International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) and Post Conflict Peace

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (I.C.C.) AND POST CONFLICT PEACE

BUILDING PROCESS IN LIBERIA 2003-2013

OFODUM CHIOMA M.

PG/M.Sc./13/65765

A PROJECT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE (M.Sc.) IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

SUPERVISOR: PROF. OBASI IGWE

SEPTEMBER, 2014

APPROVAL PAGE

This research project work has been examined and approved by the Department of

Political Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, for the award of Master of Science (M.Sc.)

Degree.

…………………………………………….. …………………………………

Prof. Obasi Igwe Prof. Jonah Onuoha PhD

Project Supervisor Head of Department

Date:………………………………. Date:……………………………

…………………………………………….. ………………………………………

Dean of the Faculty External Examiner

Prof. A.I Madu

Date:……………………………….. Date:……………………………….

DEDICATION

To God Almighty who is the Alpha and Omega, Author and Finisher of our Faith, my family whose goodwill have kept me going.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Indeed, a positive accomplishment of a work of this magnitude would have proved holistically abortive if not for the gracious and timely intervention of some number of people with unquestionable intellectual and moral substance.

Firstly, it will be a real tremendous injustice to my humble soul if I fail to display my unalloyed appreciation to my indefatigable and ever generous and accommodating supervisor- Professor Obasi Igwe. It is not enough for me to qualify him s not just my supervisor but also to admit that his keen interest in the proper and timely completion of this work kept me going even amidst the heat. Simply put, he was more than a counselor and a mentor to me. To this extent, am most grateful.

I wish to extend my hands of appreciation to all the lecturers in the Department of

Political Science, University of Nigeria Nsukka, for their immeasurable contributions to the success of this work. A special mention must be made to Professor Jonah Onuoha (Head of

Department of Political Science) in whom I have learnt how to imbibe the culture of happiness irrespective of ups and down of life. Equally to be thanked is Professor Aloysius

Okolie (PG coordinator) in whom I learnt how to be disciplined, Dr Ezirim whose words of encouragement have always boosted my efforts of being a good student. Above all, I won’t forget the like of Professor Ken Ifesinachi whose moral support and admonishment have immensely contributed to making me academically responsible and in whom I have learnt how to be humble, cool, calm and calculated.

In the same vein, I must not fail to appreciate my Lovely family who have moulded me into what I am to today. I couldn’t have attained this height without your unquantifiable and immeasurable love and encouragement. I wouldn’t have wished for a better family.

Equally, I will not forget to commend my beloved and darling Roommates; Joy,

Ngozi and Ogonna, my friends; Mama, Papa, Amaka, Chinwe, Pitilia, all my brothers and

iv sisters in Christ, my senior Colleagues; Macas and Kingsley and above all my inestimable friend (Ibekwe Ikenna) in whose strength I found strength and in whom I have found inspiration. I wouldn’t have achieved this without you standing by me.

Finally, this acknowledgement will be half and half if I fail to register my incalculable degrees of appreciation to Lecturers in the Department of Political Science Anambra State

University ( my ALMA Mater) who gave me the needed academic foundation to achieve this.

I wouldn’t have done this without your various academic and moral input to my Life. To all of you, I say may God bless you all.

Ofodum, Chioma Mirian Department of Political Science University of Nigeria Nsukka. September, 2014

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction

1.1. Background of the Study 1

1.2. Statement of the problem 8

1.3. Objectives of the Study 19

1.4. Significance of the study 20

CHAPTER TWO: Literature Review

2.1. I.C.C. intervention and its challenges in Liberia 21

2.2. I.C.C. intervention in Liberia and consequences of peace building in Africa 58

2.3. Gaps in Literature 70

CHAPTER THREE: Methodology

3.1. Theoretical Framework 71

3.2. Application of the Theory 74

3.3. Research Design 75

3.4. Methods of Data Collection 76

3.5. Methods of Data Analysis 77

3.6. Logical Data Framework 78

CHAPTER FOUR: Problems of ICC In Liberia Post –Conflict Peace-Building , 2006- 2013

4.1 Problems of ICC in Liberia Post –Conflict Peace-Building , 2006-2013 81

4.2 The ICC: Problem of Funding and Politics of Indictment 86

4.3 The ICC in Africa: the Problem of Over Concentration in Africa 91

CHAPTER FIVE: Consequences of ICC Peace-Building Intervention In Liberia, 2006-2013

5.1 The Establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone 96

5.2 ICC : A Barrier to Peace and Reconciliation to other Peace –building Mechanisms in Liberia 101

5.3 The Arrest and Trial of Charles Taylor as a Factor for Peace in Africa 106

CHAPTER SIX : Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1 Summary 116

6.2 Conclusion 117

6.3 Recommendations 119

Bibliography

Appendices

vii

LIST OF TABLES

4.1 Violation of the International Law of Armed Conflicts by Rebel Leaders 85

4.2 The extent of the constraints placed on the ICC 90

4.3 List of Indicted Persons by the ICC 95

5.1 Main Donors to the Special Court of Sierra Leone 100

5.2 Disarmament and De-mobilization Process in Liberia (Phase 1) 103

5.3 Disarmament and De-mobilization Process in Liberia (Phase 11) 104

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 5.1 The signing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Agreement 101

Fig. 5.2 Timeline of Conflict events in Liberia (1997-2011) 104

Fig. 5.3 Charles Taylor during his trial at the Special Court of Sierra of Sierra Leone 109

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council DDRR Disarmament De-mobilization Rehabilitation and Reintegration ECOMOG Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ICC International Criminal Court ICTR International Court Tribunal for Rwanda ICTY International Court Tribunal for Yugoslavia INPLF Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia LURD Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy

MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia NPLF National Patriotic Front of Liberia RUF Revolutionary United Front SCSL Special Court for Sierra Leone TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission UN United Nations

UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia UNMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

Abstract Liberia is a country located in West Africa, it has experienced two protracted civil wars, one from 1989 to 1996 and the second from 1999 to 2003. With the end of the first civil war, Charles Taylor emerged as the President of the country. His coming to power nevertheless came with lots of quagmire. However, after the first civil war, many peace building processes have been carried out to arrest the situation of incessant violence in the country, these processes to a relative extent was making progress in addressing the issues among the warring parties, but was interrupted by undue intervention. It is against this backdrop that the study therefore seeks to examine the International Criminal Court and post conflict peace building process in Liberia; 2003-2013. To achieve this, the study focused more on ascertaining whether the International Criminal Court intervention was favourable to peace building in Liberia within the year under review. The study adopted qualitative descriptive method of data collection and analysis. The Human Needs theory was also employed to aid the focus of the study. The study nonetheless adopted the One Group Pre Test Post Test design as the guiding blueprint to the work. In the course of the research work, we found that the ICC intervention was not favourable to the post conflict peace building in Liberia. We also found out that the ICC was not a credible factor for peace building in Liberia. Hence, the study recommends that for there to be an enduring peace in Liberia, the government should put in more efforts to putting an end to structural violence by adopting home grown programs and strengthening the independence the judiciary, thereby satisfying the human needs of the Liberians.

CHAPTER ONE

Introduction

1.1 Background To The Study

Peace is a relative condition of friendly security climate that allows individuals and group relations to progressive order and stability. Peace does not mean absence of conflict or war. It reflects that security friendly system that frees individuals and groups of people from fear and dangers of losing such inalienable human rights as life, liberty and property. In view of the above assertion, peace is the prime value of human existence.

Thus for David (2006), he described peace as “public goal” because it guarantees security for all rather than fear of terror of mutual (assured) destruction. Conflict on the other hand is an integral aspect of social existence and social progress. By conflict, we refer to contradiction arising from differences in interests, ideals, ideologies, perception and tendencies. These contradictions exist at all levels of the society, group, institutions and nations as well as in interpersonal, inter-group, inter-institutional and international relation.

Nnoli (1998) sees conflict as so ubiquitous in social life that it has been isolated by some as the basic unit to understand social existence. Marxism for example agrees that to understand society is to understand social conflict. It is difficult to conceive of history outside the resolution of conflict. What is often regarded as social problems are inevitably contradiction, which impedes social progress. Their resolution helps to push society forward towards increased humanity. The resolution of conflict within the individual makes him or her better person, the game holds true for groups, institutions, nations and international relations.

Conflict is so related to the loss of peace, that it is tempting to define peace by eliminating conflict (Ofuebe, 2001).

This however, is likely to lead to very unpleasant results given that conflicts are central to life. Indeed, Ofuebe (2001) contended that life without conflict is no life at all, and

1 that the peace which is achieved merely by eliminating conflict is the peace of the grave yards. He further conceived conflict as “the pursuit of incompatible interests and goals by different groups” noting that armed conflicts are “the resort to the use of force and armed violence in the pursuit of incompatible and particular interests and goals”. The worst forms of armed conflict include mass murder and genocide against unarmed civilians. Therefore, conflict resolution scholars argue that conflict has an ontological basis in human needs, and it is the denial which causes violent conflict, or cause re-solvable differences to degenerate into armed conflicts.

The conception of conflict ,its management and resolution have led to terms such as peace making ,conflict prevention, third party intervention and the focus on mediation and negotiations, peace enforcement, and peace building. Indeed, the tremendous increase in human multiplication, as well as the characteristic self centered nature of man has brought about conflicts of all kinds in the international political system today. The following conflicts, among other ones, have occurred since 1914 to date, namely World war 1, World war 11, the Israel-Palestinian crisis, the Iraq- Iran crisis, Saudi Arabia – Kuwait ,the U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan, the Cuban missile crisis, the Ethiopian- Italian crisis, the Israeli versus Arab nations crisis, the Spain –Moroccan war, the Rwandan-Burundi crisis, Nigeria

Cameroon border crisis, Tanzanian –Ugandan crisis, Ethiopian Eritrea crisis war, Somalia

,Angolan, Sudan, sierra Leonean and the Liberian armed conflict (which is our particular area of study).

A critical investigation into the root causes of conflict, highlighting the actors, structures and dynamics in conflict situation is important in determining intervention mechanisms and the management and resolution of conflict. Conflict prevention describes the whole range of development and crisis intervention efforts to reconcile parties and groups with incompatible interests and to prevent the pursuit of divergent goals from degenerating

2 into armed violence. Also, when the pursuit of irreconcilable differences and interests escalate into armed conflict and is resolved, the efforts and intervention strategies to prevent relapse into further violence is described as conflict prevention (Ofuebe, 2001). Implicit in this definition is the concept of peace building which refers to the efforts and interventions aimed at overcoming the root causes of conflict. Peace building is all about the attempts to overcome the structural, relational and cultural contradictions which lie at root of conflict in order to underpin the processes of peace making and peace keeping. In theoretical terms, peace building is a combination of the fields of development studies and conflict resolution.

Peace building, as a concept introduced by Boutros Boutros-Ghali the then United Nations

Secretary General, in his Agenda for Peace, involves three components: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali 1992). Boutros-Ghali (1992: 21) further defined peace building as an ‘action taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’.

According to Boutros-Ghali, a comprehensive multidimensional peacekeeping undertaking is inseparable from peace building. For him, comprehensive peacekeeping includes:

The supervision of ceasefires, the re-groupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into the civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes, the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures, the establishment of new police forces; the design and supervision of the constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction (Boutros-Ghali 1995: 6 ).

Sequentially, Green and Ahmed (2004) argues that post conflict peace building is otherwise known as post-conflict confidence building measures. He went further to note that in strategic terms, it is designed to restore greater confidence and trust among the survivors across disputing states, or parties, particular countless number of refugees (internally

3 displaced citizens, who left their homes and enterprises without a choice). Usually, survivors are terror haunted, with minds running amok due to the losses, sight and heart breaking horrors of conflict. The fears need to be allayed that they would not be a cause for the resumption of conflict situations. Assurances are needed that the survivors will live with hope and confidence. It presents multidimensional challenges beyond humanitarian intervention and assistance; international legal frame work for fair treatment of refugees.

Peace education against violence, psychology, secular education and vocational skills to provide learning and creative focal points for the future. In strategic analysis, post-conflict peace building is wholly conflict reduction and conflict avoidance.

Historically, according to Ruiz (1992), Liberia is a place set up in 1821 as a colony for free slaves from the United States. She is a multi ethnic and multicultural country. As of

2008, Liberia has the 3rd highest population growth rate in the world 3.66% (UNDP, 2009).

The current population is 3,042,004. The indigenous ethnic groups of Liberia can be linguistically divided into three groups who speak; The isolate Gola language and the Mel languages (particularly Kissi) in the east and Kru languages (particularly Bassa) in the west to which must be added the immigrant communities; Mande-Fu (Kpelle, Gio, Mano, Loma)

Mande-Tan (Vai, Mende, Mandingo) and Repatriated (Americo-Liberians, Congo,

Caribbean).

Consequentially, Adebajo (2002) opined that Liberia’s internal conflict can be traced back to at least 1847 when it gained its independence from the United States. However, the civil war has immediate root causes in the Samuel Doe military regime and his failed promise to institute democratic reforms and return the country back to civilian rule after the 1980 coup which brought him to power. On 12 April 1980, Samuel Doe, a 28 year old Master

Sergeant (Staff Sergeant) in the Liberian Army and a member of the Krahn ethnic group, terminated the half a century rule of the Americo-Liberians in a military coup. Although only

4 constituting 5% of the population, the Americo-Liberians exerted a monopoly of power over the majority of indigenous peoples and had dominated the country’s political, social and economic life for over 130 years Significantly for Doe, the country’s indigenous population initially supported the coup as it signalled an end to what was seen as a hostile regime. Doe subsequently established a military administration after he had executed President William

Tolbert and most of the key figures in his administration. Doe’s military regime was to stay in power until 1985 when as he promised national elections would take place, and a new democratic constitution would come into force. Doe also promised to end the system of corruption and redistribute the nation’s wealth among the people. However, Doe failed on both counts. First, like the Americo-Liberians before him, Doe had created a governmental system that benefitted one ethnic group, the Krahns. Second, Doe stifled an attempt to create a draft constitution for a return to civilian rule in 1985. The National Constitutional

Committee set up by Doe under the chairmanship of Amos Sawyer in 1981 to prepare a draft constitution was undermined as Doe objected to its contents of improving the powers, privileges and prerogatives of the Presidential office . By 1984, Doe’s military regime had transformed itself into a transitional caretaker government which he headed as the constitutional civilian president. In positioning himself as president, Doe appeared to have tried to undermine, another commission, the Special Election Commission, set up to monitor the elections, by attempting to ensure that it was dominated by his friends and members of his

National Democratic Party of Liberia, and that the rules were biased in his favour . By the time of the 1985 elections, the Special Election Commission had declared Doe the winner.

From 1985, Doe eliminated opposition groups and subjected opposition leaders to harassment and intimidation by his security forces. This triggered an abortive coup by the ex-commander of the Liberian Army, Thomas Quiwomkpa, an ethnic Gio and former Doe ally. The failure of the coup resulted in a brutal campaign of repression by Doe’s Krahn-dominated Armed

Forces of Liberia (AFL) in Quiwomkpa’s home region of Nimba county. The attack was also carried out against the Gio and Mano peoples who were thought to be Quiwomkpa’s strongest supporters. It was therefore ‘not by accident that (Charles) Taylor and (‘Prince’

Yormie) Johnson (himself a Gio) initiated their invasion, and that the core of their commando units (were) mainly Gio and Mano.

However, Akintola (2005) noted that prior to the first Liberian civil war which began in 1989, the country was ruled by Americo-Liberians (American descendants), until

1980 when Sergeant Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, became the first indigenous president of

Liberia. Liberians for the first time thought, they were going to be liberated under Samuel

Doe’s regime. Nevertheless, his regime became very authoritarian, discriminatory and abusive. It was as a result of the repressive regime of Samuel Doe that Charles Taylor began an attack in 1989 which finally led to the overthrow of Samuel Doe’s government by a break- away faction from the rebel’s group of Charles Taylor. This group, known as The

Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) was led by Prince Johnson in

September 1990. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peace keeping group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mediated and Dr

Amos Sawyer acted as interim president until the 1997 elections when Charles Taylor of The

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as president. Two years later, the second civil war erupted with two rebel groups. One emerged from the border between Ivory

Coast and Liberia and became known as The Movement for Democracy in Liberia

(MODEL), the other was started by a group of exiled Liberians in Guinea known as the

Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

These two groups that fought Taylor’s government destabilized the country. With international pressures and ECOWAS intervention, Charles Taylor was compelled to resign in 2003. He went into exile in Nigeria and his vice-president, Gyude Bryant was chosen to

6 act as interim president until the 2005 election, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and sworn in as the president of Liberia in January 2006. It is against the background of brutality, atrocities, and humanitarian damage that characterized the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra-

Leone that the ICC (International Criminal Court) intervened. Meanwhile, the I.C.C. emerged through the adoption of July 17, 1998 by 120 States in Rome. A Statue known as the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court (the Rome Statue), establishing the

International Criminal Court for the first time in history of mankind. By that adoption,

States decided to accept the jurisdiction of a permanent international criminal court for prosecution of the perpetrators of the most serious crimes committed in their territories or by their nationals after the entry into force of the Rome statue on 1st July 2002. These serious crimes include the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. The seat of the court is in Hague in the Netherlands although the Rome statue provides that the court may set elsewhere whenever the judges consider it desirable.

Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court is time bound. The

ICC has jurisdiction only with respect to events which occurred after the entry into force of its statue on 1st July 2002. Njoku (2003) critically observed that “at the ICC, perpetrators are investigated, prosecuted, and punished because of harm done to their victims, and that it is Indeed, the severity, quantity and context of harm that define certain acts as international crimes. He further observed that the suffering of victims has served as moral and political impetus for state and non-state actors to create international laws and institutions, but that despite the centrality of victims to international criminal justice, such tribunals have rarely emphasized their well-being, or sought to include their perspectives in decision-making. The

International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided no role for victim participation other than as witnesses. These tribunals eventually

7 improved their outreach programs so affected communities would at least be informed of the tribunals’ work (Orentlicher, 2008).

In this respect, the Rome Statute contains two novel rights for victims at international criminal tribunals: the right to legal participation and reparations. The Statute also ordered the creation of a Trust Fund for Victims; a body that would provide material assistance to victims and help implement reparations. Consequently, some have argued that the ICC goes beyond the strictly retributive justice of previous international criminal tribunals and also promotes restorative justice (Funk, 2010; Musila, 2010).

According to Mbaku (2002), he asserted that on July 17, 1998, the 120 countries that adopted the Rome Statute which established the International Criminal Court (ICC) believed that global justice would benefit from and be greatly enhanced by the creation of an

“international criminal justice regime empowered to prosecute individuals guilty of gross atrocities and human rights violations, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide”. Mbaku (2002) further opined that two realities gave impetus to Africa’s strong support for the establishment of the ICC: the carnage that gripped Rwanda in 1994 and the need to find ways to prevent powerful countries from preying on weaker ones. There was urgent need in Africa to squarely confront impunity and the mass violation of human rights, as well as prevent militarily, politically and economically stronger countries from invading weaker ones. In terms of the latter, the inclusion of “crimes of aggression” “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of using armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state,” was especially attractive to African countries (ICC, 2012). Today, 43 African countries are signatories to the

Rome State and, of these, 31 are states parties.

The International Criminal Court has meanwhile charged Charles Taylor with 11 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international

8 humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone from November 30, 1996, to January 18, 2002.

The Prosecutor alleges that Mr. Taylor is responsible for crimes which include murdering and mutilating civilians, including cutting off their limbs; using women and girls as sex slaves; and abducting children adults and forcing them to perform forced labour or become fighters during the conflict in Sierra Leone. Mr. Taylor is charged on the basis that he allegedly backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels fighting in Sierra Leone; that he had links with senior leaders in the RUF such as Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie (a.k.a.

Mosquito), Issa Sesay, and others in addition to a second warring faction, the Armed Forces

Revolutionary Council (AFRC); and that he was responsible for Liberian forces fighting in support of the Sierra Leonean rebels. Taylor has pleaded not guilty to these charges (Cheng,

2008).

It is against this backdrop that this study seeks to examine whether the intervention of the International Criminal Court was favourable to peace building process in Liberia.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Liberia is one of the countries in West Africa, with many ethnic groups. This complex ethnic situation still plays significant role in the present day Liberian politics. This ethnic wrangling among other external factors, had led to the protracted bloody civil wars in

Liberia the first civil war of 1989 until 1996. Thus by the middle of 1990, a civil war was raging. Taylor's NPFL soon controlled much of the country, while Johnson began advancing into the capital, Monrovia. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) attempted to persuade Doe to resign and go into exile, but despite his weak position besieged in his mansion, he refused. ECOMOG, an ECOWAS intervention force, arrived at the

Freeport of Monrovia on August 24, 1990, landing from Nigerian and Ghanaian vessels.

While making a brief trip out of the Executive Mansion to ECOMOG Headquarters, Doe was captured by Johnson on September 9, 1990, and tortured before being killed.(Cheng, 2008)

The spectacle was videotaped and seen on news reports around the world. A series of peacemaking conferences in regional capitals followed. There were meetings in Bamako in

November 1990, Lome in January 1991, and Yamoussoukro in June–October 1991. But the first seven peace conferences, including the Yamoussoukro I-IV processes failed. Peace was still far off as both Taylor and Johnson claimed power. ECOMOG declared an Interim

Government of National Unity (IGNU) with Amos Sawyer as their president, with the broad support of Johnson. Taylor launched an assault on Monrovia on October 15, 1992, named

'Operation Octopus (Adebajo, 2003). The assault may have been led by Burkina Faso soldiers. The resulting siege lasted two months. By late December, ECOMOG had pushed the

NPFL back beyond Monrovia's suburbs. Meetings in Cotonou, Benin, began in July 1993 to agree a ceasefire. The Cotonou Agreement, a treaty between the NPFL, IGNU and Doe’s remaining supporters (known as the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy or ULIMO). A coalition government was formed in August 1993. Yet it and the prior agreements failed due to lack of agreement between the warring factions. In September 1994, the Akosombo Agreement attempted to replace the coalition with moves towards a democratic government, but IGNU rejected this. The Abuja Accord of August 1995 finally achieved this, but in April 1996 the NPFL and ULIMO again began fighting in Monrovia, leading to the evacuation of most international Non-governmental organizations and the destruction of much of the city. Furthermore Adebajo (2003) noted some of the peace agreements that was signed with the aim of achieving peace. And they include:

• Banjul III Agreement (1990-10-24)

• Bamako Ceasefire Agreement (1990-11-28)

• Banjul IV Agreement (1990-12-21)

• Lomé Agreement (1991-02-13)

• Yamoussoukro IV Peace Agreement (1991-10-30)

• Geneva Agreement 1992 (1992-04-07)

• Cotonou Peace Agreement (1993-07-25)

• Akosombo Peace Agreement (1994-09-12)

• Accra Agreements/Akosombo clarification agreement (1994-12-21)

• Abuja Peace Agreement (1995-08-19)

However despite all these peace processes and agreements the conflicts escalated.

