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SHSH Commentary on the June 2013 Afghanistan

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SHSH Commentary on the June 2013 Afghanistan THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. 19th June 2013 A commentary on the June 2013 Afghanistan Operational Guidance Note This commentary identifies what the ‘Still Human Still Here’ coalition considers to be the main inconsistencies and omissions between the currently available country of origin information (COI) and case law on Afghanistan and the conclusions reached in the June 2013 Afghanistan Operational Guidance Note (OGN) issued by the UK Border Agency. Where we believe inconsistencies have been identified, the relevant section of the OGN is highlighted in blue. An index of full sources of the COI referred to in this commentary is also provided at the end of the document. This commentary is a guide for legal practitioners and decision-makers in respect of the relevant COI, by reference to the sections of the Operational Guidance Note on Afghanistan issued in June 2013. Access the complete OGN on Afghanistan here. The document should be used as a tool to help to identify relevant COI and the COI referred to can be considered by decision makers in assessing asylum applications and appeals. This document should not be submitted as evidence to the UK Border Agency, the Tribunal or other decision makers in asylum applications or appeals. However, legal representatives are welcome to submit the COI referred to in this document to decision makers (including judges) to help in the accurate determination of an asylum claim or appeal. The COI referred to in this document is not exhaustive and should always be complemented by case-specific COI research. Contents 2.2 Actors of Protection p. 2 2.3 Internal Relocation p. 21 3.9 General security situation p. 42 3.11 Locally engaged staff p. 44 3.13 Minors p. 51 APPENDIX Index of sources p. 74 Useful sources to consult on the security situation in Afghanistan p. 81 Useful sources to consult on the situation for internally displaced persons in Afghanistan p. 83 1 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. 2. Country Assessment 2.2 Actors of protection Excerpt from June 2013 Afghanistan OGN 2.2.15 Conclusion: If the applicant‘s fear is of ill-treatment/persecution by the state authorities, or by agents acting on behalf of the state, then consideration needs to be given as to whether the fear is based on a localised, random or national threat. It should be noted that the role of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is not as a source of protection for the individual citizen. 2.2.16 If the ill-treatment/persecution is at the hands of non-state agents, then the provision of state protection outside of Kabul and other main cities might not be accessible due to the structural weakness of the security services. In Kabul and other cities the authorities are in general willing to offer protection to citizens; however their willingness and ability to do so needs to be judged against the individuals facts of each claim. It is important therefore that caseworkers refer to the most up to date country information to ascertain whether in the circumstances prevailing at the time the decision is made, effective protection is available for an individual applicant, taking full account of their personal circumstances. 2.2.17 Effective protection is generally not available, even in Kabul, for women (see section 3.12.11) It is considered that the COI provided at paragraphs 2.2.2 – 2.2.14 of the OGN is generally consistent with the COI available in the public domain with regards to the inability of the police to provide effective protection in Afghanistan. In addition to setting out the structure of the police force (paragraphs 2.2.2 and 2.2.3) and NATO’s role (2.2.10), the COI included illustrates issues with the vetting of police recruits and local-level oversight (2.2.4); limited female police officers (2.2.5); human rights abuses committed by the police (2.2.6 and 2.2.9), lack of accountability and impunity (2.2.7 and 2.2.8); lack of training, illiteracy and corruption (2.2.8), weaknesses and bias of the judicial system (2.2.11 and 2.2.13). Given that these structural weaknesses affect the security forces in general, not just in those areas outside of Kabul and other main cities, it is questionable whether effective protection would ever be accessible in Afghanistan. Whilst the willingness and ability of the authorities to provide protection should be assessed based on the individual facts of each claim, as the OGN recognises, there are additional structural issues undermining police protection in Kabul not addressed in the OGN which are relevant for such cases. Non-exhaustive, illustrative COI has been presented on the following additional issues which undermine the effectiveness of the police focusing on the situation specific to Kabul. Some COI which refers to the situation for the police in general has been presented to provide greater context. The sources of COI are mainly from 2013, although where further background was considered relevant, older sources have been included: o Capacity of police force, especially in Kabul o Ability of the police to protect against insurgent attacks, especially in Kabul o Insurgent infiltration of the security forces, especially in Kabul In order to assist in conducting further research on insurgent attacks in Kabul, or elsewhere in Afghanistan, a database of useful sources to consult on the security situation in Afghanistan has also been included in the Appendix. 2 THIS DOCUMENT SHOULD BE USED AS A TOOL FOR IDENTIFYING RELEVANT COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION. IT SHOULD NOT BE SUBMITTED AS EVIDENCE TO THE UK BORDER AGENCY, THE TRIBUNAL OR OTHER DECISION MAKERS IN ASYLUM APPLICATIONS OR APPEALS. Capacity of police force, especially in Kabul Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The Afghan War in 2013: Meeting the Challenges of Transition -- Volume III: Security and the ANSF, May 2013 […] Accepting the Real-World Capability of the Police Forces It is almost as dangerous to lump all of the elements of the Afghan police together as it is to indulge in the absurdity of focusing on 352,000 men as a measure of progress when it includes so many different force elements and excludes critical elements like the ALP [Afghan Local Police]. Each element of the police forces has a radically different mix of capabilities; and level of political interference, corruption, and ties to power brokers and criminal networks. Each element has very good units within it, but the larger elements all have many mediocre and some bad and corrupt units as well. The fact that current rating systems ignore these realities out of political considerations (and sometimes a basic lack of professional competence) does not make them any less real. Dealing with Key Force-Building Challenges The ANP [Afghan National Police] is a very mixed force–subject to politics, power brokers, and corruption to a far greater extent than the ANA [Afghan National Army]. The AUP [Afghan Uniform Police] and Afghan Border Police (ABP) are critically dependent on effective governance and the other elements of the rule of law–capabilities lacking or critically weak and corrupt in at least half the districts in the country. While recent reports do reflect real progress, such progress needs to be kept in far more careful perspective than is the case for the ANA, particularly because the current rating systems– while politically correct –are fundamentally dishonest and incompetent because they do not assess either the level of support from governance and the other elements of the rule of law, or the level of political interference, corruption, and ties to power brokers and criminal networks. […] The scale of the problems involved are summarized in Figure 32 to Figure 35: • Figure 32 shows the pace of the buildup in manpower and the level of problems in attrition and turnover that still need to be addressed The problems involved are more serious than with the ANA, but like the ANA, it should be stressed that the goal is not to meet the total in manpower, but to create a stable manpower base with the proper training, and steadily more experienced officers and manpower. Like all other aspects of the sometimes - mindless race to 352,000, quantity per se rarely tells in the combat performance of an inexperienced and half- formed force. Quality always does. • Figure 33 highlights the progress in manning by corps and equipment. It is critical to understand that most of the ANP will succeed or fail at the local and district levels and on the basis of the interaction between units at the District level with local governance; the other elements of the rule of law; and the relative power of insurgents, criminals, power brokers, militias, and the ALP: Partnering with the ANP will be far harder after the 2014 election and as US and other ISAF forces and advisors withdraw, and partnering at the MoIA [Ministry of Interior Affairs] and provincial levels can only have a limited impact after 2014. Nevertheless, the ANP will need outside advisors and partners through 2016 to 2018. In practice, trying to do this from Kabul, rather than from at least several facilities in the “four corners” of the country, will again be a recipe for exceptional risk.
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