed by the • Latin America and the Caribbean (Brazil, June 2005). Plan of Action. Again, the text here represented a compromise between advocates of special funding for ICT/ICD With the agenda focused on a small number of specific activities (the proponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund) issues, the organisers also encouraged thematic rather and donors concerned to mainstream ICTs in development than regional discussion. rather than to give them special status. It announced the Substantive negotiations again took place through a se- establishment of a Task Force on Financial Mechanisms, ries of PrepComs, held in Hammamet, Tunisia in June 2004 to work under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General; and in Geneva in February and September 2005. This time, and set up procedures for the development of benchmarks however, the work of the PrepComs was more structured, of ICT activity, including “a composite ICT Development being built around the work of three smaller-scale fora (Digital Opportunity) Index”.21 which fed their work into the PrepCom system. These interim fora are described in the following sections. The second summit phase - from Geneva, December 2003 to Tunis, November 2005 Interim fora The outcome of the first phase of the summit might be The first and least known of these three fora was the GroupGroupGroup summarised, therefore, as follows: of Friends of the ChairChair. This Group, made up of govern- a. Broad principles were agreed, which might be taken ment representatives from six countries in each region plus as defining an international consensus on the infor- regional coordinators and representatives of the ITU, the mation society. This was ambitious and aspirational UN Secretary-General and the two host countries, was set in tone, with little implementation detail. With the ex- up by the first PrepCom of the second phase with the re- ception of the “digital divide”, it focused almost en- mit of developing the documentary basis for negotiations tirely on “digital opportunities” and paid little atten- during that phase. Its critical role lay in developing what tion to major problems arising in the information and was known as the “political chapeau”, the basis of the ul- ICT sectors. timately agreed Tunis Commitment which set out the agreed ethos and vision of the WSIS project. Important b. Compromise was reached on texts concerning conten- issues of debate within this context included the status tious issues of human rights and freedoms of infor- within the second phase of the text agreed in Geneva and mation and expression. However, these issues re- the nature of the follow-up process to WSIS after Tunis. mained unresolved and continued to provide an undercurrent of dissension during the second phase, Much more contentious, at least initially, were the two in- exacerbated by tensions over human rights and free- dependent fora established by the UN Secretary-General, dom of expression within its host country, Tunisia. at the request of the Geneva phase of the summit, to resolve critical issues that could not be resolved in Geneva - c. The two major issues of controversy during the first the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms and the Working phase - financing mechanisms (and particularly the Group on Internet Governance. These interim fora played proposed Digital Solidarity Fund) and Internet govern- an important - in many ways crucial - role in the evolution of ance - were referred to interim fora under the auspices WSIS overall. Both, significantly, addressed problems - of of the UN Secretary-General, with a remit to report infrastructure finance and of Internet governance - rather back to the second phase of the summit through its than the opportunities that Secretary-General Annan had preparatory process. represented as characterising the summit overall in his opening address in Geneva. They were, however, substantially different in the means they adopted to address these.

20 ibid., section A, article 3. 22 Records of the second phase preparatory meetings 21 ibid., section E, article 28.a. can be accessed at www.itu.int/wsis/preparatory2/index.html.

Section A . Background 29 The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms (TFFM) was the capacity of governments and donors to invest. Less atten- earlier of these independent fora to report. As noted above, tion has been paid to applications development and ca- intense argument had centred during the first phase of the pacity-building, and more investment is needed here - with summit around a proposal to establish a Digital Solidarity more donor involvement - if the benefits of ICTs are to be Fund which would focus international resources on the fully realised. “digital divide”. Donor countries strongly resisted the idea of establishing a new ICT-specific international fund, be- Based on this analysis, the Task Force drew the following lieving that development resources should be allocated conclusions: within rather than outside the Monterrey Consensus, that 1. It recommended governments to maximise the attrac- existing resources for ICT investment were both sufficient tiveness of their environments to private sector infra- and underutilised, and that a separate funding arrange- structure investment, as the best way of securing re- ment for ICTs was difficult to reconcile with their main- sources to extend network access and service provision. streaming approach to ICD. 2. It recommended improvements to processes enabling The remit of the TFFM, agreed in Geneva, reflected these ICD applications and initiatives, including greater pool- priorities: the Task Force was to review the adequacy of ing of requirements and experience-sharing. existing financial mechanisms, and to propose “improve- 3. It called for innovative approaches to finance investment ments and innovations of financing mechanisms” in the in more difficult areas such as those which are geo- light of that review - including “the effectiveness, the fea- graphically remote, and to meet new, more expensive sibility and the creation of a voluntary Digital Solidarity but potentially productive challenges such as regional Fund.”23 infrastructure and broadband network deployment. The structure of the Task Force, unlike that of the parallel 4. It suggested a range of “improvements and innova- Working Group on Internet Governance (see below) was tions” to existing financing mechanisms, including comparable with many similar UN task forces and working better coordination of institutional funds, multistake- groups before it. Organised by the UNDP with support from holder partnerships and more effective use of domes- other multilateral agencies, it met only twice, relying sub- tic finance. stantially on the work of consultants rather than engaging directly in analysis itself. Unlike WSIS, where delegations The downgraded Digital Solidarity Fund won the barest of were led by diplomats and telecoms sector specialists, the endorsements from a report which firmly emphasised “the Task Force had substantial representation from mainstream context of available financing for the broader set of devel- development sectors in both donor and developing coun- opment agendas and goals,”25 including the Monterrey tries, and this difference is evident from a report which is Consensus and the Millennium Declaration, and the im- much more reflective of mainstream development thinking portance at a national level of incorporating ICD within Pov- than the Geneva Declaration and Plan of Action. Member- erty Reduction Strategies and similar national develop- ship of the Task Force is listed in Annex 2. ment programmes.

Its report24 begins by noting both the innovation and the The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was dynamism of the ICT sector, and its subsequent line of ar- more innovative in both membership and process than the gument can be summarised as follows. Enabling ICT infra- Task Force on Financial Mechanisms. Chaired by the UN structure to be deployed and enabling it to support devel- Secretary-General’s Special Adviser for WSIS, Nitin Desai, opment activity both depend heavily on the environment it brought together a wide range of people from govern- for innovation, investment, business development and ment, private sector and civil society and included diverse service provision. In practice, infrastructure investment has Internet expertise. Civil society participants were chosen moved from traditional public (government and multilat- through a process of dialogue with civil society organisa- eral agency) sources in the 1980s to the private sector in tions, which submitted a list of suggested members al- the 1990s, benefiting from deregulation of telecoms mar- most all of whom were accepted. Membership (which is kets. Though Northern investment has fallen significantly listed in Annex 2) was also geographically extensive and since 1999, there has been an increase in Southern invest- inclusive. However, WGIG members acted as individuals, ment and in innovative multistakeholder partnerships - not as representatives of any interest group, government trends that should be encouraged as the investment re- or agency. They met four times in formal session, holding quirements for broadband, in particular, greatly exceed the public sessions open to participation by all-comers and so enabling much more extensive engagement with their work by the private sector, civil society and the Internet 23 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f. community than is generally the case in comparable fora. 24 The report of the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/ doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1372|1376|1425|1377. 25 TFFM report, 2004, section C2, p. 10.

30 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? WGIG members focused in teams on issues of particular d. Issues relating to the developmental aspects of interest to them, doing much of their work in online dia- Internet governance, in particular capacity-building in logue, supported by an expert secretariat. Participants in developing countries.31 the WGIG interviewed for this report generally felt very The report commented on issues in categories b., c. and positive about its processes and about their ability to par- d., but its most important work concerned issues relating ticipate – as, indeed, did interviewees on the margins who to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet wanted to get their point of view across through the pub- resources - the issues that lay at the heart of the concerns lic sessions organised by the WGIG. raised during the first summit process, especially over the The remit given to the WGIG in the Geneva Plan of Action United States’ role and responsibilities. was that it should: Although it attempted to divide roles and responsibilities i. develop a working definition of Internet governance; between different stakeholders, the WGIG’s lists of these ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to are less clear-cut than the text later adopted in Tunis (see Internet governance; below). At the heart of its report, however, lie three principles derived from the Geneva Declaration of Principles, iii. develop a common understanding of the respective which formed the basis for much of the subsequent debate: roles and responsibilities of governments, existing intergovernmental and international organisations and ¥ No single Government should have a pre-eminent role other forums as well as the private sector and civil so- in relation to international Internet governance. ciety from both developing and developed countries; • The organizational form for the governance function iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity … for will be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.26 the full involvement of Governments, the private sector, civil society and international organisations. The WGIG report,27 agreed in June 2005, succinctly re- • The organizational form for the governance function sponds to the first three of these objectives, with the more will involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovern- contentious material it might have contained relegated to mental and international organizations within their a subsidiary “background report”.28 Internet governance respective roles.32 is defined as follows: Internet governance is the development and applica- Alongside these principles, the WGIG agreed that there tion by Governments, the private sector and civil soci- were “two overarching prerequisites to enhance the legiti- ety, in their respective roles, of shared principles, macy of Internet governance processes”: norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and pro- • The effective and meaningful participation of all stake- grammes that shape the evolution and use of the holders, especially from developing countries. Internet.29 • The building of sufficient capacity in developing coun- This definition found its way into the Tunis Agenda, the tries, in terms of knowledge and of human, financial final WSIS report.30 and technical resources.33

The WGIG divided public policy issues relevant to Internet The WGIG was not able to agree on a model for oversight of governance into four categories: the Internet on this basis - the issue was too controversial - but it was able to put forward four alternative models as a. Issues relating to infrastructure and the management the basis for future discussion in WSIS itself. These were: of critical Internet resources (such as the domain name and root server systems) 1. A Global Internet Council, “anchored” in the United Nations, consisting of government representatives, b. Issues relating to the use of the Internet (such as spam, which would take over the functions currently man- network security and cybercrime) aged by ICANN, plus many of the policy and other re- c. Issues that are relevant to the Internet but have an sponsibilities in categories b., c. and d. above (a model impact which is much wider … and for which existing characterised in much media discussion as the UN tak- organisations are responsible (such as intellectual ing over the Internet). property and international trade) 2. No specific oversight organisation but perhaps an enhanced Governmental Advisory Committee in ICANN.

26 Geneva Plan of Action, section C6, article 13. 27 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.doc. 28 Available from: www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc. 31 WGIG report, section III, para. 13. 29 WGIG report, section II, para. 10. 32 ibid., section V, para. 48. 30 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, article 34. 33 ibid., section V, para. 74.

Section A . Background 31 3. An International Internet Council (independent of the Subcommittee B with everything else before the Summit. UN) to perform the functions currently undertaken by PrepCom 3 needed to be reconvened twice, as the date of ICANN and perhaps any other public policy functions the Tunis summit drew near, to consider the remaining con- that did not fall within the remits of other intergovern- tentious issues concerning Internet governance and fol- mental organisations. low-up activities and, as in Geneva, final resolution of these 4. A complex multiple governance model including a gov- was not reached until the last evening before the summit ernment-led Global Internet Policy Council, a private- was due to begin. sector-led replacement for ICANN (WICANN), and a One of the key issues at the start of the second phase was Global Internet Governance Forum involving govern- the determination of a number of countries that issues ments, the private sector and civil society on an equal dealt with in the text of the Geneva documents should not 34 footing. be reopened - that the summit should move on, as the Eu- ropean Union put it, “from principles to action”, rather than Finally, whatever oversight arrangements might emerge reverting to the disputes over rights, for example, that had from WSIS, the WGIG proposed the creation of a “global been “resolved” in 2003. Once that principle was estab- multi-stakeholder forum to address Internet-related published, the second phase could focus on three main issues: lic policy issues.”35 As well as including non-governmen- financing mechanisms, Internet governance and the fol- tal stakeholders, this would be more inclusive of develop- low-up and implementation of WSIS output documents. ing countries. It would provide a space within which a wide range of Internet-related issues could be discussed and The text on general principles of ICD, within the political developed, but would not have decision-making powers. chapeau, was not particularly contentious, and these over- This proposal forms the basis for the Internet Governance all ICD issues were therefore relatively little discussed dur- Forum that was ultimately agreed in Tunis. ing the second phase. Among significant developments in this area in the long term may be efforts to establish bench- The second summit PrepComs marks for measuring ICD activities, including the ITU’s de- and Tunis summit velopment of a (rather telecoms- and Internet-focused) Digital Opportunity Index. A stocktaking exercise, intended The negotiating process for the second phase of the sum- to assess progress in ICD developments since the Geneva mit closely resembled that for the first, at least in method- meeting, provided little more than a list of initiatives re- ology. Texts were negotiated in PrepComs by national del- ported to the WSIS secretariat, rather than a substantive egations in which diplomats, particularly those from Ge- basis for measuring action in the round. neva missions, tended to play the leading role. Diplomats aside, most national delegations continued to be domi- As it happened, the second phase of the summit coincided nated by communications ministries and telecoms sector with a review of the Millennium Development Goals held specialists. Private sector and civil society representatives by the United Nations in September 2005, but the were still only allocated a marginal role in formal negotia- synergies between the two were few. ICTs featured little in tions (but did have limited speaking rights), though both the reviews of MDG issues by the Millennium Project and played significant roles in caucusing and developing texts barely at all in the review of progress towards achieving 36 outside the formal process, and gained networking value, MDGs in the UNDP’s Human Development Report. Little too, as a result. Some interviewees suggested that the pri- was said at the Millennium review summit itself about vate sector was significantly more apparent during phase them, though a certain degree of interaction had been two than it had been during phase one. established in the Geneva documents, for example in making the terminal dates for WSIS targets consistent with the There were, however, substantial differences in the way 2015 objectives of the Millennium Declaration. that the second phase was conducted. PrepCom 1, in June The second PrepCom, in February 2005, focused on and 2004, set the scene for the overall process and established effectively resolved the issues concerning financing the Group of Friends of the Chair. PrepCom 2, it was agreed mechanisms, at least so far as the WSIS process was con- in advance, would focus on financing mechanisms and cerned. Issues which had proved deeply divisive at the end PrepCom 3 on Internet governance. This sequencing of is- of the first phase were barely raised again after that point. sues, built around the work of the three interim fora, had In effect, the PrepCom agreed the conclusions of the Task significant implications for the nature of the second phase Force on Financial Mechanisms, and no new mechanisms debate. As the negotiating process continued, PrepComs were established to finance ICT or ICD activities. The Digital divided much of their energies into two subcommittees - Subcommittee A dealing with Internet governance and 36 See the reports of the Millennium Project at www.unmillenniumproject.org/, and UNDP, Human Development Report 2005 - International cooperation at a crossroads: 34 ibid., section V, paras. 52-71. Aid, trade and security in an unequal world, at hdr.undp.org/reports/ 35 ibid., section V, para. 40. global/2005.

32 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Solidarity Fund became a small, voluntary body - estab- holder participation in the proposed Internet Governance lished enough to avoid embarrassment but in a form and Forum. It was difficult even for participants to see, at the on a scale unlikely to have much impact on overall devel- end of the day, exactly who had won or lost what in this opment activity. Critical to this outcome was an agreement particular debate. reached during the African regional meeting, just before the second PrepCom, in which key multilateral agencies, The final issue of contention was follow-up activity. Here including the World Bank and the European Commission, again, industrial countries were anxious to avoid the crea- agreed to support regional infrastructure development in tion of elaborate new institutions. The compromise reached Africa - perhaps the first stage in a rethinking of the role of was one that involved many UN agencies but left the ques- multilateral agencies in ICT infrastructure finance since tion of control - and the potential for turf battles within the donors and the international financial institutions effec- UN system - unresolved. As with the Internet Governance tively withdrew from this area in the early 1990s. Forum, much will depend on what happens next.

By far the most contested area of discussion during the The Tunis phase outputs second summit phase was that of Internet governance, which threatened - like the Digital Solidarity Fund during As with the Geneva phase of the summit, the Tunis phase the Geneva phase - to prevent agreement being reached generated two outcome documents, the Tunis Commit- on a final set of outcome documents. Given the amount of ment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. time devoted to Internet governance, and the way in which 37 international media covered WSIS 2 when it finally took The Tunis Commitment begins by reaffirming the con- place, the Tunis event looked and felt at times more like a tent and positions taken in the Geneva Declaration of Prin- world summit on Internet governance than on the infor- ciples and Plan of Action, and restates the positive view of mation society. ICTs as an instrument of social and economic development - of “progress”, its authors might have said - which is ar- The WGIG report was not received with the same air of con- ticulated at greater length in the Geneva Declaration of sensus as that from the TFFM; indeed, some interviewees Principles. Also reaffirmed were the special commitments (who disagreed with the tone of the WGIG) questioned made to particular geopolitical and social groups (devel- whether it had any impact at all on the subsequent debate. oping countries, small island states, women, young peo- The United States was adamant that the WGIG report should ple, indigenous communities, etc.). not provide a basis for negotiation, though it was in practice discussed substantially by Subcommittee A. Overall, Language here was not uncontested: there was renewed most interviewees believed, the WGIG report did have a sig- discussion, for example, about the roles of different stake- nificant impact. It provided perhaps the first clear defini- holders; continued discussion about the nature of refer- tion of Internet governance and sorted some of the ques- ences to terrorism, cybercrime and the relationship between tions arising from the Internet into a coherent order - not proprietary and open source software; strengthened lan- necessarily one that everyone agreed with, but one that guage concerning child abuse. The digital solidarity agenda helped develop a common understanding and a common was placed squarely in the context of debt relief and trade framework for negotiations. While its suggested models for reform as well as financial assistance. But, in essence, the Internet governance were not particularly influential, the po- Commitment is a restatement of the values and principles liticised nature of the debate around oversight perhaps established in Geneva in briefer and more general terms. meant that no recommendations on this theme would have The stated purpose of the Tunis Agenda38 was to move withstood negotiations. One of the most substantive out- from principles to action. It concentrates on the three core comes of the summit on Internet governance, the creation areas of focus for the summit’s second phase: financing of an Internet Governance Forum, can be seen as a direct mechanisms, Internet governance and the follow-up and outcome of a proposal made by the WGIG. implementation of WSIS outcomes. Negotiations in Subcommittee A of the remaining PrepComs As noted above, the text on financing mechanisms was were intense and fraught. A small number of large develop- agreed by the end of PrepCom 2 and discussion on this was ing countries - some acting as a “like-minded” bloc - led the not reopened later in the Tunis phase. The text concerned attack on the status quo, particularly perceived United was closely modelled on the conclusions of the Task Force States control of ICANN and the root server system. The on Financial Mechanisms. It affirms the importance of ICT United States and a group of supporting countries resisted. investment but in instrumental rather than aspirational The European Union took a third line, widely seen as a break with the United States, built around “enhanced cooperation” of Internet governance processes. Civil society focused 37 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/ doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2266%7C0. resources, not unsuccessfully, on seeking to secure, and 38 Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/ then to broaden the remit and the scope for multistake- doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2267%7C0.

Section A . Background 33 terms. It places this investment firmly within the context The inelegance of this second paragraph betrays its ori- of wider development investment and of agreed develop- gins in textual compromise. Parts of the text on Internet ment instruments such as the Monterrey Consensus; sug- governance were fought over word by word and phrase by gests ways in which existing investment sources could be phrase. That which was finally agreed recognised: more effectively coordinated and/or used; urges, encour- that the existing arrangements for Internet governance ages and supports ways of helping, facilitating or enhanc- have worked effectively to make the Internet the highly ing outcomes rather than prescribing solutions. The Dig- robust, dynamic and geographically diverse medium ital Solidarity Fund, so contentious in the Geneva phase, that it is today, with the private sector taking the lead is welcomed in its new, residual form as “an innovative in day-to-day operations, and with innovation and financial mechanism of a voluntary nature open to inter- value creation at the edges.42 ested stakeholders.”39 It recognised, too, the complexities of Internet governance, The text on financing mechanisms is, therefore, what might but was unable to resolve the political contradictions be- be described as a reformist text, which represents a con- tween key players in the PrepCom disputes. Signatories sensus built around improvements to the status quo rather to the Agenda document, for example, were “convinced than radical new initiatives - and lacks the sense of urgency that there is a need to initiate, and reinforce, as appropri- and priority for ICTs articulated in the Geneva Declaration ate, a transparent, democratic and multilateral process, and Tunis Commitment. Some key questions - in particu- with the participation of governments, private sector, civil lar, those around strategic investment in areas such as society and international organizations, in their respective broadband infrastructure - are raised but, effectively, re- roles” - a statement built around ambiguity (“as appropri- ferred back to pre-existing institutional fora: matters for ate”, “in their respective roles”) rather than agreement. the multilateral development banks, for bilateral and mul- “This process,” it continued, “could envisage creation of tilateral donors, for private sector investment and public- a suitable framework or mechanisms, where justified, thus private partnerships, etc., rather than for special interven- spurring the ongoing and active evolution of the current tion, specialist summits or special Funds. arrangements in order to synergise the efforts in this re- The second main section of the Tunis Agenda is concerned gard” (likewise note “where justified”, “in this regard”).43 with Internet governance. It is less dependent on the WGIG The Agenda affirms that “Countries should not be involved than is the financing section on the TFFM, though the is- in decisions regarding another country’s country-code Top sues and options as set out by the WGIG played a major Level Domain (ccTLD),”44 but does not resolve future ar- part in its creation. Its development, as noted above, was rangements for this. “Enhanced cooperation” is consid- much the most contested area of discussion during the ered essential, including cooperation on “the development second summit phase; and the rather incoherent struc- of globally-applicable principles on public policy issues as- ture of the final text reflects the last-minute nature of the sociated with the coordination and management of criti- consensus that could be achieved. cal Internet resources,”45 but the mechanisms to develop It begins by adopting the WGIG definition of Internet this are deferred for consideration by those concerned, and governance: by a forum to be established through the office of the UN Secretary-General (see below). A working definition of Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the pri- Although the section does not deal with the Internet in gen- vate sector and civil society, in their respective roles, eral or in principle, it does address some Internet policy is- of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making sues outside the specific governance context. Developing procedures, and programmes that shape the evolu- country concern about high international connectivity costs 40 tion and use of the Internet. is mentioned, for example, alongside a list of potentially “The international management of the Internet,” it adds, ameliorative measures. There is also text on public policy issues such as cybercrime, spam and “abusive uses of ICTs”. should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, From the perspective of this report, two issues are of cru- civil society and international organizations. It should cial importance - the role and relationships of different ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate stakeholders, and the future structure for Internet-related access for all and ensure a stable and secure function- dialogue and decision-making. ing of the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.41

42 ibid., article 55. 39 Tunis Agenda, article 28. 43 ibid., article 61. 40 ibid., article 34. 44 ibid., article 63. 41 ibid., article 29. 45 ibid., article 70.

34 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The roles of different stakeholders in Internet governance The IGF would have no oversight function and would are defined as follows: not replace existing arrangements, mechanisms, institutions or organizations, but would involve them and … the management of the Internet encompasses both take advantage of their expertise. It would be consti- technical and public policy issues and should involve tuted as a neutral, non-duplicative and non-binding all stakeholders and relevant inter-governmental and process. It would have no involvement in day-to-day international organizations. In this respect it is recog- or technical operations of the Internet.49 nised that: a. Policy authority for Internet-related public policy In short, the nature, role and influence of the Forum were issues is the sovereign right of States. They have left up for grabs. Its implications for future international rights and responsibilities for international policymaking are discussed in Chapter 8. Internet-related public policy issues; Thirdly, the Agenda document considers implementation b. The private sector has had, and should continue to and follow-up arrangements for the rest of WSIS’ agenda have, an important role in the development of the issues. This area, too, was substantially debated and con- Internet, both in the technical and economic fields; tested during second phase PrepComs, as different agen- c. Civil society has also played an important role on cies jockeyed for position (or, in some cases, to avoid it). Internet matters, especially at community level, Much of the text in this section reaffirms the WSIS ap- and should continue to play such a role; proach to and objectives for ICTs in development, placing it within the context of mainstream development activity d. Inter-governmental organizations have had, and and reiterating the stated importance of multistakeholder should continue to have, a facilitating role in the participation. coordination of Internet-related public policy issues; It is worth, firstly, looking to identify just what “commitments” are actually made in the WSIS outcome texts. In prac- e. International organizations have also had and tice, even in the Tunis Commitment itself, use of the word should continue to have an important role in the “commitment” is relatively scarce. There are only a few development of Internet-related technical stand- places, in any of the texts, in which the summiteers formally ards and relevant policies.46 commit themselves to undertake particular courses of ac- Inter-governmental organisations (though not govern- tion, rather than recognising perceived truths, affirming be- ments) are explicitly encouraged “to ensure that all stake- liefs, recommending particular approaches or calling on holders, particularly from developing countries, have the governments and others to action in line with broad objec- opportunity to participate in policy decision-making relat- tives.50 The one place in which formal commitments do ap- ing to Internet governance, and to promote and facilitate pear at length, and might be considered summarised, comes such participation”.47 towards the end of the Tunis Agenda, and is set out in An- nex 3. If the WSIS follow-up process is meant to monitor Much of the argument about Internet governance during and encourage long-term outcomes, this comes as close as the latter stages of the second summit phase concerned possible to a definition of what those outcomes might be. the possible establishment of an Internet Governance Fo- rum (IGF) and its potential remit. The final decision, as No “new operational bodies” are required by the Agenda noted earlier, was to ask the UN Secretary-General to con- document for implementation or monitoring of WSIS out- vene the first meeting of a Forum, which would then: comes, but there is significant jostling of institutional arrangements within the UN system. Instead of an overall Build on the existing structures of Internet governance, WSIS review agency, the UN Secretary-General was asked with special emphasis on the complementarity between to set up a UN Group on the Information Society within all stakeholders involved in the process - governments, the framework of the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB), business entities, civil society and intergovernmental “with the mandate to facilitate the implementation of WSIS organizations.48 outcomes.” The CEB should take into account, in devel- Given a wide remit, based on language some of which origi- oping this, “the experience of, and activities in the WSIS nated with civil society, the Forum was to develop its own process undertaken by” the three agencies that might be processes and procedures, with a “lightweight and decen- likely to contest its leadership, the ITU, UNESCO and the tralised” management structure and an initial five-year UNDP.51 ECOSOC was also asked to review WSIS outcomes term. However, it was to be a discussion forum: in 2006, and consider possible changes to the Commis-

sion on Science and Technology for Development.

46 ibid., article 35. 49 ibid., article 77. 47 ibid., article 52. 50 See list of commitments in Annex 3. 48 ibid., article 73. 51 Tunis Agenda, article 103.

Section A . Background 35 36 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? section b

Analysis

chapter 4 WSIS organisation and structure chapter 5 WSIS and its issues chapter 6 WSIS and developing countries chapter 7 WSIS and civil society

chapter 4 WSIS organisation and structure

Although in some ways not quite a conventional UN sum- The genesis of the Summit, briefly mentioned at the start mit, WSIS has generally been perceived as falling within the of Chapter 3, is an interesting story in itself and has been long line of UN summits which have addressed major chal- generally misunderstood. The summit was not approved, lenges to the international community over many years. This as most participants assumed, from substantial debate chapter of the report looks, firstly, at the structure of UN within the “Plenipot” but through the adoption, without summits in general, and their appropriateness for consid- discussion, on the last day of the conference, of one among eration of ICT issues; then at some specific issues concern- a number of proposals for which no time for debate had ing the organisation of WSIS, and how these affected rep- been found earlier in the meeting and which were not resentation and other issues; and finally, suggests some deemed contentious. The resolution itself was unclear interim conclusions about the implications of WSIS organi- about both the scope of the “information society” and the sation and structure for future international ICT decision- nature of the “world summit” it proposed.1 However, those making. It is not concerned with the participation of differ- involved at the time say that they did not think it implied a ent actors, which is discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. UN-style summit of the kind that subsequently took place; one insider remembers most of those involved anticipat- A summit for ICTs? ing a relatively small gathering of sectoral experts and selected heads of state which could look at the issues and The possibility of a world summit on the information soci- make recommendations, not least concerning the future ety was first proposed by the ITU Plenipotentiary Confer- ence (to insiders, the “Plenipot”) in 1998 and its organisa- 1 The resolution is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/ tion was led, on behalf of the United Nations, by the ITU. resolutions/73.html.

Section B . Analysis 37 of the ITU itself (a significant point of concern in the origi- UN-style summits have become relatively common in re- nal resolution). Similar meetings had been organised by cent years - some years have seen several, perhaps partly other UN specialist agencies on issues of concern to them as a result of this kind of “summit creep”. Some have but also of wider interest to others in the UN family. The clearly been much more successful than others - the Rio ITU’s experience with the Maitland Commission in 1984/5 conference on sustainable development in 1992 and the may also have been in some people’s minds as a prec- Beijing World Conference on Women of 1995 generally edent.2 being cited as examples of success which other summits hope to emulate. The UN itself has developed consider- However, the idea of a concentrated world dialogue on able experience in the management of summits and (less rapidly changing “information and communications” is- successfully) the expectations they arouse. sues - which might take summit form - was not entirely new. As early as 1996, the European Commission organ- Summits are, of course, extremely expensive instruments ised a global Information Society and Development Con- of international decision-making. They require large invest- ference in South Africa. A multistakeholder Global Knowl- ments of money and, especially, time from government edge Partnership was launched following international officials and subject experts over an extended period, Global Knowledge Conferences in Toronto and Kuala which represents a considerable opportunity cost, espe- Lumpur in 1997 and 2000, including UN agencies such as cially for smaller governments and for non-governmental UNESCO and the UNDP. Other inter-governmental agen- actors like those in civil society. They raise high expecta- cies, notably the World Bank, had begun revising their at- tions: if so much time and effort, and the political will of titudes to information and knowledge issues during the so many senior people from so many countries, are con- late 1990s, developing strategies built around the concept centrated on a single decision-making forum, people ex- of a “knowledge society”. Within the UN family, UNESCO pect it to achieve great things and are correspondingly dis- in particular was developing a proactive agenda on infor- appointed if it reveals more difference than agreement mation and communication issues, though from a rather between the parties. As a result, cynics suggest, whatever different - more developmental and cultural, less techno- their outcomes, summits must always be described as ei- cratic - perspective than the ITU. Information and commu- ther “successes” or “great successes”. nication technology was undoubtedly changing very rap- However, summitry is merely one method of achieving (or idly, and the concepts of digital dividend and digital di- at least seeking) international agreement. Most interna- vide were increasingly debated in development as well as tional policymaking is conducted in narrower, more for- technological circles. The dot.com boom was underway; mal, often rule-based organisations like the ITU and the the dot.com bust was yet to happen. World Trade Organisation; and is thought to be more ex- Interviewees describe how the ITU’s proposal for a “world peditiously handled there because it takes place within summit”, therefore, met with significant enthusiasm in groups that have specialist expertise. Summits are, in other principle in parts of the UN system and, just as importantly, words, rather like referendums: it only really makes sense with relatively little opposition. First the UN’s Administra- to have them on issues that are of fundamental importance tive Committee on Coordination, representing other UN or that cannot be resolved through the conventional inter- agencies, endorsed the idea, and then the General Assem- national governance mechanisms that already exist. bly, representing member-states, endorsed the proposal Insiders say that this is how they are generally considered that it should become a full-scale summit, with all the au- within the UN system. What summits are best at doing is thority and all the paraphernalia of preparatory commit- addressing broad problems that are of fundamental im- tees and diplomatic negotiation that entails. Once the pro- portance to the whole world community, where progress posal for a summit of this kind emerges, it has momen- is not being achieved through conventional inter-govern- tum. Many interviewees from governments and interna- mental mechanisms, and where it seems possible that the tional organisations described how, though they them- dramatic gesture of heads of state and government col- selves were unenthusiastic, it was difficult for them or their lectively signing an agreement will inject a new dynamic governments/organisations to argue against a summit into efforts to resolve that problem. Climate change is a because that seemed to imply that the issue of the infor- classic example of the sort of issue for which summits have mation society was unimportant. Nevertheless, they con- been thought appropriate. tinue to wonder whether a smaller scale initiative might have been more effective in dealing with many of the is- Historically, the justification for summits has generally sues concerned or in generating more dynamic outcomes. been that a particular issue has become so important that it requires the establishment of a new global consensus. The uniqueness of the summit format is that it can coerce 2 The Maitland Commission was an “International Commission for World world leaders into such a consensus. If large numbers of Wide Telecommunications Development”, assembled by the ITU. Its heads of state and government agree to gather together report is available from: www.itu.int/osg/spu/sfo/missinglink/ index.html. in one place to set out how they are going to resolve a

38 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? global problem, the theory goes, it is too embarrassing less expensive fora or existing channels. How many for them to have nothing to sign at the end of their confer- telecentres, one interviewee put it, could you establish ence. This puts unique pressure on them to achieve agree- with the money spent on WSIS?; how many anti-retrovirals ment, and the object of the whole multi-year preparatory could you supply to those living with HIV and AIDS? process is to refine issues to a point at which, often through last-minute crisis negotiations, an acceptable compromise Interviews and other evidence suggest that the implica- consensus can be achieved. This may, in practice, be a low- tions of this character of WSIS were seen in four ways dur- est common denominator consensus, or it may be a sub- ing the event as a whole. stantive agreement which genuinely advances global ac- Firstly, WSIS was treated much more seriously by devel- tion on an issue, but there is rarely total failure in the sense oping countries than by industrial countries. The number that there is no document to endorse. The trick at the heart of heads of state and government attending the Geneva of the summit exercise, as one insider described it, is to and Tunis sessions was relatively low, but delegations from set a final date for signature where heads of state will be industrial countries were particularly likely to be led by too embarrassed to leave without agreement, and to ex- junior ministers or even civil servants rather than by the ploit the potential brinkmanship involved in this to make hoped-for heads of state and government. This would the maximum amount of progress on issues that have seem to stem logically from the “opportunity” rather than proved intractable. “problem” focus of the event. Industrial countries saw lit- Not everyone within the international system thought that tle value for them in discussing the development of the the information society was susceptible to this kind of information society at home, and had less interest in dis- approach, for a number of reasons. One of these was in cussing the information society in development than did fact suggested by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan – developing countries. They only really became engaged though as a cause for celebration, not concern – in his in it where it impinged on international decisions that did opening remarks to the Geneva summit in December 2003. affect them: for example, in the allocation of development “This summit is unique,” he said; “Where most global con- funding or the management of a resource (the Internet) ferences focus on global threats, this one will consider how that they considered critical to their economies. Develop- best to use a new global asset.” But, the previous para- ing countries had a much stronger interest, at least within graph suggests, summits have been used for problems the plenaries where their representation was much more rather than opportunities for a reason. Problems concen- senior. trate minds on the choices between different ways of tack- ling them. Opportunities are far more open: there are far Secondly, the summit received much less attention from more ways that opportunities can be seized than prob- powerful centres within government than most other sum- lems can be tackled. When governments are asked how mits have achieved. National delegations were generally problems might be tackled, they will respond by exclud- built around ministries of information and communication, ing options, which makes it possible to narrow down supported by the Geneva UN missions of their countries. choices for action. When they are asked how opportuni- These were the obvious departments of government to deal ties might be seized, they make lists which it is easiest for with issues being handled by the ITU. However, ministries summit officials to combine in ever bigger lists, rather than of information and communication are usually peripheral to prioritise. Summits, in short, look less well suited to to the foci of power within governments: their ministers deal with opportunities than with problems, not least be- are not key ministers, their budgets are relatively small, cause there is nothing urgent enough to forge consensus their influence on presidents and ministers of finance is at a global level between heads of state and government. pretty weak. One presidential advisor interviewed for the project put it this way: “the ministry of communication saw Other stakeholders tend to behave differently as well. WSIS as a way of building its prestige, and we didn’t feel Faced with global problems, private sector businesses tend the issues involved were important enough for us [at the to emphasise the difficulties involved in the solutions prof- centre of government] to intervene, so we let them have fered (consider climate change, for an example); presented their heads.” The impact of this on the representation of with opportunities, they are more likely to promote their developing countries is discussed in Chapter 6. products, as they did in WSIS’ exhibition space. Problems focus civil society attention on a narrow range of issues; Thirdly, the summit’s discussion of “digital opportunities”, opportunities give them scope to show the full range of and the way this is reflected in its outcome documents, their diversity of interest and approach. was discursive and poorly focused. The ITU’s invitation to governments - and regional WSIS meetings - to submit their Many participants in WSIS, from all stakeholder groups, thoughts on opportunities which ICTs could address was were concerned about its cost and cost-effectiveness, and essentially a list-making exercise, and this set something about whether the global attention it achieved added as of a tone for negotiations on the content of output docu- much value as could have been achieved through other ments. The African WSIS bureau, the Bamako Bureau, for

Section B . Analysis 39 example, set up after the Africa regional conference dur- which is changing as rapidly as information and communi- ing the first summit phase, agreed 21 “priorities” for ac- cation technology. Within the four year WSIS timescale, tion. Debate about content of the output documents re- the number of Internet users worldwide at least doubled, fined the texts proposed – debating points of disagreement reaching perhaps one billion;4 teledensity in Uganda rose (perhaps resolving them through ambiguity, perhaps de- from 1% to 6%;5 major new technologies were developed leting any that were too contentious), adding special ref- with the potential to transform future ICT deployment, erences to particular groups (women, young people, the while the cost of others plummeted. The ICT landscape of disabled, indigenous peoples) and particular issues. The 2005 differed markedly from that of 2001. Yet, while the Geneva Plan of Action essentially compiles the contribu- summit documents repeatedly refer to the dynamism of tions received and discussed in this way, but does nothing ICT markets, they themselves were remarkably undynamic. to prioritise them - either by assessing their relative impor- Where the “information society” itself and the role of ICTs tance or by sequencing them for maximum effectiveness; in development are concerned, the texts agreed in 2005 nor does it discuss the limitations, difficulties, costs or show no significant change from those of 2003, which were potential conflicts between them. Certainly, it is hard to themselves based on contributions put forward in 2001 find anyone experienced in ICD that thinks the Plan of Ac- and 2002. Some interviewees have suggested that – again, tion pushed the boundaries of thinking on the role of ICTs regardless of what it may have done in terms of aware- in development or the role of ICTs in social change – what- ness-raising – WSIS may have actually slowed rather than ever it might have achieved in terms of awareness-raising.3 accelerated thinking and decision-making about these issues by focusing it around perceptions from a particular, Fourthly, summit negotiations actually focused in practice receding moment in time. not on these opportunities but on what were seen as problems - the issues of infrastructure finance and Internet governance; to a lesser extent, the conflict between na- Summit organisation: the role of the ITU tional sovereignty and information rights; and, underlying these, “the problem of the digital divide”. Thus, while Six more specific organisational and structural issues con- much of the text of the Geneva Plan of Action is concerned cerning WSIS were consistently raised by respondents in with the potential role of ICTs in development, the negoti- interviews and questionnaires for this study. These were: ating process that accompanied it was preoccupied with 1. The role of the ITU as principal summit organiser, its the much narrower question of the desirability of a Digital relations with other UN agencies, and the implications Solidarity Fund to address disparities of investment re- of these for the summit as a whole sources for ICTs and ICD. The second summit phase saw 2. The division of WSIS into two phases almost no discussion of development or wider “information society” issues in principle, but was preoccupied al- 3. The role of regional meetings and preparatory com- most in its entirety, first by resolution of the disagreements mittees over infrastructure finance (PrepCom 2), then by the issue 4. The role of the two interim fora, the TFFM and the WGIG of Internet governance and the question of follow-up processes. Cynics in Tunis had a case for saying that the sec- 5. The follow-up process instituted for WSIS in the Tunis ond phase was a summit not on the information society, Agenda but on Internet governance, and for questioning whether 6. The relationship between WSIS and other international agreement on that was sufficiently important to ensure decision-making fora on both ICTs and development. so much attention from so many people for so many years. Nevertheless, it was the ability of the summit process to Some of these issues are discussed in depth in other chap- achieve a consensus on Internet governance that ulti- ters of this report. Representational issues concerning the mately enables it to be labelled a “success” today. TFFM and the WGIG, for example, are considered in Chap- ter 7 and the follow-up process is addressed in Chapter 8. One further point is worth making about the subject mat- The following sections of this chapter therefore focus on ter for the summit. Four years is a long time for the interna- the role of the ITU, the summit’s two-phase structure, the tional community to discuss any issue. It is a particularly role of regional meetings and preparatory committees, and long time to spend within a single process on a subject the relationship of WSIS with other international decision- making fora. The first two of these distinguish the organisation of WSIS from other comparable summits, making it 3 Some in civil society have argued that this is because civil society was perhaps more appropriate to call it a “UN-style” summit effectively excluded from participation in the drafting of the Plan of Action. Others, however, point out that the WSIS document was less than a UN summit per se. substantive than those emerging from other summits (from whose drafting civil society organisations were also absent); and that the 4 Approximate data derived from www.itu.int/ITU-D/icteye/Indicators/ absence of development-oriented civil society organisations from the Indicators.aspx#. summit preparatory process would have made it difficult for civil society to reflect the consensus of development (rather than ICT- 5 Approximate data derived from www.ucc.co.ug/marketInfo/ focused) NGOs. marketstatistics.php.