Thus Donald (2002) shrewdly argued that the persistent nature of the Conflict was due to the fact that Charles Taylor organized and trained some indigenous northerners in Ivory Coast.

During Doe's regime Taylor had served in the Liberian Government's General Services

Agency, acting 'as its de facto director'. However, he fled to the United States in 1983 amid what Ellis (1990) describes as the 'increasingly menacing atmosphere in Monrovia' shortly before Thomas Quiwonkpa, Doe's chief lieutenant, fled into exile himself. Doe requested

Taylor's extradition for embezzling $900,000 of Liberian government funds. Taylor was thus arrested in the United States and after sixteen months broke out of a Massachusetts jail in circumstances that are still unclear.

On December 24, 1989, Charles Taylor and a small group of Libyan-trained rebels calling themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) entered Nimba County from neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, attacking the village of Butuo. The raid, mounted by a small group of men, managed to capture some weapons, and then the raiders withdrew to the jungle. The NPFL initially encountered plenty of support within Nimba County, which had endured the majority of Samuel Doe’s wrath after the 1985 attempted coup. When Taylor and his force of 100 rebels reentered Liberia in 1989, on Christmas Eve, thousands of Gio and

Mano joined them. While these formed the core of his rebel army, there were many Liberians of other ethnic backgrounds who joined as well. Doe responded by sending two AFL battalions, including the 1st Infantry Battalion, to Nimba in December 1989-January 1990,

11 apparently under then-Colonel Hezekiah Bowen. The AFL acted in a very brutal and scorched-earth fashion which quickly alienated the local people. The rebel invasion soon pitted ethnic Krahn sympathetic to the Doe regime against those victimized by it, the Gio and the Mano. Thousands of civilians were massacred on both sides. Hundreds of thousands fled their homes. By May 1990 the AFL had been forced back to Gbarnga, still under the control of Bowen's troops, but they lost the town to a NPFL assault on 28 May. By June 1990,

Taylor's forces were laying siege to Monrovia. In July 1990, Prince Yormie Johnson split from Taylor and formed the Independent National Patriotic Front (INPFL). The INPFL and

NPFL continued their siege on Monrovia, which the AFL defended. Johnson quickly took control of parts of Monrovia prompting evacuation of foreign nationals and diplomats by the

US Navy in August.

Nevertheless, Adebajo (2003) argued that in August 1990, the 16-member ECOWAS agreed to deploy a joint military intervention force, the Economic Community Monitoring

Group (ECOMOG), and place it under Nigerian leadership. The mission later included troops from non-ECOWAS countries, including Uganda and Tanzania. ECOMOG’s objectives were to impose a cease-fire; help Liberians establish an interim government until elections could be held; stop the killing of innocent civilians; and ensure the safe evacuation of foreign nationals. ECOMOG also sought to prevent the conflict from spreading into neighboring states, which share a complex history of state, economic, and ethno-linguistic social relations with Liberia. On 9 September 1990, Doe visited the barely established, newly arrived

ECOMOG headquarters in the Free Port of Monrovia. Thus, Ellis(1990) noted that , his motive was to lay a complaint that the ECOMOG commander had not paid a courtesy call to

Doe, the Head of State. However, the exact circumstances that led to Doe’s visit to the Free

Port are still unclear. Doe had been under pressure to accept exile outside of Liberia.

However, after Doe arrived, a large rebel force led by Prince Johnson’s INPFL arrived at the

12 headquarters and then attacked Doe's party. Doe was captured and taken to the INPFL’s

Caldwell base. He was brutally tortured before being killed and dismembered. His torture and execution was videotaped by his captors. Johnson’s INPFL and Taylor’s NPFL continued to struggle for control of Monrovia in the months that followed. With military discipline absent and bloodshed throughout the capital region, members of ECOWAS created the Economic

Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to restore order. The force comprised some

4,000 troops from Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, the Gambia and Guinea. ECOMOG succeeded in bringing Taylor and Johnson to agree to its intervention, but Taylor's forces engaged it in the port area of Monrovia.

Consequently, in November 1990, ECOWAS invited the principal Liberian players to meet in Banjul, Gambia to form a government of national unity. The negotiated settlement established the Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU), led by Dr. Amos Sawyer, leader of the LPP. Bishop Ronald Diggs of the Liberian Council of Churches became vice president.(Regan 2003) However, Taylor's NPFL refused to attend the conference. Within days, hostilities resumed. ECOMOG was reinforced in order to protect the interim government. Sawyer was able to establish his authority over most of Monrovia, but the rest of

Liberia was in the hands of various factions of the NPFL or of local gangs. Prompted by this, the United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy (ULIMO) was formed in June

1991 by supporters of the late President Samuel Doe and former Armed Forces of Liberia

(AFL) fighters who had taken refuge in Guinea and Sierra Leone. It was led by Raleigh

Seekie, a deputy Minister of Finance in the Doe government. After fighting alongside the

Sierra Leonean army against the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), ULIMO forces entered western Liberia in September 1991. The group scored significant gains in areas held by another rebel group – the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), notably around the

13 diamond mining areas of Lofa and Bomi counties. The group was alleged to have committed serious violations of human rights, both before and after its breakup.(Cheng 2008)

Consequently, Njoku (2003) noted that In 1993, ECOWAS brokered a peace agreement in Cotonou, Benin. Following this, on September 22, 1993, the United Nations

(U.N.) Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), to support ECOMOG in implementing this Cotonou peace agreement. UNOMIL in early 1994 deployed 368 military observers and associated civilian personnel to monitor implementation of the abortive Cotonou Peace Agreement, prior to elections originally planned for

February/March 1994. Renewed armed hostilities, however, broke out in May 1994 and continued, becoming especially intense in July and August. ECOMOG, and later UNOMIL, members were captured and held hostage by some factions. By mid-1994, the humanitarian situation had become disastrous, with 1.8 million Liberians in need of humanitarian assistance. Conditions continued to deteriorate, but humanitarian agencies were unable to reach many in need due to hostilities and general insecurity. Factional leaders agreed in

September 1994 to the Akosombo Agreement, a supplement to the Cotonou agreement, named after the Ghanaian town where it was signed, but the security situation in Liberia remained poor. In October 1994, in the face of ECOMOG funding shortfalls and a lack of will by the Liberian combatants to honor agreements to end the war, the Security Council reduced to about 90 the number of UNOMIL observers. It extended UNOMIL’s mandate, however, and subsequently extended it several times until September 1997. In December

1994, the factions and other parties signed the Accra Agreement, a supplement to the

Akosombo Agreement, but disagreements ensued and fighting continued.

However, in August 1995, the main factions signed an agreement largely brokered by

Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings. At a conference sponsored by ECOWAS, the United

Nations and the United States, the European Union, and the Organization of African Unity,

Charles Taylor agreed to a cease-fire and a timetable to demobilize and disarm his troops. At the beginning of September 1995, Liberia’s three principal warlords – Taylor, George Boley and Alhaji Kromah – made theatrical entrances into Monrovia. A ruling council of six members under civilian Wilton G. S. Sankawulo and with the three factional heads Charles

Taylor, Alhaji Kromah and George Boley, took control of the country preparatory to elections that were originally scheduled for 1996. Heavy fighting broke out again in April

1996. In August 1996, these battles were ended by the Abuja Accord in Nigeria, agreeing to disarmament and demobilization by 1997 and elections in July of that year. 3 September

1996, Sankawulo is followed by Ruth Perry as chairwoman of the ruling council, who served until 2 August 1997.

However, Simultaneous elections for the presidency and national assembly were finally held in July 1997. In a climate hardly conducive to free movement and security of persons, Taylor and his National Patriotic Party won an overwhelming victory against 12 other candidates. Assisted by widespread intimidation, Taylor took 75 per cent of the presidential poll (no other candidate won more than 10 per cent) while the NPP won a similar proportion of seats in both parliamentary chambers. 2 August 1997, Ruth Perry handed power to elected president Charles Taylor (Bush, 1996).

Liberians had voted for Taylor in the hope that he would end the bloodshed. The bloodshed did slow considerably, but it did not end. Violent events flared up regularly after the putative end of the war. Taylor, furthermore, was accused of backing guerrillas in neighboring countries and funneling diamond monies into arms purchases for the rebel armies he supported, and into luxuries for himself. After Taylor's victory, the country was peaceful enough so that refugees began to return. But other leaders were forced to leave the country, and some ULIMO forces reformed as the Liberians United for Reconciliation and

Democracy (LURD). LURD began fighting in Lofa County with the aim of destabilizing the

15 government and gaining control of the local diamond fields, leading to the Second Liberian

Civil War.

In 1997, the Liberian people elected Charles Taylor as the President after he entered the capital city, Monrovia, by force. The implicit unrest manifested during the late 1990’s is emblematic in the sharp national economic decline and the prevalent sale of diamonds and timber in exchange for small arms.

Hence, the 1989-1996 Liberian civil war, was one of Africa's bloodiest, which claimed the lives of more than 200,000 Liberians and further displaced a million others into refugee camps in neighboring countries. Entire villages were emptied as people fled. Child soldiers committed atrocities, raping and murdering people of all ages (Adebajo, 2003).

In consonance to the above, Mbaku (2002) brilliantly avers that Liberia's civil war claimed the lives of one out of every 17 people in the country, uprooted most of the rest, and destroyed a once-viable economic infrastructure. The strife also spread to Liberia's neighbors, contributing to a slowing of the democratization that was progressing steadily through West

Africa at the beginning of the 1990s and destabilizing a region that already was one of the world's most marginal.

Thus, the Second Liberian Civil War began in 1999 and ended in October 2003, when

ECOWAS intervened to stop the rebel siege on Monrovia and exiled Charles Taylor to

Nigeria until he was arrested in 2006 and taken to The Hague for his trial. By the conclusion of the final war, more than 250,000 people had been killed and nearly 1 million displaced.

Half that number remain to be repatriated in 2005, at the election of Liberia's first democratic

President since the initial 1980 coup d'état of Samuel Doe.

Accordingly, Njoku (2003) shrewdly asserted that The incumbent president Ellen

Johnson Sirleaf, who initially was a strong supporter of Charles Taylor, was inaugurated in

January 2006 and the National Transitional Government of Liberia terminated its power.

In the same view, Omeje (2008) opined that despite various attempts to consolidate peace in Liberia through the various peace building processes, peace did not last long and in

1999, the Liberian civil war broke out. In 1997 it was thought that the general election, which brought Charles Taylor to power, had put paid to the endless conflict in Liberia and the danger of its spreading to the rest of West Africa. Indeed, the 1997 election had many assumptions, among which were i) The creation of official access for Charles Taylor. The main rebel leader, to ascend to power with the hope that it was the best option left to end the conflict. ii) ECOWAS cease fire monitoring group (ECOMOG) was to remain in Liberia for some time to disarm, demobilize, train and re-integrate the rebels into the national armed forces of Liberia which should be virile in order to ensure political stability and security in the country and in the sub region at large; iii) At the end of the conflict, Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) would engage in a self-assessment of how to strengthen its hold on sub-regional security.

These assumptions were however shattered as soon Charles Taylor ascended to power. His intention was not only to rule Liberia but also to control regimes in the sub-region and build an empire for himself in Mano-river basin region. So first, he refused to honour the mandate allowing ECOMOG to remain in Liberia to perform the post-war reorganization of the Liberian military. Secondly, he reciprocated the gesture which the Revolutionary United

Front (RUF) had rendered to him while he was fighting to take over power in Monrovia. On assumption of office, he quickly supported the RUF to destabilize Sierra Leone in order to pave the way for CPL Fodeh Sankoh to rule in Freetown (Omeje, 2008). It was believed that

Charles Taylor was pursuing this course, because he was fingered in all the conflicts that occurred in the Mano-river basin region and the entire West African sub-region as a whole.

In turn, within Liberia itself, rebels that did not accept Charles Taylor’s leadership decided to

17 return to the bush to continue the war. Thus, the Liberians United for Reconciliation and

Democracy, (LURD) became the main rebel groups challenging Taylor’s authority, subsequent differences among the rebels led to the emergence of Movement for Democracy in Liberia, (MODEL) among others. This was the genesis of the second conflict (1999 -Oct

2003) which ECOWAS mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) was deployed to resolve. ECOMIL was an interposition force, which was expected to give way to the United Nations mission in

Liberia (UNMIL) as from October 1, 2003. These wars, both the first civil war (1989-1996) and the second civil war (1999-2003) were among the bloodiest in Africa. Entire villages were emptied as people fled. Child soldiers committed atrocities, raping and murdering people of all ages (James & Robert, 2003:21).

It was against this backdrop, that the International Criminal Court (ICC) which was established to judge political leaders or individual accused of war crimes, genocide, crime against humanity and the crime of aggression intervened in Liberia. With ECOWAS intervention to stop the rebel siege in Monrovian, she exiled Charles Taylor to Nigeria until he was arrested in 2006 by the ICC and taken to Hague for his trial which is the headquarters of ICC.

According to the preamble to the ICC’s Statute, the Court’s stated aim is to ‘end impunity’ for the most serious crimes of international concern and to contribute to their prevention. Unlike temporary, context-specific tribunals set up by the UN Security Council

(such as those for Rwanda and for the former Yugoslavia), the ICC is a permanent body born of a multilateral treaty. The statute governing the Court was adopted by 120 states in Rome in 1998. In what was hailed as a landmark achievement for an international justice movement, the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002 thereby establishing the

International Criminal Court.

Instead of delving into atrocities of decades passed, the ICC can only investigate crimes committed after the Rome Statute took effect. This temporal jurisdiction, allied with the ICC’s permanent status and international mandate, has drawn the Court into situations where conflict is active or barely concluded. Seeking to dispense criminal justice during conflict and even in parallel with peace processes represents an ambitious vision for international justice – one that endeavours to reverse the historical trend of justice being postponed or bartered away as part of peace deals.

The recent period has been hugely significant for the ICC. In the Democratic

Republic of Congo (DRC) situation, the Court has confirmed charges against its first accused in the dock, Thomas Lubanga, and transferred two further suspects to custody in The Hague,

Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo. Regarding Darfur, the ICC has issued two arrest warrants for the government minister, Ahmed Haroun, and for the militia leader, Ali

Mohamed Abdel Rahman ‘Kushayb’. The Court has also opened investigations in Central

African Republic. Meanwhile, the northern Uganda peace efforts have seen intense negotiations around the I.C.C’s warrants for leaders of the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army. In its wider operations, the Court has taken steps to establish its field presence and has taken crucial decisions regarding the participation of victims in its work. At the same time, most of the warrants issued by the ICC remain outstanding and the situations in Uganda and Sudan are finely poised.

The fact that the I.C.C. has focused so overwhelmingly on African situations speaks partly to the prevalence of violations of international criminal law in Africa but also prompts questions about why the gaze of international criminal justice falls in some places and on some people and not on others. Thus Weed (2011) argued that the International Criminal

Court (ICC) has, to date, opened cases exclusively in Africa Cases concerning 25 individuals are open before the Court, pertaining to crimes allegedly committed in six African states:

Libya, Kenya, Sudan (Darfur), Uganda (the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA), the Democratic

Republic of Congo, and the Central African Republic The I.C.C. is designed as a ‘court of last resort’ that backs up national jurisdictions rather than trumps them. Nonetheless, the

Court’s focus on Africa has stirred African sensitivities about sovereignty and Courting

Conflict. Notwithstanding these constraining factors, the early record of the I.C.C. in Africa deserves to be scrutinized critically. In conflicts involving atrocities committed by multiple conflict parties, the prosecution of individuals from certain factions and not others is especially significant for people living in the most affected areas. Perceptions of the ICC on the ground have at times been damaged by insufficient efforts by the Court to make clear the basis on which individuals have been the subject of warrants and of particular charges, while those of apparently equal culpability have not. It is also evident that the I.C.C. has not always forged strong relations with other actors who are critical to the Court’s ultimate success.

Furthermore, there is nothing continentally-specific about crimes committed during conflict. Yet the first investigations of the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) are concentrated in Africa. The absence of direct Great Power involvement in these conflicts might make Africa more susceptible than other parts of the world to such investigations.

Thus, arising from the above postulations, the study therefore seeks to provide answers to these questions:

1. Was the International Criminal Court (ICC) intervention favourable to peace

building in Liberia between 2006 and 2013?

2. Did the Liberian example fail to showcase the ICC as a credible factor for peace in

African conflicts?

1.3 Objectives of the study

The broad objective of this research is to critically examine the role of I.C.C. in peace building process in post conflict Liberia 2006-2013. The specific objectives of the study include:

1) To determine whether the International Criminal Court (I.C.C.) intervention was

favourable to peace building in Liberia between 2006 and 2013

2) To ascertain whether the Liberian example failed to showcase the I.C.C. as a

credible factor for peace in African conflicts.

1.4 Significance of the Study

In attainment of the stated objectives, the study will be significant in twofold; theoretical and practical. Thus, in the theoretical aspect, it will critically contribute to the debate as to whether the I.C.C. intervention consolidated the peace building process in post- conflict Liberia and in African continent at large. It will also contribute to the articulation of the best option for peace building process in post-conflict Liberia. This study will immensely be significant to scholars and researchers in strategic and peace studies, and international relations at large via its findings. This is possible by way of referring to it for subsequent research on similar topics.

In the practical aspect, the study will be of great relevance to policy makers , government and international community at large on the best possible and effective means of achieving enduring peace in any post-conflict situation especially in Liberia, Africa and the world in general so as to consolidate peace which will in return facilitate development globally.

CHAPTER TWO

Literature Review

The goal of any research is to fill the gap in literature for the obvious reason that knowledge is cumulative and developmental. That is, it involves a progression from the known to the unknown. Therefore, in a conscious effort to fill this gap, we decided to embark upon relevant literatures to this study. To address the fundamentals of the concept under study as raised in the statement of problem, the study will thematically review literature related to

I.C.C and Post-Conflict Peace building in Liberia.

2.1: I.C.C Intervention and Its Challenges in Liberia

The most urgent challenge faced by the international community and humanitarian relief agencies involved in post-conflict development/peace building has been to find the most appropriate way of putting in place measures to ensure durable peace without a relapse into conflict. It is therefore necessary to undertake an excursion into previous works, articles and other forms of contributions made by various seasoned scholars in order to understand why this research work is paramount to understanding and consolidating peace in Liberia.

Indeed, traditional peacekeeping operations, which were implemented between the end of the Second World War and the end of the Cold War, required peacekeepers to create a buffer zone to separate warring or belligerent parties and prevent them, through their mutual consent, from fighting. Thus, Donald (2002:21) opined that traditional or first generation peacekeeping operates according to three principles: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality of peacekeepers and minimum use of force. However, with the end of the Cold

War, many conflicts emerged in the global system that led to the escalation of violence and human casualties.

Prompted by the need to protect human rights, UN Secretary-General, Boutros

Boutros-Ghali, proposed a ‘second generation’ of UN peace operations in which the mandate

22 of peacekeeping was extended to the deployment of large UN peacekeeping forces, the protection of human rights and the permission to use force (Boutros-Ghali 1995:4; Slim

1996:6)). In this type of peacekeeping operation, peacekeepers are actively involved in the resolving and settling of conflicts – in the cases of both inter- and intra-state conflicts

(Williams 1998:1; Richmond 2002:44). Peace building, as a concept introduced by Boutros

Boutros-Ghali in his Agenda for Peace, involves three components: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping (Boutros-Ghali 1992).

Accordingly, Boutros-Ghali (1992) defines peace building as an ‘action taken to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and consolidate peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’. For Boutros-Ghali, a comprehensive and multidimensional peacekeeping undertaking is inseparable from peace building. For him, comprehensive peacekeeping includes: The supervision of ceasefires, the re-groupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration into the civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mining programmes, the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures, the establishment of new police forces; the design and supervision of the constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms, the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of elections and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction (Boutros-Ghali,1995:6).

Over the years, various efforts have been made to elaborate on this definition. The

Brahimi Report (2000) defined peace building as “activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war.” In 2007, the Secretary-

General’s Policy Committee has described peace building as:“A range of measures targeted to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening national capacities at

23 all levels for conflict management, and to lay the foundation for sustainable peace and development.

Scholarly interest has led to a proliferation of literature on different aspects of peace building (Amadiume & An-Na'im, 2000; Kumar, 1998; Galtung 1998 ; Harris, 1999;

Morphet, 1998; Pugh, 2000; Rothstein, 1999; Sorenson, 1998; the United Nations, 1996;

Walter, 1999). Research has also concentrated on peace building experiences in Angola, the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, Cambodia, Congo, El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan,

South Africa, and other countries individually or as a group (Anstee, 1996; Arnson, 1999;

Chan & Vanancio, 1998; Lisee, 2000; Parris, 1997; Marks, 2000; Mockaitis, 1999; Synge,

1997; Vuckovic, 1999; Wood, 2000). However, an understanding of the diverse aspects of peace building has yet to be integrated in a manner that helps assess whether and how the wide variety of new experiences have accomplished the task of consolidating peace.

Thus, for Amadiume & An-Na'im (2000) they argues that as peace negotiations have resulted in the settlement of intrastate violence and wars over the last decade, several societies have been going through difficult phases of post-conflict reconstruction. Negotiated settlement of long-term conflict brings about new challenges as well as opportunities for social transformation. The demand to rebuild divided societies emerging from serious long- term conflict is overwhelming, and recent efforts reflect the complex nature of the process of peace building.

Similarly, Kumar (1998) shrewdly remarks that peace building involves a process comprised of various functions and roles. It often entails a wide range of sequential activities, proceeding from cease-fire, refugee resettlement to economic reconstruction and the advancement of human rights. The end of violent conflict has to be accompanied by rebuilding physical infrastructure and the restoration of essential government functions that provide basic social services. In the long run, stability cannot be achieved without the

24 participation of former adversaries in a democratic political process and socio-economic reform.

Hence, Galtung (1998) posits that the dynamics of peace building are affected by dialectic human interactions and perceptions as well as the social environment. It takes time to overcome both psychological and structural obstacles resulting from protracted conflict locked in vicious cycles of confrontation. Social reconstruction, rehabilitation and reconciliation are essential elements that make a peace process durable and sustainable.

Morphet (1998) nevertheless avers that every peace process is not the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations (e.g., the impact of intensity and level of violence in inter-group relations on transformative dynamics).

