BACKGROUNDER No. 2729 | September 19, 2012

The Chávez Plan to Steal ’s Presidential Election: What Obama Should Do Ray Walser, PhD

Abstract n October 7, 2012, some 18 mil- On October 7, 2012, Venezuela’s Olion Venezuelan voters will Key Points Hugo Chávez will stand for re- choose between the incumbent election against opposition candidate president, Hugo Chávez, and the uni- ■■ The October 7 presidential elec- Henrique Capriles. The Venezuelan fied opposition candidate Henrique tions in Venezuela pit anti-Amer- ican authoritarian incumbent presidential election matters to the Capriles Radonski. Chávez, president Hugo Chávez against democratic U.S.: Venezuela is a major oil supplier since 1999, seeks an unprecedented opposition candidate Henrique to the U.S.; Chávez’s anti-American third six-year term and the chance to Capriles. worldview has led to alliances with make Venezuela’s march to social- ■■ Venezuela’s presidential election , , and ; and Chávez ism and a dominant-party state affects U.S. interests: Venezuela offers safe havens to FARC and irreversible. is a major oil supplier to the U.S., . Chávez also works to The contrast of forces is stark: and Chávez’s anti-Americanism weaken democratic governance a populist, charismatic autocrat has led to alliances with Iran, throughout the Americas. Under the against his polar opposite. Capriles, Syria, and Cuba and safe havens Obama Administration, the U.S. has former governor of the state of for FARC and Hezbollah. offered no comprehensive strategy Miranda and winner of a February ■■ Chávez is pursuing a multistep or policy for dealing with the man presidential primary, represents a strategy aimed at securing his who continuously demonstrates his unified democratic opposition with a re-election that is far from fair. If ruthlessness in implementing an constructive program for the return re-elected, he vows to crush the anti-American, socialist, Bolivarian to liberal democracy. opposition and make socialist rule irreversible. Revolution across the Americas, but must choose between further there is still time for the U.S. to descent into authoritarianism, ■■ Despite the regime’s abuse of the support democratic freedoms before archaic socialism, and official anti- advantages of incumbency, the democratic opposition believes it the election. Americanism and a return to repre- has a chance to win, return liberal sentative democracy, adherence to democracy to Venezuela, and free-market principles, and recovery This paper, in its entirety, can be found at improve relations with the U.S. of the and transparency, http://report.heritage.org/bg2729 ■■ The Obama Administration Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison as well as improved relations with should play a more active role 1 Center for Foreign Policy Studies the U.S. For the opposition, October in monitoring the elections, The Heritage Foundation 7 may represent the last stand supporting fair and free voter 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 against Chávez’s tightening authori- participation, and preparing con- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org tarian noose. tingency plans for a contested Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily The Venezuelan presidential and possibly violent election reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or outcome. as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill election matters to the U.S. With before Congress. oil reserves equal to those of Saudi BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2729 September 19, 2012

Arabia, Venezuela is a major oil sup- process and the deterioration of legitimacy. Yet after 13 years in office, plier to the U.S. Chávez’s anti-Amer- democratic governance in Venezuela. it is clear that Chávez—his mindset, ican worldview has led to alliances Before October 7, President instinct, and ideology—is the polar with Iran, Syria, and Cuba, all state and Secretary of opposite of a true democrat. The sponsors of terrorism. Venezuela State should deliv- 58-year-old ex-soldier and leader offers safe havens to the narcoter- er strong messages of support for of a 1992 military coup attempt rorist Revolutionary Armed Forces democracy and against dictatorship has become an outsized strong- of (FARC) and the Islamist in Venezuela. Given the absence man (caudillo) on a messianic mis- terrorists of Hezbollah. Chávez also of serious international electoral sion to transform Venezuela into a works to weaken democratic gover- observation, the U.S. should support Bolivarian utopia.2 nance throughout the Americas. active civil society participation and Chávez is taking few chances. domestic electoral monitoring. From OCTOBER 7 REPRESENTS A CRITICAL His electoral strategy consists of dispatching extra State Department JUNCTURE. THE U.S. NEEDS TO four distinctive steps: (1) exploit personnel for observation on the the advantages of an uneven elec- ground to creating a bipartisan EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC toral playing field that highly favors group of experts to monitor the elec- TOOLS TO FOCUS ATTENTION NOT the incumbent; (2) conceal critical tions and prepare a comprehensive ONLY ON THE VOTING, BUT ALSO information needed to inform voter post-election report, the U.S. can ON THE FUNDAMENTAL LACK decision-making; (3) conduct an offer a serious assessment of whether OF FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTORAL inflammatory campaign aimed at the elections were genuinely free and deepening polarization and incit- fair. PROCESS AND THE DETERIORATION ing fears; and (4) tilt the process in Beyond October 7, the U.S. needs OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN his favor on election day. As a savvy a well-prepared contingency strategy VENEZUELA. operative, Chávez knows that the for dealing with potential violence best electoral outcome is one that is and governability issues in case of a determined—perhaps rigged or sto- Chávez loss or post-electoral disor- Chávez is aggressive, obsessive, len—before voters even arrive at the ders. If Chávez wins, the U.S. cannot and often paranoid. He self-identifies polls. abandon the millions of Venezuelans with Jesus Christ, Fidel Castro, and, Despite powerful and unfair dis- who cast their votes against an above all, ’s “great lib- advantages, Capriles and the opposi- increasingly authoritarian regime erator,” Simon Bolivar. tion still believe they have a genuine that promises to curtail individual Chávez’s quest to spread socialism shot at winning. While polling data liberty, throttle economic freedom, and the is the are inconsistent, the race appears to and endanger the security of every- core of what is referred to as chavis- be tighter than initially predicted, one living in the Americas. It also mo. His socialism of the 21st century and the closer the race, the greater needs to plan for longer-term intelli- promises social justice and a perma- the temptation for Chávez to cheat. gence assessments and possible puni- nent rupture with “savage” capital- Currently, the U.S. lacks a com- tive countermeasures if Chávez’s ism, an end of the bourgeois state, prehensive strategy for the Chávez anti-American activities continue. and neo-liberal economics to achieve phenomenon or the upcoming elec- autonomous or “endogenous” growth. tions. October 7 represents a critical 21st-Century Socialism, Its chief elements are ever-increasing juncture at which the U.S. needs to the Bolivarian Revolution, state ownership of natural resources employ boldly all available diplomat- and Anti-Americanism and control of the means of produc- ic tools to focus attention not only on Although governing increas- tion through nationalization, con- the voting, but also on the fundamen- ingly as an autocrat, Chávez clearly fiscations, and collectivization. The tal lack of fairness in the electoral counts on the perception of electoral private sector is slowly asphyxiated,

