The Resurrection of 'Active Measures': Intelligence Services As a Part Of

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The Resurrection of 'Active Measures': Intelligence Services As a Part Of APRIL 2018 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 The resurrection of ‘active measures’: Intelligence services as a part of Russia’s influencing toolbox IVO JUURVEE Hybrid CoE Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 The resurrection of ‘active measures’: Intelligence services as a part of Russia’s influencing toolbox Russia’s Intelligence Services (RIS) are a key instrument in the coun- try’s toolbox of hostile influence exerted abroad. As such, they are no mere ad hoc arrangement by some spy chief, nor a paranoid delusion of the West, but rather an integral function in accordance with Russian legislation and based on a long tradition. Indeed, their activities have extended far beyond information-gathering for the purpose of Russia’s decision-making. – writes Ivo Juurvee, Head of Security & Resilience Programme and Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security The term ‘active measures’ became widely form an integral part of the executive known in the Western academic and public power in the Russian state apparatus. discussion as early as the Cold War and is still sometimes used, although it has The Russian definition acquired many meanings that are not con- of ‘intelligence activity’ veyed in the Russian discourse, and which may be confusing. Hence, a short excursion into the RIS, their functions and parlance is Publicly available legislation defines the in order. Although possible assassinations functions of the SVR and FSB. An article by the RIS have been widely discussed in the Federal Law on Foreign Intelligence since the poisoning of Sergei Skripal of 1996 (originally regulating SVR action and his daughter in March 2018, this only, but with the 2003 Law on the Federal paper only deals with non-violent means Security Service its scope was widened of influencing. These are by far more to the FSB as well) provides a two-part common in peacetime and should not definition of ‘intelligence activity’. The first be overshadowed by single acts of part deals with the procurement and violence. processing of information, which are classic intelligence service functions. There are three main intelligence ser- The second part – support of the measures vices in Russia (collectively referred to implemented by the state in order to ensure as the RIS in this article): the Foreign the security of the Russian Federation – Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal is less explicit. However, it is the original Security Service (FSB), and the Military source of the abbreviation MS (meropri- Intelligence (known as the GRU, but ex- yatiya sodeistviya in Russian, or ‘support cluded here since its peacetime activities measures’) used in the name of a unit in remain largely unknown). Together, they both the SVR and FSB. 2 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 for obvious reasons, it is worth taking a What does the term support closer look at the abundance of material measures mean and where on the essence of active measures. These does it originate from? were defined by the KGB as agent-oper- ational measures aimed at exerting useful influence on a wide variety of subjects in Public sources do not provide an answer. the political life of the target country. The term already appeared in the 1992 As known from documents provided by version of the Law on Foreign Intelligence, defectors, these measures were gener- probably written by the former offices of ally directed towards sowing discord the KGB (the Soviet intelligence and secu- between the allies, and were frequently rity service) and based on its experience. concerned with undermining the United The KGB’s once top- secret definition States, although they sometimes had of intelligence was among the reams of the narrower operational goal of dis- notes smuggled to Britain by the defect- crediting a particular person. The use of ing senior KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin agents was not absolutely necessary, as and is now known: A secret form of politi- the measures also involved mailing copies cal struggle which makes use of clandestine of authentic or forged documents (the means and methods for acquiring secret antecedents of ‘fake news’) and articles information of interest and for carrying out to the media and political establishment active measures to exert influence on the promoting views similar to the Kremlin’s. adversary and weaken his political, eco- The internet has changed the technical nomic, scientific and technical and military modus operandi completely, however, as positions. such work can now be executed far more cheaply and with no need for the direct Comparing the two terms, intelligence involvement of the RIS. activity and support measures, we can draw the conclusion (corroborated by SVR defector Sergei Tretyakov) that support Agent of influence and confidential measures are the direct successors of contacts as tools for active active measures, and merely a new and measures in the Soviet Union politically correct term formulated after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is also worth noting that when President Vladimir Putin Delving deeper, the term agent of influ- and other ex-KGB officers in the current ence was also used, namely: an agent op- Russian leadership received their educa- erating under intelligence instructions who tion in the KGB’s academies, intelligence uses his official or public position, and other was defined as a ‘secret form of political means, to exert influence on policy, public struggle’. opinion, the course of particular events, the activity of political organizations, and state agencies in target countries. Such people Support measures can be studied were not only operating under intelligence through the substance of the Cold instructions but also clearly aware of their War active measures concept deeds, and in receipt of (usually financial) benefits for their work in the interests of Since the current RIS handbooks on sup- Moscow. The public position implied that port measures are unavailable for scrutiny any kind of opinion leader could be re- 3 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 cruited. However, in the field of influence contacts and useful idiots is even more operations, the KGB’s main strength did blurred. not reside in agents, but in confidential contacts: individuals of foreign nationality The information-gathering capacity of the who, without being agents, communicate RIS is key. Without in-depth knowledge to intelligence officers information of and facts, conducting efficient support interest to them and carry out confiden- measures is difficult. For example, in or- tial requests, which in substance are of an der to magnify distrust in society, there intelligence nature, and based on ideolog- has to be knowledge about existing ical and political affinity, material interest, polarization and the reasons behind it. and friendly or other relations that they When seeking to discredit a person, their have established with intelligence officers. personal information has to be acquired. Confidential contacts worked on a volun- This means that information, any infor- tary basis and had no obligations towards mation, has value. The growing number intelligence officers. of Russian spies detained and convicted abroad compared to earlier decades indi- These designated agents of influence cates that human intelligence (HUMINT) is and confidential contacts may have been being actively deployed. However, the link easy to detect, but almost impossible to between HUMINT and support measures convict in a democratic country. Providing is difficult to prove from open sources. classified information to foreign powers is penalized in every country and the A case occurred in March 2014 in which perpetrators may be caught red- a phone conversation between the EU handed with evidence (usually copies High Representative of the Union for of classified documents or some kind Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the of digital traces of having smuggled Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs was them). However, disseminating the tapped, uploaded to YouTube and clips Kremlin’s talking points or facilitating its from it instantly used by RT (formerly Rus- agenda is not a crime, especially if it is sia Today), a Russian TV network targeted performed out of ‘ideological and po- at an international audience. Although the litical affinity’.Confidential contacts can eavesdropper was never identified, the RIS claim – and sometimes truly believe – that would seem to be the only entity possess- they are communicating with ordinary Rus- ing both the signals intelligence capacity sian diplomats or just friendly Russians, not and the intent to use it in the interests RIS officers. It is logical to assume that at of the Russian media during the intense least some of the persons labelled as useful phase of the Ukraine crisis. This case and idiots (a term probably wrongly attributed similar ones highlight the issue of using to Lenin) may appear as confidential con- information procured by the RIS for tacts in current RIS media operations. Information produced files. Without having direct access to by the RIS can also contribute to better RIS documents or information from de- planning of information influence op- fectors, it is virtually impossible for count- erations and provide feedback on their er-intelligence to differentiate between outcome. It may also be used as a basis agents of influence and confidential con- for diplomatic and economic efforts to tacts. The difference between confidential influence political decisions abroad. 4 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 sian/Soviet intelligence defectors. Mem- Russian intelligence service oirs contain important empirical informa- activities abroad will not disappear tion on the field of influence activities. The most recent memoirs by an RIS defector were published more than a decade ago, RIS activities abroad, support measures and while memoirs might be obsolete as a included, will not disappear in the foresee- genre, similar information-sharing would able future. The expulsion of alleged RIS be especially helpful for diplomats, politi- officers after the Skripal poisoning case cians, journalists, academics, think tankers, may have a containment effect in several and even the public at large.
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