However, overall conceptual and analytical approaches can be suggested to identify steps and actions for bringing about harmonious relations between former adversaries and reconstructing post-conflict societies.

Accordingly, Pugh (2000) observes that peace building approaches oriented toward re-establishing the existing status quo are not likely to lead to social transformation. The current focus on mere restoration of order has serious limitations. Existing political and economic structures can be an obstacle to overcoming imbalances between groups. The strategies have to be more geared toward modifying social structures and processes associated with these imbalances.

Nevertheless, Rothstein (1999) concludes that the policy responses have been mostly prepared by donor agencies, and packages of specific implementation programmes have been formulated without much consideration of the particular circumstances of a recipient society.

The institutionalized approaches are not often adequate to meet the specific needs and diverse interests of women, children, the elderly, and people with a marginalized social and economic status. These programmes have neither fully comprehended the meaning of their activities,

25 nor their potential impact. What has not been properly investigated is the contribution that grassroots initiatives, introduced at a community level, can make toward establishing a peace structure and culture.

According to Sorenson (1998) he brilliantly posits that the understanding the effectiveness of different elements of peace building is enhanced by examining how security, political, social and economic components support each other in rebuilding the fabric of divided societies.

Conversely, Walter (1999) asserted that the task of peace builders in Bosnia, Liberia,

Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala and other post-civil war societies is to confront unique psychological and ethical situations derived from a conflict system. Even with a negotiated settlement, shooting, bombing, shelling and other types of violence do not stop immediately.

Given the tangible and imminent nature of violence or threats of violence, physical safety is obviously an important concern. In addition, the end of an internal war poses many social problems such as disputes over ownership rights to properties. The pain around the conflict remains evident and serves as an obstacle to a return to normal life. Thus, overcoming physical, mental and emotional challenges remains an important concern for those who have to rebuild their own societies.

Peace building operations are, in a technical sense, charged with monitoring or implementing a negotiated settlement between two or more hostile parties. In practice, post- conflict peace building starts when conflict has been controlled to the degree that normal social activities can be resumed, and reconstruction of violence-torn societies becomes possible. As intense violence becomes less visible, conditions for longer-term political and social stability take root. The control of violence at an interpersonal and inter-communal level is thus a prerequisite to establishing a constructive relationship (Bertram, 1995:388).

Thus, for Anstee (1996) he argues that conflict does not disappear in many social circumstances, and its proper management is an important task in transforming adversarial relationships. To prevent the disruption of a peace process, a cease-fire and other agreed upon peace settlement measures have to be observed, and, under certain circumstances, may have to be enforced. On the other hand, peace building 'is not a therapy' 'to impose on an unwilling patient', and cannot be achieved by a mere dependence on violence control methods. Trust and confidence building measures have to be taken in order to induce cooperation and produce positive attitudes that create a better atmosphere for the peaceful settlement of differences.

Whereas progress in peace building relies on the improvement in inter-communal relationships, repairing relationships at a psychological level has often been suggested without examining possible sources of injustice. Changes in perceptions promoted by education and reconciliation have to be followed by structural reform that prevents the dominant relationships in the future. It is too optimistic to believe that a few training workshops and facilitated dialogue sessions, designed for reconciliation activities, can break the cycle of violence. The failure to provide solutions to the root causes of the problems that caused the war creates new dynamics in a continuing search for peace in a divided society.

Although the operating goal of peace building has been considered in terms of averting the revival of a violent conflict brought under control, it should not be understood as a mere short-term conflict prevention strategy. With its requirement to gradually create conditions that will ensure that there is no reason to resort to destructive means again, peace building is a long-term activity going beyond the immediate imperative of stopping the gun ((Boutros-

Ghali, 1995; Chan & Vanancio, 1998; Arnson, 1999).

Boutros-Ghali (1995) specifically argued that to prevent the recurrence of violence, the root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation. Thus, a long-term strategy is

27 aimed at addressing 'the principal political, economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place'. Peace building can be generally characterised in terms of supporting 'structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict'. He further asserted that a broad scope of structural change has to follow the agreement on the key issue of reforms.

In a sharp different view, Lisee (2000) contend that whereas dynamics of conflict resolution have to be extended to a comprehensive and durable peace process, implementing the agreements may not necessarily be linear, nor orderly and may not guarantee an expected outcome. In some post-conflict settlement processes, continued hostilities and mistrust ended with renewed fighting, and efforts to reach another settlement had to be made. For instance, an agreement between contending groups in Liberia in September 1995 did not end the chaos but led to renewed war. The renegotiations of new terms finally resulted in the election and creation of a new government in 1997. The entire process caused unnecessary human costs.

In support of the above view, Marks (2000) noted that although it is not easy to bring adversarial parties in a communal conflict to the negotiation table, or to help them reach an agreement, it is an equally formidable task to ensure that the parties maintain their commitment to abiding by the agreement. During the period of operationalisation of a formal accord, intense uncertainty and struggle exist over the scope and pace of prescribed reform.

There are different expectations, feelings of insecurity, and a lack of established political procedures and normative standards. By generating continuing suspicion, an unpredictable atmosphere for the future makes community cooperation difficult. The implementation of a peace process is often delayed by continuing mutual distrust. In El Salvador, lack of progress in the land transfer programme provoked halting a phased disarmament by Farabundo Marti

National Liberation Front (FMLN) in October 1992.

However, negotiation does not necessarily produce an outcome that brings about a balanced relationship. In addition, a conflict settlement process would not be able to address all the underlying issues reflecting critical dimensions in the adversarial relationship. Peace agreements can unravel if the parties come to the conclusion that it is no longer in their interests to abide by the agreements Thus, new issues related to the implementation of a peace agreement as well as old issues underlying adversarial relationships have an impact on a post-conflict settlement process. Since the residue of anger and hatred has to be overcome in developing a collaborative working relationship, the restructuring of relationships has to go along with the implementation of specific agreements (Hampson, 1996:3).

Indeed, Mockaitis (1999) concludes that the stated goals of peace agreements may well reflect compromised solutions at the negotiation table, but may contradict the demands of various group members. In most instances, peace accords result from concluding new pacts at the elite level, and concerns of various elements in civil society are not often incorporated in making compromise deals. The agreements opposed by extreme factions on each side, as has been well demonstrated in the effort to build a new Palestinian/Israeli relationship, do not themselves provide a guarantee for successful implementation, if the extremists attempt to destroy progress with violent tactics. In a nutshell, Wood posits thus; peace agreements are not the end of an old conflict since they 'sometimes contain their own seeds of destruction'. Political crisis can be generated in the process of implementing mandates. Restrictive provisions may bring about disputes over cheating. Too rigid terms for settlement can easily re-ignite inter-communal fighting. Therefore, attempts for overly strict implementation of the agreement make a flexible adjustment of peace plans to unpredictable situations difficult (Wood, 2000:45).

Wood (2000) further asserted that the terms of settlement are often renegotiated during an implementation process, given that foot-dragging practices and broken promises are common. Most importantly, the post-accord process has to be adjusted to respond to the concerns of new stakeholders and expand the constituents.

In consonance with the above argument, Vuckovic (1999) avers that the lack of a genuine commitments makes the transition to peaceful relations very difficult. The long civil war in Angola, which traces back to the struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975, suggests how difficult it is to bring about stability. The brutal phase of Angola's armed conflict continued with the rejection of the election victory of the incumbent government by the opposing National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla forces and its resumption of insurgency. Control of destructive forces such as the Khmer Rouge was an important factor in the Cambodian peace process.

Accordingly, Jett (2000:52) argues that the warring factions do not suddenly change their behaviour after peace agreements. The need of peace enforcement can be assessed in terms of the degree of the commitments from various parties. The continued intolerance of other groups can be a good indicator of renewed violence, and preventive deployment of forces might be necessary. Thus, the promise of nonviolent problem solving has to be carefully assessed with the evolution of new situations. The commitments will be weak if the parties do not have enough stake in the peace process. The fragile process may break down without external support.

Mockaitis (1999) further contend that a more desirable and successful settlement of violent conflict relies on the commitment of warring parties to determine their future at political forums but not through military tactics. Rules and strategies for games of survival during peacetime are different from those of wartime when planning was inevitably focused on immediate survival. In order to establish rules of peaceful competition for power, losers may have to be persuaded and pressed to accept the outcome of implementing their agreements.

In a more concise way, Synge (1997) captured it that as those who benefit from the status quo want to maintain privileges, some form of serious confrontations is inevitable.

However, engagement in a process of peace building has to represent a serious indication that a dominant party does not simply impose its will or eliminate the other side while a weaker party is committed to the pursuit of nonviolent structural transformation. Even though demands for change made by a weaker party are not often met, peace agreements should help provide a framework for continued efforts to transform unjust relations. The goal of peace building needs to be formulated by a shared vision arising from mutual understanding and the collaborative spirit of problem solving.

Re-negotiation of the process to settle differences is required due to many unresolved issues on the road to the creation of political institutions and economic reform. Given that failure to identify and manage incompatible positions is likely to bring setbacks to the process, there has to be continued confidence in resolving conflict peacefully with a concrete package of mutual commitments and undertakings. As negotiations rather than threats and intimidation have to be a principal norm to guide behaviour, a mechanism to sort out opposing interests is crucial in dealing with ambiguities and confusion surrounding the implementation of agreements (Parris, 1997).

Nevertheless, Peace building strategies must be coherent and tailored to the specific needs of the country concerned, based on national ownership, and should comprise a carefully prioritized, sequenced, and relatively narrow set of activities aimed at achieving the above objectives.”The Secretary-General has set out his vision for peace building in three reports (A/63/881–S/2009/304, A/64/866–S/2010/386 and A/67/499-S/2012/746) on post- conflict peace building, and one (A/65/354–S/2010/466) on women’s participation in peace building. The 2009 report identified five recurring priority areas for international assistance:

1. Support to basic safety and security;

2. Political processes;

3. Provision of basic services;

4. Restoration of core government functions;

5. Economic revitalization.

The report also laid out an accompanying agenda for action for the UN. The 2010 report on women’s participation in peace building details the Secretary-General’s Seven-

Point Action Plan on Gender-Responsive Peace building, including specific targets for each of the seven points (conflict resolution, post-conflict planning, post-conflict financing, gender-responsive civilian capacity, women’s representation in post-conflict governance, rule of law and economic recovery).

Despite such increased attention on peace building policy and practice since Boutros

Boutros-Ghali’s initial observations, the 2012 report states that the UN and its partners must do more to ensure that countries emerging from conflict are able to contain and manage conflict themselves and transform it into sustainable peace. The report identifies inclusivity, institution building and sustained international support, as critical actions in preventing relapse into violence and producing more resilient societies. The report also notes that successful peace building processes must be transformative, creating space for a wider set of actors – including women, youth, marginalized groups, civil society, and the private sector – to participate in national post-conflict decision-making. With respect to institution building, the report observes that public administration and social services delivered equitably and accountably can help in addressing grievances and rebuilding a country’s legitimacy.

The 2012 report reflects not only lessons learned from the UN’s experience in peace building, but also wider policy discussions that have taken place amongst peace building stakeholders. Countries emerging from conflict together with development partners, the UN and other international organizations, have articulated a shared vision of peace building through the International Dialogue on Peace building and State-building. The New Deal for

Engagement in Fragile States, a policy framework emanating from the Dialogue, identifies five overarching peace building and state-building goals:

1. Legitimate (inclusive) politics;

2. People’s security;

3. Access to justice;

4. Employment generation and livelihoods support;

5. Accountable revenue management and service delivery.

The New Deal emphasizes the need to anchor support activities in a nationally owned peace building plan (One Vision/One Plan) and endorses the use of compacts as a means to implement those plans. The PBF contributes to the achievement of these peace building and state-building goals, and looks for opportunities within its current Priority Areas to support the New Deal principles. Various policies have stated clearly the “why” and the “what” of peace building. Both the Secretary-General’s 2009 report and the New Deal clearly establish the scope of peace building – i.e. it encompasses activities, ranging from politics and security to social services and livelihoods. The broadening of the scope has been an important development in recent years. Yet, what the various reports and definitions have been less successful at is the “how” and what makes an intervention peace building and how it contributes to a reduction in the risk of relapse. He further noted that:

Peace building refers to those initiatives which foster and support sustainable structures and processes for peaceful coexistence and decrease the likelihood of the outbreak, reoccurrence, or continuation, of violent conflict. The process entails both short- and long-term objectives, for example, short- term humanitarian operations and longer-term developmental, political, economic and social objectives, while there appears to be a general consensus of what peace building involves, and there has been a lack of commitment by the international community to long-term development goals. Rather, peacekeeping operations are seen as short-term development goal or a subset of military operations rather than a long-term development one. (Bush, 1996:76).

In Bush’s view, the international community’s approach to peace building, which is based on ‘quick in-and-out operations’, is tantamount to ‘bungee cord humanitarianism’

(Bush, 1996:76).This means interventions that merely show presence without addressing the

Problems. In other words, there is a gap between rhetoric and action on the part of the international community in peace building.

It is in the light of the above problem that a development scholar, Peter Uvni, views post-conflict development/peace building as “premised on three pillars: rehabilitation, reconstruction and development”. (Uvni, 2000:9). Busumtwi-Sam, (2004:317 and White and

Cliffe 2000) similarly noted the same three distinct approaches to post-conflict development along the continuum of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and conventional development. They all acknowledged the utility of humanitarian assistance/relief, rehabilitation and development approaches in providing short- to medium-term needs of individuals, refugees’ resettlement, shelter, food and medical attention in post-conflict societies, but they also admit of their shortcomings. For instance, Uvin notes and that there has been a lack of financial commitment by the international community towards post- conflict development. He further argues, ‘the international community is not willing to or capable of providing the resources of creating a truly functioning democracy’ (Uvin,

2000:11).

Another important limitation in post-conflict peace building, as noted by Chesterman and Reilly, has been the rush to hold early elections and exit the war-torn country without putting in place proper security policies or addressing the root causes of the conflict

(Chesterman, 2002:209; Reilly, 2002:120). In this regard, merely rehabilitating the state and pursuing development policies without addressing the root causes of conflict and security issues cannot bring lasting peace. As Green & Ahmed (2004:319) argued, ‘peace building involves the fundamental questions not only about what to reconstruct but also about how to

34 do so in order not to recreate the unsustainable institutions and structures that originally contributed to the conflict’.

However, Lipschutz (1998:7) noted that liberal democracy, serving as a normative model in post-conflict state building, has been applied without considering the empirical context of its applications. A liberal political model has been especially inadequate in addressing deeper causes and consequences of communitarian violence reflecting socioeconomic cleavages, internal colonisation, regional grievances, failure of assimilation, and cultural oppression . He further avers that in protracted communal strife, social divisions along ethnic, religion and class lines are further deepened by self-sustaining patterns of hostility and violence. The process of transforming the dynamics of intrastate conflict is not separated from a social/historical trend toward a demand for greater group autonomy.

Nonetheless, Parris (1997) further posits that the management and regulation of conflict are affected by existing social realities that contradict political pluralism in which success relies on the assumption that power is distributed among a plethora of interest groups. In a functioning pluralistic democracy, political institutions have to channel demands articulated by interest groups. The process of interest aggregation and its translation into policy matters by political parties is difficult in societies that lack not only a culture of political tolerance and compromise but also associations organised to defend specific interests. In addition, formal institutionalisation of a political process does not necessarily guarantee genuine expression of people's interests if the process is dominated by a few who have capacity to monopolise power.

Conversely, Jeong (2000) systematically noted that Peace being dissociated from social justice, does not address the fundamental structural causes of war . to him, post- conflict reconstruction faces the deep social inequalities that are common in (and endemic to) many divided and impoverished countries. Political instability is inherent in the failure to

35 reduce gross inequalities and in the lack of policies on poverty reduction. Formal methods of representation and institutional procedures can be a contentious issue without addressing power differentials among social groups and classes. The development of people's capacity to influence social structures and political processes has to go hand in hand with empowerment of the marginal sectors of society.

Furthermore, durable peace could not be achieved without 'the establishment of a local, state, regional and international systems of procedural and distributive justice which are responsive to basic needs. Procedural and distributive justice can be complementary to each other in the way that participatory mechanisms allow identity groups to express their needs and grievances in a constructive manner. In addition, forming political entities of multiethnic and multicultural configurations would require respect for greater autonomy and diversity. Dominant groups need to be convinced that their own long-term security interests are served by the promotion of a just society (Peck, 1996:74).

Timetables have to consider the links between short-term crisis management plans and long-term strategies for sustainable community building. Some programmes are designed to meet the immediate physical and material needs of local populations. At the same time, most settlement agreements need to have schedules for a cease-fire and the subsequent demobilisation of armed combatants flexibly adjusted to the needs for security arrangements.

Despite meeting the immediate goal of maintaining fragile peace, future conflict could erupt again without reconstruction and reconciliation. It will take more time to see the effects of such programmes on changes in culture and behaviour (Lumsden, 1999).

Consequently, Wood (2000) argued that the de-mobilisation of regular and militia forces and the creation of safe zones are critical initial steps to the stabilisation of a volatile situation at the early stages of a peace settlement. Short-term crisis intervention is necessary with the recognition of any sign of tension between groups. De-mobilisation and integration

36 of guerrilla forces into a newly reformed army had to proceed before moving to the next step for successful settlement in El Salvador, Liberia, Namibia, and Mozambique. Halting violence and maintaining a cease-fire may be enough to create a stable security environment at the initial stage, but it has to feed into a new political process as well. Still on his argument, Wood (2000) noted that the short-term strategies also have to consider an effective response to the emergent material needs of devastated communities. Humanitarian aid can focus on health, education and other social programs designed to meet urgent basic necessities. Without humanitarian aid and assistance, post-conflict society faces difficult conditions that prevent an easy return to normal life. The targets of relief work can be refugees and displaced people who have such needs as physical safety, family reunion, the supply of water, food, shelters, and medical treatment.

In consonance to the above view, Lumsden (1999) noted that a short-term emergency response has to be followed by resource mobilisation, professional training and restoration of administrative functions. Shattered social services such as health, nutrition, and education have to be revived with the rehabilitation of damaged school buildings and hospital equipment. In the intermediate term, it is crucial to reform government institutions, restore law and order, establish new local administrative structures, and train the personnel necessary to preserve them. The administration and supervision of fair elections precedes the formation of a functioning government. The political process ultimately has to move on to the integration of formerly warring factions into a new political structure, and the protection of human rights and justice.

It is a long process to change the psychological relationship of the parties and social structures of conflict. Peace building following long armed conflicts is implemented in a complex social situation, and it requires multidimensional responses. Activities designed for long-term goals have to be able to regenerate themselves for transforming the cycle of

37 conflictual behaviour. Projects for reconciliation and civil society building require transformative perspectives. The main task of reconstruction is to help local communities become self-reliant. Peace building lays the foundation for durable communal relations with social and economic improvement as well as reform of state institutions and political representation. Economic and social cooperation is fostered to build confidence among former adversaries (Peck, 1996:83).

De-militarisation is a more urgent goal than institution building while the former will be undermined in an unstable political environment ((Hampson, 1996; Stein, 2001 ).

Specifically, for Hampson (1996: 9) military demobilisation, economic and political reforms are interconnected to each other in creating stable relations between former adversaries. 'For a peace settlement to be durable, institutions and support structures must be put in place so that the parties are discouraged from taking up arms again. Thus, for Stein (2001) long-term development objectives cannot be achieved without building local capacity. Development programs are difficult to implement in the presence of acute violence and extreme insecurity.

Thus, a secure environment for rebuilding political, economic, and social structures of war- torn societies is created by demilitarisation aimed at the control of violence.

Hampson (1996) concludes that the major dilemma in a peace process is the clash between the need for power sharing and the desire to confront the sources of injustice. It was difficult to expect Khmer Rouge leaders to play a constructive role in the Cambodian peace process given their past involvement in genocide and other crimes against humanity. The

Khmer Rouge were excluded from building a new political structure and they were eventually eliminated by military means. In general, since the immediate pursuit of justice endangers the settlement process, the extent of the participation of those responsible for human rights abuses depend on a complex balance of power and moral judgements.

Normalisation of relations is supported by confidence building measures along with the acceptance of mutual security. Confidence building, though traditionally applied to reduction in military forces and armaments, can help mitigate intra-state conflict situations.

The effective handling of future crises and confrontations requires setting up clear sets of agreed norms and expectations among various groups. Regular lines of communication among former adversaries can lead to enhancing confidence across ethnic divides. In particular, a nonviolent expression of interests and techniques to resolve differences also strengthens the ability to constructively manage conflict (Garver, 1997).

Garver (1997) further avers that by making each other's motives transparent, confidence building reduces risks of renewed fighting resulting from miscalculation, miscommunication, and misunderstanding of intentions. Since misjudgment often provokes violent conflict, open discussion to clarify the issues and the exchange of information, in themselves, contribute to tension reduction. An atmosphere of trust is produced by demonstrating that the groups have no hostile intentions nor plan to make a surprise attack.

Mistrust and misperception cannot be eliminated when adversaries are armed. Suspicion in a political process exists when either or both of the parties refuse to put down their arms.

Failure of demobilisation in Angola led to the destruction of the entire process. The situation in Cambodia was destabilised by the inability for complete demobilisation. The lack of a disarmament policy in Somalia created significant challenges to peace enforcement missions by the UN peace keeping forces, making their eventual withdrawal inevitable.

Given that eruption of violence plays a destructive role in restoring confidence, introduction of confidence building measures at the early stage of peace building is desirable.

The first step in the transition from war to building new relationships starts with disarmament and de-militarisation, which reduce the ability of adversaries to attack each other. The ability and desire to renew fighting are not reduced without the elimination of destructive capacities.

Independent monitoring systems can be used to observe and report any breach of agreement that might have a risk of rearmament. The reduction and disbanding of opposing forces must be carefully monitored with verification procedures such as on-site inspection and observation (Garver, 1997).

Indeed, Garver (1997) in furtherance to his argument avers that mutual confidence building among former adversaries with the elimination of weapons reduces the risk of turning renewed hostilities into violent battles. The slow and ineffective implementation of the disarmament plan agreed upon in the 1995 Abuja peace accord among Liberian warring factions, made the deployment of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS) peacekeeping forces throughout the country difficult. War erupted again after the joint forces of Taylor and Kromah expelled the Johnson faction from the interim government.

ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) failed to stop violence, including looting in the capital in the course of the April 1996 crisis.

