HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for and Himalayan Studies

Volume 20 Number 1 Himalayan Research Bulletin no. 1 & Article 7 2

2000

Roundtable: The Politics of Culture and Identity in Contemporary Nepal

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Organizers: William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen Panelists: Karl-Heinz Kramer, Laren Leve, David Romberg, Mukta S. Tamang, Judith Pettigrew,and Mary Cameron

William F. Fisher and Susan Hangen local populations involved in and affected by the janajati Introduction movement in Nepal. In the years since the 1990 "restoration" of , We asked the roundtable participants to consider sev­ ethnic activism has become a prominent and, for some, a eral themes that derived from our own discussion: worrisome part of Nepal's political arena. The "janajati" 1. To what extent and to what end does it make sense movement is composed of a mosaic of social organizations to talk about a "janajati movement"? Reflecting a wide and political parties dominated by groups of peoples who variety of intentions, goals, definitions, and strategies, do have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman . This the wide-ranging practices of activists in social organiza­ movement has reshaped political discourse in Nepal by per­ tions and constitute a movement or are they but a discor­ sistently challenging the previously-accepted view of na­ dant set of disparate actions? To what extent are groups tional culture, , and , and by presenting a like the MNO or the Janajati Mahasangh engaged in the potentially revolutionary vision of Nepal as a multi-cultural, same project? multi-linguistic, and multi-religious state. This conflict pits anger and resentment about the two-hundred-year-history 2. How significant is the distinction between social of economic, political, and cultural dominance of Nepal and political spheres in Janajati discourse? Some Janajati by high-caste hill against fears that Nepal is on the activists take pains to distinguish between activities and verge of violent disintegration that would make it another groups that are part of a Janajati social movement, on one Sri Lanka or Yugoslavia. hand, and those which are part of a Janajati political move­ ment, on the other. While this distinction appears on the This roundtable brought together scholars who have surface to echo distinctions made by social movement theo­ conducted extensive research on different dimensions of rists, we might question how cleanly this demarcation can the janajati movement to share their perspectives, explore be drawn. What is the relationship between new asser­ the divergent and sometimes contradictory modes of ac­ tions of social and political identity and attempts to create tivism in the janajati movement, and to discuss the changes effective political strategies? that are occurring as new organizations emerge, actors re­ position themselves, and new issues arise. 1 The 3. How do post-1990 ethnic social and political orga­ roundtable's primary goal was to explore in some depth nizations differ in form, membership, and in the issues they the complex and changing nature of relationships among address from those which existed during the era? various actors, social organizations, political parties, and How have previously existing ethnic organizations re-po­ sitioned themselves and re-cast their historical narratives in the post-Panchayat era? 4. How does the work of foreign and Nepali scholars 1Roundtable was part of the Annual Meeting of the Assqciation articulate with contemporary ethnic politics in Nepal? How of Asian Studies, held in Boston, MA on March 12, 1999. have the ways in which scholars have classified difference Roundtable participants included William Fi sher, David in Nepal influenced or informed the strategies contempo­ Gellner, Susan Hangen, Karl-Heinz Kramer, Lauren Leve, rary political activists employ to assert or re-classify dif­ Kathryn March, and Mukta Singh Tamang. Addition extended ference? comments were provided by David Holmberg, Judith Pettigrew, and Mary Cameron. 5. How does the Janajati movement articulate with in a larger frame encompassing the politics of difference in

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 3 contemporary Nepal, including the politics of class, gen­ negotiating identities as they move toward modernity their der, and geography? own terms. But while everyday li ves are important anthropologi­ cal material, we would be ill -advised to treat some people William F. Fisher, Chair as more "ordinary" than oth ers and thus more worthy of Opening Remarks study, and we risk oversimplification if we focus on some I welcome everyone to the AAS roundtable on the Poli­ momentary lack of fit between what activists say and the tics of Culture and Iden tity in Contemporary Nepal. We feelings of those on whose behalf they claim to speak, and are fortunate to have here today a wide range of schol ars then take this lac k of fit to be evidence of how un authentic who have conducted research on different aspects of the the voices of ethnic activists are. Tracking a movement is Janajati movement. I will start with some background re­ not merely a matter of assessing the size of the constitu­ marks to help frame and initiate our exchange. ency at a particular moment, but also entails close atten­ tion to both the persistent assertion of new views, hi sto­ Within Nepal there are widespread di sagreements about ri es, categori es, and perspectives as well as the resonance th ~ seriousness of Nepal 's "ethnic problem", the threat it of so me of these assertions with a wider population. poses to national integration, and its causes. Some say that the Janajati problem is one of the most serious problems The innovative narratives of the activists may notal­ faced by Nepal at the moment but others argue that the ways reflect change that has already happened in the vil­ current furor is merely the work of a few disgruntled eth­ lages, but we should bea r in mind that th e politics of cul ­ ni c elites in , who are out for personal ga in , ture entails simultaneous battle at numerous levels in vari­ and some even point to the complicity of foreign scholars ous political and geographic spaces. It would be ironic if in emphasizing ethnic differences and promoting a critical as anthropologists we emphasize the need to listen to and view of th e two hundred year hi story of nation building in make space for previously unheard voices but at th e same Nepal. time dismiss some voices by insisting that we are the best determiners of whose voices are ordinary or authentic Some of my high caste informants have said enough to be heard. di sm iss ively that the whole Janaj ati movement could be ended with just 20 or so hi gh go vernment appointments . Depending on th e speaker, current ethnic unrest is at­ When I paraphrased these claims to Janajati activists they tributed to a variety of causes. Ethnic ac tivists attribute it laughed and noted that th ey too had heard these remarks. to two hundred years of Hindu oppression and growing But th ey interpreted comments like thi s as signs of grow­ awareness of this history among affected social groups. But ing respec t for the movement since the estimated number less charitable views portray it as a misunderstanding and of appointments needed to end th e movement misuse of new democratic processes and political freedom had apparently doubled within one year. to promote what are essentiall y commtmal claims. In the judgement of thi s latter group, there is no basis for th e fear Scholars, too, have questioned the size of the janajati of ethnic conflict at the grassroots level or among rural movement and challenged or di sm iss the authenticity or areas in Nepal. sign ificance of views ex pressed by a collection of ethnic "elites" or "intellectuals." One oftoday's participants, in a At the heart of the debate about identity, difference and recent volume, has cautioned us not to unquestioningly national culture are two co~11peting views of the nation of "give full credence to the most vocal and most active pro­ Nepal. One portrays a democratic Hindu kingdom com­ ponents of ethnic identity" and has rem inded us of the "duty posed of a harmonious flower ga rden of four vamas and to pay attention to the values and world views of ordinary 36 jats which share a heroic pas t, speak a common lan­ people."' I agree with thi s view but offer an additional guage, follow a common reli gion , and are led, at least sy m­ caution. It is apparent that what appears on the surface to bolically, by a divine and benevolent king. A second view be a res urge nce of traditional ethnic identities in Nepal is, opposes a Nepali past of internal colonization, Hindu op­ at least in part, a se lective intell ectual construction oriented pression, and the forced assimilation of non-Hindu minori­ as much to th e future as to th e past, and as much toward ti es into a hierarchica l system, to an emergent vision of th e modern as it is to the traditional. Janajati activists are Nepal as a "nation in th e making". In this view, thi s "na­ tion in th e making" if it is to ac hi eve nationhood at all, can onl y do so as a culturally plural and secular society. 2Dav id Gellner. 1997. "Ethnicit y and Nationalism in the For many residents in Nepal, the term "janajati," at least World 's only Hindu State," in Natioualis111 and Ethuicity in a as it is cutTently used, seemed to appear almost overnight Hindu Kiugdo111. Eds. David N. Gelln er. Joanna Pfaff­ and within a few years had become widely used and ac- Czarnecka. and John Welpton. Harwood. pp. 19, 23.