40 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The role of the ITU was also undertaken by the central secretariat of the Un- ion, working to the Secretary-General. The ITU’s Develop- Although it largely fitted into the standard summit format, ment Bureau played only a marginal role in the organisa- WSIS was not, as indicated earlier, an entirely conventional tion and content of WSIS – something which seemed odd international summit and it is worth looking at some of to outsiders, but less strange to those familiar with inter- the differences between it and other summits in this con- nal ITU politics. text. In particular, the organisation of WSIS was led by one of the UN specialist agencies, the ITU, rather than by the Secondly, as noted earlier, the ITU’s lead role in turn af- UN’s central organisation. fected the composition of national delegations to WSIS. Because invitations to participate were issued by the ITU, The possibility of a world summit on the information soci- they naturally found their way to the departments of gov- ety was, as noted earlier, proposed by the ITU Plenipoten- ernment responsible for relations with the ITU – predomi- tiary Conference in 1998, though it had been raised earlier nantly ministries of communications, information, infor- in the 1990s in discussion within the UN system and among mation technology or (at their widest) commerce and in- some civil society organisations. This resolution described dustry. Aside from diplomatic personnel, participation in the ITU as “the organisation best able to seek appropriate national delegations – which is discussed further in Chap- ways to provide for development of the telecommunica- ter 6 – came predominantly, in most countries, from these tion sector geared to economic, social and cultural devel- departments of government, from the regulatory agencies opment,” and so to facilitate “the emergence of the con- associated with them, and from the telecommunications cept of the information society in which telecommunica- businesses owned or partly owned by them (mostly fixed tions play a central role.”6 The idea of a World Summit telecoms operators). Mainstream development ministries grew through iterations with other parts of the UN family were poorly represented at WSIS for a number of reasons, into an event of the type normally described as UN sum- discussed in Chapter 6, but one of them was that invita- mits. The UN General Assembly gave the job of organising tions from the ITU only reached them if they were passed this now-grander summit to the ITU in January 2002.7 on by the ministries that received them – and those minis- The character of any summit is, of course, likely to be sub- tries tended to see the information society as their con- stantially determined by its organisational structure. In- cern, or perhaps their opportunity. terviewees for the project suggest that the decision to give the ITU the lead responsibility had five significant effects So, thirdly, many felt, did the ITU. The last three decades on the organisation of the Summit and thereby on its out- have seen the ITU’s role and authority over its traditional comes. Each of these has significance for this study. mandate greatly diminished. Liberalisation of telecommunications leaves much less scope for governments to make Firstly, the lead role of the ITU implied a certain approach binding agreements; none, really, any longer for binding to the content of the Summit. The ITU is a technical agency, agreements between state-owned monopolies. As not just in the sense that it has a specialist issue to deal telecoms services have become openly traded and with, but in the sense that this issue is technological. ITU telecoms infrastructure has become more open to foreign conferences, staff and study groups deal with highly tech- investment, the inter-governmental dimension of telecom- nical issues like spectrum allocation, telecommunication munications has become governed as much, in many ways, standards and the regulation of interconnection rates. Even by the rules of the World Trade Organisation as by a spe- the ITU’s development arm, the Telecommunication Devel- cialist sectoral body like the ITU. Standardisation of tech- opment Bureau, is primarily concerned with “the devel- nological development has also been dealt with more and opment of telecommunications” rather than with “tel- more in recent decades by the private sector – which now ecommunications in development”. With the best will in leads work in this area within the ITU, since it extended the world, the ITU lacks expertise in wider policy areas such the scope for private sector participation in the early 1990s. as human rights and mainstream development, and its ITU pessimists recognise the risk of the Union diminish- personnel tend to see ICTs as technologies (or new tech- ing to little more than a spectrum management agency – nologies) rather than within the cultural framework of in- unless of course it finds a new and wider role. formation and communications (which preoccupies UNESCO), the development policy framework (which con- For some within the ITU – member-states and permanent cerns the UNDP and other UN specialist agencies) or the officials – the organisation of WSIS undoubtedly repre- rights agenda (which preoccupies many civil society or- sented an opportunity to carve out that niche; to become ganisations). In practice, the ITU’s management of WSIS for the information society, and perhaps the Internet, what the original International Telegraph Union was for the tel- 6 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 1998, resolution 73, available from: egraph in 1865. For organisations to seek new fields of www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/73.html. activity is, of course, entirely proper; whether they suc- 7 See UN General Assembly resolution 56/183, available from: ceed depends on how far their aspirations chime with their www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolutions/ 56_183_unga_2002.pdf. existing stakeholders and with potential partners already

Section B . Analysis 41 involved in areas they wish to address. In this case, the had no knowledge of them or their political nuances within ITU’s potential role was highly contentious. Not everyone their own experience. Input from the highly experienced within the ITU itself – again member-states and permanent former UN Under Secretary-General for economic and so- officials - is convinced of the propriety of its extending its cial affairs Nitin Desai, key organiser of many past sum- mandate into wider areas. Industrial country governments, mits, undoubtedly helped to facilitate organisational is- for example, have been far less sympathetic to the ITU’s sues as the summit progressed. evolving in this way than those of developing countries, for reasons discussed in Chapter 5. There is genuine and One further point here is that, while all UN member-states longstanding debate within the ITU about this question. have diplomatic missions in New York, a number of smaller countries do not have missions in Geneva. Their ability to More importantly for the nature of WSIS, however, the ITU’s play a role in WSIS may have been diminished by this. potential expansion into areas of development and cul- Unlike for example in the UN’s political work and in the tural policy was contested by the UN agencies most con- WTO, participation in ITU activities is usually led by coun- cerned with these areas. The nature of this contest was try-based rather than mission-based personnel, and this described by some of those involved as a “land grab” by may also have impacted on participation. one side or the other; and equally downplayed by others (on both sides). The key fact is that there were underlying Fifthly, the ITU’s lead role created some additional chal- tensions about expertise, roles and responsibilities. Dur- lenges in addressing the participation of non-governmen- ing the initial set-up period for the summit, there were tal organisations, particularly civil society. Over decades, continuing differences between the developmental visions UN summits had gradually opened up some space for non- of UNESCO, the UNDP and other development agencies governmental stakeholders within their formal processes, within the UN family and what they saw as the technologi- though always within a framework in which governments cal determinism of the ITU. The compromise reached was retained sole responsibility for drafting and agreeing texts. that the ITU organised WSIS in partnership with other This partial and gradual opening had been overseen by major agencies, through a High Level Summit Organising the UN’s political process in New York, particularly Committee able to advise the ITU on issues beyond its ECOSOC, the Economic and Social Council, which has for- mandate. Nevertheless, inter-agency tensions remained mal responsibility for liaison between the UN system and evident throughout both phases of the summit right up to non-governmental actors.8 the discussions concerning WSIS follow-up, where they The ITU, however, has a different tradition. The changing resulted in the unwieldy, multi-headed implementation nature of telecommunications in the 1980s and 1990s meant structure which is discussed in Chapter 8. that the ITU had to be much more accommodating to pri- Fourthly, although WSIS operated in the manner of a UN vate sector interests than other UN specialist agencies, go- summit, it was never entirely one in the normal sense. As ing so far as to enable them to become “Sector Members” well as being managed by a specialist agency rather than and to play a full (even a leading) role in some ITU activities the United Nations central organisation, it also received (especially concerning standards), even if formal decision- no funding from the central structure but had to raise its making power remained with governments (as some gov- own. Insiders suggest that this was the primary reason why ernments remain determined to assert at every opportu- WSIS sessions were held over three days rather than five, nity). On the other hand, the ITU established no compara- putting more pressure on PrepComs to deliver a final text ble status to offer “civil society”. Civil society organisations to the summit and allowing less scope for last-minute ad- cannot (at least easily) play any formal part in ITU activi- justments to be made by heads of state themselves. ties, such as study groups, or be accredited to ITU conferences. This exclusion was challenged with some, but not The ITU’s lead role also meant that the Summit was or- great, enthusiasm by some civil society NGOs in the later ganised from Geneva rather than New York, which had 1990s, and remained in place when the management role tended to play the greater role in previous summits. UN for WSIS was formally handed to the ITU in January 2002. insiders suggest that there are marked differences of character between the UN organisations in its two core homes Interviewees had different interpretations of how this af- – with New York emphasising the UN’s political character fected the participation of civil society in WSIS. Some ar- and Geneva the role of specialist agencies; and with the gued that the ITU’s lack of understanding of civil society political centre in New York having, at best, doubts about organisations and concerns made it harder for these to the organisational capacity of specialist agencies to han- gain ground, particularly when hardline anti-civil society dle what is a fundamentally political event. Cultural differ- national delegations sought to maintain ITU-style purity ences within the UN, they suggest, may have exacerbated within the WSIS structure. However, as Chapter 7 shows, tensions in the organisational process. Certainly, ITU insiders acknowledge that they found some WSIS issues – 8 The UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service also supports civil society such as human rights – difficult to handle because they understanding of and engagement with the UN system.

42 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? the fact is that civil society participation in WSIS was sig- in phase one led not to debate about implementation in nificantly greater than that in any previous summit. An al- phase two but to the absence of debate about those is- ternative interpretation, therefore, is that the ITU’s inex- sues. Disputes over the “WSIS follow-up” process were, perience and lack of processes for handling civil society in effect, debates about an implementation process which may actually have facilitated the latter’s participation. should happen after WSIS, not during its second phase. Without arrangements of its own to handle civil society Language on development in the Tunis Agenda added involvement, the ITU, in this interpretation, needed to work nothing to that in the Geneva Plan of Action – and, indeed, through a specialist civil society bureau within the WSIS the “action lines” listed in the Geneva Plan became the secretariat whose very existence normalised a much basis for implementation planning after Tunis. A couple of greater degree of civil society participation in WSIS than initiatives by the ITU – a stocktaking exercise and the pub- might otherwise have happened. Certainly, the ITU tended lication of a Golden Book of WSIS-related initiatives – were to leave a good deal of the responsibility for developing more concerned with advocacy for ICD than with imple- civil society input to this bureau. Chapter 7 explores this mentation planning. question further. What the second phase did, in practice, was provide a framework for the resolution of the two main outstanding A two-phase summit issues from the first – i.e. infrastructure finance and Internet governance. However, few interviewees felt that The second organisational aspect of WSIS to be consid- resolution of these issues necessitated a second summit ered at this point is its unique division into two summit phase, rather than alternative processes built around ei- phases, the first culminating in the Geneva Summit of De- ther new or existing spaces for debate. Similar unresolved cember 2003, the second in the Tunis Summit of Novem- problems from other summits have been handed on to ber 2005. Publicly, this two-phase structure was justified smaller, focused fora along the lines of the WGIG and the as enabling the first phase to concentrate on principles TFFM without being referred back to global summits. For and the second on implementation. In fact, as everyone many participants from industrial countries, in particular, knew, it resulted from the UN’s failure to choose between the second phase became a prolonged exercise in what two competing bids to host the summit, one from the home they saw as damage limitation, ensuring that changes were of the ITU, the other from the government which proposed not made to the compromise principles established in the the original “Plenipot” resolution calling for a summit. first phase, and seeking to avoid what would be, for them, Few participants interviewed were convinced of the mer- unacceptable conclusions to negotiations on the two out- its of the two-phase approach. Most – even those enthu- standing issues. siastic about WSIS overall – were concerned about the additional high cost of participation, both financially and in the time of expert personnel. They found it hard to per- Regional meetings suade themselves that a two-phase approach had suffi- and preparatory committees cient value to justify doubling this expense. On the whole, in spite of rhetoric, it seems unlikely that the United Na- The third structural issue worth considering is the role of tions would choose to repeat this way of doing things. regional meetings and preparatory committees.

The central question here is one of whether, whatever the This structure forms part of the package of summit organi- origins of the two-phase structure, its public justification sation. It is, essentially, how UN summits are done. Input did in fact occur: whether the principles developed during from regional gatherings – and perhaps thematic meetings the first summit phase and outlined in the Geneva out- – is assembled by the coordinating central organisation. come documents were translated into action in the sec- Documents resulting from this input are put before pre- ond phase. In fact, as described in Chapter 3, this did not paratory committees, whose role it is to develop texts for happen. The principles agreed in Geneva were not, in the agreement, ultimately, by heads of state and government. first place, particularly incisive or coherent; they certainly Debate focuses around the wording of texts: wording that did not amount to a comprehensive, prioritised plan of is unacceptable to some parties is gradually displaced, action, nor did they have any structures through which when those parties insist, by wording which is acceptable implementation could be coordinated or monitored. In to all – either because it represents a genuine consensus spite of prior agreement not to do so, a few countries did or because, through ambiguity, it glosses over differences. try, early in the second phase, to reopen points of princi- Experts in drafting international agreements, from diplo- ple – for example concerning human rights – but without matic missions, play the key role in this process which usu- success. Industrial countries, in particular, were adamant ally requires many iterations over the course of the pre- that the second phase should not cover the same ground paratory period. Preparatory committees are there fore as the first. But, interviewees tended to agree, the estab- the locus for intense lobbying by interested stakeholders; lishment of principles on rights and development issues though, when the final summit takes place, the media tend

Section B . Analysis 43 to give and the general public to receive the impression that WSIS and the wider world the whole agreement was put together by heads of state and government in the course of a single week or less. The final structural issue worth consideration here is the relationship between WSIS and other international deci- It is fairly obvious that the quality of any final agreement sion-making fora, both other international summits and here is going to depend on the quality of inputs (whether mainstream international ICT decision-making bodies. from regional meetings or elsewhere), the quality of drafting expertise and the extent of political will to reach agree- The year 2005 saw not just the second phase of WSIS but ment. Few interviewees for this report had much experi- also a United Nations summit session devoted to review- ence of summits other than WSIS but those that had did ing progress towards achievement of the Millennium De- not suggest that the experience in WSIS was very much velopment Goals. The outcome documents from the first different, in terms of quality, from that elsewhere. Inter- phase of WSIS were clear that ICTs had, potentially, a ma- viewees experienced in ICT policymaking, however, did jor role to play in facilitating achievement of the MDGs: have some concerns. Two points are, at least, worth con- “Our challenge,” in the words of the preamble to the Ge- sideration. neva Declaration of Principles, “is to harness the potential of information and communication technology to pro- Firstly, regional meetings varied substantially in character mote the development goals of the Millennium Declara- and outputs. Some involved extensive civil society partici- tion.”9 A good deal of discussion had been undertaken, pation – as in Africa; others were much more formal and within WSIS, the UN ICT Task Force and elsewhere, about government-focused, like those in the Asia/Pacific region. the contribution which ICTs could make to individual Some made substantive contributions; others had rela- MDGs, while MDG target 18 itself calls on governments tively little to offer (such as the European meeting during and inter-governmental organisations, “in cooperation the first phase; none was held in Europe during the sec- with the private sector, [to] make available the benefits of ond). Their contributions to the central secretariat there- new technologies - especially information and communi- fore varied in content, style and quality; and there were cations technologies.”10 Yet this input was barely visible significant clashes between inputs from different regional in the global development discourse that took place in the meetings which the central secretariat found it difficult to Millennium Review Summit. resolve. Some of those involved felt that this was not the best way to begin writing texts which ought to be coher- This lack of relation between WSIS and mainstream de- ent and comprehensive approaches to the issues under velopment fora is discussed in more depth in Chapter 5. It consideration. was not just a problem of content, however, but of structure. No significant structural links were established be- As for preparatory committees, a great deal of time was tween the two events, which would have enabled an inter- wasted during those for WSIS on issues that were not sub- change of views or integration of proposals. The conjunc- stantive in terms of content. The first PrepCom of the first tion of a global summit which emphasised the role of ICTs phase was almost entirely occupied with procedural mat- in development with a global summit which largely ignored ters: in particular, who should be allowed to take part in their relevance to development’s key goals suggests that what? When issues of substance were discussed, most ob- WSIS was never properly integrated with the international servers with ICT experience found debates frustrating – system as a whole and in particular that it failed to address with a good deal of misinformation about issues and a the “paradigm gap” between ICTs and development which good deal of political posturing getting in the way of the is discussed in Chapter 5. It also raises questions about more substantive and better informed discussion they whether the same lack of interaction would have been ex- experienced at fora which had decisions of immediate perienced if WSIS had been organised by an agency at the importance to take. (Those involved in both tended to com- heart, rather than on the periphery, of the UN system. ment that they found debates at ITU meetings and conferences frustrating, too, but less frustrating than they found Much the same level of disconnection can be seen between those at WSIS.) PrepComs were much more dynamic and WSIS and other international ICT decision-making fora, focused when issues became politically contentious, as with the obvious exception of Internet governance. Cer- in the disputes over financing mechanisms and Internet tainly where the Internet is concerned, WSIS debates and governance. The quality of PrepCom management here, follow-up fora are likely to have a lasting impact on the which is to some degree a matter of chance, could be of future – one which is discussed further in Chapter 5. They great significance. Many interviewees, for example, felt may also have some impact on the future structure of the that a positive outcome to the discussions on Internet gov- ITU. The 2006 World Telecommunication Development ernance in Subcommittee A of the second phase PrepComs Conference – which sets the ITU Development Bureau’s had been possible to a large degree as a result of the way

in which that subcommittee was chaired (by the Pakistani 9 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 2. ambassador to the UN in Geneva, Masood Khan). 10 See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#.

44 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? programme for the next four years – discussed the WSIS by other issues of the moment. The merits of different ap- outcomes in depth; and the opportunities presented by proaches to (say) Internet governance can be caught up in WSIS follow-up for the ITU were also a significant issue at the backwash of international conflicts (such as Israel/ its 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference. But there are many, Palestine or the war in Iraq) or the brokering of deals in many dimensions of international ICT decision-making that unrelated international negotiations (such as the Doha WSIS barely touched. It is hard to see that it will have much round of trade talks). While summits are therefore intended on the 2007 ITU World Radiocommunication Conference, for use on critical issues that require common action to which will deal with crucial questions of spectrum man- which heads of state in general affirm consent, this agement; or on the implementation of the WTO’s Basic politicisation means that such deals are not necessarily Telecommunications Agreement, which sets the framework based on the subject under discussion alone. Where there for international investment and liberalisation in telecoms is widespread misunderstanding or divergence of opinion markets. As things stand, few interviewees could point to about the nature of the subject under discussion – as with non-Internet areas of international ICT decision-making Internet governance – that can be an alarming prospect. like these in which they expected the WSIS outcomes to have an influential impact. The WSIS experience suggests, in other words, that summits are not necessarily the most effective way of reaching agreement on international problems. Recourse to Conclusions them should not be automatic, particularly given the expense involved. All stakeholders – governments, interna- What does this analysis of WSIS’ structure and its implica- tional organisations and civil society organisations among tions imply for developing countries and for civil society? It them – should assess the cost-effectiveness of summitry may seem pointless, after the event, to consider whether a before commitment. The aims of a summit process should world summit such as WSIS was the best way to address also be clear in advance. In the case of WSIS, many par- “information society” issues, but there is a point in looking ticipants felt that there was insufficient clarity about a at whether the experience suggests any lessons for the fu- number of key factors: the scope and substance of the core ture. Many of the implications are discussed in more detail question (the “information society”); the management in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, but a few suggested conclusions structure for the summit (particularly the two-phase for- about structure are worth making here, particularly in re- mat); the role and responsibilities of different stakehold- gard to developing country and civil society participation. ers concerned. Clarification of these issues in advance might have made WSIS more effective or more decisive; Firstly, the WSIS experience raises questions about the or it might have suggested that alternative forms of inter- value of summitry per se. As noted earlier, summits are national discourse would have been more fruitful. As it hard to argue against. By their existence, they state that was, in the words of one insider, the first phase of WSIS the international community views their subject as impor- spent a great deal of time circling issues whose meaning tant, as a priority. Suggesting that a particular summit pro- was unclear rather than addressing real points on which posal should not be pursued is easily misrepresented as agreement might achieve results. implying that the issue it concerns is not important. In the case of WSIS, lack of public dissent from the proposal for A key question here for the “information society” is the the summit was accompanied by extensive private disquiet pace of change. Information and communication technolo- about its appropriateness and value amongst international gies change rapidly. So does our understanding of their officials involved in its organisation, within the private implications and applications. And so does our experience sector, in many governments (especially in industrial coun- of actual use (consider, for example, the unexpected but tries) and in a good many civil society organisations. The dynamic adoption of the World Wide Web, mobile te- key question, this suggests, should not be whether an is- lephony or SMS). Even a two-year summit process here is sue is important enough to merit a summit, but whether problematic. What is known at the start of 2001 may be the outcomes from a summit are likely to be sufficiently very different from what is understood at the end of 2003, more valuable than those that could be achieved other- yet final texts tend to be based on early drafts. How much wise to justify the high costs involved in time and money. more is this a problem when summit processes extend for It is, in other words, about “horses and courses”; the big- four years? gest is not necessarily the best for the job in hand. For those who are primarily concerned with ICTs, fore, in- Secondly, the WSIS experience reminds us that summits cluding civil society organisations, it is suggested that the are highly political. This, in turn, means that the issues key question in determining methodologies for interna- they discuss - often complex technical issues (such as tional decision-making should be outcome-focused. What Internet governance or global warming) – enter into an will be most likely to achieve agreement?; to achieve agree- arena of political argument in which actors adopt positions ment which genuinely includes the concerns of a wide which are determined not by the issues themselves but range of stakeholders?; to achieve agreement which is

Section B . Analysis 45 likely to prove lasting and has the flexibility needed to some way towards redressing the balance of power within allow continued development in an age of rapid and un- the international community. Developing countries feel that certain technological change? Alternative ways of reach- they have more influence in summits than in the UN’s or ing agreement to those currently established may be help- specialist agencies’ normal decision-making processes. ful here or not. Existing channels have set precedents, There may well be truth in this, at least at plenary stages, often because they have proved effective, though this and the question is discussed in more depth in Chapter 6. does not mean to say that they remain so, or that they However, the use of summits to bypass the balance of could not be improved (for example, through greater power in conventional decision-making does not really inclusiveness). New models, such as those developed in address the underlying problems that developing countries the Internet community, may also have much to offer. The have concerning representation – their lack of influence in important thing is what will work. In the case of WSIS, those conventional decision-making processes them- many organisations participated in it with low expecta- selves. After all, it is these conventional processes that will tions because it was the biggest show in town and they have responsibility for implementing summit decisions. The could not afford to miss it; but the opportunity costs were relative degree of influence exercised by developing coun- substantial. It was a disruptive event but did not, for them, tries in summits depends, of course, on a variety of factors live up to its promise. – not least the degree of cohesion in developing country participation. Nevertheless, the weaknesses in WSIS’ struc- There is also the question of international representation. ture and in its outcome documents do nothing to suggest One of the reasons why summits are more favoured by de- that less attention should be paid to the conclusions that

veloping countries than industrial countries is that they go the “Louder Voices” study reached in 2002.

46 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? chapter 5 WSIS and its issues

The World Summit on the Information Society meant dif- It would have been interesting to see what answers differ- ferent things to different people. Prima facie, from its ti- ent stakeholders would have given if asked what they tle, it might have been expected to address the broad range meant by the term. The underlying concept might perhaps of changes taking place within society as a result of infor- be summarised as a society in which the exchange of in- mation technology. These are taking place in all societies, formation (i.e. communication) becomes the primary ac- industrial as well as developing, albeit in different ways tivity that determines economic prosperity and governs and to different degrees. In practice, the Summit focused people’s lives. An information society, in this sense, can on a relatively narrow selection of issues - the relation- be taken as implying the opening of a new phase in human ship between ICTs and fundamental rights, that between development, one which is as important as the Agrarian ICTs and development, infrastructure finance and Internet Revolution that separated hunter-gatherer from agricultural governance - and paid little or no attention to many oth- societies, and the Industrial Revolution that marked the ers that it might have considered, such as the impact of rapid growth of disparities between industrial and agricul- information technology on the relationship between state tural societies in the 18th and 19th centuries. The term was and citizen (censorship, the “surveillance state”) or the used in this sense of “progress” by some interviewees, role of ICTs in national and international conflict. Much particularly advocates of ICT, i.e. those who see the infor- more attention was paid to ICTs in developing countries mation society as a positive development and, often, as and to relations between industrial and developing coun- an opportunity to overcome the social and international tries (infrastructure finance, Internet governance) than to disparities following industrialisation in a new economic the social, economic and cultural changes resulting from paradigm. For others, its meaning was much narrower, re- the rapid evolution of ICTs and their deployment in indus- ferring to specific changes within society rather than to the trial countries (whose governments were much less posi- transformation of society as a whole. Interviewees for this tive about the value of a summit in the first place and so project therefore had widely different interpretations of the chose not to raise issues of domestic significance within term, and many recognised its uncertain nature. They also it). Far more attention was paid to the potential value of had different interpretations of its scope and that of ICTs – ICTs than to the challenges and risks they pose. At most, concerning the extent, for example, to which they include therefore, it would be fair to say that WSIS was a summit broadcasting. The same degree of uncertainty was very on aspects of the information society rather than on the likely true of participants in WSIS as a whole. information society as a whole. In practice, four issues dominated discussion in the WSIS The concept of an “information society” is itself conten- process, each of them concerned with a different set of tious - and the “information society” as such is never interactions between ICTs and other aspects of society and clearly defined within the WSIS outcome documents, be- economy and each of particular concern to a different set yond the definition of “a people-centred, inclusive and of actors. These issues were: development-oriented Information Society,” at the start of the Geneva Declaration, as one where everyone can cre- 1. The issue of information and communication rights and ate, access, utilize and share information and knowledge, their relation to the fundamental rights expressed in enabling individuals, communities and peoples to achieve other UN declarations their full potential in promoting their sustainable devel- 2. The relationship between ICTs and development opment and improving their quality of life, premised on 3. The financing requirements of ICT deployment (both the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United infrastructure and applications) Nations and respecting fully and upholding the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.11 4. The governance of one specific ICT, the Internet.

11 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 1.

Section B . Analysis 47 This chapter considers each of these in turn, reviewing elsewhere, these statements of development principles participation in them by developing countries and civil have not been subject to the same reaffirmation doubt. society, and their impact on the longer-term development In the case of WSIS, the reaffirmation question was com- of international ICT decision-making. plicated by the fact that the issue under discussion – the information society – potentially extends the impact which Human rights and the information society fundamental rights may have on society and alters the relationship between the government and citizen. New ICTs Issues concerning human rights differed significantly be- such as the Internet obviously have potential to give tween the first and second phases of WSIS. During the first greater reach to freedoms of expression than they had phase, they were principally concerned with the nature of before: more people can potentially communicate, share the WSIS texts’ commitment to existing human rights ideas and organise collectively than previously. This rep- standards, in particular reaffirmation of the Universal Dec- resents an increase in freedom of association as well as of laration of Human Rights and of commitments to gender expression. Content which is restricted or forbidden within equity and other fundamental principles. During the sec- national jurisdictions becomes more readily accessible, in- ond phase, the main human rights issues revolved around cluding content which national governments (and perhaps the venue for the second summit meeting and conflicts – also majority opinion) considers morally or politically rep- not least within civil society, as constituted within WSIS – rehensible. Rights to information and to communication, about how this should be handled. while implicit in established freedoms of expression, there- The first phase arguments about textual reaffirmation, at fore carry additional nuances. Governments which restrict heart, concern what rights are accepted as fundamental by freedoms of expression in the first place are wary of their the international community and what issues relating to extension, either in the form of rights to information and rights – or what nuances of those rights – need to be spelled communication or through the impact of new technologies. out in more detail or with more specificity. This is not the In practice, of course, new technologies also offer govern- place for a substantial discussion of international human ments new opportunities to observe and control citizens’ rights agreements. It is, perhaps, though, worth noting a behaviour, yet this potential was virtually unconsidered couple of points which had specific relevance to WSIS. in any WSIS forum, including (with some exceptions) civil society. The long-term impact of information technology Firstly, the reaffirmation of certain core texts in new in- on the balance of relations between the state and citizen ter-governmental agreements, particularly the Universal remains unclear: will the “information society” be one that Declaration, is essentially a question of the value and empowers individuals or governments, the liberation of significance of maintaining a common global set of stand- knowledge or the surveillance state? Fifty years from now, ards or aspirations. The concept of universal human it may well seem odd to those reflecting on it that a World rights, which sees them as inherent to all, has an am- Summit on the Information Society spent so much time biguous place in international discourse. Declarations of discussing the domain name and root server systems and universal rights and of equality are rarely challenged in so little on major transformations in the relationships be- principle, but commonly rejected or ignored in practice, tween people and their governments. either because they conflict with cultural norms or because they conflict with the perceived authority or wishes During the second phase of WSIS, the issue of information of governments. While almost all governments would and communication rights took on a more immediate and therefore claim to endorse fundamental rights agree- more “real life” character because the second summit was ments such as the Universal Declaration, and the out- to be held in Tunisia, a country with what is generally con- comes of subsequent inter-governmental processes like sidered a poor human rights record, including a record of the Beijing Declaration following the 1995 World Confer- obstructing access to Internet sites critical of the govern- ence on Women or the 1990 Convention on the Rights of ment and of suppressing free expression of dissent. Not all the Child, implementation in practice is very far from uni- governments were happy about the choice of Tunisia, but versal, and many governments feel uncomfortable with the issue had most impact on civil society. Some interna- parts of these core documents. Not explicitly reaffirming tional civil society organisations (CSOs) took the opportu- them in new international agreements potentially dilutes nity to denounce the Tunisian authorities; most expressed their significance, without overtly challenging the princi- solidarity with Tunisian organisations that were harassed ples that they contain. and excluded from participation in the WSIS process.

In principle, this question of reaffirmation is no different for Their campaigns, however, were complicated by the pres- human rights declarations than it is for the documents spell- ence within WSIS, from the Geneva summit onwards, of Tu- ing out the agreed international consensus (or compromise) nisian NGOs supportive of their government – organisations on development policy – i.e. the Millennium Development which were not regarded as “real” NGOs by most interna- Goals and the Monterrey Convention. However, in WSIS as tional civil society organisations, but which nevertheless had

48 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? rights to register and participate as such. They became par- the WSIS process as a whole. In the long term, this omis- ticularly active during the first PrepCom of the second phase, sion is probably the most remarkable feature of WSIS’ at- held in Hammamet (in Tunisia) in June 2004. Other civil so- tention to human rights. ciety participants felt their involvement there was aimed at removing critical references to Tunisia from civil society input and sought to exploit concerns about issues such as ICTs and development transparency and representativity in ways that fostered Most observers now seem to expect summits to focus on North-South divisions within the civil society group. It was development issues, in particular to provide a forum for well-organised and disruptive, both organisationally and resolving differences between industrial and developing politically. It dominated civil society discussion in the countries. They expect them to interrogate development Hammamet PrepCom, preventing strategisation around questions, looking in particular at development which is other issues, and continued to be problematic throughout not occurring rather than developments which are. Thus, the second phase. In particular, it hampered civil society although the “information society” is not inherently either efforts to explore other human rights issues. about developing countries alone or about relations be- During the second summit itself, some international CSOs tween them and industrial countries (where the most rapid worked closely with excluded Tunisian NGOs, including at- changes associated with an information society are to be tempts to organise alternative events outside the summit found), most interviewees for this project expected, from site. These initiatives were largely prevented by the Tuni- the start, that the summit would place development at the sian authorities. heart of its agenda. This expectation was increased by the interventions of UNESCO and other development-focused The impact of this “Tunisia factor” on civil society within agencies during the initiation phase of WSIS, when they WSIS is considered further in Chapter 7. Interviews sug- sought to dilute the technocratic emphasis they felt the gest that it was regarded as something of an embarrass- ITU was giving it, and to increase its social and economic ment by WSIS organisers that the second summit was held content. in a country where freedom of expression was substan- The WSIS outcome documents convey no sense that the tially curtailed. To some extent, they suggest, this may re- role of ICTs in development is or has been any way contested. flect naïveté on the part of the ITU, especially, at the time The Tunis Commitment, for example, refers to “a unique that summit venues were selected. With no experience in opportunity to raise awareness of the benefits that Infor- human rights issues, the ITU simply did not anticipate that mation and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can bring the summit would focus substantially on rights issues or to humanity and the manner in which they can transform that the selection of Tunisia would prove problematic. Most people’s activities, interaction and lives, and thus increase participants outside civil society, however, when asked, confidence in the future.”12 In fact, however, the view that did not seem particularly aware of the problems being ICTs have a major part to play in development in general is faced by Tunisian NGOs or the difficulties this posed for neither old nor uncontested. This needs some context. civil society as a whole. It is, first, relatively new. The much-cited Maitland Com- Issues to do with human rights and, in particular, freedoms mission, which called for action to increase teledensity in of expression were an important part of the WSIS debate. developing countries in the mid-1980s, had little discern- However, the two principal areas in which they arose were able impact on international development thinking. Inter- essentially ones in which human rights advocates de- national financial institutions (IFIs) withdrew from lend- fended established positions – the affirmation of funda- ing for telecommunications infrastructure in the early mental statements of human rights, and the rights of Tu- 1990s because they felt this could and should be funded nisian civil society organisations to participate effectively by the private sector. Until at least the mid-1990s, the con- in their own country and in WSIS itself. Many other rights sensus in development agencies was that ICTs, including issues were raised to some extent within the context of telephony but perhaps excluding broadcast radio, were the WSIS outcome texts. Much of the discussion around luxuries of benefit to the wealthy and irrelevant to poverty these concerned the inclusion of specific references to reduction. This view only began to change in the late 1990s, particular rights issues within the information society con- notably around the time of the first Global Knowledge Con- text - either reaffirmations of existing principles or clear ference in 1997. The idea that ICTs are powerful instru- statements of their applicability in a new dimension of ments of development is therefore recent. social and economic life. It is difficult to find much in the texts which can be seen as an extension of human rights Nor is it universally held. ICTs do not feature prominently principles, but equally hard to find anything that might in the key instruments of international development policy diminish them. As noted above, the global impact of new – the Monterrey Consensus, the Millennium Development ICTs and of an “information society” on the relationship between the state and citizen received little attention in 12 Tunis Commitment, article 5.

Section B . Analysis 49 Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) Under favourable conditions [emphasis added], these and other agreements reached between national govern- technologies can be a powerful instrument, increas- ments and donors. The MDGs focus on the reduction of ing productivity, generating economic growth, job crea- income and non-income poverty, and set targets for im- tion and employability and improving the quality of provements in basic indicators of the quality of life (such life of all. They can also promote dialogue among peo- as health, education and gender equity) rather than the ple, nations and civilizations.14 use of particular assets (such as bicycles, radios or phones). Only MDG target 18 mentions ICTs, and does so However, the surrounding text reflects the conviction of in the context of a goal that gathers up a few other issues advocates rather than the concerns of sceptics. Of course, rather than giving them priority.13 Neither the reports of WSIS did not set out to address this paradigm gap. It was the Millennium Project orchestrated by the UN nor the initially convened, and then overwhelmingly attended, by Human Development Report published by the UNDP in those already convinced of the merits of ICTs in develop- 2005 to review progress on the MDGs pays much atten- ment. Although they had different approaches to their tion to ICTs; the latter almost none. PRS documents devel- developmental role (and to the importance of technology oped by the governments of developing countries, in as- per se), the different agencies contesting oversight of WSIS sociation with the World Bank and donor countries, also – the ITU, UNESCO, etc. – all did so from a pro-ICD per- pay little attention to them. As noted in Chapter 4, there spective. The overall ethos of WSIS from the start was one was little interaction between WSIS and the Millennium that advocated ICD, which placed it firmly on one side of Review Summit, also held in 2005, and WSIS’ debates and the gap and, some mainstream development sector inter- outcomes had little impact on its conclusions. viewees suggested, undermined interest in it as an event that might also attract the interest of sceptics. This dichotomy reflects what is increasingly being seen as a significant paradigm gap between ICT/ICD advocates, Some interviewees for this study whose experience on the one hand, and many mainstream development spe- crosses the boundaries between ICD and mainstream de- cialists, on the other. Its roots lie in the fact that few main- velopment – including people based in both ICD and mainstream development specialists have much experience of stream agencies - feel that a major opportunity was lost the potential and limitations of ICTs, and remain sceptical here. They suggest, in effect, that by treating WSIS as an about their viability within their spheres of action, certainly opportunity to assert that ICTs were the future for devel- in achieving the very substantial gains put forward by ad- opment, ICD advocates missed the opportunity to put their vocates of new technology; while ICT specialists in gen- case for this to mainstream development agencies; and eral have limited understanding of poverty issues or the also missed the opportunity to learn sufficient about main- constraints posed by limited human resources, intermit- stream development concerns to make their own assess- tent electric power and conservative behaviour patterns ments more focused on these priorities. A world summit in limiting the impact new technologies have on social and on the information society, their argument runs, should economic life. The former suspect what they regard as tech- have been an opportunity for different perceptions of the nological determinism in the latter – the idea that tech- role of ICTs in development to be discussed in depth, and nologies necessarily imply progress and that, because a for a closer common understanding of them to be reached. technology can do something, it necessarily will. The lat- The fact that WSIS’ outcomes were largely ignored in the ter suspect the former of conservatism, in particular of Millennium Review shows that it did little or nothing to unwillingness to try new methods of doing things in the enhance that common understanding. The lack of any face of intractable problems. Most donors have responded marked new enthusiasm for ICTs in development in multi- to this paradigm gap by mainstreaming ICTs, in effect sup- lateral and bilateral agencies since WSIS or for participa- porting ICT use in development programmes only where it tion in WSIS follow-up – and the reduction in interest ap- contributes to established mainstream objectives (such parent in some bilateral agencies – adds to this sense of as the MDGs and the national development planning goals opportunity lost. If accurate, this is obviously a serious fail- set out in PRS). ing in WSIS as an instrument of international policy, particularly if, as discussed below, reduction of interest on the Little of this paradigm gap is evident in the WSIS outcome part of donors was accompanied by greater awareness/in- documents. The Geneva Declaration does acknowledge terest on the part of developing country governments. that ICTs should not be considered panaceas: “We are aware that ICTs should be regarded as tools and not as an It is worth looking at this question from two particular end in themselves,” it says, adding that: angles: that of participation in the WSIS events, and that of the Geneva and Tunis outcome documents.

13 Target 18 commits governments, “in cooperation with the private sector, [to] make available the benefits of new technologies - especially information and communications technologies.” See www.un.org/millenniumgoals/#. 14 Geneva Declaration of Principles, article 9.

50 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Participation in WSIS varied, but focused strongly on those • Civil society participation also focused on agencies with a strong ICT background. This was particularly true in with a particular interest in ICTs – whether from a rights the preparatory committees, while there was more diver- or an ICD perspective. Mainstream development NGOs sity of participation (or at least attendance) in the plenary – which are often particularly sceptical about the value summit sessions: of ICTs for meeting grassroots needs - were mostly absent, and did not contribute to civil society input • Inter-governmental agencies within the UN family par- into WSIS. Mainstream rights CSOs were also not participated, more or less in accordance with the extent ticularly active. Civil society participation is the primary of their engagement in ICD: UNESCO, the UNDP, the focus of Chapter 7. World Bank and its associated infoDev having a larger presence, but agencies such as the FAO and the WHO In summary, the record of participation – as seen in list of also showing their ICD wares in exhibition spaces. En- participants to PrepComs and summit meetings them- thusiasm for participation varied here: many of those selves and as discussed with participants from all interviewed within these agencies felt that it was nec- stakeholder groups – tends to confirm the view that WSIS essary for them to be present, but that the primary was more a meeting of ICT specialists than a meeting of value from being there would be derived from network- minds between such specialists and the wider developing rather than the conclusions of the summit itself. ment community. • Industrial country delegations were led, mostly, by dip- That view also tends to be confirmed by a review of the lomats and by commercial and industrial departments Geneva and Tunis outcome documents. Both of these, as of government responsible for the ICT sector. Repre- noted above, strongly endorse the role of ICTs in future sentatives from donor agencies within these govern- development. A key section of the Geneva Plan of Action ments tended to play a subordinate role, often (they lists a number of application areas in which ICTs are ex- felt) very subordinate – their prime objective being not pected to play such a critical role, prefacing each with the to promote ICTs in development but to prevent com- letter “e” (which, incidentally, is significantly disliked – mitments being made which went beyond their own perhaps seen as appropriation - in mainstream develop- assessments of them. They were less visible during ment communities): “e-government”, “e-business”, “e- the second phase of WSIS than the first, at least after learning”, “e-health”, “e-employment”, “e-environment”, its second PrepCom had effectively resolved the issue “e-agriculture”, “e-science”.15 The detail, however, that ac- of infrastructure finance. Discussion with such donor companies these is poorly structured and has clearly been agency representatives suggests that they were, on agreed by negotiation rather than analysis, derived from the whole, less convinced of WSIS’ merits than their submissions by ICT rather than sectoral specialists. That colleagues from multilateral agencies. on “e-agriculture” illustrates the point - here it is in full: • Developing country delegations were also generally led by diplomats and by representatives of the tel- a. Ensure the systematic dissemination of information ecommunications establishment (ministries of com- using ICTs on agriculture, animal husbandry, fisheries, munications, communications regulators, fixed net- forestry and food, in order to provide ready access to work operators). With some exceptions, few govern- comprehensive, up-to-date and detailed knowledge ments included mainstream development ministries and information, particularly in rural areas. in their delegations. However, enthusiasm for WSIS b. Public-private partnerships should seek to maximize and for its role in promoting ICTs in development was the use of ICTs as an instrument to improve produc- much stronger among these delegates than their peers tion (quantity and quality).16 from industrial countries. Their participation is ex- plored further in Chapter 6. Much of the text is also written from a supply- or technology-led perspective, starting from what ICTs can do rather • Private sector engagement was primarily directed than from the development challenges (poverty, illiteracy, through the Coordinating Committee of Business In- HIV/AIDS, lack of clean water, etc.) that are central to the terlocutors (CCBI), which brought together interna- MDGs and therefore all mainstream development activity. tional business representative bodies under the leadership of the International Chamber of Commerce. Almost all those with a development background who were Participation in private sector engagement with WSIS interviewed for this project felt that these texts were a poor focused on businesses with particular interests in the reflection of the substantial thought which has gone into supply of ICTs (such as equipment manufacturers) defining the information society and its relation to devel- rather than its users (such as the financial services opment over the past decade, including the four years of sector). ICT businesses also took the opportunity of WSIS itself. Organisations as varied as the World Bank, the summit exhibition spaces to market their goods

and services. More comment on private sector engage- 15 Geneva Plan of Action, section C7, articles 14-22. ment can be found in Chapter 7. 16 ibid., article 21.