Such de-militarisation programs as demining (removing land mines), de-mobilisation and re-integration of ex-combatants into productive sectors of society are critical to creating a sustainable security environment. These programs have to be able to provide safety at individual and group levels. Through de-mobilisation, the number of personnel in the army has to be reduced while former opposing armed forces are disbanded. As new armed forces can be comprised of soldiers from different factions, de-mobilisation is not separated from restructuring and reformation of armed forces and police. De-mobilisation also has to go along with the reintegration of former combatants into the civilian society. Discharge of combatants without proper training programmes suitable for community life, can increase social instability. Conversion and reduced military spending free resources for retraining and other social programmes while minimising the influence of the military over political process. Following the defeat of the regime in 1991, the transition government in Ethiopia

40 implemented de-mobilisation and reintegration programmes involving national and local government agencies and NGOs. Financing resettlement, education, employment, housing, health, farmland and credit for ex-combatants was, to a great extent, supported by the

International Committee for the Red Cross, the World Bank and bilateral donors (Garver,

1997).

Thus, post-conflict reconstruction projects or policies need to, and should, address the underlying causes of the conflict, by dislodging the institutions and structures that caused it and creating new strong institutions and structures that can contribute to a sustainable peace.

From all the postulations of these scholars who have contributed a great deal to the understanding of peace building, it can be deduced that they lacked systemization in their presentation and analysis. The three approaches, humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation and a short-term development goal, though necessary, have a lot of weaknesses. Humanitarian assistance is needed to provide shelter, food, clothing and medicine to victims of conflict.

This is crucial because securing the lives of the people in anticipation of constructing democracy and the rule of law is of utmost importance in a post-conflict society.

Rehabilitation, which concerns immediate tasks that must be undertaken after the cessation of violence to restore a basic semblance of normality and restore the basic functioning of the state, usually takes three to six months (Uvin 2000).

Thus rehabilitation seeks to provide physical infrastructure for the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons. Thirdly, a short-term development approach aims at reconstructing the state by providing temporary shelter, drafting a constitution and putting in place administrative structures. But such measures fail to address long-term development issues. However, the search for peace in Liberia, as in any post-conflict country, may be guaranteed if we interrogate the causes of conflict in Liberia .Were the root causes of the conflicts that led to the first civil war from 1989 to 1990 addressed? If they were not, what

41 lessons can be learned by the present government of Liberia in this post-conflict period, and what policies are needed to maintain peace and stability in Liberia without a resumption of conflict? And to examine the causes of the conflict in Liberia, a brief background of the country’s civil war is needed.

Thus Adebajo (2002) historically narrated that prior to the Liberian civil war which began in 1989, the country was ruled by Americo-Liberians (American descendants) until

1980 when Sergeant Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, became the first president of Liberia.

Liberians for the first time thought they were going to be liberated under Samuel Doe’s regime. However, his regime became very authoritarian, discriminatory and abusive of human rights in Liberia. It was as a result of the repressive regime of Samuel Doe that

Charles Taylor began an attack in 1989 which finally led to the overthrow of Samuel Doe’s government by a break-away faction from the rebels’ group of Charles Taylor. This group, known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was led by Prince

Johnson in September 1990. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), mediated, and Dr. Sawyer acted as interim president until the 1997 elections when Charles

Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as president.

Two years later, the civil war began with two rebel groups. One emerged from the border between Ivory Coast and Liberia and became known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the other was started by a group of exiled Liberians in Guinea who called themselves Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).These two groups that fought Taylor’s government destabilized the country. With international pressures and ECOWAS intervention, Charles Taylor was compelled to resign in 2003. He went into exile in Nigeria and his vice-president, Gyude Bryant, was chosen to act as interim president until the 2005 election, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and sworn in as the

President of Liberia in January 2006. Liberians suffered from the Americo-Liberian rule in that they were systematically discriminated against in terms of employment, political representation and development projects. But did the situation change when Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, gained power in 1980? It did not.

Samuel Doe’s government became more repressive, authoritative and abusive of human rights. Indeed, there were political, social and economic factors that led to a resumption of the civil war in 1989. Firstly, after the 1985 elections, instead of establishing inclusive democratic governance, Doe deepened ethnic exclusion by disproportionately appointing his own tribe, the Krahns, and co-opted the Mandingoes, who were the wealthiest business people, into his cabinet to the neglect of the rest of the fourteen tribes of Liberia.

Secondly, the extra-judicial execution of Colonel Thomas Quinwokpa and his military men, including the Gios and Manos, brought about counter-reaction. Thirdly, the execution of

William Tolbert and several members of his cabinet, and the reckless confiscation of property, led the Americo-Liberians to support Charles Taylor’s uprising.

Doe’s government and the turmoil that then engulfed the country. Samuel Doe’s regime was very repressive and pursued ethnic discrimination policies. As Amos Sawyer argues,

“Sergeant Samuel Doe ascended to power from the lumpen elements of the Liberian Army.

Within a few years, he purged the military of all his rivals and of its trained officers, and relied on an under disciplined core recruited largely by his Krahn ethnic groups” (Sawyer

2004:444).

This means that the professionalism of the military was undermined, and this not only negated merit principles in the military but also weakened the military institution.

Meanwhile, questions have continued to be asked as to whether Charles Taylor, after his election in 1997 as the President of Liberia, addressed the socio-economic and political crisis that had led to the civil war. The evidence suggests that Taylor failed to address the root causes of the conflict, especially given that leaders of the twelve opposition parties who competed with him in the 1997 elections were harassed and intimidated. This led to a resumption of violent conflict in 1999.

The opposition parties went into exile to Guinea and Ivory Coast. It was these exiled groups who formed LURD and MODEL to fight Taylor’s government. Indeed, jobs were given to his party supporters, while certain parts of Liberia where his party did not get significant votes were either given no development projects or completely neglected. This led to widespread discontent against the government. The case of Liberia illustrates Nicole Ball’s assertion that “economic and political inequalities form the root causes of conflict in Africa, and until disparities between peoples are reduced, conflict will continue’ (Ball, 1991:385).

However, with respect to the operations of the International Criminal Court, Njoku,

(2003) noted that” at the ICC, perpetrators are investigated, prosecuted, and punished because of harm done to their victims. And that it is the severity, quantity and context of harm that defines certain acts as international crimes. Moreover, the suffering of victims has served as moral and political impetus for state and non-state actors to create international laws and institutions. Despite the centrality of victims to international criminal justice, however, tribunals have rarely emphasized their well-being, or sought to include their perspectives in decision-making”. This fact can be buttressed having recourse to the preamble of the Rome statue establishing the international criminal court which postulated

44 that: the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished.

Accordingly, Dembour & Haslam (2004) elucidated on this by using the International

Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, for example because they concentrated on perpetrators and their rightful punishment. While victimization figured prominently in testimony, victims themselves were an afterthought and rarely given the opportunity to tell their stories.

Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda (ICTR) and the former

Yugoslavia (ICTY) provided no role for victim participation other than as witnesses. These tribunals eventually improved their outreach programs so affected communities would at least be informed of the tribunals’ work, but many criticized them for failing to promote victims’ interests (Orentlicher, 2008).

These criticisms, as well as the rising importance of victims’ rights in domestic criminal systems, led civil society organizations and sympathetic states to promote victim- focused provisions during the creation of the ICC (Schabas, 2007; Schiff, 2008). As a result, the Rome Statute the founding treaty of the ICC contains two novel rights for victims at international criminal tribunals: the right to legal participation and reparations. The Statute also ordered the creation of a Trust Fund for Victims, a body that would provide material assistance to victims and help implement reparations. Consequently, some have argued that the ICC goes beyond the strictly retributive justice of previous international criminal tribunals and also promotes restorative justice (Funk, 2010; Musila, 2010).

Nevertheless on the establishment of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, Kimani (2013) asserted that

In August, the Security Council passed Resolution 1315, requesting the “Secretary-General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court consistent with this resolution, While the Resolution “reiterate’ that the situation in Sierra Leone

continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region (Kimani, 2013:24)

This is because, unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court was not established according to the Council’s Chapter VII authority, but by an international agreement whose negotiation was requested by the Security Council. Kimani (2013) further asserted that after

17 months of negotiations, in January 2002, the UN and the Government of Sierra Leone finally signed the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone

(Special Court Agreement), including as an annex the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra

Leone.

In the same view, Clarke (2014) shrewdly argued that The Lomé Peace Agreement granted an amnesty for crimes committed by all parties and referred to the establishment of a

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Although the UN Special Representative of the

Secretary-General present at the signing was not a party to the Agreement, he later appended a handwritten reservation to the amnesty stating that the UN would not recognize amnesty for

“international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law. For a while, it seemed as if the proposed TRC would be the only transitional justice mechanism available to address the human rights violations committed during the conflict. Civil society activists strongly supported the Commission as a way to ensure a measure of accountability. Legislation governing its establishment was passed in February 2000. The TRC was mandated to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. Preparatory activities began in March 2002, and commissioners were sworn in during July. The TRC worked for about two years and handed over its final report to the president in October 2004.

However, shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement, fighting re-erupted. In course of the attempted rescue of the UN peacekeepers taken hostage in May 2000, RUF leader Foday

Sankoh was taken into custody. The government feared that a national trial of Sankoh and his coconspirators would aggravate the conflict and fuel RUF desires to move on Freetown to disrupt the proceedings. Accordingly, on June 12, 2000, President Kabbah wrote to the

Secretary-General requesting the assistance of the international community in creating a court to try senior RUF officers. The Security Council viewed the taking of the peacekeepers hostage as a direct attack on the UN and felt obliged to assist in the prosecution of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, the Security Council and the Secretariat took strongly opposing views on how to accomplish this in light of the ICTY’s and ICTR’s financial drain on UN resources. For example:

• The Secretariat supported assessed funding, arguing that voluntary contributions

would be dangerously uncertain, while the Council insisted the opposite;

• The Secretariat argued in favour of granting the Special Court enforcement powers

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the Council did not;

• The Secretariat wanted personal jurisdiction over “those most responsible,” rather

than the narrower “those who bear the greatest responsibility” proposed by the

Council

Furthermore, Hoile (2012) posits that negotiations came to a standstill, but eventually it was agreed that the Special Court would be established by treaty rather than by resolution so that it could proceed without committing UN members to funding. The Court would function independently from the UN bureaucracy, be subject to the oversight of a

“Management Committee,” and have to raise its own funds. With this financial compromise, the Court’s operations were significantly scaled down and the Security Council prevailed on each of the above points of disagreement.

However, according to John M .M. (2002), Nonresident Senior Fellow, Africa Growth

Initiative; on July 17, 1998, 120 countries adopted the Rome Statute which established the

International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC, which came into being in July 2002, is “a permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern,” which include “genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; and the crime of aggression.” These countries believed that global justice would benefit from and be greatly enhanced by the creation of an “international criminal justice regime empowered to prosecute individuals guilty of gross atrocities and human rights violations, including war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide,”

(Boell 2012:89). Open Society Justice Initiative, observed that:

In August 2003, based on an agreement with African Heads of State, Taylor left office after rebel forces had come close to entering the Liberian capital, Monrovia. He was granted political asylum in Nigeria. In March 2006, Taylor was transferred to the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone where he now faces trial. The Special Court for Sierra Leone is trying Charles Taylor. Although the trial is being held in The Hague, Mr. Taylor is still being tried by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The latter Part of the trial and judgment is taking place on the premises of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. (Open Society Justice Initiative, 2003:58).

However, the Open Justice Initiative critically failed to elucidate on the reason for establishing The Special Court for Sierra Leone which is a prerequisite for understanding how it functions. This was why Cheng (2008) explained that the Special Court for Sierra

Leone was established on January 16, 2002, under an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone. It was established to try “those who bear the greatest responsibility” for war crimes, crimes against humanity, other serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra

Leone since November 30, 1996. The Special Court is a hybrid tribunal that makes a blend of

48 international and Sierra Leonean domestic law, as well as a blend of international and domestic Sierra Leonean personnel.

Charles Taylor was charged with 11 counts of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Sierra Leone from November 30, 1996, to January 18, 2002. The Prosecutor alleges that Mr. Taylor is responsible for crimes which include murdering and mutilating civilians, including cutting off their limbs; using women and girls as sex slaves; and abducting children adults and forcing them to perform forced labor or become fighters during the conflict in Sierra Leone.

Mr. Taylor has pleaded not guilty. Mr. Taylor is charged on the basis that he allegedly backed Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels fighting in Sierra Leone; that he had links with senior leaders in the RUF such as Foday Sankoh, Sam Bockarie (a.k.a. Mosquito), Issa

Sesay, and others in addition to a second warring faction, the Armed Forces Revolutionary

Council (AFRC); and that he was responsible for Liberian forces fighting in support of the

Sierra Leonean rebels. The specific counts against Mr. Taylor are:

• Five counts of war crimes: terrorizing civilians, murder, outrages on personal dignity,

cruel treatment, and looting,

• Five counts of crimes against humanity: murder, rape, sexual slavery, mutilating and

beating, and enslavement; and

• One count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law: recruiting

and using child soldiers. The Prosecutor alleges that Mr. Taylor bears individual

criminal responsibility for the crimes on the basis that he allegedly took part in the

crimes by planning, instigating, and ordering them; aiding and abetting them by

providing military training and support to the RUF and AFRC; and taking part in the

execution of a plan to take control of Sierra Leone during which the crimes were

committed. The Prosecutor further alleges that Mr. Taylor was a superior to

perpetrators of the crimes and failed to take reasonable measures to prevent or punish

the crimes while knowing or having reason to know about them (Strum, 1980).

However, Omeje (2008) maintained that “It is fine that Charles Taylor was convicted of 11 counts of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity of the rebel militia that committed atrocities of an unspeakable nature, and that he will be sentenced in early May. And it may further impress liberal commentators that fair legal procedures and diligent judicial oversight led to Taylor's acquittal with respect to the more serious charges of

"command responsibility" or "joint criminal enterprise". Surely, the circumstantial evidence sufficiently implicated Taylor in a knowing micromanagement of the crimes that it would have seemed reasonable to hold him criminally responsible for the acts performed, and not just for aiding and abetting in their commission. I share the view that it is desirable to lean over backwards to establish a reputation of fairness in dealing with accusations under international criminal law. It is better not to convict defendants involving crimes of state when strong evidence is absent to uphold specific charges beyond any reasonable doubt. In this respect, the Taylor conviction seems restrained, professional and not vindictive or politically motivated”.

But as Cheng (2007) has shown in a perceptive article published online on Al Jazeera, there are some elements of this conviction that feed the suspicion that the West is up to its old hypocritical tricks of seizing the moral high ground while pursuing its own exploitative economic and geopolitical goals that obstruct the political independence and sovereignty of countries that were once their colonies. As Cheng points out, the financing of the Special

Court for Sierra Leone was almost totally handled by the United States, United Kingdom, the

Netherlands and Canada. In addition, there were pragmatic reasons to make sure that Taylor was never allowed to return to Liberia, where he retains a strong following. It was feared that if Taylor were back in Liberia he would likely again foment trouble in the Liberian sub-

50 region, and this would make it impossible to restore stability, and begin "legitimate" mining operations, which is what the West apparently wanted to have happen in Sierra Leone.

However, beyond these sensational elements of the trial, a number of experts in international law regard it as a landmark case. Taylor, the rebel leader turned democratically- elected president, stands charged with 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity including rape, murder, terrorism, and using child soldiers during Sierra Leone’s brutal civil war, a war that was characterized by a gruesome trademark of amputations and mutilation of victims.

But as the news story reaches a climax, and journalists and analysts speculate its possible outcome and its implications for global justice and accountability within the region, the arrest and trial of Charles Taylor, have generated a lot of support, criticisms. Which in turn have a generated a lot of mixed feelings among Liberians. This fact has been buttressed by Clair MacDougall 25 April 2012, who opined that “Taylor, once a charismatic and powerful leader, enjoys a significant amount of support in Liberia nearly a decade after he was compelled to step down, despite the fact that many also regard him as a war criminal. It is unclear how his supporters will respond to the verdict”.

But back in the capital Monrovia, with its paved roads, supermarkets and giant choking electricity generators that are a world away from its neighboring counties, opinion is more varied. Nathan Gull, a 33-year-old businessman and public administration student sits crouched on a wooden bench, dressed in pinstriped trousers and a checked shirt. “We would like for Charles Taylor to be indicted for war crimes in Liberia rather than Sierra Leone,” says Gull. “There were more atrocities that occurred in Liberia under the leadership of

Charles Taylor as compared to that in Sierra Leone.”Like many of the men seated around him, Gull criticises the culture of impunity in Liberia, a country in which ex-faction leaders and those who were deeply involved in the war, both militarily and economically, hold senior

51 government positions.“The whole process is partial, Charles Taylor alone has been singled out by the international community,” says Gull. “But what has happened to the others like

George Boley, Sekou Damate Konneh and Alhaji Kromah? All of these top rebel leaders are walking free. We see some of them in the Senate and the House of Representatives, so why only Taylor?”(Berge, E. 2008).

Ferencz (2005) writing on Reconciliation defined reconciliation as building or rebuilding relationships damaged by violence and coercion, not only among people and groups in society, but also between people/citizens and the state. He further asserted that It is important to give specific consideration to societal stakeholders that have a great interest in reconciliation and peacebuilding, without having a strong or organized voice, e.g., victims, youth, ex-combatants, displaced people, diasporas, women, etc.

In a similar view, Green (1997) gave interpretations of what constitutes elements of “reconciliation”, they include ; • trauma healing at all levels of society (personal, community-based and national); • truth-telling and thus assuming responsibility for crimes; • providing reparations to victims; • forgiveness; • transitional justice (restorative, retributive, distributive, economic and/or social); • trust building and dialogue generation; • eliminating the use of violence as a political tool by the country’s elite; • addressing ethnic, social, and identity-based cleavages and polarisation; • defining a shared vision for the country (nation building); • addressing imbalances such as political exclusion; and

• power-sharing as a way to start building trust at the highest levels.

To him, reconciliation is both backward- and forward-looking. Al-though it is important to deal with the past (i.e., address impunity, the underlying causes of conflict, etc.), it is also necessary to try to move society in a new direction and think of reconciliation as preventative as well as restorative or remedial.

Molanthe (2014 ) similarly poists that another interesting aspect of reconciliation is how it relates to conflict-sensitive development, because addressing social, economic and cultural justice issues can be an important means to achieving reconciliation and vice versa.

In this regard, reconciliation can be interpreted as contributing to building just, equitable and inclusive societies rather than merely dealing with the physical violations of the past.

Flowing from the above, Weah (2009) a Liberian civil society activist and scholar who has specialized in Liberia’s post-conflict transition, claims that the political prominence of Johnson Sir leaf and others involved in the war underlines the challenges the nation will face in its pursuit of justice and reconciliation.“It just shows that we are still far away from having any breakthrough if Prince Johnson presides over the national security committee of our country that is trying to reform the very security architecture he destroyed. That is a joke,” Weah, (2009) says emphatically. Liberia’s TRC released its final report in 2009 recommending 120 people to be tried for war crimes and 50 people to be barred from politics for 30 years. President Johnson Sirleaf was listed in the latter category for sending money to

Taylor early on in the war in order to, in her own words, “challenge the brutality” of

President Doe’s regime ( Truth and Reconciliation Report ,2009).

Interestingly, the Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and peace activist Leymah Gbowee says that the tensions that arose during the elections illustrated the urgent need for reconciliation amongst Liberians. She further posits that:

For six years we have sidestepped it, she said at the office of her peace foundation in Monrovia. When the time came for the election of leaders, the ugly head of the past rose up. We haven’t as a people been able to look that evil that brought the war in the eye and say this is it, this group is responsible (Gbowee, 2009:56).

According to her, prosecutions are not the way forward, at least not for now, in a nation still divided along the same ethnic lines that defined the war and where peace is fragile and maintained by a force of 8,000 United Nations peacekeepers.“If you decide to indict

Prince Johnson and use the retributive kind of justice for prosecution, especially in Liberia, you need to think about how you will quell some of the riots and demonstrations that will come as a result of this,” Gbowee says. “The question is should we allow him to go free because of fear of that?” The answer is ‘no I do not support impunity’. But the other question is when? Not now. We still see people being prosecuted for crimes they committed in World

War II today,” (Steinberg, 2009). Steinberg also argues that a war crimes court could further divide Liberians. "There is so little consensus on where blame lies,” he says. “It is hard to imagine a process would be considered fair (by Liberians) even if some powerful international agency or court were involved.” But perceptions of former faction leaders differ from county to county, sometimes even village to village, depending on the dominant ethnic makeup of the area and the politics of patronage that existed there. There is no agreed upon or coherent narrative of the war or consensus on who were the victims and the persecutors.

Liberia’s Truth and Reconciliation Report (TRC) released its final report in 2009 recommending 120 people to be tried for war crimes and 50 people to be barred from politics for 30 years. President Johnson Sirleaf was listed in the latter category for sending money to

Taylor early on in the war in order to, in her own words, “challenge the brutality” of

President Doe’s regime ( Truth and Reconciliation Report ,2009).

In 2011, just over a year after the 2009 TRC report was released, the Supreme Court found the TRC’s recommendations to be unconstitutional because it violated the rights of individuals to due process.“It is a shame that Liberia doesn’t have legitimate and transparent processes through which to suppress the recommendations through good law,” says Jonny

Steinberg, author of Little Liberia: An African Odyssey in New York. To him, ‘‘the

54 recommendations have been suppressed in such a problematic fashion compounding ordinary people’s suspicions that the powerful individuals have managed once again to escape accountability”. Taylor’s verdict is to come on the back of last year’s tense presidential and legislative elections that saw claims of electoral fraud, a boycott of the second round by the opposition Congress for Democratic Change party (CDC), and a protest on the day before the vote in which one demonstrator was shot dead and several others were injured. The CDC’s support base was largely made up of the unemployed and ex-combatants, many of whom feel they have not benefited under Johnson Sirleaf’s administration (Cheng, 2009). Nobel

Peace Prize Laureate and peace activist Gbowee (2009) further noted that the tensions that arose during the elections illustrated the urgent need for reconciliation amongst Liberians.

“For six years we have sidestepped reconciliation” hence, he further asserted that when the time came for the election of leaders, the ugly head of the past rose up. We haven’t as a people been able to look that evil that brought the war in the eye and say this is it, this group is responsible. Thus, Prosecutions are not the way forward, at least not for now, in a nation still divided along the same ethnic lines that defined the war and where peace is fragile and maintained by a force of 8,000 United Nations peacekeepers. “If you decide to indict Prince

Johnson and use the retributive kind of justice for prosecution, especially in Liberia, you need to think about how you will quell some of the riots and demonstrations that will come as a result of this”.