1. Juan Forero, “Latin America’s New Authoritarians,” , July 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/2012/07/22/ gJQAMdtD3W_story.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 2. For good background on Hugo Chávez, see Michael Shifter, “What to Read on Venezuela,” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/ readinglists/what-to-read-on-venezuela (accessed September 11, 2012).

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while private property rights are degraded. The Bolivarian Revolution: Key Features of In the long run, the Chávez • Personality-centered; power increasingly concentrated in executive’s brand of socialism aims to wean hands.5 Venezuelan workers and managers • Reduced horizontal accountability (diminished checks and balances); from profit-seeking habits to build power is unitary in an increasingly politicized, polarized state. an economy of solidarity, happi- • Power/influence/wealth of state freely used to build a permanent major- ness, and humanistic values. As ity under a dominant “revolutionary” party.6 long as a competitive private sector • Control, restriction, and sanction of media without formal censorship. exists, Venezuela’s economy will be • “Autocratic legalism” that allows selective sanctioning and punishment of far too capitalist for Chávez’s tastes. opponents. Venezuela’s 21st-century future • Restriction of opposition nongovernmental organizations and civil soci- increasingly looks like Cuba’s 20th- ety; elimination of foreign support and funding. century Communist past. • Speaking on behalf of poor while building dependent client base. • Anti-imperialism (compulsive anti-Americanism) that leads to support- VENEZUELA’S 21ST-CENTURY FUTURE ing tyranny under the banner of building a multipolar world order. INCREASINGLY LOOKS LIKE CUBA’S 20TH-CENTURY COMMUNIST PAST. foundations of chavismo. The institu- decrees and exercising emergency The Bolivarian Revolution pre- tions of governance, from the leg- powers have opened additional doors scribes “participatory and pro- islature and courts to the National for establishing an omnipotent exec- tagonistic democracy” rather than Electoral Council (CNE) and armed utive authority. representative or liberal democracy. forces, respond to central direction In short, Chávez has “achieved Chávez’s anti-institutional approach by Chávez. So too does the party absolute control of all state institu- weakens the federal model of the he has built, the United Socialist tions that might check his power.”4 1999 Venezuelan constitution osten- Party of Venezuela (PSUV), and its The only person to whom Chávez is sibly in order to empower citizens, alliance with minor parties of the truly accountable is himself. often marginalized in the past, and Left, known collectively as the Great In the 2012 campaign platform, presumably grant them a greater Patriotic Pole (GPP). Chávez promises to root out the voice in governing within their com- In practice, strategic-level deci- vestiges of capitalism, “completely munities. This model seeks to crowd sion-making resides with a growing pulverize the bourgeois state,” and out all intermediate layers of rep- executive power that is increasingly move beyond a “point of no return” resentation and independent civil unchecked and thoroughly central- to make Venezuela’s transition to society in order to establish direct— ized. Customary checks and balances, socialism irreversible.7 and unmonitored—links between the such as an independent judiciary, Another consistently troubling leader (Chávez) and the governed. have no place in chavismo since “divi- aspect of chavismo is its strident, This presumed delegation sion of powers weakens the state.”3 often reckless anti-Americanism. In of public authority cannot con- Control of the legislative majority Chávez’s view, the U.S. is a predatory, ceal the essentially authoritarian and a capacity to govern by issuing hegemonic nation that dominates

3. Joel D. Hirst, “Free Press and the Bolivarian Project,” presentation at the American Enterprise Institute, February 9, 2012, http://aei.org/files/2012/02/10/- free-press-and-the-bolivarian-project_140017454095.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 4. For a comprehensive study, see Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela (Washington, D.C.: Press, 2011). 5. Javier Corrales, “Hugo Boss,” Foreign Policy, January 4, 2006, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2006/01/04/hugo_boss (accessed September 11, 2012). 6. Joel D. Hirst, The ALBA: Inside Venezuela’s Bolivarian Alliance (: Interamerican Institute for Democracy, 2012). 7. Hugo Chávez, “Propuesta del candidato de la patria, Comandante Hugo Chávez: Para la gestión Bolivariana Socialista, 2013–2019,” June 11, 2012, http://www. chavez.org.ve/Programa-Patria-2013-2019.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012).