Section B . Analysis 51 the Canadian International Development Research Centre, There is, however, general agreement among interview- the Global Knowledge Partnership and a variety of non- ees that WSIS did foster much greater awareness of the governmental organisations have generated far more so- potential of new technologies, particularly within devel- phisticated and coherent analyses of the potential of ICTs, oping countries (or at least amongst ICT-related decision- the “knowledge society” and related concepts than any- makers). This, they feel, was not a result of the WSIS texts thing in the WSIS outcome documents.17 The latter, by or the negotiating process around them, but of the oppor- comparison, provide a poorly argued case; one that is only tunity WSIS presented for people to meet, network and weakly rooted in the overarching development and pov- share experience. For some, this value came from pro- erty challenges, and which, today, many already think has longed engagement with particular issues during the an outdated feel. There is a strong sense of disappoint- PrepCom process. (Some civil society organisations, for ment amongst development-oriented interviewees for this example, report increased interest in their ICD activities study that the outcome of a global summit on these is- and advice from developing country governments.) For sues should be so much less substantial, developmental more, particularly in civil society, it focused on the infor- or forward-looking than work which, it is felt, could have mal summit that surrounded each of the two plenary ses- informed it much more effectively. sions – the combination of exhibition space, including a great deal of space devoted to development agency expe- This WSIS text in fact betrays its origins. To populate the rience (especially in Geneva), and a wide range of panel WSIS draft documents, the ITU asked governments, other discussions and presentations, the quality and sophisti- stakeholders and regional preparatory conferences for two cation of which greatly exceeded those in the summit’s kinds of input: for their views on issues for inclusion, and formal space. Some delegates, as well as observers, also for examples of success stories within their own territo- indulged extensively in the opportunities afforded by the ries. The former found their way into the draft outcome informal summit. While most participants would therefore documents, the latter into a “WSIS stocktaking” exercise. have gained little knowledge from the formal sessions, The quality and nature of input from regional meetings was many gained a good deal from the informal summit, and also variable. Perhaps this approach stemmed from the reported that this would influence them in ongoing debate perception that WSIS was about an opportunity rather than and policy development at home. They felt the same would a problem. It failed, however, to raise questions and chal- be true of colleagues. lenges about the role of ICTs in development, or to encourage debate about their potential and limitations, either It will be interesting to see how this increased level of within contributing governments/countries/organisations awareness might be built on in the future. On the whole, or within the WSIS process. WSIS received scant attention in the media anywhere. Press interest in the first summit was limited, and journal- How do participants feel that WSIS has affected percep- ists were more attentive there to press conferences by tions of ICT and development issues among the different heads of state that promised news about issues other than stakeholders? Opinion varies. As might be expected from the summit itself. In the second phase, press interest was the above analysis, while some delegates were support- almost entirely confined to Internet governance (very of- ive of the advocacy approach to ICD within WSIS, others ten poorly understood, and sometimes along apocalyptic were concerned that it lacked depth and discouraged en- lines (such as “24 hours to save the Internet”)). ICTs and gagement with other, less committed stakeholder groups. development did not feature in the media, which did not Certainly, few felt that WSIS did anything to foster innova- therefore generally provide a means for the awareness- tive thinking about ICTs in development. While innovative raising experienced by delegates to trickle down to gen- thinking was going on while WSIS took place – indeed, eral populations (or indeed to many in the wider develop- the four years concerned saw a burgeoning literature of ment community). increasing diversity and quality, much of it available in the summit exhibition areas and/or presented in the informal A separate impact may be seen in the decision-making discussion sessions surrounding the summit – hardly any processes of developing countries themselves. Most in- of this trickled through to PrepComs or to plenaries. The terviewees agreed that the whole WSIS experience did WSIS outcome documents are not being displayed by ICD raise awareness of ICTs within developing country gov- proponents as authoritative statements of the role of ICTs ernments. Many of those that had not participated in DOT in development because they do not have sufficient cred- Force-era enthusiasm for ICT/ICD caught a whiff of that ibility to play this role, either within or outside the ICD era’s sense of excitement about their potential. Many of community. those who had participated in it had their enthusiasm reinforced by the pro-ICT/ICD ethos of WSIS. Although the quality and scope of their efforts varied, some developing country governments did try to institute new multi- 17 The extensive literature on ICD issues can be accessed through such stakeholder fora or spaces in which the wider community portals as the Development Gateway (www.developmentgateway.org) and the Communication Initiative (www.comminit.com). could contribute to WSIS policymaking. This question is

52 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? discussed further in Chapter 6, which illustrates some 2006 World Telecommunication Development Conference country experiences from case studies undertaken for this than did that in 2002 - only the World Bank and UNESCO study, but it is worth noting now that increased interest participated from the UN family in 2006, for example, while and enthusiasm in developing countries may not be the UN ICT Task Force and the FAO were also present four matched in multilateral and bilateral donors. years earlier.18 Participation in the first meetings of WSIS follow-up action lines (discussed in Chapter 8) has been Some of the most intriguing, but as yet uncertain, impacts patchy, at best. Some bilateral agencies, notably DFID (UK), of WSIS may be on the inter-governmental agencies and have downgraded the status of ICT/ICD work while few – donor governments participating in the summit. Although the Swiss Development Corporation (SDC) is one example development agencies had paid little attention to infor- – have raised its status. Bilateral agencies are more firmly mation and communication technologies for development mainstreaming ICD activity, and some (notably DFID, which in the early 1990s, by the time WSIS began the topic was has established a substantial Government and Transpar- both familiar and fashionable. The World Bank, UNESCO ency Fund including media support)19 seem to be paying and other international agencies had developed substan- more attention now to more traditional information and tial policies on ICD, while other specialist agencies were communication roles in development (for example, to the also looking seriously at its relevance to their work. Many media) than to technology. bilateral donors had initiated ICT/ICD programmes of their own, from USAID’s Leland Initiative to DFID’s “Building All of which looks, from WSIS’ point of view, rather coun- Digital Opportunities” and the Acacia Programme of Cana- terproductive: the summit was meant to increase funding da’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC). and resources to ICD, not to diminish them. It is too early yet to reach any firm conclusions on this, but some inter- Some of these agencies had been involved in the G8 DOT viewees suggest that it may well be that WSIS (perhaps Force and all played some part, in some cases reluctantly, even its first phase) represents the highpoint of develop- in the subsequent UN ICT Task Force. None, however, ac- ment agencies’ interest in ICTs, rather than the start of cording to interviewees, was likely to increase its activity something big. Senior decision-makers in many bilateral in ICD as a specific result of WSIS taking place. WSIS was agencies seem to be less convinced than they were in 2001 never really intended to raise their awareness but that of of the potential of ICTs to achieve major impacts on the others, though it might have been expected to increase MDGs, at least in the short term, and to be more fearful of coordination of agency activities (in line with general de- diverting resources from more tried and trusted ap- velopment policy thinking on the need for greater aid har- proaches at this stage. However, as previous paragraphs monisation). suggest, this trend may coincide with a contrary increase Interviewees from such agencies were divided about the of interest in ICTs within developing country governments, impact which it has had on their agencies’ engagement which may look more often to multilateral agencies for with the issues. Some felt that WSIS enhanced their abil- support where it is concerned. Time will tell how this turns ity to engage with partners and perhaps raised conscious- out - though the WSIS follow-up process as it stands looks ness of their work amongst their colleagues. Others con- poorly equipped to monitor and evaluate on our behalf. sidered it a diversion from what might have been more productive ICD initiatives and suggested that it may even have reduced subsequent interest among their colleagues: Infrastructure finance “now that the summit is over”, said one, “they think the and Internet governance issue has been dealt with and that we should move on to other things.” This post-WSIS effect may be of particular Two issues were left unresolved by the Geneva phase of interest where bilateral donors are concerned. These typi- WSIS, passed to interim fora (the Task Force on Financial cally have very few staff engaged on ICT/ICD work. By the Mechanisms and the Working Group on Internet Govern- start, let alone the end, of the Tunis phase, they were ex- ance), and these accounted for the majority of work un- hibiting “WSIS fatigue”. They were among those most dertaken during the second phase. sceptical of the value of a second phase and most con- The two interim fora were crucially important to the way cerned at it diverting attention away from specific initia- in which WSIS dealt with these unresolved issues. Much tives being undertaken by their agencies. has been made of their difference in form and style, par- In practice, since the end of WSIS, interviewees suggest ticularly the way in which they organised discussion of their there has if anything been a falling away of interest in ICTs issues and the way in which they handled multistakeholder from bilateral, and perhaps also multilateral, agencies. Certainly, there have been few major new ICD initiatives launched since WSIS - the Africa infrastructure initiative 18 See participation lists at www.itu.int/ITU-D/conferences/wtdc/2002/ and www.itu.int/ITU-D/wtdc06/index.html. described in the following section being one exception. 19 See DFID White Paper, Making Governance Work for the Poor, 2006, Fewer bilateral and multilateral agencies attended the ITU’s available from: www.dfid.gov.uk/wp2006/default.asp.

Section B . Analysis 53 participation. A word on this here will help to clarify some and, indeed, for Internet governance itself. In both cases, of the points made below and in Chapters 6 and 7. the inclusion of expertise and knowledge from these groups was crucial to the outcome of WSIS negotiations The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms followed a con- on the issues. These representational questions are dis- ventional format for United Nations agencies in address- cussed in Chapter 7. ing the issues before it. In the case of the TFFM, the UN Development Programme led the task force process, in Both fora were also crucial to the degree of success that association with the World Bank and UNDESA (the UN could be attributed to WSIS. The first summit almost broke Department of Economic and Social Affairs). Selected, down entirely on the question of infrastructure finance. regionally-balanced, representatives from key institu- Without a new forum to discuss this, there would have tions concerned with infrastructure finance - including been no outcome document for heads of state to sign in governments, UN and other inter-governmental organi- Geneva. Internet governance was also a significant area sations, and the private sector - acted as members of the of dispute in Geneva, but it was not until the Tunis phase Task Force. These members were not engaged actively in that it reached the same degree of crisis as infrastructure research and analysis. Consultants were hired to do this finance had caused before. Without a resolution of these and to report to the Task Force, which then discussed their issues, WSIS today would be seen as a failure. The two conclusions from an essentially political perspective. processes, and the issues associated with them, are con- Consultation with the private sector and civil society was sidered in turn below. limited. The Task Force report was presented to the second PrepCom of WSIS’ second phase, where it was largely Infrastructure finance agreed without dissent. None of this received much public attention. The centrepiece of the problem posed to the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms was the proposal for a Digital The Working Group on Internet Governance, by contrast, Solidarity Fund made by President Wade of Senegal dur- was considerably more innovative in its structure and modus ing the first WSIS phase and backed by a substantial operandi. Participants - much more diverse, including sig- number of other developing countries. This proposal, if nificant numbers from the private sector, civil society and agreed, would have established a new, probably UN-led, the Internet community - were selected through a process fund specifically concerned with financing ICT infrastruc- of mediated consultation managed by the UN and its ap- ture and applications. It was opposed by donor countries pointed agents (the Working Group chair and secretariat), during the first WSIS phase because they argued that it with a view to inclusiveness. Working Group members acted would divert funds from other established priorities (such (or at least were asked to act, and mostly did) as individu- as the MDGs), would be inconsistent with mainstream- als, not representatives of their institutions. They did the ing, and was in any case not needed since existing financ- Group’s work themselves, rather than hiring consultants; ing mechanisms were underused. The tussle between ad- held open sessions to include the views of a wide range of vocates and opponents of the Digital Solidarity Fund al- other stakeholders; and debated their way to a consensus most prevented the first summit from reaching agree- on the various points within their remit (or, in one case, to a ment: only tough last-minute diplomacy by the Swiss set of options). Their report was received with much less PrepCom president forced through the compromise of re- consensus but formed a vital part of ongoing argument ferring the issue to an interim Task Force. about Internet governance when the issue reverted to WSIS PrepComs. Their issue received more public attention than The Task Force on Financial Mechanisms has been quite anything else in the whole Summit process. widely disparaged, not least by some civil society organisations because of the narrow limits of multistakeholder Both fora were faced with the same problem: the under- participation they experienced. In addition, it has been representation of key stakeholders during negotiations on quite widely suggested that the Task Force’s report had their issues during the first WSIS phase. In both cases, the nothing really new to say and that it had no real impact critical issue here was not what is normally understood by on the outcomes of WSIS. This criticism tends to come, multistakeholder participation - i.e. the involvement of the however, from ICT/ICD-focused CSOs rather than from private sector and civil society, though these were (of course) mainstream development agencies - which have been sig- excluded from formal negotiations in the WSIS process - nificantly absent from this debate. Discussions with those but the absence of more specific groups whose expertise who are most closely involved in international ICT/ICD was vital and whose interests were directly concerned. In issues suggest that it is, however, a rather shallow as- the case of the TFFM, this was the donor community (main- sessment. The TFFM, they suggest, was presented with stream development agencies and bilateral national donors) quite a complex problem, which underlay the remit it was responsible for the allocation of development funding. In handed. It is worth setting this problem out in some de- that of the WGIG, it was the Internet community, those re- tail before looking further at the role of the TFFM and its sponsible for the provision and delivery of Internet services implications.

54 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? International agencies and governments are alike commit- particularly if this were interpreted to include higher value ted to a series of international instruments which provide ICTs like the Internet (whose effective use is increasingly a framework for the allocation of development funds (from dependent on broadband infrastructure). both multilateral agencies and bilateral donors). The most The original Digital Solidarity Fund proposal - to set up a important of these are: new mechanism explicitly for ICT infrastructure and appli- 1. The Monterrey Consensus (the outcome of the 2002 cations - therefore lay outside both the core agreements United Nations International Conference on Financing on international development and the tenor of orthodox for Development), which determines the overall frame- development agency thinking. Its achievement would re- work for development aid finance. quire either reallocation of existing development funds 2. The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its pred- (which would require, in effect, reinterpretation of the ex- ecessor documents, which establish principles for the isting development agreements) or the allocation of new determination of development spending, including funding (which, were it available, donors would prefer to national ownership of development strategies and in- focus on the established MDGs). As some interviewees ter-agency harmonisation amongst donors. from the donor community saw it, the demand for the Dig- ital Solidarity Fund amounted to the demand for ICTs to 3. The Millennium Development Goals, which establish be treated as a new MDG – i.e. a new priority for develop- priority targets - focused on poverty reduction - for the ment action - which would be inconsistent with the period up to 2015. Monterrey and MDG agreements. Consenting to it would 4. Poverty Reduction Strategies, i.e. national develop- open up those core agreements to demands from other ment plans formulated - at least in theory - through vested interest groups. consultative processes, which provide the basis for Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, for While the DSF was supported by many developing country World Bank financing agreements and for much bilat- delegations within the WSIS negotiations, donors also noted eral donor support. that these delegations were mostly led by officials from telecommunications or ICT ministries, who, not surprisingly, None of these international agreements gives priority to supported additional resources for their own areas of re- ICTs or envisages significant development (as opposed to sponsibility. They were unclear, however, if the DSF proposal private sector) funding for ICT infrastructure. also had support from mainstream development ministries Orthodox development agency thinking on ICT infrastruc- or ministries of finance, whose priorities for funding lay in ture investment since the early 1990s had been that this their Poverty Reduction Strategies and other instruments should be left to the private sector. IFI, multilateral donor setting out national development objectives. They sus- and bilateral donor investment in this context have there- pected that, like themselves, many national development fore been largely confined to capacity-building: assisting leaders would be reluctant to see new resources allocated governments to create the conditions for foreign direct in- to sectors that did not fall within their PRS priorities. Pri- vestment (FDI) by privatising incumbent telecoms monopo- vately, some national development leaders have indicated lies, liberalising telecoms markets in general and estab- that this was their view, but that expressing solidarity with lishing independent regulatory authorities to promote com- a developing country proposal for change also played an petition. Private sector investment in telecoms infrastruc- important part in determining their position on the DSF. ture since the 1990s has been spectacular – one of the most This series of observations suggests that two potential substantial and successful areas of FDI yet experienced. contests over resources were subsumed within the wider This has in turn achieved very considerable growth in ac- DSF debate: one between donors and aid beneficiary coun- cess to telecommunications. Teledensities (the number of tries, which was essentially about the scale of develop- telephones per 100 citizens) had been stagnant at around ment resources; and one between ICT advocates/minis- 0.5% in Least Developed Countries for many years, before tries and mainstream development managers within both the influx of FDI associated with liberalisation and the in- donors and developing countries, which was essentially troduction of mobile technology boosted them from the about the desirability of allocating resources to ICTs. late 1980s. This, again, has led to one of the fastest growth rates recorded for adoption of any technology. The TFFM’s mandate, here, was crucial. Donor countries ensured that this required it to review the use made of Within the development community, this strategy has been existing sources of finance as well as the desirability of regarded as successful, enabling available finance to be fo- something new. As the Geneva Plan of Action put it: cused instead on other, more intractable, core infrastructure requirements such as water, power and transport. Only in While all existing financial mechanisms should be fully the ICT sector had a perception begun growing, by the time exploited, a thorough review of their adequacy in meet- WSIS began, that private sector investment might be insuffi- ing the challenges of ICT for development should be cient to meet the future access gap for communications, completed by the end of December 2004. … Based on

Section B . Analysis 55 the conclusion of the review, improvements and inno- from governments or development agencies/IFIs) to sup- vations of financing mechanisms will be considered plement (but not replace) private sector-led investment including the effectiveness, the feasibility and the crea- strategies, mark as significant a change in overall thinking tion of a voluntary Digital Solidarity Fund, as men- about ICT infrastructure finance as the original DSF pro- tioned in the Declaration of Principles.20 posal, and one that is more consistent with other development finance instruments. Joint public/private partnership To place the DSF proposal in the context of overall devel- investment, in particular, is mentioned in this context. While opment finance and existing finance instruments, the TFFM couched in conservative language, in other words, the Task also needed to bring mainstream development thinking Force report includes quite a significant movement away into the debate about infrastructure finance, rather than from the “private sector only” consensus that had domi- leaving this to ICT specialists. Its membership structure – nated thinking on ICT infrastructure since the early 1990s. drawing on the ranks of development as well as infrastructure expertise – facilitated this. So did its methodology – One of the surprising features of the second phase of WSIS using a consultancy report which focused on assessment is that the infrastructure finance issue - which had almost of existing financial instruments and considered new de- prevented agreement in Geneva - barely resurfaced again mands in the context of past practice, and which placed after the Task Force report. The advocates of the Digital ICT infrastructure investment itself within the context of Solidarity Fund played virtually no part in the Task Force overall development finance. for Financial Mechanisms itself, apparently by choice, and accepted the almost total marginalisation of the DSF pro- It is not surprising, therefore, that the Task Force report is posal in the TFFM report without demur when it was dis- grounded in more mainstream development thinking than cussed in the second PrepCom of the Tunis phase. A vol- is the Geneva Plan of Action.21 For this reason, the report untary DSF was established, but has failed to make a mark has been considered conservative by many ICT-oriented and is generally considered unlikely to do so in future. observers, particularly in civil society. Its approach to the Many interviewees considered this vestigial DSF no more DSF itself also put this on the back burner. As described in than a face-saving exercise (though one that was indeed Chapter 3, the Task Force took the view that existing financ- effective at saving face). ing instruments were insufficiently used at present and that there was scope for making further use of these and for Why did the DSF, which had caused such a fuss in Geneva, alternative new financing initiatives such as public-private raise so few hackles barely six months later? One sug- partnerships. It did not, therefore, endorse the DSF pro- gested explanation is that the rethinking described above posal in the form that it had been promoted. Indeed, the within the Task Force report led shortly afterwards to a report dismissed the DSF proposal in very few words insignificant change in actual practice. Keen to avoid the DSF deed, though it did “welcome” an attenuated voluntary and to show that alternatives were viable, the World Bank fund.22 Some interviewees, from some developing coun- and the European Commission took the opportunity of the tries and from ICT-oriented civil society organisations in Africa regional meeting for the second phase of WSIS, in particular, see this as a rebuff to a developing country pro- Accra in February 2005, to put forward a new infrastruc- posal from the international development establishment. ture initiative for Africa: an initiative which they presented as indicating a new, more active approach to ICT infrastruc- Some interviewees from that development establishment ture finance by development agencies, and which gave the suggest a different interpretation – that the apparent con- proponents of the DSF sufficient value to call off the hunt servatism of the Task Force report masks the starting point for a better Fund within the main negotiations. for a significant rethinking of the role of development finance in relation to ICT infrastructure. The Task Force re- This interpretation suggests, in other words, that the in- port, they say, did look seriously at the changing nature of frastructure finance issue has been more dynamic than the infrastructure finance, especially concerning remote and general ICT and development debate described above. It rural areas and concerning higher specification networks, suggests that the developing country-led proposal for a recognising that the world might have reached a point in Digital Solidarity Fund was effectively bought off by the time where private sector investment had peaked and new introduction of alternatives which were more acceptable technologies presented the possibility of much higher lev- to donors (industrial countries) but met enough of the pri- els of service becoming available through different types orities of the DSF’s proponents (who also recognised that of infrastructure. They argue that the alternative ap- the strength of donor hostility was unlikely to be over- proaches to infrastructure finance suggested by the report, come). Subsequent publications by the World Bank and including widened scope for public investment (whether other international actors have consolidated an apparent shift in emphasis towards more proactive IFI investment 20 Geneva Plan of Action, section D2, article 27.f. in ICT infrastructure, albeit within the same overall frame- 21 The report, Financing ICTD, is available from: www.itu.int/wsis/tffm/ final-report.pdf. work of private sector leadership and the promotion of 22 See Financing ICTD, p. 94. sector restructuring/liberalisation.

56 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? At the heart of this issue, perhaps, lay a difference of per- The relative priority to be accorded this form of infrastruc- ception between developing and donor countries. Devel- ture remains unclear to most donors (and, if PRS processes oping countries pressed hard for a particular approach to are to be believed, to their development partners). How- be agreed during the first phase of WSIS, with strong lead- ever, the DSF proposal was sufficient to push some into a ership at high level coming from the President of Senegal. rethinking of their long-term strategy, initially as a way of Support for this position was widespread within the de- avoiding what they saw as a worse outcome (an independ- veloping world, coming not just from Africa but also from ent, UN-managed fund), latterly with more conviction. This countries such as India. It was also backed by many civil could be described as a victory, as readily as a defeat, for society organisations, expressing solidarity with a devel- developing country solidarity. Its implications are dis- oping country demand – though it should be borne in mind cussed in Chapter 6. that few of the civil society organisations involved in WSIS were development NGOs. Developing country solidarity was, however, weaker than it might have appeared to be. Internet governance It was Francophone West African countries in particular When WSIS was first proposed, no-one expected Internet that supported President Wade; privately, delegates from governance to be one of its priorities. In fact, there was other parts of Africa expressed some concern about the almost no discussion of Internet governance in the first original DSF proposal, and interviews suggest that these phase preparatory process until the Western Asia (Middle private doubts were shared by more powerful figures in East) regional meeting - the last to be held - in February non-ICT ministries. Ultimately, it was the developing coun- 2003. Yet, from that point on, issues to do with Internet try bloc, not donors, that blinked in Geneva and allowed governance became hugely important and highly divisive. the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms to be established. Internet governance was one of two issues which almost collapsed the first summit session. It predominated in the The DSF’s supporters also failed to pursue their proposal second phase so much that some have described Tunis as vigorously during and after the TFFM, particularly after a a world summit on Internet governance rather than on the more substantive proposal for African infrastructure was information society. put on the table. The most apparent gain from this issue becoming so prominent in Geneva was obtained by those Why did Internet governance become so important to the African developing countries that will benefit from this ini- WSIS process? A number of suggestions were made about tiative, and it could be argued, therefore, that their con- this by interviewees: certed effort and brinkmanship in the Geneva phase paid off. Taking this issue to the wire did lead to a reward. The Firstly, some suggest, it was an issue waiting in the wings DSF per se was not essential to its proponents, though for the right occasion to come along. Almost uniquely in the establishment of a voluntary fund helped to save any human history, the Internet has become very important face that needed saving.23 What was important was some with very little government involvement. It was other stake- money on the table, and the switch in thinking on the part holders – at first individuals (computer experts, many with of donors that accompanied it. Time will tell whether the anti-authoritarian instincts) and cooperative fora that they scope and scale of the African infrastructure initiative will established (such as the Internet Engineering Task Force) look substantial enough in years to come. – later joined by private sector actors, that took and moulded the shape of the Internet (in spite of its origins in The switch in donor thinking involved here should not be the US military). The result was a global phenomenon exaggerated at this stage. Nevertheless, a good many in largely outside the control of governments or the remit of the development sector think it was probably overdue. inter-governmental organisations. However practical this Stimulation of private sector investment proved very suc- may have been in its own terms, it was a vacuum that the cessful in promoting telecommunications access in the institutions of international governance were unlikely to 1990s, but has left a residual access gap that, it seems, leave alone for ever. Many governments wanted to take can only be addressed by greater intervention. Interna- charge of something that could undermine their own au- tional development agencies continue to take the view that thority. Some felt it inherently wrong that any major social private sector investment, supported by restructuring and force should be so far outwith government control. In this liberalisation, will account for most required investment, sense, the Internet governance issue might be seen as one 24 but not all. Private sector investment may also be insuf- of the authority of governments vis-à-vis their citizens. ficient to stimulate higher bandwidth access in the future. Secondly, where governments were engaged, they were not equitably so. Of course, inequity in government own-

23 The DSF’s limited activity to date can be found at www.dsf-fsn.org/ ership and engagement in international issues is nothing cms/content/view/43/77/lang,en. unusual in itself. In this case, however, the apparent ineq- 24 The GSM Association has suggested that private investment will uity was particularly marked, with the US government at deliver access to 95% of the world’s population – see its report Universal Access at www.gsmworld.com/universalaccess/index.shtml. least appearing to have great potential powers over both

Section B . Analysis 57 domains and root servers, control over which, if exercised, therefore low – lower than it might have been on other is- would impact strongly on national sovereignty. The extent sues – and posed less risk to those engaged upon it (though to which such powers had been exercised was minimal and the impact of changes that might result could be profound). the extent to which they could be exercised in practice was As with infrastructure finance, Internet governance was an uncertain, but the issue had obvious symbolic importance issue which divided developing from industrial countries. – not least as a symbol of American hegemony in a mono- On the whole, industrial countries were satisfied with the polar world, and thereby also of the international balance level of Internet governance currently prevailing at the start of power between industrial and developing countries. This of WSIS: they felt that more governance would slow down dimension of the question might be seen as one of the innovation and opportunities for investment. Developing authority of governments versus other governments, par- countries in general were less comfortable that an increas- ticularly less powerful versus more powerful governments. ingly important sector lacked inter-governmental oversight Thirdly, a good many interviewees believe, rightly or not, comparable with the ITU’s historic role in telecommunica- that the dispute over Internet governance was driven by tions and the Universal Postal Union (UPU)’s in postal serv- ambitions within the ITU – not necessarily the ITU as a ices. Both groups of countries, however, had important whole, but some officials and some member-states – for fractures within them. Much of Europe was uncomfortable the ITU to assume the role of overseer of the Internet. In with what it saw as the United States’ aggressive defence this context, the question of Internet governance can be of its existing “powers” over ICANN and root servers; while seen as part of the long process of restructuring commu- differences emerged between the assertiveness of a number nications, in which the ITU had gradually lost much of its of large developing countries and the bulk of Least Devel- authority over telecoms and in which the Internet had oped Countries on the issue (discussed in Chapter 6). emerged outside the control of established institutions and The private sector broadly shared industrial country gov- with new institutions of its own, some of them with quite ernments’ perceptions of the issue here. Private sector different (and more multistakeholder) conceptions of au- leadership, it felt, had done well by the Internet. Greater thority. This aspect might be seen as a contest of older government control, it felt, would stifle the innovation “international system” models of governance versus newer which drove it forward. Subjection to an ITU-style stand- (to some, subversive) models of governance being piloted ard-setting regime, rather than the fluid modus operandi by new (and equally, to some, subversive) pioneers – of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and similar among them, ICANN. structures, it felt, would be particularly damaging. Suspi- Fourthly, some suggest, the dispute over Internet govern- cion of ITU encroachment was particularly strong within ance was driven by a further coincidence of circumstances. the Internet community. As one interviewee put it, “if the Internet governance became important within WSIS around ITU had been in charge, we wouldn’t have the Internet to- the time of the Iraq war.25 Many of those countries that were day.” The consensus business view was set out in an In- most hostile to the US position on Internet governance were ternational Chamber of Commerce issues paper released also those most hostile to US involvement in Iraq and US shortly after the Geneva summit: foreign policy in general. Internet governance, to them, may The pace of change, the fast evolving state of the have been simply a proxy for a different foreign policy argu- Internet and the creation of a global information soci- ment: its critics versus the United States. ety heighten the risks associated with premature or unnecessary government regulation.… Business has And finally, some interviewees suggest, more controver- a strong market incentive to foster the empowerment sially, that the very lack of immediate crisis in Internet gov- of users. But it will only make the necessary invest- ernance helped to make it a point of crisis within WSIS. ments if it can trust that governments will recognize There were issues of controversy in Internet governance, and reinforce the leadership of business in respond- certainly, but there always had been and the system, in the ing to the highly dynamic nature of the Internet.26 old phrase, wasn’t “broke”. The Internet would continue to evolve without a revolution in its governance. Indeed, Civil society’s view was more distinct and more divided. many – including most industrial country governments, pri- On the one hand, most civil society organisations sympa- vate sector organisations and Internet pioneers – believe thised with developing countries’ demand for more say that the Internet’s dynamic growth has only been possible vis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time, they were because of the low level of government involvement there reluctant to concede more powers over the Internet to has been. An argument about Internet governance would governments of any stamp, fearing that this would lead to not stop this dynamic growth. The price of arguing was greater censorship and political control. As with human

25 The Western Asia (Middle East) regional meeting which initiated Internet governance as a major issue took place in February 2003, 26 ICC, Issues Paper on Internet Governance, January 2004, p. 10, during the international political crisis preceding the March 2003 available from: www.iccwbo.org/home/e_business/policy/ invasion of Iraq. ICC%20issues%20paper%20on%20internet%20Governance.pdf.

58 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? rights, therefore, there was some conflict within civil soci- The methodology the WGIG used, as a working group, was ety between support for a greater voice for developing comparable in many ways to the commissions which in- countries, on the one hand, and desire for a diminished formed many international policy issues in the 1980s – for role for governments, on the other. The consensus view example, the Brandt Commission on international devel- was summarised in the independent civil society declara- opment, the Palme Commission on common security and tion issued at the end of the Geneva phase: the Brundtland Commission on sustainable development. These commissions brought together a range of people … the Internet cannot be governed effectively by any one with different backgrounds, different expertise and differ- organisation or set of interests. An exclusionary inter- ent social or political outlooks; treated them as individu- governmental model would be especially ill suited to als rather than as representatives of their respective or- its unique characteristics; only a truly open, multi- ganisations or communities; and addressed a substantive stakeholder, and flexible approach can ensure the issue of international concern by achieving consensus Internet’s continued growth and transition into a mul- among themselves but not necessarily across the whole tilingual medium.27 spectrum of international opinion (as, for example, a UN summit must attempt to do). The nearest analogue to the Like infrastructure finance, Internet governance proved in- WGIG in recent ICT experience was probably the G8 DOT tractable towards the end of the Geneva summit phase. Force of 2000-2002, composed of individuals from gov- Unlike infrastructure finance, it did not fade away during ernment, private sector and civil society in each of the G8 the second phase but became, if anything, even more con- countries and eight selected developing countries. tentious. Like infrastructure finance, the Geneva summit referred this issue to an interim forum. Unlike infrastruc- The selection of WGIG personnel is described in Chapter 7. ture finance, that forum – the Working Group on Internet At this point, however, it is worth noting that the selection Governance – adopted an innovative, multistakeholder process was much more inclusive than was normal for UN format which probed creatively into the issues that it had appointed fora. Private sector and civil society organisa- before it. tions were invited to put forward nominations, and their nominations were, by and large, approved. This style of The WGIG had the remit to: appointment was adopted deliberately by the Working i. develop a working definition of Internet governance; Group’s chair (the experienced former UN Under Secretary- General Nitin Desai, who had been responsible for organ- ii. identify the public policy issues that are relevant to ising many previous summits) and secretary (the Swiss Internet governance; diplomat Markus Kummer) in response to the specific is- iii. develop a common understanding of the respective sue. Because of the nature of existing arrangements, they roles and responsibilities of governments, existing felt that Internet governance could not properly be ad- intergovernmental and international organisations and dressed by a standard UN-style task force of representa- other forums as well as the private sector and civil tives from government and inter-governmental organisa- society from both developing and developed coun- tions, which would have lacked both expertise and cred- tries; ibility. The real experts had to be drawn into the debate. iv. prepare a report on the results of this activity to be Much the same applied to the WGIG’s working methods. presented for consideration and appropriate action for One member described the key moment in determining the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.28 how the WGIG worked as being when the chairman told members that they were expected to participate as indi- Most interviewees – but with important exceptions – con- viduals rather than as representatives of particular organi- sidered the WGIG to have been effective in advancing the sations or vested interests, and specifically that they debate on these issues by the time it reported in June 2005. should use the singular personal pronoun (“I” not “we”) Interviewees in general suggest that it was able to agree a when making contributions. The issues facing the WGIG workable definition of Internet governance, and develop were highly politicised. Many WGIG members had strongly a broad consensus on many of the issues before it. Excep- held opinions, and had difficulty in understanding each tions to the consensus about this among those interviewed others’ perspectives on the issues. Participants recalled tended to be those critical of the WGIG’s conclusions, in that requiring them to think as individuals rather than rep- particular those who wished to promote a more formal resentatives, and to work together rather than respond- model of Internet governance than that which was finally ing to consultants’ views, encouraged members to con- suggested by the Tunis outcome documents. front some of their assumptions and question some of their differences with colleagues. The outcome was not necessarily agreement, but did include greater understanding 27 Shaping Information Societies for Human Needs, p.22, available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208. and some displacement of assumption and (in some cases) 28 Geneva Plan of Action, section C6, article 13. ignorance by flexibility and knowledge. A conventional

Section B . Analysis 59 UN-style task force, interviewed participants agreed, was to focus discussion during the tense and difficult final ne- more likely to have remained confrontational, and would gotiating stages. While the report did not provide the for- have been less likely to achieve (at least as substantive) a mal framework for these negotiations, it could not be ig- consensus report. nored and certainly influenced WSIS’ final outcome on the subject. Whether this provides a model for other themes of Holding open sessions at which all-comers could contrib- international discourse is discussed in Chapter 7. ute to the WGIG’s deliberations was also innovative and constructive. As discussed in Chapter 7, this enabled im- The final negotiating stages on Internet governance were, portant actors who had little other route into WSIS to par- nevertheless, as divisive as those of the first summit ticipate in discussions of considerable importance to them. phase. They saw the opening of what was generally inter- The quality of contributions made during open sessions preted as a split between the United States and European was generally high, and this increased confidence in the Union; and saw a gap, discussed in Chapter 6, develop WGIG process among different stakeholder groups, par- between the positions of larger and more powerful devel- ticularly the Internet community. WGIG members paid at- oping countries, on the one hand, and Least Developed tention during open sessions and report making signifi- Countries on the other. The final outcome – described in cant use of the evidence put forward in their closed dis- Chapter 3 – could be and was seen as a victory by differ- cussion and drafting sessions. ent groups of participants with widely different views, and left much up for grabs in the post-WSIS world. All those The WGIG was able, in this way, to produce something that interviewed, however, stressed that the ability to achieve could be described by its participants as a multistake- agreement of any sort during the final WSIS PrepComs was holder consensus. Though WGIG members participated as greatly influenced by skilful chairing of the PrepCom sub- individuals, they cohered sufficiently for the WGIG report committee assigned to this (by the Pakistani diplomat to have something in it for most and to be something which Masood Khan). Individuals, too, often play an important they felt they could promote when Internet governance part in determining the outcomes of international nego- issues returned to the main WSIS PrepCom process. By tiations, and discussions on Internet governance benefited building a common understanding within a group that com- from three particularly skilful performers, without whom prised the different perspectives on the issues, the WGIG any kind of consensus might have been much more diffi-

set a perimeter around the debate that followed and helped cult to achieve.

60 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? chapter 6 WSIS and developing countries

International relations are built around power. Large coun- the “Louder Voices” report. These are quoted at some tries with powerful economies and military might have more length in Chapter 2 but, for convenience, are summarised influence on what happens in the world than microstates or again more briefly here: the impoverished. Size matters; money talks.

Most inter-governmental organisations, by contrast - and UN summits - are structured around equality of sovereign 1. Most developing countries are members of es- states. China, with 1,300,000,000 people, has one vote, tablished international organisations with ICT re- the same as Kiribati (population around 90,000); the sponsibilities, such as the ITU and WTO, and are United States (GDP = USD 12,455 billion) the same as usually represented at their meetings. However, Lesotho (GDP = USD 1.5 billion).29 there is not as yet an effective connection between the agendas of these organisations, their In practice, the pressures and processes of inter-govern- decisions, and the international development mental organisations exercise some mitigating effect on goals set out in the UN Millennium Declaration. the exercise of military and financial power; but the politi- [This point is considered in Chapter 5 above.] cal realities of population size and economic wealth, of 2. Effective participation in decision-making is not access to and control of scarce resources, of strategic and limited to what happens before and during military power, etc. predominate. Negotiating processes meetings. It requires sustained engagement such as those at international summits reflect and refine with issues over an extended period of time, the balances of power and authority between individual backed up by substantial technical, policymak- countries whose status within them is made up of many ing and negotiating capacity. different factors - hard facts such as those already described, but also “softer” factors such as established inter- 3. Action to strengthen the ICT policy capacity of national partnerships, cultural and historic ties, the person- developing countries must include action to alities and authority of governments and individual person- level the policy playing field so as to ensure that alities, the quality of expertise and other input into the ne- the needs of developing countries are on the gotiating processes concerned. Hard facts of size, wealth, agenda of international ICT fora and that they resources etc. might be described as determining the “natu- are included in decision-making processes. ral” weight of a country in this context, but it can punch Three critical aspects of this concern: well above or below this weight – have a louder or a softer a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access voice - according to the impact of these softer factors. to information about ICT-related issues, decision-making fora and processes The “Louder Voices” report, published in 2002, reviewed the extent of developing country participation in interna- b. Logistical problems, including the frequency tional ICT decision-making bodies, and in particular the con- and location of international meetings and straints facing developing countries in respect of their par- restrictions on participation (for example, by ticipation. The report is briefly summarised in Chapter 2. private sector and civil society experts) Its insights formed one of the primary impulses behind c. Ineffective use of financial resources avail- the present study, which has been concerned to see able to support participation. whether the WSIS summit format enabled developing countries to have more substantial impact – a louder voice - 4. Weaknesses in national policymaking are, how- and whether WSIS may have lasting implications for devel- ever, even more significant in leading to under- oping country participation in other ICT fora in the future. representation and ineffective participation. This chapter focuses on these particular issues, and both Three critical aspects of this are: begins and ends with a specific look at the conclusions of a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of government and citizenship, of the potential role of ICTs. 29 Data from World Bank, web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20535285~menuPK:1390200~ pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html.