However, many analysts, like Weah (2009) argued that the indictment of powerful members of the political establishment such as Johnson Sir leaf has been the main reason the report appears to have been shelved and its more punitive recommendations ignored.“The prospects seem very remote, but it is only because of the prevailing political will”. If there is a change of regime, the conversation might change and the space could be opened up for prosecution and we could be involved in a new round of investigations.”But others argue that

55 the recommendations of the TRC were unlikely to be implemented because they were deeply flawed and because report did not build up a case as to why certain people should be prosecuted or banned from politics.

Steinberg (2009) nevertheless argues that a war crimes court could further divide

Liberians. "There is so little consensus on where blame lies,” he further argued that it is hard to imagine a process would be considered fair (by Liberians) even if some powerful international agency or court were involved.” Synonymously, Adebajo (2003) in his funny expression asserted that many ordinary Liberians also agree that a war crimes court may not be the way forward. Citing a story to buttress his argument, he posits that, Oliver a 27-year- old lab technician from River Gee County, in the South East of Liberia, survived a massacre committed in 1995 by the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), a rebel faction that fought during the first civil war. Wah hid behind a tree and watched as soldiers raped his mother and slit her throat “like a cow” and hacked off his father’s limbs. 37 villagers were killed that day.“If we say that people should be prosecuted in Liberia, everybody would go, because almost the whole of Liberia went to war,” says Wah. “For me I suggest that Liberians forgive each other and rebuild our country. ‘‘Abraham Dulleh, a 28-year-old sociology student, stated that

Liberia must move beyond the past and focus on the nation’s current developmental challenges. “As a nation we have been through a lot,” he says. “We think that bygones should be bygones because we need to develop this country if we are to move forward. We need to get back the things that we lost during the war. Even if you arrest all of the warlords and put them in the chair it wouldn’t make me have my school fees; it will not provide me with food or anything” (cited in Adebajo, 2003).

A number of advocacy groups, however, argue that prosecutions are necessary if

Liberia is to move forwards. In 2009 when TRC’s final report was released, for example,

Human Rights Watch recommended that an international-domestic hybrid war crimes court

56 be set up in Liberia. “Liberia is in a situation where there have been serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, but no prosecutions for the crimes,”(Human Rights Watch, 2003). “What we are seeing is a justice vacuum that puts

Liberia in stark contrast with its neighbour Sierra Leone. In Sierra Leone, we are seeing a robust justice effort however imperfect and limited.” Liberian human rights lawyer Tiawan

Gongloe who was tortured for speaking out against Taylor’s regime agrees that prosecutions are necessary but argues that rather than trying perpetrators in one domestic-international court, special chambers for war crimes should be created in domestic courts and supported by international legal experts. And he argues that perpetrators should be tried in the counties in which they committed crimes. “Justice should be a deterrent for perpetrators and provide relief for victims,” he says. “A lot of these international courts don’t really provide relief for victims and are out of the public eye the victims will never see them.” But after decades of oppression under the ruling class followed by war, Liberia’s legal system is weak and unable to handle even simple criminal cases, a shortfall Gongloe acknowledges (Human Rights

Watch, 2003).

Sirleaf (2009) has sidestepped the more contentious elements of the TRC report, and in her second term is increasingly using the discourse of economic empowerment to define reconciliation. In her inauguration speech earlier this year, she said: “True reconciliation means a process of national healing and learning the lessons from the past to perfect our democracy. Above all it means economic justice for our citizens and the spread of progress to all of our people. It means creating jobs, opportunities and giving our young people the skills to prosper and lead the life they choose.” Indeed, Johnson Sirleaf appears to be steering clear of notions of punitive justice and last year appointed Gbowee to head the Liberian

Reconciliation Initiative.

The body will be politically and financially independent although its actual processes and projects remain unclear. Part of Johnson Sirleaf's plans; however, are known to include the ‘palaver hut programme’, the least controversial of the TRC’s recommendations and the only one to be implemented at this stage. Palaver huts are spaces in traditional communities where people resolve disputes through discussion and the programme is aimed “to afford anyone who has committed, whether knowingly or unknowingly against an individual or the state, to admit the wrongful act and seek pardon from the people of Liberia”.

However, some members of Liberian civil society argue the palaver hut programme will not adequately address the mass atrocities that were committed during the war. There needs to be a discussion about the palaver hut programme. It is not a universal dispute resolution mechanism all across Liberia. Historically the palaver hut has not been used to address mass atrocities.” Verdier the former chairman of the TRC, who now lives in the US and claims to have left Liberia due to death threats in the lead-up to the elections, says that prosecutions are fundamental to reconciliation in Liberia and sees the limited palaver hut programme as politically motivated. “We cannot have reconciliation without justice, and reconciliation shouldn’t be politicised,” (Verdier, 2003). The head of the Liberia Democratic

Institute Dan Sayree (2003), in a similar view ostensibly argues that the Liberian

Reconciliation Initiative and the palaver hut programme are politically motivated and a distraction from the broader issues of justice and accountability. For him, he sees it as a charade and a deceitful approach and non-committal action towards peace and reconciliation in Liberia. “If you want to reconcile people, those who you want to reconcile must be convinced that they have justice. Justice is not just about punishing people. It is also about creating an environment where those who perpetrated violence or other acts against people can admit to the problems that they created.” ( Keppler does not see a direct relationship between justice and reconciliation, but avers that justice plays an important role in building

58 peace and challenges arguments that pursuing prosecutions in post-conflict countries can have a destabilizing effect” From Human Rights Watch’s perspective, trials for the gravest crimes and human rights violations committed are essential to making a serious break from the past, giving redress to the victims and to strengthening the rule of law.”

Having reviewed the work of various scholars on I.C.C. (International Criminal

Court) intervention and its challenges in Liberia, we can deduce that there are various opinions among various scholars on the issue of I.C.C. intervention and its challenges in

Liberia. However, the writers have failed to render adequate systematic treatment of the issue.

2.2: The I.C.C Intervention in Liberia and Consequences of Peace Building in Africa

Mbaku (2002; 57) opines that two realities gave impetus to Africa’s strong support for the establishment of the ICC: the carnage that gripped Rwanda in 1994 and the need to find ways to prevent powerful countries from preying on weaker ones. There was an urgent need in Africa to squarely confront impunity and the mass violation of human rights, as well as prevent militarily, politically and economically stronger countries from invading weaker ones. In terms of the latter, the inclusion of “crimes of aggression” “the planning, preparation, initiation or execution of an act of using armed force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state,” was especially attractive to African countries (ICC 2012). Today, 43 African countries are signatories to the

Rome State and, of these, 31 are states parties.

In the same view, Schabas (2010) brilliantly observed that the ICC interventions and perceptions of the ICC in Africa despite past and present war and conflict in other world regions, the ICC’s prosecutorial interventions are currently focusing exclusively on African cases: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR),

Sudan (Darfur), Uganda (Northern), Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya. The cases have come

59 about as a result of a combination of self-initiated interventions by the ICC’s First Chief

Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, two UN Security Council referrals, and the submission by individual African governments (specifically, CAR, DRC and Uganda) of cases to the Court.

Nevertheless, the current Afro-centric focus of ICC prosecutorial interventions has created a distorted perception on the African continent about the intention behind the establishment of the Court. The reality is that African countries voluntarily signed up to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, and some have therefore asked why those who share this perception now question the Court for doing its work.

Similarly, Murithi buttressed this fact when he opined that:

Despite past and present war and conflict in other world regions, the ICC’s prosecutorial interventions are currently focusing exclusively on African cases: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan (Darfur), Uganda (Northern), Libya, Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya (Murithi, 2013:37).

The cases have come about as a result of a combination of self initiated interventions by the ICC’s First Chief Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, two UN Security Council referrals, and the submission by individual African governments (specifically, CAR, DRC and Uganda) of cases to the Court. Nevertheless, the current Afro-centric focus of ICC prosecutorial interventions has created a distorted perception on the African continent about the intention behind the establishment of the Court. The reality is that African countries voluntarily signed up to be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC, and some have therefore asked why those who share this perception now question the Court for doing its work”. In the same way, Max du et al (2013) opine that all of the cases that the ICC is currently investigating and prosecuting have to do with crimes allegedly committed in countries in

Africa. This has raised questions as to whether this is an example of the selectivity of international criminal law.

Schabas (2010) further argues that by examining each African case individually one might be able to come up with a rational explanation of why all the current cases of the ICC are in Africa. One might even argue that, to a neutral observer, if one critically analyses the facts, it is impossible to reach the conclusion that the ICC was established with the sole purpose of prosecuting cases from Africa. At the same time, though, one could also identify a combination of domestic and international political interests behind the submission of, for the time being, only African cases and behind UN Security Council referrals to the ICC.

Thus, for Meernik (2005), he asserted that the AU constantly ‘reiterates its commitment to fight impunity in conformity with the provisions of Article 4(h) of the

Constitutive Act of the AU’. According to officials of the AU, what the body takes exception to is in effect being constrained by how other international actors choose to fight impunity on the African continent. In a statement shortly after she was sworn in as the Chairperson of the

AU Commission, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stated that ‘the AU had applied its mind and decided that it is more important to get peace in Sudan than to rush for the arrest, and therefore they ask for it to be deferred; as far as I know, that decision still stands’.

Accordingly, Meernik (2005) further noted that this sentiment is not unique to Africa.

There is no other region of the world that is subject to the prosecutorial interventions of the

ICC, so it is not possible to compare or contrast whether the AU’s stance is in fact unreasonable. All inter-governmental organizations undoubtedly would want to determine how their member states engage with issues relating to transitional justice, peace- building, democratic governance and the rule of law, without feeling that there is an overbearing and patriarchal entity in effect stipulating how the continent should be going about doing so. In a similar view, Sriram (2009) it is an understatement to note that the relationship between the

AU and the ICC has got off to a bad start. One could not imagine a worse start. Both organizations share a convergence of mandates to address impunity and to ensure

61 accountability for violations, atrocities and harm done in the past. Where the organizations diverge is in the fact that the AU is a political organization and the ICC is an international judicial organization. In this divergence lies how the two organizations go about ‘addressing impunity and ensuring accountability for past violations, atrocities and harm done’

Interestingly, (Meernik, 2005; Sriram, 2009; Schabas, 2010) held a similar view that the AU, by its very nature, will gravitate first to a political solution and approach to dealing with the past; such an approach will place more of an emphasis on peace-making and political reconciliation. The ICC, on the other hand, will pursue international prosecutions, because this is written into its DNA, the Rome Statute. On paper it would appear that the two approaches may never converge. Yet there is scope for the AU to become more nuanced in the situations in which it would side with and support ICC interventions to promote accountability for past violations.

Conversely, Schabas (2010) opined that the ICC has to acknowledge and communicate that it is aware that it is operating in an international political milieu – and that on occasion it would have to sequence its prosecutions to enable political reconciliation processes to run their course. This would require the ICC to step down from the artificial pedestal on which Ocampo placed it, asserting that it does not play politics when in fact it has appeared that everything that it has done has been politically tainted. In effect, the ICC will need to embrace the political lessons of its past transgressions and omissions, and openly acknowledge that, in the absence of a world government, it works in an inherently unrestrained international political system.

Sequential to the above, Controversies over the establishment of this new international justice body have overshadowed what it means for the African countries where the Court is taking its first steps. The fact that the ICC has focused so overwhelmingly on

African situations speaks partly to the prevalence of violations of international criminal law in

Africa but also prompts questions about why the gaze of international criminal justice falls in some places and on some people and not on others. The ICC is designed as a ‘court of last resort’ that backs up national jurisdictions rather than trumps them. Nonetheless, the Court’s focus on Africa has stirred African sensitivities about sovereignty. Africa also manifests a pattern of political elites maneuvering to ensure that interventions by international institutions ultimately play to their advantage. Furthermore, as Graeme Simpson’s essay in this collection points out, the Court’s ‘cultural relevance,’ as a supposed embodiment of ‘western’ legal norms, has been questioned, as has the extent to which the pursuit of criminal justice through international channels can further or undermine the pursuit of other goals such as peace and reconciliation.

Countries from the global south frequently complain of skewed power relations in the

UN Security Council. This imbalance has affected the ICC because, under the Statute of the

ICC (the Rome Statute), the Security Council has the power to refer cases to the court. The

Security Council has referred some cases Libya and the Sudanese region of Darfur– but not others, such as Israel and Syria. The fact that the two situations that have been referred come from Africa tends to support the suggestion that there is an anti-African bias. This has been effectively argued by John Dugard, in relation to Israel, in the most recent issue of the

Journal of International Politics, (2012).”There are good reasons to pursue the cases that are under investigation or prosecution before the ICC. For one thing Africa has experienced a large number of atrocities and, statistically speaking, the rate of atrocity crimes committed on the continent would make it a natural focus for the court anyway. The victims of those crimes want justice. The people who complain about the bias tend to be African political elites, not the victims, who appear to be almost universally relieved that somebody – anybody – is paying attention to their plight”.

However, there is a genuine problem, which has to do with perception and the need for the ICC to be seen to be acting in a just manner in order to maintain its authority. The universal aspirations of international criminal law are inconsistent with a focus that is limited to African states, in a world in which many other states – particularly powerful ones act with apparent impunity. The refusal by Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa in 2012 to share a stage with former British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Johannesburg, based on the latter’s actions over the war in Iraq, called attention to this apparent moral ambivalence in relation to the way the ICC works. Tutu’s moral authority helped to demonstrate that this perception problem is very real. Failure to take this problem seriously has provided some

African politicians and officials with ammunition to argue that the ICC is selectively biased against Africa. This distracts from the very real plight of victims of war crimes and crimes against humanity which have taken place on the continent.

The previous chief prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo (2003:12) exacerbated the situation by failing to communicate with his African interlocutors, particularly by failing to partake in discussions with the AU former chairperson of the AU

Commission Jean Ping. Sequentially, on October 17, 2013, Bucharest (AFP) – The president of the International Criminal Court said that it has never “targeted any African country”, claiming any such criticism was “regrettable, We never chased any African country, we didn’t do anything in this respect, they brought their own situation to us,” Korean judge

Sang-Hyun Song told AFP in Bucharest.”ICC is re colonization of African people. Check

ICC records, all the cases been handled or transferred there are Africans, have you ever seen a white man or white president tried there, Gorge Bush waged war against Afghanistan and

Iraq after UN and other international community cautioned him, his then secretary of state even regretted their action in Iraq, why can’t they prosecute him. Nicolas Sarkozy the formal president of France waged war against Ivory Coast, many people condemned it but no arrest

64 was made. They will cause war/problem in Africa because of our resources/wealth and they will use ICC to punish anyone that goes against them”. Let me explain the problem of Ivory

Coast to you people,

Furthermore, on May 28 Global Information Network (GIN) reported that – As the

African Union summit drew to a close this week, Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam

Desalegn leveled a stinging blow at the International Criminal Court (ICC) that prosecutes human rights violators, when he accused it of “hunting Africans" as 99% of those indicted by the ICC are from the continent. This shows something is flawed within the system of the ICC and to that he said we object He continued: “The intention (of the ICC) was to avoid any kind of impunity and ill governance and crime, but now the process has degenerated into some kind of race hunting.”

The same appears to apply to the U.N. Security Council referrals to the ICC, which are similarly biased,” (Boell 2012). One may wonder if crimes that fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction have only been committed in Africa. Throughout the world, “serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole” are being committed, yet the ICC has devoted its resources to prosecuting mostly African cases. African governments argue that the ICC is practicing a form of “selective justice” and that it is avoiding diplomatically, economically, financially and politically strong countries, such as the United States, the

United Kingdom, Russia and China, because these countries can threaten the ICC’s existence. Today, opposition against the ICC is growing. Many Africans are now joining their leaders to challenge the moral integrity of the ICC, with some arguing that the court is opting for political expediency instead of the universal justice spelled out in the Rome

Statute. Unfortunately, the ICC is yet to adequately and effectively allay the fears of Africans and convince them that the court’s work is based exclusively on the belief that “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole must not go .Following

65 from the above, African leaders have said the November trial of Kenya's president at the

International Criminal Court should be delayed, and that if it was not, he should not attend.

An African Union summit (2009) called on the U.N. Security Council to defer the trial under

Article 16 of the court's Rome Statute, which allows for a delay of a year subject to renewal."If that is not met, what the summit decided is that President (Uhuru) Kenyatta should not appear until the request we have made is actually answered," Ethiopian Foreign

Minister Tedros Adhanom told journalists in Addis Ababa. The summit was called to discuss

Africa's relations with the court, which has provoked mounting frustration among African leaders who accuse it of unfairly targeting people on the continent and largely ignoring crimes elsewhere in the world."We would like our concerns to be heard loud and clear,"

Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn, whose country chairs the African Union, told the closing session, we have agreed that no charges shall be commenced or continued before any international court or tribunal against any serving head of state or government, or anybody acting or entitled to act in such capacity during his or her term of office."

However, contrary to the above, Al Jazeera's Malcolm Webb, reporting from Addis

Ababa, said it was a damning statement against the ICC from the AU and that, while it did not have any legal significance, it was a strong political statement, Court has never “targeted any African country”, claiming any such criticism was “regrettable”. Korean judge Sang-

Hyun Song told AFP in Bucharest “We never chased any African country, we didn’t do anything in this respect, they brought their own situation to us,” Korean judge Sang-Hyun

Song told AFP in Bucharest.

Writing on civil society and the ICC, Meernik (2005) remarks that the view of

African civil society with regard to the role of the ICC on the continent is not a homogeneous one. There are several schools of thought among civil society and the wider public. There are those who view the ICC as a necessary palliative to the gross impunity that has wreaked

66 havoc on the lives of African citizens. There is also the critical view, among some civil society actors, that the ICC is not a panacea that will cure Africa of all its ills and rid it of its criminal elite. The pro-ICC civil society camp views the Court as confronting and subverting attempts by African leaders and governments to circumvent accountability for past atrocities; it argues that the domestic legal systems are unable to deal, or are incapable of dealing, with the most serious crimes of international concern, and therefore the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction has to be operationalised.

However, in divided societies, exclusive ethnic, religious, or regional loyalties still remain obstacles in the process of institution building .The state as an institution does not always represent the general interest of the population. Concentration of power in one group can aggravate social and political cleavages that have generated a violent conflict. Minority concerns can be ignored by the majority favouring an electoral system that does not have power sharing mechanisms. The system, which allows the winner to take all, does not ensure the rights of minorities, especially following a zero-sum contest wherein positions for both winners and losers are sharply divided. In winner-take-all elections, the losers have incentives to take up arms and return to violence in order to pursue their political objectives.

Voting systems need to be designed to guarantee that opposition voices are heard (Knife &

Tekle-Mikael, 1997).

Accordingly, Knife & Tekle-Mikael, (1997) further noted that a variety of constitutional models (power sharing at the centre and/or power delegation to minority regions) can be suitable for different traditions and social contexts. Political institutions can mitigate the impact of inter-group cleavages by ensuring the autonomy of minority groups.

Institutions encouraging bargaining and accommodation are more likely to produce political stability. Coalitions can be built to undermine inter-group rivalry in preserving national

67 cohesion whereas the political rights of groups, which do not belong to a ruling coalition, have to be protected.

Ethnic plurality is also protected by the structure of a federal government or other types of a decentralised political system. Stability in multi-ethnic countries derives from balanced power distribution between the centre and the region. Delegation of power to regions and districts can ease fear of minority groups concentrated in particular areas. Each region can be entitled to the right to choose and teach its official language as well as a national language. Public sector powers and tasks may be deferred to regions to give autonomy to diverse ethnic groups. Regions determine their own administrative structures, exercise authorised tax powers to generate revenue, and have separate police forces. Under specified conditions, regions may also have the right to secede (Knife & Tekle-Mikael,

1997).

Development has to improve a social reality that is inhospitable to human material well-being. Post-war economic reconstruction has to be designed to alleviate unjust socio- economic conditions, the main causes of war. Owing to the problems related to a lack of human capital and destruction of physical infrastructure, it is a challenging task to reinitiate economic development halted by violent conflict. It takes time to rebuild the systems of transport and communication, banking, health care, education and agriculture damaged or destroyed by fighting. In addition, inadequate distribution of land and other resources weakens the community's ability to recover from war wounds. The prospect for early economic recovery is further hampered by environmental degradation resulting from the conduct of war and subsequent population movement. In countries that endured long civil wars, local communities bear the heavy burden of the cost for repopulation and other economic recovery activities given the national government's indebtedness stemming from high military spending.

In overcoming economic problems precluded by violent conflict, major attention may be paid to a production increase in agriculture, manufacturing and construction along with the establishment of small enterprises and commerce to be resumed by savings and credit. Sustainable development projects must be compatible with the protection of the environment that supports the survival needs of local populations. It is often the case that due to the low domestic capacity of raising revenue and high demands for expenditure, the role of foreign donors with financial resources is critical in economic recovery (Harris, 1999:117).

Economic growth and patterns of income distribution have to be considered in an integrative framework of building harmonious relations between different social groups. The logic for a market economy provides opportunities to pursue self-interest, but does not create conditions for social harmony. Macroeconomic reforms aimed at stimulating the economy can generate income gaps with unequal development across different regions and groups. On the other hand, cutbacks in public spending and real salaries to reduce budget deficits, undermined peace accords at places like Liberia. The goal of community development cannot be achieved without equitable distribution of resources to support economic activities of the poor and marginalised. Given the fact that incentives for local economic activities are not created by pure liberal economic policies, investment in human and physical resources should be balanced with financial and monetary stability (Väyrynen, 1997).

Consequently, Väyrynen (1997) further noted that the capacity of indigenous organisations to mobilise resources in a local setting is the key to a grassroots development approach. Uprooted populations need to be integrated into development programs with assistance in promotion of self-sufficiency and sustainability. The participation of local populations in rebuilding their communities reassures regained control over their own lives.

Various projects organised at a community level such as production cooperatives, savings and loan associations, job training and literary programs operate in an informal economy.

Economic programs have to be designed to bring about stability and equity. Political stabilisation is undermined by both perceived and real imbalances in income and wealth.

Ending a long civil war does not necessarily induce significant changes in the overall economic structures. In order to reduce deep and expanding social disparities, an economic system has to be reformed in a way to strengthen the development potential of different ethnic groups and ultimately to produce benefit to all the groups.

In promoting the goal of peace, development programmes have to address the social and economic ills that are the roots of violence. Long-term economic planning has to consider such social issues as land distribution. Those who own the coffee plantation or have monopoly over other means of production can still exercise a dominant influence on rebuilding the local economy. The resistance of these forces in Liberia, for instance, makes it difficult to implement the land distribution plan included in the Peace Accord that the government and rebel forces signed. In order to overcome these problems, the process of land transfers can be expedited by government funds (Boyce, 1997).

