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On Fugitive Politics Praxis and Critique: On Fugitive Politics by Matthew James Hamilton A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Political Science University of Toronto © Copyright by Matthew James Hamilton (2019) Praxis and Critique: On Fugitive Politics Matthew James Hamilton Doctor of Philosophy Political Science University of Toronto 2019 Abstract Through dialectical reflection upon the predicament of fugitive political praxis – forms of political action or claim making compelled to resist or give expression to political wrongs via the very mediums and contexts that sustain their imperceptibility and uninhabitability – this dissertation engages simultaneously in an immanent critique of the ‘primacy of [decentered/ fugitive] praxis’ and the development of a critical theory of fugitive politics. The ‘primacy of praxis’ names a constellation of contemporary political thinking that has discovered, out of both the ruins of sovereign or autonomous subjectivity (‘the decentering of the subject’) and the impasses of Critical Theory, novel forms of (fugitive) political possibility. The challenge of the dissertation is to salvage the promise of fugitive praxis from the antinomous theoretical architecture that falsifies it by inflating its plurality, agonism and indeterminacy into the status of ontological, affirmative or axiomatic givens. To raise the question of the inhabitability of fugitive politics is to ask after the particular social and political conditions that variably obstruct or facilitate responsiveness to the fragile claims of fugitive politics. Thinking both with and against Adorno – using his own philosophical insights to exceed his philosophy’s particular, historically sedimented limitations – the dissertation aims to rethink the interpretation of fugitive praxis in the historical present by reconsidering his critical conception of mediation. Critical political interpretation, I will argue, ii neither affirms the resistant or heterogeneous power of (de-centered) praxis, nor discloses its impossibility within the mediating context of the historical present. On the contrary, it proceeds through micrological ambivalence to elucidate political praxis amidst the world particularity of its emergence – in triumphant and transient flashes as well as in its disappointing, constrained and damaged forms – neither to celebrate nor mourn, but to disclose the conditionality of praxis and so to dis-close concrete insight as to how different form of praxis and different forms of political institutions might be realized. iii Acknowledgments Perhaps Adorno’s most incontrovertible insight was that even the most autonomous forms of thought and action owe their possibility to the support of others who have shaped, enabled and challenged them along the way. The allure Adorno’s philosophy has held for me owes in no small part to the aptness with which this insight holds in my own case. The individual whom has imparted the most significant impact on this project is my supervisor, Peggy Kohn. From her suggestion, years ago, that I take up Adorno’s Aesthetic Theory until the final defense, both her patience and advice have been the sine qua non of this dissertation. Her guidance saw me through the difficult process of developing my own theoretical voice amidst a whirl of competing languages, problems and influences. She has set a lofty image of what a scholar and political theorist can be. Her example has left an indelible impression on every aspect of my professional life. Davide Panagia has exerted an immeasurable influence upon my thinking from my first days as a graduate student at Trent University, and it would not be hyperbolic to characterize the present work as an attempt to grapple with the challenges and perplexities inaugurated by his novel approach to political theory. Additionally, his scholarly and professional guidance have help offered orientation amidst an unfamiliar world. David Cook, Ruth Marshall and Jennifer Nedelsky have each offered immense contributions, both as members of my dissertation committee and as scholars who played decisive roles in shaping my thinking, from unforgettable seminars at the early stages of my research to penetrating and incisive challenges that gave shape and direction to my written work. iv I would like to thank Robyn Marasco for agreeing to serve as the external examiner. Her penetrating insights made for an excellent discussion during the defense. The challenges she posed will offer an invaluable spur to my future thinking. A number of friends and colleagues have made important impressions on my thinking throughout the research process, in forums such as the department’s Political Theory Research Workshop, conference presentations, the wonderful yet seemingly