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Home , First Hellenic Republic, Greek nationalism, Papaflessas, Theodoros Vryzakis

Instilling Religion in Greek and Turkish

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Also by Ioannis N. Grigoriadis TRIALS OF EUROPEANIZATION: Turkish Political Culture and the European Union (2009)

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Instilling Religion in Greek and : A “Sacred Synthesis”

Ioannis N. Grigoriadis

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 instilling religion in greek and turkish nationalism Copyright © Ioannis N. Grigoriadis, 2013. Softcover re print off the hardcover 1st edition 2013 978–1–137–30 119–2 All rights reserved. First published in 2013 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN® in the United States—a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010. Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS. Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world. Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries. ISBN: 978–1–137–30120–8 PDF ISBN: 978–1–3 49 –45341–2

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress. A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library. First edition: 2013 www.palgrave.com/pivot doi: 10.1057/9781137301208 To Evgenia

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Contents

List of Figures viii

Foreword by Ahmet Evin ix

Acknowledgments xiv

List of Abbreviations xv

Introduction  Theoretical considerations on religion and nationalism 7

 Religion and Greek Nationalism: From Conflict to Synthesis  and the resurrection of “Hellas” 15 The church and the Greek War of Independence 17 The Greek nation-state and : the 21 The schism and the “nationalization” of the Church of 23 The “Hellenic-Christian Synthesis” 25 Two instances of “nationalization” 30 Setting March 25 as Greece’s Independence Day 31 The myth of the “Clandestine School” 33 Greece, Orthodoxy, and the end of the 35

vi DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Contents vii

TheKaramanlıs and the “Turkish Orthodox” controversy 38 Papa-Eftim and the “Independent Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate” 40

 Religion and Turkish Nationalism: From Conflict to Synthesis  Yusuf Akçura: three policies and the role of Islam 56 Ziya Gökalp’s reconciliation attempt: the Turkish nation, culture, and Islam 57 Islam and the Turkish nation from the Young Turks to Atatürk 60 The of and nation-building 61 The Atatürk Reform: the campaign to marginalize religion 62 The Democrat Party era 68 The “nationalization” of Sunni Islam: the “Hearth of the Enlightened” (Aydınlar Ocağı) 71 The 1980–1983 military regime: the adoption of the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” 74 Two instances of “nationalization” 76 Mandatory religious education 76 Popularizing Turkey’s new foreign policy vision 78 The persistence of religion in defining Turkishness: the Gagauz affair 80

 Conclusion  The “Sacred Synthesis” revisited 92 Final theoretical considerations 96 The “Sacred Synthesis” today 98

Appendix I 

Appendix II 

Bibiliography 

Index 

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 List of Figures

1 fleeing Izmir during the Great Fire (September 1922) 4 2 “The Oath at .” Painting by 32 3 “The Clandestine School.” Painting by 34 4 Greek refugees evacuating Eastern Thrace, November 1922 37 5 “Treasury of Orthodoxy.” A cover of a Karamanlı publication 39 6 Religious diversity in late Ottoman Konya. An Orthodox , a Muslim mullah, and an Armenian bishop 54 7 Anıtkabir, Atatürk’s mausoleum in Ankara, a symbol of Kemalism 61 8 Atatürk introducing the new Turkish alphabet (1928) 64 9 Livissi or Kayaköy, a Greek ghost town in southwestern 94

viii DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Foreword

How did national identity come to be associated with reli- gion in both Greece and Turkey, especially since national- ism was initially adopted in both countries as the essential driver for modernizing nation-building projects? Ioannis N. Grigoriadis takes up this compelling question, which, oddly, has escaped attention until the present study. He provides a coherent analysis of how nationalism, with its impeccable Enlightenment pedigree as a secular and pro- gressive ideology, was associated with and reinforced by tradition and confessional particularism on both sides of the Aegean, but for different reasons on either side. This work promises to open up a fresh debate among scholars on the relationship between nationalism and reli- gion in Greece and Turkey. As far as the Greek side of the argument is concerned, we would like to offer a supple- ment of four subjects inspired by the fine argumentation of the author: (1) the role of accident, in history; (2) religion as the cradle of nationalism; (3) the concept of time in the Orthodox faith as an impediment to modernity; and (4) tradition and the “segmentary” society. The Greek identity was an outcome of the exposure of Orthodox people to an educational system, promulgated by church-run institutions of learning. Thus, ethnic iden- tity in the Christian Balkans, a fluid concept before state- building, was closely associated with the Orthodox Church. When the first constitution appeared in January 1822, in the nascent Greek Assembly at Epidaurus, it stated clearly: “The autochthonous residents of the Greek Territory who believe in Jesus Christ are Hellenes and enjoy all the civil