Thus from all these, we deduced that ICC has been in force for almost 11 years now, and by far the major challenge facing the court is how to deal with Africa. The recent decision of the AU Assembly embodies this challenge. Though partly self-serving, there are also legitimate concerns underpinning the AU's criticism of the ICC.

2.3 Gaps in Literature

With the above literature reviewed, we found out that while some scholars were in support of the International Criminals Court intervention in Liberia, like in the works of

(Verdier, 2012, Weah, 2009),others were of the opinion that retributive kind of justice was not the way forward.(Gbowee, 2009; Cheng, 2008). However, despite the multitude of literature reviewed, especially on I.C.C. intervention and challenges of peace building in

Liberia and I.C.C. intervention in Liberia and consequences of peace building in Africa, they

70 have been limited by the fact that none has been able to take an in-depth analysis of the impact of I.C.C. intervention in Liberia, especially in the area of peace-building. Secondly, none of them was able to make a critical explanation into the nature, character and politics of

I.C.C. intervention in Africa, Liberia precisely.

CHAPTER THREE

Methodology

3.1. Theoretical Framework of Analysis

Our analysis of I.C.C. and Peace building in Liberia is based on the theoretical context of Human needs theory. The Human Needs Theory has evolved only in the last few decades, and largely as a reaction against these limited separate discipline explanations of social problems. Often ignored and neglected by peace researchers, Human Needs Theory may offer valuable insights into the sources of conflict, and thus possible resolutions. Thus,

Coate & Rosati (2008) argued that, Human needs are a powerful source of explanation human behaviour and social interaction. All individuals have needs that they strive to satisfy, either by using the system, acting on the fringes or acting as a reformist or revolutionary.

Given this condition, social systems must be responsive to individual needs, or be subject to instability and forced change (possibly through violence or conflict). Human needs theorists argue that one of the primary causes of protracted or intractable conflict is people’s unyielding drive to meet their unmet needs on the individual, group, and societal level.

Thus, Human Needs Theory offers insights into a range of peace building processes that are involved in “the reduction of both direct and structural violence. According to this theory, in order to live and attain well-being, humans need certain essentials. These are called human needs or basic human needs. Human needs theorists argue that conflicts and violent conflicts are caused by un-met human needs. Violence occurs when certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their need, or when they need understanding, respect and consideration for their needs. Rosenberg states that violence is a tragic expression of unmet human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs. If we are able to connect with our needs and those of others, we will

72 therefore be able to look at other ways of meeting such needs, avoiding violence and destruction.

Often, human needs or basic human needs are confused with subsistence needs.

However, such a view of human needs may limit our understanding of the human being to simply exist as a biological creature. Although there are conflicts over subsistence, most conflicts have to do with other unmet human needs, such as protection, identity, recognition, participation and understanding. Only by giving more importance to these latter needs, truly recognizing them as human needs essential to the wellbeing of all human being, will we be able to address current and intractable conflicts. Our confused view of human needs as subsistence needs only is also in part due to the alienation of “needs” we have created in our society. Needs are often associated with weakness, and someone who needs is considered weak and fragile. This also further impedes the inclusion of needs approaches in conflict transformation and peace processes.

Various researchers have applied human needs theory. Here, the proposals of

Abraham Maslow, John Burton, Marshall Rosenberg and Manfred Max-Neef will briefly be explored. In his Pyramid of Human Needs, Abraham Maslow puts emphasis on the hierarchy of needs, stating that some are more urgent than others. He says although all needs are instinctive, some are more powerful than others. The lower the need is in the pyramid, the more powerful it is. The higher the need is in the pyramid, the weaker and more distinctly human it is. The lower, or basic, needs on the pyramid are similar to those possessed by non- human animals, but only humans possess the higher needs. On the base of the pyramid he places food, water, and shelter. On a second level, he places the need for safety and security, followed by belonging or love. The need for self-esteem is found on a fourth level and finally on a fifth and final level, personal fulfillment. Maslow argues that human needs are arranged in a hierarchy in terms of their potency and each human being is trying to meet needs on a

73 certain level at any one time. An individual looking to meet needs for food and water will not be looking to meet needs of belonging, love or self-esteem. Only when the needs on the lower end of the Pyramid are met, will humans look to meet their need for personal fulfillment.

John Burton, since the publication of his book, Deviance, Terrorism and War: The

Process of Solving Unsolved Social and Political Problems (1964), has been closely identified with the theory of basic human needs. Burton did not invent the theory, which posits the existence of certain universal needs that must be satisfied if people are to prevent or resolve destructive conflicts, but he gave it its most impassioned and uncompromising expression. He has been applying human needs theory more actively to current social and political conflicts. In his work on protracted, social conflicts, he looks at how universal human needs often are neglected, leading groups to use violence to claim their rights and satisfying their needs.

In what is really a compatibility of human needs, Burton argues that education and culture make parties manipulate the issues and dehumanizing the other parties. In Burton's view, the needs most salient to an understanding of destructive social conflicts were those for identity, recognition, security, and personal development. Over time, however, he tended to emphasize the failure of existing state systems to satisfy the need for identity as the primary source of modern ethno-nationalist struggles. The great promise of human needs theory, in

Burton's view, was that it would provide a relatively objective basis, transcending local political and cultural differences, for understanding the sources of conflict, designing conflict resolution processes, and founding conflict analysis and resolution as an autonomous discipline.

Application of Human Needs Theory to I.C.C and Post Conflict Peace Building in Liberia

Liberia as a country has about 14 different ethnic groups, with ethnic wrangling among other external factors, led to the protracted bloody civil wars in Liberia. In the first civil war of 1989 to 1996, recorded death case of about 200,000 people and eventually led to the involvement of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and of United

Nations (Adebajo, 2002). Despite various attempts to consolidate peace in Liberia through the various peace building processes, the peace did not last long and in 1999, the second

Liberian civil war broke out.

Thus, Human Needs Theory offers insights into a range of peace building processes that are involved in “the reduction of both direct and structural violence.” According to this theory, in order to live and attain well-being, humans need certain essentials. These are called human needs or basic human needs. Human needs theorists argue that conflicts and violent conflicts are caused by un-met human needs. Violence occurs when certain individuals or groups do not see any other way to meet their need, or when they need understanding, respect and consideration for their needs. Rosenberg (1964) states that violence is a tragic expression of un-met human needs, implying that all actions undertaken by human beings are attempts to satisfy their needs. If we are able to connect with our needs and those of others, we will therefore be able to look at other ways of meeting such needs, avoiding violence and destruction. Furthermore, the human needs theorists argues that for there to be a sustainable peace in any post- conflict situation, the root causes of the conflicts which are mostly centered around the unmet human needs of the people must be adequately addressed. Thus, with the use of Human Need Theory we can be able to systematically analyse the root causes of Liberia’s civil war, ascertain why all the previous Peace building processes failed after the first civil war leading to the second Liberia civil war and ultimately examine whether the

I.C.C. intervention was favourable to the post conflict peace building process in Liberia.

3.2 Hypotheses

The study is guided by the following hypotheses:

1. The International Criminal Court intervention to peace-building in Liberia between 2006 and

2013 was un-favourable.

2. The Liberian example does not showcase the International Criminal Court as a credible

factor for peace in African conflicts.

3.3 Research Design

A research design is a blueprint that tells how to reach unassailable and plausible

answers to research problems. It is the plan, the structure and the strategy of the

investigation, so conceived as to obtain answers to research questions or problems

(Kerlinger, 1986). The research design thus provides the framework for the generation and

analysis of data according to the priorities set by the researcher (Bryman, 2001). Azika

(1991:28) classified three main categories of research design as follows: “Survey,

Experimental and Expo-facto research design”. These categories have sub-categories. Thus,

in this study we employed the use of “one group pre-test post-test design” (Leege & Francis,

1974:1).

In this type of research design, it requires a measurement to be taken before an

experimental variable or casual event has occurred. The difference between the first and

second observations is attributed to the experimental variables; the independent and

dependent variables are examined after the events must have occurred and data already in

existence. In this type of design the test of hypothesis involves observing the independent

and dependent variables simultaneously since the effects of the former on the later had

already taken place prior to the investigation. (Kerlinger, 1977) Cohen and Manion (1980)

further explained ex-post facto to mean “after the fact” or “retrospectively” and this is

applied to studies which investigate possible cause and effect relationships by observing an

76 existing condition, and searching back in time for plausible causal factors.. Here we will attempt to link some existing effects or observations to some causative agent or agents and variables. Thus with I.C.C. as our independent variable and post-conflict peace- building process in Liberia as our dependent variable, using the above mentioned Research design, we will analyse the peace building processes in Liberia, before and after the intervention of

I.C.C. and with the result, we will be able to ascertain the impact of I.C.C. in the post-conflict peace-building process in Liberia.

The pre –test post-test design is represented in this form:

O1 X O2 Where

O1= first observation x= experimental variable

O2=second observation

3.4 Method of Data Collection

For the purpose of generating data to test our hypotheses, our method of data collection was based on the qualitative method. Qualitative method according to Biereenu-

Nnabugwu (2006:37) is used to “obtain in-depth information and concept/variable clarification so as to facilitate instrument designs”. Further, he avers that this method is well suited for contextual analysis. It refers to gathering data in form of words, pictures, symbols, oral account of events and other materials of non-numerical value by investigator. The data helps the investigator to not only understand the nitty-gritty of the area of study but also helps in interpretation and the systematic scrutiny. According to Leege and Francis

(1974:188), ''the quality of data is inextricably tied to methods and techniques used for generating data. McQueen and Knussen (2003:196) opined that “qualitative research technique represents a more or less selective type of research often used in exploratory and normative designs where the main objective is to gain a variety of insights so as to discover

77 and identify decisions, problems and opportunities”. Qualitative method is particularly useful when the task is to glean, illuminate, interpret and extract valuable information so as to draw inference from the available evidence to reach a conclusion. Basically, secondary sources of data were extensively used in this study. This is due to the nature and demands of the hypotheses we put forward for investigation and empirical validation. Secondary source of data refer to a set of data authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in form of document or survey results and code books collected for a purpose other than the present one (Ikeagwu,1998). From the fore going, the study relied on secondary sources of data because of the nature of the work. Consequently, data were gathered from extensive use of books, journals, magazines, articles and conference papers,

Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, Abuja, Center for Advance Social Sciences, Port-

Harcourt, and internet materials that are very useful in analyzing and understanding

International Criminal court (I.C.C.) and Post conflict Peace Building in Liberia.

3.5 Method of Data Analysis

Data analysis according to Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006:227) “refers to the use of relevant techniques, tools, strategies and procedures for exploring relationships among key variables gathered in the cause of research. Nwanna (1981) defines data analysis as the technique whereby the investigator extracts from the data, information that was not apparently there before and which would enable a summary description of subject to be made.

The study adopted qualitative descriptive method in analyzing our data. Qualitative descriptive analysis essentially has to do with summarizing the information generated in research, so that appropriate analytical method can be used to further discover relationship among the variables (Asika, 2009). As observed by Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2006:374), the most significant feature of qualitative research is the fact that it relies heavily on skills,

78 creativity and abilities of the researcher, sometimes far more than is usually noted. Reflecting on this, Jones (1985) points out that analysis of qualitative data is a highly personal activity.

It involves processes of interpretation and creativity that are not only difficult but also threatening to make explicit (Nnabugwu, 2006:374). This therefore implies that qualitative descriptive analysis depends greatly “on an investigators’ own style of rigorous thinking, along with sufficient presentation of evidence and careful consideration of alternative interpretations”, (Robert Yin 1989:105 in Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2006:374). One of the essential features of qualitative descriptive analysis is that it involves fracturing of data into lumps of meanings (Walker, 1985). The fracturing leads to formation of explanation of concepts, events, actions and statements. They are in turn achieved through categorization, examination, tabulation, restricting, combining and “by developing relations between categories to address the initial proposition and objective of study” (Obikeze, 1990: 74).

Hence, analytically, qualitative descriptive analysis denotes logical introduction. Ultimately, this brought about the conclusions that enabled us to make far-reaching recommendations that would expand the frontiers of knowledge and help consolidate peace building processes in Liberia and Africa in general.

CHAPTER FOUR

Problems of the ICC in Liberia Post-Conflict Peace Building, 2006-2013

This section would be grouped in to sub-topics to enable us test our hypothesis number one to ascertain whether the hypothesis stands valid or null.

4.1 Problems of the ICC in Liberia Post-Conflict Building

It is worthy to note that the root causes of the Liberia civil war also contributed to the problem faced by the ICC. To examine the causes of the conflict in Liberia, a brief background of the country’s civil war is needed. The Liberian civil war began in 1989. The country was ruled by Americo-Liberians (American descendants) until 1980 when

Sergeant Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, became the first president of Liberia. Liberians for the first time thought they were going to be liberated under Samuel Doe’s regime. However, his regime became very authoritarian, discriminatory and abusive of human rights in Liberia.

It was as a result of the repressive regime of Samuel Doe that Charles Taylor began an attack in 1989 which finally led to the overthrow of Samuel Doe’s government by a break-away faction from the rebels’ group of Charles Taylor.

This group, known as the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), was led by Prince Johnson in September 1990. The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), a regional peacekeeping group of the Economic Community of West African States

(ECOWAS), mediated, and Dr. Sawyer acted as interim president until the 1997 elections when Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) was elected as president. Two years later, the civil war began with two rebel groups. One emerged from the border between Ivory Coast and Liberia and became known as the Movement for

Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the other was started by a group of exiled Liberians in

Guinea who called themselves Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD).

These two groups that fought Taylor’s government destabilized the country. With

82 international pressures and ECOWAS intervention, Charles Taylor was compelled to resign in 2003. He went into exile in Nigeria and his vice-president, Gyude Bryant, was chosen to act as interim president until the 2005 election, when Ellen Johnson Sirleaf was elected and sworn in as the President of Liberia in January 2006.

Given this background of the civil war in Liberia, the questions that need to be asked are: What led to a resumption of conflict following the end of the war in 1990 and the election of Charles Taylor as president of Liberia in 1997? Were the root causes of the conflicts that led to the first civil war from 1989 to 1990 addressed? If they were not, what lessons can be learned by the present government of Liberia in this post-conflict period, and what policies are needed to maintain peace and stability in Liberia without a resumption of conflict?

Many reasons have been given for this conflict. For Adebajo (2002) the conflict is generally attributed to bad governance. He further identifies six key issues, as indices of bad governance, that contributed to the Liberian War: ‘the exclusionary rule of the Americo-

Liberian Oligarchy, the brutal and inept rule of Samuel Doe; the deleterious effects that Doe’s rule had on the armed forces of Liberia, ethnic rivalries and personal ambitions that resulted from Doe’s rise to bloody power; and the destabilizing effects of the withdrawal of the U.S. support from Doe, a strategic Cold War ally’ (Adebajo 2002:19).

Given these issues outlined by Adebajo, it can be seen that Liberians suffered from the Americo-Liberian rule in that they were systematically discriminated against in terms of employment, political representation and development projects. But did the situation change when Samuel Doe, a native Liberian, gained power in 1980? It did not. Samuel Doe’s government became more repressive, authoritative and abusive of human rights. Indeed, there were political, social and economic factors that led to a resumption of the civil war in

1989. Firstly, after the 1985 elections, instead of establishing inclusive democratic governance,

Doe deepened ethnic exclusion by disproportionately appointing his own tribe, the Krahns, and co-opted the Mandingoes, who were the wealthiest business people, into his cabinet to the neglect of the rest of the fourteen tribes of Liberia. Secondly, the extra-judicial execution of Colonel Thomas Quinwokpa and his military men, including the Gios and Manos, brought about counter-reaction. Thirdly, the execution of William Tolbert and several members of his cabinet, and the reckless confiscation of property, led the Americo-Liberians to support Charles Taylor’s uprising.

From the above account of the factors that led to the civil war in Liberia, it is sufficiently clear that bad governance was the main reason for the violence that followed. As can be seen in Liberia, a crisis of governance as exhibited in the abuse of human rights, dictatorial rule, social and ethnic exclusion, and institutional failures led to the overthrow of Doe’s government and the turmoil that then engulfed the country. Samuel Doe’s regime was very repressive and pursued ethnic discrimination policies. As Amos Sawyer argues,

‘Sergeant Samuel Doe ascended to power from the lumpen elements of the Liberian Army.

Within a few years, he purged the military of all his rivals and of its trained officers, and relied on an under-disciplined core recruited largely by his Krahn ethnic groups’ (Sawyer

2004:444). This means that the professionalism of the military was undermined, and this not only negated merit principles in the military but also weakened the military institution.

The question worth discussing is whether Charles Taylor, after his election in 1997 as the President of Liberia, addressed the socio-economic and political crisis that had led to the civil war. The evidence shows that Taylor failed to address the root causes of the conflict.

Instead, leaders of the twelve opposition parties who competed with him in the 1997 elections were harassed and intimidated. This led to a resumption of violent conflict in 1999.

The opposition parties went into exile to Guinea and Ivory Coast. It was these exiled groups who formed LURD and MODEL to fight Taylor’s government. Indeed, jobs were given to

84 his party supporters, while certain parts of Liberia where his party did not get significant votes were either given no development projects or completely neglected. This led to widespread discontent against the government. The case of Liberia illustrates Nicole Ball’s assertion that ‘economic and political inequalities form the root causes of conflict in Africa, and until disparities between peoples are reduced, conflict will continue’ (Ball, 1991:385).

However, the above history of the crisis also accounts to the fact that the arrest of

Taylor came with pockets of complaints as the group he favoured during his administration perceived the ICC intervention as a course to witch hunt Taylor other than justice they constituted problem to the society citing other actors that were involved in the conflict with similar records who were not apprehended by the ICC. See table 4.1

Nevertheless, the insurgent forces have consistently violated the international law of war from the onset of the insurgency. Charles Taylor was commander in Chief of the

National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) which comprised the bulk of rebel strength.

Prince Johnson was an NPFL commander with Charles Taylor until he broke off in February

1989 to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPLF). Johnson’s forces, thought to number not more than 500 fighters, were based in Monrovia, and controlled several parts of the city, including Pushrod Island. Troops under both commanders had engaged in violations of civilians and captured soldiers, torture, and mutilation (Elliot,

1990:3).

Furthermore, gross abuses against civilians by the rebels had accelerated in the course of the Liberian Armed conflicts. Rogers (1996:153) have argued that since 1989, when rebel forces began to make significant inroads into the Krahn stronghold of Grand Gedel, and violation reached staggering proportions. The Mandingo people, a mercantile tribe considered too accommodating to Doe had also been singled out for persecution and death by rebel

85 troops. Since they had intended to be wealthier than other Liberians, they had been perceived as having profited from their relationship with the authorities.

The violence against Krahn non-combatants from 1989 had been so great that the

Krahn had poured out of Grand Gedeh at the rate of 1,000 per day. At this time, U.S officials and relief personnel estimated the number of Krahn refugees in the Toupleu area to be approximately 75,000 to 80,000. This represented a significant portion of the total Krahn population of Liberia, estimated at 4% of the national population, or approximately 125,000, people (Africa Watch, 1989:12).

Table 4.1: Violation of the International Law of Armed Conflicts by Rebel Leaders

Government/Rebel Leaders Nature and Ethnic Group No of Total Character of Victims Violation Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Rape Madingo 5,000 Liberia (NPFL) Women 7,350 Women Prince Johnson Independent National Rape Grand Gedeh 2,350 Raped Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) Women Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Torture Khran 15,000 Liberia (NPFL) Persons 19,015 Victims were Persons spread around 4,015 were Prince Johnson Independent National Torture the Liberia Persons Tortured Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) Ethnic groups.

Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Displacement Grand Gedeh 80,000 Liberia (NPFL) of Civilians Refugees 160,000 Victims were Refugees spread across fled to Cote Prince Johnson Independent National Displacement the Liberian 80,000 d’ Ivoire Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) of Civilians Ethnic Groups Refugees

Source: Human Rights Watch, (2006:4) Atrocities in Liberian Civil War

From the statistical table above, it is empirically clear that about seven thousand, three hundred and fifty (7,350) women were raped, about nineteen thousand and fifteen (19,015) suffered torture and one hundred and sixty thousand (160,000) were displaced and tortured into refugees.

Taylors supporters have argued that Taylor alone did not commit war crime neither did he alone violated international laws. With this argument, some ethnic groups that are loyal to Taylor has failed to completely settle with the peace process in Liberia.

Another lingering problem faced by the ICC in post-peace building in Liberia includes finding the best way to integrate ex-combatants into either the civilian population or the military. They also have to deal with the disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons.

4.2 The ICC: Problem of Funding and Politics of Indictment

In respect to the establishment of ICC, Dolin (2004) noted that, during the Conference that establish the ICC in Rome on July 1998, three basic groupings of states emerged. Led by

Canada and Norway, the “like-minded group” was arguably the most influential and advocated a potent and robust ICC. It consisted mostly of the middle powers and developing countries, who generally supported a proprio motu prosecutorial model. The second group consisted of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, or the “P-5,” with the exception of Britain, which had joined the like-minded states just before the conference began. Not surprisingly, this group sought a more important role for the Security Council in the establishment and operation of the Court. The United States, in particular, expressed grave concerns about the possibility of a proprio motu prosecutor and argued for the limiting of the ICC’s jurisdiction to Security Council referrals. A third non-aligned group was formed in opposition to the P-5‘s insistence on the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the statute.

This group included such states as India, Mexico and Egypt. However, this group’s position in respect of the independence and powers of the ICC was similar to that of the P-5.

Jurisdictional issues were the most complex and most sensitive, but the proprio motu prosecutor model did receive significant, although not general, support. As the conference was nearing its conclusion and no agreement was evident, the Bureau of the Committee of the

87 whole decided to prepare a final package for possible adoption. The alternative of reporting that an agreement could not be reached and scheduling another conference was not attractive.

Many feared that a second conference stood no better chance of success and would likely result in either a weakened ICC or no court at all for years to come. By a final vote of 120 in favour, 21 abstaining and 7 against, the Bureau’s package was adopted.

Furthermore, frencz (1997) ostensibly noted that the United States voted against the

Statute in Rome putting it in the company of China, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar and Yemen, and then, as previously noted, “unsigned.” Its expressed concerns related to jurisdictional issues and, in particular, to what the American delegation saw as a lack of accountability in granting proprio motu power to an independent prosecutor. In American Senate hearings that coincided with the conference, Senator Rod Grams (1998) called the ICC “a monster that must be slain” and Senator John Ashcroft (1998) similarly denounced the ICC as “a clear and continuing threat to the national interest of the United States.” Conversely, in 2003, the

United States turned around to its initial stand on not signing the Rome Statue this it did by overwhelmingly supporting the arrest and trial of Charles Taylor through its funding. It is axiomatic to state that U.S funded this body because it was in line with their national interest but not necessarily to bring justice to the country. This is in contrary to their initial assertion that Liberia should be left alone by other international bodies stating that it was Liberia’s internal affair (Hoile, 2012).

