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A Defence of Jilrgen Habermas's Discourse Ethics A DEFENCE OF JURGEN HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE ETHICS SO IS THERE A PLACE FOR MORALITY? A DEFENCE OF JORGEN HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE ETHICS By CRAIG FAUCETTE, RA. A Thesis Submitted to the School ofGraduate Studies in Partial Fulfilment ofthe Requirements for the Degree Master ofArts McMaster University © Copyright by Craig Faucette, September 2000 MASTER OF ARTS (2000) McMaster University (Philosophy) Hamilton, Ontario TITLE: So is There a Place for Morality? A Defence ofJilrgen Habermas's Discourse Ethics. AUTHOR: Craig Faucette, B.A. (Wilfrid Laurier University) SUPERVISOR: Professor E. Boetzkes NUMBER OF PAGES: vi, 93 11 Abstract The purpose ofthis thesis is to offer a defence of Jlirgen Habermas's discourse ethics against rival ethical theories that are oriented toward questions ofthe good life. Habermas's discourse ethics is founded on the Kantian distinction between the right and good. This distinction has come under fire from hermeneutically informed theorists, such as Georgia Warnke and Charles Taylor, as being either unattainable and unnecessary (Warnke), or contradictory as it must rely on the cultural contextuality in which it is formed (Taylor). But since Habermas's discourse ethics is discursive in nature and founded on the structural pragmatics of language use, it is able to effectively answer both Warnke's and Taylor's concerns. I attempt to prove this by showing that Habermas grounds discourse ethics through linking it with the perspective in which participants partake in actual discourse; thus providing a quasi-contextual basis, while it still remains Kantian in nature, as its scope and function is cognitive, universal and formal. 11l Acknowledgements I would like to thank my family, Brenda, Michael and Paul Faucette, for providing support, both emotional and financial. A very special thanks to my advisors Dr. Elisabeth Boetzkes and Dr. Brigitte Sassen for their illuminating and helpful comments, and for taking on a project that fell outside their areas of interest. To Dr. Allison Weir and Dr. Nikolas Kompridis at Wilfrid Laurier University for introducing me to Habermas. I would also like to thank the graduate students in the department ofphilosophy during the years of 1998-2000, especially Michael Thomson. The penetrating discussions and comradery both inside and outside the class helped sharpen both my philosophic knowledge and this thesis topic, and gave me a sense ofcommunity amongst many good souls. To Amy, I really cannot put into words the contribution you have made to this project and my life in general. I just hope there is a way to repay you for all the things you have done. And finally, this thesis is dedicated to the above mentioned people as I do not believe I could have completed this project without all ofyour help. I offer my deep gratitude as all ofyour unique contributions to this project have enriched my life. Thanks. IV TABLE OF CONTENTS: Introduction 1 The Moral Point ofView: Jiirgen Habermas's Discourse Ethics 6 2 A Place for Morality? Georgia Warnke's Critique of Discourse Ethics 41 3 Finding the Source: Charles Taylor's Critique of Procedural Approaches to 66 Ethics Conclusion 87 Bibliography 90 v LIST OF ABBREVIATraNS ltirgen Habermas: MCCA Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1990) JA Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993) TCA, I The Theory o.fCommunicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society vol. 1 (Boston: Beacon Press,1984) PT Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992) Georgia Warnke: LD Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). JI Justice and Interpretation. (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1993) Charles Taylor: SS Sources ofthe Self: The Making ofthe Modern Identity. (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1989) VI Introduction Much ofthe debate in contemporary ethics and politics has focused on the cogency ofmaking a distinction between the "right" and the "good." In political theory this debate has revolved around the differences between Liberals and the so-called Communitarians. Liberal political theorists, such as John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, argue that the state must remain neutral on questions ofthe good life and focus its concern on rights-based problems that do not in theory privilege one notion ofthe good over any other. Communitarians such as Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel, on the other hand, argue that the liberal notion ofneutrality as it concerns questions ofthe good is a chimera, stating that it is either itself a vision ofthe good life or policies that stem from it in fact privilege certain notions ofthe good over others.! Since the state cannot remain neutral, it should return to its republican roots advocating civic participation and self- government. In ethics, the debate has been somewhat similar. Neo-Kantians argue for a moral theory that is concerned with validating norms that regulate action and are universal in nature. While neo-Aristoteleans argue that our ethical and moral principles must reflect the political and ethical traditions ofthe cultures and forms oflife in which they are I Michael 1. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), and Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition." In Multiculturalism, edited by Amy Gutmann, 25-74. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 1 2 embedded. As a result, ethical theory cannot take on a universal character, but is rather dependant on culture and time. So far the problem with these debates is that neither side seems to have really learnt from the other. Instead solitudes have been erected between both traditions of thought, where each side is able to effectively point out the other's deficiencies but is unable to incorporate the other's strengths into its own approach. Thus, the debate has resulted in a stalemate. One exception to this trend is the moral theory of JUrgen Habermas. Habermas's moral theory, also known as discourse ethics, is a rights-based approach to ethics. It is firmly entrenched in the Kantian moral tradition. So at first view it would seem that his approach reflects the same pattern I indicated above. But what separates Habermas from other neo-Kantians is that his discourse ethics is able to effectively account for the criticisms brought forward by hermeneutically informed neo-Aristotelean ethics of the good by incorporating some oftheir insights. Hermeneutic thinkers such as Georgia Warnke and Charles Taylor, point out that Kantian inspired theories advocate a moral position that is abstracted from the moral horizon ofthe agents who must rely on it. Thus, on the one hand, the effectiveness of neo-Kantian moral theory to help answer our moral dilemmas is placed into question. While on the other hand, the abstract moral theory is unable to take account ofthe differing notions ofthe good life, forcing it to sacrifice the good while advocating the right. But as I shall argue in the following chapters, Habermas's discourse ethics offers an answer to these criticisms. Firstly, Habermas advocates a dualistic approach to ethics. 3 He brackets questions that concerned the right way to act (moral questions) from questions ofthe good life (ethical concerns). Both the moral and the ethical viewpoint playa role in his discourse ethics. As we shall see, each looks to answer questions that the other cannot take into account. Secondly, unlike other neo-Kantian approaches to ethics, Habermas's moral viewpoint-articulated in the principles of universalization (D) and discourse (D)-is not based on an external rationale that is abstract from the moral sensibilities ofagents involved in moral discourse. His discourse ethics is rather grounded in the formal pragmatic structure of language use, which means that the moral viewpoint is derived from a participant-based perspective. Even though it looks to validate universal norms, its foundation and strength rest with a community of interlocutors who attempt to resolve their moral dilemmas discursively. Chapter 1 is devoted to a discussion ofHabermas's justification of discourse ethics. I am looking to delineate the primary facets ofhis cognitive discursive approach to moral questions. This will require a briefexplication ofsome ofthe other thinkers-such as Lawrence Kohlberg, Jean Piaget, P. F. Strawson, and R. Alexy-that have influenced discourse ethics, and also its basis in Habermas's earlier work. The point ofthis chapter will be to account for the sharp distinction Habermas makes between moral and ethical questions, and his justification of a particular moral point ofview which is not based on the values or standards ofanyone particular culture. In Chapter 2 I shall discuss Georgia Warnke's criticism ofHabermas's discourse ethics. Warnke, informed by an interpretive stance rooted in the pluralistic approach of 4 literary criticism, asserts that any moral theory that makes a distinction between moral and ethical questions and looks to find agreement on those moral questions is misguided. Warnke believes that ethics must instead look to account for the plurality ofvalues that members of a given society or culture hold. She claims that an ethical theory must recognize that there is not only one correct interpretation of our moral dilemmas. It must facilitate the agent's acknowledgment of the interpretive character of her beliefs, which indicates that there is more than one valid interpretation and her own interpretation cannot fully account for the whole ofthe dilemma. Accepting such a position gives moral agents the chance to learn from other differing points ofview, where they can improve their own understanding and create a common ground between them. Although I do not necessarily want to reject Warnke's interpretive pluralism altogether, I shall argue for the need for a particularly moral discourse. As we shall see, some ofour debates require that we come to an agreement over what we believe to be right.
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