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 ix x Foreword rights without any limitation and difference.” As the Ottoman Empire became partitioned by competing nationalist movements the millet sys- tem was quickly replaced by separate ethnic identities. Rigas’ vision of transforming the Ottoman Empire into a republic that would include all religious communities, be they Muslim, Christian, or Jewish, gave way to revolutions predicated on ethnicities and nation-states that took their respective churches under their wings. Some will argue that if Sultan Mahmud II had not executed Grigorios V on the premise that as Milletbaşı he was responsible for the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, it is entirely possible that the church would have kept its distance from the Greek revolutionaries. Without its large following of devout peasants, the revolution would probably have not lasted as long as it did. Although an enemy of all rebel- lions against legal authority, the Patriarch might nevertheless have been confronted by rebel priests and prelates such as (Grigorios Dikaios) and the general outcry of his flock. We will never know. What is for sure is that Mahmud’s blunder made Grigorios a martyr not only of the church but also of the Greek revolution. Thereafter church and state went hand in hand. The relationship between church and state in Greece was a two-way street. No doubt the Orthodox hierarchy lives under the authority of the Ministry of Education and Creeds but its influence on the flock of Christians was always strong. A contemporary philosopher, Stelios Ramfos,1 points out that among the idiosyncrasies of the Greek Orthodox Church, as compared to the Protestant churches of the West, was the former’s attachment to the perception of cyclical and therefore immutable time. Equally Orthodox mystics perceived time as a sequence of seasons reaffirming the immutable will of God. Concomitant with the notion of time was the absence or lack of development of individualism, even during the heyday of the Greek Enlightenment. Western individualism was seen by the Eastern Church as a manifesta- tion of blasphemous egotism that undermined the communal spirit of the parish and its liturgy. The exclusion of individualism from Orthodox communities not only protected the flock from dangerous innovations but also precluded a vision of the future in the timeless present of the liturgy. Some consider this attachment to the present as a conservative factor impeding change and progress. The proverbial Greek “individual- ism” merely describes the failure and the resistance of the “segmentary” society of coming to terms with the will of the state and the rule of law.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Foreword xi

The Greek state of 1830 inherited a social structure that conforms to the model described by Ernest Gellner as “segmentary” society.2 The concept is in line with a pre-modern system intended to protect the extended family from the transgressions of an arbitrary state. The “segmentary” society still poses a formidable challenge to legal authorities in Greece. The legacy of “segmentary society” has also been particularly strong in Turkey. The key feature of the Ottoman social structure, the millet system, exemplified “segmentary society”: Ottoman subjects were organ- ized into communities defined along ethnic and confessional lines. These communities (millets) displayed typical characteristics of what Tönnies called Gemeinschaft.3 These communities coexisted but lived separately from one another, each according to its own religion, customs, and cultural conventions.4 Orthodox constituted one millet in this system and Muslims another. The cosmopolitan ruling elites did not identify themselves with any particular millet but only with the state. When the independent was established in 1830, there obtained a clear Ottoman definition of what the Orthodox millet was. At that time, however, the richest, best educated, and the most influential were living in the Ottoman capital, in Asia Minor, or in some of the Aegean islands. It was this group that had been responsible for transmitting the ideas that emerged from the in the first place and kin- dling a desire for independence among the Greeks. Ironically, this group would remain outside the independent kingdom as Ottoman subjects, but the ideas they disseminated served to bring nationalism into the constitutional debates immediately after the independence. Nationalism came into the limelight much later in Turkey. The Ottoman modernizers were preoccupied with preserving the cosmo- politan empire. Their program of reforms (carried out, incidentally, at an accelerated pace after the Greek independence) were directed to that end. They dropped the pursuit of Ottomanism in favor of Turkism (nationalism) only at the very end when the idea of saving the Empire no longer seemed feasible. The signaled the end, and the Empire was totally dismembered at the end of . Defining the Turkish nation became an urgent task with the establishment of the new republic just as it had been the case in Greece during the constitutional debates following independence. The famous exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey that took place in the wake of the Lausanne treaty put the question once more into bold relief. Who was a Turk? And, who was a Greek? According to