4 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000 knowledged. The term became popular in the mid 1980s Year of Indigenous People also makes this concern very among a small group of ethnic activists who deliberately clear: translated into English as "nationalities" and employed it "We, the indigenous , wish to protect to draw attention to their argument that Nepali society con­ our ethn ic identities ... and we are working to redesctibe his­ sists of a number of different but equal nationalities which tory. We want to write our hi stori es ourselves. collectively constitute the nation. It become common on the national scene by the mid 1990s. The ambiguity of the The government that has been ruling has been cover­ English definition for "nationalities" is also consistent with ing up the true facts about indigenous people, and has been the different claims and strategies which are present in the describing, writing, and publishing hi story form imperial­ janajati movement: "nationalities" may refer to "groups of ist and internal colonialist perspectives. We want to an­ people, each of which has a common and distinguishing nounce that, on the religious front, we are free from the linguistic and cultural background and form one constitu- country and the state's constitution, and want to act ' ent element of a larger group (as a nation)" or it may also accordingly ... we have been divided by the cultural and suggest that each of these aggregations of people is "po­ political repression of . We want to be tentially capable of forming a nation state."3 equals again. We want to use our ancestral land, sources and media freely again ... Our culture is caught between the The Janajati activists have set out not only to oppose unjust Hindu culture and the excessively liberal Western what they describe as a state-created and maintained sys­ culture .. .Instead of increasing the standard of living of tem of social hierarchy but also to demarcate and shape a janajati peoples, development projects conducted by the new social system-one that is non-hierarchical and non­ governmental and nongovernmental organizations actually discriminatory. They set out to do this through a number decrease it and act to eliminate cultural identity ... we want of interrelated strategies: I) They challenge the symbols a society unified in diversity."5 of the nation, subversively appropriate and recodify signs, and look within their own group's history and traditions The counter natTatives of nationalism put forth by the for symbols of unity around which their community may janajati are often dismissed as a strange brew of facts, fic­ be re-imagined and mobilized. It is in this process that tions, and myths. Indeed, some of the details of these sto­ social groups may become political entities-nationali­ ries may not stand up to intense academic scrutiny and may ties-which may begin to bargain with the state for in­ be justifiably labeled confused. But these natTatives are creased social, political, and economic of their citi­ more about emotion than reason and the model of ethni­ zens. 2) They legitimize their actions by citing a history of cally plural nationalism they promote may indeed prove subordination, land theft, and slavery at the hands of the more viable and endurable than state-imposed integration ruling elite. 3) They emphasize a number of stark dichoto­ based on suppression, exclusions, and intolerance. mies: janajati and jati, indigenous and non-indigenous, It is ironic that a state which classified and divided its Hindu and Non -Hindu, flat nose and pointy nose, all of population as a means to assimilate and rule the diverse which call attention to ongoing processes of discrimina­ segments through a state-sanctioned hierarchy must now tion . 4) They establish new sets of categories within which find a way to address the insistence of these diverse seg­ to locate peoples: foremost in this process is a re-writing ments that national unity can emerge through acceptance of their community histories and a demand for a recon­ of them as separate and different elements of the popula­ ceived national historical narrative. They also embrace tion. previously despised characterizations and reinterpret them with positive attributes. Stokely Carmichael noted the importance of this kind David Gellner of process: Bmne/ University, London "the basic need is to reclaim history and identity from what Before responding to the questions which the organiz­ must be called cultural tetTori sm ... we shall have to struggle ers have asked us to address, I would like to make three for the right to create our own terms through which to de­ preliminary points. fine ourselves and our relationship to the society and to First of all, the organizers refer to some people's "fears have these terms recognize".4 • The report of Nepal's National Committee for the UN

•carmichael, S. and C.V. Hamilton. 1967. Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America. New York: Vintage. 5National Committee for the International Year of the World' .1See, for in stance, the unabridged Oxford English Dictionary. Indi genou s Peoples. 1993. "Indi genou s People of Nepal."

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 5 of violent di sintegration" in the face of identity politics in On the question of the social versus the political in ac­ Nepal. But that process has already begun: large tracts of tivist discourse: it is essential for ethnic activists to try and the western hills are not fully or at all controlled by the keep party politics out of their organizations. Why? Since government, but the main actor here is the CPN (Maoist). 1990 everything has become political. Trade unions have The relationship between the Maoists and the Janajati ac­ all split along pmty lines. Any organization that wants to tivists is by no means straightforward, but there are some maintain its unity and build a mass organization (the dream links. And, of course, ethnic identity can play a role even of every activist) must stop the politically active being when it is not consciously a principle of recruitment or or­ prominent in the organization. If well-known political fig­ ganization. My point is that we should be discussing the ures are office holders in an ethnic organization, then the Maoist problem at the same time. organization is assumed to be aligned to their party (this happened, for example, to the Nepal Bhasa Manka Khalah, Second, a methodological point. As scholars we are headed by Padma Ratna Tuladhar). This immediately alien­ always a step behind. Things happen on the ground and ates potential members who are supporters of the other we are not always there. Even if we are 'there,' participant parties. In order to prevent this happening the Jyapu observation is not sufficient to grasp a complex phenom­ Mahaguthi has a rule baiTing the politically active from enon like 'the Janajati movement.' A variety of methods, holding office within the organization, though they are and the cooperation of many different scholars, as in the welcome as ordinary members. This is intended to pre­ present panel, are necessary. vent the organization being hijacked by a particular politi­ My third point is on the ethics of involvement. Some cal party, and to try and ensure that the organization con­ people say, 'Don't get involved, don' t offer advice. You'll tinues to represent all Jyapus (effectively: all Jyapus of only look stupid; and, in any case, it is patronizing to offer Kathmandu, and some outlying villages; Lalitpur has its advice.' Others would say, 'There is --at some point-- a own Jyapu organization). By maintaining a distance from duty to get involved and not to maintain the Olympian de­ political parties, ethnic organizations can hope to encour­ tachment of the armchair observer.' For myself, I believe age a kind of bidding process between the parties to win that scholars working in Nepal do have a duty to concern their support, and indeed there is some evidence that this themselves with ethnic politics, and to do so in all humil­ has been happening. ity. They also have a duty not to become the mouthpiece I don't want to go on too long, so let me conclude. I of nationalist movements, but to represent, or at least to be think that the way forward for the Nepalese state is to en­ aware of, the full plurality of ordinary people's voices. dorse some form of what has been called 'strategic essen­ Turning now to Bill and Susan's questions: they have tialism' . It should give some kind of recognition to some asked us, 'Who are the activists?' In the case of the Newars ethnic groups, i.e. continue the first multiculturalist steps my estimate is that there are 1-200 people, more if you that have already been taken. Whether these policies should include all the students who do no more than organize and include quotas or reservations for public sector jobs, edu­ publish campus magazines in Newari. They are, however, cational opportunities, and seats in assemblies, as in , just the tip of an iceberg. The concerns they articulate and is one of the most difficult current questions of Nepali poli­ the rhetoric they use go much wider and deeper. They can, tics. At the same time the state should attempt to encour­ on occasion, mobilize quite large numbers of people, e.g. age multiple and cross- cutting identities, including a com­ for the Bhintuna celebration at the beginning of the so-called mon Nepaliness. Newar New Year. There is an important split between the ethnic and the Buddhist activists (the latter being more Susan Hangen numerous). There is some overlap of the two groups: a Department of Anthropology, University of Wisconsin­ few people are equally active in both spheres. But for the Madison most part, activists EITHER give priority to -­ in which case they want to reach the largest audience pos­ sible, and therefore use Nepali as well as Newari; and they The "Janajati" Movement: A View fmm East Nepal want to reform, i.e. to change, traditional Newar culture-­ OR they are cultural nationalists whose prime aims are to We are Mongol, we are Mongol, preserve both Newari and traditional Newar cultyre. No matter what others call us, We are Mongol.

6 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(I-2) 2000 While researching the Mongol National Organization sent so as to secure registration from the Election Com­ (MNO) in eastern Nepal, I heard activists sing the refrain mission. By continuing to operate as a political party de­ of this song at numerous political gatherings. The term spite this ruling, the MNO places itself in constant conflict "Mongol" hails from early 19th century ethnology and hi gh­ with th e state, thus creating and sustaining an example of li ghts the idea of racial unity among the numerous groups hi gh-caste llindu dominance of the political. of peoples who have historically spoken Tibeto-Burman By contrast, the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh, and the languages. As this song suggests, the MNO asserts this single ethnic-group focused organizations that constitute ethnonym in a field in which other people call "Mongols" it, insist that they are non-political, social organizations. other names. By insisting on the term Mongol, the MNO These organizations seek to promote the "languages, reli­ rejects both the label "matwali," issued by the 19th cen­ gions and cultures" of janajatis and to raise public aware­ tury Nepali state, and the label "janajati" which has be­ ness about issues affecting janajatis through publiC'ations come prevalent in the post 1990 wave of ethnic activism in and conferences. Their work can be seen as political in that Nepal. The MNO's rejection of the term "janajati" is at they operate as "pressure groups," working to influence once an acknowledgment that the party operates in a wider members of the government to form policies that will up­ field of activism, the "janajati" movement, and a way of lift janajatis and pursuing incremental changes within the locating itself within that movement. present system. For example, during the drafting of the 1990 As one of several ethnic political parties that has Constitution, the Janajati Mahasangh made recommenda­ emerged since 1990, the MNO positions itself in the move­ tions to the Constitution Commission; and later the organi­ ment as a "political" rather than a "social" organization. zation spearheaded opposition to teaching as a The MNO sees political power as "the main key that can compulsory language in schools. As the widespread cur­ open all locks" for Mongols and seeks to gain control of rency of the term "janajati" reflects, this strategy of ac­ the Nepali state - through elections, if possible, or by commodation is the prevalent and legal way to make claims armed revolution if not. Their plans to transform the state on the basis of ethnicity in post 1990 Nepal. Furthermore, so that it benefits Mongols include: restructuring Nepal as some activists in these organizations have argued, it is a a federation of states where Tibeto-Burman languages are more effective way to secure rights for janajatis at the used and abolishing the , which it sees as a but­ present moment than attempting to directly seize political tress of Hindu dominance. power. Though the MNO's founder-president, Gopal Gurung, As a strategy to gain political power at the national is sometimes assumed to comprise the extent of the MNO, level, the MNO's participation in electoral politics as a small the party has an active "grassroots" base of support with and unregistered party is of limited effectiveness. (We may active party commjttees in 8 districts. The MNO's strong­ also question the effectiveness a violent takeover of the hold is in the rural areas of , where it has had state, the MNO's other plan.) At the village level, how­ limited electoral success at the village level. Given the ever, taking the format of political party has enabled the party's relatively sh011 history, relatively undeveloped party MNO to include people in its membership who are not structure, and lack of financial resources and legal status, brought into the janajati organizations. Political pa11ies are the MNO has been surprisingly successful in elections. In able to mobilize a wide sector of the population, because the first local elections in 1991, the party won 57 seats at people can take part in them and align themselves with the village level and managed to gain control of several them simply by voting for them. Thus although MNO lead­ Village Development Committees. In 1994 national elec­ ers and activists come from among the tulo mane he of the tions, the party received the third most votes after the large, village, ordinary villagers also consider themselves to be long-established and well-funded Congress and Commu­ part of the MNO and call themselves "Mongols"- whereas nist parties, and received more votes that the third most they feel alienated from the social organizations which popular party in the nation overall, the Rastriya Prajatantra emphasize writings, formal speeches, and cultural entre­ Party. As Articles 112(3) and 113(3) of Nepal's 1990 Con­ preneurship. As one uneducated woman who supports the stitution forbid the Election Commission from registering MNO and wasn't involved in the local Gurung organiza­ political parties that are explicitly community or region tion told me, "they probably only let people who can read based, the MNO is an "illegal" party. The MNO is pres­ or write take part in those organizations." So by being a ently th e only political party that has been denied registra­ political party the MNO is able to create space for a wide tion on this basis and still continues to put up candidates range of types of participation in the movement. Even for election, albeit as independents. Other identity based though th e MNO has a marginal position in the movement political parties either boycott elections, or have widened at the national level because of its confrontational stance the definition of the community who they claim to repre- towards the state, at the village level it is able to create a kind of populist base.

