The Peril of Prussianism
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The Case of the S
THE CASE OF THE S. S. WIMBLEDON 1923 Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.) (ser. A) No. 1 (Brief Summary and Excerpt∗) At the end of World War I, Germany and the Allied Powers signed the Peace Treaty of Versailles.1 The Treaty was punitive in nature and did not allow Germany to add any reservations or to contest any provision contained therein. The provision most directly at issue in the Wimbledon case was Article 380, which provided that "[t]he Kiel Canal and its approaches shall be maintained free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations at peace with Germany on terms of entire equality.” [11] During the summer of 1920, Germany's neighbor Poland was at war with Russia, and Germany declared herself a neutral in the conflict. A French company chartered an English vessel, the S.S. Wimbledon, which the Polish government hired to carry war materiel to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig (Gdansk today). The most direct route from France to Danzig involved traveling through the English Channel into the North Sea and then through the Kiel Canal. The canal connects the North Sea to the Baltic Sea and lies just north of Hamburg with both of its banks in German territory. German money paid for its construction and German labor built it.. On the morning of March 21, 1921, the S.S. Wimbledon arrived at the entrance to the Kiel Canal. Neutrality orders issued in the summer of 1920 prohibited the transport through German territory of war materiel destined for either belligerent. -
World War I Concept Learning Outline Objectives
AP European History: Period 4.1 Teacher’s Edition World War I Concept Learning Outline Objectives I. Long-term causes of World War I 4.1.I.A INT-9 A. Rival alliances: Triple Alliance vs. Triple Entente SP-6/17/18 1. 1871: The balance of power of Europe was upset by the decisive Prussian victory in the Franco-Prussian War and the creation of the German Empire. a. Bismarck thereafter feared French revenge and negotiated treaties to isolate France. b. Bismarck also feared Russia, especially after the Congress of Berlin in 1878 when Russia blamed Germany for not gaining territory in the Balkans. 2. In 1879, the Dual Alliance emerged: Germany and Austria a. Bismarck sought to thwart Russian expansion. b. The Dual Alliance was based on German support for Austria in its struggle with Russia over expansion in the Balkans. c. This became a major feature of European diplomacy until the end of World War I. 3. Triple Alliance, 1881: Italy joined Germany and Austria Italy sought support for its imperialistic ambitions in the Mediterranean and Africa. 4. Russian-German Reinsurance Treaty, 1887 a. It promised the neutrality of both Germany and Russia if either country went to war with another country. b. Kaiser Wilhelm II refused to renew the reinsurance treaty after removing Bismarck in 1890. This can be seen as a huge diplomatic blunder; Russia wanted to renew it but now had no assurances it was safe from a German invasion. France courted Russia; the two became allies. Germany, now out of necessity, developed closer ties to Austria. -
23. Relativism and Radical Conservatism
This is the preprint version of a book chapter published by Routledge/CRC Press in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Relativism, edited by Martin Kusch (Abingdon: Routledge, 2020), 219–27 on December 4, 2019, available online: http://doi.org/10.4324/9781351052306-24. 23. Relativism and radical conservatism Timo Pankakoski and Jussi Backman ABSTRACT. The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism’s problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism’s ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements – such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of “life” as the basis of politics – to discredit notions of universal political morality and law, thereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his 1 thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist. -
The Changing Depiction of Prussia in the GDR
The Changing Depiction of Prussia in the GDR: From Rejection to Selective Commemoration Corinna Munn Department of History Columbia University April 9, 2014 Acknowledgments I would like to thank my advisor, Volker Berghahn, for his support and guidance in this project. I also thank my second reader, Hana Worthen, for her careful reading and constructive advice. This paper has also benefited from the work I did under Wolfgang Neugebauer at the Humboldt University of Berlin in the summer semester of 2013, and from the advice of Bärbel Holtz, also of Humboldt University. Table of Contents 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………….1 2. Chronology and Context………………………………………………………….4 3. The Geschichtsbild in the GDR…………………………………………………..8 3.1 What is a Geschichtsbild?..............................................................................8 3.2 The Function of the Geschichtsbild in the GDR……………………………9 4. Prussia’s