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the global economy, threatens world 2000, following adoption of a new popular vote but only a minority of peace, destabilizes peaceful govern- constitution, Chávez retained the seats (67 of 165) because district- ments, and voraciously consumes presidency with 59.7 percent of the ing and proportional representation scarce resources. vote. He survived a presidential rules favored Chávez’s PSUV. The ideology that Chávez espous- recall referendum in August 2004 By far the most significant politi- es combines the themes of nation- with a 59 percent margin and in cal development has been the re- alism and Marxist–Leninist anti- 2006 defeated opposition candidate emergence of an energized, unified imperialism with anti-Zionism and Manuel Rosales, winning with 62.84 opposition. With increasing unity a post–Cold War vision of a multi- percent. and growing sophistication, the polar world in which U.S. power and opposition has ended its recurring influence are drastically diminished. THE IDEOLOGY THAT CHÁVEZ tendency to engage in self-destruc- Because of his anti-Americanism, ESPOUSES COMBINES THE THEMES tive infighting. The February 7, 2012, Chávez believes he must prepare presidential primary, organized by Venezuela for an impending clash OF NATIONALISM AND MARXIST– the MUD, was a formidable display of with the U.S., which he claims will LENINIST ANTI-IMPERIALISM WITH activism and produced an impressive take the form of covert actions— ANTI-ZIONISM AND A POST–COLD turnout of over three million votes.10 fomenting internal unrest and desta- WAR VISION OF A MULTIPOLAR Capriles, the 40-year-old former bilization, a coup, even his assas- governor of Miranda state, emerged WORLD IN WHICH U.S. POWER sination—sponsored either by the as the clear winner with 64 percent opposition or by the . AND INFLUENCE ARE DRASTICALLY of the vote. Since February, he has Chávez’s anti-Americanism drives DIMINISHED. waged a vigorous campaign in the him to ally himself with Iran and face of serious obstacles. Capriles’ Syria and support foreign terror- In December 2007, Chávez suf- central message has been one of rec- ist organizations including FARC, fered his first electoral setback onciliation, a plea for the restoration the Basque ETA, and Hezbollah.8 when a referendum proposing to of balance to national policy, and a He looks to build strong ties with end restrictions on presidential re- promise not to jettison social pro- geopolitical counterweights to the election and 68 other constitutional grams but rather to place them on a U.S., such as China and Russia. From changes was narrowly defeated. sustainable foundation. to , Chávez has Term limits, however, were lifted in From a distance, the campaign spent lavishly to build a network of 2009 in an unconstitutional referen- for the presidency looks like many anti-American allies and clients. In dum.9 Before his cancer was discov- others, including those in the U.S.: the longer term, he hopes to make ered, Chávez expressed a desire to catchy spots, large rallies, photos South America a proving ground for govern until 2031. of Chávez kissing babies, celebrity the Bolivarian Revolution. Opposition candidates boycotted support (including U.S. actor Sean the 2005 legislative elections, giving Penn), and negative campaign ads. Elections: Chávez a total majority, but in the Yet behind the daily flow of campaign Opposition Gaining Ground 2010 legislative elections, candidates activity is a well-coordinated Chávez The October 7 election is the representing the Democratic Unity strategy to retain power while fourth presidential election since Roundtable (MUD) stood united appearing to preserve a semblance of Chávez won the presidency in 1998 against the PSUV. Opposition par- electoral legitimacy. with 56.2 percent of the vote. In ties gained a small majority in the

8. On the nature of the anti-American threat, see Douglas E. Schoen and Michael Rowan, The Threat Closer to Home: Hugo Chavez and the War Against America (New York, Free Press, 2009), and Ray Walser, “State Sponsors of Terrorism: Time to Add Venezuela to the List,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2362, January 20, 2010, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/01/state-sponsors-of-terrorism-time-to-add-venezuela-to-the-list. 9. Article 345 of the Venezuelan Constitution states that a revised constitutional reform initiative may not be submitted during the same constitutional term of office of the National Assembly. 10. Ray Walser, “Venezuela’s Presidential Primary: Capriles Radonski Ready to Challenge Chavez,” Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3501, February 13, 2012, http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/02/venezuelas-presidential-primary-capriles-radonski-ready-to-challenge-chavez.