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 7 The question of the extent to which the MNO is en­ Karl-Heinz Kramer gaged in the same project as the Janajati Mahasangh was a Nepal's ethnic groups are still lack ing integration and central topic of debate among MNO members. Since the Janajati Mahasangh as a coalition has a very limited pres­ participation in the modern democratic Nepa li state. But ence in Ilam District, the debate focused on how the MNO th eir situation has, nevertheless, improved compared to should relate to the sin gle- focused "social pdnchayat times. The guarantee of fundamental rights is organizations" which compose the Janajati Mahasangh. much safer today. Especially the ri ght of freedom of opin­ ion and expression and th e freedom to form orga nizations (article 12) have helped the ethnic elites to make their ar­ Most MNO supporters perceived the work and goals of the guments heard among their own groups and in the general social organizations and the MNO to be compatible, and public. mutually enhancing. Individuals asserted that the social organizations create support for the MNO by raising The greatest problem is still th e attitude of the Nepali people's awareness and by encouraging Mongols to break state. There is hardly any organization outside the ethnic away from . Other people described how joining camp that really wants to understand the ethnic argumen­ the MNO led them to get involved in the social organiza­ tation. Politicians may be talking about participation of eth­ tions. The MNO encourages Mongols to become "not nic groups and suppressed castes, but the facts speak a dif­ Hindu" and look for "their own language, reli gion and cul­ ferent language, and th ere is hardly any change in attitude ture" but only the social organizations offer Mongols spe­ in sight. Another outstanding example are the ri ghts cific cultural identities. orga ni zations which have come into existence in greater number. They may be talking about indigenous groups, but MNO leaders, however, criticized the social organiza­ like the political parties th ey, too, are dominated by mem­ tions and urged other leaders, in particular, to refrain from bers of high Hindu castes, especially . Many of these taking part in any of their activities or programs. First, MNO people cannot understand the arguments of the ethnic lead­ leaders argued that the social organizations' emphasis on ers, since they have never learnt to vi ew the Nepali state promoting language, religion, and culture could mislead and society from the ethnic perspective because of th e one­ and confuse people into believing that this is the entire goal sidedness of the national education system. of activism. Uplifting Mongol languages and cultures is meaningless, they insisted, without the power to institu­ Last month I have taken part in a conference organized tionalize the use of these languages and cultures- "like by POLS AN in Kathmandu on the topic of "democratiza­ growing cash crops without a market to sell them in ," as tion and development of civil society in Nepal". There I one MNO leader often explained. have presented a paper on this topic against the multiethnic background of the country. This paper dealt especially with Second, the leaders criticized the social organizations the lega l si tuation on the one hand and the implementing for promoting individual ethnic group identities, rather than politica l sphere on the other hand. Even though I had al­ Mongols as a coalition, which could fracture the unified ready chosen a moderate style of argumentation , my paper Mongol identity and political block. MNO leaders also set off a controversial di scussion almost di sregarding th e expressed fear that if they participated in social organi za­ other partly very interesting papers. On e (Dwarika tions associated with single ethnic organizations, they could Nath Dhungel) even turned my arguments on the problems be seen as aligned with one ethnic group more than with of integration and participation into the opposite stating I other ethnic groups. As one leader stated, "We are fight­ wanted to disintegrate Nepal. And even in the press my ing for the freedom of all Mongols, not just one group." arguments were distorted. Spotlight (issue of 26 January), This ethnographic readin g of the MNO raises so me for exampl e, stated me to have argued that Nepalese ethnic important iss ues in considering the janajati movement at groups are a threat to Nepal 's integrity supporting Dwarika large. It is important to remember that what may be an ef­ Nath Dhungel 's biting critics that there is no reason to be­ fective strategy for an organization at the national level lieve that there is any such threat of ethnic conflict. may not be so effective at the village level, and vice versa. I take these reactions as proof th at the ethnic argumen­ The challenge of creating a unified, concrete identity from tation is having an effect. And with this I will turn over to a heteroge neous population without negatin g the multiple the se t of themes derived from Bill 's and Susan's discus­ identities within the group is a critical issue for the janajati sions. If we speak about a ''janajati movement" th en we movement. It is also a central problem for all nationalist must be aware, that we are not talking about a coherent projects, and thus, examining the debates over this iss ue in movement but more about a ge neral process of growin g this movement in Nepal can shed light on ethnic and na­ ethnic awareness. Wh en we are talking here about the tionalist politics elsewhere. janajati, then we first of all think of Nepal's divergent eth-

8 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(I-2) 2000 nic groups. But we must also be aware that in recent years of organization, has opened up chances for ethnic political th ese groups have been joined in th eir action by the so­ argumentation. Interestingly enough ethnic political par­ ca ll ed suppressed or untouchab le castes. All these groups ties are a product of the 1990s and it was only after the have in common that they have been disadvantaged in the people's movement that the socio-culturally oriented modern Nepali state in respect to legal ri ghts and to politi­ janajati organizations became politically active institutions, ca l, soc ial and economic participation. Even if it is not a proving their groups as historic entities of a common Nepali sin gle movement, all these groups, nevertheless, have a state. It was especially the self-historification of the ethni c simil ar fate, similar intentions, goa ls, definitions and strat­ groups that provided them with political arguments in their egies. And they have founded organizations of their own dialogue with the Nepali state. representing their interests against the Nepali state and its Scholarly works on Nepal's ethnic movement are still central elites. It thus makes sense to talk about a "janajati in an infant state. It have especially been anthropologists, movement." first foreigners later also Nepal is, who wrote about greater Nevertheless I see some differences between those or­ ethno-political consciousness and organizations. Foreign ganizations that started with social issues and only became political scientists and historians working on Nepal are political in the second end (to these groups I especially comparatively few in number, but among corresponding count the organizations of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh) Nepali scholars a change in attitude can be observed in and those organizations that predominantly work on a po­ recent years. This becomes obvious when I compare the litical basis and call themselves political parties, like the talks I had with them five years ago with their current ar­ Mongol National Organization of Gopal Gurung. The lat­ gumentation. But it will take time. A special problem of ter again took a very radical stand when I met him last Nepali scholars is that they still recrute themselves mostly month, distancing himself from the current Nepali state. from the Chetri and especially the Bahun groups. Under The groups of the Nepal Janajati Mahasangh take a much the panchayat system these persons represented the state milder approach, even though one cannot deny that there ideology of politics, society and nationalism, and most of are radical political figures also within that group. Suresh the controversial argumentation the ethnic organizations Ale Magar and Padma Ratna Tuladhar, for example, ac­ are confronted with today is still based on their writings. tively took part in celebrations of the NCP (Maoist) on the Ethnic and thus cultural difference, which has been accepted completement of three years of)ana yuddha that took place as given by the current constitution, is still challenged by in New Delhi. many Nepali intellectuals, as I have mentioned in the be­ ginning. Political ethnic argumentation in recent years has Even though these persons differ from the argumenta­ mainly been focussed on this, let me call it stubborn, atti­ tion ofGopal Gurung, who distances himself from a Gurung tude of leading Nepali scholars. Radical forces within the identity and instead speaks about a common Mongol iden­ ethnic movement have already started to oppose them with tity of all Nepali ethnic groups, they have in common with militant demands and argumentations. Here I see a great him that they use their social ethnic engagements for the danger for the future of the ethnic movement and of the propagation of ajanajati political movement. Go pal Gurung Nepali state in general. may use the term Mongol instead of janajati, but in the end he is talking about the same thing. The janajati movement must be seen as part of devel­ opment of civil society in Nepal. A well-developed civil The introduction of the new constitution in 1990 of­ society potentially influences government in two ways. It fered a chance not only to change the political system but enhances political responsiveness by aggregating and ex­ also to reconsider the state's politics of nationalism. There pressing the wishes of the public through a wealth of non­ can be no doubt that democracy has definitely entered Nepal governmental forms of association, and it safeguards pub­ in 1990 when the new constitution was promulgated. Sov­ lic freedom by limiting the government's ability to impose ereignty exercised by the king for centuries was transfe1Ted arbitrary rule by force. Based on rights, rule of law, free­ to the people. The constitution fmther stipulated provisions dom and citizenship, civil society becomes the place for a like constitutional monarchy, a parliamentary form of gov­ critical rational discourse. It is a precondition for the exist­ ernment, a pluralistic society, and a civilian order. It also ence of democracy and a property of democratic states and reinstated popular election of the parliament based on the societies. principle of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. But there are still a number of shortcomings within the The 1990 constitution with its guarantee of fundamen ­ constitution itself, and there still exist undemocratic laws tal rights has laid the foundation for the start of this pro­ enacted under the previous authoritarian regime requiring cess in Nepal. As such thejanajati movement must be seen replacement or amendment. The guarantee of fundamental in the context of similar movements of the so-called un­ rights, like those of freedom of opinion and expression or touchable castes, the women, or even the Maoists as far as