Section B . Analysis 61 • Thirdly, however, as summits are global meetings rep- b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT resenting the entire United Nations family, their del- issues, particularly in respect of emerging egations feel obliged, at least, to reach consensus. Dia- technologies and new policy areas - such as logues in most international fora can be resolved, if it migration from circuit-switched to IP net- comes to it, by votes. In summits, consensus is gener- works and indeed Internet issues in general. ally expected, if not necessarily required. Outcome documents should be signed by every government, not c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy- just by a majority – which means that, while summits making processes, including: may force recalcitrant governments to agree to some- i. Lack of political leadership thing that they would not otherwise have been pre- ii. Absence of national ICT strategies pared to sign (as at Kyoto?), they are just as likely to stick to the lowest common denominator of agreement. iii. Ineffective coordination between different government departments and agen- This suggests, prima facie, that the disadvantages which cies with ICT responsibilities developing countries face in international decision-mak- iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par- ing fora, as described in “Louder Voices”, may be less acute ticipation in national decision-making in summits. Summit work is less technical, and less technical expertise is therefore required. Summit activity is fo- v. Inadequate preparation for international cused on fewer specific meetings, and there is much less meetings need to cover simultaneous subsidiary meetings than in vi. Ineffective use of financial and human re- conventional decision-making fora – which makes life sources. easier for smaller delegations. The pressure on developing countries to make concessions is weaker because “decisions” made by summits are less “decisive” than those As discussed in earlier chapters, summit processes such made by (for example) ITU Radiocommunications Confer- as WSIS are different from normal international negotia- ences (i.e. they have less immediate or certain impact on tions. They have a more general character than conven- important stakeholders). Though votes are rarely taken, tional decision-making processes, looking at a “big issue” the principle behind “one nation: one vote” is much clearer rather than detail – which makes them more accessible to at summits than it is elsewhere; and solidarity between those that are less fully informed about an issue. They have blocs of countries may be easier to achieve. less sectoral baggage, in the sense of issues and precedents, alliances and animosities, that influence work in The need for consensus may also give countries which are decision-making fora such as ITU study groups or WTO normally weak in international governance more influence committees and working groups. They are less rules- than they might otherwise wield. A number of representa- bound, which may create more space for creativity in ne- tives of major countries in WSIS commented in interviews gotiation – though summits, too, have over the years de- that their main objective at the summit was to prevent developed standard ways of proceeding, built around pre- cisions they considered inappropriate from being taken paratory committees, regional meetings and the like. They rather than to secure positive objectives of their own – are more political – with participation in the final summit suggesting that the pressure to conform may be some- event often being at the level of head of state rather than what reversed in summits, acting more upon the minority head of mission or head of government department. industrial countries than the (politically and economically) weaker developing countries taking part. The shift away Three further differences, interviews suggested, may have from the established relationships of conventional inter- the biggest impact on different ways of behaving: national negotiations, the different power structure and • Firstly, summits are one-off events rather than ongo- the higher degree of politicisation within them may make ing negotiations. They do not need to look back to what summits particularly susceptible to “policy trading”, i.e. has gone before or forward to what comes after in the to agreements between countries or blocs of countries same way as continuous negotiating fora like those in that, for example, country X will support a particular policy the ITU or WTO. line of interest to country Y within the summit in return for comparable concessions in entirely different negotiations • Secondly, they do not have to reach firm conclusions being conducted elsewhere. that bind governments’ future behaviour. The outcome documents of summit meetings are often aspirational, On the other hand, the observations above also suggest, urging courses of action rather than requiring them. prima facie, that the outcomes of summits are likely to Outcomes do not necessarily stick, as those who wel- have less immediate impact, and so to be less valuable to comed the Kyoto Protocol on climate change have developing countries than those of more conventional learnt to their regret. decision-making processes. Politicisation also, obviously,

62 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? carries the risk that a summit will reach less optimal posi- within Africa so far as WSIS, and ICT/ICD in general, are tions on the issues with which it is ostensibly most con- concerned. In other countries, political leaders saw much cerned than might otherwise occur. less gain to be achieved from upgrading their national profile at this event. What does the experience of developing countries, as developing country participants described it, have to sug- As well as total numbers, as suggested in earlier chap- gest about these various hypotheses? The following sec- ters, the composition of national delegations was particu- tions look at this from two perspectives: participation in larly interesting. The APC study of African participation in the international summit itself, and participation in na- the first summit phase found that, in most African coun- tional policymaking processes related to the development tries, delegations were predominantly made up of two of policies for WSIS. The latter discussion leads forward groups – diplomats, particularly from countries’ missions to consideration of civil society and wider “multistake- in Geneva, who took the lead in actual negotiations dur- holder” participation in Chapter 7. ing PrepComs; and representatives of the established telecommunications sector, led by the communications ministries who were their countries’ primary interfaces with Participation in the Summit the ITU, but also including substantial numbers of personnel from communications regulatory commissions and Chapter 4 briefly discussed the participation of different from the former incumbent fixed telecommunications op- delegations in WSIS. Participation varied substantially erating companies. Participation in delegations from other between countries, both in numbers of delegates and in stakeholders was sparse. There was little representation the composition of delegations. from mainstream development ministries, for example, Some countries paid much more attention to the WSIS which might have contributed more effectively to discus- process than did others, both at plenary sessions and, sion of the role of ICTs in development; little from the pri- more importantly, during the preparatory committees. An vate sector or civil society; little or none from the broad- earlier APC study looked in some detail at African partici- casting sector, which provides the most widely available pation in the various meetings associated with the first ICT services in developing countries; little again from new phase of the summit.30 This found, for example, that all ICT markets such as mobile telephone companies and the but five of fifty-four African countries were represented Internet community. during the initial Bamako consultation meeting in May Much the same pattern prevailed in the second summit 2002, and all but six at the Geneva summit in December phase. Under-representation of the Internet community in 2003. Participation in PrepComs varied considerably. A few national delegations may have been particularly signifi- African countries – notably Cameroon, Mali, South Africa, cant here given the amount of time that phase spent on Tanzania and Tunisia – were well-represented throughout, Internet governance, and the limited understanding of it but between ten and fifteen African countries chose not shown by many diplomats and conventional telecommu- to attend each PrepCom. Three African countries had del- nications specialists. egations over sixty strong at the Geneva summit while, as noted, six were officially unrepresented. Similar variations Many interviewees remarked that the domination of many in the level and scope of country participation can be found delegations by the national telecommunications establish- during the second phase. Participation lists, illustrating ment had an obvious effect on participation in negotiations, the numbers taking part from different countries in the two and especially on developing country input. Telecoms-led main summit sessions and in one second phase PrepCom, delegations found it much easier to address telecoms is- can be found in Annex 1. sues than they did to focus on development questions. When the latter arose, they were poorly equipped to present Of course, the size of delegations is no clear proxy for their national development priorities, or to position ICT issues degree of influence, but it probably tends to indicate the accurately within these. Their contributions tended to fo- extent to which a government was taking WSIS seriously cus on the potential of technology rather than the problems and saw it as an opportunity to further its own objectives, requiring development attention. For many development- to learn from the experience and networking opportunities focused interviewees, this was an opportunity missed. WSIS available, or to make sure that the “wrong” decisions were could have offered scope for developing countries to chal- less likely to be reached. In some cases, delegates sug- lenge the ICT sector to focus on their core development gested, delegation size and level were due to the personal objectives. In practice, it did not. priorities of national leaders. President Wade of Senegal, for example, has sought to play a significant leadership role Women were also poorly represented in national delegations. Just 19% of official country delegates in the Tunis 30 D. Souter, “African participation in WSIS: review and discussion summit, on average, were women, the same figure as in paper”, APC, 2004, available from: rights.apc.org/training/contents/ Geneva. Industrial country delegations were more likely ictpol_en/ictmodule.2006-05-18.6637944641/ictunit.2006-05- 19.5882667093?set_language=en. to include women than those from developing countries

Section B . Analysis 63 (72%, on average, of OECD country delegations were fe- government of China argued so vociferously against infor- male in Geneva, 73% in Tunis). This gender imbalance is mation and communication rights during the first phase by no means untypical of participation in international ICT in order to lay the ground for later arguments about the decision-making fora, but is at odds with the principles of Internet rather than because this was such a high priority gender equality advanced in summit principles and texts. for it per se; though clearly issues of information and com- Participation lists illustrating these figures are included in munication rights have a high profile in China today.) Annex 1. A more detailed analysis of gender participation, however, should also explore the relative status of men Differences of participation in the debate on infrastruc- and women within delegations, which is not readily dis- ture finance have been considered in Chapter 5. The lead cernible from the available participation lists. role in this particular debate came from one country (Sen- egal), supported strongly by its neighbours in West Africa, As well as these general issues of participation, it is worth less strongly by those in the rest of Africa, and less strongly looking at the participation of developing countries in the again by other developing countries. Financing ICTs and three other key debates that took place during WSIS: on ICD was problematic for the countries concerned, espe- information and communication rights, on infrastructure cially for LDCs. Those delegations that argued most forci- finance and on Internet governance. As noted in Chapter bly for a Digital Solidarity Fund tended to be countries 5, all three of these saw differences between countries which had difficulty – mostly because of their development which, while by no means exclusively between industrial status – in securing foreign investment for ICT develop- and developing countries, had significant overtones within ment. (It should be borne in mind, however, that telecoms them of this development divide. sector-led delegations may not always have reflected the The question of information and communication rights cuts views of national governments as a whole on development to the heart of relations between governments and citi- finance.) With some exceptions (e.g. India), larger and zens. Participatory political structures place high value on more influential developing countries which did not have information and communication rights – on freedoms of such financing problems did not play a prominent part in expression, on individual citizens’ rights to dissent, to or- the argument. The fact that it disappeared so comprehen- ganise, to publish what they want. Few countries, how- sively from the agenda for the second phase of WSIS after ever, have fully open political cultures of this kind. Many African LDCs had secured what they considered sufficient governments see information and communication rights gains in February 2005 (see Chapter 5) suggests that this as potential threats to their authority, particularly if that reflected a division of interest among developing coun- governmental authority itself is weak or if it is ideologi- tries as well as a division of opinion between developing cally based on belief in government’s responsibility to rule and industrial blocs. in the perceived interest of the people rather than at their Developing country participation in the discussion about behest. The disjuncture between participatory and authori- Internet governance is, perhaps, the most interesting of tarian approaches to government, and so to information these debates. In this case, it was not LDCs that played and communication rights, is closely paralleled in attitudes the most prominent role, but a small group of larger de- towards the participation in decision-making of civil soci- veloping countries which adopted positions particularly ety and the private sector. (It also affected relations hostile to the United States. These countries – notable amongst governments, for instance in the underlying ten- among them China, Brazil, Pakistan, South Africa and Iran sions throughout the process that resulted from some gov- – share a number of common characteristics. These are ernments questioning the appropriateness of holding relatively large countries, with markets sufficiently large WSIS 2 in a country that significantly constrained freedoms for them to have few problems attracting external invest- of information and communication.) ment in the ICT sector (and so not concerned to win con- The arguments between governments over information cessions in other areas like financing mechanisms). They and communication rights at WSIS should not be carica- could support large delegations, including personnel with tured as being between industrial and developing coun- substantial expertise in the areas under discussion. They tries but seen as lying between these different government are also active in other international fora, on other issues, approaches. However, most of the leading countries which asserting their status as major players, sometimes in “like- challenged information and communication rights and minded” partnerships, sometimes independently. These which most strongly objected to multistakeholder partici- characteristics distinguish them from the majority of de- pation were developing countries, while most of those veloping countries, particularly Least Developed Countries, which championed these were from the North. In truth, for whom issues such as infrastructure investment are interviewees suggest, the majority of governments on both much more important. A number of interviewees from LDCs, sides of the development divide were not particularly con- particularly in Africa, expressed frustration that their efforts cerned about these issues – but those that were pursued to secure gains they considered important to them through them fiercely. (A couple of interviewees suggested that the the Internet governance debate were frustrated by the

64 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? politicisation of that debate by these larger and more pow- for the WSIS process as a whole. This was a mixed bless- erful development countries – “the ultras”, as one such ing. On the one hand, some participants suggested, it delegate described them. Other observers of the Internet enabled African countries to set the tone: to put an Afri- governance debate also commented on this distinction can agenda on the table at the very beginning of the sum- between LDC and more powerful countries’ participation. mit process. On the other hand, others pointed out, it meant that the main opportunity for African regional dis- It is, of course, always dangerous to think of “developing cussion was over and done with before the PrepCom proc- countries” as a homogeneous bloc rather than a category ess had begun to define the issues that would really pre- that is sometimes useful, sometimes not. However, the occupy the summit. At a regional level, Africa therefore emergence of a (relatively small) group of large and more had less opportunity to debate these issues than other powerful developing countries, acting assertively, either regions, and less scope to put forward a considered conti- individually or as a “like-minded” group, and sometimes nental point of view. (The emergence of Internet govern- claiming to speak on behalf of developing countries as a ance as an issue from the last of the regional events made whole - has been a feature of a number of recent interna- this a significant problem for other regions, too.) The tional negotiations. The Doha round of WTO negotiations Bamako meeting raised a number of important African is- and the development agenda within WIPO (the World In- sues, including infrastructure investment, regulation and tellectual Property Organisation), for example, has seen enabling environments, and multilingualism. It produced similar alliances. It is unclear whether this represents a an outcome document which addressed requirements to lasting trend or a passing phase in international discourse, different stakeholders, including African governments, in- and WSIS does not really provide evidence either way, ter-governmental organisations and the WSIS secretariat. other than to reaffirm the dangers of underestimating dif- It also demonstrated quite impressive multistakeholder ferences among developing countries. participation, and its conclusions were substantially influenced by civil society. As suggested in Chapter 5, it is difficult to determine win- ners and losers in the Internet governance debate. On the The Bamako Bureau which it established to represent Af- whole, the difficult decisions involved have merely been de- rica collectively during the remainder of the preparatory ferred. That may represent, in a sense, a victory for those process, however, found it hard to sustain a comparable countries and stakeholders that considered them important network or represent such a comprehensive range of think- enough to raise the WSIS stakes, and so had most to lose ing later in the summit phase. Its presentation of 21 “pri- from losing. Few interviewees thought that LDCs and other orities” for Africa during the second PrepCom illustrated low-income countries gained much, though they did sug- the difficulty it had in focusing on Africa’s most important gest that a few – such as Ghana – raised their profile through issues rather than listing its concerns.31 the issues and gained respect from other participants. The Africa regional conference during the second phase took place shortly after the report of the Task Force on Fi- Regional meetings nancial Mechanisms was published, and proved an important stage in the resolution, within WSIS, of the crisis sur- One final area of participation is worth exploring here. As rounding the proposed Digital Solidarity Fund. Non-re- well as global PrepComs, the preparatory process in both gional donors present at this meeting had understood the WSIS summit phases included regional (in reality, more or need to defuse argument about the DSF and begun to rec- less continental) preparatory conferences. These varied ognise some of the new challenges for infrastructure fi- substantially in character. Those in Africa included quite nance posed by the Task Force’s report. The regional con- substantial civil society participation, while those in Asia/ ference in Accra was an opportunity for them to put for- Pacific, for example, were much more strongly led by gov- ward an African infrastructure initiative which offered Af- ernments. Some had a dramatic impact on the course of rican countries some of what they had been seeking WSIS – notably the Middle East regional event during the through the DSF. Together with endorsement of a limited first phase, which introduced Internet governance as a voluntary DSF, this was sufficient to defuse that conflict. major summit theme; others were much less significant, for example the first phase European regional event, whose Although this was not necessarily apparent to them at the outcomes were so insubstantial that the experience was time, participants in both these African regional events felt not repeated in the second phase. The two African regional subsequently that they had had substantial value – the events provide an interesting instance of how this tier of former in enabling the continent, including civil society, to summit preparation could engage with WSIS. discuss issues in some depth and set the basis for future networking; the latter in drawing forward a new alignment During the first phase, Africa was home to the first regional conference, held in Bamako, Mali in May 2002, even before 31 The 21 priorities are available from: africa.rights.apc.org/ the first PrepCom had begun to set the terms of reference index.shtml?apc=ie_1&x=30659.

Section B . Analysis 65 between donors and African regional institutions such as ICTs, though the impact of this was disappointing. “The NEPAD (the New Partnership for Africa’s Development). perception among senior decision makers” from other This does not seem to have been complemented, however, departments, the case study reports, however, “was that by much discussion of WSIS within those regional institu- the agenda of WSIS was not very relevant and useful to tions themselves. African input to WSIS took place at a India’s aspirations from the summit.” Development minis- national and a continental level, rather than that of conti- tries ignored DoT’s invitation to participate, and only the nental sub-regions. WSIS was not a major topic of inter- Ministries of Information and Broadcasting and of Infor- est, for example, in gatherings of the Southern African mation Technology responded, their sectoral agendas Development Community (SADC), the East African Com- clashing to some degree with DoT’s. Private businesses munity, or the West African economic partnership ECOWAS. were also relatively uninvolved in official delegations, Some interviewees felt that this was an opportunity though some of the large ICT businesses based in India missed, to develop a stronger sub-regional dimension to participated in their own right – as would be expected, Africa’s input and to focus on the continent’s diversity given the country’s international reputation for software rather than its commonalities. This is not, however, a prob- development and other ICT services. Nevertheless, Indian lem that is unique to ICTs. businesses had nothing like the presence that Chinese businesses had, for example in the exhibition area at the Tunis summit. National policymaking processes

The “Louder Voices” study found that weaknesses in na- Although Bangladesh starts from a much lower e-readi- tional policymaking processes were more important in ness base than India, its government, too, has adopted explaining the limitations of developing country partici- an extremely ambitious national ICT strategy, which was pation in international ICT decision-making than deficien- the focus for considerable debate around the time that cies in the structure of international decision-making bod- WSIS was announced. It established national consulta- ies. Would the same be found in respect of WSIS? Coun- tion processes, which are described in Chapter 7, though try case studies were undertaken for the present study these may have caused as much confusion as enlighten- in five varying developing countries – in Bangladesh, Ec- ment. During the second phase of the summit, however, uador, Ethiopia, India and Kenya – in order to address the government of Bangladesh attained some promi- this question. With one exception, they found processes nence in WSIS as a whole - holding the PrepCom vice- that were comparably weak in terms of both national and presidency for Asia, presenting position papers for dis- international engagement. This section summarises the cussion, trying to coordinate LDC inputs in some areas, evidence from these case studies concerning participa- and - towards the end of the Internet governance nego- tion in international meetings, while evidence concern- tiations during the third PrepCom of the second phase - ing the national policymaking process is summarised in successfully introducing new text encouraging commer- Chapter 7. Copies of the country case studies are avail- cial negotiation of reduced interconnection rates for LDCs able online.32 and other priority countries.

The lead role for WSIS in all of the case study countries National participation from Ecuador varied substantially was taken by a government department which was tech- between the two phases of the summit. During the first, nologically oriented and usually within the telecommuni- the government made significant efforts to engage with cations establishment – the Department of Telecommuni- different stakeholders and use their input to contribute to cations (DoT) in India; the Ministry of Science and Infor- a national policy agenda, though, the case study reports, mation Technology in Bangladesh; the National Telecom- “despite the efforts and the political will of the stakehold- munications Council (and Secretariat) in Ecuador; the ers, [this process] did not allow the basic consensus Ethiopian Telecommunications Authority (the national needed for the formulation of a position and priorities of telecoms regulator) in Ethiopia; and the Kenya Communi- the country to be reached.” During the second phase, the cations Commission (ditto) and then the Ministry of Trans- government of Ecuador was more preoccupied with its role port and Communications in Kenya. in information society politics in Latin America, which diverted official time and resources and which also concen- It is clear from the case studies that different governments trated the country’s approach on issues which the govern- had different perceptions of the role and value of WSIS. The ment felt would further its ambitions in its region. Indian country case study, for example, makes clear that India’s Department of Telecommunications saw the sum- The Ethiopian government did not attend the African remit primarily - at least during the first phase - as an oppor- gional meeting which kicked off the first phase of WSIS tunity to showcase India’s considerable achievements in in May 2002, though the country was represented there by a substantial group of private sector and civil society participants. Having missed that opportunity, the Ethio- 32 Available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ wsis_research. pian Telecommunications Authority organised a national

66 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? consultative workshop in early 2003, which led to the es- • Facilitate and coordinate the implementation of ICT tablishment of a task force and to the development of a show case initiatives and encourage the mainstream- substantial official response to the WSIS draft texts later in ing and integration of ICTs at the national development the year. However, this was not proactive, and a compara- strategy to achieve the UN Millennium Development ble position paper developed by the government during the Goals (MDGs).33 second phase also offered little dynamic content on either development issues or the two main issues being dealt with This was followed by the creation of a new alliance be- in that phase. tween Kenyan civil society and private sector organisations with an interest in ICT policy, the Kenya ICT Action Net- According to the country case study, Ethiopia did not, work (Kictanet). It added a new dynamic to lobbying on therefore, play “any significant role in defining or driving national ICT issues and significantly contributed to national the agenda and outcomes of global governance issues dis- WSIS policy. cussed at the Summit.” Ethiopia currently gives great prominence to ICTs within development policy, but this Kenyan participation in the second phase of WSIS was emphasis is built around plans for improving public serv- substantial and substantive. The combination of WSIS with ices rather than on issues such as affordability (which is discussions on a new national ICT policy stimulated par- of primary interest to civil society) or competition (which ticipation in the Summit, including more senior leadership is currently very limited, but which is of great interest to than in the first phase. Participation in the Summit, in turn, the private sector). Since WSIS, the government has been the country case study suggests, improved awareness of reviewing its approach to ICTs in order to incorporate the ICT and development issues in general and in detail, im- Tunis agenda, but the country case study reports that this proved policy coordination within government, and built is still very much a government-led agenda. solidarity between groups that had previously contested space for policy influence. However, the case study con- Kenya also had a large group of participants at the first tinues, limits to understanding and cohesion remained. phase African meeting in Bamako in May 2002, mostly from “Careful review of the participation of public sector, civil the private sector and civil society though it also included society and private sector ... shows that the engagement government participants. Afterwards, Kenyan delegates was not coherent and input to the WSIS issues tended to recognised that they had been ill-prepared for the meet- be reactive rather than proactive.” Thinking about WSIS ing and this recognition was crucial in the formation of a remained focused on technology rather than the national Kenya Civil Society WSIS Caucus bringing together non- development context, and debate in Kenya still exhibited governmental groups with longstanding experience of ICTs many of the deficiencies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncriti- in development (see Chapter 7). cal acceptance of the WSIS process and its recommenda- The government of Kenya was represented by the coun- tions in Kenya,” the case study concludes, “shows that try’s telecoms regulator and Geneva mission in the first there is a long way to go to influence a global debate on a WSIS phase, at least up to the final PrepCom when a civil wider set of issues regarding ICTs and development.” society representative joined the team. Participation in the This brief summary of the evidence set out in the country Geneva summit itself was much more substantial, a large case studies suggests that there was considerable vari- multistakeholder delegation led by the vice-president cre- ance in the experience of different developing countries ating what the country case study describes as a turning in the WSIS context. Government engagement varied both point in Kenya’s subsequent approach. Shortly before the between countries and, within countries, over time. Some first PrepCom of the second phase, Kenya’s Ministry of governments were able to have significant input at differ- Transport and Communications set up a National WSIS ent stages of the overall negotiations, but none of the coun- Plan of Action Implementation Taskforce, led by the regu- try case studies reports a strongly proactive presence. latory commission, which aimed to: WSIS was not used by any of the five countries studied as • Initiate structured dialogue and lay down strategies a way of pressing an important national agenda, though on the implementation of the WSIS Plan of action [sic] India’s DoT clearly hoped this might be possible in the initial stages. Of the countries studied, only Kenya suggests • Articulate national common positions on the issues that the impact of WSIS may result in significant change to be discussed in the PrepComs towards the Tunis in the way that government engages with other stakehold- Phase of the Summit ers in policymaking or with other countries in international • Develop and implement mechanisms for coordinated fora. Issues concerning multistakeholder participation in national initiatives and multi-stakeholder partnerships the case study countries are discussed in Chapter 7. • Facilitate national workshops to sensitise policy makers and stakeholders on their roles in the implemen- 33 Communications Commission of Kenya, “The World Summit for tation of the WSIS action plan Information Society Process”, www.cck.go.ke/wsis_process.

Section B . Analysis 67 WSIS and conventional activities, appears to have been weak in most cases, and ICT decision-making certainly in those assessed in country case studies undertaken for this project. Few countries included significant The experience of WSIS was, as discussed at the begin- representation from these ICT-user ministries in their WSIS ning of this chapter, different in many ways from that in delegations. This finding corresponds to the poor knowl- conventional ICT decision-making fora. WSIS was a one- edge management – the lack of “joined-up government” - off event, with a wide remit (if rather narrow actual de- within international ICT decision-making processes which bate), in which the conventions of the ITU, the WTO, ICANN was described in “Louder Voices”. and other international ICT decision-making bodies did not Again as with the fora discussed in “Louder Voices”, inter- apply. Did interviewees for this study think that these dif- views suggested that the majority of developing countries ferences enabled developing countries to participate more seem to have made little effort to engage civil society and effectively or not in the work of WSIS – and how much dif- private sector voices in national debate on WSIS propos- ference, if any, did that make? Again, it is worth looking at als and outcomes. While the Geneva outcome documents this question firstly from the point of view of participation advocated a multistakeholder approach, this seems to in the international events themselves; secondly from that have been observed as much in breach as substance. There of national policymaking; and thirdly in relation to overall was, for instance, little formal or informal multistakeholder WSIS outcomes. consultation in four of the five countries of which case stud- In terms of participation, it would certainly seem that de- ies were undertaken for this study. Even in some indus- veloping countries played a more forceful role in WSIS than trial countries, where multistakeholder participation is they play in most international ICT fora. Two reasons are more established, civil society organisations reported that suggested for this: arrangements for multistakeholder dialogue were weak, and that what took place was more likely to be informal • Firstly, the equal status afforded to all delegations gave dialogue than a formal part of the decision-making proc- them a stronger sense of power within the forum – and, ess. However, some countries – such as Kenya, among the if they chose to exercise it, an inbuilt majority. While case studies for this report - did experience substantial this may also be true in theory at, for example, ITU multistakeholder involvement. This represents an advance study groups, it is rarely true in practice because few on the experience reported in “Louder Voices”. It will be developing countries actually attend with sufficient important to monitor whether it sets a precedent in these expertise or regularity. The summit was, in this respect, countries for more conventional ICT fora in the future, both more like the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, where national and international. The future performance of developing country political authority can be more ef- Kictanet in Kenya will be particularly interesting to observe. fectively deployed. • Secondly, industrial countries did not consider WSIS Interviewees, by and large, felt that the quality of exper- particularly important to them and substantially down- tise available to delegations improved where multistake- graded their participation compared with that in other holder participation took place. This is likely to have been international ICT fora. The only areas in which this was particularly so on issues such as the Internet where gov- not the case concerned the two major disputes during ernments historically have little expertise. However, the the WSIS process, on financing mechanisms and poor quality of the WSIS outcome documents, described Internet governance, where industrial countries did in Chapter 5, suggests that this did not have much impact participate more substantially in order to protect their at the level of text negotiations. In fact, most delegations own interests. relied on their Geneva missions – i.e. on diplomats experienced in diplomatic rather than sectoral nuance – to nego- As a result, some international observers described de- tiate these texts. The format of more conventional ICT deci- veloping countries as, in practice, leading much of the pre- sion-making fora is likely to be more susceptible to enhance- paratory committee process. The voices of developing ments in the quality of inputs than summitry, and this expe- countries in WSIS were “louder” than they were in more rience need not therefore be taken as indicating what might conventional ICT fora. But were they more effective? happen if delegations at these more conventional ICT fora also took in more non-governmental expertise. As with the more obviously sectoral inter-governmental negotiating fora considered in “Louder Voices”, develop- Few interviewees felt that developing countries made sig- ing country participation in WSIS was led by ministries of nificant gains through WSIS, at least in terms of stated ob- telecommunications or their successors (a number of coun- jectives. The most obvious instance here is that of the Dig- tries moved towards converged ministries of information ital Solidarity Fund. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it technology, or the like, during the summit period). Interac- had strong support from a large number of developing coun- tion between these ministries and those responsible for tries during the first summit phase, and provided a signifi- other departments, particularly mainstream development cant focus for developing country solidarity. However, as

68 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? noted earlier, the DSF proposal in its initial form was simply For obvious reasons, it is not possible to act on 21 priori- not pursued by its sponsors during the second phase. Some ties. Priorities must be fewer in number if they are, mean- alternative gains were nevertheless made as a result of the ingfully, to be priorities. The length of this list reflects a pursuit of the DSF, as described in Chapter 5. failure apparent in many WSIS contexts, to prioritise issues on which political attention could be concentrated. In terms of Internet governance, as in other contexts, it is In practice, WSIS outcome texts do have something to say difficult to say. Developing country objectives here varied, on most of these issues, but in very few cases does this and a distinction needs to be drawn between the majority text represent anything new or substantial. The Digital of developing countries, on the one hand, and the small Solidarity Fund could be regarded as, in the end, some- but vocal group of countries that vigorously pursued this thing of a failure for African engagement in WSIS, though issue. If the objective was to break United States power advances were made on “infrastructure” and WSIS itself over the Internet, they failed. Equally, they failed if the had an impact in “capacity building”. It would, in short, be objective was to draw the Internet more closely under the possible to tick boxes regarding content where many of wing of an inter-governmental agency. But shifts have un- these “priorities” were concerned, but not regarding prac- doubtedly occurred in the way the Internet will be gov- tical outcomes. It is a matter for debate whether this was erned in the future, which are yet to be worked out (see primarily due to structural weaknesses with WSIS or within Chapter 8). In that sense, therefore, changes might be continental input to it – a debate which could valuably be thought to have been achieved, the extent of whose im- undertaken within Africa by governments, regional organi- pact will only become apparent over time. sations, local private sector businesses and civil society One final way of looking at this is to consider the list of 21 organisations. priorities for Africa agreed by the Bamako Bureau for sub- mission to WSIS during the Geneva phase. These are set Conclusion out in the box below. As discussed earlier in this report, WSIS differed significantly from conventional ICT decision-making bodies in a • Infrastructure and maintenance of infrastructure number of important ways. It had, for a start, a much wider and equipment remit, looking at the whole “information society” and (at • Human resource development and capacity least ostensibly) at the relationship of the ICT sector with building non-sector-specific issues such as freedoms of expression • Gender issues and women empowerment in and development policy. Its engagement with these issues, ICTs uses as importantly, was less prescriptive than that of other in- • Partnership between public and private sectors ternational fora. Unlike the ITU-T (the ITU Telecommuni- • Debt conversion (to back up ICTs development) cation \o “Standardization” Standardisation Sector) and • Environmental protection ICANN, for example, WSIS was never going to draw up pre- cise rules with lasting impact on government and business. • Open and free software Its decisions were at most likely to set the tone for future • National information and communication international discourse and national policymaking - to af- strategies with special support to the African fect the context in which conventional ICT agencies con- Information Society Initiative (AISI) duct their business. • Sectoral applications • Support to NEPAD This combination of generalism and limited power had an • Digital Solidarity Fund impact on participation at a national level. Developing • Technology transfer, particularly South to countries in general, and many individual developing coun- South transfer tries in particular, participated more substantially in WSIS than they tend to do in more outcome-focused decision- • Research and Development making bodies. The equal status afforded all countries • Investment strategies within the summit format gave relatively weak countries • Content development more chance to put their point of view, and gave more • Internet governance powerful developing countries a ready opportunity to en- • Relations between traditional media and new ICTs hance their visibility and status within the developing • Legislative and regulatory framework world and vis-à-vis industrial powers. At the same time, the generalism of much WSIS debate made it easier for • Intellectual property rights delegations short of substantive expertise to play a part. • Security Industrial countries, on the other hand, by and large felt • Regional cooperation that they had less to gain from WSIS. For them, the fact that WSIS was not able to make substantive decisions was

Section B . Analysis 69 grounds for downgrading their presence. Not a few inter- and advocating an ICT sector perspective on development viewees from such countries, for example, felt that their issues. While present, the participation of UN specialist main objective in participation was to “prevent harm” development agencies was peripheral. Many mainstream rather than to promote a positive agenda. As a result, it development specialists from such organisations say they would probably be true to say that developing country ended WSIS as sceptical about ICTs in development as they presence was more prominent, more visible and more sub- began, and even many ICD specialists within them left Tu- stantial in comparison with industrial countries than is typi- nis cynical about the degree of hype they felt it had at- cally the case in ongoing negotiating fora such as the ITU tached to ICTs. Mainstream development agencies were, - but that this resulted primarily from the lack of priority by and large, insufficiently engaged with WSIS for it to have afforded WSIS by industrial countries. had much impact on them institutionally.

Amongst developing countries themselves, a clear distinc- Regional ICT institutions also had relatively little engage- tion can be drawn between the participation of development with WSIS. The summit structure of regional (i.e. con- ing countries in general, on the one hand, and a category tinental) preparatory conferences did not encourage their of more powerful and more assertive countries, on the engagement. The European Union, as was to be expected, other. Countries in this latter category - notably China, In- engaged with WSIS as a regional bloc, consistent with the dia, Brazil and South Africa - tended to be larger, to have Union-level lead in trade issues and the principle favour- less difficulty in attracting foreign investment than other ing Union-wide cohesion in hybrid negotiations. Other re- developing countries, and to have well-established politi- gional economic blocs, however, such as SADC, did not cal agendas to pursue alongside WSIS-specific issues (of- substantially discuss WSIS issues, nor did they form a ten to do with their relationship with the United States and/ major part of the agenda of regional sectoral bodies such or industrial countries in general). They acted to some as the African Telecommunications Union or regional regu- degree in formal collusion but also in informal alliance or latory associations. This was, perhaps, a weakness of the independently. Although often observed as, and some- WSIS process – or of summit processes in general. times presenting themselves as, articulating a general Finally, a word about the ITU – as begetter and manager developing country perspective, their interests did not of the Summit, did it also benefit in the end from playing coincide closely with those of the mass of developing coun- these roles? tries, particularly LDCs, which (for example) find it more difficult to attract investment. In many ways, the ITU is in the throes of a prolonged crisis of identity. Its historic role as international regulator of tel- The appearance of this divergence amongst developing ecommunications and telecoms standards has been sub- countries - which might be characterised as one between stantially diminished during the past thirty years - as liber- “emerging powers” and “other developing countries, par- alisation and globalisation have reduced the scope for in- ticularly LDCs” - can be tracked in a number of recent international management of telecoms and the private sec- ternational fora, not least the Doha round of WTO nego- tor has taken over the development and also, in effect, the tiations. Its implications for developing country participa- enforcement of standards. ITU Councils and Conferences tion are not yet properly addressed, but are likely to be have repeatedly addressed the implications of this for the significant in future. They reflect a growing diversity in the Union’s role, notably (for example) incorporating private economic and political characteristics of what was once “Sector Members”, but have tinkered around the edges called the “Third World”. A more assertive bloc of emerg- rather than radically reforming the Union’s structure. WSIS ing powers which is more powerfully engaged in interna- represented a major opportunity for the Union to reposi- tional decision-making, on ICTs or other issues, does not tion itself within the UN and international systems, one that imply any increase in the influence of LDCs, and analysis was readily recognised by the Secretary-General and the of participation will need to pay more attention to this dis- Council. While some of the conspiracy theories advanced in tinction in the future. other organisations about a concerted land grab by the ITU do seem exaggerated (and underestimate the ITU’s inter- With the exception of Internet governance bodies, and to nal diversity and divisions), for some within the Union and some extent the ITU, WSIS does not appear to have had a for some supporters among its member-countries, the op- significant impact on other international decision-making portunity to become lead agency for the information soci- bodies concerned with ICTs, or indeed development. Most ety and/or the Internet looked like the promised land. Other interviewees from such agencies felt that WSIS may have member-states, however (notably industrial countries), and raised awareness of some issues that they deal with, but private sector members, have been strongly opposed to any that it would not have a lasting effect on either their ac- broadening of the ITU’s role. tivities or their institutional structure. As noted earlier, WSIS did not break through the existing paradigm gap Institutionally, most interviewees felt, the ITU failed to between ICT and development communities: it was prima- make substantial gains during the WSIS process. It did not rily an ICT sector event, attended by ICT sector participants acquire new roles where the Internet is concerned. In fact,

70 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? opposition to its doing so may have hardened within in- are divided over rebalancing: some (or at least some parts dustrial countries and civil society during WSIS, though of some) governments see rebalancing as a question of support remains significant among some former commu- international justice (of significance to smaller industrial nist and developing countries. The nature of future Internet countries as much as developing ones); others are con- governance is not resolved, however, and the ITU will concerned about the risk of technical dilution or politicisation tinue to bid for a more substantial role. Overall, the WSIS of decisions which should be taken on pragmatic or purely experience might be considered an opportunity for the ITU technical grounds. Civil society organisations, meanwhile, to reposition itself which has left it still uncertain where tend to favour rebalancing in favour of developing coun- and how to reposition. Debate on this continued at the tries (on grounds of international equity) but also a reduc- Union’s 2006 Plenipotentiary Conference. tion in the powers of inter-governmental organisations (dis- trusting organisations which are dominated by govern- In assessing developing country participation in interna- ments and unexposed to multistakeholder participation). tional organisations, especially where ICTs are concerned, it is important not to confuse two separate issues: the in- On balance, few interviewees felt that WSIS had signifi- fluence of developing countries within ICT decision bod- cantly changed the balance of power or likely outcomes ies; and the influence of ICT decision-making bodies over of forthcoming negotiations in other ICT decision-making the ICT sector. The latter is concerned with the scope of fora, with the obvious exception of those concerned with international governance of ICTs; the former with the bal- Internet governance (which is discussed in Chapter 8). The ance between developing and industrial countries in deci- ITU’s World Telecommunication Development Conference sion-making of whatever scope. in March 2006 spent a good deal of time discussing the implications of WSIS and placed its Development Bureau’s In practice, the two are often confused (not least by inter- workplan for the coming four years firmly in its wake – but viewees for this project). Developing countries tend to it has fewer, not more resources to devote to ICT for devel- want to gain both more influence in decision-making bod- opment (ICT4D). WSIS action line follow-up meetings have ies vis-à-vis industrial countries (a question of balance) attracted little interest (as described in Chapter 8). WSIS and more influence for decision-making bodies over inter- is no longer on the tip of people’s tongues at international national developments (a question of scope). This reflects ICT gatherings. The networks it created are dissipating their relative weakness both internationally and nation- (apart from those on Internet governance). Its outcomes ally: rebalancing would increase the weight of attention simply do not have enough to say about what other ICT paid to their concerns, while increased scope would sup- fora should be doing. The evidence from those who par- port enhanced government authority and capacity to man- ticipated in this study suggests that WSIS is unlikely to age domestic markets. Industrial countries and the private have a lasting impact on other international ICT fora, and sector tend to want a reduction in the decision-making that the conclusions of the “Louder Voices” study remain powers of international bodies (global deregulation), but as valid as they were four years ago.

Section B . Analysis 71 chapter 7 WSIS and civil society

Civil society participation in international summit proc- private business; between the state and organised labour esses is always controversial. The United Nations system – trade unions, a component of what is now called civil so- is predicated on the unique authority of governments. ciety; and between the representatives of business and of Governments are understood, de facto and de iure, to rep- workers (the private sector and trade unions). resent those they govern. Although they are highly variable in practice, the legitimacy and accountability of gov- Multistakeholderism is the concept of decision-making ernments are assumed because for inter-governmental in- which formally engages not just governments but also other stitutions to challenge them, except in the most extreme stakeholder groups within society. Typically, at a national and universally agreed of cases, would jeopardise the fab- level, it implies the formal (as well as informal) engage- ric of international discourse (and, many would say, the ment of the business community (the “private sector”) and stability of international relations). Governments therefore of organisations representing groups within the commu- speak, within the UN system and most other international nity (“civil society”) as well as government. At an interna- organisations, for their nations and their citizens; and tional level, inter-governmental organisations (IGOs) are many governments, throughout the period since 1945, added to the mix. This is seen by many governments as a have been very jealous of their unique authority to do so. challenge to their authority and status as the legal repre- (This differs, of course, from the situation in national gov- sentatives of their people; as a national sovereignty ques- ernance, where national governments share decision-mak- tion concerning relations within the nation comparable with, ing authority with local government, with the judiciary, with say, the external national sovereignty questions raised by parliamentary bodies, with a variety of semi-autonomous membership of the European Union or by ICANN’s role in quasi-governmental organisations, and with a wide range respect of Internet domains. Some governments, however, of other social actors including civil society organisations.) see it as an opportunity to harness the support and expertise of the community as a whole to improve the respon- One United Nations agency, the International Labour Or- siveness of government, the quality of decision-making and ganisation (ILO), has a different tradition. It inherited a multi- the implementation of government services. This interpre- stakeholder character from its pre-1945 (League of Nations) tation recognises that neither appointed officials nor peri- structure, one in which representatives of governments, em- odic elections are good at capturing the diversity of con- ployers and trade unions collectively negotiate and deter- cerns and needs within society, and that incorporating the mine ILO decisions. In a very formal sense, this represents private sector and civil society in decision-making can im- a different way of looking at the state – seeing it more as a prove the quality of government (and perhaps the likeli- partnership between different interest groups with contest- hood of re-election). This “liberal” approach to multistake- ing perspectives out of which consensus may be reached. holderism, within the country, is not surprisingly more of- This reflects, at an international level, the balance of gov- ten found in democratic than authoritarian states. ernance authority that pertains between different institutions - legal, social and economic, as well as political - within Multistakeholderism at an international level adds another nation-states. Similar “social partnership” arrangements dimension to this question, which might be described as exist, though with limited effect, within the European Un- “governmental confidence”. Governments which are con- ion and some other international organisations. fident of their status with their citizens (which may mean governmental systems rather than individual govern- It is difficult to envisage today’s nation-states agreeing as ments) are more likely to choose to include a wider range formal a multistakeholder arrangement as the ILO, but the of stakeholders in national representation abroad. Gov- structural difference between it and other UN agencies ernments which are confident of their status both within points to the growing significance of stakeholder diversity their own countries and within the international commu- in contemporary national and international discourse. The nity are more likely to welcome formal multistakeholder ILO structure sought to replicate at international level a na- participation in international fora. Correspondingly, gov- tional division between the state and opposite sides of its ernments which feel insecure at home – because they lack specialist relationship, workers and employers. It assumed democratic legitimacy, because the authority of govern- three distinct relationships within this triangle: between ment has been historically weak, because they represent the state and employers, often but not quite the same as the victors of civil conflict or particular vested interest

72 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? groups – or insecure abroad – because they are small, decision-making. However, many governments remain militarily or economically vulnerable, ideologically at odds suspicious of the representativeness, in particular, of civil with mainstream opinion, emerging from international society – in terms of both its social composition and po- conflict: these governments are less likely to include litical ideology. stakeholder diversity in representing themselves to other Summits have provided a particular focus for contention nations, and less likely to welcome scrutiny from stake- over multistakeholder participation. Summits are inter-gov- holders other than their peers in international fora, espe- ernmental events: it is governments that decide the con- cially human rights activists and other civil society groups. tent of final texts, by which governments (if anyone) are Nevertheless, the past thirty years or so have seen two bound. Access to discussion about texts - to participation trends in the balance of relations between the three na- in PrepComs and Summit meetings themselves - has been tional stakeholder categories (government, the private jealously guarded by governments (though not all have sector and civil society). Firstly, the neoliberal consensus been adamant about this), and very little space has been in economic policy – the preponderance of free market given to any non-governmental actors within formal sum- economics, particularly since the fall of communism at the mit proceedings. This has not prevented non-governmen- beginning of the 1990s - has increased the economic power tal actors from making themselves heard. After all, many of and the role and influence of the private sector vis-à-vis the issues discussed by summits – sustainable develop- the state, and particularly that of multinational and inter- ment, for one example; the “information society” for an- national companies. Secondly, civil society organisations other – require action by the private sector and communi- have grown increasingly critical of the representativeness ties as well as governments if change is going to come. of government and more assertive about their capacity to Some governments, particularly in the North, have been articulate alternative citizens’ perspectives - particularly prepared to include private sector and (sometimes) civil those of marginalised groups such as the poor, landless, society participants in their official delegations (though this indigenous peoples and, most significantly, women. usually means that these participants are bound by col- These processes have been important at both national and lective responsibility, i.e. tied to the official delegation line international levels. The influence of business has in- rather than pursuing that of their own CSO or CSOs in gen- creased in most countries, particularly post-communist eral). In the corridors, meeting rooms and coffee bars of and developing countries, and that of multinational busi- every summit, unattached private sector and civil society nesses has also increased in international trade and in- representatives have also caucused, lobbied and inter- vestment – especially in the telecommunications sector, acted with official delegates willing to listen to or put across where privatisation and liberalisation have led to the ap- their point of view. At summit after summit, civil society pearance of major telecoms corporations investing in many organisations have organised alternative events, some- countries. Civil society organisations have increasingly times called alternative summits or NGO fora, at which al- represented themselves as supplements to formal demo- ternative viewpoints are expressed, debated and alterna- cratic institutions in democratic states and as alternative tive declarations agreed, which can be juxtaposed against forms of democratic representation where formal democ- the decisions reached in the formal summit process. racy is weak. Their involvement has been highly diverse - Summits, in other words, have had formally constrained coming from a wide variety of organisations and alliances but informally extensive non-governmental participation with a wide range of social and political perspectives and for many years. Recent summits have also seen increas- of representational scope. ing space granted to civil society participation within their The balance between the two principles represented here formal proceedings, normally mediated via ECOSOC, as - of governmental sovereignty on the one hand, and of rep- perception of the value of civil society engagement has resentational diversity on the other - has been debated increased within government delegations and the UN bu- within the United Nations system for many years. The UN reaucracy. The following paragraphs consider WSIS in this system is, of course, built around governments. It does context: firstly in terms of civil society experience in par- not formally distinguish between categories of non-gov- ticipation and organisation; then, in terms of content and ernmental actor - private sector and civil society organisa- the key issues that preoccupied civil society participants. tions have the same formal identity within the UN system. The chapter ends by reviewing the implications of the WSIS However, the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) experience for future multistakeholder involvement. provides a consultative process for accredited NGOs, of which there are now over 2700 (though these obviously Civil society participation represent only a small proportion of civil society stakeholders). ECOSOC has in effect provided a limited safety WSIS was, as has been noted repeatedly in this report, valve for the growing pressure from civil society for more not an entirely normal summit – it was a UN-style summit substantial participation in UN (and other international) rather than a UN summit per se; a summit organised by

Section B . Analysis 73 the ITU with support from other UN agencies rather than During PrepComs, civil society organisations met in ple- by officials from the United Nations itself. This may have nary during the morning, while their Content and Themes created a different space for non-governmental actors to Group met each evening. Much of the time of these dis- be represented. In any event, almost all interviewees with cussions was spent on administrative and political ques- experience of other summits agreed that private sector and tions, rather than debating substantive issues (which were civil society participation in the formal summit proceed- more substantially dealt with in caucuses and informal dis- ings of WSIS substantially exceeded that in those previ- cussion). Some participants complained that these regu- ous summits. A civil society bureau was established early lar meetings were dominated by relatively few voices and in the preparatory stages of the first summit phase to in- that they offered little scope for newcomers to get involved. corporate civil society participation, and was accommo- The political tensions raised by the presence of Tunisian dated within the secretariat structure set up by the ITU. It organisations with questionable NGO credentials made was intended to parallel the inter-governmental bureau’s civil society organisation more difficult during the second role in process (but not content) matters. In practice, the phase – especially around the time of the Hammamet civil society bureau was, by all accounts, substantially left PrepCom in early 2005 - to a degree that caused confu- to its own devices to organise civil society participation, sion and anger among many who had participated within not least because the ITU lacked experience of civil soci- civil society during the earlier summit period. ety organisations and their ways of working. Meanwhile, There was, meanwhile, no large-scale alternative event or- civil society participants in WSIS set up their own coordi- ganised at WSIS in the sense that has occurred at other re- nating structures, including a “Content and Themes Group” cent summits – for example, the 2002 Johannesburg Earth to coordinate the work of diverse caucuses, working Summit. While some outside events did take place in Ge- groups and other content-oriented partnerships that were neva and Tunis – there was, for example, some effort to or- established by civil society organisations.34 ganise events in solidarity with excluded Tunisian civil soci- During the formal summit processes themselves - though ety during the second summit – these were small, entirely this was, at times, in the teeth of resistance from some gov- unlike the very substantial event in Johannesburg. In spite ernments - civil society and private sector representatives of the problems, in short, non-governmental actors were were able to make formal presentations in PrepComs and able to find more space to engage in the activities that most plenary sessions. They undoubtedly influenced areas of the interested them within the perimeter of WSIS than in other final texts agreed by WSIS, partly through this formal pres- summits, and this was sufficient to retain them inside the ence, more substantially through lobbying and alliances WSIS tent rather than taking up a space without. Three ex- formed and pursued outside the formal meeting rooms. planations were put forward for this by civil society inter- They had more impact on the Declaration of Principles in viewees and others with experience of summits. Geneva than on the Plan of Action; more in Tunis on Internet governance than on infrastructure investment - though, in One explanation, discussed to some extent earlier in this this latter case, some impact on both. Private sector and report, is that the ITU simply did not know how to handle civil society actors also played significant roles in influenc- civil society involvement, having no prior experience of it ing some of the more specific content negotiated between in its own events and no statutory provision of its own for delegations, on subjects such as child protection and gen- including them comparable with the sector membership der equity. However, they had little involvement in discus- available to businesses. While more liberal towards the sion of texts concerning implementation of the development private sector, therefore – at least to the ICT-oriented pri- agenda. They also argued (not least amongst each other) vate sector – the ITU has been less liberal towards NGOs. on a number of topics (such as the relationship between When it came to organising WSIS, the ITU had far less ex- proprietary and open source software). perience of handling relations with civil society organisations than other UN agencies. This inexperience may have Civil society organisation was – perhaps inevitably given led it to be more open, particularly given the pressures the nature of the summit process – sometimes less than put on it to make WSIS less technological and more devel- coherent and often reactive rather than proactive. CONGO, opmental, in the fear of being seen to be more restrictive the formal association of NGOs associated with the UN than others thought necessary. system, played more of a role in trying to achieve organisational coherence during the second phase than it had The second explanation is simply that the greater space played in the first, but, as noted elsewhere in this chapter, which was offered to civil society by the WSIS Secretariat the limited thematic scope of the second phase made it to (at least) explore participation sufficiently changed the less easy to bring the whole of civil society together be- balance of advantage for many civil society organisations hind a common agenda that mattered to all involved. between participating from within the tent and from without to make the latter option insufficiently attractive to enough organisations that might want to put an alternative 34 See www.wsis-cs.org/cs-overview.html. together. If the tent was more welcoming, then maybe it

74 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? was worth a look inside. And once inside, the potential for sector members) were allowed to sit as observers in achieving things there looked better than going out into public meetings (plenary and subcommittee meetings the rain. Many civil society participants put a lot of effort in the preparatory process, Plenary and committee into achieving this outcome. meetings in the Summit). Upon the invitation of the presiding officer of the body concerned, and subject The third view expressed by interviewees is that perhaps to the approval of that body, such observers were al- the issue of the “information society” was insufficiently lowed to make oral statements on questions in which attractive in itself to a wide enough range of civil society they had special competence. If the number of re- organisations for them to want to organise a big alterna- quests to speak was too large, the civil society and tive. WSIS just was not important enough for the major business sector entities were requested to form them- social movements, in other words – and this may have been selves into constituencies, which then spoke through particularly so precisely because it was, in Kofi Annan’s their respective spokespersons.35 terms, an opportunity rather than a problem. The “information society” did not inspire the same kind of antago- A number of governments, including both industrial and nism as global warming or women’s disenfranchisement. developing country governments, also made a point of This interpretation is strengthened, perhaps, by the fact including private sector and civil society representatives that WSIS also attracted no significant anti-globalisation within their formal delegations (although, as noted above, protests, not even protests like those that occurred when this did not mean that they could express positions con- the G8 set up its Digital Opportunity Task Force in Okinawa trary to those of the delegations that included them, and in 2000. Neither Geneva nor Tunis needed to protect them- some such delegates expressed the feeling that their pres- selves against the kind of demonstrations seen in Seattle ence in delegations was tokenistic, that they had little real in 1999 or Genoa in 2001. say in how their delegations behaved).