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The Chávez Strategy, or campaigning door-to-door.13 “legal” penalties rather than through Step 1: Unequal Electoral The head of the nation’s oil com- censorship and shutdowns. Competition pany, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. Venezuela’s Law of Social The Chávez strategy begins with (PDVSA), has made it clear that he Responsibility for media forbids what calls “tilting the expects all 115,000 employees to vote transmitting news that might “cause pitch” and rigging the system to win for Chávez. Key opposition leader anxiety in the public or disturb an indefinite stay in power.11 Ramon Guillermo Aveledo concluded public order” or that “incites or Spending His Way to Victory. that Chávez wants to “purchase a promotes hatred or intolerance.”16 Central to the Chávez regime has dictatorship.”14 The equally vague Organic Law of been turning the nation’s oil earn- Telecommunications grants the ings into social programs (misiones THE CHÁVEZ REGIME INCREASINGLY government the power to suspend bolivarianas) that deliver free health RESTRICTS THE INDEPENDENCE AND or revoke broadcasting concessions care, free education, free or low- when “convenient for the interests cost housing, and subsidized food FREEDOM OF THE PRESS. of the nation, or if public order and for millions. Chávez has accelerated security demands it.” Journalists can social spending in advance of the Monopolizing and also be hauled into court for violating elections. In March, the government Manipulating the Media. The insult laws (desacato), which penalize lifted Venezuela’s national debt ceil- Chávez regime increasingly restricts citizens for criticizing public officials. ing while increasing the budget by 45 the independence and freedom of Electoral rules limit air time for percent. Last year, Venezuela report- the press. The onslaught against a presidential candidates: three min- edly issued more sovereign debt than free press began in May 2007 when utes for television, four for radio. Yet any other Latin American nation, the government refused to renew independent monitoring shows that raising $15 billion on international the license for the nation’s oldest pro-government, pro-Chávez pub- capital markets. In brief, chavismo is commercial network, Radio Caracas licity has averaged more than one engaged in “incumbency protection Television (RCTV). It continued hour per day since July 1.17 Similarly, on steroids.”12 when Chávez targeted Globovision, Chávez exploits a public-service Chávez has used a prominent news channel. The requirement for private broadcast- power to award jobs, contracts, and government hounded its owner, ers to broadcast pro-government subsidies to partisans and pals. Guillermo Zuloaga, into exile and messages and employs the right to Government workers now make fined the station a ruinous $2 million demand national air time (cadenas). up 20 percent of the nation’s labor for reporting on deadly prison riots force. Government workers report in 2011.15 Other media outlets have The Chávez Strategy, Step 2: that they are required to contribute suffered fines or have been unable Leave Voters in the Dark to the Chávez campaign by sell- to renew their operating licenses. A second thrust of the Chávez ing raffle tickets, donating a day’s Chavismo forces competitive voices strategy is to mask or obscure incon- salary, attending political rallies, off the airwaves by imposing costly venient facts, unsettling trends, and

11. “Tilting the Pitch,” The Economist, July 7, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/21558280 (accessed September 11, 2012). 12. “Expert Interview: Alejandro Velasco,” Venezuela’s 2012 Presidential Election, Duke University, April 26, 2012, http://sites.duke.edu/history136a_01_s2012_ awk7/resources-and-learning-more/interviews/ (accessed September 11, 2012). 13. Ana Diaz and Ingrid Bravo Balabú, “Obligaron a funcionarios a comprar y vender rifa del PSUV,” , August 18, 2012, http://www.el-nacional.com/ noticia/47496/16/obligaron-a-funcionarios-a-comprar-y-vender-rifa-del-psuv.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 14. Ramon Guillermo Aveledo, “Venezuela’s Opposition Is Winning,” Real Clear World, March 9, 2012, http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2012/03/09/ venezuela_opposition_is_winning__99946.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 15. , “Challenging Chávez’s Grip on Venezuela,” The Washington Post, July 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2010/07/11/AR2010071103036_pf.html\ (accessed September 11, 2012). 16. , “Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil Society,” December 22, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/22/venezuela- legislative-assault-free-speech-civil-society (accessed September 11, 2012). 17. Andres Velasco, “Rebuilding Venezuelan Democracy,” Project Syndicate: A World of Ideas, July 31, 2012, http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/ rebuilding-venezuelan-democracy (accessed September 11, 2012).

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policy failures that might nega- circle will be able to replace him. the Chávez regime reports that eco- tively influence voter opinions. On Economic Mismanagement. nomic growth achieved 5.4 percent October 7, voters will lack compre- Venezuela’s economy has experi- in the second quarter of 2012, seri- hensive information regarding the enced roller-coaster movement over ous economists argue that growth in candidate’s health, his economic the past decade. Overall, Venezuela Venezuela is largely unsustainable mismanagement, problems in the leads Latin America in rising infla- and actually decelerating. Economic oil sector, the country’s crime epi- tion rates, caused in large measure by experts predict severe currency demic and , the govern- Chávez’s economic policies. Multiple- devaluation in early 2013 and cuts in ment’s increasing militarism, and tiered exchange rates, export con- social spending. the regime’s hidden foreign policy trols, and price regulations have Dependence on Oil. Blessing or agenda. seriously distorted markets and curse, it is fair to say that without oil Chávez’s Health. In June 2011, prices. Nationalization of private revenue and Venezuela’s petro-state after a three-week disappearance companies has gathered momentum status, Chávez would likely be an from the public, a visibly weakened in recent years and covers all sec- ex-president rather than a candidate. Chávez appeared on television in tors from agriculture to tourism.19 As of 2012, Venezuela’s reserves in Cuba’s capital to report that he had Nationalizations are undertaken to oil and natural gas are reportedly undergone surgery to remove a cover up or obscure policy mistakes, greater than those of . “baseball-sized tumor.” By October while compensations have become The current $100-per-barrel cost is 2011, Chávez claimed to be cancer- increasingly erratic.20 a boon for Chávez. Nevertheless, not free. But in February 2012, he secre- all is well in oil-rich Venezuela. tively returned to Cuba for a sec- CHÁVEZ’S 13-YEAR RULE HAS SENT Between 1998 and 2009, the ond round of surgery, again raising VENEZUELA RACING TOWARD THE PDVSA labor force increased by 267 serious doubts about his health and percent, from 39,000 to 115,000 survival prospects. BOTTOM IN VIRTUALLY EVERY workers, while its output dropped In recent months, Chávez appears INDICATOR THAT MEASURES from around 3.5 million barrels of to have made a recovery. He has ECONOMIC FREEDOM, RULE OF LAW, oil per day to 2.6 million barrels per 22 again declared his cancer con- AND EASE OF DOING BUSINESS. day. Experts estimate that out- quered.18 The true state of his health, put could have reached as much as nonetheless, remains the Venezuelan five million barrels per day under government’s most closely guarded Chávez’s 13-year rule has sent more competent and less politicized secret. Chávez’s incapacity or death Venezuela racing toward the bottom management.23 will open up a succession struggle. in virtually every indicator that mea- Much of PDVSA’s earnings—as It is widely agreed that no current sures economic freedom, rule of law, much as $6.7 billion annually—sup- member of the president’s inner and ease of doing business.21 While ports Chávez’s social programs and