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 9 their political arguments in favour of downtrodden sections "Bahunbad" by public intellectuals, Buddhists andjanajati of Nepali society are taken into consideration. But only a leaders have pointed to ways i!l which nationalized Hindu­ politically self-conscious civil society imposes limits upon ism has masked and supported Monarchial power and high state power. If the political practices of a self-conscious caste Hindu privilege. And Hindu nationalists and loyal­ civil society transgress the boundaries of the state spon­ ists have reacted aggressively in their own defense.7 Yet, sored political discourse, a crisis of legitimacy of the state · to the best of my knowledge, religious organizations that results. I hope today's discussions will shed some light on are not explicitly linked to an ethnocultural or political the question if such a crisis is given in Nepal. agenda are generally not construed as falling within the janajati sphere by activists or scholars, whether Nepali or foreign. This raises the question as to why language and Lauren Leve culture are considered appropriate bases on which to claim Wellesley College political identity, whereas in the same context, religion is not. Framing Religion, Politics and Culture in ]anajati Ac­ tivism: Lessons from Theravada Buddhism My research has been on a Theravada Buddhist reform movement which has clashed with the Nepali state in dif­ ferent ways at various times since the 1920s and 1930s Are political revolutionaries and social reformers - when it first emerged among Newar Buddhists, and which those who would take over the state and those who ask has played an important part in re-articulating ethnic and only for greater freedom to practice and reproduce what religious identity for many Newars since then. Theravada they see as their indigenous cultural identities - properly Buddhists as a whole do not see themselves as appropri­ part of the same movement? One of the problems it was ately involved in janajati politics. Almost all will contest suggested that speakers might address today is conceptu­ the assertion that Buddhism is in any way political; and the alizing an interpretive framework for analyzing the diver­ collaborations between Buddhist monks and janajati ac­ sity of parties and practices that fall under the rubric of tivists that sprung up in the wake of thejana andolan were, janajati politics. My remarks will be directed largely to and continue to be, fiercely debated within the Theravada this concern. In part, this approach is methodologically community. Yet, I see important points of analogy between driven; unlike many of the others on this panel, I have not the Theravada Buddhist reform and thejanajati movement, done fieldwork on janajati activism per se, nor have I and in the ways that Theravada Buddhists andjanajati ac­ worked with people who would identify themselves as in­ tivists are positioned by and position themselves vis-a-vis volved in this movement. Yet, the fact that many of these the state. Thus it is instructive to compare their points of people do appear to me to be acting within the realm of contiguity and common cause, as well as of divergence cultural politics nevertheless, provides the root contradic­ and disavowal. tion that animates these comments. There are significant structural parallels between the To begin, I propose a brief detour through the recent Newar cultural renaissance/anti-Rana resistance at the be­ history of "religion" in the construction of the nation. As ginning of this century of which the early Theravada re­ anyone who followed the debates that surrounded the draft­ form was a part, 8 and the politicization of ethnic and reli­ ing and release of the VS 2047 (1991) Constitution will gious identity today. During the 1920s and 1930s, know, the current wave of public contestation over the place Theravada was a religious reform that had political impli­ of Hinduism in the democratic nation-state began at the cations in a state where political and religious subjectivities same time as, and in dialogue with, the rise of post­ were intertwined. Thus, although its robed representatives Panchayat assertions of cultural and linguistic never actually aspired to state power, their politics of cul­ subnationalisms. Since 1990 (when I started doing field­ ture were perceived by the Ranas as provocative nonethe­ work in Nepal, and hence, when my ethnographic less. Despite protestations that their undertaking was reli­ "memory," as it were, begins), protests and marches in fa­ gious, not political, Theravada monks and nuns were ex­ vor of a secular state have given rise to publicized refusals pelled from Nepal twice in the first half of this century for to celebrate Dasain,6 and Hindu nationalist anxiety has ordaining Hindus and women, and preaching against such grown, as manifested in the heightened visibility of mili­ tant Hindu associations like the VHP, and the increasing hostility being directed toward . Accusationsof 7 Many of these trends and events are also documented in Pfaff-Czarnecka ( 1997). 8 See Gellner (1986; 1992:13-18; 1997), Lakaul (1985), Malia (1982), (1985 (2041 VS)), Shrestha (n.d.), 6 See Pfaff-Czarnecka (1993) and Hangen (1997). (1992).

10 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000 cultural edifices as sacrifice and the caste system. At the an identity-appropriate language in which to voice this pro­ same time, many of its lay devotees were jailed, fined, and test.10 But the rhetoric makes sense only because these harassed. domains - religion and politics - had already been con­ structed as separate, and differentially valued, by the state. The position ofTheravada Buddhists in relation to the state became less problematic after 1951, due in large part During the Panchayat period, the language of "religion" to King Tribhuvan's personal spiritual propensities.9 But was appropriated by the state, which used it to represent in the months immediately following the jana an dolan, a itself as a domain of selflessness, service, and devotion to number of prominent Theravada monks began to attend tradition, authority, and the collective good, including the meetings of the Janajati Mahasangh, and they were among traditional authmity represented by the King, whom offi­ the leaders of the call for the constitutional recognition of cial nationalist discourse portrayed as affectively bound to Nepal's ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity that rocked his citizens, and as the foremost provider for the public Kathmandu over the summer and into the fall of 1990. At good. (Just think of the billboard at Ratna Park on which the same time as they were pressing for these political re­ King Birendra proclaims: "Just as I have affection for my forms, however, they were also active in a number of more country and my people, I have that same responsibility for 11 religiously-orient~d l)Ctivities, including preaching dhanna my sick and hungry people." ) At the same time, this moral at the meetings ofindividualjanajati associations, and or­ and moralizing state was rendered opposed to the world of ganizing Buddhist training camps which aimed to propa­ "politics," which was associated with political parties, and gate their putatively "pure" brand of Buddhism among eth­ represented as an anti-nationalist realm of self-interest and nic groups whose and cultures they argued had greed. The result of this was the depoliticization of the state been "cmTupted" by a long history of Hindu domination. through its identification with - and embodiment as - In conjunction with this goal, one even atTanged , and the conesponding vilification of what came the initiation of six young boys from what they explicitly to be defined as "politics," a discursive production that publicized asjanajati castes- one Gurung, one Magar, one continues to underlie much of what is and isn't recognized Tharu, and three Tamangs - as novice Theravada monks, as "political" today. and sent them to Thailand for high school and further Bud­ I would not propose this as a full explanation for the dhist training in the hope that they would return to spread Theravada monks removing themselves from the avowed Theravada Buddhism among their native communities. ethnopoliticallandscape. But it illustrates one outcome of As it turned out, by 1996, four of the six boys had dis­ the way that the Nepal state has historically positioned it­ robed, rejecting their roles as representatives of their jats self as a religious entity, and used Hindu tropes and cat­ to return to normal teenage life. More significantly, most egories in the process of governance. Religion is implicit of the monks had broken with the Janajati Mahasangh by in identity- and identity politics- in Nepal, even when it this time; as it was explained to me, because the organiza­ is not explicitly politicized in these terms. Even today, criti­ tion became "too political." Yet, considering that I had seen cal categories of belonging to the nation-state derive from one of the very same monks who told me this in 1995 ral­ and reference a Brahmanical world view. This underscores lying crowds at the Tundikhel in 1990, and that he himself the importance of engaging with religion as an organizing had been one of the ones expelled in 1944, this assertion of factor in ethnic and nationalist politics. To do justice to the an ontological distinction between the "religious" and "po­ complex relations between nationalism, class andjanajati litical" realms struck me as a strange denial of Theravada identity in Nepal today, it is important to insist on an ana­ lived experience. Briefly, I interpret this opting out of eth­ lytical language that will make sense of the political di­ nic politics at least in part as an act of resistance to events mensions of cultural assertions without assimilating internal to janajati politics themselves- when the secular ethnonationalism 12 to an economistic logic that assumes state initiative was defeated and their partner groups moved that the politics of identity are in fact about commanding on to other issues and modes of organization, I suspect that resources and making material claims on the state, or oth- the monks felt rather marginalized, and being able to claim a higher authority, under the sign of the religious, offered

