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Foreign Military Studies Office https://community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 10 Issue #12 OEWATCH December 2020 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT EURASIA 3 Russia-Pakistan Security Cooperation 4 Russian Military Presence in Armenia and the Region 6 Turkey’s Security Cooperation in Central Asia 7 Dodging the Draft 9 Improving the Officer Promotion System 10 Russian Media: Ukraine Considering Legislation Enabling Forced Relocation of Russians 11 “Red Berets” University Chosen to Train Russian Military Police 12 Russia Launches New GLONASS-K Satellite 14 GLONASS Ground Crew Operations 16 GLONASS General Designer on Improving Navigational Precision 19 Russian Media: US Sanctions Hinder GLONASS Modernization 21 Contract Soldiers and AWOL 22 Russian Concerns over Chinese Espionage 23 Early Lessons-Learned from Nagorno Karabakh 24 Sweden Increases Sub-Arctic Defense 25 Kurile Islands Getting Up-armored 27 A Turkish Perspective: Key Military Takeaways from the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict INDO-PACIFIC 28 Foreign Perspectives of the Geopolitics of Data Governance 30 Chinese Central Military Commission Issues New Outline of Joint Operations 31 China Lays Out Technology Road Map to Catch Up with the United States 32 China Questions Safety Issues in Military Intelligentization 33 An Indian Perspective on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) 35 Indian Defense Chief Sees Collusion Between China and Pakistan 38 Chinese Mobile Apps and China’s Increasing Digital International Presence MIDDLE EAST, NORTH AFRICA 40 IRGC Air Force Unveils Underground Facility and Missile Rail System 41 Iran: We Have Five Years to Grow the Population 42 Iran: Construction Begins on the Chahbahar-Zahedan Railway 43 Iran: Conflicting Assessment of China Talks 44 Is Turkey Preparing for War in Idlib? 46 Syrian Kurdish Commander Discusses Issues Facing Kurds AFRICA 48 France Reaffirms Counter-Terrorism Commitments with Mali 49 Climate Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa 50 “Good Coups” Present Dilemma for African Union 51 In Africa, China Learns Development May Not Improve Security 52 East African Terrorists Take Advantage of Coastal Security Gaps 53 Kenyan Perspectives on Tanzania’s General Election 54 As Ethiopia Conducts Military Ops in Tigray, the African Union Pushes for Peace 55 South Sudan-Uganda Troops Clash Along Disputed Border 57 South Africa’s Defense Industry in Decline, Looks to Boost Exports 58 Arms Used by al-Shabab Extremists in Somalia Attack Linked to North Korea LATIN AMERICA 59 ELN Suffers Major Blow 60 Peruvian Presidency in Flux 61 Diplomacy in Bolivia 62 Chileans Will Write a New Constitution 63 Spain Not Sending Ambassador to Venezuela APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is part of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command G-2, whose mission OEWATCH is to Understand, Describe, Deliver, and Foreign News & Perspectives Assess the conditions of the Operational of the Operational Environment Environment. For over 30 years, FMSO has conducted open source research Volume 10 | Issue 12 December | 2020 on foreign perspectives of defense and security issues, emphasizing those topics that are understudied or Regional Analysts and unconsidered. Expert Contributors Operational Environment Watch Eurasia Chuck Bartles provides translated selections with Ray Finch background from a diverse range Les Grau of foreign media that our analysts Ihsan Gündüz Adam Rodger and expert contributors believe will Matthew Stein give security professionals an added dimension to their critical thinking Indo-Pacific Dodge Billingsley about the Operational Environment. Cindy Hurst Karen Kaya Peter Wood The views expressed in each article are those of Middle East, North Africa Robert Bunker the author and do not represent the official policy or Ihsan Gündüz position of the Department of the Army, Department Alma Keshavarz of Defense, or the US Government. Release of this Michael Rubin information does not imply any commitment or intent on the part of the US Government to provide any Africa Robert Feldman additional information on any topic presented herein. Joseph Hartung The appearance of hyperlinks does not constitute Sura Jaradat endorsement by the US Army of the referenced site Jacob Zenn or the information, products, or services contained therein. Users should exercise caution in accessing Latin America Geoff Demarest hyperlinks. Editor-in-Chief Tom Wilhelm The Operational Environment Watch is archived Editor Dodge Billingsley and available at: https://community.apan.org/wg/ Design Editor Thomas Tolare tradoc-g2/fmso/. ON THE COVER: Chinese Peacekeeping Battalion in South Sudan being awarded UN Medal for Service. Source: UNMISS/Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/unmissmultimedia/36743053214/in/album-72157687458137433/ Attribution: CC BY-NC-ND 2.0 EURASIA Russia-Pakistan Security Cooperation OE Watch Commentary: After the governments of Pakistan and Russia established a security cooperation partnership several years ago, there were questions about what it would include, particularly since the Russian government could damage its relations with India depending on the level of cooperation with Pakistan. The accompanying excerpted article reports on a recent joint military exercise of Russian and Pakistani forces and it provides a look at how this security cooperation partnership continues to take shape. The article comes from The Frontier Post, an independent English-language newspaper in Pakistan, and it reports how Russian “personnel of the Southern Military District arrived in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan aboard an Il-76 military transport plane to participate in the Friendship 2020 joint Russian- Pakistani drills” and that the Russian contingent included “over 70 servicemen of the special operations company of the Southern Military District’s 49th combined arms army.” The article also mentions how the exercise (also known Jump Training from helicopters of the service members of Russia and Pakistan at the exercise “Friendship-2016”. as Druzhba-2020) will take place “at the Pakistani Army’s Tarbela special Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File: Тренировка_по_десантированию_из_вертолетов_ operations training ground and on the territory of the National Counterterrorism военнослужащих_России_и_Пакистана_на_учении_«Дружба-2016» _(4).jpg, CC BY 4.0 Center in Pabbi” and that the “Russian-Pakistani military drills have been held annually since 2016 alternately in each of the countries.” In July 2019, the Russian government notably declined a deal from Pakistan for the purchase of a large order of a new Kalashnikov variant. There were reports that the deal did not go through because of pressure from the Indian government; however, Pakistan did acquire several Mi-35 attack helicopters from Russia in 2017. According to the article, “in September, a contingent of the Pakistani armed forces participated in the opening ceremony of the multinational military exercise titled ‘Kavkaz-2020’ in Astrakhan, Russia.” The Indian government declined to participate in Kavkaz-2020, supposedly because of Pakistan’s involvement. Outside of the lone acquisition of helicopters in 2017, the latest exercise shows how far Russia-Pakistan security cooperation partnership extends. End OE Watch Commentary (Stein) “Previously in September, a contingent of the Pakistani armed forces participated in the opening ceremony of the multinational military exercise titled “Kavkaz-2020” in Astrakhan, Russia” Source: Bilal Afridi, “Russian commandos arrive in Pakistan for joint drills,” The Frontier Post, 5 November 2020. https://thefrontierpost.com/ispr-russian-forces-arrive-in-pakistan-for-fifth-joint-military-drill/ …The official press statement remarked that, “The personnel of the Southern Military District arrived in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan aboard an Il-76 military transport plane for participating in the Friendship 2020 joint Russian-Pakistani drills. The international drills involve over 70 servicemen of the special operations company of the Southern Military District’s 49th combined arms army, and also officers of the command headquarters.” …the drills will run at the Pakistani Army’s Tarbela special operations training ground and on the territory of the National Counterterrorism Center in Pabbi. In addition to this, the personnel from both countries will exchange experience and practice inter-operability in accomplishing a broad range of missions, in particular, eliminating illegal armed formations and conducting reconnaissance and search measures employing aircraft and technical reconnaissance capabilities… The exercise was aimed at sharing both armies experiences in counter terrorism domain, said an Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release… Friendship joint Russian-Pakistani military drills have been held annually since 2016 alternately in each of the countries, the Russian press office underscored. Previously in September, a contingent of the Pakistani armed forces participated in the opening ceremony of the multinational military exercise titled “Kavkaz-2020” in Astrakhan, Russia. OE Watch | December 2020 3 EURASIA Russian Military Presence in Armenia and the Region OE Watch Commentary: Even before the governments of Armenia and Azerbaijan signed the ceasefire agreement on 9 November that included the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to Nagorno Karabakh, Russian forces were already deployed in Armenia in a couple of capacities. The accompanying
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