18. Ezequiel Minaya and David Luhnow, “After Months of Illness, Chávez Says He’s Fit,” , August 2, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10 000872396390444320704577565213428006308.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 19. , “Venezuela’s Nationalizations Under Chávez,” December 1, 2011, http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/01/venezuela-nationalizations- idUSN1E79I0Z520111201 (accessed September 11, 2012). 20. Chris Sabatini, “The Revolution Will Not Be Marginalized,” Foreign Affairs, January 7, 2011, http://www.as-coa.org/articles/revolution-will-not-be-marginalized (accessed September 11, 2012). 21. The Heritage Foundation’s 2012 Index of Economic Freedom ranks Venezuela 173rd among 179 ranked nations. See Terry Miller, Kim R. Holmes, and Edwin J. Feulner, 2012 Index of Economic Freedom (Washington: The Heritage Foundation and Dow Jones & Company, Inc., 2012), http://www.heritage.org/index/ ranking. The World Bank’s Doing Business lists Venezuela as 177th among 183 ranked countries. See “Economy Rankings,” in World Bank, Doing Business http:// www.doingbusiness.org/rankings/ (accessed September 11, 2012). The 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index lists Venezuela as 73rd among 110 ranked countries, just behind the . See “The 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index Table Rankings,” in Legatum Institute, 2011 Legatum Prosperity Index, http://www. prosperity.com/rankings.aspx (accessed September 11, 2012). 22. Javier Corrales, “A Setback for Chávez,” Journal of Democracy, January 2011, p. 125, https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/311013/original/JOD%2B2011%2BC orrales%2Bpp.%2B122-136%2B%2528PJC%2Bedits%2B12-30-10%2529.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 23. Gustavo Coronel, “The Venezuelan Elections: How Can PDVSA Recover?” Journal of Energy Security, July 2012, http://www.ensec.org/index.php?option=com_ content&view=article&id=371:venezuela-chavez-and-pdvsas-oil-woes&catid=128:issue-content&Itemid=402 (accessed September 11, 2012).

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discounted sales and donations to 19,336 homicides,26 compared to , 60 percent of the other nations, leaving less than is a reported 4,550 murders in 1998 exported to Europe in 2011 needed for investment and explo- when Chávez first won election.27 passed through Venezuela.32 ration. A lack of transparency and Only 5 percent of criminal cases Widespread Corruption. accountability in the PDVSA has lead to convictions, and impervi- Corruption occurs at all levels of opened the door to contract fixing, ousness to arrest and prosecution government. Former Foreign Policy massive inefficiency, and corruption. is rampant. According to Amherst editor Moises Naim warns that inter- Failure to invest in maintenance and College scholar Javier Corrales, “the action between government officials safety has seriously weakened the regime has essentially stood by while and criminal organizations has cre- company and contributed to numer- the country has fallen prey to one of ated a dangerous “.”33 Two ous mishaps, including the fire at the the most lethal crime waves in the former senior judges—Eladio Aponte Amuay refinery on August 25 that world.”28 and Luis Velasquez Alvaray—fled claimed 48 lives.24 Kevin Casas–Zamora, formerly Venezuela in 2012 and have pro- Yet Venezuela’s dependence on of the Brookings Institution, attri- vided extensive information to the oil has never been greater. Today, oil butes rampant crime to a collapse U.S. regarding the loss of judicial accounts for between 90 percent of law enforcement institutions, independence, widespread corrup- and 95 percent of Venezuela’s export systematic weakening of local gov- tion, and drug-trafficking deals earnings and is the source of 50 per- ernment, and increased narcotics among senior officials.34 Since 2008, cent of the government’s budget. trafficking.29 In the prison system, the U.S. Treasury Department has Rampant Crime. A recent Gallup 47,000 prisoners are crammed into designated five serving and former poll indicates that Venezuela is the 33 prisons designed for 12,000, and key officials as drug kingpins, includ- country whose residents fear crime violence continues to worsen.30 The ing current Defense Minister Henry the most.25 The homicide rate is Venezuelan Prison Observatory Rangel Silva.35 among the highest in the Americas has reported that over 500 prison- Corruption can also be of a at around 67 per 100,000 inhab- ers died between July 2011 and July more mundane nature. In 2011, itants. For 2011, the Venezuelan 2012.31 Drug trafficking remains Venezuelans were scandalized when Observatory of Violence recorded a major threat. According to the it was discovered that 30,000 tons