Nevertheless, Roberge (1997) systematically argued that Crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC are limited by the Rome Statute to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. He further noted that the Court will also have jurisdiction over the crime of

“aggression” when a provision is adopted defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court is to exercise jurisdiction in that regard. Deferring the inclusion of aggression has generally been recognized as a concession made to entice broader (i.e.,

American) support of the Statute. The Court has jurisdiction over those individuals directly responsible for committing these crimes, as well as others who may be indirectly responsible, such as military commanders or other superiors. Jurisdiction is also limited ratione temporis to offences committed after the entry into force of the Rome Statute. Article 12 restricts the

ICC’s jurisdiction to crimes committed on the territory of a State Party or those committed by a national of a State Party. Noticeably absent is jurisdiction over an accused simply in the custody of a State Party. An ICC investigation may be commenced either by the Security

Council, pursuant to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, by a State Party or by the prosecutor acting under the proprio motu power.

Subsequently, in Article 15 of the UN Charter, the prosecutor has the ability to initiate an investigation ex officio, but there are significant restrictions and oversight relating to the exercise of this purview. To begin with, the proprio motu jurisdiction is limited by the principle of complementarity. The ICC is a court of last resort, and the prosecutor must defer to a state with national jurisdiction over an offence unless that state is unwilling or unable to investigate and prosecute. Moreover, if desirous of initiating an investigation without a

Security Council or State Party referral, under Article 15, the prosecutor must first apply to the Pre-Trial Chamber for a ruling on admissibility. Notification is required for any states that might normally have jurisdiction over the offence, regardless of whether they are a party to the Statute. This provision had been proposed by the United States and was accepted by many signatory states with great reluctance as a compromise necessary to ensure the existence of the independent prosecutor. Thus, the prosecutor must defer unless the Pre-Trial Chamber agrees that the state or states with national jurisdiction are not genuinely able or willing to carry out their own proceedings.

The state or states concerned also have the right to appeal the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision. Furthermore, to address other concerns of the P-5, Article 16 of the Rome Statute

89 provides for the deferral of investigations or prosecutions for a period of one year at the direction of the Security Council. This deferral power is renewable and, theoretically, could result in an indefinite postponement of ICC proceedings and, with the passage of time, less likelihood of conviction. Despite this oversight power lying in the hands of a small minority of the world’s nations, some critics have suggested that Article 16 does not go far enough and in fact undercuts the role of the P-5 by requiring an affirmative vote to stop the prosecutor.

The Security Council only has the power to allow an investigation or prosecution to continue, but not to stop one. Conversely, others have expressed fears that the Security Council’s deferral power could eviscerate the independence of the prosecutor and the Court. What if, for example, a general understanding were to develop among the P-5 countries that it would not be in any one of their interests to allow an ICC investigation against P-5 nationals?

Finally, with respect to war crimes, Bassioum (1998) noted that the ICC is limited by the wording of the Statute to “grave breaches” of the Geneva Conventions, “serious violations” of the listed laws and customs of international armed conflict and a more limited list of offences for armed conflicts not of an international nature. Moreover, Article 8 states that the Court will have jurisdiction over war crimes when “committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large scale commission of such crimes.” Moreover to buttress the fact above, Sunga (1997) systematically demonstrated the extent of the constraints placed on the

Court and to show that fears of a “rogue prosecutor” are misplaced, Roberts (1999) lists the following events and indicates whether they would, assuming temporal jurisdiction, fall within the purview of the ICC:

Table 4.2 Showing the extent of the constraints placed on the Court

Event Admissible

1968 My Lai massacre of Vietnamese Maybe (only if killings were planned or if ICC villagers by US troops dissatisfied with US investigations)

1982 United Kingdom Royal Navy sinking No (target was legitimate) of Argentine warship Belgrano

1991 US bombing of Amariya bunker in No (civilian deaths not intended) Baghdad 1991 to Rebel killings and amputations in Yes date Sierra Leone

1992- Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, Croatia Yes 1999 and Kosovo

1994 Rwandan genocide Yes

1999 Kosovans killed by NATO bombs No (civilian deaths not intended)

Source: Adopted from Roberts (1999:24)

In respect to Roberts’ determination relating to the My Lai massacre, it should also be noted that US servicemen were tried domestically and that one conviction of Lieutenant

William Calley but was not indicted by the court. As such, the principle of complementarities would likely have precluded ICC jurisdiction even in such an extreme case of abuse by the

American military.

The case of Liberia, while not under the jurisdiction of the ICC, is perhaps the only case where sufficient time has passed to analyze the impact of the indictment on peacemaking with any clarity. It is also the case, together with the indictment of Milosevic by the

International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, that is most often cited by scholars and practitioners as illustrative of transitional justice’s potential to foster peace while holding those most responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity accountable. While the indictment of Charles Taylor did hasten a lasting ceasefire and pave the way for a transitional government, it did not provide, contrary to what some observers suggest, clear-cut proof that

91 peace and justice could be pursued simultaneously. A closer examination of the course of events illustrates that although justice was pursued in the midst of peace negotiations, it was deferred until long after the peace agreement was signed. The warrant was only executed after regional states and the US had determined that Taylor had violated the terms of his exile through continued meddling in sub-regional politics. The terms of Taylor’s exile explicitly favored peace at the cost of justice, allowing his exit to Nigeria in exchange for a lack of interference in sub-regional politics. That he eventually violated the terms of his exile and was subsequently handed over to the Special Court two years later had no effect on the situation on the ground at the time.

Contrary to public sentiment in 2003, Crane has said that he would have delayed unsealing the indictment, had he not been confident that it would support the peace process in the long run. With five years hindsight, it appears that Crane’s calculated gamble to delegitimize and isolate Taylor through an indictment for war crimes furthered the cause of peace in Liberia by creating an incentive for Charles Taylor to peacefully step aside in exchange for a temporary pledge from Nigeria not to execute the arrest warrant.

4.3 The ICC in Africa: the Problem of Over Concentration in Africa

There have been controversies over the establishment of this new international justice body has overshadowed what it means for the African countries where the Court is taking its first steps. The fact that the ICC has focused so overwhelmingly on African situations speaks partly to the prevalence of violations of international criminal law in Africa but also prompts questions about why the gaze of international criminal justice falls in some places and on some people and not on others (Bosco 2014).Thus Clarke (2014) noted that the ICC is designed as a ‘court of last resort’ that backs up national jurisdictions rather than trumps them. Nonetheless, the Court’s focus on Africa has stirred African sensitivities about sovereignty and self-determination not least because of the continent’s history of colonization

92 and a pattern of decisions made for Africa by outsiders. Africa also manifests a pattern of political elites maneuvering to ensure that interventions by international institutions ultimately play to their advantage. Furthermore, as Graeme Simpson’s essay in this collection points out, the Court’s ‘cultural relevance,’ as a supposed embodiment of

‘western’ legal norms, has been questioned, as to the extent to which the pursuit of criminal justice through international channels can further or undermine the pursuit of other goals such as peace and reconciliation.

In consonance to the above, Hoile (2012) shrewdly argued that The ICC has experienced difficulties in navigating the political terrain of Africa. Many of these difficulties emanate from the inherently emotive, morally fraught and politically charged nature of the atrocities that the ICC was established to address. Further features of the ICC’s mandate, such as its minimal temporal jurisdiction and reliance on the support and cooperation of nation states both domestically and internationally limit the Court’s room for maneuver.

Notably, Mbeki (2014) noted that the ICC also confronts immense practical and logistical problems of conducting investigations and engaging with affected populations in highly insecure environments. Notwithstanding these constraining factors, the early record of the ICC in Africa deserves to be scrutinised critically. In conflicts involving atrocities committed by multiple conflict parties, the prosecution of individuals from certain factions and not others is especially significant for people living in the most affected areas as seen in

Liberia. Perceptions of the ICC on the ground have at times been damaged by insufficient efforts by the Court to make clear the basis on which individuals have been the subject of warrants and of particular charges, while those of apparently equal culpability have not. It is also evident that the ICC has not always forged strong relations with other actors who are critical to the Court’s ultimate success.

However, the (unfulfilled) promise of the 1990’s haunts the current debate over the

ICC. For all its noble intentions, the ICC is a politicized mechanism, no less rooted in the

‘double standards’ of the international system than other bodies heavily influenced by the

Permanent Five (P5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Although just two – the United Kingdom and France – of the five permanent members of the UNSC are members, the ICC’s first decade in existence has revealed how the interests of the P5 and other major powers (members and non-members) has significantly influenced the Court’s work. The ICC is ultimately dependent on the world’s leading powers providing the clout and muscle

(whether diplomatic, military or financial) necessary for it to function and arrest suspects, yet through direct and indirect means they have routinely marginalized the Court when its work threatened to negatively impact their interests ( Adebajo, 2002)

Furthermore, Kimani (2013) reiterated that in practical terms, this has resulted in ICC investigations not being pursued in places like Afghanistan, Georgia or Palestine, even though jurisdictionally strong arguments could be made that they should. The ICC’s sharpest critics claim that international criminal law does not apply to the powerful, only the weak – hence the focus on Africa, the new court’s ‘laboratory’. The major powers have become, in essence, both players and referees, formulating the rules of the game but refusing to play by them (Hoile, 2012).

To buttress the above fact, Kimenyi (2013) using a table, presented the lists of mostly African leaders apart from that of Charles Taylor that have been indicted by the ICC.

To him, the ICC has opened investigations into eight situations (shown in the table below under the column titled S) in: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1); Uganda (2); the

Central African Republic (3); Darfur, Sudan (4); the Republic of Kenya (5); Libya (6); the

Republic of Côte d'Ivoire (7); and the Republic of Mali (8). The ICC has publicly indicted 36 people. The ICC has issued arrest warrants for 28 individuals and summonses to eight others.

Ten persons are in detention. Proceedings against 26 are ongoing: eleven are at large as fugitives; one has been arrested, but is not in the Court's custody; nine are in the pre-trial phase; another three are at trial; one is appealing his sentence; and one individual's acquittal is being appealed by the prosecution. Proceedings against ten have been completed: one has been convicted, four have had the charges against them dismissed, one has had the charges against him withdrawn, one has had his case declared inadmissible before the Court, and three have died before trial. The list below details the counts against each individual indicted in the Court and his or her current status. The column titled ‘G’ lists the number of counts (if any) of the crime of genocide with which an individual has been charged. ‘H’ list the number of counts of crimes against humanity and ‘W’ the number of counts of war crimes. ‘C’ lists the number of counts of contempt of the Court and other offenses against the administration of justice.

Table 4.3: List of Indicted Persons by the ICC

Source:file:///C:/Users/user/Desktop/List%20of%20people%20indicted%20in%20the%20Int ernational%20Criminal%20Court%20-%20Wikipedia,%20the%20free%20encyclopedia.htm assessed on 18/09/2014.

With the above analysis and data presented, it is empirically clear that most ICC indictment has more concentration in Africa outside other countries that have also committed same like atrocities, with this, and in consonance with other factual evidence presented above we stand firm to state that our hypothesis number one remains valid that the International

Criminal Court intervention to peace-building in Liberia between 2006 and 2013 was un- favourable for the sustenance of peace in the country.

96 CHAPTER FIVE

Consequences of ICC Peace-Building Intervention in Liberia 2006-2013

This section addressed our hypothesis number two, outlining the empirical data that would enable the researcher to test whether the hypothesis stands valid or null. It on this note that we put below various sub-topics to test the hypothesis.

5.1 The Establishment of The Special Court for Sierra Leone

The Lomé Peace Agreement granted an amnesty for crimes committed by all parties and referred to the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Although the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General present at the signing was not a party to the Agreement, he later appended a handwritten reservation to the amnesty stating that the

UN would not recognize amnesty for “international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international law.”

For a while, it seemed as if the proposed TRC would be the only transitional justice mechanism available to address the human rights violations committed during the conflict.

Civil society activists strongly supported the Commission as a way to ensure a measure of accountability. Legislation governing its establishment was passed in February 2000. The

TRC was mandated to

create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone; … to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered(TRC Document, 2000:2).

Preparatory activities began in March 2002, and commissioners were sworn in during

July. The TRC worked for about two years and handed over its final report to the president in

October 2004.

However, shortly after the Lomé Peace Agreement, fighting re-erupted. In course of the attempted rescue of the UN peacekeepers taken hostage in May 2000, RUF leader Foday

Sankoh was taken into custody. The government feared that a national trial of Sankoh and his

coconspirators would aggravate the conflict and fuel RUF desires to move on Freetown to

disrupt the proceedings. Accordingly, on June 12, 2000, President Kabbah wrote to the

Secretary-General requesting the assistance of the international community in creating a court

to try senior RUF officers. He did this because of the pressure mounted on him by the United

Nations.

The Security Council viewed the taking of the peacekeepers hostage as a direct attack

on the UN and felt obliged to assist in the prosecution of the perpetrators. However, the

Security Council and the Secretariat took strongly opposing views on how to accomplish this

in light of the ICTY’s and ICTR’s financial drain on UN resources. For example:

• The Secretariat supported assessed funding, arguing that voluntary contributions would be

dangerously uncertain, while the Council insisted the opposite;

• The Secretariat argued in favour of granting the Special Court enforcement powers under

Chapter VII of the UN Charter, while the Council did not;

• The Secretariat wanted personal jurisdiction over “those most responsible,” rather than the

narrower “those who bear the greatest responsibility” proposed by the Council.

Negotiations came to a standstill, but eventually it was agreed that the Special Court

would be established by treaty rather than by resolution so that it could proceed without

committing UN members to funding. The Court would function independently from the UN

bureaucracy, be subject to the oversight of a “Management Committee,” and have to raise its

own funds. With this financial compromise, the Court’s operations were significantly scaled

down and the Security Council prevailed on each of the above points of disagreement.

In August, the Security Council passed Resolution 1315, requesting the “Secretary-

General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an

independent special court consistent with this resolution.” While the Resolution “reiterate that

98 the situation in Sierra Leone continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region,” unlike the ICTY and ICTR, the Special Court was not established according to the Council’s Chapter VII authority, but by an international agreement whose negotiation was requested by the Security Council.

After 17 months of negotiations, in January 2002, the UN and the Government of

Sierra Leone finally signed the Agreement on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra

Leone (Special Court Agreement), including as an annex the Statute of the Special Court for

Sierra Leone. This signing took place two days before President Kabbah declared the official end of the war.

In view of the above, the Special Court for Sierra Leone emerged as a result of the intervention of the ICC in Liberia over Charles Taylors involvement in Sierra Leonean conflict. It therefore stands in for one of the major consequences of ICC intervention in

Liberia. It is worthy to not that the establishment of this court is in contradiction with the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that opted for amnesty instead of retrogressive justice that could aggravate the conflict again.

Kimenyi (2013) argues that domestic and international perceptions on the establishment of the Court vary and are, to some extent, in tension. Although the Court enjoys support in Sierra Leone, there is a domestic perception that its mandate is too narrow, partly because only eleven persons were indicted.

In tandem with the above view, Lizza (2000) the legitimacy of the Special Court at the local level is partly affected by the perception that it is an international court, a perception the Court has cultivated through its jurisprudence and presentation. There are almost no

Sierra Leoneans in the most senior positions at the Court. To a significant extent, it has marred the legitimacy of the court by appointing internationals in posts that locals should

99 have held. All of this leads to the danger of creating a “spaceship phenomenon”; i.e., a Court that is perceived as a curiosity and an anomaly with little impact on citizens’ everyday lives.

Also, opportunities for legacy have been limited by the fact that the local legal profession keeps its distance from the Court. All these factors have implications for longer- term restoration of the rule of law and establishment of trust in judicial mechanisms in Sierra

Leone. The international legitimacy of the Special Court has been affected by the fact that it does not apply the geographic distribution of the UN and that is dominated by common law jurisdictions. There were also early allegations of U.S. dominance in the Office of the

Prosecutor.

In-fact, the first Prosecutor of the Special Court, David Crane, was serving as a senior

Inspector General in the U.S. Department of Defense, had taught international law and has a degree in West African studies. Backed aggressively by the United States, Crane’s nomination was challenged by a candidate advanced by the UN, Ken Fleming, an Australian lawyer who had served as Acting Chief of Prosecutions for the ICTR. While many international law advocates had misgivings about an American adopting such a prominent position in the Court, a clear advantage would be continued political and financial support from the United States.

Some, particularly in the military, perceive the Special Court as an arm of U.S. foreign policy, particularly due to some of the remarks of the first Chief Prosecutor.

Aggravating this tension, the United States pressured the government to sign a bilateral immunity “Article 98” agreement in March 2003 specifying that Sierra Leone would not hand over U.S. nationals to the ICC. Sierra Leoneans, who had celebrated the country’s leadership on international justice, expressed deep anger at perceived U.S. coercion for this concession (Lizza, 2000).

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The court indicted Charles Taylor for war crime, genocide and crime against humanity. However observers have been worried to the fact that lot of Peace agreement and negotiation was on to bring a lasting peace and normalcy to the country but with establishment of the Special Court, other previous mechanisms for negotiation and reconciliation were swept under the carpet as U.S through its gigantic funding to the body implicitly and explicitly dictates to the court its modus of operation this is evident in the appointment of the operational staff of the court and more importantly the huge funding of the court by the United States. See table 5.1 below, though other countries contributes voluntarily but U.S has the huge chunk of the contribution and therefore dictates to the court on how to operate as it is being said that he who plays the piper dictates the tune.

Table 5.1: Main donors to the Special Court for Sierra Leone (Contributions received in US$)

Source: Adopted from (Perriello & Marieke, 2006:10)

The above table showcased the contributory strengths of countries towards ICC

Special courts for trial and arrest. From the above data, we can see that the table demonstrates the powerful financial muscle pulled by the United States. It is in line with this gigantic contribution that the U.S uses to dominate the outcomes of the courts verdict which would always go in line with their national interest. The Special Court for Sierra Leone is therefore a major consequence of the ICC intervention in Liberia.

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5.2 ICC: A Barrier to Peace and Reconciliatory efforts of other Peace building

Programs in Liberia

Many writers (Kimenyi, 2013; Clarke, 2014; Hoile, 2012) have expressed their concern that the ICC stand as an obstacle to reconciliation and the resolution of conflicts. In the past, many countries, including South Africa, Chile and, to some extent, Great Britain in relation to Northern Ireland, have granted amnesties in order to end conflicts. The fear is that as the ICC becomes involved in ongoing or recent conflicts, wars will be fought longer, peace processes will be disrupted and leaders will be reluctant to relinquish power if facing indictment. Ultimately, the argument is that removing the possibility for amnesty removes incentives for settlement, and may even encourage leaders to remain in power.

Moreover, Prior to the intervention of ICC in Liberia there have been many other various peace-building mechanism. For instance, in 1989, rebel leader Charles Taylor initiated a civil war after invading Liberia from neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire. The war claimed more than 150,000 lives and displaced close to one million people. The Truth and

Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was also established to for mutual settlement of the conflict. See the figure 5.1 below

Figure 5.1: The Signing of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Agreement

Source: Adopted from (Hoile, 2002:29)

102 However, the 1993 peace agreement negotiated by the Economic Community of West

African States (ECOWAS) and backed by the UN, led to the creation of the United Nations

Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). UNOMIL was established to implement the peace agreement and after many delayed elections, Taylor was elected in July 1997.

The program was established against the background of the Accra Comprehensive

Peace Agreement signed by the warring factions in August 2003 and the UN Security

Council Resolution 1509, which provided the legal framework for the deployment of peacekeeping operations in Liberia. It was designed in October 2003 and presented to the donors for adoption in November 2003. It was then subsequently presented to the National

Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) and the Policy Committee of the NCDDRR.

DDRR activities in Liberia have been strictly donor driven with the DD led by UNMIL as a military process and the RR by UNDP as mandated by the international partners through a memorandum of understanding. The figure below shows the

The interim government for its part created the political environment for DD, free and fair elections, RR and Security Sector Reform. The RR program in Liberia commenced in

June 2004. Its key components included: agriculture, vocational skills training, apprenticeship (on-the-job) training, labour based activities (public works), and formal education. 67 percent of the caseload was managed by UNDP and funded through its Trust

Fund. The remaining 33 percent was conducted by the European Union, the US Agency for

International Development (USAID) and other bilateral partners.

The total number of former combatants disarmed and demobilized between December

2003 and October 2004 was 103,912 of which 99,000 became eligible for reintegration assistance, assuming two percent spontaneous reintegration. 24 percent of those disarmed and demobilized were female and eleven percent were children.

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However, UNMIL works with the United States to demilitarize and disarm rebel forces. In its first year, see table 5.2. UNMIL over saw the disarmament of over 95,000 ex- combatants. Further, in 2009, UNMIL was actively involved in Liberia’s Disarmament,

Demobilization, Reintegration and Rehabilitation (DDRR) program, which disarmed 103,000 and demobilized 101,000 ex-combatants. The UN and its partners provide rehabilitation services such as education and vocational training, with more than 98,000 ex-combatants benefiting from these programs. In March 2012 UNMIL destroyed a cache of weapons discovered in various parts of the country collected over six month period including grenade launchers, riffles, automatic pistols and several machine guns.

Table 5.2 Disarmament and Demobilization Process in Liberia (Phase 1)

Disarmament and Demobilization Figures Process GOL Combatant 13,490 disarmed

Weapons 8,679 collected

Unexploded Ordinance 2,650 collected

Small arms ammunition 2,217,668 collected

Source: (United Nations Document, 2004:26)

Unlike phase 1 which focused mainly on formal GOL combatants, the second phase covered combatants from all the three major worrying factions and achieved the disarmament of a total of 51,231 former combatant made up of 6,888 from AFL 19,742 from LURD 14,601 from MODEL, in addition a total of 27,000 weapons and 153,631 small arms and ammunitions were collected. See table 5.3 below Table 5.3: Disarmament and Demobilization Process in Liberia (Phase 11) Disarmament and Demobilization Figures Process Combatants AFL 16,888 LURD 19,742 MODEL 14,601 Total No of Combatants Disarmed 51,231 Weapons 27,000 Small Arms Ammunitions 153,631 Total No. of Weapons Collected 180,631 Source: (United Nations Document, 2004:28)

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These were the progress made in the Disarmament and Demobilization process in

Liberia prior to the ICC intervention in the country. See figure 5.2 for more information on the decreasing level of conflict prior to ICC intervention.

