SURVEI NASIONAL DAN KAJIAN OPINI PUBLIK; REFLEKSI PENANGANAN PANDEMI DAN DAMPAK KONSTELASI POLITIK 2024 Pengantar

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SURVEI NASIONAL DAN KAJIAN OPINI PUBLIK; REFLEKSI PENANGANAN PANDEMI DAN DAMPAK KONSTELASI POLITIK 2024 Pengantar INDONESIA POLITICAL OPINION SURVEI NASIONAL DAN KAJIAN OPINI PUBLIK; REFLEKSI PENANGANAN PANDEMI DAN DAMPAK KONSTELASI POLITIK 2024 Pengantar Lembaga riset sosial dan opini berbasis kajian akademik. Telah melakukan penelitian dalam bidang media, demokrasi, isu gender dan politik sejak tahun 2013. Indonesia Political Opinion (IPO) dalam kemajuannya fokus pada riset sosial terkait politik dan opini publik. IPO berkantor pusat di Jl. Tebet Raya, No. 2D, Jakarta. dan telah memiliki perwakilan tetap di Kota Bandung, Yogyakarta, Kota Batam dan Kota Mataram. Visi dan Misi IPO, menjadi lembaga kajian berbasis riset yang INDONESIA menguatkan relasi civil society, dan meneguhkan Demokrasi POLITICAL OPINION sebagai sistem politik berkeadaban, serta menjunjung tinggi keterbukaan. Direktur Eksekutif Dr. Dedi Kurnia Syah Putra INDONESIA Metodologi POLITICAL OPINION Multistage random sampling (MRS) IPO terlebih dulu menentukan sejumlah Desa untuk menjadi sample, pada setiap desa terpilih akan dipilih secara acak –menggunakan random kish NASIONAL grid paper– sejumlah 5 rukun tetangga (RT), pada setiap RT dipilih 2 keluarga, dan setiap keluarga akan dipilih 1 responden dengan pembagian PROP 1 PROP K laki-laki untuk kuesioner bernomor ganjil, perempuan untuk bernomor genap, sehingga total responden laki-laki dan perempuan. Pada tiap-tiap proses pemilihan selalu menggunakan alat bantu berupa lembar acak. DS 1 … DS N DS 1 … DS M Metode ini memiliki pengukuran uji kesalahan (sampling error) 2.50 RT1 RT2 RT3 RT4 RT5 persen, dengan tingkat akurasi data 97 persen. Setting pengambilan sample menggunakan teknik multistage random sampling (MRS), atau pengambilan sample bertingkat. Survei ini mengambil representasi sample sejumlah 1200 responden yang tersebar proporsional secara nasional. KK KK KK KK KK Dengan teknik tersebut memungkinkan setiap anggota populasi (responden) mempunyai peluang yang sama untuk dipilih atau tidak dipilih menjadi responden. Untuk menguji faliditas responden, IPO melakukan L P L P L P L P L P spot check pada 15 persen dari total populasi sample.[] Periode Survei 10-22 Maret 2021 INDONESIA Sampling POLITICAL OPINION JENDER PENDIDIKAN PEKERJAAN 7% 10% 9% 28% 4% 23% 50% 50% 58% 61% TINGGI MENENGAH FORMAL INFORMAL PRIA WANITA DASAR TIDAK WIRASWASTA TIDAK BEKERJA STATUS KELUARGA PENERIMA BANTUAN DEMOGRAFIS BANTUAN TUNAI 1.6% 11% 19% SEMBAKO 9% LISTRIK GRATIS 3.2% 46% BLT UMK 3% 35% 89% BLT DESA 5% KARTU PRAKERJA 3% INDONESIA TIMUR KELUARGA PKH SUBSIDI GAJI 0.8% INDONESIA TENGAH MANDIRI BLU KEMENDIKBUD 0.4% INDONESIA BARAT NON-PENERIMA 74 % Kepuasan responden terhadap INDONESIA kinerja pemerintah dalam POLITICAL OPINION Temuan penanganan pandemi Covid-19 Kinerja Presiden Bidang Sosial Bidang Ekonomi Bidang Politik/Hukum 11% 8% 7% 3% 42% 43% 31% 55% 58% 49% 37% 56% Meskipun data kepuasan responden atas bantuan sosial cukup dominan, hanya 11 persen dari penerima bantuan yang menyatakan puas. Sementara persepsi publik atas kinerja pemerintah bidang politik, PUAS TIDAK RAGU-RAGU keamanan