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Sarah Howell Crater School of Business, Innovation, and Science May 9, 2014 Sarah Howell [Peru]

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Sarah Howell Crater School of Business, Innovation, and Science May 9, 2014 Sarah Howell [Peru] International Marketing Project: Peru Sarah Howell Crater School of Business, Innovation, and Science May 9, 2014 Sarah Howell [Peru] Table of Contents Introduction………………………………………………………………………. page 3 Issue………………………………………………………………………………….. pages 4 to 5 Non-Profit…………………………………………………………………..…….. pages 5 to 7 Geographical Area Analysis………………………………………………… pages 8 to 9 Economic Analysis…………………………………………………………..…. pages 9 to 17 Political System………………………………………………………………….. pages 18 to 22 Trade Laws and Legal Analysis……………………………………………. Page 23 Population…………………………………………………………………………. Pages 24 to 29 Diet and Nutrition……………………………………………………………… pages 29 to 31 Housing……………………………………………………………………………... pages 31 to 33 Transportation…………………………………………………………………… pages 34 to 36 Labor…………………………………………………………………………………. pages 36 to 38 Education…………………………………………………………………………... pages 39 to 41 Clothing……………………………………………………………………………... pages 41 to 42 Recreation and Leisure……………………………………………………….. pages 42 to 44 Language……………………………………………………………………………. Pages 44 to 49 Religion………………………………………………………………………………. pages 49 to 50 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….. pages 51 to 53 Appendix……………………………………………………………………………. Page 54-63 Non-Profit Print Ad………………………………………………. page 54 Issue Brochure…………………………………………………….. page 55 Recipes………………………………………………………………… pages 56 to 61 Etiquette Information………………………………………….. pages 61 to 62 Country Selection Letter………………………………………. Page 63 Page 2 Sarah Howell [Peru] Introduction Working hard to become more modern and clean Peru is moving forward in leaps and bounds. In the early 2000’s almost half of the population lived below the national poverty line, but through a focus and effort less than a third of the Peruvian population now live below the line. (ruralpovertyportal.org). Although such an improvement can be seen, there is still a concern for the rural areas, in which over 50 percent of those who live in rural areas live below the poverty line. (ruralpovertyportal.org). It can be seen that the lack of a good education has been a cause of the continuation of the rural poverty. Education in Peru has been improving in the last decade, and continues to work on problems in the system. It has been moving forward in the city, but there is still a worry about the adjustment needed in rural education. The Peru Education policy decrees that school is compulsory for the youth of seven to sixteen years old, and in addition that education is free of cost. (mapsofworld.com) Throughout this, the education has increased in number, although the quality of education has not reached that of the United States. There is also the worry that those who live rurally do not have as much access to the schools. Peru is moving forward in education, which will continue to increase the amount of knowledgeable citizens in the future. As was mentioned before, there is a large problem of the poverty seen with Peruvians living in the rural areas. In Peru 8 million people are under poverty conditions, but only a third of the population lives below the poverty line. The issue is problem of the urban versus rural development. The rural poverty rate still sits at over 50 percent and this because of the focus of growth in urban areas. The government focuses on bettering the areas of Peru that are seen as having the opportunity to advance, and at the same time leaving villages behind that are full of villagers barely able to survive. While the urban areas of Peru advance, the rural areas fall farther behind and experience problems of poverty. Our focus is on this issue of rural poverty, and how we can better the education that is being provided at this point. We believe that education is the key to success, and the future of Peru. By allowing students the opportunity to attend schools with the supplies and tools they need, we believe that these educated students can go back into their villages and make the difference needed to improve their environment. When children attend school, they are encouraged to learn creativity, problem solving, and life skills. With more students entering into the rural areas who have knowledge and understanding, we believe that it is possible to stop the constant cycle of uneducated people birthing uneducated children. With more innovative minds, these children will be the future of the rural Peru. With more education and opportunities, we can renew rural Peru. Page 3 Sarah Howell [Peru] Issue In Peru 8 million people are under poverty conditions, but only a third of the population lives below the poverty line. Peru is considered to be a country that is rising in the world rankings, and last year it was ranked 77th out of 187 countries on the United Nations Development Programmes’s Human Development Index. (ruralpovertyportal.org) The issue is not the lack of