Changing Role in the Geschichtsbild of the GDR…………………….11 4.1 1945-1951: The Post-War Period………………………………………….11 4.1.1 Historiography and Publications……………………………………11 4.1.2 Public Symbols and Events: The fate of the Berliner Stadtschloss…14 4.1.3 Film: Die blauen Schwerter………………………………………...19 4.2 1951-1973: Building a Socialist Society…………………………………...22 4.2.1 Historiography and Publications……………………………………22 4.2.2 Public Symbols and Events: The Neue Wache and the demolition of Potsdam’s Garnisonkirche…………………………………………..30 4.2.3 Film: Die gestohlene Schlacht………………………………………34 4.3 1973-1989: The Rediscovery of Prussia…………………………………...39 4.3.1 Historiography and Publications……………………………………39 4.3.2 Public Symbols and Events: The restoration of the Lindenforum and the exhibit at Sans Souci……………………………………………42 4.3.3 Film: Sachsens Glanz und Preußens Gloria………………………..45 5. -
WWI Study Guide: Causes
Unit VII: WWI Study Guide: Causes IB Syllabus Details: The First World War • Diplomacy, alliances, ententes • Imperialism, arms race • Nationalism, incidents, Balkan wars • Social and economic changes during and after the War • Versailles and other treaties • Post-war economic and political problems Study Questions: 1. Why were both the French and the British concerned about German aspirations after 1870? 2. What developments led the British to abandon their “splendid isolation”? 3. How were European international relations affected in the years 1905 to 1913 by the crises over a) Morocco and b) the Balkans? Quotes: How far do you agree with the following quotes? 1. “It had long been felt that a unified Germany would revolutionize the relationships of the European peoples; after 1870 these anticipations were confirmed.” 2. “The Serbs conceived of their small kingdom as the Piedmont of the South Slav Risorgimento.” 3. “The Balkan crisis of 1914 proved fatal because two others had gone before it, leaving feelings of exasperation in Austria, desperation in Serbia, and humiliation in Russia.” 4. “Although it is not true that Germany started the war, as its enemies in 194 popularly believed, it must be granted that its policies had for some years been rather peremptory, arrogant, devious, and obstinate.” 5. “The alliance system was an obvious cause of the war, but it was only a symptom of deeper trouble- the world had an international economy but a national polity.” Identification: Know what each item is and its importance. Dual Alliance 1879 “Splendid isolation” Triple Alliance Franco-Russian Alliance Entente cordiale Triple entente Annexation of Bosnia Black Hand Sarajevo crisis German “blank check” WWI Study Guide- Course of War Study questions: 1. -
How Britain Unified Germany: Geography and the Rise of Prussia
— Early draft. Please do not quote, cite, or redistribute without written permission of the authors. — How Britain Unified Germany: Geography and the Rise of Prussia After 1815∗ Thilo R. Huningy and Nikolaus Wolfz Abstract We analyze the formation oft he German Zollverein as an example how geography can shape institutional change. We show how the redrawing of the European map at the Congress of Vienna—notably Prussia’s control over the Rhineland and Westphalia—affected the incentives for policymakers to cooperate. The new borders were not endogenous. They were at odds with the strategy of Prussia, but followed from Britain’s intervention at Vienna regarding the Polish-Saxon question. For many small German states, the resulting borders changed the trade-off between the benefits from cooperation with Prussia and the costs of losing political control. Based on GIS data on Central Europe for 1818–1854 we estimate a simple model of the incentives to join an existing customs union. The model can explain the sequence of states joining the Prussian Zollverein extremely well. Moreover we run a counterfactual exercise: if Prussia would have succeeded with her strategy to gain the entire Kingdom of Saxony instead of the western provinces, the Zollverein would not have formed. We conclude that geography can shape institutional change. To put it different, as collateral damage to her intervention at Vienna,”’Britain unified Germany”’. JEL Codes: C31, F13, N73 ∗We would like to thank Robert C. Allen, Nicholas Crafts, Theresa Gutberlet, Theocharis N. Grigoriadis, Ulas Karakoc, Daniel Kreßner, Stelios Michalopoulos, Klaus Desmet, Florian Ploeckl, Kevin H. -
Chronological Table