This is not to say that greater space for civil society input For all the caveats, this set of circumstances represented a meant great space for it. The participation of non-govern- gain in participatory space for non-governmental actors mental actors in the formal WSIS process was highly con- beyond what might have been expected from experience at tested as soon as the first preparatory committee began previous summits, and one of some symbolic importance. in May 2002. A number of governments - notably those of Civil society organisations had more opportunity to express China and Pakistan - objected vehemently to any presence a view in formal sessions than beforehand. The extent to of non-governmental actors in the PrepComs’ formal which this might set a precedent for future multistakeholder spaces. Arguments over representation took up a large participation is considered towards the end of this chapter. proportion of the time of the first PrepCom (and added to Whether this participatory gain made a difference to ne- the scepticism of some participants, for example in devel- gotiations - either at the time or subsequently – depends, opment agencies, about the value of the summit). The pres- obviously, on the use made of it and the attention paid to ence of the private sector was just as strongly opposed by it. Opinion among interviewees here is divided. The space hostile governments as was that of civil society - and, in- and time allocated to civil society contributions was not deed, common cause over their exclusion helped to bring great, and its allocation by the civil society plenary (on civil society and private sector representatives into closer which, see below) could, therefore, be contentious. There dialogue than, interviewees suggest, had been the case was an obvious tendency for civil society speakers to try at previous summits. The fact that ICT private sector busi- to cover more issues than they had time available to say nesses were accustomed to participation in ITU discus- something substantive about. The attention paid to speak- sions probably increased their dissatisfaction at attempts ers during PrepCom and (especially) plenary sessions was to exclude them from comparable WSIS meetings. also highly variable. At times, for example during the tenser The division of governmental opinion here, to a significant moments of negotiations such as those on Internet govern- degree, coincided with that on issues of freedom of ex- ance, most delegations (as in most summits) paid close at- pression. Most of the governments which supported civil tention to anything that was germane to these (and little to society participation were from industrial countries; most anything that was not). In plenary, however, and in much of of those that opposed it were from developing countries - the negotiation process, contributions from delegates are though there were governments in both groups that often repetitious, and delegates in the audience pay scant bucked this trend. In practice, however, the consensus that attention to them, spending their time instead in conversa- was reached did allow more space for non-governmental tion, reading, preparing their own inputs or doing emails. presentations within formal proceedings than was the case The ambience of summits - very large conference arenas, at previous summits. The formal position was that: distant speakers usually inaudible (in any language) without headphones, simultaneous interpretation, the ready Participants from accredited civil society entities (including NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC) and 35 “The multi-stakeholder participation in WSIS and its written and from accredited business sector entities (including ITU unwritten rules”, at www.itu.int/wsis/basic/multistakeholder.html.

Section B . Analysis 75 opportunity for one-to-one discussions outside the formal organisations were able to build substantive coalitions with meeting space - also discourages attention to what is be- important national delegations. During the first phase of ing said from the platform or the podium. It is critical, there- the summit, for example, civil society organisations con- fore, for speakers to be able to attract attention if they cerned with rights issues shared common objectives with want notice to be taken of them; and this is as much a the European Union and its member-states in maintaining matter of demagogic style as it is of content. On the whole, the integrity of established human rights principles within interviewees felt that the diversity of civil society repre- the proposed outcome documents. During the second sentation increased the attention paid to civil society phase, civil society input proved important in securing speakers and that many of the points they made were, at agreement on the Internet Governance Forum, and civil so- least, registered by delegations. Private sector speaking ciety language made up a good deal of that defining its re- slots were less diversified, and interviewees suggested mit. Some specialist civil society organisations also proved that, while the points made in them were well-argued, this very effective at focused lobbying on their particular issues, lack of diversity meant that delegations paid less atten- notably child protection agencies which significantly in- tion to them as the summit process continued. creased awareness and secured substantive language addressing their concerns. While the ultimate value of this lan- The availability of speaking slots is not, however, the most guage depends on its impact on implementation, these important locus for civil society contributions to the de- agencies will in future be able to point to this language as velopment of summit outcomes. This depends much more affirmation of their cause by the international community. on the effectiveness of what amounts to lobbying activity: seeking to influence the thinking of national delegates who WSIS illustrated an anomaly here which civil society finds have the power to commit their countries or to use their in many international negotiations and which results from countries’ influence within negotiations in pursuit of par- differences in the objectives pursued by different ticular objectives. Lobbying is a highly skilled activity in stakeholder groups. Civil society and private sector bod- any context, and its effectiveness depends on a number ies are more able to achieve sustainable partnerships with of factors, particularly: governments that broadly endorse their presence in negotiations. On the whole, industrial (donor) countries are • The saliency of issues to both “patron” (in this case more positive towards participation of this kind, not least national delegation) and “client” (lobbyist) - and the because they are more experienced with it at home. How- level of risk to other objectives of the patron involved ever, civil society’s objectives often involve promoting the in promoting a particular position on the issue con- policy positions of developing countries which are at odds cerned. with those of industrial or donor governments – usually • The level of understanding of those issues in both from a sense of ideological commitment, sometimes parties, especially the sophistication of understand- merely from one of solidarity. In the first phase of WSIS, ing by lobbyists. for example, civil society broadly supported the Digital • The reliability (in terms of facts) and trustworthiness Solidarity Fund proposal. It was donor countries – which (in terms of honest and open dealing) in each party’s opposed it – that were, in practice much more supportive perception of the other. of civil society organisations’ participation in negotiations than the international community in general, however, • The political skills and capacity for political judgement while the most vociferous opponents of civil society in- of lobbyists, in particular at identifying effective points volvement included important developing countries such of entry into the debate, and at knowing when to hold as China and Pakistan. back or retreat from exposed positions. An alternative way of looking at this is in terms of the dif- Most of these are at least as much personal as organisa- ferent issues that are prioritised by different stakehold- tional skills, and a great deal of the success or failure of ers. Opponents of civil society involvement in WSIS gen- lobbying depends on individual personalities being able erally opposed it from a viewpoint that emphasises gov- to forge alliances of common interest which are sustain- ernment authority over citizens’ rights. There is therefore able over the period of time required to pursue an issue. a sense in which the anomaly can as readily be expressed The effectiveness of lobbying is greatest where these skills in terms of civil society interests: in a juxtaposition be- are brought to bear by a coherent and skilful team of lob- tween civil society concern for development, for example byists on a coherent partnership of delegations which have (which tends to imply alliance with developing countries other common interests to pursue – though individuals and, not necessarily on the same basis, with the more de- can also make a significant difference. velopment-oriented donors) and civil society concern with Interviews for this project confirm the importance of all rights (where their objectives are generally closer to those these observations on the WSIS process. There were, to of industrial country governments and may be vigorously begin with, a number of policy areas in which civil society opposed by some developing countries). Different civil

76 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? society organisations prioritise rights and development for example, tensions in the Internet Governance caucus issues differently. Some interviewees suggested the cau- between those with primarily Internet and those with pri- cus process and the general ethos of much civil society marily civil society backgrounds; and over the need to rep- debate discourage open discussion on these dichotomies resent the whole Internet-using community as well as and their implications for how civil society organisations those with specialist expertise. Interviewees do suggest, function within decision-making fora. however, that the regional and thematic caucus structures never really gelled, and that Northern and Southern CSOs While this distinction should certainly not be considered tended to maintain different priorities throughout. anything so crude as a division between industrial and de- During the second phase, the caucus system worked less veloping countries, therefore, it does mean that civil soci- effectively and civil society behaved in a much less cohe- ety organisations find it easier organisationally to partner sive way. Interviewees reported that a few specialist cau- with individual industrial countries and with specific indus- cuses continued to have a powerful impact, for example trial country blocs (such as the European Union) than with the Internet Governance Caucus and that on child protec- comparable blocs of developing countries, even where tion. There was, however, much less cohesion at the over- these countries and blocs are opposing important policy all civil society level; and more divisions were apparent positions they espouse (such as the Digital Solidarity Fund). within civil society, for example over issues like the empha- Much civil society activity within and around summits takes sis that should be given to free and open source software. place through caucuses, i.e. semi-formal associations of organisations and activists that have broadly common in- One reason for this difference, interviewees agreed, was terests. These caucuses became prominent during the the disruptive impact of participation by a large number Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995, and have of Tunisian organisations, the genuineness of whose civil featured in many of its successors. Their purpose is to draw society credentials was challenged by many that had been together diverse entities in a formation through which they involved during the first phase. More established interna- can develop common positions and promote these with tional NGOs tended to regard these Tunisian organisations greater critical mass. Membership is generally open to all as interlopers, suspiciously close to their government and organisations which are recognisably civil society in char- certainly remote from the “excluded” Tunisian rights or- acter and which wish to take part in them. Caucuses also ganisations and other NGOs that bore the brunt of gov- help to build shared awareness and understanding within ernment suppression. Many civil society participants felt civil society. The networks generated by this may have that this “Tunisian factor” undermined the openness of more lasting value, though (at least before WSIS) caucuses discussion during caucus meetings and made them less themselves were usually formed for individual summits productive fora for deciding strategy, with the latter mi- rather than as longer-term alliances. grating from caucus room to coffee shop.

Given this purpose, and their significance as foci for organi- Interviewees also felt that the concentration of issues dur- sation, the representativeness and coherence of caucuses ing the second summit also undermined the effectiveness not surprisingly have substantial impact on the effective- of the caucus system. With Internet governance by far the ness of the lobbying process described above. In principle, most important item on the agenda, there was not a great the caucus process could work in very different ways: deal other than Internet governance on which to caucus – at least where text was concerned (arrangements for WSIS • It could help to build a relatively powerful consensus, follow-up were also of significant interest). The overall civil increasing the commitment of civil society in general society caucus therefore lost focus on issues, becoming to focus on causes promoted by groups within civil so- more of an organisational tool and therefore of less inter- ciety (in the case of WSIS, for example, to support the est to many potential participants. More differences, po- inclusion of language concerning child protection). litical as much as ideological, were observable between • Alternatively, it could tend to reduce the range of is- components of individual caucuses – for example between sues covered and points made concerning them to a Anglophone and Francophone members of the African civil lowest common denominator on which general agree- society caucus. ment can be reached – like WSIS itself, therefore, avoid- A greater difference was also suggested during the sec- ing areas of conflict in pursuit of greater consensus. ond phase between those civil society organisations Interviewees reported the experience of WSIS as being whose instincts were to cooperate or work within the WSIS rather mixed. The caucus process was generally felt to have process and those more keen to criticise its outcomes. To worked well during the first summit phase, with civil soci- some extent, this could be observed in differences of view ety as a whole building up substantial esprit de corps as between civil society actors concerning the Digital Soli- its right to participate was challenged. Some caucuses darity Fund and the report of the Task Force on Financial needed time to create a working atmosphere – there were, Mechanisms.

Section B . Analysis 77 In a few cases, during the second phase, caucus organisa- many civil society delegates, particularly those not involved tion also became more formal. The African civil society in caucusing, found it the most useful part of the whole WSIS caucus, for example, sought to establish an institutional experience. structure of a kind more like that which might have been But we have not so far considered who was there. Civil expected from African governments. Formalisation of this society is immensely diverse. It is defined essentially by kind, some suggested, turns a caucus into a committee, a what it excludes - inter-governmental organisations, gov- structure of a different kind with, usually, a different kind ernments and private businesses – which implies that it of purpose: more of a permanent institution than a tem- includes everything else – from peasants’ organisations porary alliance, something of which organisations might and trade unions; through women’s groups, faith groups, seek to be members rather than simply to attend. The im- etcetera; perhaps to include political parties, academics, plications of this possible development of the caucus struc- more amorphous “social movements”. “Civil society”, in ture are considered again towards the end of this chapter. other words, is arguably not defined by its objectives, like Participation in caucuses and PrepComs built one level of governments (“to rule”) or businesses (“to make profit for networking between civil society organisations that were shareholders”), but bounded by the fact that it does not particularly concerned with WSIS issues – especially those share those objectives. It is therefore likely to be much concerned with issues of information rights. A further di- more fractured than these other stakeholder groups - po- mension of WSIS activity that was particularly important litically, socially, culturally, geographically, ideologically. to civil society was the exhibition space and informal sum- While its fractures are obviously recognised by civil soci- mit held at each WSIS summit session. The exhibition ety actors, the ethos of civil society engagement in inter- space and the very wide range of workshops, seminars, national institutions, where the value of common objec- discussion fora and presentation sessions associated with tives is self-evident, tends to obscure them. This has of- it offered a wider range of networking opportunities to a ten caused problems for civil society representation, and wider range of civil society organisations. This informal instability in civil society coalitions. summit drew in more development NGOs in particular – So which parts of civil society were represented in the mostly those with specific ICD projects or programmes but PrepComs, in Geneva and in Tunis? A paradigm gap simi- also some more mainstream organisations. lar – but not identical – to that found in government del- The exhibition space in Tunis was significantly different egations can be found in civil society representation. from that in Geneva. In the first summit, the ICT4D Plat- Firstly, civil society participation in WSIS was constrained form, sponsored by the Swiss Development Corporation, by a number of “access” factors. Even the best-funded in- had a strongly developmental character, including both ternational NGOs found it difficult to resource participa- donor agencies and NGOs. Many NGOs with ICD pro- tion in the paraphernalia of WSIS – PrepComs and regional grammes saw it as an opportunity to showcase these. conferences requiring high travel and accommodation Spaces for semi-formal workshop sessions around the costs, websites and listservs to coordinate activity, staff periphery were oversubscribed, and these were comple- time diverted from other work. These cost factors dispro- mented by further sessions held within the exhibition area, portionately affected developing country civil society or- many of them by civil society NGOs. The atmosphere at ganisations, which are poor in comparison with their in- times was febrile, as interested visitors, without passes to dustrial country peers. Some fellowship resources were the (somewhat isolated) plenary itself, gorged themselves available for NGOs, but these were limited, and it was diffi- on the variety of inputs available - which often (though not cult – as the “Louder Voices” study found with government always) had a strong advocacy component. The exhibition representatives – for organisations to achieve continuity space in Tunis was more like those associated with major of presence throughout the WSIS process. Wealthier North- ITU trade conferences, such as the “Telecom” events held ern CSOs were therefore more substantially represented annually in different geographical regions. A higher pro- at WSIS than poorer Southern CSOs; and Northern CSOs portion of stands were occupied by businesses promoting played a more prominent part in civil society caucusing than technological solutions (including, notably, a strong pres- their Southern counterparts. While they were conscious of ence from the Chinese business sector); a lower propor- this and made considerable efforts to compensate for it, tion from development agencies and NGOs. The semi-for- CSO activists were unable to prevent some hostile devel- mal workshop programme, however, was still dynamic, oping country governments from claiming that civil society with substantial coordinated programmes of sessions or- represented a Northern, not a Southern perspective. ganised by bodies such as the Global Knowledge Partner- ship. Although the atmosphere around these was less fran- As well as being geographically unequal, the composition tic, interviewees felt that the quality of many meetings was of civil society representation also failed to reflect fully the very high, and often more analytical than had been the case diverse areas of interest of civil society organisations that in Geneva. The understanding of ICT issues in these works- might have played a part. There were perhaps three main hops certainly exceeded that in the main WSIS process, and types of civil society organisation whose presence might

78 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? have been expected and which might have substantial Within industrial countries, a reasonably high degree of expertise to contribute to the issues debated in the sum- multistakeholder participation in policy dialogue has be- mit: organisations primarily concerned with a) rights; b) come relatively common. Relevant private sector organi- ICT issues, including the Internet; and c) development. In sations, for example, are often routinely included in del- practice, however, organisations concerned primarily with egations to the ITU. Discussion with civil society organi- ICTs were much more substantially and actively present sations involved in both development policy and rights than mainstream organisations concerned with either issues is part of normal practice. A routine culture of multi- rights or development issues.36 stakeholder engagement obviously offered opportunities for civil society organisations of all types to have an input Two reasons were suggested for this. Firstly, ICTs offer sub- into national policy development on WSIS-related issues. stantial new space for the expression of opinion and for This did not always lead to substantial formal consulta- networking between individuals and civil society organi- tion: in Britain, for example, formal consultation consisted sations. Control over this space is contested, particularly of sparsely attended meetings organised by the British in authoritarian states, by governments and citizens/dis- Council in the run-up to each WSIS summit. However, Brit- sidents/opponents. The fact that much early Internet de- ish CSOs did not, by their own evidence, feel excluded from velopment was led by people with an anti-establishment WSIS discussions because they were able (and encour- perspective has contributed to this debate. As a result, aged) to make their input through the normal channels the Internet and ICTs were already central to the concerns that they had available. Experience varied in different in- of a significant group of information rights CSOs when dustrial countries, but CSOs could usually make their WSIS was announced. A similar case obviously applies to voices heard. ICT-focused organisations, including those using ICTs in development activity, since they have directly chosen to Experience in developing countries was more diverse. work within this area. But the second reason suggested Some national delegations to WSIS from developing coun- for the disparity in representation by organisational type tries included CSOs, but this varied substantially. The ma- is really the converse of the first. ICTs do not have the same jority of delegations had no civil society representatives powerful resonance for mainstream rights and develop- at all. A small number of countries, however – such as ment NGOs that they have within the ICT/Internet com- South Africa – made a point of including civil society par- munities. As with the official development community, in ticipants, and some also included these in PrepComs. particular, the value of ICTs in development is still conten- These countries, not surprisingly, were among those that tious; in fact, wariness of ICTs is probably greater in devel- had implemented more extensive multistakeholder con- opment NGOs, which have an even stronger focus on pov- sultation as part of their WSIS preparations. erty reduction than official donors. Few mainstream development sector NGOs, therefore, were present in Geneva As discussed in Chapter 6, five country case studies con- or Tunis; and none played a significant part in WSIS’ dis- cerning national WSIS policymaking processes were un- cussion of ICTs and development. The impact this had on dertaken for this project – in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ethio- civil society’s contribution to this debate is discussed later pia, India and Kenya. In each of these countries, some ef- in this chapter. fort was made by government to engage with other stakeholders in preparing for WSIS, though only one case study Some countries, both Northern and Southern, included – that in Kenya – suggests that this may lead to lasting civil society representatives in their national delegations. change in policymaking processes. Ecuador, among the country case studies for this report, was one example. Such representatives did not always find In India, the process of engagement in WSIS was led by the it easy. Some expressed the feeling that they were being Department of Telecommunications (DoT), which initially used as tokens. Others felt constrained by the principle of saw the summit as an opportunity to promote Indian busi- collective responsibility, which meant that they were un- ness interests. According to the case study, DoT “had a nar- able to express their organisation’s point of view, certainly row view of the scope and participants that could play a in WSIS sessions and sometimes even within delegation leading role,” initially restricting its invitations to contrib- meetings. ute to other government departments and the private sector, and excluding NGOs, the media and other entities. Re- The likelihood of civil society participation in national del- sponse to its invitations was insubstantial, even within gov- egations reflected the likelihood of participation in national ernment. Though business associations did play some part fora discussing WSIS issues. This varied substantially be- in formal consultation, their contribution was never great. tween countries. The case study suggests that few Indian NGOs have been involved in national policymaking on ICTs or have substan- 36 Though not entirely so: Amnesty International, Christian Aid and Plan tial expertise in this area. India’s history of statism, it is International were among mainstream rights and development NGOs attending the Tunis summit. suggested, may be partly responsible for the weakness of

Section B . Analysis 79 civil society in this area. Nevertheless, a number of Indian issues. “These initiatives,” the case study reports, “opened civil society organisations attended PrepCom and plenary new possibilities to tighten the government-civil society sessions of the summit, though none were included in the relationship, ... although not always with effective, spe- official consultation processes - themselves pretty insub- cific and efficient results.” The process faced multiple dif- stantial - that were held by DoT. Indian civil society re- ficulties - for example due to changes in the government spondents felt that they were able to contribute on some team responsible, varying quality of knowledge of ICT is- issues through civil society caucuses, including Internet sues and uncertain financial resources to support involve- governance and gender issues, and to some degree to raise ment by Ecuador in regional and global WSIS meetings. awareness of Indian civil society concerns with “It was,” the study concludes, “an uneven, staggered proc- policymakers. However, as in other countries, they report ess with random and poorly-timed calls for participation that their participation was constrained by lack of finan- that lacked clear coordinating roles and attempted to in- cial resources.37 troduce participatory multisectoral working methodologies. Despite the efforts and the political will of the stake- Bangladesh’s participation in WSIS was led by the Minis- holders, it did not allow the basic consensus needed for try of Science and Information Technology, which made the formulation of a position and priorities of the country some efforts to engage with the private sector and civil to be reached.” society in policy development. In late 2002, the government set up a Working Group on WSIS with representa- This national discourse vanished from the scene for twelve tives from relevant ministries, the private sector, the me- months after the Geneva summit and, when reactivated in dia and civil society, with a secretariat based in the coun- January 2005 to provide input to the second PrepCom of try’s telecommunications regulatory commission. How- the second phase, it was more clearly dominated by gov- ever, the country case study suggests that this Working ernment officials. Government participation in the second Group was insufficiently inclusive, with limited private sec- phase of WSIS was therefore better, while that of other tor participation and no opportunity for non-invited NGOs stakeholders was less substantial. Although civil society to play a part. As a result, “some of the major NGOs such delegates were included in Ecuador’s national delegation as Grameen Bank or BRAC, who also have a stake in ICT in Tunis, these reported finding that they were unable to areas, had little or no participation in the WSIS activities play a significant civil society role as delegation members. in the country.” A second, apparently overlapping, consul- Civil society organisations in Ecuador report feeling that, tation and policy development process was set up by the while WSIS opened space for multistakeholder participa- Ministry of Science and Information Technology. tion, including better access to government officials, “the Civil society may have been more engaged in Bangladesh benefits of multistakeholder alliances were circumstantial than India, though it was likewise constrained by finan- and not always effective.” Relatively few civil society or- cial difficulties. A number of civil society organisations ganisations participated in the WSIS dialogue: “Some ac- participated in official working groups and/or undertook tors only participated in the initial stage of the first phase their own initiatives. Along with APC and OneWorld South in Geneva and experienced ... disenchantment; others Asia, the Bangladesh Working Group on WSIS organised a persevered until Tunis, with certain periods of more intense South Asian regional consultation meeting in January participation. Some limited their participation to national 2005. The input from this conference was submitted to dynamics, others to regional and global ones, and a few relevant regional bodies. Unusually, one consultation fo- to both.” The picture, in other words, was mixed, but, over- rum for civil society within Bangladesh was held outside all, relationships between civil society and other stake- the capital, in Khulna, though the country case study sug- holders were insufficiently developed to maximise the gests that this was more of an awareness-raising exercise potential WSIS offered. Lack of resources, as elsewhere, than a truly consultative event.38 also hindered civil society involvement. Private sector engagement was, meanwhile, “sporadic, isolated and un- Efforts were also made by the government in Ecuador to planned.” Media debate was conspicuous by its absence.39 draw the private sector and civil society into a multistakeholder dialogue. The National Telecommunications Coun- As noted in Chapter 6, the government of Ethiopia did not cil, responsible for coordination of the country’s WSIS par- attend the Bamako regional meeting which initiated ticipation, began to convene multistakeholder workshops African participation in the first phase of WSIS in 2002. nationally and provincially from around the beginning of However, this conference was attended by a substantial 2003 with the aim of guiding national input into WSIS delegation - thirteen in all - from the private sector and civil society. Having missed its initial opportunity in

37 Quotations and evidence from Rekha Jain, country case study of India, Bamako, the Ethiopian telecommunications regulator available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ wsis_research. 38 Quotations and evidence from Partha Sarker, country case study of 39 Quotations and evidence from Valeria Betancourt, country case study Bangladesh, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ of Ecuador, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ wsis_research. wsis_research.

80 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? (ETA) organised a national consultative workshop at the the country, holding national civil society consultation beginning of 2003, involving about fifty delegates from workshops in both phases of the WSIS process. different stakeholder communities. A task force resulted, A further important development, after the first summit headed by the regulatory body with a small (though multi- meeting, was the creation of a new alliance, the Kenya ICT stakeholder) membership and the intent to establish a Action Network (Kictanet), established by Kenyan civil so- regular consultation process. In practice, however, accord- ciety and private sector organisations with an interest in ing to the country case study, this regular dialogue did not ICT policy. This highly unusual partnership, formed during emerge, and “discussion on the WSIS process was con- a meeting in October 2004 organised jointly by APC and fined to ICT experts from key organisations,” reflecting the local private sector and civil society partnerships, no- similar concentration of the country’s overall ICT activity. tably the Telecommunications Service Providers Associa- In spite of this, the development of a substantial official tion of Kenya, the Media Council of Kenya and the WSIS response to the draft WSIS texts in mid-2003 provided “an Caucus, built on cross-stakeholder desire to have more opportunity for stakeholders to reflect on WSIS issues and influential input in national ICT policy, and has been highly national development challenges.” There was less consul- successful in achieving this objective. Kictanet has added tation during the second phase of the summit, in which no a new dynamic to lobbying on national ICT policy and con- formal multistakeholder consultation was arranged. tributed significantly to national WSIS thinking. However, Ethiopia did not, according to the country case study, there- the country case study notes, it does not include main- fore see much real multistakeholder involvement. What stream development sector organisations, an important participation did take place “was centred around govern- omission from the perspective of building an holistic ap- ment’s agenda and influenced [more] by international de- proach to the role of ICTs in society and its development. velopment agencies than by strong contributions from civil As noted in Chapter 6, Kenyan participation in the second society, private sector, academia and the media.” Civil so- phase of WSIS was substantial and substantive. Partici- ciety and the private sector were not well organised, ac- pation in the Summit, the country case study suggests, cording to the study, and tended to respond to what gov- improved awareness of ICT and development issues in ernment had to say rather than articulating their own con- general and in detail, improved policy coordination within cerns. To some extent, their inability to take advantage of government, and built solidarity between groups that had such formal consultative spaces as were created reflects previously contested space for policy influence. However, the historic weakness of civil society resulting from the to reiterate comments reported in Chapter 6, limits to un- hostility or wariness of successive government regimes derstanding and cohesion remained. “Careful review of the within the country. Although Ethiopia has a wide range of participation of public sector, civil society and private sec- civil society organisations which could have something to tor ... shows that the engagement was not coherent and offer in terms of ICT policy, the case study concludes, WSIS input to the WSIS issues tended to be reactive rather than did not generate an environment more conducive to multi- proactive.” Thinking about WSIS remained focused on stakeholder participation. However, awareness was raised, technology rather than the national development context, in particular enabling government to explore experience and debate in Kenya still exhibited many of the deficien- in comparable countries more fully, and this may contrib- cies discussed in Chapter 5. “Uncritical acceptance of the ute positively to future ICT policy development.40 WSIS process and its recommendations in Kenya,” the case It was Kenya, among the five case study countries, that study concludes, “shows that there is a long way to go to experienced a substantive and potentially lasting increase influence a global debate on a wider set of issues regard- in multistakeholder participation. ing ICTs and development” - and civil society organisations could play an important part in developing this wider dis- A significant delegation from Kenya attended the 2002 cussion.41 Bamako African conference - mostly from civil society and the private sector – but quickly recognised that it was ill- The evidence from the country case studies suggests that prepared. A conference in Addis Ababa (co-organised by civil society had to struggle to be heard in most cases. APC and UNECA in November 2002) recommended the While many governments established some form of space creation of an East African Civil Society Organisations WSIS in which different stakeholders could contribute, the case Caucus. Responding to this, a Kenya Civil Society WSIS studies – and other experience reported by interviewees – Caucus was created, including ten organisations with suggest that these were usually low-key, sometimes longstanding experience of ICTs in development. This es- tokenistic, and rarely central to a policymaking agenda that tablished local legitimacy, secured international funding continued to be set by governments. Perhaps they created (from Canadian IDRC), and became a potent lobbyist within a precedent which could be built on in the future, but it is

40 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study of 41 Quotations and evidence from Lishan Adam, country case study of Ethiopia, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ Kenya, available from: www.apc.org/rights.apc.org/documents/ wsis_research. wsis_research.

Section B . Analysis 81 not generally apparent that the processes they initiated of one view or the other might describe this as a contest are also being used for more conventional policymaking between collaboration and utopianism. Caucuses try to purposes. They usually seem to have been one-offs for resolve this by achieving consensus within civil society, WSIS, in other words. The exception to this pattern comes but do not always succeed in doing so; and the latter from Kenya, where the establishment of Kictanet, as an stages of the second phase of WSIS saw some authoritative non-governmental partnership, looks as if it antagonisms emerge between those civil society organi- may have lasting impact. Democratic engagement, the role sations that took a more pragmatic and those that took a of individual sector champions and systematic lobbying more ideological view. are all potential features of continuing multistakeholder The ability of civil society to engage constructively with participation, and Kictanet’s success to date, both in re- other stakeholders is partly political: marriages of conven- spect of WSIS and in influencing other ICT decisions – for ience can sometimes – actually, it would seem, quite of- example on telecommunications regulation - suggests a ten - be made which cut across differences of paradigm. potential new direction for multistakeholder activity within Civil society and private sector groups, for example, share the sector in other countries. The fact that it combines civil a common interest in achieving greater input into decision- society and private sector participation seems to be an making. However, other stakeholders make clear, it is the important factor in building its authority with government. quality of civil society input into any process that will de- Inclusion of a wider range of civil society organisations, termine how much civil society organisations are listened notably development NGOs, may add further to its potency to. How well do civil society proponents of any particular and its potential. proposal understand the issues concerned, the motivations of different actors, the likely impact of wider Civil society contributions policy? How far are proposals based on evidence rather than assumption or ideology? How amenable are organi- When it comes to the content of discussions during WSIS sations to reaching pragmatic consensus with other per- – as in any summit – interviewees identified five main ob- spectives? Oppositionalism sometimes plays well within jectives for civil society: civil society, but other stakeholders say they find it very off-putting and that it makes it less likely that civil society a. To “get its message across”, whatever that message proposals will enter into the texts that are finally agreed. may be - in other words, to raise the profile of particu- In the second WSIS phase, notably over Internet govern- lar issues that civil society (or any individual organi- ance, many government and private sector stakeholders sation) considers important: with delegations, other felt that the “constructive engagement” offered by civil civil society participants and (where possible) a wider society helped smooth the way to final agreement, per- audience haps because it enabled them to discuss the politics of b. To articulate voices of the poor and disenfranchised Internet governance in a way that was less polarised be- c. To maintain (i.e. resist “backsliding” on) established tween international power blocs. United Nations agreements (for example on rights or Text, however, is not – or at least should not be – the development priorities) and, where possible endgame here. International agreements are littered with d. To improve language concerning these established text that is honoured in the breach rather than observ- rights and priorities ance. Ambiguous texts, texts so bland as to be meaning- e. To introduce new language into international discourse less, texts that no-one ever expects most of their signa- that will extend existing provisions – for example, by tories to comply with: all of these are commonplace in promoting women’s rights or child protection, or by international agreements. Many interviewees recognised entrenching multistakeholder dialogue for the future. the way in which the momentum of negotiations drew them into preoccupation with the text rather than its Civil society’s ability to achieve these objectives depends, meaning: with achieving a form of words that secures like that of any other interest group, on its ability to se- agreement which approximates more with their own po- cure wider support for them, and therefore on its ability to sition than with that of their disputants. Equally, they use the resources available to it in order to secure that recognised that this could easily lead them into hollow support and its translation into text. This means reaching victories: into achieving text that lacked meaning or beyond the core civil society constituency within meetings, would never be observed. With hindsight, a lot of par- partnering and reaching agreement with representatives ticipants in WSIS were critical of the WSIS final texts for of other stakeholder communities. For all civil society precisely these reasons, particularly lack of depth in the organisations, it therefore involves tensions between their case of the text on development, and ambiguity in that role as representatives of a particular interest group (which on Internet governance (what, exactly, is “enhanced co- may be “the poor or marginalised”) and their role as ac- operation”?). The WSIS texts, as noted earlier, contain tors in a process designed to achieve consensus. Critics very few specific “commitments”.

