APRIL 2018

Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 The resurrection of ‘’: Intelligence services as a part of ’s influencing toolbox

IVO JUURVEE

Hybrid CoE Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 The resurrection of ‘active measures’: Intelligence services as a part of Russia’s influencing toolbox

Russia’s Intelligence Services (RIS) are a key instrument in the coun- try’s toolbox of hostile influence exerted abroad. As such, they are no mere ad hoc arrangement by some spy chief, nor a paranoid delusion of the West, but rather an integral function in accordance with Russian legislation and based on a long tradition. Indeed, their activities have extended far beyond information-gathering for the purpose of Russia’s decision-making. – writes Ivo Juurvee, Head of Security & Resilience Programme and Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security

The term ‘active measures’ became widely form an integral part of the executive known in the Western academic and public power in the Russian state apparatus. discussion as early as the and is still sometimes used, although it has The Russian definition acquired many meanings that are not con- of ‘intelligence activity’ veyed in the Russian discourse, and which may be confusing. Hence, a short excursion into the RIS, their functions and parlance is Publicly available legislation defines the in order. Although possible functions of the SVR and FSB. An article by the RIS have been widely discussed in the Federal Law on Foreign Intelligence since the poisoning of Sergei Skripal of 1996 (originally regulating SVR action and his daughter in March 2018, this only, but with the 2003 Law on the Federal paper only deals with non-violent means Security Service its scope was widened of influencing. These are by far more to the FSB as well) provides a two-part common in peacetime and should not definition of ‘intelligence activity’. The first be overshadowed by single acts of part deals with the procurement and violence. processing of information, which are classic intelligence service functions. There are three main intelligence ser- The second part – support of the measures vices in Russia (collectively referred to implemented by the state in order to ensure as the RIS in this article): the Foreign the security of the Russian Federation – Intelligence Service (SVR), the Federal is less explicit. However, it is the original Security Service (FSB), and the Military source of the abbreviation MS (meropri- Intelligence (known as the GRU, but ex- yatiya sodeistviya in Russian, or ‘support cluded here since its peacetime activities measures’) used in the name of a unit in remain largely unknown). Together, they both the SVR and FSB.

2 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 for obvious reasons, it is worth taking a What does the term support closer look at the abundance of material measures mean and where on the essence of active measures. These does it originate from? were defined by the KGB as agent-oper- ational measures aimed at exerting useful influence on a wide variety of subjects in Public sources do not provide an answer. the political life of the target country. The term already appeared in the 1992 As known from documents provided by version of the Law on Foreign Intelligence, defectors, these measures were gener- probably written by the former offices of ally directed towards sowing discord the KGB (the Soviet intelligence and secu- between the allies, and were frequently rity service) and based on its experience. concerned with undermining the United The KGB’s once top- secret definition States, although they sometimes had of intelligence was among the reams of the narrower operational goal of dis- notes smuggled to Britain by the defect- crediting a particular person. The use of ing senior KGB archivist agents was not absolutely necessary, as and is now known: A secret form of politi- the measures also involved mailing copies cal struggle which makes use of clandestine of authentic or forged documents (the means and methods for acquiring secret antecedents of ‘’) and articles information of interest and for carrying out to the media and political establishment active measures to exert influence on the promoting views similar to the Kremlin’s. adversary and weaken his political, eco- The internet has changed the technical nomic, scientific and technical and military modus operandi completely, however, as positions. such work can now be executed far more cheaply and with no need for the direct Comparing the two terms, intelligence involvement of the RIS. activity and support measures, we can draw the conclusion (corroborated by SVR defector Sergei Tretyakov) that support and confidential measures are the direct successors of contacts as tools for active active measures, and merely a new and measures in the politically correct term formulated after the fall of the Soviet Union. It is also worth noting that when President Delving deeper, the term agent of influ- and other ex-KGB officers in the current ence was also used, namely: an agent op- Russian leadership received their educa- erating under intelligence instructions who tion in the KGB’s academies, intelligence uses his official or public position, and other was defined as a ‘secret form of political means, to exert influence on policy, public struggle’. opinion, the course of particular events, the activity of political organizations, and state agencies in target countries. Such people Support measures can be studied were not only operating under intelligence through the substance of the Cold instructions but also clearly aware of their War active measures concept deeds, and in receipt of (usually financial) benefits for their work in the interests of Since the current RIS handbooks on sup- . The public position implied that port measures are unavailable for scrutiny any kind of opinion leader could be re-