24. William Neuman, “Venezuelan Government Criticized in Deadly Refinery Blast,”, August 27, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/28/ world/americas/venezuelas-chavez-criticized-in-deadly-refinery-explosion.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 25. Clancy Bertane, “Latin Americans Least Likely Worldwide to Feel Safe,” Gallup World, August 3, 2012, http://www.gallup.com/poll/156236/Latin-Americans- Least-Likely-Worldwide-Feel-Safe.aspx (accessed September 11, 2012). 26. “Put Yourself in their Shoes,” El Universal, July 28, 2012, http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/120728/put-yourself-in-their-shoes (accessed September 11, 2012). 27. Kevin Casas–Zamora, “Venezuela’s Crime Debacle: A Cautionary Tale,” Brookings Institution, February 3, 2012, http://www.brookings.edu/research/ opinions/2012/02/03-venezuela-casaszamora (accessed September 11, 2012). 28. Corrales, “A Setback for Chávez,” p. 131. 29. Casas–Zamora, “Venezuela’s Crime Debacle.” 30. Fabiola Sanchez, “Venezuela Prison Riot Leaves More than 20 Dead,” The Huffington Post, August 20, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/20/ venezuela-prison-riot_n_1810423.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 31. “Venezuela Prison Riot ‘Leaves 20 Dead,’” BBC News, August 20, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19323029 (accessed September 12, 2012). 32. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “The Transatlantic Cocaine Market,” April 2011, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/ Transatlantic_cocaine_market.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 33. Moises Naim, “Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes Office,”Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/25/mafia-states/ ah37# (September 11, 2012). 34. “Another Former Judge Alleges Drug Trafficking Ties in Venezuelan Government,” What’s Next Venezuela?, May 11, 2012, https://www.whatsnextvenezuela. com/tag/luis-velasquez-alvaray/ (accessed September 12, 2012). 35. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Asset Control, “Narcotics: What You Need to Know About U.S. Sanctions Against Drug Traffickers,” September 6, 2012, http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/drugs.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012).

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of imported food had been left to rot continues to insert the military into Silva said that Venezuela’s armed in government warehouses while “all the structures of the Venezuelan forces are “wedded” to Comandante market scarcities increased.36 Ready state” while turning ordinary citi- Chávez and his revolutionary project. money, loose accountability, and a zens into informants and domestic In 2010, Chávez warned that “it is not breakdown in public integrity have spies.41 possible to stage an unarmed revolu- dogged the Chávez regime since its The creation of a Bolivarian tion against this bourgeoisie.”44 inception.37 It is little wonder that or people’s militia has led to the The Hidden Foreign Policy Transparency International has con- establishment of a body of 50,000 Agenda. To advance his revolution, sistently awarded Venezuela one of to 125,000 armed individuals.42 Chávez pursues an activist foreign its lowest global rankings.38 These quasi-soldiers owe their loy- policy agenda. The range of allies and Growing Militarism. Chávez alty not to the state, but to Chávez. clients began with the Cuba of Fidel is an ex-lieutenant colonel in Paramilitary or vigilante groups and Raul Castro, which formed the Venezuela’s army. He prefers the title known as colectivos have also Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of comandante to presidente and assigns emerged in certain localities with Our Americas (ALBA) in 2002. ALBA the military a central position within the potential to turn Chávez’s bel- now has eight members.45 Beyond the Bolivarian Revolution. As com- ligerent, confrontational words into ALBA, Chávez values his ties with mander in chief, he has already brutal street fights.43 Iran, Syria, Russia, and China. managed to eliminate congressional By far the most intimate of oversight of military affairs. He has OVERALL, CHÁVEZ’S Chávez’s foreign associations is redefined the primary mission of UNACCOUNTABLE FOREIGN POLICY with Cuba. Chávez staffs his social Venezuela’s armed forces by calling misiones with Cuban nationals and on them to fight “imperialism” and PUTS VENEZUELA AT RISK OF employs Cubans to set up agricul- defend socialism to the death.39 FURTHER U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL tural collectives. After more than Venezuelan constitutional experts SANCTIONS WITH LIMITED BENEFITS a decade, Chávez remains depen- question Chávez’s unstinting efforts FOR THE VENEZUELAN PEOPLE. dent on an estimated 30,000 Cuban to convert the armed forces into a medical personnel rather than on partisan political force in violation of trained Venezuelan health care pro- the 1999 constitution, which states The military’s role in the event of viders. Cuban technical personnel that the armed forces are “an essen- an opposition victory is uncertain. are employed in the energy sector tially professional institution with In June 2010, then General and now and staff-sensitive immigration and no political orientation.”40 Chávez Minister of Defense Henry Rangel intelligence services as well as in the

36. “Wikileaks Report Cites Production, The , March 7, 2012. 37. Gustavo Coronel, “The Four Hotbeds of Corruption in Venezuela,” , March 17, 2011, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/four- hotbeds-corruption-venezuela (accessed September 11, 2012). 38. Transparency International’s Corruption Index ranks Venezuela 172nd of 183 countries ranked. Transparency International, “Corruption by Country/Territory: Venezuela,” 2012, http://www.transparency.org/country#VEN (accessed September 11, 2012). 39. A. Pozzolungo and J. Figuerora, “Chávez pidió eliminar palabra ‘muerte’ del lema socialista,” , July 29, 2011, http://eltiempo.com.ve/venezuela/ gobierno/chavez-pidio-eliminar-palabra-muerte-del-lema-socialista/27866 (accessed September 11, 2012). 40. Article 328, Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 1999, http://www.venezuelaemb.or.kr/english/ConstitutionoftheBolivarianingles.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 41. Javier Corrales, “President Hugo Chávez’ Campaign Vision for Venezuela: Militaristic and Top Down,” Americas Quarterly, August 22, 2012, http://www. americasquarterly.org/president-hugo-chavez-campaign-vision-for-venezuela-militaristic-and-top-down (accessed September 11, 2012). 42. “A Tripoli? Hugo Chávez Grooms a Militia” The Economist, April 7, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18529829 (accessed September 11, 2012). 43. Daniel Wallis, “Chavista Militants May Be Wild Card After Venezuela Vote,” Reuters, August 15, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/15/us- venezuela-colectivos-idUSBRE87E0GN20120815 (accessed September 11, 2012). 44. “A Caribbean Tripoli? Hugo Chávez Grooms a Militia.” 45. Hirst, The ALBA: Inside Venezuela’s Bolivarian Alliance. ALBA’s eight members are Antigua and Barbuda, , Cuba, Dominica, , , Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela.