82 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? In many previous summits, civil society organisations have view of ICTs’ role in development expressed within this text, produced alternative texts to that of the formal summit but – as noted earlier in this chapter – any such input came itself. They did so in the first, Geneva, session of WSIS, from those civil society organisations which were already producing a “declaration” which set out a consensus civil strongly committed to that role, and did not engage main- society view of what was needed to “[shape] information stream development NGOs which are more sceptical. An societies for human needs.”42 opportunity to address this paradigm gap was missed within civil society as well as within governments. Civil society did not produce a comparable statement in Tu- nis until a month after the end of the summit, by which time Civil society engagement in the second phase was rather the attention of other stakeholders had moved on. While it different. Rights-based organisations continued to defend expressed pleasure at some developments within WSIS – the relationship between ICTs and basic rights and to seek including increased, if precarious, participation by civil soci- extensions to those rights within the text. Some niche CSOs, ety in the summit process, and the establishment of the such as child protection and disability agencies, increased Internet Governance Forum - the tone of this final summit their profile in the WSIS process and achieved significant statement was (as its title, “Much more could have been gains in terms of their own objectives. ICD-oriented CSOs achieved”, suggests) mostly one of resigned disappointment: had less to do, because the development components of Overall, it is impossible not to conclude that WSIS has the text agreed in Geneva were not revisited in the second failed to live up to [its] expectations. The Tunis phase phase. As we have noted repeatedly, this focused on two in particular, which was presented as the ‘summit of main issues, financing mechanisms and Internet govern- solutions’, did not provide concrete achievements to ance. What input did civil society make into these? meaningfully address development problems.43 During the first phase, when the Digital Solidarity Fund was During the first phase, civil society interest in WSIS coa- proposed by the President of Senegal, civil society’s instincts lesced, as it had in previous summits, as organisations were to support the proposal, seeing it as a significant pro- which thought they might be interested declared them- posal from the South (which therefore represented a po- selves, expressed their priorities and sought partners. Each tential shift in international influence) and as a challenge to new summit, interviewees suggested, starts with this sort- the established paradigms of development policy (which ing out of civil society interests. Civil society played a par- many CSOs consider, unsurprisingly, to be dominated by ticularly prominent role in the first regional meeting to be the North and by multilateral institutions which are also held, in Africa in May 2002 and contributed substantially Northern-dominated). However, this amounted more to ex- to its outcomes, mostly text related to ICTs and develop- pressions of solidarity than to contributions of significance ment. The first PrepCom then changed the emphasis, fo- to the content of the debate. Privately, a good number of cusing strongly on the issue of who should be represented civil society representatives were sceptical of the DSF for within the WSIS process and requiring civil society to con- reasons shared by (for example) liberal European donors. centrate too on defending its right to take part. Challenges Civil society did not play as significant a part in the work of to the inclusion of references to established human rights the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms as in the WGIG, instruments also concentrated attention on that area of though some civil society organisations (including APC) were civil society interest. These, rather than development ques- directly involved, arguing, inter alia, for greater mutual en- tions, held the main attention of WSIS and its civil society gagement between the financing and policy agendas. Many participants during the remainder of the first phase. civil society organisations were critical of what they saw as its conservatism – in particular, its reaffirmation of the pri- Civil society contributions to content in this period there- mary role of private sector investment in extending connec- fore concentrated on the defence of established rights of tivity and its rejection of a development instrument (the DSF) expression and the relationship between ICTs and the over- that might be Southern-owned/led. Civil society actors did all rights agenda, in which context they found themselves lobby for new approaches to infrastructure investment dur- in informal alliance with industrial country governments. ing the Africa regional preparatory meeting of the second During the first phase, civil society input was directed much phase and the subsequent second PrepCom, though there more towards the Declaration of Principles than towards were divisions amongst them over the DSF and the report the Plan of Action, from whose negotiation they were ef- of the TFFM. The fact that the proponents of the DSF did not fectively excluded, and in which the major contributions pursue the matter after the second PrepCom of the second came from governments. Where it was expressed, civil phase, for reasons discussed in Chapter 5, meant that there society input was strongly in tune with the very positive was little scope for further civil society engagement with it, beyond a general sense of frustration that the “develop- 42 The Geneva civil society declaration is available from: www.itu.int/ ment establishment” had “won”. wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en?&id=1179|1208. 43 “Much more could have been achieved”, p. 4, available from: Internet governance was another matter. Financing mecha- www.worldsummit2003.de/download_en/WSIS-CS-summit- statement-rev1-23-12-2005-en.pdf. nisms were historically largely matters for government;

Section B . Analysis 83 many in civil society saw the Internet as part of their own favour of the broad objective of an Internet more free from world, a creation of individuals and non-governmental US authority yet not subject to more governmental or in- partnerships rather than of governments (or, come to ter-governmental control. This caucus had three advan- that, the private sector). There were many intellectual and tages. Firstly, it contained a very high level of expertise ideological cross-currents between information rights- on the issues that it dealt with, coming from members of based civil society organisations and Internet pioneers. the Internet community. Secondly, many of its Internet- Many information rights-based organisations saw the focused participants were used to working with each Internet as a crucial opportunity to extend freedom of other in other contexts. Thirdly, it benefited from the rela- expression (with some, though less, attention to the tively similar views on the roles of governments and non- threat of Internet censorship). governmental actors which were shared by many in the Internet community with many within civil society organi- The Internet, in other words, corresponded closely to the sations, especially those concerned with information non-governmental or anti-governmental tendencies rights. The result was a powerful and authoritative cau- within civil society. CSOs might be expected to defend cus, which was well-equipped by its knowledge and range free-spirited, multilateral alternative models of interna- of skills to lobby effectively within what became an in- tional governance like the Internet Engineering Task tensely political debate. Civil society engagement un- Force. At the same time, however, many in civil society doubtedly helped to see off, at least within WSIS, pro- shared the resentment of developing countries at the posals for a more authoritarian governance regime (which apparent authority over the Internet held by the United was also opposed by most industrial country govern- States. This included its apparent authority over ICANN ments and the private sector); it helped secure agree- (in spite of the fact that ICANN’s governance model was ment on the Internet Governance Forum as part of the more open to non-governmental stakeholders than, say, post-WSIS approach; it also contributed a significant the ITU or its postal equivalent, the UPU). In general, civil amount of language to the final WSIS text on Internet society opinion here wanted to see both a reduction in governance, including the mandate of that Forum. United States influence (which was in line with developing countries’ objectives) and a reduction (or at least no With hindsight, participants in this debate could argue quite increase) in government influence over the Internet strongly for the benefits of constructive engagement in com- (which was not), and certainly no increase in influence parison with, say, those of developing and issuing an alter- for the (CSO-unfriendly) ITU (which some countries saw native civil society statement from the summit’s margins. as the natural home for Internet governance, as it had In the Geneva phase, civil society had a wider range of historically been for telecommunications). issues to discuss. The whole character of the “informa- This was quite a complex web. Interviewees suggested that tion society” seemed up for grabs, and there were points two things were crucial to civil society’s effectiveness of principle to argue on a wide range of issues around within the Internet governance debate. which civil society could coalesce. The hostility of many government delegations to civil society presence also fos- One was the structure adopted for the WGIG, which is de- tered a sense of community and solidarity. Civil society scribed in Chapter 6. This was a much more CSO-friendly input focused on rights issues, and had relatively little structure than the TFFM: one in which civil society was in- impact on the text on development. These factors were vited to select representatives, most of whom were ap- less apparent in the Tunis phase, which focused much proved; where those representatives were given space to more narrowly on Internet governance – an issue in which contribute fully, on equal terms with representatives of civil society found other ways of influencing outcomes other stakeholder groups; and where civil society language (in the WGIG and through dialogue with government del- contributed substantially to the final report. The WGIG was egates sharing many Internet community objectives). The therefore seen as a major advance for civil society influ- majority of civil society organisation and caucusing were ence in an important international negotiation. This may also weaker in the second phase, but the Internet Gov- only have been possible because governments already ernance Caucus provided a powerful instrument which lacked authority over the Internet and so were more will- could be used, with significant success, to advance posi- ing to concede space on it to other stakeholders – a point tions commonly held within civil society. discussed in Chapter 8 – but it had real value for civil society. In particular, it gave civil society advocates a much stronger position of authority from which to lobby for their The private sector language during the final PrepComs of the second phase. Before considering the lessons for civil society organisations The second factor cited as crucial was the Internet Gov- emerging from this experience, it is worth looking briefly at ernance Caucus, which brought together civil society and the comparable experience of the private sector. As noted other Internet specialists in common cause to argue in earlier, while the UN system makes little distinction between

84 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? the private sector and civil society, this is not the case with Outside formal CCBI contributions, therefore, business the ITU, which has had private sector “Sector Members” input had a supplier rather than a consumer perspective. closely involved in much of its work since the early 1990s. This added to the similar supply-led emphasis in WSIS While not entirely uncontroversial within the ITU – some overall, which resulted from the ITU’s management role governments are very clear about the limits to private sec- and the skewed nature of participation in national delega- tor involvement when final decisions are reached – this tions. Even within the ICT sector, there was a marked dis- might have been expected to give the business community tinction between manufacturing businesses, which were an inside track on representation. The hostility which ICT well represented, and service providers, which were less businesses actually experienced during the first PrepCom likely to be present, either in the exhibition areas or in the of the first phase may have taken both business representa- negotiating space. tives and the ITU aback, and certainly did much to foster a “common cause of the excluded” with civil society. The exception, where service providers were concerned, was the presence of former national telecoms monopo- Private sector participation in WSIS was dominated by the lies, particularly in developing country delegations. Many Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI) of these are only partly private sector today if they are pri- which was made up of the International Chamber of Com- vate sector at all. A consequence of this was that the busi- merce (ICC) and ten or more other international business ness component present within developing country nego- organisations and individual firms. It was set up by its tiating fora was primarily made up of the most conserva- members to act as “a vehicle through which to mobilise tive and traditional part of the ICT sector – those busi- and coordinate the involvement of the worldwide business nesses holding fixed network telephony licences, many still community in the processes leading to and culminating in holding monopolies and/or controlled by state bureauc- the Summit.”44 racies. Few developing countries included significant representation from the mobile telecoms sector or from the Interviewees for this report from all sectors agree that the Internet community within their delegations. Industrial CCBI was highly effective at representing its members, countries, however, were likely to have more such repre- though there was some criticism of lack of diversity in the sentatives, who usually shared perspectives on issues like content and presentation of business views when these market liberalisation and Internet governance with the could be formally put to PrepCom and plenary sessions. One governments in whose delegations they participated. advantage of representation through the CCBI was that, because the membership of the ICC and its other member- One section of the business community that was relatively organisations included non-ICT as well as ICT businesses, it poorly represented, ironically, was the Internet community, was able to put forward perspectives that reflected busi- especially Internet service providers (particularly from de- ness interests across the board. However, in practice, it was veloping countries) and those parts of the Internet commu- ICT businesses that participated in the CCBI as in wider de- nity which do not fit straightforwardly into either business bate around WSIS. Some interviewees also questioned or civil society categories - organisations such as Internet whether the CCBI was able effectively to represent the views registries, for example, which operate as, in effect, non-profit of a wider business community, in particular whether it had businesses. These latter organisations are intensely affected sufficient understanding of the interests of small and me- by debates on Internet governance, and their under-repre- dium sized businesses, and businesses based in develop- sentation was a potential weakness of the Internet governing countries, as well as those of large international con- ance debate within WSIS. Those that did take part suggested cerns. Business observers feel that it became more repre- that their peers failed to understand the potential signifi- sentative, in both passive and active senses, as the WSIS cance for them, in the unregulated Internet, of an inter-gov- process went on, though it was always disadvantaged by ernmental summit. If so, they were dangerously naïve. In the different rhythms of business and summit proceedings. practice, the relative openness of the WGIG, particularly its public sessions, did allow such Internet organisations to In terms of participation outside the CCBI, there were clear have significant informal input, but even so the number of distinctions between sections of the private sector that participants from this community was small. As is often the were and were not well represented – much as there were case, those who wish to promote multistakeholder par- with civil society. Not surprisingly, it was ICT businesses ticipation need to take care to encourage the engagement that participated in lobbying and in exhibiting. Business of significant stakeholders with narrow interests which users of ICTs, including major user groups like the financial may not form part of broader discussions but which are services sector, were poorly represented other than through fundamentally affected when these broad discussions their membership of the CCBI and its constituent organisa- tackle narrow questions. tions, in spite of the fact that they might be expected to be considerable beneficiaries of the “information society”. CCBI and wider business input into WSIS focused on a small range of common objectives. Large businesses did not want 44 From www.iccwbo.org/policy/ebitt/id2343/index.html. to see greater regulation, by and large, particularly

Section B . Analysis 85 over the Internet which they felt had delivered the goods processes, and the opportunity cost in other work for business because of the openness with which it has which could not be undertaken as a result. developed. In this, they have common cause with civil society and industrial country governments. They are strongly It is probably easiest just to say that the experience var- in favour of private sector-led investment and of its facilita- ied. Some organisations invested relatively little and tion through the privatisation and liberalisation of ICT mar- gained a good deal; others feel the opposite was true. On kets. They want light rather than intrusive regulation – regu- balance, few think that the summit as a whole was the lation that will foster competition rather than imposing pub- best way of spending that amount of money, either in prin- lic policy obligations on them. They see themselves as con- ciple or in the specific context of the “information soci- tributing to development by their investment and pursuit ety”. A lot of money, many feel, was spent on pretty lim- of business objectives, not as instruments to be used by ited outcomes. On the other hand, once a summit is de- governments to deliver development outcomes. These views clared, it is very difficult for many CSOs to opt out. Those – confined to a much smaller range of WSIS issues than that prioritise the issues under discussion see it either as those expressed by civil society - were consistently articu- an opportunity to press their cause or as a process from lated through the CCBI. which they cannot afford to be absent (though those whose interest is more marginal might so choose). While almost The relationship between civil society and the private sec- every government will attend, therefore, civil society par- tor within WSIS was an interesting one. The early part of ticipation tends to be more skewed in favour of the already the first phase saw sustained attacks on the participation committed, and so less representative of civil society as a of both civil society and the private sector from a number whole. (The relative absence of mainstream development of governments, which led to the exclusion of both from NGOs has already been noted as a problem here.) Busi- meetings at which they felt they had a right to be present. ness organisations tend to take a more hard-headed view, This common exclusion, interviewees from both camps based on the potential contribution of participation to the observed, built bonds of solidarity between civil society bottom line. and private sector groups, supported by a number of positive personal relationships across the stakeholder divide. The desirability of multistakeholder participation in deci- Although there was always going to be a distance between sion-making is one of the more important structural issues civil society and the private sector – both in the range of within current thinking about international discourse. Anxi- issues they were interested in addressing and the perspec- ety about the representativeness of governments and tive from which these might be addressed – a significant about their ability to cover all facets of any question has degree of partnership continued throughout the summit. led to significantly more widespread support for the view Internet governance was another area in which civil soci- that other major stakeholders – essentially the business ety and the private sector had some common cause against community and civil society – need to participate in na- the risk, as they saw it, of greater government control. The tional decision-making and that their participation will sig- implications of this for the relationship between civil soci- nificantly enhance its quality. In practice, governments ety and the private sector are discussed further in the fi- share authority with other social actors within national nal section of this chapter. decision-making spaces: with very rare exceptions, they do not claim the monopoly on representation or authority that many governments claim at an international level. WSIS and multistakeholderism Some governments and inter-governmental organisations, however, also see value in incorporating the business com- The costs and benefits of participation in WSIS are still munity and civil society alongside governments and inter- debated within civil society. governmental organisations in international decision-mak- • Some participants from civil society feel that signifi- ing spaces, although their ability to advance this is con- cant gains were made: some in terms of holding the strained by the hostility of governments which do not con- line on information rights or inching towards a more cede multistakeholder space at home or do not see this open future for Internet governance; some in terms of as transferable into the international sphere. raising issues and advocacy of ICT rights and ICTs in Other governments remain adamantly opposed to this di- development; some in terms of building their own ca- lution of the exclusiveness of their authority. pacity and understanding of ICT issues (and of sum- WSIS has been cited, however, as a significant point within mit-style negotiations); some in terms of networking, the longstanding debate about multistakeholderism within in particular the building of bonds between civil soci- international decision-making. Certainly, the WSIS outcome ety organisations that will be useful in the future. documents strongly endorsed the principle of multistake- • Others are more critical of the high costs involved in holderism. The Geneva Declaration of Principles included participation, in terms of both money and human what became known as the Geneva Principle on this: resources - the actual cost of being part of summit

86 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? We recognize that building an inclusive Information society participation in PrepCom and summit sessions, per- Society requires new forms of solidarity, partnership haps more than it would otherwise have had because the and cooperation among governments and other stake- ITU lacked experience in handling civil society and its ways, holders, i.e. the private sector, civil society and inter- while civil society’s own structures determined how and national organizations. Realising that the ambitious by whom the space available should be used. Civil society goal of this Declaration - bridging the digital divide and and private sector speakers had more space in which to ensuring harmonious, fair and equitable development make formal contributions in PrepComs and plenary ses- for all - will require strong commitment by all stake- sions. More national delegations were more interested in holders, we call for digital solidarity, both at national liaising with other stakeholders over the issues, and non- and international levels.45 governmental stakeholders themselves may have been more willing to lobby and to reach consensus – perhaps The Tunis Agenda reiterated this principle, and incorpo- because this looked more possible – than to argue and to rated it in its proposals for following-up both Internet gov- state their opposition. At any rate, no-one thought that ernance and general post-WSIS activities: WSIS set back the cause of multistakeholder participation. We are convinced that there is a need to initiate, and reinforce, as appropriate, a transparent, democratic, The locus of greatest multistakeholder involvement sug- and multilateral process [concerning Internet govern- gests one of the reasons why this might be so. Much has ance], with the participation of governments, private been made of the multistakeholder character of the WGIG, sector, civil society and international organizations, in in particular the opportunity given to civil society to nomi- their respective roles.46 … nate its own representatives and the openness created within the WGIG’s internal debates by focusing these on We encourage the development of multi-stakeholder individual rather than representative participation. Every- processes at the national, regional and international one interviewed about their part in the WGIG felt that levels to discuss and collaborate on the expansion and stakeholder differences became less important as the diffusion of the Internet as a means to support devel- Group worked more intensively together and were not as opment efforts to achieve internationally agreed de- significant to the final outcome as would have been the velopment goals and objectives, including the Millen- case if the WGIG had been conducted more traditionally. 47 nium Development Goals. … The question is not so much what was the effect of this Building an inclusive development-oriented Informa- modus operandi, but why it happened and whether it sets tion Society will require unremitting multi-stakeholder a precedent for future summits or negotiations. effort. … Taking into account the multifaceted nature of building the Information Society, effective cooperation A couple of observations made by some of those involved among governments, private sector, civil society and are important here. the United Nations and other international organiza- • One is that governments may have been more willing tions, according to their different roles and responsi- to cede ground to other stakeholders in the case of bilities and leveraging on their expertise, is essential.48 Internet governance because they had less to lose; in These statements went further than might have been ex- fact, they did not actually hold the ground concerned pected from other summits, though rhetoric did not nec- in the first place, and they may have actually needed essarily imply implementation. Some civil society observ- the participation of other stakeholders in order to ers were initially critical of the extent of multistakeholder refashion an area of governance that was outside their participation governments accepted in the Multistake- control. They would not, therefore, by implication, have holder Advisory Group set up to establish the Internet considered allowing so much multistakeholder partici- Governance Forum – though the IGF itself, when it met in pation in an area of policy that was more traditionally Athens in late 2006, paid exemplary attention to multi- under the control of governments and inter-govern- stakeholder principles. mental organisations, such as infrastructure finance.

The rhetoric of the WSIS outcome documents does, how- • The other is that the WGIG methodology is particularly ever, reflect what interviewees from all sectors recognised well attuned to a particular set of problems. As an is- as significantly greater multistakeholder participation in sue, Internet governance is both highly technical and WSIS than in previous summits. The civil society bureau highly politicised. Many of those involved in the Internet for WSIS had significant responsibility for facilitating civil governance debate combined entrenched views on what should happen with real ignorance of the techni- 45 Geneva Declaration of Principles, section A, article 17. cal structures whose governance they discussed. The 46 Tunis Agenda, article 61. informal modus operandi adopted by chairman Desai 47 ibid., article 80. and secretary Kummer in these circumstances allowed 48 ibid., article 83. people with strongly divergent views to learn from one

Section B . Analysis 87 another in a way that more formal proceedings (or con- At a national level, the evidence of most of the country sultants’ reports) would not have done, and so facili- case studies undertaken for this report does not show any tated coming together in both knowledge and under- substantial changes taking place within the WSIS period standing of different perspectives. The implication here itself. However, one of those case studies – that of Kenya is that other international issues which share this com- – does show significantly greater engagement by civil so- bination of technical complexity and politicisation may ciety organisations in policymaking; and it is clear (e.g. be susceptible to similar ways of working – climate from their WSIS delegations) that similar broadening did change and genetically-modified foods spring to mind take place in at least a few other countries. Many civil so- – but that these ways of working would have less im- ciety participants do in fact feel that WSIS may have a sub- pact on issues where technicalities are simpler and/or stantial impact on their ability to engage in national poli- ideological divisions are less profound. cymaking debates, resulting from a combination of factors – notably the experience they have had of engaging Some of the particularities of Internet governance here during the WSIS process itself (in those countries where might apply more widely to information and communica- some multistakeholder participation did occur); the pos- tion issues in general. WSIS may, in other words, offer more sibility that national government officials will respond more of a precedent in how future ICT decisions are made with- positively in future, given the emphasis on multistakehol- out setting any precedent for other areas of international derism in the WSIS outcome documents; greater knowl- discourse. edge of the range of ICT issues which they have gained through WSIS; and better networking with other civil soci- Within the ICT sector, much is likely to depend on how the ety organisations and the Internet community within their multistakeholder principles in the WSIS outcome docu- countries (as in Kenya). These observations relate to the ments are translated into practice by, for example, the ICT sector rather than to civil society interaction with gov- Internet Governance Forum and the action-line follow-up ernment more generally. processes established by the Tunis Agenda. The Global Alliance, which follows on the work of the UN ICT Task As for international civil society networking, it is still early Force, has also inherited similar multistakeholder princi- to say how extensively that may be affected by WSIS in ples. However, this does not necessarily have much im- the long term. The first phase of WSIS undoubtedly saw pact on other international ICT decision-making fora. the building of many new partnerships and of considerable esprit de corps among civil society participants. With The evidence reported in Chapters 5 and 6 suggests that, the exception of those working on Internet governance, with the obvious exception of Internet governance bod- this tended to dissipate somewhat during the second ies, the content of the WSIS outcome documents has not phase. Since WSIS ended, interviewees report, it has been had much impact on the issues being discussed within hard to maintain networks that were set up during WSIS, these pre-existing decision-making agencies: that WSIS again with the exception of relationships around Internet is, in practice, a one-off event; and that it had too little to governance where there is still a good deal of momentum say with too little depth about the issues with which they to events. The implications of all of the findings in this are concerned. There is little evidence to date, either, of chapter for future civil society engagement with the issues any of the multistakeholder principles adumbrated in the are discussed in Chapter 8. WSIS documents affecting the working methods of mainstream ICT agencies. For the present, the “Louder Voices” conclusions seem again to be maintained.

One inter-governmental agency that did find itself exploring its own representative structures as a result of WSIS, however, was the ITU. Although, when charged with run- ning WSIS, it had considerable experience of private sector involvement in decision-making, it had little understanding of civil society. The ITU discussed a number of possible reforms to its structure at its quadrennial Plenipotentiary Con- ference, held towards the end of 2006 in Antalya, Turkey, including the possibility of greater civil society involvement. Somewhat cautiously, the Antalya “Plenipot” resolved to initiate a “study on the participation of all relevant stakeholders in the activities of the Union related to the World Summit on the Information Society.” This may or may not 49 The “Plenipot” resolution is at www.itu.int/council/groups/pp06- lead to greater space for meaningful civil society participa- plen7.html. A review of the ITU’s activity post-WSIS can be found in the chapter by D. MacLean in Global Information Society Watch, tion; time will tell.49 first report, APC, forthcoming.

88 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? RESPONSIBILITY FOR WSIS ACTION LINES, AS ALLOCATED BY THE TUNIS AGENDA

Action Line Possible moderators / facilitaros

C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional Commissions/ITU and all stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development

C2. Information and communication ITU infrastructure

C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO

C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD

C5. Building confidence and security ITU in the use of ICTs

C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL COMMISSIONS/UNCTAD

C7. ICT Applications

¬ E-government ¬ UNDP/ITU ¬ E-business ¬ WTO/UNCTAD/ITU/UPU ¬ E-learning ¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNIDO ¬ E-health ¬ WHO/ITU ¬ E-employment ¬ ILO/ITU ¬ E-environment ¬ WHO/WMO/UNEP/ UN-Habitat/ITU/ICAO ¬ E-agriculture ¬ FAO/ITU ¬ E-science ¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD

C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCO diversity and local content

C9. Media UNESCO

C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOC Society

C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/UNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC

Section B . Analysis 89 90 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? section c

Recommendations

chapter 8 Conclusions and recommendations

This final chapter is divided as follows: considered part of the “information society”, by any means, it did bring a large number of people together to • It begins with a summary of the findings set out in the discuss some important aspects of this, particularly – its earlier chapters and a brief set of conclusions about secretariat would suggest – the role of ICTs in develop- the overall impact of WSIS on developing countries and ment. What did it achieve? civil society. It was suggested in Chapter 4 that summits are almost • It then raises a number of issues and challenges fac- always described as “successes” or “great successes”. To ing different stakeholders, particularly in developing be considered “failures”, they have to fail most abjectly: countries and in civil society. people are reluctant to accept that they have invested so • Finally, it makes a series of recommendations about much time and money to achieve little or nothing. WSIS is actions which might be taken to enhance participa- not widely regarded as a failure, nor as a “great success”. tion by these stakeholders. These recommendations Opinion varies about just how much was achieved, but the are comparable in purpose to those in the 2002 nearest approximation to an average of opinion among “Louder Voices” report. interviewees for this project would be, perhaps, that it was “modestly successful”. How and where might this be so? While the content of this entire report is the responsibility of its author, this is even more true of these conclusions It is important, first, to recognise how narrowly WSIS and recommendations, which are intended as much for avoided failure. The first summit preparatory process was discussion within APC as beyond it. minutes away from collapse over the issue of the Digital Solidarity Fund at the end of its final reconvened PrepCom. Conclusions For much of the final stages of negotiations during the second phase, many participants did not expect sufficient From 2001 to the end of 2005, WSIS dominated interna- compromise to be achieved on Internet governance. Ei- tional discussion of some important ICT issues. While it ther of these circumstances could have gone the other did not cover the full range of questions that might be way, and, if they had, WSIS would have been considered

Section C . Recommendations 91 a failure indeed. Of course, brinkmanship like this is not military. Governance and authority over its development unusual in challenging international fora, and many fac- have expanded outwards from that narrow origin to include tors affect each forum’s ability to progress beyond differ- - successively - academics, geeks and commercial busi- ences to some form of consensus. Much of the responsi- nesses. The “Internet community” resulting from this has bility for the compromise reached on each occasion within developed organically rather than by the fiat of any gov- WSIS seems to have been due to the high degree of pres- ernment authority, national or international. Decisions sure to avoid failure; some to the skill of individuals (in- about the development of Internet standards are made cluding meeting chairs) in securing compromise. collectively by groups, often made up of individuals rather than representatives, on a basis of mutual tolerance and So, to some degree, the “success” of WSIS could be said intolerance: attention is paid to the competent while the primarily to lie in avoiding failure. Significant, if not over- incompetent speak to themselves alone. Where more for- whelming, change could be said to have occurred in the mal governance is required, as with domain names, com- two major areas of dispute whose resolution preoccupied promises were reached between this essentially non-gov- the second phase – infrastructure finance and Internet ernmental structure and the statutory authority required governance. for enforcement. In the case of infrastructure finance, although this was All evolving governance processes build on legacies; they probably underestimated at the time, the report of the Task retain vestiges of what was present in the past. Like con- Force on Financial Mechanisms and the pressure which stitutional monarchy in Western Europe, these vestiges can developing countries applied over the Digital Solidarity simultaneously be symbolic and retain significant roles or Fund led to movement in the focus of debate on ICT infra- influence. They can be displaced either by revolution or structure finance. For the first time in a decade, the devel- evolution. The last twenty-five years of Internet develop- opment establishment began to review the relationship ment can be seen as the gradual evolution of the Internet between public and private finance in this sector, includ- from an instrument of US polity to a global resource - and ing the potential role of IFI and donor funds. This is begin- the same can be said of Internet governance. Authority ning to mesh with reconsideration of the legal and regula- has gradually moved away from the United States as the tory frameworks required for ICT infrastructure develop- Internet has developed, and can be expected to continue ment in a new phase of ICT restructuring (built around the moving further away as the Internet becomes more truly deployment of new wireless and broadband networks global in character (in infrastructure, content and user rather than the privatisation and liberalisation of fixed line base). Nevertheless, features of Internet governance re- telecoms). In years to come, WSIS and the TFFM may be sulting from its legacy remain, and ICANN’s status, and seen as playing a pivotal role here; perhaps as being a that of the root server system, vis-à-vis the US government tipping point. “Modest success” may, in due course, de- are among these. At present, they are both symbolic and velop into something more. On the other hand, it may not. (potentially) significant. Over time, evolution of the In the case of Internet governance, different observers have Internet, particularly its globalisation, are likely to make different views. Some think that WSIS took a significant them more wholly symbolic and less truly significant; how- step in shifting the balance of power within the Internet, ever, at present they are certainly considered both in many though with little immediate effect. Others think that noth- countries, particularly developing countries - and there- ing changed. Most people on both sides (all sides) of the fore a threat to national sovereignty. argument left Tunis fairly happy with the outcome – which It seems important, looking at this from the perspective of implied that the argument would continue in the new fora those countries, not to confuse two separate issues which that the summit established: the Internet Governance Fo- are often confused in this debate: the authority of the United rum and whatever mechanisms define “enhanced coop- States vis-à-vis other countries in respect of Internet gov- eration”. Experience in the year following WSIS was mixed. ernance (an issue of sovereignty and international relations); The meaning of “enhanced cooperation” remained unclear, and the authority of governments over the Internet (an is- while the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum sue of national governance, particularly the balance of largely eschewed this controversy in favour of developing power between the citizen and the state). Many govern- broader understanding of Internet issues and differences ments in WSIS pursued both an increase in governmental of opinion on them (in which it was notably successful). authority and a decrease or removal of the perceived legacy WSIS therefore did not transform Internet governance, but powers of the United States. Industrial countries and the it has created more space for debate. How that space will private sector were much less concerned about the US’ be used is yet open to question. legacy powers, but more concerned to avoid increased regu- One way of looking at this is to see WSIS not as a revolu- lation of the Internet, national or international. Civil society tionary moment in Internet development but as a step in organisations tended to favour diminution of US legacy pow- the long-term evolution of the Internet. The Internet was, ers and avoidance of increased regulation (though, in their after all, originally, designed in and for the United States case, on grounds of citizens’ rather than business rights).

92 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? There were, therefore, a lot of different objectives cutting new networks and that the pressures for change in Internet across these two central (national and international) dimen- governance arrangements were building up to a point where sions of Internet governance. they could ultimately erupt. In both cases, this suggests, WSIS may have brought forward changes that were likely The argument during WSIS over Internet governance - and to come about, one way or another, within the medium term. particularly over ICANN and root servers - can be seen as It may not, however, have been the most cost-effective way an attempt to remove the remaining US powers over the of doing so, or more likely to achieve outcomes as good as Internet, and so globalise Internet regulation at a stroke. those that might be achievable through other fora. This would have been a revolutionary moment in the development of Internet - the equivalent, say, of the comet As for development, the content of the WSIS outcome docu- landfall that ended the Cretaceous era or the end of the ments – as discussed in Chapter 5 – is thin. Far more ar- ancien régime in France in 1789. The difficulty with it for ticulate, incisive, memorable and useful statements of the industrial countries and the private sector was not that it potential (and limitations) of ICTs in development were pro- would have diminished US authority (though that was an duced during the WSIS period by individual multilateral or- issue in the United States) but that it would have increased ganisations (the World Bank, the UNDP, UNESCO, GKP etc.), regulatory intervention in the Internet, since it implied re- donor governments (DFID, SDC, etc.) and developing coun- locating authority over aspects of the Internet from places try governments (a succession of ICT strategies which, where they were merely potentially subject to government though sometimes criticised for being over-ambitious, gen- intervention (by the US) to places where they would be erally had a much more analytical and cohesive feel than actively subject to regulation by either new or existing the Geneva Plan of Action). ICD specialists interviewed for bodies (such as the ITU). Industrial countries and the pri- this project were generally disparaging of the content of vate sector were particularly averse to the possibility of the WSIS outcome documents, thought these already ITU-style regulation and standard-setting being imposed looked substantially outdated, and did not think them use- on the Internet, where they thought it would constrain ful in persuading mainstream development sector col- rather than facilitate the dynamic innovation that has made leagues of the merits of ICTs. In the twenty years before it so successful. WSIS, the Maitland Commission’s 1984/5 report “The Miss- ing Link” was increasingly often cited in discussion about The “enhanced cooperation” approach advocated by the the evolution of thinking on ICD, though it would seem more European Union and adopted in the Tunis final documents rarely read by those that cited it.1 The WSIS outcome docu- can be seen in this context as an endorsement of evolu- ments may come to share this fate. tionary change. This perhaps explains why so many parties to this dispute could consider themselves to be victo- WSIS does not seem to have changed much, therefore, in rious (or at least not to be defeated). It allowed Internet the content of the ICD debate, though this has clearly governance conservatives in the United States to retain a moved on in other areas. The World Bank and others are sense of US leadership; radicals in developing countries rethinking some of the policy and regulatory issues asso- to retain the prospect of building a new, more inter-gov- ciated with enabling frameworks. The UNDP and others ernmental (and more interventionist) model of Internet are focusing on building more effective approaches to governance; and proponents of gradual change to envis- mainstreaming, built around better understanding be- age a continuation of the laissez-faire “governance-lite” tween ICT and mainstream professionals. Donor countries approach which they prefer. The likelihood is that “en- are reviewing – and in some cases reducing – their com- hanced cooperation”, if it means anything, will mean the mitment to ICD. Developing countries are beginning to in- continued gradual diminution of the United States’ effec- tegrate ICTs more substantively into Poverty Reduction tive superior power over the Internet which has been tak- Strategies and similar documents. However, these have ing place for the past twenty-five years, without its being not been WSIS-driven processes so much as processes replaced by an inter-governmental agency along the lines driven by the same enthusiasm for ICD which led to WSIS of the UN model; but this will continue to be a process of in the first place. They would, most development special- gradual evolution. ists seem to think, have happened anyway; and some think that WSIS may have slowed down their development by This suggests, then, that WSIS may seem, with hindsight, focusing debate on a rather limited range of perceptions to have a lasting legacy in both infrastructure finance and that were pulled together during its first year. Internet governance. Would the developments concerned have happened anyway without WSIS intervening? Opin- Where WSIS does seem to have had an effect on the ICD ion on this, too, is divided, but the consensus is probably debate, according to interviewees, is in awareness and in that the status quo in both cases was becoming unsustain- networking. Developing country interviewees, in particular, able anyway and that it would therefore need to be addressed; i.e. that the existing mechanisms for infrastruc- 1 It was virtually impossible, before WSIS, to find a copy online, ture finance would be stretched too far by the potential of and there were few print copies available.

Section C . Recommendations 93 felt that WSIS had increased substantially the information speculate, in hindsight, whether a more sophisticated and and knowledge available to them, to their colleagues and more lasting outcome might have been achieved by a com- fellow participants, and thereby to decision-makers in gen- bination of the summit with an international commission eral within their countries. They felt this better understand- that investigated the issues with depth and rigour. ing would improve the quality of decision-making and that To summarise the views of interviewees on WSIS as a whole the wider range of engagement in ICTs resulting from WSIS, (insofar as this is possible). It had limited achievements, which varied in scale from country to country, would also but was not a failure. It advanced some debates, but did help to make decision-making more inclusive. This view is not address others. It cost a great deal of money, and the supported by evidence from some, but not all, of the coun- costs of future summits to their participants should be more try case studies undertaken for this report. In terms of carefully considered before they are agreed. (In particular, networking, participants undoubtedly gained considerably a two-stage summit was unnecessary. The difficult issues from greater access to a wider range of experience and of infrastructure finance and Internet governance might expertise, and this helped to build a broader base for net- have been resolved during the first summit if the second working support in future. Civil society, in particular, gained had not opened up the opportunity for delay. The second from this aspect of the summit. However, networks require summit added nothing to the first except a resolution of maintenance if weak as well as strong relationships are to these issues.) On balance, there were gains, but they could survive the end of summits. WSIS does not have self-sus- almost certainly have been achieved at lesser cost. taining networks extending beyond its own life, with the exception (in a sense) of the Internet Governance Forum, and the value of this networking will tend to dissipate un- Challenges and recommendations: less other networks can build upon it. There are candidates for this role; whether they succeed in taking up the oppor- developing countries tunity is to be seen. Developing country participation in WSIS is discussed in The above paragraphs suggest that WSIS had a limited but Chapter 6. This analysis suggests that developing coun- significant impact in certain policy areas. What it did not do tries played a more prominent part in WSIS than indus- was substantially address many other areas of what could trial countries, though primarily because the latter lacked be considered the “information society”. It tended to as- incentives to prioritise the summit. Developing country par- sume that there were powerful links between ICT invest- ticipation, however, was led by what might be described ment and economic growth, but did not explore this rela- as the telecommunications establishment – ministries of tionship, where it was most likely or how it might be fos- communications, telecommunications regulators and fixed tered, in the sense that these issues have been considered network operators – in cooperation with the diplomats nor- by the OECD. It described a range of positive potential so- mally involved in inter-governmental drafting. Little part cial impacts of ICTs but had little to say about the risks, in was played in most developing country participation by new particular where relations between the state and citizen are ICT sectors (mobile businesses and the Internet commu- concerned. Discussion about rights was largely based nity), broadcasters, mainstream development ministries or around the defence of established freedoms of expression, civil society. A distinction was also apparent between a rather than changes and potential conflicts which may arise small number of larger and economically more powerful as a result of widespread use of new technologies. WSIS developing countries, possessed of substantial ICT exper- was, in other words, seen by most of its participants as an tise and able to exert significant influence either alone or opportunity to advocate the use of ICTs rather than to ex- in partnership with one another; and smaller, weaker de- plore their implications for the future; to propose an infor- veloping countries, particularly LDCs, who found it more mation society than to try and understand one. difficult to press their agenda. Aside from the overall development text, which was largely bland and insubstan- Which, in a sense, takes the discussion back to the origins tial, developing countries pressed for two objectives, nei- of WSIS itself. As pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, the origi- ther of which was fully achieved though each had partial nal resolution of the ITU “Plenipot” was not necessarily outcomes in the direction sought: the Digital Solidarity thought to mean a summit of the kind that eventually tran- Fund, which generated some new approaches to infrastruc- spired. At the time, many thought it meant a smaller scale ture finance; and the removal of US authority over ICANN event involving heads of state and experts, drawing up a and the root-server system, which led to some movement report for consultation. Summits, historically, have been in the evolution of Internet governance. large scale events which address big problems for which broad and universal agreements are required on the best Developing country delegates did agree, however, that ways to move forward. They are not good at developing un- they and their countries gained substantially in network- derstanding in depth, particularly of complex issues which ing, information and awareness from the WSIS experience, pose new challenges. Smaller fora are better at that, some- and that this would have lasting implications for national thing which the WGIG demonstrated. It is interesting to decision-making.

94 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The “Louder Voices” report listed a number of reasons why Developing countries had less challenge participating in developing countries lacked influence in international ICT WSIS than they do in the wider range of ICT negotiations. decision-making. These included, in particular, those set Summits are, self-evidently, important. Presidents and out in the box below. heads of government expect their countries to be represented. UN agencies invite broad participation. All coun- As a summit, WSIS was of course very different from the tries have missions in New York to facilitate their repre- normal run of international decision-making fora; it dealt sentation in other UN summits; most countries (though in generalities, not specifics; was of less critical interest not all) had missions in Geneva which could facilitate to industrial countries; tended to politicise issues rather theirs in WSIS. Although expensive, developing countries than to focus on technical solutions. It seems therefore, almost universally, therefore, attended WSIS and played this report suggests, to have had relatively little impact some part in it: speaking in plenary sessions, participat- on permanent ICT decision-making fora – though increased ing in caucuses, etc. Very few countries did not attend awareness of the issues may encourage greater develop- the plenary summit events (174 out of the UN’s 192 mem- ing country participation in those fora in the future. ber-states had official delegations in Geneva, 168 in Tu- nis). Participation in PrepComs was a little sparser (143 national delegations attended the first PrepCom of the first phase, for example; 149 the second PrepCom of the At the international level: second phase), and delegations were considerably a. Lack of easy, affordable and timely access to smaller, but nevertheless a considerable majority of gov- information about ICT-related issues, deci- ernments took part. Although it was expensive, the sion-making fora and processes. money for participation was found; the logistics chal- b. Logistical problems, including the frequency lenges were overcome. and location of international meetings and re- If the international factors described in the box above were strictions on participation (for example, by not so prominent in WSIS, many of the national factors private sector and civil society experts). concerned were apparent. What impact did the WSIS ex- c. Ineffective use of financial resources available perience have on these? to support participation. Firstly, WSIS did, by all accounts, increase awareness of the potential of ICTs in development amongst government At the national level: officials and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the com- a. Lack of policy awareness, at all levels of gov- munity. Government officials were directly involved in ernment and citizenship, of the potential role WSIS, and required to demonstrate that governments of ICTs in development. were taking WSIS issues seriously; and demonstrate this b. Lack of technical and policy capacity on ICT is- they therefore sought to do. Almost all developing coun- sues, particularly in respect of emerging tech- try interviewees for this report felt that greater aware- nologies and new policy areas - such as mi- ness had been achieved and would have an impact in the gration from circuit-switched to IP networks future. However, this did not reach far down the decision- and indeed Internet issues in general. making ladder. Media attention to WSIS, in most countries, was minimal. The absence of multistakeholder en- c. Weaknesses in national and regional policy- gagement in WSIS policymaking, in many countries, making processes, including: meant that the breadth of awareness and information i. Lack of political leadership transfer was less than it might have been. In a fast-mov- ii. Absence of national ICT strategies ing sector such as ICTs, too, knowledge rapidly falls out of date. iii. Ineffective coordination between different government departments and agen- Secondly, while WSIS was not primarily concerned with tech- cies with ICT responsibilities nical detail, it did provide spaces in which greater policy iv. Lack of private sector and civil society par- and technical expertise could be acquired by developing ticipation in national decision-making country representatives. This was partly a result of WSIS discussions – it would be difficult to engage seriously in v. Inadequate preparation for international the Internet governance debate without acquiring some meetings greater understanding of Internet governance issues – and vi. Ineffective use of financial and human partly of the opportunity to network with regional experts resources. from other countries. However, the overall policy focus and the politicisation of WSIS debate probably meant that less capacity was built than might have been.

Section C . Recommendations 95 Developing countries were stronger and better repre- • Lack of technical and policy capacity, particularly in sented in WSIS than they were in the other ICT decision- areas of emerging technology, and lack of capacity to making fora assessed in “Louder Voices”. Nevertheless, assess the likely impact and cost-effectiveness of ICT interviews and country case studies for this report sug- reforms and ICD interventions gest, many of the same weaknesses were to be found in • Lack of integration between national ICT strategies and national and regional policymaking processes. national development plans such as Poverty Reduc- • While political leadership in some countries was strong tion Strategies – Senegal is a good example – in many countries WSIS • Poor knowledge management, in particular inad- was left in the hands of the telecommunications es- equate coordination between government depart- tablishment rather than those of central government. ments responsible for the ICT sector and for main- While ministers may have been involved, these were stream development objectives not usually powerful ministers; and the attention paid • Lack of private sector and civil society (multistake- to WSIS by the most important centres of government, holder) input into decision-making – a result both of such as ministries of finance, was weak. their absence from official decision-making processes • National ICT strategies have been developed in many and of their own limited capacity countries in the years since the “Louder Voices” re- • Inadequate preparation for international meetings, port was published. However, as noted in Chapter 5, including the lack of coordination with regional part- they are often poorly integrated into Poverty Reduc- ners tion Strategies and other national development plans. The predominance of the telecommunications estab- • Ineffective use of financial and human resources. lishment in participation at WSIS meant that relatively Effective participation in international decision-making little of the development debate there fed back into fora is a highly complex matter, illustrated by the follow- mainstream development activity in-country; and, in ing graphic derived from the “Louder Voices” report:2 many countries, mainstream development concerns were poorly articulated in policy debate concerning The illustration might be summarised as follows. Effective WSIS. delegations benefit from powerful and coherent national • Both interviews and country case studies suggest and regional policy formulation processes which identify that ineffective coordination between government de- priority issues, coordinate and synthesise the views of dif- partments continued during WSIS. As well as having ferent stakeholders and establish a position which can be little or no mainstream development participation in sustained through lobbying and negotiation over the WSIS meetings, many countries appear to have un- weeks and months preceding a decision as well as at the dertaken little in the way of policy coordination on decision-making meeting itself. These policy formulation WSIS issues at a national level. With some notable processes are in turn underpinned by deep policy struc- exceptions, country presentations at WSIS offered tures – the analytical capabilities that allow policymakers the perspective from the communications ministry to understand the implications of different options and rather than an holistic view of ICTs and development choose the most effective strategies for their countries. across the board. Without this comprehensive range of tools, participation in international fora will be weak. • Some developing countries – including Kenya, among the country case studies for this report – opened up It will always be difficult for developing countries to secure new spaces for participation by the private sector and this degree of complexity and comprehensiveness in poli- civil society in national decision-making. However, cymaking, not least because expert human resources are this experience does not appear to have been very in short supply, but this does not mean that much cannot widely shared, in spite of significant efforts to secure be done to improve the quality of representation. One key participation by civil society in quite a number of issue is prioritisation. Major industrial countries need this countries. level of policymaking across the board because they have deep interests in many different areas of ICT policy. Devel- oping countries, by and large, have fewer interests. They The challenges for developing countries in future interna- can afford to prioritise – to identify the limited range of tional ICT decision-making are therefore likely to remain issues on which decisions are sufficiently significant for much as they were at the time of the “Louder Voices” report: 2 The following paragraphs draw on an article entitled “Louder Voices and the International Debate on Developing Country Participation in • Lack of awareness of the potential (and limitations) of ICT Decision-Making”, to be published in William J. Drake & Ernest J. ICTs in much of the political establishment and in so- Wilson III, eds. Governing Global Electronic Networks: International Perspectives on Policy and Power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, ciety more generally forthcoming in 2007.