Chronological Table 1895 25 June Salisbury's third administration 29 December Jameson raid 1896 3 January Kaiser's telegram to Kruger 1898 17 January Salisbury's unsuccessful overture to Russia for co-operation in China 25 March Cabinet decides to lease Wei-hai-wei from China 29 March Chamberlain's bid for Anglo-German al- liance 10 April Reichstag ratifies First Naval Law 4 May Salisbury's 'dying nations' speech 13 May Chamberlain's bid for friendship of U.S.A. and Germany (Birmingham speech) 14 June Anglo-French convention over West Africa 30 August Anglo-German agreement over Portuguese colonies 2 September Battle of Omdurman 18 September- December Anglo-French crisis over Fashoda 1899 21 March Anglo-French convention over Central Af rica: France excluded from Valley of Nile 18 May- 29 June First Hague Peace Conference 12 October Boer War begins 14 November Anglo-German agreement over Samoa 30 November Chamberlain proposes Triple Alliance (Leicester speech) 10-15 December 'Black Week' in Boer War I goo January Bundesrath affair 27-28 February Formation of London Representation Com mittee 17 May Relief of Mafeking CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE 259 13 June- 14 August Boxer rising in China 14 June Second German Naval Law 16 October Anglo-German agreement over China (Yangtze) November Salisbury relinquishes Foreign Office to Lansdowne 1901 22 January Death of Victoria; accession of Edward VII 12 March Lansdowne's draft alliance for German co operation in Far East 15 March Bulow denies China agreement's application to Manchuria March-May Anglo-German discussions continue 29 May Salisbury's objections to a German alliance 25 October Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech defending British policy in South Africa 16 December U.S. -
A History of German-Scandinavian Relations
A History of German – Scandinavian Relations A History of German-Scandinavian Relations By Raimund Wolfert A History of German – Scandinavian Relations Raimund Wolfert 2 A History of German – Scandinavian Relations Table of contents 1. The Rise and Fall of the Hanseatic League.............................................................5 2. The Thirty Years’ War............................................................................................11 3. Prussia en route to becoming a Great Power........................................................15 4. After the Napoleonic Wars.....................................................................................18 5. The German Empire..............................................................................................23 6. The Interwar Period...............................................................................................29 7. The Aftermath of War............................................................................................33 First version 12/2006 2 A History of German – Scandinavian Relations This essay contemplates the history of German-Scandinavian relations from the Hanseatic period through to the present day, focussing upon the Berlin- Brandenburg region and the northeastern part of Germany that lies to the south of the Baltic Sea. A geographic area whose topography has been shaped by the great Scandinavian glacier of the Vistula ice age from 20000 BC to 13 000 BC will thus be reflected upon. According to the linguistic usage of the term -
The Censorship of Literary Naturalism, 1885-1895: Prussia and Saxony
Grand Valley State University ScholarWorks@GVSU Peer Reviewed Articles History Department 2014 The Censorship of Literary Naturalism, 1885-1895: Prussia and Saxony Gary D. Stark University of Texas at Arlington Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/hst_articles Part of the History Commons ScholarWorks Citation Stark, Gary D., "The Censorship of Literary Naturalism, 1885-1895: Prussia and Saxony" (2014). Peer Reviewed Articles. 19. https://scholarworks.gvsu.edu/hst_articles/19 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the History Department at ScholarWorks@GVSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Peer Reviewed Articles by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@GVSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. SYMPOSIUM: THE CENSORSHIP OF LITERARY NATURALISM The of Censorship Literary Naturalism, 1885-1895: Prussia and Saxony GARY D. STARK has been written in recent years about the emergence of modernist culture in^w de siecle Europe and the resistance MUCH it met from cultural traditionalists. The earliest clashes be? tween traditionalism and modernism usually occurred in the legal arena, where police censors sought to uphold traditional norms against the modernist onslaught. How successful was the state in combatting emer? gent modernist cultural movements? Arno Mayer, in a recent analysis ofthe persistence ofthe old regime in Europe before 1914, maintains that: "In the long run, the victory of the modernists may have been inevitable. In the short run, however, the modernists were effectively bridled and isolated, if need be with legal and administrative controls."1 In Germany, the first stirrings of modern literature?if perhaps not yet of full modernism?began with the naturalists, also called the "real- ists," the "youngest Germans," or simply "the Moderns."2 Naturalists Research for this essay was made possible by generous grants from the National En? dowment for the Humanities, the German Academic Exchange Service, and the Uni? versity of Texas at Arlington Organized Research Fund. -
Rabbi David Fränckel, Moses Mendelssohn, and the Beginning of the Berlin Haskalah