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military.46 Access to passports, offi- The Chávez Strategy, system. He continues to war against cial documents, and information net- Step 3: Demonize, Isolate, the OAS, denouncing it as U.S.- works, including the Internet, opens and Instill Fear influenced and a “corpse waiting to doors for future invasions of privacy Chávez engages in discourse filled be buried.” and restrictions on individual liberty. with insult, rancor, and vilification.50 Chávez claims that citizens who Leaders in Havana and Caracas know He routinely claims that Capriles air their grievances before OAS’s that domestic spying, bureaucratic is the tool of Venezuela’s elite and Inter-American Commission on meddling, and political repression go “the right wing” in the U.S.51 Allies Human Rights violate national sover- hand in hand with the tighter eco- and supporters of Chávez have gone eignty. A recent decision to withdraw nomic controls of socialism. further by making spurious attempts from the commission clearly sig- Chávez has also built strong at character assassination, seeking nals that Venezuela will abide by its ties with the Peronist presidents to foment anti-Semitic propaganda own standards, render increasingly of Argentina, providing them with by portraying Capriles as Jewish, politicized justice, and ignore or deny loans, commercial orders, and and portraying him as a fascist and international protections afforded to suitcases filled with cash,47 and has a homosexual.52 In early August, its citizens. rendered covert support for the Chávez claimed to have evidence 48 narcoterrorism of FARC. The costs showing that Capriles belonged to a A RECENT DECISION TO WITHDRAW for assistance (giveaway) programs, “fascist” organization of wealthy fam- FROM THE INTER-AMERICAN estimated to total as much as $82 bil- ilies implicated in “neo-Nazism.”53 COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS lion between 2005 and 2011, remains Undercutting Recognized hidden from legislative oversight or Human Rights Standards. The CLEARLY SIGNALS THAT VENEZUELA public scrutiny.49 In the same vein, commitments to democratic gov- WILL ABIDE BY ITS OWN STANDARDS, secretive ties with Iran and opening ernment enshrined in the found- RENDER INCREASINGLY POLITICIZED Venezuela as a safe haven or gateway ing documents of the Organization JUSTICE, AND IGNORE OR DENY for foreign terrorist organizations of American States (OAS) and the are carefully concealed from public Inter-American Democratic Charter INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS view. of 2001 bind all signatory nations not AFFORDED TO ITS CITIZENS. Overall, Chávez’s unaccountable only to regular elections, but also to foreign policy puts Venezuela at risk governing democratically. However, Criminalizing Support for of further U.S. and international Chávez has undertaken to dilute Democracy. Venezuela’s 2010 sanctions with limited benefits for Venezuela’s commitment to the high- Defense of Political Sovereignty and the Venezuelan people. er standards of the inter-American National Determination attacks

46. Nikolas Kolzoff, “Countdown to Venezuela Election: What Will Befall Chávez’s Ties to Cuba?” The Huffington Post, March 3, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost. com/nikolas-kozloff/countdown-to-venezuela-el_b_1369716.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 47. Jaime Daremblum, “Has Argentina Joined the Chávez Bloc?” Hudson Institute, March 2011, http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/ArgentinaFinal.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 48. International Institute of Strategic Studies, The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador and the Secret Archive of ‘Raúl Reyes’,” Strategic Dossier, 2011, http://www.iiss.org/ publications/strategic-dossiers/the-farc-files-venezuela-ecuador-and-the-secret-archive-of-ral-reyes/ (accessed September 11, 2012). 49. Benedict Mander, “Critics Question Flow of Venezuelan Aid,” The Financial Times, August 28, 2012, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/03ba7206-eab5-11e1- 984b-00144feab49a.html#axzz252Xi2BMu (accessed September 11, 2012). 50. Aveledo, “Venezuela’s Opposition Is Winning.” 51. “Chávez Somos Todos,” Tal Cual, August 11, 2012, http://www.talcualdigital.com/nota/visor.aspx?id=74595&tipo=AVA (accessed September 11, 2012). 52. “Chávez Camp Launches Smear Campaign Against Presidential Rival Capriles,” , February 14, 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/ feb/15/chavez-smear-campaign-capriles-presidential (accessed September 11, 2012). Capriles is a Catholic whose grandparents came to Venezuela from Poland in the aftermath of the Holocaust and World War II. The U.S. State Department’s 2011 report on international religious freedom noted that Venezuela has “contributed to a rising tide of anti-Semitism.” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm#wrapper (accessed September 11, 2012). 53. IOL News, “Candidate Slams Chávez’s Nazi Accusations,” August 8, 2012, http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/candidate-slams-chavez-s-nazi- accusations-1.1358851#.UCKmz6D67B8 (accessed September 11, 2012).