10 Adams (1998) takes a similar approach in her analysis of the political uses and implications of discourses of science by 9 In the later part of his life, the King became extremely close medical doctors involved in thejana andolan. to the knowledgeable and charismatic Theravada monk, 11 "Jasari malai mero des a ra janatako mamata cha, usai gari Bhikshu Amritananda. For a brief period prior to the King's bhok ra rogle pidita mero janataprati mero jimmedari cha. Sri death, Theravada received explicit royal recognition and some Pane Birendra." state patronage as a result of Amritananda's influence. 12 I take this expression from Tambiah ( 1996).

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 11 erwise reducing religion to politics by other means. References

What does this have to do with delineating an analyti­ Adams, V. 1998. Doctors for Democracy: Health Profes­ cal space for contemplating religion, politics, and culture sionals in the Nepalese Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­ injanajati activism? In comparing Theravada Buddhist and versity Press. other janajati organizations, I am not proposing that Chatte1jee, P. 1986. Nationalist Thought and the Colonial Theravada Buddhism is the same as the MNO or the Newar World: A Derivative Discourse. Minneapolis: University of member-groups of the Janajati Mahasangh (with whom Minnesota Press. in some cases it shares members). Nor would I claim that Gellner, D. 1986. Language, Caste, Religion and Terril OJ)'.' this very partial commentary addresses the whole of the Newar Identity Ancient and Modem. Archives of European So­ problem. I have tried to make two points in this presenta­ ciology, XXVII, 102-148. tion: first, that interpreting cuiTent events in the janajati field requires broadening conventional definitions of what Gellner, D. 1992. Monk, Householder and Tantric Priest: Newar Buddhism and Its Hierarchy of Ritual. Cambridge: counts as political. "Culture" is not merely about social Cambridge University Press. identity, but also pm1icipates in defining the category of "the political" itself. Hence, analyses of the relations be­ Gellner, D. 1997. Caste, Co/11/IIUIIalislll, and Colllmunislll: tween politics and culture must be ready to open up inher­ Newars and the Nepalese State. In D. N. Gellner, Pfaff-Czarnecka, ited definitions of what counts as political action, even when & J. Whelpton (Eds.), Nationalism and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Cultm·e in Contemporary Nepal (pp. this departs from the self-appraisals of activists and others 151-184). Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers. who may also act as anthropological informants. My th ink­ ing here has been influenced by Partha Chatte1jee's (1986) Hangen, S. 1997, November 19, 1997. Becoming "Not­ reading of the history of anti-colonial nationalism in India, Hindu": A Gurung Community's Move to Buddhism and Eth­ nic Politics in Nepal. Paper presented at the American Anlhro­ in which he proposes that the period of social and religious pological Association Annual Meetings, Washington D.C. reforms that preceded the articulation of nationalism as a political movement must be seen as a constitutive stage of Lakaul, B. P. 1985. Nepalay Staviravad Gukatha Wahgu that event. Ongoing debates in Nepal recognize language, Kha (How Theravada Buddhism Came to Nepal). Kathmandu: culture and religion as mutually implicated vehicles through Malati Lakaul. which the Shah-Rana state has defined and dominated its Malia, K. P. 1982. Classical Newari : A Sketch. diverse subject peoples. Here, where collective identities Kathmandu: Educational Enterprise. have emerged in dialogue with the classificatory systems Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. 1993. The Nepalese -, or and policies of the Hindu nation-state, seem·ingly apoliti­ Shaping a State Ritual in Quest for Legiti111acy. In C. Ramble & cal processes of religious and cultural transformation are M. Brauen (Eds.), Anthropology in and the Himalaya . indeed integral aspects of contesting state power. Zuriche: Volkerkunde Museum. As a second, related point, I have proposed that schol­ Pfaff-Czarnecka, J. 1997. Vestiges and Visions: Cultural arly analyses of cultural identity in Nepal should be atten­ Change in the Process of Nation-Building in Nepal. In D. N. tive to the complex politics of religion, not only as iden­ Gellner, J. Pfaff-Czarnecka, & J. Whelpton (Eds.), Nationalism tity, but also as discourse. An objectified notion of "reli­ and Ethnicity in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary Nepal . Amsterdam: Amsterdam. gion" has played a critical - if as yet mainly unstudied­ role in configuring janajati identities and activities in a Pradhan, B. L. 1985 (2041 VS). Asan (Political History). context where identity categories have historically been Kathmandu: Asan Khalak. defined along religious lines. Finding appropriate concep­ Shrestha, B. G. (n.d.). The Newars: The Indigenous Popu­ tual frames to guide future inquiry is an important step to­ lation of the in the ModernS tate of Nepal. wards producing a relevant and informed anthropology of Tambiah, S. J. (1996). Leveling Crowds: Ethno-national­ ongoing process of identify formation, cultural politics, and ist Conflicts and Collective Violence in South . Berkeley: activism. This task calls for further engagement with the University of California Press. complex role of religion in constituting ethnic, national, and nationalist identity. Upreti, P. R. (1992). Political Awakening In Nepal: The Search for a New Identity. New Delhi: Commonwealth Pub­ lishers

12 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000 David Holmberg of as Tamang areas were involuted, cellular like units tied Department of Anthropology in chains not unlike the chains of dialects ofTamang lan ­ Cornell University guage. During the period of the 1950s and 1960s after the collapse of the Rana regime, there were more organized Ethnic Movements in Contemporary Nepal political actions based on identity to the northwest of The comments I make today are based on collabora­ Kahmandu. Inspired in part by organizers for the Con­ tive research I have done and continue to do with Kathryn gress Party, local communities of Tamang who were se­ March and Mukta Singh Tamang both of whom are speak­ verely oppressed by in-migrating Bahun, rioted and looted. ing at today's roundtable. I want to further acknowledge These Bahun had, at least in Tamang recountings, acquired the important contributions to this work made by my long land and local political influence through legal manipula­ term research associate, Suryaman (Himdung) Tamang and tions that were only possible because of their association Amrit Yhonjan of and Literacy Coun­ with dominant powers. In 1960 anti- riots oc­ cil. curred in what are now Nuwakot and Dhading districts where Tamang villagers looted and drove out all Brahman I. I should preface my remarks today with the qualifi­ families from several villages. Troops killed and wounded cation that they are Tamang-o-centric. The first point I several Tamang and arrested hundreds. Mahendra used make is historical. Ideologies of difference in contempo­ the presence of these "Brahman refugees" in Kathmandu rary Nepal transform those which took form with the con­ as one of the pretexts for dissolving the first democrati­ solidation of the Hindu state of Nepal in the late 18th cen­ cally elected govemment in 2017 v.s. and banned, one can tury. Nepal formed, for Tamang, in the exercise of violent presume not incidentally, the first Tamang cultural asso­ force by high-caste, Indo-Nepalese who deployed a hierar­ ciation which had been organized by Santabir Lama in 2013. chical ideology conflating caste and ethnicity to organize diversity. Tamang were conceived of as low, beef-eating, Contemporary janajati organizations among Tamang Buddhists, subject to enslavement, unfit for military duty, are a new urban-based movements which became possible capable primarily of physical labor, and, in the west, sub­ only after liberalizations of the new constitution. They are ject to regimes of compulsory labor or rakam. In a word, distinguishable from earlier identity politics because they the is not one of the phulbaari or "gar­ are Kathmandu-based, nation-wide efforts at organization den" of the discretely flourishing blossoms of Prithvi inspired by transnational rhetorics of nation, diversity, in ­ Narayan Shah but of domination of discrete sectors of the digenousness, and identity especially those current in Nepalese population by an elite. The term phulbaari, ac­ greater India. The leading Tamang ethnic organizations tive in discourse about ethnicity in Nepal at least since the have distinct political leanings if not party affiliations. fall of the Ran as in 2007 I 1950, must be seen as part of the Although these organizations are based in Kathmandu, they continuing quest for an ideology of difference but one are beginning to influence local communities in signifi­ which, in the contemporary context, disguises the cant ways. For instance, Tamang in the area we work, have infrastructural reality of relations of domination and sub­ abandon ned the celebration Dasain as a Hindu and ordination in Nepal. In Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, it are focussing on making Buddhist /hosar a focal context constitutes an active misrecognition of relations of domi­ for asserting Tamang culture in a broader alliance with eth­ nation. Contemporary janajati movements are a continua­ nic associations like the Gurung who have developed , in tion of a history of opposition to relations of domination some areas at least, an anti-Dasain/ which is celebrated and the ideologies that support them. at village and district cultural centers at the time of Gurung Lhosar. Buddhism is in many respects the rallying point II. My second point relates to the larger transforma­ for broad opposition but is confounded, I should note, by tions in political and cultural discourse that followed the mass Tamang conversions to Christianity in some regions. collapse of the Rana regime and the reconstruction of old orders of domination in the panchayat era and led to the In the urban/village contrast, one must note the fol­ liberalizations succeeding the People's Movement and the lowing: new constitution in 1990. In reference to the western 1. The diversity of peoples called Tamang is substantial in Tamang, identity politics did exist in the past. Communi­ both language and culture due to the history of isolation ties produced themselves as collectivities around local head­ and regional involution . The creation of pan-Tarnang iden­ men and in opposition to the outside, especially the royal tity is an urban based political cum cultural effort at a new, regime of the Ran as/Shahs and the system of c01·vee labor, synthetic iden in extensive and elaborate Buddhist rituals which gener­ ated power both symbolic and real in local communities. tity. During this period, there was no possibility for wider orga­ 2. Concerns with the preservation ofTamang language and nization under the rubric of"Tamangness." What we think

