Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism
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Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Also by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis TRIALS OF EUROPEANIZATION: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union (2009) DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish Nationalism: A “Sacred Synthesis” Ioannis N. Grigoriadis DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 instilling religion in greek and turkish nationalism Copyright © Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, 2013. Softcover re print off the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978–1–137–30 119–2 All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–1–137–30120–8 PDF ISBN: 978–1–3 49 –45341–2 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. First edition: 2013 www.palgrave.com/pivot doi: 10.1057/9781137301208 To Evgenia DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Contents List of Figures viii Foreword by Ahmet Evin ix Acknowledgments xiv List of Abbreviations xv Introduction Theoretical considerations on religion and nationalism 7 Religion and Greek Nationalism: From Conflict to Synthesis Adamantios Korais and the resurrection of “Hellas” 15 The church and the Greek War of Independence 17 The Greek nation-state and irredentism: the Megali Idea 21 The schism and the “nationalization” of the Church of Greece 23 The “Hellenic-Christian Synthesis” 25 Two instances of “nationalization” 30 Setting March 25 as Greece’s Independence Day 31 The myth of the “Clandestine School” 33 Greece, Orthodoxy, and the end of the Ottoman Empire 35 vi DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Contents vii TheKaramanlıs and the “Turkish Orthodox” controversy 38 Papa-Eftim and the “Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate” 40 Religion and Turkish Nationalism: From Conflict to Synthesis Yusuf Akçura: three policies and the role of Islam 56 Ziya Gökalp’s reconciliation attempt: the Turkish nation, culture, and Islam 57 Islam and the Turkish nation from the Young Turks to Atatürk 60 The Republic of Turkey and nation-building 61 The Atatürk Reform: the campaign to marginalize religion 62 The Democrat Party era 68 The “nationalization” of Sunni Islam: the “Hearth of the Enlightened” (Aydınlar Ocağı) 71 The 1980–1983 military regime: the adoption of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” 74 Two instances of “nationalization” 76 Mandatory religious education 76 Popularizing Turkey’s new foreign policy vision 78 The persistence of religion in defining Turkishness: the Gagauz affair 80 Conclusion The “Sacred Synthesis” revisited 92 Final theoretical considerations 96 The “Sacred Synthesis” today 98 Appendix I Appendix II Bibiliography Index DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 List of Figures 1 Greek refugees fleeing Izmir during the Great Fire (September 1922) 4 2 “The Oath at Agia Lavra.” Painting by Theodoros Vryzakis 32 3 “The Clandestine School.” Painting by Nikolaos Gyzis 34 4 Greek refugees evacuating Eastern Thrace, November 1922 37 5 “Treasury of Orthodoxy.” A cover of a Karamanlı publication 39 6 Religious diversity in late Ottoman Konya. An Orthodox bishop, a Muslim mullah, and an Armenian bishop 54 7 Anıtkabir, Atatürk’s mausoleum in Ankara, a symbol of Kemalism 61 8 Atatürk introducing the new Turkish alphabet (1928) 64 9 Livissi or Kayaköy, a Greek ghost town in southwestern Anatolia 94 viii DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Foreword How did national identity come to be associated with reli- gion in both Greece and Turkey, especially since national- ism was initially adopted in both countries as the essential driver for modernizing nation-building projects? Ioannis N. Grigoriadis takes up this compelling question, which, oddly, has escaped attention until the present study. He provides a coherent analysis of how nationalism, with its impeccable Enlightenment pedigree as a secular and pro- gressive ideology, was associated with and reinforced by tradition and confessional particularism on both sides of the Aegean, but for different reasons on either side. This work promises to open up a fresh debate among scholars on the relationship between nationalism and reli- gion in Greece and Turkey. As far as the Greek side of the argument is concerned, we would like to offer a supple- ment of four subjects inspired by the fine argumentation of the author: (1) the role of accident, in history; (2) religion as the cradle of nationalism; (3) the concept of time in the Orthodox faith as an impediment to modernity; and (4) tradition and the “segmentary” society. The Greek identity was an outcome of the exposure of Orthodox people to an educational system, promulgated by church-run institutions of learning. Thus, ethnic iden- tity in the Christian Balkans, a fluid concept before state- building, was closely