Figure 5.2: Timeline of Conflict events in Liberia 1997-2011

Source: Adopted from (Cheng, 2004:26)

From the figure above, we can see that multiple rebel groups were still active at a low level in Liberia in 1997. Drastic increase accompanied the withdrawal Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeepers (ECOMOG) in late 1998, and the creation of LURD in 1999. The emergence of MODEL (2003) prompted a further escalation. Also in

2003, the ceasefire, however, with the signing of Accra agreement (August), and Taylor’s flight to Nigeria marked a dramatic decline in fighting, which was further encouraged by the start of disarmament in 2004. But with the arrest and trial of Taylor in 2006, small-scale attacks on civilians and increase in violence became visible again mostly in Monrovia.

105 In addition to the above achievement, the RR of Children Associated with Fighting

Forces (CAFF) recorded a huge success (Adebayo, (2002). Studies by UNMIL, UNDP, the

UN Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF) and even the NCDDRR come to the overarching conclusion that the program succeeded in disarming, demobilizing, rehabilitating and reintegrating its beneficiaries. This also applies for the RR of CAFF.A memorandum of understanding was signed between UNICEF and UNDP which mandated UNICEF to coordinate the reintegration activities for children. 11,780 children were demobilized and expected to be targeted with reintegration assistance. Of those, 9,042 were boys and 2,738 girls. It was estimated that up to 4,000 CAFF never went through the DD process. According to a

UNICEF study, the children’s DD process in Liberia had the unique feature of focusing on the rights and special needs of the children.

According to UNICEF, 99 percent of the demobilized children were reunited with their families. Presently, 4,929 (3,048 boys and 1,881 girls) children are enrolled in skills training, while 2,079 (1,104 boys and 975 girls) have graduated from skills training programs. It should be emphasized that social reintegration for children has been successful at both the individual and community level. Let me now turn to the RR of adults. The following plans were implemented to facilitate productive activities of RR beneficiaries and their return to families and communities: Post-discharge resettlement support in the form of reinsertion benefits, access to short-term reintegration and employment opportunities, acquisition of basic skills, access to basic agriculture inputs and supplies, self-employment and formal education, and counseling services to strengthen relationships in community- based activities.

The program initiated phased payments to each of the groups that were demobilized, starting three month after discharge. By the end of February 2005, 101,495 ex-combatants had received cash benefits. As an initial allowance, the money supported the resettlement and

106 maintenance of ex-combatants and families for the immediate period following demobilization and discharge. The DDRR Process in Liberia helped to bridge the critical gap between demobilization and reintegration, particularly in parts of the country that have been inaccessible to any form of services.

The Joint Implementation Unit (JIU)/UNDP preliminary study conducted in February

2005 to track the use of the cash received by beneficiaries found a very positive influence of payments on the overall DDRR program and the peace process in general. The results also indicated that money was used by recipients to initiate small scale business and purchase of basic consumer items. These basic investments became the first major injections of cash into local economies in districts long occupied by ex fighters.

However, with the arrest of Charles Taylor, it led to a decline in the effectiveness of the DDRR programme. This is because the citizens felt that it was a carrot and stick mechanism adopted by the ICC to indict the people involved in the war. This is represented in the chart below.

The fact above demonstrates that prior to the intervention of ICC in Liberia, lots of progress have been made in the area of peace and security but the intervention eluded the continuation of these programs as people who are supposed to be re-integrated into the normal civilian life or the national security became afraid of ICC intervention, consequently, the intervention eluded the operational efficiency of these programs.

Another concern that finds expression in the debate is that the ICC endangers soldiers because its existence will prevent them from acting when they should, for fear of potential prosecution. Those who express this opinion like (Perriello & Weirda , 2006) contend that if the prosecutor initiates proceedings without supervision by any national government, cases could be pursued without understanding the dilemmas that are faced by soldiers in armed conflict.

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5.3 The Arrest and Trial of Charles Taylor as a Factor for Peace in Africa

In order to fully comprehend the above stated sub-topic it is very pertinent for us to note the intricacies that was involved in the arrest and trial of Charles Taylor. Thus as previously noted, the Special Court of Sierra Leone (SCSL) was established to try those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity . The SCSL prosecutor originally indicted Taylor on 3 March 2003 on a 17 count indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the conflict in Sierra Leone. On 16 March 2006, a SCSL judge gave leave to amend the indictment against Taylor. Under the amended indictment, Taylor was charged with 11 counts. At Taylor's initial appearance before the court on 3 April 2006, he entered a plea of not guilty.

However, In early June 2006, the decision on whether to hold Taylor's trial in

Freetown or in The Hague had not yet been made by the new SCSL president, George Gelaga

King. King's predecessor had pushed for the trial to be held abroad because of fear that a local trial would be politically destabilizing in an area where Taylor still had influence. The

Appeals Chamber of the Special Court dismissed a motion by Taylor's defense team, who argued that their client could not get a fair trial there and also wanted the Special Court to withdraw the request to move the trial to The Hague.

On 15 June 2006, the British government agreed to jail Taylor in the United Kingdom in the event that he is convicted by the SCSL. This fulfilled a condition laid down by the

Dutch government, who had stated they were willing to host the trial but would not jail him if convicted. British Foreign Minister Margaret Beckett stated that new legislation would be required to accommodate this arrangement. While awaiting his extradition to The

Netherlands, Taylor was held in a UN jail in Freetown.

On 16 June 2006, the United Nations Security Council agreed unanimously to allow

Taylor to be sent to The Hague for trial; on 20 June 2006, Taylor was extradited and flown to

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Rotterdam Airport in The Netherlands. He was taken into custody and held in the detention centre of the International Criminal Court, located in the Scheveningen section of The Hague.

The Association for the Legal Defense of Charles G. Taylor was established in June 2006 to assist in his legal defense.

In tandem to the above fact, Okuk (2008) noted that when Taylor's trial opened 4 June

2007, Taylor boycotted the proceeding and was not present. Through a letter which was read by his attorney to the court, he justified his absence by alleging that at that moment he was not ensured a fair and impartial trial.

On 20 August 2007, Taylor's defense now led by Courtenay Griffiths obtained a postponement of the trial until 7 January 2008. During the trial, the chief prosecutor alleged that a key insider witness who testified against Taylor went into hiding after being threatened for giving evidence against Taylor. Furthermore, Joseph "Zigzag" Marzah, a former military commander, testified that Charles Taylor celebrated his new-found status during the civil war by ordering human sacrifice, including the killings of Taylor's opponents and allies that were perceived to have betrayed Taylor, and by having a pregnant woman buried alive in sand.

Marzah also accused Taylor of forcing cannibalism on his soldiers in order to terrorize their enemies.

In January 2009, the prosecution finished presenting its evidence against Taylor and closed its case on 27 February 2009. On 4 May 2009, a defense motion for a judgment on acquittal was dismissed, and arguments for Taylor's defense began in July 2009. Taylor testified in his own defense from July through November 2009. The defense rested its case on

12 November 2010, with closing arguments set for early February 2011. On 8 February 2011, the trial court ruled in a 2–1 decision that it would not accept Taylor's trial summary, as the summary had not been submitted by the January 14 deadline. In response, Taylor and his counsel boycotted the trial and refused an order by the court to begin closing arguments. This

109 boycott came soon after the 2010 leak of American diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks, in which the United States discussed the possibility of extraditing Taylor for prosecution in the

United States in the event of his acquittal by the SCSL. Taylor's counsel cited the leaked cable and the court's decision as evidence of an international conspiracy against Taylor.

Figure 5.4: Charles Taylor during his Trial at the SCSL

Source: (Human rights watch ,2013:18)

On 3 March, the appeals court of the SCSL overturned the trial court's decision, ruling that as the trial court had not established that Taylor had been counseled by the court and personally indicated his intent to waive his right to a trial summary, Taylor's due process rights would be violated by preventing him from submitting a trial summary. The appeals court ordered the trial court to accept the summary and set a date for the beginning of closing arguments.] On 11 March, the closing arguments ended and it was announced that the court would begin the process to reach a verdict.

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In the conclusion of the verdict hearing, alternate Judge El Hadji Sow began to present his dissenting position. However, as he did, the three presiding judges stood up and left the court room. Here’s what Judge Sow had the chance to say: “The only moment where a Judge can express his opinion is during the deliberations or in the court room, and, pursuant to the Rules, when there are no serious deliberations, the only place left for me is the court room. I won’t get because I think we have been sitting for too long but for me I have my dissenting opinion and I disagree with the findings and conclusions of the other Judges, because for me under any mode of liability, under any accepted standard of proof, the guilt of the accused from the evidence provided in this trial is not proved beyond reasonable doubt by the Prosecution. And my only worry is that the whole system is not consistent with all the principles we know and love, and the system is not consistent with all the values of international criminal justice, and I’m afraid the whole system is under grave danger of just losing all credibility, and I’m afraid this whole thing is headed for failure.”

It is pretty damning stuff. Sow’s is a voice that needs to be heard, not silenced. But it’s a pressing question whether or not the Court’s procedural rules allow Sow, as an

Alternate Judge, to issue a statement or not. (Update: comments at Opinio Juris seem to suggest Sow’s decision to speak was inappropriate). Regardless, it certainly doesn’t look good for the Court to so actively disregard the views of a fellow judge. Unsurprisingly, Griffiths was described as incensed.

Nevertheless, confidentiality rules are likely to ensure that Sow’s dissenting opinion won’t be made public any time soon. But the question remains: why not, in the hours-long delivery of the verdict and years-long trial, give a few minutes for Sow to express his opinion on the matter? Perhaps it is inevitable that accountability for atrocities is framed as a fight between good and evil, right and wrong. But this isn’t particularly helpful. It is hard to

111 imagine prosecuting and defending the world’s worst human rights violators without legal limitations, political controversies and moral dilemmas.

In addition to the above, Easterday (2012) and Kendall (2012) who were present when the Taylor verdict was delivered opined that “ the trial and verdict was Pretty fascinating and a rather dramatic stuff. They went further to reiterate that Judge El Hadji Malik Sow, a

Senegalese jurist who serves as alternate judge for Trial Chamber II, attempted to speak following the end of Presiding Judge Richard Lussick’s reading of the judgment. Those of us seated in the public gallery heard a few words from an unidentified speaker before the microphones were cut off, and through the glass we could hear him continuing to speak.

Shortly thereafter, what appeared to be a metal grate was lowered over the glass, so that we could no longer see into the courtroom.

As people waited for press statements from the prosecution and the defense, a paper began to circulate with the statement from Judge Sow. Apparently the court stenographer had continued to type into the transcription program which appeared on the screens of those seated in the courtroom, and one of the legal assistants from the Taylor defense team copied the text and saved it out of concern that the Special Court would strike the judge’s statement from the official record (after receiving transcripts from the previous proceedings, we can confirm that the comments were indeed struck from the record). To them, Sow’s statement makes several claims that may be of interest to observers of the Special Court’s work. He points out that there were ‘no deliberations,’ suggesting communication issues among the judges of Trial Chamber II. He also notes the length of the trial ‘we have been sitting for too long’ which lasted 420 trial days, or nearly four years from the opening and closing of the case. Finally, he contested the Chamber’s findings that the Prosecution had sufficiently proven Taylor’s culpability beyond a reasonable doubt…

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To buttress the above fact, Murithi (2013) shrewdly argued that International Law must be delivered with the right procedures and indubitable evidences if it has to be credited as objective justice. This Law of Nations must not be biased with politics of selfish competition in the international and global interests. This Law must always be the servant of security, stability, order and peace and not vice versa. This Law must not be put as a

‘Blockage Cart’ before the ‘Horse of Peace’ and ‘Political Progress’ in nation States. It must not be used as a tool of ‘Political Pressure’ on any Government by the non-signatory to it like

USA government or by the signatory to it like the Governments of France and UK, among others. It must not also be abused by the Civil Society Lobby Groups like ‘Coalition’ and

‘Human Rights Watch’ who are good at nothing except exaggerating the statistics of the dead and displaced persons and wishing them ever lasting suffering for the benefit of expatriates.

Yes, it is true that “Justice delayed is Justice denied” but it is even truer that “Peace disturbed is Peace destroyed.”

Peace is a greater good than Justice and that is why the United Nations got founded on it rather than on Justice. Justice can wait because Peace is a priority to it. The current

President of African Union, Kikwete (2012) understands the value of peace in Africa very well when he warned the ICC Western agents to avoid creating chaos in the continent by trying to indict the sitting President of the Sudan and lock him behind the Criminal Bars in

The Hague. The Arab League Secretary-General, Amr Musa, said "the situation is very serious and very dangerous…the search for justice should not jeopardize the other priorities in Africa." African Union Peace and Security Commissioner, Ramtane Lamamra, said “ICC targeting of African High Officials is unacceptable” Why have the ICC’s first four cases targeted African conflicts only? Is this an attempt to prove that Africa knows nothing best about government except to murder its citizens in a genocider manner? Liberia’s Charles

Taylor in 2006 and Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic in 1993 were the only Heads of States

113 tried in the International Courts but that was done when they were out of power. Arrogant and rigid enforcement of International Law is an abrogation of justice especially when it is done hastily with political motives rather than legal intentions. For example, upon hearing the news of Ocampo ill-motives on the President of the Sudan, George Bush ran to the media and said “we’re trying to work with Al Bashir to make sure he understands that there will be continued sanctions if he doesn’t move forward by facilitating the deployment of peacekeepers and flow of aid in Darfur…We’re not a member of the ICC, but we’ll see how that plays out with Al Bashir.” You can understand here how USA is against the ICC but happy to use it as a “Tool of Pressure” on Sudan. You can also detect sarcastic Neo-colonial mentality from Bush when he thinks the President of the Sudan is a man who lacks understanding. I remember Hugo Chaves, the President of Venezuela telling Bush in the face that he is the worst devilish President the world ever had.

Okuk (2008) in his own view systematically argued that ICC is not a credible factor for peace in Africa owing to the manner and nature of the arrest, trial and verdict of Charles

Taylor. Okuk went further to consolidate this by citing an example using Sudan as a case in view. Thus, he stated that:

I am supporting my team from the Sudan and urge them to warm up with the following ideas from a philosopher who was against the current status quo of the international community and the Foreign Policy of American Government, especially the Hiroshima disaster and Vietnam War. He was a good liberal American philosopher and I love him very much. His name is John Rawls. To challenge the partiality of the International Law and its injustices on the Less Developed and Less Powerful Countries, Rawls came up with an alternative. He called it the “Law of the Peoples” (Okuk, 2008:13).

He presented its basic principles as follows:

1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples; 2) Peoples are to observe international treatise and undertakings without using double standards;

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3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them according to reasonable consensus; 4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention into others’ internal affairs without their request; 5) Peoples have the right of self-defence but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defence; 6) Peoples are to honour the fundamental human rights without rigidity; 7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war as a last resort for urgent needed solution; and 8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavourable conditions because of lack of just or decent political, social, and economic structures in their communities. Based on these points, you can see how USA and UK are failing in Iraq and

Afghanistan. They have provoked terrorism in the World and are unable to control it. Their

Technology of Intelligence and Hard Ware of War has been defeated by the cleverest Osama

Bin Laden. The unjust Iraq during the time of Saddam Hussein’s Regime is far better and peaceful than the invaded Iraq under Bush’s control now. They eliminated Hussein into the land of the dead in the name of double standard justice, and spoiled the peace of Iraqis by setting Iraq to fire of chaos. What has the Anglo-American definition of dream of liberty and justice brought to Iraq.(Kimenyi, 2013)

Flowing from the fact presented in this section, our hypothesis number two stands valid that the Liberian example does not showcase the International Criminal Court as a credible factor for peace in African conflicts.

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CHAPTER SIX

Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations

This section is set out to specifically look at the summary, conclusion and recommendations of the study.

6.1 Summary

The study on International Criminal Court (ICC) and post conflict peace building in

Liberia has exposed us to critically analyze the role of ICC in peace building process in post conflict Liberia between 2006 and 2013. To do this, we divided our work into Five substantive Chapters. With chapter one looking at the background to the study, Statement of problem, Objectives of the study and Significance of the study. In chapter two we undertook a critical and systematic review of relevant literature to establish a gap which formed the nucleus of our work. Some of the works we reviewed include the works of (Cheng 2008,

Boutros-Ghali 1995, Bush 1996, Uvni 2000, Cliffe 2000, Adebajo 2002, Boell 2012 .e.t.c ).

In the course of the review, we found out that a lot of writers have written on Liberia’s civil war including Post -conflict peace -building in Liberia . But none of the writers was able to critically and systematically examine the role of the International Criminal Court in Post conflict peace building in Liberia with its attendant consequences as a factor for peace in

Africa. And this gap became the focus of our work.

Thus in order to do this effectively, in the methodology which is in Chapter three, we made use of qualitative descriptive method of data analysis, Human needs theory and employed the use of One group pre-test post-test Research design to analyse our hypotheses.

Thus in chapter four and five, using the above methods, we tested our hypotheses . And from the analyses, we were able to find out that the ICC intervention was un-favourable to post conflict peace building in Liberia. This is because we deduced that with Taylor’s arrest,

116 ethnic wrangling among the various ethnic groups was fueled thus frustrating the efforts of various post- conflict Peace building processes that was already on ground to consolidate peace in Liberia. Some of these efforts includes; the efforts of the Truth and Reconciliation

Commission, DDRR and UNMIL etc. Furthermore, most of Taylor’s supporters systematically argued that Taylor alone did not commit war crime neither did he alone violate international laws. Thus with this argument, some of the ethnic groups have failed to completely settle with the peace agreement in Liberia.

The study also ascertained that during American Senate hearings, Senator Rod Grams in 1998 called the ICC “a monster that must be slain” and Senator John Ashcroft similarly denounced the ICC as “a clear and continuing threat to the national interest of the United

States.” However, in 2003, the United States turned around to its initial stand on not signing the Rome Statute this it did by overwhelmingly supporting the arrest and trial of Charles at the ICC Taylor through its funding.

The study also observed that the ICC confronts immense practical and logistical problems of conducting investigations and engaging with affected populations in highly insecure environments. The ICC’s sharpest pitfall is also evident in the fact that the

International criminal law does not apply to the powerful nations, only the weak hence the focus on Africa.

Furthermore, the study also found out that the establishment of the Special Court for

Sierra Leone was not for the sole reason of restoring a lasting peace in Liberia. This was because the International legitimacy of the Special Court was also affected by the fact that it does not apply to the geographic distribution of the UN and that it is mostly dominated by

P’5 of the Security Council. With the United States of America taking the lead. Their dominance has also reflected in the Office of the Prosecutor. Evidently, the first Prosecutor of

117 the Special Court, David Crane, was serving as a senior Inspector General in the U.S.

Department of Defense.

Nonetheless, the study also found out that prior to the intervention of ICC in Liberia, lots of progress was made in the area of peace and security but the intervention eluded the continuation of these programs (DDRR and RR) as people who were supposed to be re- integrated into civilian life or the national security became afraid because of the ICC intervention.

In consonance to the above fact, the study observed that the ICC is a mere product of the United Nations through its Security Council. This made the ICC to be dependent on them thus easily influenced by them. This simple reason accounts to the reason of ICC being engaged in selective justice. In addition, this research found out that neither punitive justice nor cosmetic approach to peace-building process in Liberia can consolidate peace in Liberia.

Finally, we summarized our work in chapter six, we also drew our conclusion from the test of our hypotheses In the same chapter. The study nevertheless made recommendations that is in consonance with our hypotheses.

6.2 Conclusion

Post-conflict peace building starts when conflict has been controlled to the degree that normalcy have returned fully to the society, and reconstruction of violence-torn societies becomes possible. As intense violence becomes less visible, conditions for longer-term political and social stability take root. The control of violence at an interpersonal and inter- communal level is thus a prerequisite to establishing a constructive relationship. Hence, having studied the post- conflict peace -building process in Liberia before and after I.C.C. intervention in Liberia, and analyzed the pre- post test situation, it has been established that the I.C.C. role in the post conflict peace building process in Liberia was un-favourable.

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The study was able to discover that the basic aim of the court was actually not to bring about a lasting and sustainable peace in the country, rather it was an avenue for underground politics by powerful nations to further their selfish national interest. Who through their funding dictates to the court its mode of operation and relative to their national interest of mainly revolves around resource control. The United States is a clear example of this gimmick, indeed, U.S was not a signatory to the Rome Statute but through its financial muscle and contribution to the Court, it has use the court as an avenue to punish leaders who are not in the good book of America.

Furthermore, the ICC in its operation has displayed impartiality in the course of their duty as countries are not treated on the same terrain. Nonetheless, the Truth and

Reconciliation Commission in Liberia was already making progress in-terms of uniting the worrying parties, the Disarmament and Re-integration program had made palpable progress by integrating the people back into normal civilian lives and rebels into the state security but with the intervention of the ICC and the trial of Charles Taylor, people who were responding to these program became afraid on the ground that they might be apprehended by the ICC. furthermore, ICC also endangered the effectiveness of the soldiers in peace keeping mission. This is because its existence will prevent them from acting when they should, for fear of potential prosecution which was the case of Liberia.

Conclusively, The ICC intervention in African have also be criticized by many observers who argued that the court does not interfere in other powerful continent where records of flagrant human rights abuse are recorded. Rather, they focus mainly on Africa.

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6.3 Recommendations

Following from the above findings, in-tandem with our hypotheses, we therefore

recommend that:

• For there to be a lasting and sustainable peace in Liberia, there should be improvement in the

nature and mode of governance in Liberia to accommodate and benefit the masses. This may

involve stimulated thinking that considers all shades of opinion or that brings together

different points of view. Thus, there is the need to consider these basic human needs in

Liberia, which includes inter alia need for identity. Indeed, there are acceptable means for

example, of giving a sense of identity to the person at the workplace, to young people, to

minorities and ethnic groups, and catering to the need of providing food, water, housing,

electricity, health, education, and other necessities of life. All these listed above, forms an

effective strategy of preventing conflicts and achieving an enduring Peace in Liberia. Thus,

averting the undue interference of external bodies like the ICC whose intervention has proven

un-favourable towards ensuring a lasting and sustainable peace in Liberia.

• Following with the report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, punitive

justice is not the way forward and even if there is need for such, it should be based on rule of

law without any form of prejudice. Furthermore, programs such as the DDRR and the TRC

should be encouraged and vigorously pursued in order to maintain their much achieved

progress prior to the ICC intervention. Africans should also endeavour to strengthen and

encourage the independence of their judiciary for proper and just dispensation of justice than

relying on the ICC whose intervention overtime has not proved to be a credible tool for

consolidating peace and security in Africa.

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