RABBI DAVID FRÄNCKEL, MOSES MENDELSSOHN, AND THE BEGINNING OF THE BERLIN HASKALAH. REATTRIBUTING A PATRIOTIC SERMON (1757) Addenda Gad Freudenthal On December 10, 1757, R. David Fränckel (1707–1762), Chief Rabbi of Berlin Jewry, delivered in German a sermon on the occa- sion of Frederick the Great’s victory at Leuthen five days earlier (5 December). Volume 1 of EJJS carried my article describing the genesis of this so-called “Leuthen Sermon” and established that (contrary to previous consensus) it was written by David Fränckel and not by his former student Moses Mendelssohn (1729–1796).1 Rather, it was written in Hebrew by Fränckel and only translated into German by Mendelssohn. In an appendix, I described the very rich aftermath of the sermon: after having been very elegantly translated into English (we do not know by whom) and published by the ephemeral London publisher W. Reeve in 1758, the translation was reprinted no less than four times in New England. Mr. Shimon Steinmetz from Brooklyn (N.Y.) kindly drew my attention to three earlier relevant items that had escaped my atten- tion. He also supplied copies of them. I herewith thank him warmly for his generous and erudite help and share his findings with readers of EJJS: [1] As early as March 1758, The Scots Magazine, published in Edinburgh, carried the following entry in the section “New Books”: A thanksgiving-sermon from Psal xxii. 23.24 for the King of Prussia’s victory Dec. 5. Preached on the sabbath of the 10th, in the synagogue of the Jews in Berlin. -
Staying Optimistic: the Trials and Tribulations of Leibnizian Optimism
Strickland, Lloyd 2019 Staying Optimistic: The Trials and Tribulations of Leibnizian Optimism. Journal of Modern Philosophy, 1(1): 3, pp. 1–21. DOI: https://doi.org/10.32881/jomp.3 RESEARCH Staying Optimistic: The Trials and Tribulations of Leibnizian Optimism Lloyd Strickland Manchester Metropolitan University, GB [email protected] The oft-told story of Leibniz’s doctrine of the best world, or optimism, is that it enjoyed a great deal of popularity in the eighteenth century until the massive earthquake that struck Lisbon on 1 November 1755 destroyed its support. Despite its long history, this story is nothing more than a commentators’ fiction that has become accepted wisdom not through sheer weight of evidence but through sheer frequency of repetition. In this paper we shall examine the reception of Leibniz’s doctrine of the best world in the eighteenth century in order to get a clearer understanding of what its fate really was. As we shall see, while Leibniz’s doctrine did win a good number of adherents in the 1720s and 1730s, especially in Germany, support for it had largely dried up by the mid-1740s; moreover, while opponents of Leibniz’s doctrine were few and far between in the 1710s and 1720s, they became increasing vocal in the 1730s and afterwards, between them producing an array of objections that served to make Leibnizian optimism both philosophically and theologically toxic years before the Lisbon earthquake struck. Keywords: Leibniz; Optimism; Best world; Lisbon earthquake; Evil; Wolff The oft-told story of Leibniz’s doctrine of the best world, or optimism, is that it enjoyed a great deal of popularity in the eighteenth century until the massive earthquake that struck Lisbon on 1 November 1755 destroyed its support. -
Building an Unwanted Nation: the Anglo-American Partnership and Austrian Proponents of a Separate Nationhood, 1918-1934
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Carolina Digital Repository BUILDING AN UNWANTED NATION: THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP AND AUSTRIAN PROPONENTS OF A SEPARATE NATIONHOOD, 1918-1934 Kevin Mason A dissertation submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of PhD in the Department of History. Chapel Hill 2007 Approved by: Advisor: Dr. Christopher Browning Reader: Dr. Konrad Jarausch Reader: Dr. Lloyd Kramer Reader: Dr. Michael Hunt Reader: Dr. Terence McIntosh ©2007 Kevin Mason ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ii ABSTRACT Kevin Mason: Building an Unwanted Nation: The Anglo-American Partnership and Austrian Proponents of a Separate Nationhood, 1918-1934 (Under the direction of Dr. Christopher Browning) This project focuses on American and British economic, diplomatic, and cultural ties with Austria, and particularly with internal proponents of Austrian independence. Primarily through loans to build up the economy and diplomatic pressure, the United States and Great Britain helped to maintain an independent Austrian state and prevent an Anschluss or union with Germany from 1918 to 1934. In addition, this study examines the minority of Austrians who opposed an Anschluss . The three main groups of Austrians that supported independence were the Christian Social Party, monarchists, and some industries and industrialists. These Austrian nationalists cooperated with the Americans and British in sustaining an unwilling Austrian nation. Ultimately, the global depression weakened American and British capacity to practice dollar and pound diplomacy, and the popular appeal of Hitler combined with Nazi Germany’s aggression led to the realization of the Anschluss .