dan hukum, didominasi ketidakpuasan kinerja. Kepuasan responden terhadap INDONESIA kinerja pemerintah dalam POLITICAL OPINION Temuan penanganan pandemi Covid-19 Kinerja Wakil Presiden Bidang Sosial Bidang Ekonomi Bidang Politik/Hukum 9% 6% 15% 13% 29% 40% 38% 36% 54% 62% 47% 51% Ketimpangan persepsi kepuasan pada Presiden dan Wapres masih mengemuka. Hal ini menandai keterlibatan Wapres dalam kerja Presiden masih belum mengemuka. Data yang muncul dipengaruhi pengetahuan publik atas minimnya PUAS TIDAK RAGU-RAGU aktifitas Wapres yang mendapat perhatian media. Penilaian responden apakah INDONESIA program jaring pengaman sosial POLITICAL OPINION Temuan (JPS) tepat sasaran dan efektif? Bantuan Tunai SEMBAKO Program Pra-Kerja Catatan khusus, Terdapat 68.1% responden menyatakan program TEPAT SASARAN 29.9 61.7 23 jaring pengaman sosial rawan dikorupsi, 51.3% TIDAK TEPAT 51.3 37.8 68.1 menyatakan jarring pengaman sosial tidak TT/TJ 18.8 0.5 8.9 signifikan membantu, 54.7% beranggapan pemilihan penerima bantuan tidak transparan dan terbuka. 5% 17% 20% 24% 32% Membaca tabulasi respon publik, program JPS 36% yang telah berlangsung, layak dan perlu untuk di 59% audit pada seluruh program. Hal ini diperlukan 63% 44% guna meningkatkan kepercayaan publik. Terutama anggapan publik terkait kerawanan korupsi dalam implementasi program yang mengalokasikan EFEKTIF TIDAK ABSTAIN (TT/TJ) anggaran sangat besar, hal ini semakin diperkuat dengan terjeratnya mantan menteri sosial Juliari Batubara (PDIP) dalam kasus korupsi Bansos. Persepsi responden atas kebijakan penutupan/pembukaan fasilitas pendidikan dan Temuan rumah ibadah selama Pandemi PENUTUPAN SEKOLAH PEMBUKAAN SEKOLAH 36% 6% Data ini membandingkan antara 64% kebijakan yang sudah diambil oleh 94% pemerintah dan dijalankan oleh publik, yakni penutupan/pembatasan SETUJU TIDAK SETUJU TIDAK sekolah dan rumah ibadah. Dan respon publik jika dua fasilitas publik PENUTUPAN RUMAH IBADAH PEMBUKAAN RUMAH IBADAH tersebut kembali dibuka. 19% Dari data yang ada, sebagian besar 2% publik merasa pandemi tidak menjadi penghalang kedua fasilitas 81% 98% tersebut dibuka kembali. SETUJU TIDAK SETUJU TIDAK Penilaian responden terhadap dampak kebijakan INDONESIA POLITICAL OPINION Pembatasan Sosial berskala Besar (PSBB)/Pemberlakuan Temuan Pembatasan Kegiatan Masyarakat (PPKM) Respon ketepatan Dampak Sosial Dampak Ekonomi Dampak Kepatuhan Dampak Kesehatan kebijakan 9% 8% 17% 23% 18% 33% 38% 28% 51% 58% 26% 75% 44% BAIK BURUK RAGU-RAGU 72% Responden menilai jika pelaksanaan PSBB/PPKM sejauh ini sudah cukup dan tidak perlu dilanjutkan (54 persen), kemudian tingkat kepatuhan responden dalam mematuhi instruksi protokol kesehatan (83 persen), selama pelaksanaan PSBB/PPKM responden tetap TEPAT TIDAK beraktifitas seperti biasa di masa PSBB/PPKM (69 persen), dan responden mengalami penurunan pendapatan selama program berlangsung (62 persen). Penilaian responden terhadap INDONESIA pelaksanaan Pilkada serentak POLITICAL OPINION Temuan tahun 2020. Respon ketepatan Dampak Keamanan Dampak Partisipasi Dampak Kesehatan kebijakan 13% 14% 21% 19% 7% 54% 36% 32% 68% 72% 64% BAIK TIDAK RAGU-RAGU/TT/TJ Secara umum publik menilai pelaksanaan Pilkada serentak 2020 berjalan aman, tidak menimbulkan konflik (60 persen), berlangsung tertib (71 persen), sesuai protokol