96 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Decision-making processes

Agenda Setting Proposals Decisions

Policy formulation and implementation

Issue identification Formulation of options Coordination Implementation

Deep policy structures

Policy assessment Policy research & analysis Evaluation

them to invest substantial resources, and to focus explic- issues involved were considered sufficiently important. itly on those issues: developing the policy capacity re- Many also expressed concern about the poor utilisation quired to have an impact, involving the full range of stake- of funds made available to support participation by inter- holders in national policymaking. They can also seek to governmental organisations (IGOs) concerned about de- secure the support of regional peers and wider develop- veloping countries’ under-representation. Some fellow- ing country groupings which can have more impact if they ships – i.e. funding for travel and participation costs – were act collectively in informal as well as formal decision-mak- available to some developing countries to facilitate par- ing gatherings, and provide fuller support to the delegate ticipation in WSIS (as they are, for example, within the ITU). or delegates attending all of the fora involved. However, the attendance lists for WSIS show that some developing country governments sent very large delega- Interviewees for the “Louder Voices” study believed that tions irrespective of cost.3 Civil society participation from it was more valuable for a developing country to have real developing countries was more substantially inhibited by influence in two or three areas of real significance to it cost than government delegations. than to have an ineffective presence in a larger number of decision-making processes – particularly if the lead role Overall, then, it is suggested that the “Louder Voices” rec- on different issues of importance could be shared between ommendations concerning developing country participa- countries within a region, with each developing appropri- tion in permanent ICT decision-making fora stand today ate expertise on behalf of the regional group as a whole. much as they did in 2002. These include recommendations They were also clear, however, that far too little to both international fora themselves and developing coun- prioritisation along these lines took place, and that avail- tries participating in them. In particular (quotations from able expertise was currently spread too thinly and too in- the earlier report in italics; amended text and additions discriminately to have the impact that their governments unitalicised): desired. WSIS may have helped developing country delegations to improve their understanding of issues and their 1. International ICT fora should networks, but this analysis was not disputed by interview- ¬ promote awareness of the potential and limi- ees for this study. tations which ICTs have by providing compre- The cost of participation remains, of course, a major factor hensive, publicly-accessible, non-technical in- inhibiting developing country participation in international formation on the relevance of their activities fora. It was among the factors identified by interviewees to the development agenda; for the “Louder Voices” report, although a number made clear their feeling that resources could and would be found to support participation, at least within governments, if the 3 See Annex 1.

Section C . Recommendations 97 ¬ provide independent, authoritative technical/ Being more engaged in the formal processes, civil society policy research and analysis of major issues organisations were able to make more gains, notably in to be decided; the inclusion of some text in the final outcome documents. There was less oppositionalism from civil society than seen ¬ hold meetings in developing regions in a way at many summits, and civil society did not issue a collec- that minimises travel costs for developing tive critique of the WSIS experience until a month after country participants; the event. Civil society organisations also gained substan- ¬ avoid simultaneous scheduling of important tially through opportunities for networking (during the events; extended, four-year, preparatory process) and for informa- ¬ ensure that their procedures allow all sources tion sharing and improving understanding (through the of developing country policy and technical ca- exhibitions and “informal summits” accompanying each pacity to participate in decision-making, main summit session). However, civil society participation whether they come from government, the pri- was uneven: Southern CSOs were under-represented com- vate sector or not-for-profit organisations. pared with Northern CSOs, especially during PrepComs; and mainstream development NGOs were conspicuous by • Developing country governments: their absence, undermining the credibility of much civil ¬ should take action to: society input on development questions.

> improve information flows and policy co- Issues concerning civil society participation at the national ordination between different government level have been considered in the previous chapter. At the departments and agencies with ICT respon- international level, the challenges raised for civil society sibilities and those with mainstream devel- by the summit – and by comparable future events – seem opment roles; to fall into two main categories: concerning whether to par- > promote informed public discussion and ticipate, and how to do so. debate through both general and special- The former relates largely to the cost and cost-effectiveness ised media; of participation. The cost of taking part in international de- > include all relevant stakeholders in policy- cision-making processes is high – as described for devel- making on an issue-by-issue basis and oping countries in the previous section. Participation in through permanent consultation fora; WSIS involved not merely a presence at two plenary sum- > encourage participation of experts from the mit sessions – that alone was expensive, but would have private sector and civil society in national gained no influence on its own – but involvement in a four- delegations to international decision-mak- year process, including a substantial number of international ing fora; meetings and all of the interaction required with other civil society organisations in order to make participation worth- ¬ and should review their current practices with while. The diagram derived from “Louder Voices”, which is respect to meeting preparation, delegate se- included in the previous section, is as relevant to civil soci- lection, participation, accountability and fol- ety participation as it is to that of developing countries. low-up with a view to ensuring that these practices result in the most effective use of finan- No civil society organisation can afford to take a decision cial resources through the optimum deploy- to spend so many resources on one activity with ease. Few ment and development of technical and policy developing country civil society organisations, in particu- capacity. lar, can afford to do so, unless they are sponsored by donors. The costs alone therefore dictate that only the best- Capacity-building is, of course, crucial to success in this endowed and the most determined civil society organisa- area, and a specific recommendation concerning capac- tions will play a full part in a summit like WSIS (especially ity-building, related to both developing countries and civil if, as in WSIS, a two-phase approach effectively doubles society, is included towards the end of this chapter. the cost). Civil society participation is therefore always likely to be skewed as described above. Assessments of cost-effectiveness also come into play. In practice, in WSIS, Challenges and recommendations: civil society organisations focusing on information rights civil society and ICD were more likely to see engagement in WSIS as more cost-effective for them than civil society organisa- Civil society participation in WSIS is discussed in Chapter tions primarily concerned with mainstream rights or de- 7. It was, in many ways, substantially more effective than velopment issues. Mainstream development organisations in comparable previous summits because more space was also had another, bigger priority: the Millennium Review made available for it within the summit’s formal structure. Summit, which also took place in 2005.

98 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? The first challenge for civil society, therefore, concerns what outside the tent to inside, from a position of opposition to it collectively can do to correct the distortions in civil society a position of constructive engagement. This in turn raises participation arising from this skewed representation. This a number of challenges for civil society, in particular con- challenge has two dimensions (in addition to issues concern- cerning unity of purpose and representational character. ing the social representation of participation, e.g. by gender): It is worth looking in more detail at the implications of multistakeholderism in order to address these. • Firstly, at an international level, there is the dimension of geography. Civil society participation in WSIS was Multistakeholder participation in decision-making might less representative of the South than participation in be said to do three things: official delegations. This under-representation of the • To supplement democratic input South was more marked in PrepComs - and so in input to negotiations - than at the summits themselves. It was • To improve the quality of understanding of particular reinforced by the greater likelihood that Northern gov- issues and the concerns of particular groups, which ernments undertook formal or informal consultation are otherwise marginal to decision-making processes processes than that Southern governments did so, and • To improve the quality of decision-making and the con- by the higher technical and negotiating skill levels in sent of citizens to decisions made. Northern than in Southern civil society. It is even more marked in WSIS follow-up processes. This undermines These advantages of multistakeholder engagement in de- civil society’s claim to speak on behalf of the disadvan- cision-making are recognised within the shared decision- taged within negotiations. (At national level, it is paral- making structures in most national contexts, but less rec- leled by the over-representation of metropolitan and ognised in international decision-making. the under-representation of provincial civil society in Civil society advocacy of multistakeholder processes, national decision-making processes.) within WSIS and elsewhere, has been built around the • Secondly, at both national and international levels, demand for a voice - to supplement the democratic articu- there is the dimension of thematic diversity. Discus- lation of public opinion in more democratic societies; to sions at WSIS potentially affected a wide range of civil substitute for it in societies that are less democratic; to society organisations - in particular, those involved ensure the articulation of minority as well as majority, directly in ICTs, those concerned with rights issues, marginalised as well as advantaged, concerns and views, those working in mainstream development. In prac- etc. The absence of a voice is the immediate issue; less tice, at both national and international levels, main- attention has (naturally enough) been paid to the use that stream development NGOs had very little involvement could be made of it if and when multistakeholder proc- in civil society engagement with WSIS. This was as true esses are put in place. of industrial as of developing countries. The result was that civil society input into WSIS’ discussions on the The purpose of a voice, however, is not simply to articu- application of ICTs in mainstream development lacked late an alternative perspective to that held by government, mainstream development NGO participation. business or any other stakeholder, but to engage in political debate with them and seek to achieve shifts in policy One response to this challenge has been to appeal for ex- and practice which are consistent with civil society’s broad ternal funding of civil society participants, but this includes objectives. Multistakeholderism, in other words, is not a the risks discussed above in respect of developing coun- synonym for the more effective articulation of opposition. try participation. Also, while it addresses the question of Like democracy, it implies engagement and compromise cost, it does not address that of cost-effectiveness. If an with alternative points of view, at least in building areas organisation does not consider it cost-effective to use its of common understanding or perimeters of consensus person-time to attend a meeting, paying for it to do so does within which future policy options can be developed. The not make it cost-effective. WGIG illustrated this meaning of multistakeholderism effectively in the way that it developed mutual understand- Turning next to a second challenge. The central question ing between people with different stakeholder perspec- concerning how to participate, in past summits, has tended tives and thereby shaped subsequent debate. to be a choice between participation within the main stream of discussion and declamation from without. Ex- In practice, multistakeholder engagement requires conclusion from the main decision-making forum in past sum- sent to a set of rules within which multistakeholder partici- mits has encouraged the latter, but WSIS offered more par- pation takes place. These may be formal (who votes) or in- ticipation space “within the tent” than its predecessors formal (how people treat each other), but a functioning had done. Civil society’s demand for multistakeholder in- multistakeholder forum must have an ethos which em- volvement in decision-making – not just in summits, but braces diversity of opinion and a multistakeholder decision- also in permanent decision-making fora like the ITU or WTO making forum must have formal mechanisms and the in- – implies that civil society as a whole wishes to move from formal consent of its participants for making decisions.

Section C . Recommendations 99 WSIS experience suggests that civil society as a whole has agencies, and exist in many ways because civil society is not yet sufficiently debated its engagement in this proc- doing its job. However, the term “civil society” has also ess. As an umbrella, the term civil society covers both or- been used by organisations which seek themselves to ganisations that are strongly positive about engagement suppress social freedoms, or which have abused their with other stakeholders and those that are more hostile position to exploit the communities they claim to repre- to both or either governments and businesses. Active sent. And civil society is often regarded as suspect be- multistakeholder processes are likely to throw this differ- cause of problems of uncertainty about the quality of ence of approach into much higher relief. They are still representation. Civil society organisations often repre- highly controversial among governments, and many gov- sent particular social groups - women, workers, young ernments will be happy to see them fail. Unless there is people, consumers, etc. - which are, by definition, not effective engagement with new steps towards multistake- representative of society as a whole. Collectively, a coa- holder engagement then the trend towards it could re- lition of all civil society actors within a country may be verse. The willingness of (at least most members of) all broadly representative of society as a whole, but equally stakeholder groups to engage constructively with one an- it may not: it may, for example, be disproportionately rep- other, which was notably demonstrated at the first meet- resentative of the powerful or (conversely) of the ing of the Internet Governance Forum in late 2006, could marginalised, of particular ethnic or religious groups, of have importance well beyond the ICT sector. men or women, of the landed not the landless, the em- ployed rather than the unemployed. Civil society’s po- The second challenge for civil society is how it handles litical character, collectively, may be broadly consistent this transition in ethos in moving into multistakeholder en- with that of society as a whole, or it may not; in which vironments; how, in other words, it understands “construc- case it may be either pro- or anti-government. In some tive engagement”. Divisions of opinion on this were not societies, civil society organisations may even be surro- terribly apparent during the majority of WSIS, but did be- gates for the state - an issue that arose concerning local come more evident towards the end as compromise was NGOs during the Tunis phase of WSIS. being reached in Internet governance. Now that they are beginning to have a voice, civil society organisations within These criticisms are similar to those made of private sec- the ICT sector need to think about how to handle differ- tor representation: that, for example, the CCBI and its part- ences of view about how to use it most constructively. This ners in the WSIS process represented bigger international could be important, for example, if the review of the na- businesses rather the private sector as a whole. How rep- ture of stakeholder roles initiated by the 2006 ITU Pleni- resentation is perceived is as important here as how it is potentiary Conference opens up new spaces for civil soci- actually constructed. The third challenge for civil society, ety participation in its decision-making processes. therefore, is to recognise and address concerns within other stakeholder groups about the quality of representa- Many governments, as noted above, remain suspicious tion that it, collectively, offers, in order to build confidence of civil society participation in decision-making. For some, in it as a player within multistakeholder processes and so this is because they fear that civil society will expose their take advantage of the opportunities they represent. A key unrepresentativeness or breach barriers to popular par- issue here is the need for individual civil society organisa- ticipation and freedom of expression in their own territo- tions to recognise that civil society’s credibility depends ries. Interviews with government and IGO participants in on its diversity; that there is, in fact, no single civil society WSIS, however, make clear that the reasons for suspicion perspective on a particular issue (such as intellectual prop- of civil society are more complex than this, and these need erty rights); and in particular that attempts to appropriate to be understood by civil society organisations as they the authority of civil society to individual agency objec- campaign for and enter into stronger decision-making tives undermine both credibility and civil society’s ability roles. to act collectively.

The nature and meaning of “civil society” differs mark- Fourthly, most of the debate about multistakeholderism edly between countries. In many, civil society organisa- within civil society has concerned the relationship between tions are considered hostile by governments: either be- civil society and government (or inter-governmental organi- cause they are (in practice) opposition organisations, or sations). Much less attention has been paid to the rela- because they represent social groups which are excluded tionship between civil society and the private sector. This from power or considered hostile by government (trade is natural: it is governments and IGOs that are felt to deny unions, women’s groups, ethnic minorities, religious en- civil society a voice. In addition, many civil society organi- tities), or because they articulate policies or demand sations are ideologically hostile to private business. The UN rights (such as freedoms of expression, association and system, however, regards both groups as effectively one – behaviour) which are not granted within the society in “non-government” as opposed to “government”. The first question. These are essentially political issues relating phase of WSIS showed strong antipathy by some govern- civil society to governments and inter-governmental ment delegations to both civil society and private sector

100 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? participation; and led to substantial cooperation between • Issues where civil society has a common shared per- civil society and private sector representatives in jointly spective (i.e. few internal disagreements) and a dis- demanding a voice. Partly as a result, there was much more tinctive point of view constructive dialogue between civil society and the pri- • Issues which are currently being handled in a highly vate sector during the remainder of WSIS than had been technocratic manner but in which broader social and the case in previous summits. environmental issues, for example, could enhance the This is something that offers some scope for the future. outcomes of decisions reached. Debates at WSIS showed that there were a number of areas in which civil society and the private sector had com- Capacity-building obviously lies at the heart of this chal- mon cause, notably but not exclusively in terms of partici- lenge. pation in decision-making itself. These included issues Finally, WSIS suggests a number of challenges concern- such as openness to innovation, liberalisation of state-con- ing the modalities of civil society participation. trolled infrastructure and government control over content, developing better understanding of the way ICT markets The diversity of civil society makes coherent participation work and the interrelationship between policy, service pro- more difficult for it than it is for a relatively homogeneous vision and consumer behaviour. There is scope, largely stakeholder group like the private sector. No interviewee unexplored, for cooperation in the future in these and other from civil society for this project thought it feasible for civil areas. Formal mechanisms for building on this are weak, society to operate in WSIS through an umbrella group like though good personal relationships do exist, as a result the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors of WSIS, across this stakeholder divide. However, many (CCBI). CONGO – the Conference of NGOs in Consultative civil society organisations have ideological reservations Relationship with the United Nations – sought to encour- about the private sector. The fourth challenge is, there- age CSO participation in WSIS, but has no policy coordi- fore, whether and how civil society and the private sector nating role. The civil society caucus structure provided the build their relationship within an increasingly multistake- nearest equivalent to CCBI’s coordination but its role was holder environment. more to reflect the diversity of civil society interests and to broker support within the wider civil society commu- A fifth challenge concerns the quality of civil society in- nity for the articulation of particular points than it was to put. Most of the issues discussed in international ICT fora develop a common set of ideas and principles. It was only are highly complex technical questions. Detailed and so- in smaller and relatively narrow specialist caucuses – on phisticated understanding of them is necessary to achieve child welfare or disability, for example - that civil society credibility. Most debates are dominated by articulate peo- could achieve comparable unity of purpose to that exhib- ple, highly informed about these issues and supported by ited by the private sector. strong research and analytical teams. It is difficult to break into this inner circle of ICT policymaking – as new delegates The more diverse civil society is, in short, the more diffi- to ITU study groups are quick to find – and easy for domi- culty it is likely to have in establishing a common position nant decision-makers to dismiss new participants as ig- on issues of controversy within it, except where these are norant or misinformed. concerned directly with the representation of civil society itself. And where common positions are established, they If the struggle for the right to participate is won, how civil are less likely to be the result of considered and informed society announces its arrival will have a major impact on debate: there is more risk than there is in more homoge- its influence in the medium and longer term. Other stake- neous groupings that agreed positions will be either low- holders will look for a positive approach and for substan- est common denominators or uncritical endorsements of tial understanding of the issues. This is much more impor- the (perhaps controversial) views of particular civil soci- tant in permanent decision-making fora, which deal in ety entities participating in a particular forum. detail, than in summits, which deal in broad principles. For civil society to be effective, therefore, its first priority The second phase of WSIS also saw differences of view will have to be identification of those aspects of ICT policy emerge about the permanence of caucuses. Previously, cau- which merit concentrated attention and the resources cuses have been specific to the summit concerned. Conti- needed to address these effectively. A scattergun ap- nuity was required, however, for a two-phase summit, and proach, built around assumptions rather than knowledge, this gave the caucus structure more of an air of perma- or principles rather than pragmatism, is unlikely to build nence. At least one regional caucus sought to develop influence. Criteria for the selection of priority issues need structures such as an executive committee which are more to be developed. These might include: appropriate to permanent organisations than to time-lim- • Issues where outcomes are of high significance to citi- ited groupings. Similarly, the Internet Governance caucus zens (such as access, connectivity and information continued to function after WSIS, as a preliminary to the rights) Internet Governance Forum.

Section C . Recommendations 101 The fact that WSIS was held in two phases inevitably in- reduces the quality of decision-making, in particular the creased the continuity of those caucuses that were es- likelihood that consensus can be reached on more inno- tablished. They did not simply need to maintain continu- vative approaches. The challenge here is to ensure that ity through a series of preparatory committees, but also multistakeholder fora are both inclusive and informed. over two plenary sessions: a four-year process which is very long in terms of civil society activity. Interviewees In fact, two capacity challenges are involved here – one are agreed that this helped substantially to increase net- concerning information and knowledge per se; the other working among civil society organisations and certainly concerning the multistakeholder participation processes established some new bilateral relationships and work- themselves. Participants in multistakeholder processes ing associations which may have considerable longevity. need to understand what they are talking about; but they However, there is disagreement about whether WSIS cau- also need to understand why other stakeholders have dif- cuses themselves should be maintained post-WSIS. The ferent perspectives and different priorities from them- Internet Governance caucus is a case in point. This has, selves, and how to work with those other stakeholders in in effect, continued working in relation to the WSIS suc- order to identify viable destinations and viable ways of cessor body, the Internet Governance Forum, and it seems reaching them. likely that some comparable caucus to that established The first of these challenges – basic information and during WSIS will be necessary for civil society coordina- knowledge – was identified strongly in the “Louder tion in relation to the IGF. However, this need not be con- Voices” report. Developing country participants have tinuous with its predecessor. The potential constituency found themselves disadvantaged in many international for the IGF is different from that for WSIS – perhaps more fora because they lack basic technical or policy under- narrowly confined to Internet governance issues, poten- standing of the issues that are being discussed. They sim- tially more widely inclusive among Internet-oriented ply are not able to keep track of all of the issues involved, agencies. If the existing caucus does continue into the or to engage in discussion about them with the depth of IGF, it is difficult to see that it will not become more for- expertise of key actors in industrial country or private malised and permanent in character – perhaps a kind of sector delegations. These difficulties are compounded by civil society bureau rather than a caucus in the sense that insufficient presence in discussions (for example, partici- it has been to date. pation in plenaries but not in side meetings at which the real action takes place); by limited coordination with The sixth and final challenge for civil society therefore con- other developing country delegations facing similar prob- cerns how it develops and maintains continuity of think- lems; and by poor knowledge management within the na- ing and strategisation in international organisations, es- tional decision-making environment (for example, differ- pecially if it does gain greater space for participation. In- ent personnel attending different meetings in the same terviewees have, for example, reported that it has proved decision-making chain; lack of dialogue between govern- difficult for civil society organisations to maintain net- ment departments). Civil society participants face many works and relationships established during WSIS in the of these same problems (though they may have better post-WSIS period without the framework of WSIS meet- networking than can be found between official delega- ings in which to operate – with the exception of the tions from different countries), as do others seeking to Internet governance arena. It may be that civil society enter decision-making spaces from which they have pre- needs to look for more permanent ways of sharing exper- viously been absent or excluded. tise and in particular sharing experience between participants in different ICT fora, in order to maximise the value A number of initiatives are needed to address these de- that can be obtained from such multistakeholder partici- ficiencies, several of which are discussed in the “Louder pation that evolves. Voices” report. Critical among them is the need for new participants to access reliable, up-to-date information Recommendations on capacity-building on issues under discussion in decision-making processes and on the progress that has been made within Capacity-building, as noted earlier, is crucial to multistake- those processes towards resolving them. Inter-govern- holder participation. If a multistakeholder forum is to func- mental organisations are often much better at explaining tion effectively, its participants need to have confidence themselves and their concerns to insiders than to outsid- in the capacity of that forum to reach conclusions which ers. Both formally and informally, they tend to push new- are built on informed understanding of the issues with comers to the margins rather than welcoming them into the which it is concerned; that the quality of decision-making, fold. Key actors often look to newcomers more as voting in other words, should be based on the knowledge that is fodder for their propositions than as potential contributors available within the forum rather than the ignorance of its to more diverse discourse. Overcoming these problems re- least-informed participant. Lack of expertise constrains the quires a lot of effort on the part of “newbies”. It would be participation of those who are poorly-informed, but it also very much easier for them, however, if they had available

102 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? information sources on whose accuracy, timeliness and to review and follow up progress in bridging the dig- impartiality they could rely. The “Louder Voices” report ital divide, taking into account the different levels of saw this as a crucial element in any effort to extend par- development among nations, so as to achieve the in- ticipation in technical and policy decision-making, and ternationally agreed development goals and objec- APC has initiated discussion with other stakeholder tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as- groups on such information sources within the context sessing the effectiveness of investment and interna- of the Internet Governance Forum. tional cooperation efforts in building the Information Society, identifying gaps as well as deficits in invest- But knowing the issues is never sufficient on its own. It is ment and devising strategies to address them.4 also important to understand the processes through which decisions are made. The processes of international dis- The Tunis Agenda initiated three main follow-up processes course are often arcane, and capacity-building is needed for WSIS: for newcomers on these, too, as well as on the issues them- • A formal reporting mechanism was established, to be selves. Just as important as the formal processes, how- coordinated by a UN Group on the Information Soci- ever, can be the ethos of decision-making within particu- ety, reporting to the Chief Executives Board, and lar institutions. New actors, particularly those who have ECOSOC, reporting to the General Assembly been excluded from processes in the past, often have a • The UN Secretary-General was asked to facilitate the negative perception of the processes in which they have establishment of an Internet Governance Forum, to not previously participated. To function effectively within consider a range of Internet issues these processes, even if continuing to reject them, it is important for newcomers to understand their ethos, the • A series of action line initiatives led by different inter- reasons why they are considered effective by existing par- national agencies was agreed as the basis for imple- ticipants, and ways of maximising effectiveness within menting the other WSIS outcomes. them. Moving from exclusion to participation can demand Both the Internet Governance Forum and the action-line quite a substantial re-evaluation of process issues and follow-up process were described in the WSIS outcome attitudes to process. documents as “multistakeholder” initiatives, though nei- Finally, it should be recognised that the objective of secur- ther was formulated beyond this in much detail. This final ing multistakeholder engagement in decision-making is section of the report looks at these two areas of WSIS fol- to gain the opportunity not for a fight to the death between low-up that were agreed in Tunis, and considers how they competing perspectives but for joint participation in the fit into a wider post-WSIS scenario for both developing search for a way forward that is acceptable to all, or at countries and non-governmental actors. least has the consent of at least the large majority – a way forward that can be shared between perspectives. Multi- The Internet Governance Forum stakeholder decision-making fora are not natural environments for ideologues, but for pragmatists. This can be Internet governance was the most contested policy area uncomfortable for new participants with a strongly ideo- within WSIS. Given the intensity of disagreement about logical bent. The opportunity to learn about and under- what should happen after WSIS, it is hardly surprising that stand others’ perspectives is, however, crucial to their en- the follow-up processes were themselves controversial. gagement in such fora. One of the WGIG’s strengths was They consisted, on the one hand, of a commitment to “en- that it provided this opportunity. Much the same experi- hanced cooperation” which would “enable governments, ence was repeated for many participants in the first meet- on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsi- ing of the Internet Governance Forum in October/Novem- bilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to ber 2006, an event which many participants left saying that the Internet”5 and, on the other, to the creation of an they now understood more clearly why those who had dif- Internet Governance Forum which could discuss Internet ferent perspectives from themselves held those different issues but without decision-making powers. This Forum points of view. was given the mandate to: a. Discuss public policy issues related to key elements WSIS follow-up of Internet governance in order to foster the sustainability, robustness, security, stability and development As noted in Chapter 3, the WSIS outcome documents make of the Internet. relatively few formal “commitments”, although a substantial summary of specific commitments could be drawn from article 90 of the Tunis Agenda. This set of commitments can be found in Annex 3. The Tunis Agenda also commits 4 Tunis Agenda, article 119. summit signatories: 5 ibid., article 69.

Section C . Recommendations 103 b. Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with dif- c) Meet periodically, as required, [perhaps in parallel with ferent cross-cutting international public policies re- other UN conferences].7 garding the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall within the scope of any existing body. There was a lot here that was contested. Some wanted to confine the IGF’s role narrowly to issues that are univer- c. Interface with appropriate intergovernmental organi- sally thought of as Internet governance. Some saw it as zations and other institutions on matters under their an opportunity to continue the arguments about the fu- purview. ture of ICANN, and about the potential for other organisa- d. Facilitate the exchange of information and best prac- tions – such as the ITU – to oversee the Internet as a whole tices, and in this regard make full use of the expertise (even though this was outside the terms of the Tunis con- of the academic, scientific and technical communities. sensus). Others wanted the IGF to exploit the breadth of its mandate, to discuss wider issues which are not gener- e. Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways and means ally thought of as Internet governance per se but cut into to accelerate the availability and affordability of the the mandates of other WSIS follow-up processes and those Internet in the developing world. of other inter-governmental bodies – issues such as infra- f. Strengthen and enhance the engagement of stakehold- structure, applications and content, privacy and security. ers in existing and/or future Internet governance mechanisms, particularly those from developing countries. The initial format for the IGF was hammered out at a couple of preparatory meetings, led by the same top manage- g. Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention ment team (Nitin Desai and Markus Kummer) that coordi- of the relevant bodies and the general public, and, nated the WGIG, now reappointed to this role by the UN where appropriate, make recommendations. Secretary-General. The IGF Advisory Group met in May h. Contribute to capacity building for Internet governance 2006 and agreed an overall theme – “Internet Governance in developing countries, drawing fully on local sources for Development” – and four subsidiary themes – open- of knowledge and expertise. ness, security, diversity and access – for the first meeting i. Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodi- of the Forum, scheduled for the end of October 2006. “Ca- ment of WSIS principles in Internet governance proc- pacity-building,” they agreed, would be “a cross-cutting 8 esses. priority.” j. Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical Internet In practice, the first meeting of the Internet Governance resources. Forum is generally considered a considerable success. About 1500 people attended the three-day meeting in Ath- k. Help to find solutions to the issues arising from the ens in October/November 2006, from the whole range of use and misuse of the Internet, of particular concern stakeholder communities, including very senior figures in to everyday users. Internet affairs past and present. Perhaps uniquely in an l. Publish its proceedings.6 event held under UN auspices, no distinctions were drawn between government officials and IGO personnel, private This mandate, which derives largely from civil society text, sector and civil society participants. Everyone was treated left a good deal to be settled. It contained, potentially, a equally, and this equality was essentially an equality of great deal of work, though the IGF lacked the resources to individuals at least as much as of stakeholder groups. Dis- cover these in detail, and most participants in WSIS were cussion centred not on formal propositions but on panels reluctant to see it acquiring too great a degree of author- of experts drawn from across the stakeholder spectrum, ity, at least before they knew what it would do. facilitated by journalists who raised with them controver- The IGF, therefore, was not intended to be a governance sial issues of concern to members of the audience. As a agency itself, but rather an agency that could consider is- result, as one very experienced IGO official put it to the sues of governance. It “will”, the Tunis Agenda declared author, hardly anyone spoke in the kind of code that masks “be multilateral, multi-stakeholder, democratic and trans- controversy which is so common in other UN fora (not least parent. To that end,” it “could” (note the change of verb): among them WSIS). Discussion was also very broad, ranging across the whole range of Internet questions, certainly a) Build on the existing structures of Internet governance, not restricted to those falling readily within what is nor- with special emphasis on the complementarity be- mally understood as “governance”. tween all stakeholders involved in this process - governments, business entities, civil society and intergov- In many ways, this reflected the ethos of the WGIG; not ernmental organizations. surprisingly, perhaps, as the same top management team b) Have a lightweight and decentralised structure that that led the WGIG was responsible for leading the IGF. would be subject to periodic review. 7 ibid., article 73. 6 ibid., article 72. 8 www.intgovforum.org/meeting.htm.

104 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Multistakeholderism was central to how it worked, and in rejection of a UN-managed Digital Solidarity Fund. How- some cases rather formally so. Panels were always made ever, specific follow-up activities were agreed, including up of multistakeholder groups, and multistakeholder or- the following: ganisation was also a prerequisite for sanctioning works- 1. The UN Secretary-General and Chief Executives Board hops on the forum fringe. This had considerable impact were asked to set up a UN Group on the Information on the overall atmosphere at the meeting, and the fact that Society, made up of UN family entities, “to facilitate most participants felt that they left Athens knowing more the implementation of WSIS outcomes,” with leader- about issues that were often very controversial than they ship of this Group to come from amongst the ITU, the had known when they arrived – and, in particular, know- UNDP and UNESCO. ing more about why others thought the way they did. The IGF, in short, made it easier to explore others’ paradigms, 2. The Secretary-General was also asked to report less easy to demand agreement with one’s own. through ECOSOC to the General Assembly by June 2006 on “the modalities of the interagency coordina- Of course, a fundamental factor in this was the fact that tion of the implementation of WSIS outcomes.” the IGF had no decision-making powers. It is much easier 3. ECOSOC was asked to review the mandate and com- to explore ideas if you are not asked to vote for them at position of the UN Commission on Science and Tech- the end of the week; much easier, too, to form collabora- nology in the light of WSIS’ outcomes, “taking into tions (or “dynamic coalitions”) across stakeholder divides, account the multistakeholder approach.” though how successful those that were formed prove to be in practice remains to be seen. The basic concept of a 4. The ITU’s ICT Opportunity Index and Digital Opportu- non-decision-making forum will remain, and this gives the nity Index were endorsed alongside other sets of indi- IGF capacity to act as a global capacity-building forum on cators on ICT performance. the Internet (particularly in the sense of sharing perspec- Finally, the Agenda said the following about broader multi- tives and ideas), though the format will need to develop stakeholder follow-up of particular activities: year-on-year if it is not to become stale. The experience of, and the activities undertaken by, UN agencies in the WSIS process - notably the ITU, Action line implementation UNESCO and the UNDP - should continue to be used Follow-up activity for the remainder of the WSIS agenda to their fullest extent. These three agencies should play was spelt out in paragraphs 99 to 122 of the Tunis Agenda. leading facilitating roles in the implementation of the These include a number of different tiers and types of Plan of Action and organize a meeting of moderators/ activity, described together as “a mechanism for imple- facilitators of action lines [i.e. the action lines included mentation and follow-up at national, regional and inter- in the Geneva Plan of Action]…. national levels.” The overall framework for this was sum- The coordination of multi-stakeholder implementation marised as follows: activities would help to avoid duplication of activities. This should include, inter alia, information exchange, a. At the national level, the Agenda encourages govern- creation of knowledge, sharing of best practices, and ments to incorporate national e-strategies within na- assistance in developing multi-stakeholder and pub- tional development plans, and to include commen- lic/private partnerships.9 tary on ICD within relevant country assessment reports. Responsibility for action lines was allocated between agencies as set out in the box below. b. At the regional level, the Agenda recognises the potential for regional IGOs and UN regional commis- The initial allocation of responsibility for action line leader- sions to organise follow-up activities in conjunction ship appears to have originated in discussions during 2004. with governments, and the desirability of these in- It is not clear if, at that time, this was expected to form the cluding all stakeholders. framework for a follow-up process in due course. It certainly reflected inter-agency rivalries within the UN system, and c. At the international/global level, the Agenda requests these surfaced again during the final negotiations and in UN agencies and other IGOs to “facilitate activities the aftermath of WSIS as, firstly, approximate equality was among different stakeholders, including civil society required between the three main UN agencies concerned and the business sector, to help national govern- (the ITU, the UNDP and UNESCO) and, secondly, non-ICT- ments in their implementation efforts.” specialist agencies (such as the WHO and the FAO) as- It was agreed that WSIS follow-up “should not require serted their primacy over the ITU in follow-up processes the creation of any new operational bodies.” This was concerned with their specialist areas. The ITU downgraded consistent with donor countries’ perception of the importance of mainstreaming ICT/ICD, and with their earlier 9 Tunis Agenda, articles 109-110.

Section C . Recommendations 105 RESPONSIBILITY FOR WSIS ACTION LINES Action LineLineAction Initial proposed moderators/facilitators Moderators/facilitators agreed in February 2006

C1. The role of public governance authorities ECOSOC/UN Regional UNDESA and all stakeholders in the promotion Commissions/ITU of ICTs for development

C2. Information and communication ITU ITU infrastructure

C3. Access to information and knowledge ITU/UNESCO UNESCO

C4. Capacity building UNDP/UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD UNDP

C5. Building confidence and security ITU ITU in the use of ICTs

C6. Enabling environment ITU/UNDP/UN REGIONAL UNDP COMMISSIONS/UNCTAD

C7. ICT Applications ¬ E-government ¬ UNDP/ITU •UNDESA ¬ E-business ¬ WTO/UNCTAD/ITU/UPU • UNCTAD ¬ E-learning ¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNIDO •UNESCO ¬ E-health ¬ WHO/ITU •WHO ¬ E-employment ¬ ILO/ITU •ILO ¬ E-environment ¬ WHO/WMO/UNEP/ • WMO UN-Habitat/ITU/ICAO ¬ E-agriculture ¬ FAO/ITU •FAO ¬ E-science ¬ UNESCO/ITU/UNCTAD •UNESCO

C8. Cultural diversity and identity, linguistic UNESCO UNESCO diversity and local content

C9. Media UNESCO UNESCO

C10. Ethical dimensions of the Information UNESCO/ECOSOC/WHO UNESCO Society

C11. International and regional cooperation UN regional commissions/ UNDESA UNDP/ITU/UNESCO/ECOSOC

its role, particularly in respect of action lines C7, following attended by around 50 participants - mostly from the lead an inter-agency meeting in February 2006, with the result set UN agencies with some participants from Geneva mis- out in column three of the table in the box above. sions, civil society and the private sector. Substantial concerns were expressed at this meeting by both civil This somewhat amorphous collection of activities has society and private sector participants concerning the been slower than the Internet Governance Forum to get difficulty which they would face in participating effec- underway. A meeting of UN agencies in Geneva in Febru- tively in such a disparate process, and recommending re- ary 2006 refined the list of lead agencies for these action structuring of the action lines into clusters. Civil society lines (see above) and suggested procedures, principally and private sector participants were also concerned for information exchange between lead agencies. This about the mechanistic character of the procedures agreed was followed (not, it may be noted, preceded) by a multi- between UN agencies; the weakness of modalities for stakeholder consultation meeting, also in Geneva, multistakeholder participation; and the apparent focus

106 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? of lead agencies on “stocktaking” rather than proactive society should have mandated a follow-up process that approaches to implementation. is structured so incohesively. Many of the issues for discussion within action lines are cross-cutting, and The first “facilitation meeting” of any action line (C2 – “In- require interaction between them. Civil society sug- frastructure”) was held in Doha during the ITU’s World Tel- gestions for clustering have been welcomed by some, ecommunication Development Conference (WTDC). This but not all, senior figures in action line leadership, and was attended by about 40 people, including some national clustering will be challenging to achieve, especially delegations, but had almost no representation from civil where action lines have different UN lead agencies. society or development agencies, and none from other UN family IGOs, which were not present in Doha.10 Most other 3) The large number of action lines makes it very difficult action line processes held their first meetings in Geneva for many stakeholders to participate effectively. No during the fortnight surrounding the first “World Informa- civil society organisation has the resources to partici- tion Society Day” (an extended World Telecommunication pate effectively in more than a few such action lines. Day, 17 May 2006). These were also sparsely attended. Few, if any, developing country governments will do The last few action lines did not meet until October 2006. so - though some may participate in meetings held in Geneva through their Geneva missions, these missions Participants in these May meetings felt they were a mixed will not provide the continuity of specialist input re- bag. Some saw quite spirited discussion between a vari- quired for any proactive work. The private sector, too, ety of stakeholders and generated some interesting ideas is likely to be largely absent. Narrowly defined action about future activity. Others struggled to keep the conver- lines, in other words, are unlikely to attract substantial sation going. None looked like the beating heart of a dy- multistakeholder involvement, especially if they seem namic process that would prove a substantial legacy for to add less value than other activities which are cur- WSIS. Follow up for most has been minimal, though rently underway. Participation at the initial meetings in UNESCO has established online facilities for those action Geneva during 2006 was numerically sparse, with suf- lines where it holds the lead. Future meetings were not ficiently little representation from developing countries, scheduled on the WSIS website (still maintained by the civil society and the private sector for meeting chairs ITU), at the end of January 2007, though it is expected to express concern about the capacity of meetings to 11 these will be held in May 2007. make decisions on future action line activity.

Many participants felt that the May 2006 meetings illus- 4) The value added by action lines will be limited if they trated a number of weaknesses in the action line struc- are confined to activities such as “information ex- ture, which are likely to determine whether or not these change” and “sharing of best practices”, as suggested will form an effective follow-up process. Key points made in the Tunis Agenda and by some UN agencies and in this context include the following: governments in action line meetings. There are three principal reasons for this: 1) The purpose of the action line process is unclear. For- mally, it is billed as being to do with “implementation”. • Like all summits, WSIS’ outcome documents fo- However, the action lines themselves cannot imple- cus on issues where there was agreement. While ment anything - they have neither the mandate to do there is value in monitoring the implementation so from participating agencies nor the resources re- of agreed approaches, there is more value, for po- quired. In practice, implementation is a matter for IGOs, tential participants, in addressing challenges and governments and other actors who may participate in areas of disagreement which did not form part of action line meetings; while the action lines themselves WSIS’ overall consensus. These are not suscepti- are, at best, mechanisms for information exchange, ble to a “stocktaking” approach. monitoring and interchange of ideas. There is little en- • WSIS is over. In a fast-moving area such as ICT/ thusiasm for such activity among some important ac- ICD, potential participants in the action lines need tors, notably bilateral development agencies. and want to look forward to 2008 rather than back 2) The number of action lines - nine or sixteen depending to 2003 (when the text within individual action on how they are counted - and their diverse leadership lines was agreed). Focusing on the WSIS outcomes arrangements make it difficult for them to address the will look increasingly unattractive if it means di- issues concerned cohesively. It is ironic that a summit verting resources from more important and more which emphasised the holistic nature of the information immediate new issues. • To be worthwhile, stocktaking must be based on criti- 10 The World Bank was represented in Doha but did not attend this cal evaluation. Listing activities has relatively little meeting. value, particularly where it consists of inviting gov- 11 See www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/ events_calendar.asp?year=2007&month=0. ernments (and other stakeholders) to contribute

Section C . Recommendations 107 their “success stories”. Information exchange is the Global Alliance will be, it looks more like a post-WSIS unlikely to be comprehensive and can too easily multistakeholder forum, addressing ICT/ICD issues become mutual self-congratulation, adding noth- holistically and on the basis of an evolving agenda, than ing to real understanding of the complex questions the follow-up process designated by the WSIS outcome that need to be addressed. documents. Certainly, it looks more comparable with the Internet Governance Forum than do the action lines. If it In addition, it is difficult to see how action line meet- secures the participation at a senior level of many who ings can match other established meetings and online may otherwise have been prepared to put time into indi- spaces as fora for “information exchange” and “shar- vidual (or, more likely, clustered) action lines, then there ing of best practice”. has to be a likelihood that it - rather than the mechanisms 5) The present structure for the action lines does not ad- established by the Tunis Agenda - will play the substan- dress the paradigm gap between ICT and mainstream tive WSIS follow-up role (if that role is taken up at all). On development issues. The action line meetings in May the other hand, civil society has significant reservations 2006 were dominated by ICT/ICD professionals. While about the extent to which the Global Alliance will prove to mainstream sector professionals may participate in be inclusive. sectoral applications sub-line activities (which were slowest to get underway), their presence is needed Potential actors in the action line follow-up process there- throughout the follow-up process if that is to address fore have serious questions to ask about participation - in information society issues from a development rather particular: “is this likely to prove effective?” and “is this than an ICT sectoral perspective. The ITU’s original role likely to distract us from other, potentially more produc- as sole lead in the C2 (Infrastructure) action line is a tive activities?” This applies across the stakeholder spec- case in point: as the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms trum - to governments (including both developing country demonstrated, infrastructure is a matter of finance and and donor governments), IGOs, the private sector and civil of socio-economic development (from demand to ap- society organisations. At the very least, civil society and plication) as much as of technology. other actors should carefully monitor the Global Alliance and ensure that they generate effective input into it pro- 6) The action lines have no resources. No funding is avail- portionate to its apparent likely effectiveness, as that able from the UN to make them work, and WSIS im- emerges during the coming year. plementation is not likely to be seen as sufficient of a priority in itself for any other agencies to fund it, even At the same time, however, some actors have felt obliged for an individual action line. to make an effort to see what will emerge from the action line process and may continue to do so in the short term. With hindsight, in short, it would seem that too much at- This was, after all, set up as a multistakeholder initiative, tention was paid during the WSIS PrepCom discussions and it would be difficult for civil society simply to opt out about follow-up to resolving potential conflict between of it. The action lines, it is clear, are unlikely to be able to agencies, and too little was paid to the effectiveness of undertake any comprehensive monitoring of WSIS out- the structure agreed - especially to its cohesion and comes. However, they did potentially provide a space for inclusiveness. By the time of the first group of action line multistakeholder discussion of issues, and it initially facilitation meetings in May 2006, it was clear that con- seemed possible that they could generate worthwhile dia- siderable change had already occurred in a number of ar- logue if they focused more narrowly, and more proactively, eas - for example, in IGO approaches to infrastructure fi- on target issues. This at least seemed worth exploring dur- nance - and that implementing WSIS was already begin- ing the May 2006 meetings, perhaps through small multi- ning to look to many participants like last year’s rather than stakeholder partnerships – a civil society grouping, a pri- next year’s agenda. “Real” WSIS follow-up, in other words, vate sector partner and an IGO, for example, jointly explor- was already taking place - internationally in contexts such ing an area of ICT policy which has real importance for the as the World Bank and European Union African infrastruc- future. As things stand, most action lines are unlikely to ture initiatives, and in national programmes such as the meet again in formal session until May 2007. In these cir- “e-Lanka” initiative in Sri Lanka. cumstances, it should not be difficult to determine whether In addition, an international multistakeholder community any action lines have the capacity in practice to generate was already in process of establishing the Global Alliance worthwhile activity. If none has generated substantive work on ICT and Development, as a successor to the UN ICT during the intervening year, then it is unlikely that these Task Force, with a mandate to facilitate and promote the action lines will have much life left in them. integration of information and communication technology into development activities through a “multi-stakeholder cross-sectoral platform and forum that will bring together all stakeholders representing relevant constituencies.”12 While opinions are divided about how useful or effective 12 www.un-gaid.org/about.