interminable Hegel reading group, to simply taking the time to provide helpful feedback, including Nathan Litwin, Stephen Trochimchuk, Simon Lambek, Stefan Dolgert, Oisin Keohane, and Yaniv Feller. Cody Trojan, in particular, has been a true friend, in the full Aristotelian sense, since the beginning. Funding to support my research has been provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, the Province of Ontario, as well as the School of Graduate Studies and the Department of Political Science. Finally, I could not have survived traversing the dissertation desert with the warmth and support of my family. My parents, Dick and Sandra and my brother, Michael, whom I’ve seen too little for too long, have offered nothing but unconditional support. To my wife, Stacey, who has not only made this work possible, but who has, from the beginning, been the spark of that makes life more than mere living, this is for you. v Table of Contents Part One: Adorno, Politics and the Primacy of the Object Chapter 1 Adorno and the Decentering of Political Theory ………………… …….. 1 1.1 Introduction: From the Primacy of Praxis to the Primacy of the Object.. 1 1.2 Foreignness of Adorno’s Philosophy: The Challenge of the Preponderance of the Object ……………………………………….. 7 1.3 The Primacy of Praxis Constellations………………………………… 15 1.3.1 On Force Fields ………………………………………………. 15 1.3.2 Nietzsche and the Aporetics of Autonomy …………………….. 20 1.3.3 The Primacy of Praxis in Contemporary Political Theory …………………………………………………………………… 30 Chapter 2 Recovering the Political Promise of Adorno’s Philosophical Constellation……………………………………………………………………… 35 2.1: Natural-Historical Interpretation as Critical Disclosure ……………… 35 2.2: Preponderance of the Object…………………………………………… 46 2.3: Conclusion: Towards a Re-configuration of the Praxis-Conditions Relation ………………………………………………. 53 Chapter 3 Rethinking Adorno’s Critical Politics: From Blocked to Damaged Praxis …………………………………………………………………………… 61 3.1: The More and Less of Mediation: Understanding Adorno's Critical account of Distance from the Object ……………………………………….. 65 3.2 Exaggeration and Resignation: Adorno’s Transgression of Micrological Critique ……………………………………………………………. 74 Chapter 4 Praxis and Wrong Life: The Uninhabitability of Fugitive Politics ……… 81 4.1 Odysseus and the Oarsmen: Dualism as Damage …………………… 84 4.2 The Contradictory Totality ………………………………………………... 89 4.2.1 The Sundering of Experience and Praxis …………………….. 91 4.3 The (mere) Promise of Reconciliation …………………………………… 95 4.4 Kompridis and the Renewal of Critical Theory: Is Adorno’s Approach to Critique Skeptical and Dualistic? ………………………………………… 97 4.4.1 Kompridis’ Critique of Odysseus and the Oarsmen: Dualism and its Discontents …………………………………………………….. 99 4.5 The Scylla and Charybdis of Negative and Affirmative Critique: Conditionality or Possibility? …………………………………………………… 105 Chapter 5 The Promise of Fugitive Politics: Reading Ibsen’s A Doll’s House …. 112 5.1 Cavell and Kompridis Reading Ibsen: The Politics of Critical Responsiveness ……………………………………………………………….. 115 5.2 Adorno on Art and Reconciliation: Bernstein’s Reading of Ibsen ……… 122 5.3 #MeToo: The Uninhabitability of the Fugitive …………………………… 131 vi Part Two: Adorno after the ‘Critique of Critique’: Thinking Past the Limits of Contemporary Democratic Theory Chapter 6 Butler's Contribution to the Politics of Reconciliation ………………….. 135 6.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………. 135 6.2 The Stakes of Critical Resistance ………………………………………… 138 6.3 Butler's Ex-Static Mediation ……………………………………………….. 143 6.4 Reconstructing the Stakes of Butler's Early Account of Resistance …. 140 6.5 Towards an Immanent Critique of Dissonant Repetition ………………. 147 6.6 (Mis)reading Butler's 'turn' …………………………………………………. 152 6.7 The Language-Character of Suffering: From Levinas to Adorno ……… 161 6.8 Butler's Inheritance of the Reconciliation Problematic ………………….. 168 6.9 The problem of Reconciliation: Inhuman Mediations …………………… 173 Chapter 7 Rancière and the Primacy of Praxis ……………………………………… 181 7.1 Chapter Outline……………………………………………………………… 188 7.2 The Formative Problem: Rancière's Critique of Critique ……………….. 191 7.3 Rancière's Response to the Problem: Equality and the Rethinking of the Moment of Subjective Mediation ………………………………………… 194 Chapter 8 An Immanent Critique of the Primacy of Praxis ………………………. 210 8.1 Rancière’s Critics: Partial Steps towards the Conditionality of Praxis … 215 8.2 Predicaments of the Politics of Conditionality ……………………………. 224 8.3 Neutralization of Conditions; Naturalization of Resistance …………….. 234 8.4 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………… 253 Chapter 9 Berlant's Lateral Agency: Towards an Outline of Conditional Political Praxis …………………………………………………………………………….
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