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 13 culture are primarily the concern of Tamang residentially monic Hindu order. The contest over what diversity and displaced to Kathmandu or the where issues of na­ nationalism constitute forms one of the core elements in tion and diversity are especially sali ent. contemporary politics of culture and identity in Nepal. 3. At present, party division and longstanding political fac­ Given the cunent literacy rate in Nepal, whi ch is only tions in village communities are more influential in village about 39% of the total population, school education can life than ethnic associations at least in the western Tamang have only limited influence in generating consciousness of areas where Tamang are the dominant population. national scope. Nevertheless, formal education provides a ground for producing a group of dominant elite who are My final point is brief and meant to lead into the com­ able to perpetuate the power to control the statecraft and ments of my collaborators. Colonial typologies of caste produce and reproduce consciousness, including that of and tribe atticulated early on by scholars like Btian Hodgson diversity and nationalism. The debate on strategies in terms set the stage for modern anthropology which started off in of both contents and media for gradually universalizing a unproblematic acceptance of the basic terms of those schooling in Nepal, for example, has provided a forum for typologies. These typologies, it turns out, are largely con­ encounters between Janjati discourse and previously domi­ sistent with those of Hindu state ideologies leading to a nant views. School textbooks comprise one important state­ curious triangulation in the representation of difference in deployed means reflecting the negotiated results of such Nepal where Hindu colonizers produced categories of dif­ debate. ference which incorporated non-Indo-Nepalese which were then applied in principle in the formative ethnology of School textbooks, particularly the Nepali primers titled Nepal. These categories ironically are in significant mea­ Mahendra Mala, and social studies from their beginning, sure the nodes of contemporary janajati organization which introduce Nepal to children with quotes from King Prithvi are constructed as challenges to the models of the Hindu Narayan Saha. A famous quote which goes "Nepal is a state. They have led furthermore to the charge that anthro­ garden of four vama and thirty six jat" (~ ""ffi" 'l1'f ~ pologists, particularly those of the western persuasion, are ~ 'fi<1cfRT it) is found across the books of various grades. fanning the flames of ethnicity. It is common for high The quote is understood and interpreted in dominant mod­ caste intellectuals and elite of Nepal to debunk the ethnic ern Nepali discourse as recognition of cultural diversity movements as "constructed" but to debunk these move­ and an endorsement of the policy of harmony and co-ex­ ments is to attempt to disempower groups historically de­ istence. nied power in Nepal at the very moment they begin to ex­ Along this line, Prayag Raj Sharma ( 1997), for example, ercise power in a challenge to the old order. An appercep­ suggests that the idea of cultural diversity has been a part tion of conditions of differential power based on group of and implicit in Nepal's historical legacy. He further sug­ membership is essential to ethnic peace in Nepal and must gests that the state has done a great deal to create a collec­ begin not in the denials and defensiveness that are so com­ tive consciousness of cultural diversity as a positive value. mon among dominant sectors of the population but in ac­ Some of the descriptions in textbooks glorifying plural­ ceptance of the reality of differential power and continu­ ism, appear to support the idea that the government is com­ ing superordinate position of certain heriditary groups. mitted to fostering the notion of harmony and co-existence in multicultural and multi-lingual Nepal. One example of such text, found in a social studies book for grade 7, tells Mukta S. Tamang the children the following: Representation of Diversity in School Textbooks: Nepal is a country like a beautiful garden ... She is Implications for Politics of Culture and Identity in Nepal so beautiful because of the existence of peoples with I would like to discuss the issue of how cultural diver­ many different castes, ethnicities, religions, customs sity is being represented in school textbooks in Nepal and and qualities. (ln11'r ~ ~:GW ~ ~ ~ it ."lffit what are its implications in the politics of culture and iden­ ~ ~ ~. '11'f, mt, ~' TJUm ~erR·~~ tity in the country. The existing school textbooks, as one ~ !!fu -mit ~ itt) of the state-owned devices, evoke the concept of diversity The understanding of diversity, however, cannot be seen to create a harmonious national culture, at the same time separate from the project of national integration. The five reifying difference by categorizing peoples with particular year plan for education in Nepal prepared in 1956, for ex­ dispositions. Various ethnic activists have challenged the ample, stated its rationale as to "develop a system of edu­ existing state renderings of diversity for their representa­ cation that is national in character and suited to the genius tions in school textbooks and other public media. They of the people and to develop citizenship in all ." contend that the conceptualization of the multicultural re­ Similarly, the new education plan of 1971 states that ality of Nepal in dominant natTatives legitimizes the hege-

14 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(1-2) 2000 " ... Nepalese society will not lead to national solidarity and Prithvi Narayan Saha is the founder of modern independent sovereign nationhood without [a) central guid­ Nepal. Had he not unified the weak and disputing ance in planned socialization (aimed) at coordinating the small nations of the country, we would not have various economjc and social interests, harmonizing diverse been able to identify ourselves as Nepali belonging multi-lingual traditions into a single nationhood." to Nepal. ('f«fi 'lT(Tl:l1l[ 'l asymmetrical caste-based or modern development-based fWl>m ~ 1) evolutionary perspective, the ethnic communities are por­ Nepal is our birth place. We are all Nepali. We trayed as backward populations with particular kinds of have no . We all are subjects of one social, cultural and economic dispositions at the bottom country. (~ liTI'iT ;J[rll ·@r lit 1 wtT ~ 'itT ~ \I'OlT if 1) Diversity in this national integrative framework be­ Through these lessons children learn about themselves comes an ideology of domination by inclusion. As an ide­ as members of a single and unified nation. National inte­ ology, it has constantly been manipulated and adjusted by gration, therefore, is an extended version of P.N. Saha's the ruling elites in Nepal to perpetuate the unequal power physical unification, bringing diverse cultural, social and structure. As Harka Gurung (1998) succinctly puts it, di­ economic spheres under control of the state. To meet the versity to the homogenizing state of the dominant Hindu further demand of modern nation building, children have elites means "variation (of the peoples) not only in genus been taught several other unifying elements such as the and species but also in status and privileges ordained by state prescribed slogan "our kjng, our country; our language, the law of the land, Muluki Ain (1854)". The unequal sta­ our dress" (liTI'il ~ liTI'iT hr, liTI'iT 'llf!'IT liTI'iT -il>r) and a set of tus is characterized by economic exploitation, political national symbols drawn from Hindu symbology and ac­ oppression and cultural marginalization. In the educational tive kingship (cow, flag, red blob, crown, royal crest, coat sector, for example, 96% of the school textbook writers of arms, scepter, royal standard, and national anthem). One come from high caste hill Bahun, and Newar com­ of the most illuminating text descriptions spread across munities and those groups accounting for 70% of the children's books reads as follows: country's total graduates. (Nepal is the name of our country. We all are Nepali The discourse on diversity produced by means of edu­ who live in Nepal. There are peoples of many dif­ cation, therefore, subtly but vehemently undermines the ferent jar (caste). Bahun, Chhetri, Newar, Gurung, possibility of co-existence within a plural society. As chil­ Magar, Rai, Limbu are jars. There are other jars as dren of imagined communities, school students in Nepal well. Despite many jars, we have one kjng. We are misinformed and taught to see themselves as members have one country. All jat do not fo llow the same of the Hindu national community in order to promote na­ religion. Some worship , some worship Bud­ tional integration (Anderson 1983, Gellner 1983, Chaterjee dha, some worship Bishnu and some . In Nepal 1993). Integrative framework with hegemonic content all are called Hindu.) e'rfr, ;tSO, ~. lfiR, m, would view ethnic plurality as a deterrent to co-existence fi;rKr ·qn'f ;;n(f lit I ffi 31'(> ;;n(f