108 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Conclusion

Attitudes to WSIS follow-up vary considerably according to the perceptions which actors have of WSIS as a whole. Supporters of the summit see its follow-up process as a potential springboard for future activity. Those who regard WSIS as a distraction - including many in the donor community - are unprepared to commit further time and resources to it. Their lack of commitment to follow-up is reinforced by the amorphous character and disparate organisation of the action lines. From the perspective of January 2007, certainly, the follow-up process looks weak, except where the Internet Governance Forum is concerned.

In the light of earlier chapters of this report, this is perhaps unsurprising. WSIS did not have a major impact in terms of new thinking on either rights or development. It may have begun new processes on Internet governance and infrastructure finance, but these are being pursued elsewhere. New ICT issues are constantly emerging. In this context, the most important thing about WSIS is probably that it is in the past. Future action – whether by developing countries, civil society or any other actor – needs to be forward-looking. Time will tell whether WSIS is seen as a reference point (like the Maitland Commission), a turning point or largely an irrelevance; but whichever of these hindsight eventually prefers, the conclusion of this report is that it is not the best starting point for new action on

ICTs or ICD today.

Section C . Recommendations 109 110 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Annexes

annex 1 Participation in WSIS summits annex 2 Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG annex 3 WSIS outcome document “commitments” annex 4 References

111

ANNEX 1: Participation in WSIS summits

CountryCountryCountry Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. %% %% % %

Afghanistan 6 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0 Albania 3 67 33 1 100 0 3 100 0 Algeria 8 100 0 3 100 0 71 86 14 Andorra 10 80 20 4 75 25 3 67 33 Angola 13 100 0 3 100 0 68 87 13 Antigua and Barbuda Argentina 27 70 30 4 50 50 52 77 23 Armenia 24 88 12 5 100 0 32 81 19 Australia 14 64 36 6 67 33 16 81 19 Austria 39 62 38 12 75 25 46 74 26 Azerbaijan 36 92 8 11 100 0 64 94 6 Bahamas Bahrain 6 100 0 4 100 0 15 93 7 Bangladesh 54 93 7 7 100 0 10 100 0 Barbados 10 50 50 5 60 40 5 60 40 Belarus 27 89 11 4 100 0 2 100 0 Belgium 20 65 35 6 67 33 20 95 5 Belize 3 67 33 Benin 16 81 19 3 100 0 13 85 15 Bhutan 5 60 40 4 75 25 Bolivia 30 57 43 1 0 100 5 100 0 Bosnia and Herzegovina 10 90 10 2 100 0 22 82 18 Botswana 30 57 43 8 100 0 16 88 12 Brazil 47 89 11 25 92 8 37 76 24 Brunei Darussalam 14 93 7 2 50 50 6 100 0 Bulgaria 23 78 22 3 67 33 18 83 17 Burkina Faso 9 89 11 6 100 0 11 100 0 Burundi 6 83 17 4 100 0 6 100 0 Cambodia 7 100 0 4 100 0 5 100 0 Cameroon 10 100 0 11 100 0 20 90 10 Canada 95 69 31 16 69 31 61 59 41 Cape Verde 10 100 0 3 67 33 Central African Republic 2 100 0 13 92 8 Chad 5 100 0 9 100 0 11 82 18 Chile 11 82 18 5 80 20 12 75 25 China 21 62 38 7 57 43 59 75 25

Annexes 113 CountryCountryCountry Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. %% %% % %

Colombia 10 40 60 1 100 0 5 60 40 Comoros 13 77 23 4 50 50 15 93 7 Congo 23 96 4 5 100 0 37 89 11 Costa Rica 7 86 14 1 0 100 3 100 0 Côte d’Ivoire 19 95 5 5 100 0 27 89 11 Croatia 20 65 35 4 25 75 28 71 29 Cuba 86 72 28 6 100 0 32 75 25 Cyprus 5 60 40 1 100 0 Czech Republic 20 85 15 6 83 17 42 69 31 Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 7 100 0 3 100 0 Democratic Republic of Congo 6 83 17 9 78 22 13 85 15 Denmark 16 50 50 9 44 56 17 59 41 Djibouti 6 100 0 1 100 0 15 100 0 Dominica Dominican Republic 10 40 60 5 20 80 51 55 45 Ecuador 9 67 33 7 86 14 10 70 30 Egypt 44 80 20 9 67 33 78 62 38 El Salvador 13 62 38 3 67 33 8 75 25 Equatorial Guinea 2 100 0 15 100 0 Eritrea 1 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0 Estonia 13 85 15 4 50 50 6 83 17 Ethiopia 4 75 25 3 33 67 9 89 11 Fiji 2 50 50 Finland 51 51 49 8 88 12 46 50 50 France 112 71 29 17 71 29 146 75 25 Gabon 67 76 24 6 100 0 29 90 10 Gambia 13 92 8 2 100 0 6 83 17 Georgia 11 91 9 4 75 25 Germany 59 71 29 12 67 33 69 64 36 Ghana 36 78 22 12 83 17 38 68 32 Greece 34 71 29 2 100 0 18 72 28 Grenada Guatemala 9 67 33 5 80 20 8 88 12 Guinea 3 67 33 13 92 8 34 91 9 Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti 4 100 0 4 100 0 10 90 10 Honduras 6 50 50 3 100 0 2 50 50 Hungary 9 78 22 4 100 0 15 80 20 Iceland 16 56 44 2 50 50 9 67 33 India 16 94 6 6 100 0 63 92 8 Indonesia 31 90 10 9 89 11 34 94 6

114 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? CountryCountryCountry Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. %% %% % %

Iran 62 95 5 10 70 30 100 94 6 Iraq 7 100 0 6 67 33 6 67 33 Ireland 60 72 28 6 83 17 18 61 39 Israel 29 66 34 5 100 0 68 72 28 Italy 47 68 32 9 100 0 146 68 32 Jamaica 7 43 57 2 0 100 8 63 37 Japan 53 79 21 8 100 0 37 84 16 Jordan 16 69 31 4 50 50 19 42 58 Kazakhstan 5 100 0 3 100 0 Kenya 35 83 17 8 89 11 44 52 48 Kiribati Kuwait 16 94 6 3 100 0 44 70 30 Kyrgyzstan 26 85 15 1 100 0 1 100 0 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 2 100 0 2 100 0 Latvia 18 56 44 5 60 40 18 61 39 Lebanon 14 86 14 3 100 0 63 81 19 Lesotho 19 74 26 5 40 60 19 74 26 Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 9 89 11 8 100 0 12 92 8 Liechtenstein 4 100 0 3 67 33 Lithuania 16 69 31 6 50 50 12 75 25 Luxembourg 9 78 22 6 50 50 13 69 31 Madagascar 15 73 27 13 85 15 Malawi 6 83 27 4 100 0 9 89 11 Malaysia 125 61 39 11 73 27 38 66 44 Maldives 2 100 0 1 0 100 4 75 25 Mali 42 86 14 11 91 9 35 77 23 Malta 9 89 11 4 100 0 8 88 12 Marshall Islands 3 67 33 Mauritania 20 90 10 3 67 33 64 84 16 Mauritius 11 100 0 5 80 20 5 100 0 Mexico 20 85 15 4 100 0 15 93 7 Micronesia, (Federated States of) 2 100 0 1 100 0 4 100 0 Monaco 7 71 29 2 100 0 3 100 0 Mongolia 11 82 18 2 100 0 Montenegro - see Republic of Montenegro Morocco 22 86 14 8 75 25 108 94 6 Mozambique 34 65 35 2 100 0 40 75 25 Myanmar 6 83 17 3 67 33 3 100 0 Namibia 10 70 30 4 50 50 12 58 42 Nauru Nepal 9 100 0 3 100 0 39 82 18

Annexes 115 CountryCountryCountry Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. %% %% % %

Netherlands 22 64 36 5 80 20 23 74 26 New Zealand 6 83 17 2 50 50 6 83 17 Nicaragua 17 59 41 6 83 17 8 100 0 Niger 7 86 14 2 50 50 30 77 23 Nigeria 64 81 19 6 83 17 50 82 18 Niue 2 100 0 Norway 33 64 36 7 71 29 18 61 39 Oman 15 73 27 9 67 33 51 82 18 Pakistan 47 96 4 4 75 25 12 92 8 Palau 1 100 0 Panama 7 57 43 1 100 0 2 100 0 Papua New Guinea 1 100 0 1 0 100 Paraguay 5 60 40 3 33 67 2 100 0 Peru 14 86 14 5 40 60 3 67 33 Philippines 16 69 31 3 67 33 10 100 0 Poland 14 86 14 7 71 29 12 75 25 Portugal 21 86 14 7 71 29 31 71 29 Qatar 21 95 5 5 60 40 69 93 7 Republic of Korea 38 84 16 9 100 0 42 88 12 Republic of Moldova 6 83 17 4 100 0 9 78 22 Republic of Montenegro Republic of Serbia Romania 102 78 22 12 75 25 67 64 36 Russian Federation 69 96 4 12 67 33 69 83 17 Rwanda 26 85 15 4 75 25 52 77 23 Saint Kitts and Nevis 3 100 0 Saint Lucia 1 100 0 Saint Vincent and The Grenadines Samoa 21 52 48 2 50 50 7 71 29 San Marino 1 0 100 São Tomé and Príncipe 1 100 0 Saudi Arabia 27 100 0 10 100 0 19 100 0 Senegal 39 90 10 19 95 5 60 77 23 Serbia and Montenegro 21 67 33 9 56 44 15 67 33 Seychelles 1 100 0 Sierra Leone 4 100 0 3 100 0 Singapore 10 70 30 4 50 50 7 71 29 Slovakia 19 79 21 10 80 20 17 88 12 Slovenia 11 73 27 4 75 25 4 100 0 Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa 79 67 33 16 25 75 95 74 26

116 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? CountryCountryCountry Geneva Summit Phase 2 PrepCom 2 Tunis Summit

Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. Total Male Fem. %% %% % %

Spain 33 61 39 7 43 57 61 59 41 Sri Lanka 11 100 0 3 67 33 3 67 33 Sudan 25 80 20 4 75 25 78 90 10 Suriname 2 100 0

Swaziland 10 70 30 21 90 10 Sweden 36 50 50 6 67 33 42 52 48 Switzerland 49 76 24 20 75 25 52 67 33 Syrian Arab Republic 9 89 11 7 29 71 15 73 27 Tajikistan 43 100 0 Thailand 72 67 33 9 44 56 25 56 44 The FYR of Macedonia 20 80 20 6 83 17 Timor-Leste 1 100 0 2 100 0 Togo 7 100 0 1 100 0 43 98 2 Tonga 3 100 0 5 60 40 Trinidad and Tobago 6 83 17 3100 0 5 40 60 Tunisia 29 86 14 21 100 0 54 83 17 Turkey 16 100 0 5 80 20 39 95 5 Turkmenistan Tuvalu Uganda 13 100 0 2 100 0 18 78 22 Ukraine 35 80 20 2 100 0 54 81 19 United Arab Emirates 14 100 0 12 92 8 31 97 3 United Kingdom 30 94 6 12 67 33 33 76 24 United Republic of Tanzania 32 84 16 6 100 0 50 78 22 United States of America 66 59 41 20 45 55 130 69 31 Uruguay 9 78 22 2 100 0 7 86 14 Uzbekistan 5 100 0 3 67 33 4 100 0 Vanuatu Vatican 4 100 0 3 100 0 5 100 0 Venezuela 14 64 36 4 50 50 11 45 55 Vietnam 10 100 0 7 100 0 11 100 0 Yemen 11 100 0 4 100 0 22 95 5 Zambia 13 62 38 13 85 15 20 85 15 Zimbabwe 31 84 16 5 80 20 43 88 12

TOTALTOTALTOTAL 367636763676 901901901 445044504450 AVERAGEAVERAGEAVERAGE 818181 191919 777777 232323 818181 191919

Annexes 117 ANNEX 2: Participation in the TFFM and the WGIG

TASK FORCE ON FINANCIAL MECHANISMS Mohsen Khalil, Director, Global Information and Commu- MEMBERSHIP LIST nication Technologies, the World Bank (Alternate: Pierre Guislain Manager, Policy Division (CITPO), Global Informa- Task Force Chair: tion & Communication Technologies Department, the World Bank Group) Mark Malloch Brown, UNDP Administrator (Alternate: Shoji Nishimoto, Assistant Administrator and Director, Bureau Sarbuland Khan, Director, Office of ECOSOC Support and for Development Policy) Coordination, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Members Ayisi Makatiani, Chairman, Gallium Venture Capital and Ali Abbasov, Minister of Communication and Information CEO, African Management Services Company Technologies of Azerbaijan Zouhair Masmoudi, Director-General, Ministry of Communi- Sérgio Amadeu da Silveira, Director-President, Instituto cation Technologies and Transport (Alternate: HE Ali Hachani, Nacional de Tecnologia da Informação, (ITI), Brazil (Alter- Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent nate: Mauricio Augusto Coelho, Chief of Cabinet, ITI) Mission of Tunisia to the United Nations, Tunisia)

Owen Barder, Representative, European Union on behalf Rajendra Pawar, CEO, NIIT, India of the Netherlands EU-Presidency Gisa Fuatai Purcell, Secretary/ICT Advisor, Samoa National Michel Chertok, Representative, Global Knowledge Part- ICT Committee, Ministry of Communications and Informa- nership tion Technology, Samoa

Jim Crowe, Deputy Director, Foreign Affairs/United Nations Daniel Stauffacher, Representative, Switzerland, Swiss and Commonwealth Division, Canada Executive Secretariat for WSIS

Ahmed Darwish, Minister of State for Administrative De- Ichiro Tambo, Development Co-operation Directorate, Or- velopment, Egypt ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Mamadou Diop Decroix, Minister of Communications of Senegal (Alternate: Mr. Amadou Top, Deputy Manager, Dig- Hamadoun Toure, Director, Telecommunication Develop- ital Solidarity Fund) ment Bureau, ITU (Alternate: Pape-Gorgui Toure, Chief, Policies, Strategies, and Financing Department, ITU) Alar Ehandi, Chief Executive Officer, Look@World Founda- tion, Estonia Pedro Urra González, Director, Infomed, Cuba; * unable to participate in the TF meetings Anriette Esterhuysen, Executive Director, Association for Pro- gressive Communications (Alternate: Willie Currie, Commu- Yoichiro Yamada, Director, Specialized Agencies Division, nications and Information Policy Programme Manager) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan

Nissim Ezekiel, former Executive Director, Commission on Mohamed Yunus, Managing Director, Grameen Bank, Private Sector and Development Bangladesh *unable to participate in TF meetings

Jonathan Fiske, Senior Manager, Group Public Policy, Vodafone Group Services Ltd Observers

Ayesha Hassan, Senior Policy Manager, International José Antonio Ocampo, Under-Secretary-General for Eco- Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (Alternate: Bill Stribravy,ICC nomic and Social Affairs, Department of Economic and Permanent Representative c/o US Council for International Social Affairs Business)

118 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Charles Geiger, Assistant Executive Director, WSIS Secre- Raúl Echeberría, Executive Director/CEO, Latin America tariat, WSIS and Caribbean Internet Addresses Registry, Montevideo

Janis Karklins, President of the WSIS Preparatory Commit- Dev Erriah, Chairman, ICT Authority of Mauritius, Port Louis tee for the Tunis Phase Baher Esmat, Telecom Planning Manager, Ministry of Com- Rik Panganiban, Communications Coordinator, Conference munications and Information Technology of Egypt, Cairo of NGOs in Consultative Relationship with the United Na- Mark Esseboom, Director of Strategy and International tions (CONGO) (29 November TF meeting) Affairs, Directorate General for Telecom and Post, Minis- Pietro Sicuro, Directeur, INTIF, Gestionnaire du Fonds try of Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, The Hague francophone des inforoutes, Organisation internationale Juan Fernandez, Coordinator of the Commission of Elec- de la Francophonie (4 October TF meeting) tronic Commerce of Cuba, Havana

Ayesha Hassan, Senior Policy Manager for E-Business, IT WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE and Telecommunications, International Chamber of Com- MEMBERSHIP LIST merce, Paris ChairChairChair David Hendon, Director of Business Relations, UK Depart- ment of Trade and Industry, London Nitin Desai, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for the World Summit on the Information Society, Delhi/ Qiheng Hu, Adviser to the Science and Technology Com- Mumbai mission of the Ministry of Information Industry of China; Former Vice-President of the Chinese Academy of Sci- MembersMembersMembers ences, Beijing

Abdullah Al-Darrab, Deputy Governor of Technical Affairs, Willy Jensen, Director General, Norwegian Post and Communications and Information Technology Commission Telecom Authority, Oslo of Saudi Arabia, Riyadh Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Professor, International Commu- Carlos A. Afonso, Director of Planning, Information Net- nication Policy and Regulation, University of Aarhus work for the Third Sector; Member, Brazil’s Internet Steer- Jovan Kurbalija, Director, DiploFoundation, Geneva/La ing Committee; Member, Non-Commercial Users Constitu- Valetta ency (Rio de Janeiro) Iosif Charles Legrand, Senior Scientist, California Institute Peng Hwa Ang, Dean, School of Communication and Infor- of Technology, Pasadena, California mation, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore Donald MacLean, Director, MacLean Consulting, Ottawa Karen Banks, Networking and Advocacy Coordinator, As- sociation for Progressive Communications; Director, Allen Miller, Executive Director, World Information Tech- GreenNet, London nology and Services Alliance, Arlington, Virginia

Faryel Beji, President and CEO, Tunisian Internet Agency, Jacqueline A. Morris, Consultant, Port of Spain Tunis Olivier Nana Nzépa, Coordinator, Africa Civil Society, Vittorio Bertola, Chairman, ICANN At-large Advisory Com- Yaoundé mittee; President and CTO, Dynamic Fun, Turin Alejandro Pisanty, Director of Computing Academic Serv- José Alexandre Bicalho, Member, Brazilian Internet Steer- ices, Universidad Autónoma de México; Vice-Chairman ing Committee; Advisor to the Board of Directors of the of the Board of ICANN, Mexico City National Telecommunications Agency (Brasília) Khalilullah Qazi, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Paki- Kangsik Cheon, Chief Operating Officer, International Busi- stan to the United Nations Office in Geneva ness Development, Netpia, Seoul Rajashekar Ramaraj, Managing Director, Sify Limited, Trevor Clarke, Permanent Representative of Barbados to Chennai (formerly Madras) the United Nations Office in Geneva Masaaki Sakamaki, Director, Computer Communications Avri Doria, Research Consultant, Providence, Rhode Island Division, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Tokyo William Drake, President, Computer Professionals for So- cial Responsibility; Senior Associate, International Centre Joseph Sarr, President, NTIC Commission, Dakar Regional for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva Council, Dakar

Annexes 119 Peiman Seadat, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Is- lamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office in Ge- neva

Charles Sha’ban, Executive Director, Talal Abu-Ghazaleh Intellectual Property, Amman

Lyndall Shope-Mafole, Chairperson, Presidential National Commission on Information Society and Development of South Africa, Pretoria

Waudo Siganga, Chairman, Computer Society of Kenya, Nairobi

Juan Carlos Solines Moreno, Executive Director, Gobierno Digital, Quito

Mikhail Vladimirovich Yakushev, Director of Legal Support Department, Ministry of Information Technology & Com- munications, Russian Federation, Moscow

Peter Zangl, Deputy Director-General, Information Society and Media Directorate General, European Commission, Brussels

Jean-Paul Zens, First Counsellor, Director of the Media and Telecom Department, Ministry of State of Luxembourg, Luxembourg City

120 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? ANNEX 3: WSIS outcome document “commitments”

Geneva Declaration of Principles 16. We further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow up A number of articles reaffirm commitments to MDGs, Uni- progress in bridging the digital divide, taking into account versal Declaration of Human Rights etc. different levels of development, so as to reach internation- 10.10.10. ally agreed development goals and objectives, including We are fully committed to turning this digital divide into a the Millennium Development Goals, and to assess the ef- digital opportunity for all, particularly for those who risk fectiveness of investment and international cooperation being left behind and being further marginalized. efforts in building the Information Society.

11. 24. We are committed to realizing our common vision of the We will strengthen action to protect children from abuse Information Society for ourselves and for future and defend their rights in the context of ICTs. generations. … We are also committed to ensuring that 30. the development of ICT applications and operation of Recognizing that disaster mitigation can significantly sup- services respects the rights of children as well as their port efforts to bring about sustainable development and protection and well-being. help in poverty reduction, we reaffirm our commitment to 12. leveraging ICT capabilities and potential through foster- We are committed to ensuring that the Information Soci- ing and strengthening cooperation at the national, re- ety enables women’s empowerment and their full partici- gional, and international levels. pation on the basis on [sic] equality in all spheres of soci- 31. ety and in all decision-making processes. We commit ourselves tto work together towards the im- 65. plementation of the Digital Solidarity Agenda, as agreed We commit ourselves to strengthening cooperation to seek in paragraph 27 of the Geneva Plan of Action. common responses to the challenges and to the imple- 32. mentation of the Plan of Action, which will realize the vi- We further commit ourselves to promote the inclusion of all sion of an inclusive Information Society based on the Key peoples in the Information Society through the development Principles incorporated in this Declaration. and use of local and/or indigenous languages in ICTs. 66. We further commit ourselves to evaluate and follow-up Tunis Agenda progress in bridging the digital divide, taking into account different levels of development, so as to reach internation- 42. ally agreed development goals, including those contained We reaffirm our commitment to the freedom to seek, in the Millennium Declaration, and to assess the effective- receive, impart and use information, in particular, for the ness of investment and international cooperation efforts creation, accumulation and dissemination of knowledge. in building the Information Society. 43. We reiterate our commitments to the positive uses of the Geneva Plan of Action Internet and other ICTs and to take appropriate actions and preventive measures, as determined by law, against abu- 27.D2 sive uses of ICTs as mentioned under the Ethical Dimen- refers to “above commitments” but preceding text con- sions of the Information Society of the Geneva Declara- tains no use of the word “commit”. tion of Principles and Plan of Action.

49. Tunis Commitment We reaffirm our commitment to turning the digital divide into digital opportunity, and we commit to ensuring har- Article 7 reaffirms Geneva commitments. we commit monious and equitable development for all. We commitcommitWe Article 23 reaffirms commitment to gender equity; article to foster and provide guidance on development areas in 25 to inclusion of young people. the broader Internet governance arrangements, and to

Annexes 121 include, amongst other issues, international interconnec- e. paying special attention to the formulation of univer- tion costs, capacity building and technology/know-how sal design concepts and the use of assistive technolo- transfer. gies that promote access for all persons, including those with disabilities. 53. We commit to working earnestly towards multilingualization f. promoting public policies aimed at providing afford- of the Internet, as part of a multilateral, transparent and able access at all levels, including community-level, democratic process, involving governments and all stake- to hardware as well as software and connectivity holders, in their respective roles. through an increasingly converging technological environment, capacity building and local content. 83. Building an inclusive development-oriented Information g. improving access to the world’s health knowledge and Society will require unremitting multistakeholder effort. telemedicine services, in particular in areas such as We thus commit ourselves to remain fully engaged—na- global cooperation in emergency response, access to tionally, regionally and internationally—to ensure sustain- and networking among health professionals to help able implementation and follow-up of the outcomes and improve quality of life and environmental conditions. commitments reached during the WSIS process and its h. building ICT capacities to improve access and use of Geneva and Tunis phases of the Summit. postal networks and services.

90. i. using ICTs to improve access to agricultural knowl- We are committed to working towards achieving the in- edge, combat poverty, and support production of and dicative targets, set out in the Geneva Plan of Action, that access to locally relevant agriculture-related content. serve as global references for improving connectivity and j. developing and implementing e-government applica- universal, ubiquitous, equitable, non-discriminatory and tions based on open standards in order to enhance affordable access to, and use of, ICTs, considering differ- the growth and interoperability of e-government sys- ent national circumstances, to be achieved by 2015, and tems, at all levels, thereby furthering access to gov- to using ICTs, as a tool to achieve the internationally agreed ernment information and services, and contributing to development goals and objectives, including the Millen- building ICT networks and developing services that are nium Development Goals, by: available anywhere and anytime, to anyone and on any a. mainstreaming and aligning national e-strategies, across device. local, national, and regional action plans, as appropriate k. supporting educational, scientific, and cultural insti- and in accordance with local and national development tutions, including libraries, archives and museums, in priorities, with in-built time-bound measures. their role of developing, providing equitable, open and b. developing and implementing enabling policies that affordable access to, and preserving diverse and var- reflect national realities and that promote a support- ied content, including in digital form, to support infor- ive international environment, foreign direct invest- mal and formal education, research and innovation; ment as well as the mobilization of domestic resources, and in particular supporting libraries in their public- in order to promote and foster entrepreneurship, par- service role of providing free and equitable access to ticularly Small, Medium and Micro Enterprises information and of improving ICT literacy and commu- (SMMEs), taking into account the relevant market and nity connectivity, particularly in underserved commu- cultural contexts. These policies should be reflected nities. in a transparent, equitable regulatory framework to l. enhancing the capacity of communities in all regions create a competitive environment to support these to develop content in local and/or indigenous lan- goals and strengthen economic growth. guages. c. building ICT capacity for all and confidence in the use m. strengthening the creation of quality e-content, on of ICTs by all - including youth, older persons, women, national, regional and international levels. indigenous peoples, people with disabilities, and remote and rural communities - through the improve- n. promoting the use of traditional and new media in or- ment and delivery of relevant education and training der to foster universal access to information, culture programmes and systems including lifelong and dis- and knowledge for all people, especially vulnerable tance learning. populations and populations in developing countries d. implementing effective training and education, par- and using, inter alia, radio and television as educa- ticularly in ICT science and technology, that motivates tional and learning tools. and promotes participation and active involvement of o. reaffirming the independence, pluralism and diversity girls and women in the decision-making process of of media, and freedom of information including building the Information Society. through, as appropriate, the development of domestic

122 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? legislation, we reiterate our call for the responsible use r. promoting the development of advanced research and treatment of information by the media in accord- networks, at national, regional and international lev- ance with the highest ethical and professional stand- els, in order to improve collaboration in science, tech- ards. We reaffirm the necessity of reducing interna- nology and higher education. tional imbalances affecting the media, particularly as s. promoting voluntary service, at the community level, regards infrastructure, technical resources and the de- to help maximize the developmental impact of ICTs. velopment of human skills. These reaffirmations are made with reference to Geneva Declaration of Princi- t. promoting the use of ICTs to enhance flexible ways of ples paragraphs 55 to 59. working, including teleworking, leading to greater productivity and job creation. p. strongly encouraging ICT enterprises and entrepre- neurs to develop and use environment-friendly pro- 119. duction processes in order to minimize the negative We commit ourselves to review and follow up progress in impacts of the use and manufacture of ICTs and dis- bridging the digital divide, taking into account the differ- posal of ICT waste on people and the environment. In ent levels of development among nations, so as to achieve this context, it is important to give particular atten- the internationally agreed development goals and objec- tion to the specific needs of the developing countries. tives, including the Millennium Development Goals, as- q. incorporating regulatory, self-regulatory, and other ef- sessing the effectiveness of investment and international fective policies and frameworks to protect children and cooperation efforts in building the Information Society, young people from abuse and exploitation through ICTs identifying gaps as well as deficits in investment and de- into national plans of action and e-strategies. vising strategies to address them.

Annexes 123 ANNEX 4: References

The main WSIS documents are available from the WSIS Annan, K. (2003). Address by UN Secretary-General to the website, which is maintained by the ITU. The overall URL World Summit on the Information Society, 10 Decem- is www.itu.int/wsis. Different sections of this website pro- ber 2003 [online]. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/ vide access to: geneva/coverage/statements/opening/annan.html.

• The four WSIS output documents Berry, J.W. (2006). “The World Summit on the Information • The reports of the Task Force on Financial Mechanisms Society (WSIS): a Global Challenge in the New Millen- and the Working Group on Internet Governance (on the nium”. Libri, 56 (1), March 2006, pp. 1-15. latter, see also www.wgig.org) Cammaerts, B. (2005). “Through the Looking Glass: Civil • The proceedings of the two full Summit sessions Society Participation in the WSIS and the Dynamics • The proceedings of the preparatory process, including between Online/Offline Interaction”. Communications the PrepComs and the regional preparatory meetings and Strategies, November 2005, pp.151-174. • Participant lists in all summit fora Chacko, J. G. (2005). “Paradise lost? Reinstating the human development agenda in ICT policies and strate- • A variety of other summit-related material. gies”. Information Technology for Development, 11 (1), The site also provides access to materials generated by pp. 97-99. ISSN: 0268-1102. the follow-up processes to WSIS, including the post-WSIS Chakravartty, P. (2006). “Who Speaks for the Governed?” action lines. The Internet Governance Forum maintains a Economic and Political Weekly, 41 (3), pp. 250-257. site at www.intgovforum.org, while the first IGF meeting is also recorded at www.igfgreece2006.gr. Cogburn, D. (2005). “Partners or Pawns?: The Impact of Elite Decision-Making and Epistemic Communities in The following list notes the URLs for a number of organi- Global Information Policy on Developing Countries and sations’ work on WSIS, where this has significant bearing Transnational Civil Society”. Knowledge, Technology, on the report above. and Policy, 18 (2), pp. 52-82.

Association for Progressive Communications (APC) Communications Commission of Kenya. [n.d.]. The World Sum- www.apc.org/english/wsis. mit on the Information Society (WSIS) Process [online]. CONGOCONGOCONGO Available from: www.cck.go.ke wsis_process. www.ngocongo.orgindex.php?what=resources&g=12 DSF Foundation. (2005). Background of the Digital Soli- Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors darity Fund. Digital Solidarity Fund Foundation (n.p.). www.iccwbo.org/basis/id8215/index.html. Dwiggins, D. (2004). “WSIS Essay”. Computer, 37 (3), International Telecommunication Union March 2004, p. 7. www.itu.int/wsis. Electronic Privacy Information Center. (2004). The Public United Nations Development Programme Voice WSIS Sourcebook: Perspectives on the World www.undp.org/wsis. Summit on the Information Society. Washington DC: Electronic Privacy Information Center. UNESCOUNESCOUNESCO www.unesco.org/wsis. European Union. (2004). World Summit on the Informa- tion Society: Preliminary EU Views on the Preparatory World BankBankWorld Process for the Tunis Phase of the Summit, 28 May www.worldbank.org/wsis. 2004. Brussels: European Union.

The following list draws attention to a number of other Group of Friends of the Chair. (2005). Report on the Work reports and documents which are either cited in the text of the Group of Friends of the Chair (GFC) - Original or offer interesting insights into WSIS and/or the issues versions of the Political Chapeau and the Operational discussed above. It is not intended to provide a compre- Part. United Nations. Document WSIS-II/PC-2/DOC/ hensive list of references to WSIS resources. 03, 20 January 2005.

124 Whose Summit? Whose Information Society? Hoff, J. and Bjerke, F. (2005). “Fences and Gates in MacLean, D. (2003). “The quest for inclusive governance Cyberspace: is the Internet becoming a threat to de- of global ICTs: Lessons from the ITU in the limits of mocracy?”. Information Polity, 10 (1-2), pp. 141-151. national sovereignty”. Information Technologies and ISSN: 1570-1255. International Development, 1 (1), pp. 1-18.

Holmes, N. (2004). “WSIS Essay – Response”. Computer, MacLean, D., Souter, D., Dean, J. and Lilley, S. (2002). 37 (3), March 2004, p. 7. Louder Voices: Strengthening developing country participation in international ICT decision-making. Information Society and Development Conference. (1996). London: Commonwealth Telecommunications Or- “Chair’s Conclusions”. Information Society and Devel- ganisation/Panos London. opment; May 1996. Maitland, D. (1984). The Missing Link: Report of the In- International Chamber of Commerce. (2004). Issues Paper dependent Commission for World Wide Telecommu- on Internet Governance [online]. Paris: International nications Development. Geneva: International Tel- Chamber of Commerce. Available from: www.iccwbo.org/ ecommunication Union. home/e_business/policy/ICC%20issues%20paper% 20on%20internet%20Governance.pdf. Martin, B. (2005). “Information Society Revisited: from vision to reality”. Journal of Information Science, 31 International Telecommunication Union. [n.d.]. ICT Statis- (1), February 2005, pp. 4-12. tics Database [online]. Available from: www.itu.int/ITU- Moll, M. and Shade, L. R. (2004). “Vision impossible? D/icteye/Indicators/Indicators.aspx#. The World Summit on the Information Society”. In International Telecommunication Union. (1998). Resolu- Moll, M. and Shade, L. R. (Eds.), Seeking Conver- tion 73 of the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference, gence in Policy and Practice: Communications in the Minneapolis, 1998 [online]. Geneva: International Tel- Public Interest (pp. 45-80). Ottawa: Canadian Cen- ecommunication Union, 2 August 1998. Available tre for Policy Alternatives. from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/resolu- Mouria-Beji, F. (2004). “Preparations for the Tunis Phase tions/73.html. of WSIS”. In UN ICT Task Force, Internet Governance: International Telecommunication Union. (2005). WSIS a Grand Collaboration (pp. 365-368). New York: Golden Book. Geneva: International Telecommunica- United Nations. (ICT Task Force Series 5). ISBN: 92- tion Union. 1-104534-7.

International Telecommunication Union. (2006). RESOLU- O’Siochru, S. (2004). “Civil Society Participation in the TION GT-PLEN/7: Study on the participation of all rel- WSIS Process: Promises and Reality”. Continuum: evant stakeholders in the activities of the Union re- Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 330- lated to the World Summit on the Information Society 344. ISSN: 1030-4312. [online]. November 2006. Available from: www.itu.int/ Opoku-Mensah, A. (2004). “Twin Peaks: WSIS from Ge- council/groups/pp06-plen7.html. neva to Tunis”. Gazette: The International Journal for Klein, H. (2004). “Understanding WSIS: An Institutional Communication Studies, 66 (3-4), pp. 253-273. Analysis of the UN World Summit on the Information Padovani, C. and Tuzzi, A. (2004). “The WSIS as a World Society”. Information Technology for Development, 1 of Words: Building a Common Vision of the Informa- (3-4), pp. 3-14. tion Society?”. Continuum: Journal of Media & Cul- tural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 360, 379. ISSN: 1030-4312. Kleinwächter, W. (2004). “Beyond ICANN vs ITU? How WSIS tries to enter the new territory of Internet governance”. Prada, F. (2005). “Mechanisms for Financing the Infor- Gazette: The International Journal for Communication mation Society from a Global Public Goods Perspec- Studies, 66 (3-4), pp. 233-251. tive”. WSISPapers [online]. Choike.org, January 2005. Available from: www.choike.org/documentos/ Kummer, M. (2004). “The Results of the WSIS Negotiations financing _is_gpgs.pdf. on Internet Governance”. In UN ICT Task Force, Internet Governance: a Grand Collaboration (pp. 53-57). New Pyati, A. K. (2005). “WSIS: whose vision of an informa- York: United Nations. (ICT Task Force Series 5). ISBN: tion society”. First Monday, [online] 10 (5). ISSN:1396- 92-1-104534-7. 0466. Available from: www.firstmonday.org/issues/ issue10_5/pyati/index.html. MacLean, D. (1999). “Open Doors and Open Questions: interpreting the results of the 1998 ITU Minneapolis Raboy, M. (2004). “The WSIS as a Political Space in Glo- Plenipotentiary Conference”. Telecommunications bal Media Governance”. Continuum: Journal of Me- Policy, 23 (2), pp. 147-158. dia & Cultural Studies, 18 (3), pp. 345-359.

Annexes 125 Ruddy, T. F. (2003). “Regime Conflicts at the World Sum- United Nations Development Programme. (2005). Human mit on the Information Society (WSIS)”. In Interna- Development Report 2005: International cooperation tional Conference on Politics and Information Systems: at a crossroads: Aid, trade and security in an unequal Technologies and Applications, Proceedings (pp. 137- world [online]. Available from: hdr.undp.org/reports/ 142). Orlando: International Institute of Informatics & global/2005. Systemics. ISBN: 980-6560-04-3. Williams, Howard. (2005). “Internet Governance: Explor- Selian, A. N. (2002). ICTs in Support of Human Rights, De- ing the Development Link”. Communications and Strat- mocracy and Good Governance. Geneva: International egies, pp. 81-103. Telecommunication Union, August 2002. Working Group on Internet Governance. (2005). Back- Selian, A.N. (2004). “The World Summit on the Informa- ground Report: Working Group on Internet Governance tion Society and Civil Society Participation”. Informa- [online]. United Nations, June 2005. Available from: tion Society, 20 (3), July-31 August 2004, pp. 201-215. www.wgig.org/docs/BackgroundReport.doc.

Souter, D. (2004). “The view from the summit: a report on Working Group on Internet Governance. (2005). Report of the outcomes of the World Summit on the Informa- the Working Group on Internet Governance [online]. tion Society”. Info: the Journal of Policy, Regulation United Nations, June 2005. Available from: and Strategy for Telecommunications Information and www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.doc. Media. 6 (1), February 2004, pp. 6-11. World Summit on the Information Society. [n.d.] The multi- Souter, D. (2004a). African Participation in WSIS: review stakeholder participation in WSIS and its written and and discussion paper [online]. Association for Progres- unwritten rules [online]. Available from: www.itu.int/ sive Communications. Available from: rights.apc.org/ wsis/basic/multistakeholder.html. training/contents/ictpol_en/ictmodule.2006-05- World Summit on the Information Society. (2003). Decla- 18.6637944641/ictunit.2006-05-19.5882667093 ration of Principles: Building the Information Society: ?set_language=en. a global challenge in the new Millennium [online]. Sreberny, A. (2004). “WSIS: Articulating Information at the United Nations. Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4- Summit”. Gazette: The International Journal for Com- E, 12 December 2003. Available from: www.itu.int/ munication Studies, 66 (3-4), pp. 193-201. wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=1161|0.

Sreberny, A. (2005). “Gender, Empowerment, and Commu- World Summit on the Information Society. (2003). Plan of nication: Looking Backwards and Forwards”. Interna- Action [online]. United Nations. Document WSIS-03/GE- tional Social Science Journal, 57 (2), June 2005, pp. NEVA/DOC/5-E, 23 December 2003. Available from: 285-+. www.itu.int/wsis/documents/doc_multi.asp ?lang=en&id=1160|0. Task Force on Financial Mechanisms. (2004). Financing ICTD: The Report of the Task Force on Financial Mecha- World Summit on the Information Society. (2005). Report nisms for ICT for Development [online]. United Nations, on the WSIS Stocktaking [online]. United Nations. 22 December 2004. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/ Document WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/5, 19 October 2005. tffm/final-report.pdf. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/documents/ doc_multi.asp?lang=en&id=2167|0. Uganda Communications Commission. [n.d.]. Communica- tions Sector Comparative Figures for the period Decem- World Summit on the Information Society. (2005). Second ber 1996 to September 2006 [online]. Available from: Phase, Tunis: Preparatory Process: Group of Friends www.ucc.co.ug/marketInfo/marketstatistics. php. of the Chair (GFC) [online], 6 October 2005. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/gfc. United Nations. (1948). Resolution adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly. 217 A (III). Universal Declaration of Hu- World Summit on the Information Society. (2005). Second man Rights. UN Doc A/810, United Nations, 10 Decem- Phase, Tunis: Preparatory Process: Internet Govern- ber 1948. ance [online], 3 October 2005. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/wgig/index.html. United Nations. (2002). Resolution adopted by the Gen- eral Assembly. 56/183. World Summit on the Informa- World Summit on the Information Society. (2005). Second tion Society [online]. United Nations, 31 January 2002. Phase, Tunis: Preparatory Process: Task Force on Fi- Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/ nancial Mechanisms (TFFM) [online], 14 February 2005. resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.pdf. Available from: www.itu.int/wsis/tffm/index.html.

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Annexes 127