3 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 cruited. However, in the field of influence contacts and useful idiots is even more operations, the KGB’s main strength did blurred. not reside in agents, but in confidential contacts: individuals of foreign nationality The information-gathering capacity of the who, without being agents, communicate RIS is key. Without in-depth knowledge to intelligence officers information of and facts, conducting efficient support interest to them and carry out confiden- measures is difficult. For example, in or- tial requests, which in substance are of an der to magnify distrust in society, there intelligence nature, and based on ideolog- has to be knowledge about existing ical and political affinity, material interest, polarization and the reasons behind it. and friendly or other relations that they When seeking to discredit a person, their have established with intelligence officers. personal information has to be acquired. Confidential contacts worked on a volun- This means that information, any infor- tary basis and had no obligations towards mation, has value. The growing number intelligence officers. of Russian spies detained and convicted abroad compared to earlier decades indi- These designated agents of influence cates that human intelligence (HUMINT) is and confidential contacts may have been being actively deployed. However, the link easy to detect, but almost impossible to between HUMINT and support measures convict in a democratic country. Providing is difficult to prove from open sources. classified information to foreign powers is penalized in every country and the A case occurred in March 2014 in which perpetrators may be caught red- a phone conversation between the EU handed with evidence (usually copies High Representative of the Union for of classified documents or some kind Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the of digital traces of having smuggled Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs was them). However, disseminating the tapped, uploaded to YouTube and clips Kremlin’s talking points or facilitating its from it instantly used by RT (formerly Rus- agenda is not a , especially if it is sia Today), a Russian TV network targeted performed out of ‘ideological and po- at an international audience. Although the litical affinity’.Confidential contacts can eavesdropper was never identified, the RIS claim – and sometimes truly believe – that would seem to be the only entity possess- they are communicating with ordinary Rus- ing both the signals intelligence capacity sian diplomats or just friendly Russians, not and the intent to use it in the interests RIS officers. It is logical to assume that at of the Russian media during the intense least some of the persons labelled as useful phase of the Ukraine crisis. This case and idiots (a term probably wrongly attributed similar ones highlight the issue of using to Lenin) may appear as confidential con- information procured by the RIS for tacts in current RIS media operations. Information produced files. Without having direct access to by the RIS can also contribute to better RIS documents or information from de- planning of information influence op- fectors, it is virtually impossible for count- erations and provide feedback on their er-intelligence to differentiate between outcome. It may also be used as a basis agents of influence and confidential con- for diplomatic and economic efforts to tacts. The difference between confidential influence political decisions abroad.

4 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 sian/Soviet intelligence defectors. Mem- Russian intelligence service oirs contain important empirical informa- activities abroad will not disappear tion on the field of influence activities. The most recent memoirs by an RIS defector were published more than a decade ago, RIS activities abroad, support measures and while memoirs might be obsolete as a included, will not disappear in the foresee- genre, similar information-sharing would able future. The expulsion of alleged RIS be especially helpful for diplomats, politi- officers after the Skripal poisoning case cians, journalists, academics, think tankers, may have a effect in several and even the public at large. countries, but the RIS will have the possi- bility to use its assets in third countries When it comes to signals intelligence or to intensify its activities from Rus- and the cyber domain, the question of sian territory. The use of such options is data protection becomes crucial. Gov- highly likely, especially if diplomatic means ernments are already making great become ineffectual in the face of escalating efforts to protect classified information. tensions. However, political parties, NGOs, opin- ion leaders and even ordinary citizens This is not to say that there is no way to still have their work cut out in terms of effectively counter their work. In the field IT security. Any type of leak or hacking of legislation and law enforcement, at- operation can be exploited by the RIS and tention should turn to the issue of agents funnelled to Russian channels. of influence, and confidential contacts Finally, it goes without saying that top- in particular. This is a hard nut to crack notch counter-intelligence work is essen- for legislators. However, elaborating and tial for countering measures. properly enforcing current laws on tax evasion and money laundering, and making The RIS is an integral part of the execu- lobbying activities more transparent would tive power in Russia (not a state within a curtail the way in which agents of influence state having tasks antagonistic to other and confidential contacts operate. An im- elements of power). According to Rus- portant measure entails exposing the RIS sian legislation, they are compelled to modus operandi in influence activities. In take part in the ‘political struggle’ by the the past, educating the public has proved clandestine means available to them. to be an efficient way of raising awareness Hence, it is reasonable to assume that and duly minimizing the impact of such in this respect the legislation in Russia activities. One way of raising awareness, will be honoured. To this end, influence as exemplified during the Cold War, is the activities by the RIS will be a persistent publication of memoirs or books by Rus- problem in the future.

5 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 Author

Dr. Ivo Juurvee is Head of Security & Resilience Programme / Research Fellow at the International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS). He has been a practitioner in the field of security for more than 13 years. Among other positions in the Estonian public service, he has served as an adviser at the National Security and Defence Coordination Unit of the Estonian Government Office. Prior to joining ICDS in 2017, he worked as the head of the Internal Security Institute of the Estonian Academy of Security Sciences (EASS). Dr. Juurvee has also taught security-related topics at the University of Tartu, the NATO School at Oberammergau, and on the FRONTEX master’s programme on border management. He has worked as an Honorary Research Fellow at University College London’s School of Slavonic and East European Studies. As part of the ICDS team, Dr. Juurvee focuses on security and resilience, namely the countermeasures applicable to the wide spectrum of threats to and more widely to NATO and the EU. These include: intelligence/counter-intelligence, /count- er-terrorism, /psychological defence, and other means of non-conventional foreign pressure and the national resilience required to cope with them.

6 Hybrid CoE Strategic Analysis 7 Literature:

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The European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats tel. +358 400 253800 www.hybridcoe.fi

ISBN 978-952-7282-54-0 ISSN 2670-2282

Second version of the publication. Previously published as "Strategic Analysis April 2018: The resurrection of ‘active measures’: Intelligence services as a part of Russia’s influencing toolbox."

Hybrid CoE is an international hub for practitioners and experts, building participating states’ and institutions’ capabilities and enhancing EU-NATO cooperation in countering hybrid threats located in Helsinki,

The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors.

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