forward movement in the country but the urban versus rural development. The rural poverty rate still sits at over 50 percent and this because of the focus of growth in urban areas. This poverty is the overlying name for many smaller problems such as; illiteracy, lack of essential services, inadequate research and training, and poor infrastructure. (ruralpovertyportal.org) While the urban areas of Peru advance, the rural areas fall farther behind and experience problems of poverty. Poverty, defined as the deficiency of the necessary or the state of having little or no money and goods, is prominent in the rural areas. (dictionary.reference.com) In rural areas there are problems of lack or little education, electricity, and the rights to water or land are not secure; with a deficiency in these areas it creates an environment of hungry children and hard-working parents that make enough only to survive. This than causes a large rate of poverty in the rural areas of Peru, and creates a large separation between those who live in the cities and those who dwell in rural villages. 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% 70.00% 60.00% 50.00% 40.00% 30.00% Drinking Water Source 20.00% Sanitiation Facility Access 10.00% 0.00% (CIA Factbook) Page 4 Sarah Howell [Peru] Those born in Lima can expect to live almost 20 years longer than those in rural areas. (ruralpovertyportal.org). With the situations of survival that must be endured in rural areas, the life span of those indigenous to rural areas are endangered. A lack of education for the youth in these areas, the children are bringing brought up to live lives of the same poverty of their parents seeing as they aren’t being given the tools to make the change. The above chart compares the drinking water sources and sanitation facility access improvement. It can be seen that the improvement of the urban area is always higher, and the rural areas are seemingly unimproved. This proves that there is a large movement to advance in the urban areas, but the rural areas are continually non-changing. Therefore, with no growth in the rural areas of Peru the poverty levels will also continue as they are. Being 4,130 miles apart, Southern Oregon and Peru do not have a strong connection, but though this is true, making a difference in Peru poverty means making the difference in people’s lives. Without our help, there are many Peruvian children who might never reach their full potential of becoming a research doctor, physicist, or a spacecraft engineer. With the help of a non-profit, it can be made sure that there are no lives wasted in rural Peru. In addition, crime develops in desperate situations. People living in poverty can feel pressed to do things they wouldn’t otherwise. We can help lower the world crime rate by putting these people in better situations. While the urban areas of Peru advance, the rural areas fall farther behind and experience problems of poverty. This is something that should be seen as a large problem, as it is hindering the even larger growth of the country. With the help of our non-profit, we can help to supply the basic needs and educate better the rural citizens. Our main purpose will be to solely create a better life for those in poverty situations. Non-Profit Non-Profit name Renew Peru Mission Statement Our mission is to renew rural Peru through funding student’s school fees, paying for the necessary tools, and ensuring the possibility of education for these children. Page 5 Sarah Howell [Peru] What We Do Our focus is on youth living in rural areas, and education. We believe that education is the key to success, and the future of Peru. By allowing students the opportunity to attend schools with the supplies and tools they need, we believe that these educated students can go back into their villages and make the difference needed to improve their environment. When children attend school, they are encouraged to learn creativity, problem solving, and life skills. With more students entering into the rural areas who have knowledge and understanding, we believe that it is possible to stop the constant cycle of uneducated people birthing uneducated children. With more innovative minds, these children will be the future of the rural Peru. With more education and opportunities, we can renew rural Peru. Our Plan as Renew Peru is to fight the education problem by picking children through an application process. After the children have been chosen, we will fund them to have all the clothes, book, and supplies they need to be successful students. In addition, we will have monthly check-ins to ensure that the students are successful. We will continue to choose more students, and hope to educate and stop the current cycle. Ways You Can Help Donate Money Renew Peru will create a special program to encourage donors to participate in which participants can choose a child to sponsor through their education, and provide for. We will make this a personal experience so that the donors can receive updates on their “children” if they are interested.
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