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Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 1 From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future Aymen Jawad al-Tamimi Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 2 Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 3 Abstract: This paper focuses on the history and evolution of the group Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, beginning from its formation as the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, to Jabhat Fatah al- Sham and, finally, the present form of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham. Based on testimonies from high-ranking operatives, the article discusses the complex relationship of Jabhat al-Nusra, Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to al-Qaeda during the transformation and rebranding process. In addition, the paper examines how Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham operates on the ground, including relations with other factions and the approach adopted towards governance. Finally, the paper sheds light on the current state and future of Hay'at Tahrir al- Sham in the Syrian insurgency. Despite Hay'at Tahrir al- Sham's pre-eminent position in the remaining insurgent-held territories, the success and future viability of this project are highly questionable, particularly in light of its commitment to form a unified front for the insurgency and to push for a polit- ical revolution inside Syria. Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 4 N.B.: The content of this publication does not necessarily reflect the official opin- ion of the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung or the Al-Nahrain Center for Strategic Studies opinion. Responsibility for the information and views expressed in this publication lies entirely with the author. Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 5 From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future Introduction: The Current Dispersion essentially mean subordinating itself to of Hay'atTahrir al-Sham Turkish interests and demands - something unacceptable to the group. Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham ('Organization for the Liberation of the Levant', subsequently Not negligible, but far less significant than HTS) is the most powerful single entity in the its presence in Idlib, is HTS's existence in Syrian insurgency today. The group exerts southern Syria. The two southern provinces control over most of the insurgency's epi- of Deraa and Quneitra, which remain largely center in the northwestern province of Idlib, under insurgent control, broadly come under including the province's capital of Idlib City. the 'Southern Front' coalition that has Indeed, the province is the main area received backing from an operations room administered by the rebel group today. in Amman, Jordan, and is over seen by Western, Gulf and Jordanian intelligence1. However, given the fragmentation of In these areas, HTS does not generally offer Syria's insurgency today, HTS's level of the institutions of governance that it offers in influence in Idlib and its immediate sur- Idlib, and there is little evidence of influence roundings is not replicated in other zones of over the existing local councils and the Dar the insurgency. For example, the north al-'Adl, which is the main court system in Aleppo countryside enclave extending from rebel-held parts of southern Syria. Instead, Afrin to Jarabulus has no meaningful HTS the group's most notable function in south- presence. This fact partly stems from a long- ern Syria has been taking a lead role in standing rejection of military cooperation insurgent offensives that take place in cer- with foreign states to fight the Islamic State, tain areas on an occasional basis. For as the notion of a 'safe zone' in the north instance, HTS played the leading role in the Aleppo countryside enforced by the Turkish 'Army of Muhammad' operations room, military was partly intended to clear the which attempted - unsuccessfully - to break Islamic State from the northern border with through government-held lines in the Hadr Turkey. area of Quneitra in a bid to reach the last insurgent-held enclaves of Beit Jann in The concept of this zone, known as the southwest Damascus countryside (West 'Euphrates Shield' area, was rejected by Ghouta) in the vicinity of Mt. Hermon. In that HTS earliest predecessor, Jabhat al-Nusra, isolated enclave of Beit Jann, which col- which largely withdrew from this region. lapsed by the end of 2017 at the hands of a Today, this zone is heavily influenced by Syrian government offensive, HTS was an Turkish-backed bodies, including local coun- important faction among the remaining rebel cils, judiciaries and security institutions. The groups, but negotiated for the departure of zone has now been extended through a its fighters, there by rejecting a 'reconcilia- Turkish-backed rebel offensive between tion' with the Syrian government. January and March 2018, integrating most of the Afrin enclave that was controlled by The limitation of HTS's influence in Deraa the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and Quneitra is partly linked to the tight bor- (SDF). For HTS to expand and establish a der control policies implemented by Jordan, meaningful presence in those areas would aimed at preventing a free-for-all flooding of 1.- As of the time of writing, the operations room - known as the MOC - appears to be closed, though the Southern Front continues to exist as a coalition and some Arab and Western countries support some factions of the coalition, see "Why didn't the 'Southern Front' mobilize to support Ghouta?", Al-Modon, April 10, 2018. Continued support for certain factions appears to be based on the condition of fighting the Islamic State affiliate Army of Khalid bin al-Waleed in southwest Deraa on the border with the Golan Heights. 5 Konrad English book 5.qxd 6/29/2018 10:22 AM Page 6 From Jabhat al-Nusra to Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham: Evolution, Approach and Future weapons and foreign fighters into the south 1. Jabhat al-Nusra and its Relations with of Syria. Furthermore, the presence of HTS al-Qaeda (2012- 2016) in the south had been weakened by their predecessors' military losses in the past. For When Jabhat al-Nusra ("Support Front") example, Jabhat al-Nusra suffered high first emerged in January 2012, it did not offi- attrition rates in its fighting with the Islamic cially declare any formal ties to al-Qaeda out State-linked Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade in the of a fear of losing local support. In not doing southwest corner of the province, which has so,it acted similarly to other jihadist groups since evolved into the 'Army of Khalid bin al- that had emerged in the region in the wake Waleed' after merging with other Islamic of the Arab Spring, such as the Ansar al- State-linked groups in May 20162. Shari'a movements in Tunisia, Libya and Yemen. The propaganda on jihadist forums, While HTS is the most powerful single however, revealed that Jabhat al-Nusra was insurgent group today, fragmentation and re- aligned witha broader transnational jihadist localization have affected the group's func- movement. tioning and power over time. In fact, its lead- ing position within the insurgency today is Despite some initial suspicions about the more a result of the weaknesses of its rivals group on account of the mass casualty than its own strength or structural organiza- attacks it carried out, Jabhat al-Nusra tion. For instance, HTS does not exert any emerged by the end of 2012 as an important control over the oil-rich areas of east Syria, military actor within the insurgency. Thus, in contrast to Jabhat al-Nusra's position in when U.S. intelligence identified the group the province in 2013 and 2014 until the as originating from within the Islamic State of Islamic State's conquest of the area. Iraq (then thought of as al-Qaeda's affiliate Presently, with the decline of the Islamic in Iraq) and labelled it a terrorist organiza- State, the eastern region is divided between tion, there was widespread anger from with- the Syrian government and the Syrian in the opposition. Democratic Forces (SDF), and it is highly unlikely that HTS will gain a foothold in the Its actual affiliation to al-Qaeda ultimately region in the foreseeable future, denying the became clear when Jabhat al-Nusra was group access to what would have been a forced to distance itself from the Islamic lucrative source of revenue. State in Iraq and al-Sham. In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi unilaterally declared that The history of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham from Jabhat al-Nusra should merge with his the original Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fatah Islamic State of Iraq to form the Islamic State al-Sham in July 2016 and, ultimately, to in Iraq and al-Sham. Seeking to defend his Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham in January 2017 does group's autonomy from Baghdadi, Jabhat al- not reveal a continual ascendancy in Nusra leader Abu Muhammad al-Jowlani absolute power and influence, but rather a declared a 'renewal' of the allegiance pledge story of significant challenges and internal (bay'a) to al-Qaeda leader Ayman al- ruptures. This history will be a key focus of Zawahiri, hoping that al-Zawahiri would rule this article. in his favour in the dispute with Baghdadi. As a consequence, al-Zawahiri ordered the Islamic State to return to Iraq as the Islamic State of Iraq while urging the two sides to 2.- See Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi,"Yarmouk Valley: The Formation of Jaysh Khalid ibn al-Waleed?", May 24, 2016.

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