associated with the Orthodox Church. When the first constitution appeared in January 1822, in the nascent Greek Assembly at Epidaurus, it stated clearly: “The autochthonous residents of the Greek Territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Hellenes and enjoy all the civil DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 ix x Foreword rights without any limitation and difference.” As the Ottoman Empire became partitioned by competing nationalist movements the millet sys- tem was quickly replaced by separate ethnic identities. Rigas’ vision of transforming the Ottoman Empire into a republic that would include all religious communities, be they Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, gave way to revolutions predicated on ethnicities and nation-states that took their respective churches under their wings. Some will argue that if Sultan Mahmud II had not executed Patriarch Grigorios V on the premise that as Milletbaşı he was responsible for the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, it is entirely possible that the church would have kept its distance from the Greek revolutionaries. Without its large following of devout peasants, the revolution would probably have not lasted as long as it did. Although an enemy of all rebel- lions against legal authority, the Patriarch might nevertheless have been confronted by rebel priests and prelates such as Papaflessas (Grigorios Dikaios) and the general outcry of his flock. We will never know. What is for sure is that Mahmud’s blunder made Grigorios a martyr not only of the church but also of the Greek revolution. Thereafter church and state went hand in hand. The relationship between church and state in Greece was a two-way street. No doubt the Orthodox hierarchy lives under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Creeds but its influence on the flock of Christians was always strong. A contemporary philosopher, Stelios Ramfos,1 points out that among the idiosyncrasies of the Greek Orthodox Church, as compared to the Protestant churches of the West, was the former’s attachment to the ancient Greek perception of cyclical and therefore immutable time. Equally Orthodox mystics perceived time as a sequence of seasons reaffirming the immutable will of God. Concomitant with the notion of time was the absence or lack of development of individualism, even during the heyday of the Greek Enlightenment. Western individualism was seen by the Eastern Church as a manifesta- tion of blasphemous egotism that undermined the communal spirit of the parish and its liturgy. The exclusion of individualism from Orthodox communities not only protected the flock from dangerous innovations but also precluded a vision of the future in the timeless present of the liturgy. Some consider this attachment to the present as a conservative factor impeding change and progress. The proverbial Greek “individual- ism” merely describes the failure and the resistance of the “segmentary” society of coming to terms with the will of the state and the rule of law. DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Foreword xi The Greek state of 1830 inherited a social structure that conforms to the model described by Ernest Gellner as “segmentary” society.2 The concept is in line with a pre-modern system intended to protect the extended family from the transgressions of an arbitrary state. The “segmentary” society still poses a formidable challenge to legal authorities in Greece. The legacy of “segmentary society” has also been particularly strong in Turkey. The key feature of the Ottoman social structure, the millet system, exemplified “segmentary society”: Ottoman subjects were organ- ized into communities defined along ethnic and confessional lines. These communities (millets) displayed typical characteristics of what Tönnies called Gemeinschaft.3 These communities coexisted but lived separately from one another, each according to its own religion, customs, and cultural conventions.4 Orthodox constituted one millet in this system and Muslims another. The cosmopolitan ruling elites did not identify themselves with any particular millet but only with the state. When the independent Kingdom of Greece was established in 1830, there obtained a clear Ottoman definition of what the Orthodox millet was. At that time, however, the richest, best educated, and the most influential Greeks were living in the Ottoman capital, in Asia Minor, or in some of the Aegean islands. It was this group that had been responsible for transmitting the ideas that emerged from the French revolution in the first place and kin- dling a desire for independence among the Greeks. Ironically, this group would remain outside the independent kingdom as Ottoman subjects, but the ideas they disseminated served to bring nationalism into the constitutional debates immediately after the independence. Nationalism came into the limelight much later in Turkey.