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 xii Foreword which criteria would Greeks and Turks be identified for the exchange of populations? Confessional criteria inherited from the Ottoman mil- let system were the only ones available. The exchange mübadele( ) was implemented along confessional lines and not strictly according to eth- nicity and language. Religion thus came to be a determining factor from the outset in defining “nation” in modern Turkey, in a similar way as it had been in Greece and across the Balkans, as well. The persistence of community to the extent of curtailing individualism constitutes another similarity between the Greek and Turkish societies. Resistance to the influence of the Enlightenment was evident in both societies even while modernization in both countries was driven by the Enlightenment principles. Differences, however, provide better clues for understanding the nature of traditional society. Despite the strong influ- ence of the church over the people, Greece is less religious than Turkey, where religiousness is an integral part of communitarian . Turkish nationalism retained a religious dimension, even if the modern republic was structured on the basis of secular principles. This resulted from the dilemma of Turkish modernizers between the universal principles of civilization and the specific cultural values that a nation cherished. They rose to the challenge by repeatedly attempting to reconcile community and society, to forge together the universal and particular. The modern state, they recognized, could only be feasible with a modern citizen, an individualistic member of a differentiated society. But they also recognized the importance of common values as a glue to keep the nation together. In Turkey, religion has been a prominent value that reinforced community preferences over civic concerns, at least in the periphery. The fear of fragmentation has been the most significant factor that brought religion to bear on Turkish nationalism. The dismember- ment of the Ottoman Empire weighed heavily on the Turkish soul. As a result, emphasis was placed on unity rather than on diversity of citi- zens with a view to enhancing national solidarity. The state embraced a monolithic notion of Turkish identity that excluded communists as well as others who were considered to pose a threat to national security. After the transition to a multi-party system in 1946, the “sacred syn- thesis” was adopted by the conservative parties as a successful means to attract support of the traditionalist majority. The “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” doctrine, a convenient ideological construct formulated in the 1970s, had a deeper and lasting effect on the political sphere and clinched the place of religion in the Turkish political discourse. Surprisingly, it

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Foreword xiii was embraced by the state elite who saw greater danger in coming from the left than infusing religion into the political structures of a secular state. A comparison of the Greek and Turkish exceptionalism in the mar- riage of secular ideology with traditional religious identity is instructive. The deficit of secularism is a common feature of both political systems. However, while there is no evidence of increasing religiosity in Greece, developments over the past three decades raise the question of whether the “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” has been insidiously undermining the modern state. Ahmet Evin Professor, Sabancı University Thanos Veremis Professor Emeritus, University of Istanbul & Athens, 16 July 2012

Notes  Stelios Ramfos, Η Λογική της Παράνοιας [The Logic of Paranoia] (Athens: Armos [Αρμός], 2011).  Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994), pp. 1–14.  Ferdinand Tönnies, Gemeinschaft und Gesselschaft (Leipzig: Fuess Verlag, 1887).  Ahmet Evin, “Communitarian Structures and Social Change” in Ahmet Evin, ed., Modern Turkey: Continuity and Change (Opladen: Leske Verlag + Budrich GmbH, 1984), pp. 11–24.

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 Acknowledgments

This study has benefited from the critical remarks of Prof. William Hale, Professor Emeritus at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London; Dr. İlker Aytürk, Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Bilkent University; and Dr. Marios Hatzopoulos, Research Fellow at the Hellenic National Research Foundation, Athens. All three made valuable comments on earlier drafts of this study, and I am grateful for their contribution. I would also like to thank Evgenia Malikouti, Anastasia Sikiaridi, and Timur Kaymaz for their research assistance.

xiv DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 List of Abbreviations

AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party) AP Adalet Partisi (Justice Party) CGP Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party) CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party) DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party) ECtHR European Court of Human Rights MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Action Party) MNP Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party) OIC Organization of Islamic Conference PKK Partiya Karkaren (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) TESEV Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler Vakfı (Economic and Social Studies Foundation of Turkey)

DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208 xv DOI: 10.1057/9781137301208