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 15 changes, their concems are fundamentally directed toward townspeople are losing their language and that people are transformations of existing understanding and practice of forgetting how to "do things the Tamu way". In essence cultural diversity in Nepal. people are forgetting about the cultural centrality of the shamanic traditions and TPLS have taken on the role of reminding them "so that we don't lose our culture". By Judith Pettigrew reminding Tamus of the centrality of the shamanic tradi­ Comments tions TPLS simultaneously remind people that they are not Hindu, that the Tamu-mai have a northern origin and that Tamu Pye Llw Sangh (TPLS) ("Tamu Religious and contained within the Pye ta Lhu ta is the "correct" version Cultural Organisation") is a based Tamu (Gurung) of hi story. They remind people that Tamu history was re­ organisation. Tamu Pye Lhu Sangh's self-appointed man­ written by Hindus in the 17th Century and that in the re­ date is to preserve and revitalise Tamu cultural traditions writing one group of clans became constructed as 'supe­ and in particular the shamanic traditions of the pachyu, rior' and the other as 'inferior'. The clans according to the klehbri and "bonist lama" . 13 The organisation was founded shamans pye are equal "there is no superior and no inferior in Pokhara in late 1990 by seven men all of whom are ex­ among the Tamu-mai". TPLS's stance on the relationship British soldiers/officers. The founder members are between the clans, while widely supported at an overt level shamans, sons of shamans or members of shamanic clans. particularly in the towns, is contested often covertly by those Earlier in that year two of the founder members had trav­ Tamu-mai who perceive a hierarchical relationship to ex­ elled into the uplands in an attempt to discover if the places ist. While membership of TPLS is free and open to all chanted by pachyu shamans during theii· journey to escort Tamus ("by birth all Tamus are members") in reality not the soul(s) of the dead to the afterworld, which is also the everyone would want to be involved. Tamu downward migration route, existed in the physical landscape. Their discovery that "text" matched landscape In spite of TPLS's claim that they are a cultural and formed the basis for a movement to revitalise the declining religious organisation their activities clearly also have a and threatened shamanic traditions which culminated in political dimension. Their concem over loss of cultural the founding of TPLS in November 1990. knowledge, language, and religious infringement is matched by a concern to re-socialise a version of the past TPLS now have branches throughout west-central based on shamanic knowledge which directly contests Nepal and also in Kathmandu. Their kohinbo "shamanic Hindu interpretations of Tamu history, provides the basis monastery" in Pokhara, whose architecture is based on for the assertion of a Tamu identity which is non-Hindu, shamanic symbology contains a museum and also serves and addresses the contentious issue of clan hierarchy. as a cultural centre, a site for shamanic rituals, an office and a meeting place. It's design has been reproduced in miniature in several locations in different districts. The Mary Cameron organisation's activities include among others the celebra­ Department of Sociology and Anthropology tion of Lhosar ("Tamu New Year" celebrated on 15 Poush Auburn University (end of December), the hosting of death and other shamanic rituals at the kohinbo, the organisation of and participation Ironies in the Janajaati Movement and the Politicizing in local and national Tamu conferences and the ongoing of Ethnography in Nepal: Some Cautionary Remarks search for sacred geography. TPLS members are also in­ As an anthropologist and writer on lower castes in far volved in a community archaeology and ethno-history western Nepal, I, like the people I work with, often feel I project with researchers from the Universities of Cambridge am outside looking in on what is written about Nepali cul­ and Central Lancashire. ture. In this regard, I find the recent attention to so-called TPLS members state very clearly that they are a reli­ 'janajaati,' and the rapidity with which the term has en­ gious organisation and not a political one ("we are on the tered Himalayan academic discourse, remarkable. When I religious side not the political side"). They explain that the first heard the word janajaati, I translated it as "people," shamanic traditions are under threat from Buddhism, that (as did many Nepali colleagues and friends unaware of"the young people no longer want to train to be shamans, that movement" since it literally means 'people groups.' Ad­ mittedly in the past I have worked exclusively in a village instead of the rarified political atmosphere of Kathmandu, 138onistlbonpo lama is the term TPLS members apply to the la­ I rely on spoken rather than written texts to understand mas who conduct death rituals in collaboration with the shamans people and their culture, and I refer mostly to the history of and like them include animal sac.rifice as an integral element of caste discrimination, the experience of bodily rejection their practice. In the villages they are called "purano" "old" la­ imposed on those of lower caste, and the process of disen- mas in contrast the the "naya" "new" Tibetan Buddhist lamas).

16 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000 franchisement. I wondered, based on my translation of ticipation in the UN-sponsored indigenous people's move­ janajaati, was there now a unification movement in which ment. A second criterion is a ru story of state-sponsored dis­ all barriers would be broken, a sort of second stage people's crimination based on ethnicity (religion, language, social movement following on the heels of the first? Would Nepal organization), in the pas t and now; this is the thrust behind again distinguish itself, following a relatively nonviolent the politics of the movement. They often characterize the resto ration of democracy, as a country that could bring its latter as having been "conquered" by another dominant myriads of people together? Would caste barriers be bro­ group (read Hindus). However, the first criterion of indig­ ken, not through government quotas but through the enous status is difficult to prove, and does not always pre­ people's will? The answer is no. The janajaati movement suppose the second one of discrimjnation. For example, spoken of by the few mostly men involved in it, and their while the Newars are the indisputable indigenous people social science mouthpieces is, like the groups claiming of Kathmandu, they are not particularly interested in the membership, difficult to place boundaries around. What is janajaati movement, perhaps because as a group they are evident about the so-called janajaati movement, however, relatively successful. The ease of identifying the largest is that it presents many ironies that need pointing out. To ethnic group in Nepal, the Newar, ends with it. All other call this era in Nepal's history the janajaati-yug, as was groups' origins are less than clear, a fact that keeps the done recently in an article in SINHAS, is short-sighted and janajaati movement ambiguous and questionable to those political, and does not, in my estimation, represent the sig­ on the outside. Are the Sherpa an ethnic minority, accord­ nificant movements taking place in Nepal. At a time when ing to the movement's criteria? If so, on what basis? They international dollars and Foucaultian ideas help to consti­ are not indigenous people, and it is unclear which of their tute the practices by which groups in Nepal make their rights have been violated. The people of Mustang do not boundaries and stake their identity claims, the recently really know what to call themselves. They reject the term coined term janajaati should not be used uncritically as an 'bhotay', and many have simply adopted the last name indigenous term. For in fact its circulation seems exclu­ Lama.Are the Thakah a bounded ethnic minority or an in­ sively Kathmandu-based, and its translation as "ethnic digenous group? Hard to prove, since some claim that the minority" is transparently of western politics. Thakali as a group is less than a hundred years old, having chosen their name from the Thak Kola near where they Concerned that I was unaware of something important live. What about the Khaas of far western Nepal? They are about to happen as the next era of anthropology in Nepal an ancient group in Nepal, yet one would be hard pressed unfolded (after all, a yug is a long time), I did a quick study to locate them in the centuries of intermarriage that have of the janajaati phenomenon dming the last weeks of my charactetized their rustory. Finally, groups who are the most own research this past summer. I interviewed some promi­ endangered, the Chepang and the Santa!, are only margin­ nent and controversial Tamang and Thakali leaders, asked ally involved in either the janajaati or aadibaasi movements. Nepali friends and colleagues what they thought of the movement, and attended a UN-sponsored conference in Second, as has already been pointed out, the move­ Kathmandu on the world's indigenous people (in Nepali, ment conflates janajati with adibasi. aadibaasi). The latter event was most revealing. The promi­ Third, the movement's leaders seek to correct what they nent members of the janajaati movement allended it, and rightfully claim has been state-supported and legislated gave speeches using the two tetms interchangeably. Though discrimination (within the army, the schools, etc.) against everyone had the UN guidelines for the identification and certain groups. They want equal treatment under the law. protection of the world's indigenous people (those whose Here, regrettably, I find the greatest irony of the so-called cultures are at threat of extinction due to political, eco­ janajati movement. For while on the one hand their legiti­ nomic and environmental upheaval), the groups in Nepal macy claims cite discrimination toward them, most if not to whom 'indigenous' clearly applies in this sense, the all these groups have themselves, over the decades and Chepang and Santa!, were glaringly absent from the pro­ centuries, adopted the most discriminatory practice of Hin­ ceedings. I wondered throughout the short conference if duism, social, economic and religious marginalizing of the UN would accept the indigenous status of those mak­ lower castes. When I pressed janajaati leaders on this point, ing speeches. they said that at times in their history adopting certain Hindu From this admittedly short exploration, there aie four practices was necessary, such as untouchability, or risk os­ points I would like to make about the politics ofthejanajaati tracism and possible imprisonment. In effect, because they movement in Nepal. First, it is unclear who qualifies as an felt dominated, they also needed to dominate. Would they, ethnic minority. Leaders have established criteria of what then, welcome the most oppressed groups, the untouch­ a janajaati is, but these are debatable on several grounds. ables, into their movement? Lower castes would techni­ An important criterion is an indigenous status, and it is on cally meet the criteria of janajaati participation- oppres­ this basis that the janajaati movement has justified its par- sion by a dominant group, development of their own Ian-