kesehatan (48 persen). Responden beranggapan jika Pilkada tidak menyebarkan virus TEPAT TIDAK Covid19 (44 persen). Penilaian responden terhadap INDONESIA pelaksanaan Vaksinasi Covid19 dan POLITICAL OPINION Temuan persepsi yang melingkupi. Respon ketepatan Tingkat Keamanan Keandalan Bebas Korupsi kebijakan 20% 19% 27% 24% 27% 9% 13% 71% 68% 49% BAIK TIDAK RAGU-RAGU/TT/TJ 73% Responden miliki keyakinan jika program Vaksinasi diangap tepat dan baik, hal ini berdasarkan pemberitaan media (39 persen), himbauan pemerintah ( 55 persen), mengikuti tokoh agama (26 persen), dengan asumsi itu responden bersedia untuk mendapatkan Vaksin (71 persen). TEPAT TIDAK Sementara soal keyakinan program Vaksin bebas korupsi, sebagian besar responden tidak yakin (terlihat dalam tabulasi 49 persen menilai tidak bebas korupsi, hanya 24 persen yang nyatakan bebas korupsi). Tingkat pengetahuan responden terhadap INDONESIA POLITICAL OPINION program kerja kementerian selama pandemi Temuan Covid19. KEMENTERIAN SOSIAL 73.1% 2.8% KEMENTERIAN DESA DAN PDTT KEMENTERIAN DALAM NEGERI 64.8% 2.6% KEMENKO MARITIM DAN INVESTASI KEMENTERIAN PERTAHANAN 58.2% 1.1% KEMENTERIAN KOPERASI DAN UKM 25% KEMENTERIAN KEUANGAN 41.6% 29% 1.0% KEMENTERIAN KOORDINATOR PMK KEMENTERIAN PUPR 37.0% 0.7% KEMENTERIAN KELAUTAN DAN PERIKANAN KEMENTERIAN BUMN 36.3% 0.3% KEMENTERIAN PPN/BAPPENAS KEMENTERIAN LUAR NEGERI 30.5% 10% 0.1% KEMENTERIAN PERINDUSTRIAN KEMENTERIAN KESEHATAN 28.0% 20% 0% KEMENTERIAN LINGKUNGAN HIDUP DAN KEHUTANAN KEMENKO POLHUKAM 17.6% 16% 0% KEMENTERIAN RISET DAN TEKNOLOGI KEMENTERIAN AGAMA 14.4% 0% KEMENTERIAN PEMUDA DAN OLAHRAGA KEMENPAREKRAF 12.0% FAKTOR PERSEPSI 0% KEMENTERIAN PAN-RB KEMENTERIAN PERDAGANGAN 10.5% 0% KEMENTERIAN ESDM KEBIJAKAN KEMENKO PEREKONOMIAN 9.0% 0% KEMENTERIAN SEKRETARIS NEGARA KEM. PENDIDIKAN DAN KEBUDAYAAN 8.5% KETEGASAN 0% KEM. KOMUNIKASI DAN INFORMASI KEMENTERIAN PERHUBUNGAN 7.8% INTEGRITAS/KONSISTENSI 0% KEMENTERIAN ATR/BPN KEMENTERIAN HUKUM & HAM 5.4% EMPATI/PEDULI 0% KEMENTERIAN PEMB. PEREMPUAN - PERL. ANAK KEMENTERIAN PERTANIAN 4.2% FAKTOR LAIN 0% KEMENTERIAN TENAGA KERJA Tingkat pengenalan responden terhadap INDONESIA –popularitas-- menteri dan kementerian POLITICAL OPINION Temuan yang dipimpin. PRABOWO SUBIANTO 56.1% 2.7% IDA FAUZIAH TITO KARNAVIAN 43.6% 2.1% BAMBANG BRODJONEGORO SANDIAGA S. UNO 39.2% 1.5% MUHADJIR EFFENDY MAHFUD MD 30.1% 12 1.3% TETEN MASDUKI 24 SRI MULYANI INDRAWATI 29.5% 10 1.1% PRATIKNO AIRLANGGA HARTARTO 27.8% 0.8% SYAHRUL YASIN LIMPO ERICK TOHIR 25.1% 0.5% TJAHJO KUMOLO TRI RISMAHARINI 21.4% 16 0.2% ZAINUDIN AMALI LUHUT BINSAR PANDJAITAN 17.8% 0.1% ABDUL HALIM ISKANDAR RETNO L. MARSUDI 15.0% 38 0.0% SOFJAN JALIL BASUKI HADIMULJONO 14.6% 0.0% SAKTI WAHYU TRENGGONO FAKTOR PERSEPSI YASONNA LAOLY 12.5% 0.0% SUHARSO MONOARFA BUDI GUNADI SADIKIN 12.0% KETEGASAN/WIBAWA 0.0% AGUS GUMIWANG KARTASASMITA NADIEM MAKARIM 6.2% PEMBERITAAN MEDIA 0.0% ARIFIN TASRIF YAQUT CHOULIL QOUMAS 5.7% MERAKYAT 0.0% SITI NURBAYA JOHNY G. PLATE 5.5% TURUN KE MASYARAKAT 0.0% GUSTI AYU BINTANG DARMAVATI BUDI KARYA SUMADI 4.5% LAINNYA 0.0% MUHAMMAD LUTHFI INDONESIA Tingkat kepuasan responden POLITICAL OPINION Temuan terhadap kinerja menteri. SRI MULYANI INDRAWATI 54.7% 1.9% BAMBANG BRODJONEGORO RETNO L. MARSUDI
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