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 17 guage, state-supported discrimination. When asked, the gion and society. His writings influenced the course of janajaati leaders thought they would not want them in­ South Asian studies profoundly. Among his unpublished volved, since untouchables have their own organiza­ papers, archived in the India Office Library, is "Murmiharu tions. Would they consider relinquishing their own discrimi­ ko kulachar" (~ ~) or, as he rendered the titl e natory practices for the obvious contradiction they present · hirnself, 'Manners and customs of the Murmi.' 1 'Murmi' to their own movement? They, again , thought not because is the name Hodgson applied to (at least some of) the of the present . It is these sorts of contra­ peoples today known in the central as 'Tamang.' dictions that ethnographers of the janajati movement need Tamang, today, number some 600,000 persons, living to consider. throughout the middle hills of Nepal, making them the larg­ Turning to my last point, and the final irony of the est single ethnic (formerly known as 'tribal') group in janajaati movement is its sexism. They mostly exclude Nepal. Tamang peoples came originally from the central women. On this point, leaders (men) claim that janajaati Asian plateaus to become peasant subsistence agricultur­ women are equal to men, within their cultural groups, and alists in Nepal. They speak dialects closely related to Ti­ therefore not in need of equal protection under the law. In betan, practice Buddhism and respect its textual specialist contrast to these claims, though, anthropologists of ethnic lama-s, as well as embracing a vigorous shamanic tradi­ minorities in Nepal have not concluded that women have tion. Unlike lowland Nepali society, Tamang communi­ equal status in all the groups, though often they have greater ties are not organized along caste lines, according to which economic power than their high caste Hindu counterparts. endogamous groups are explicitly ranked in terms of titual Though under current Nepali law women still cannot in­ purity and occupational pollution; instead, Tamang have herit land equally with men, leaders in the women's move­ unranked exogamous clans. Tamang incorporation into ment find little participation from women of ethnic mi­ modern Nepal has been problematic: for two hundred years, norities. Tamang rents, taxes and especially con1ee labor were es­ sential to the creation of the state of Nepal, but Tamang I would caution against assuming a Nepali-wide and peoples have been otherwise excluded from modern op­ vibrantjanajati movement that is indigenous and well sup­ portunities, such as education, civil service, and mercenary ported by the people, or that proposes viable measures to military service by the social, religious and political prac­ right the wrongs imposed on non-Hindus. The Nepali gov­ tices of the Hindu state. Nepal nationalists are proud of ernment has changed many of its discriminatory laws, and the fact that Nepal was never colonized by any outside has introduced school texts in ethnic languages such as forces; Tamang nationalists grapple with a history of con­ Maithili, with more in the works. The govemment has done siderable internal colonization by caste Nepali forces. little, however, to end two entrenched forms of discrimi­ Hodgson's folio Murmiharu ko kulachar, dated Saturday, nation- against lower castes (16-20% of Nepal's popula­ Jesth I, 1904 BS (Bikram Sambat =ca. 1847 AD) is part of tion) and against women. It is the dalit and women's move­ the MSS Eur Hodgson (Vol 56: folios 64-78); it comprises ments, as well as the growing efforts to protect Nepal's fourteen oversized pages handwritten in somewhat archaic environment, that I feel are significant movements with Nepali and is without question the oldest documentary evi­ lasting consequences for large numbers of people. dence specifically about Tamang cultural practice. "Murmiham ko kulachar" is a fascinating document. Kathryn March It was produced in a three-party interaction: Brian Hodgson, working with and through a literate scribe-assistant, to in­ Triangulating Tamang ethnohistory: the production of terview a Tamang man from a village to the north and east identities in colonial encounters (a collaborative project of the Kathmandu Valley. The proposed collaborative of David Holmberg, Kathryn March, Mukta Singh Tamang, project has two primary aspects: first, to glean from the and Amrit Yonjan) document itself all possible evidence about the three indi­ viduals involved and their respective investments in their Introduction and general scope of the project interchange and, second, to analyze interviews of contem­ porary Tamang individuals regarding the document, its Brian Hodgson served the British Ernpit:e during much details and significance. The overarching objectives are to of the first half of the 19th century, first in India, then Nepal. refine anthropological understanding of colonialism to in ­ He was one of those remarkable civil servants who not only clude the role of dominant elites in processes of internal administered British rule, but also imagined himself a scholar, learning several languages and researching a wide variety of topics-about wildlife, botany, linguistics, reli- 1 MSS Eur Hodgson Vol 56: folios 64-78, dated Saturday, Jesth I, 1904 VS (1847 AD).

18 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(I-2) 2000 colonialism, to add to our understanding of the genesis, as the official Pundit for the British Residency and is the codification and contemporary redeployment of Tamang author of an 1831 AD grammar of his own right (as de­ identity, to explore possibilities for integrating scholarly scribed in work by his descendant Kamal P. Malia; Shiva work constructively with Tamang cultural revival move­ Sankar, too, seems to have been a frequent translator for ments and ethnic identity politics, and, finally to further Hodgson (and accompanied the eminent Prime Minister clarify the importance of working collaboratively with lo­ Jang Bahadur on his trip to Europe). Evidence internal to cal Tarnang including activists to collect, interpret, make the document suggests that the assistant working with public, and preserve their cultural artifacts. Hodgson in on Saturday, the 1st of Jesth-month, 1904 Bikram Sam bat (BS 184 7 of the Christian Era), The document and its significance for understanding = was probably a high caste man from the Newar commu­ Tamang ethnic identity nity-the ethnic group dominant in the Kathmandu Valley As a written text, "Murmiharu ko kulachar" follows and associated with its many high cultural traditions. In many of the conventions of government documents from particular, throughout the document, there m·e misspellings Nepal of the same period: the way in which it is dated, of the sort typically made by native-Newari speaking per­ framed and scrupulously identifies its interviewee not only sons bilingual into Nepal, such as: by name, but by locality. The rest of the document out­

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 19 ~ ~ ffi'\ -mm '1

~ ~ mn- '"f'!!T flf'f "' ~ '"f'!!T c; m ~ l]";f l ~ ~I (after the birth) if (the baby is) a son and on the 8th Bilw laba. Bachan chlwna laba. According to their day if it is a daughter. They invite a lama (for the marri age customs, marriage with the mother's ceremony). brother's son and the father's sister's son is permit­ ted. And

. ~ ~ 1

20 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000 goods, debt, interest, or trade he took or gave, as well as whatever this way or that, with or without, paying out whatever ?tenth, sixth or quarter share ~ 0111"11<'11'1<11~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ..-frnr '3"~ ffi ~ -zru TT""llf -mT"1T11 m lies down. -.m- -rm. ~.on-,

ROUNDTABLE: POLITICS OF CULTURE IN NEPAL 21 ''ll1f ~ Pfi- ~ <'llif with other women in the household. The passage itself is Wfu ~ ~ >fi- ~~"'Tift m ~ 1 ~ ·A'! interesting in, first, its oblique statement that 'sati is not 11<11fll~~<11~ ~~~·A'!~~ m m ~ forbidden' and, next, in its assertion that, when done, it is 1. .. done "just like a parbatya," which is the term of reference for caste Hindus; the remainder of the passage recites San­ Whistling loudly from all four sides of the pyre plat­ skritic passage with only the most passing references to form, making loud noises with all kinds of instru­ Tamang mortuary practice. ments, shouting "HaHaHa," not letting the sati's words get out, they make loud noises. They let the All these examples point to a much more nuanced un ­ pyre platform be completely destroyed and press­ derstanding of both European and internal colonization in ing down with the wood and firewood of it, doing the Nepali context. Rather than documenting the absolute this, they bum the sati and, as always, bathe right domination of British ideas and interests, there is a richer after leaving the cremation grounds and, as always, weave. Hodgson's fascination with life cycle ritual coalsces doing the rituals all along the path, they get home. well with caste Hindu idealizations about the centrality of As always, they give the malami-s and , life cycle rituals as the defining marks of identity, but not and, as always, everyone goes home to their own about the legitimacy of sati. Tamang reliance upon lama­ houses. s to pe1form many of their rituals can, in some ways, be transposed with the caste Hindu prevalence of priests. Over the life course idealized in these rituals, how­ ~ ~ crrft' fu'1 ~ il:o1 ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ever, the centrality of maiTiage to caste Hindu construc­ ~ ~ nn

22 HIMALAYAN RESEARCH BULLETIN XX(l-2) 2000