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nongovernmental organizations “other methods of struggle” if a forecast a win with 60 percent of the (NGOs) that have international sup- majority vote against Chávez.56 vote.58 On August 15, Chávez pro- port, stating that such bodies that claimed that “it would be easier for “defend political rights” or “monitor The Chávez Strategy, Step 4: 100 camels to pass through the eye the performance of public bodies” Prevail on Election Day of a needle than for [the capitalist are barred from receiving foreign On October 7, as much as 80 per- class] to win the election” and later funding.54 Foreigners invited to cent of the roughly 18 million regis- claimed he will win by 70 percent.59 Venezuela by NGOs can be summar- tered voters will visit 14,035 polling Supporters touted an August poll ily expelled. NGOs failing to comply centers and 38,500 polling stations, prepared by Jesse Chacon, an asso- with the law face stiff fines and other many in districts that are deeply ciate and former minister under punitive measures. Such a backlash loyal to Chávez. Also on October 7, Chávez, claiming that the incum- against the promotion of democracy the regime will deploy its final set of bent leads with 56 percent among is common with neo-authoritarian measures. those with the intention to vote, as regimes from Russia to and Winning Over the Electoral opposed to 29 percent for Capriles.60 Venezuela. Tribunal. The five-member Consejo With campaign messaging, a number Sparking Fear and Uncertainty. Nacional Electoral (CNE) is domi- of friendly polls, and extensive media Chávez freely provokes a climate of nated by pro-Chávez members who influence, Chávez seeks to project a fear: fear of losing benefits provided have managed to salvage a partial confident air of electoral invincibility by the state, fear that one’s vote is reputation for neutrality and objec- all the way to October 7. not secret, and fear that a vote for tivity.57 The CNE is credited for over- Questioning Secrecy of the the opposition will lead to disorder, seeing the referendum that Chávez Vote. The Venezuelan system of violence, and even civil war. While lost in December 2007 and not alter- electronic voting, according to the Chávez claims that he will respect ing the strong showing of the opposi- country’s electoral specialists, is pro- any outcome of the elections, he also tion in the 2010 legislative elections. tected against tampering. But voting claims that a Capriles victory would Despite that, however, its impartial- machines are connected to an anti- lead to social catastrophe and blood- ity is in question. Critics maintain fraud authentication system that shed. “If the right wing’s presidential that the CNE bends far too easily to requires a registered fingerprint to candidate gets into office,” Chávez the will of the president. In a close activate. Many Venezuelans harbor railed, “it would put an end to the contest, it is far from certain that the concerns about the system and the social programs promoted during 14 CNE would be able to resist pressure privacy of their ballots. Doubts about years of government, and as a result applied by Chávez and his supporters. the secrecy of the ballot could scare the country would enter into civil Presuming Victory. The Chávez voters, especially opposition voters, war.”55 Chávez’s brother Adan stated propaganda machine consistently away from the polls. in June 2011 that Bolivarian revolu- claims that Chávez’s polling lead is Limiting Electoral tionaries must be ready to consider insurmountable. In June, Chávez Observation. Following the 2006

54. Human Rights Watch, “Venezuela: Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil Society,” December 22, 2010, http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/22/venezuela- legislative-assault-free-speech-civil-society (accessed September 12, 2012). 55. “Chávez Says Election Loss Would Spark Civil War,” InterAmerican Security Watch, July 16, 2012, http://interamericansecuritywatch.com/chavez-says- election-loss-would-spark-civil-war/ (accessed September 11, 2012). 56. “Adán Chávez: La salida electoral no es la única vía,” Noticiero Digital, June 26, 2011, http://www.noticierodigital.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=779622 (accessed September 11, 2012). 57. International Crisis Group, “Dangerous Uncertainty Ahead of Venezuela’s Elections,” June 26, 2012, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/latin-america- caribbean/andes/venezuela/042-dangerous-uncertainty-ahead-of-venezuelas-elections.aspx (accessed September 12, 2012). 58. “Chávez Predicts Big Win in Venezuela Elections,” Chicago Tribune, June 19, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-06-19/news/sns-rt-us-venezuela- electionbre85j007-20120619_1_venezuela-election-datanalisis-venezuelan-president-hugo-chavez (accessed September 11, 2012). 59. Owen Richards, “Chávez Set for Win as Campaign Pushes Socialist Transformation,” Venezuelanalysis.com, August 20, 2012, http://venezuelanalysis.com/ analysis/7189 (accessed September 11, 2012). 60. Agencia Venezuela de Noticias, “GIS XXI: 56% of Venezuelan Voters Favor Hugo Chavez,” August 8, 2012, http://www.avn.info.ve/contenido/gis-xxi-56- venezuelan-voters-favor-hugo-chavez (accessed September 11, 2012).

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presidential election, Venezuela Venezuela permits voting over- Venezuelan history. The hopes of ended serious electoral observation seas in embassies and consulates. the opposition have recently been missions by the OAS, the European However, following the expulsion of bolstered by reputable polling data Union, and other groups, such as the Venezuela’s consul general in Miami that place Capriles either ahead of or Carter Center in the U.S. The CNE in January 2012, Chávez ordered the closing the gap between himself and now allows only electoral “compan- consulate closed. Despite appeals, Chávez.63 Emergent crises such as ions” invited primarily from friendly he has refused to reopen it in order the August PDVSA refinery fire, the groups such as the Union of South to punish the Venezuelan — collapse of key bridges, and restive- American Nations (UNASUR), which as many as 20,000—in Florida. To ness in some labor unions have also is currently led by a Venezuelan exercise their right to vote, they must tarnished the aura of triumph that chavista, Alí Rodriguez Araque. travel to the nearest open consulate Chávez had aimed to project.64 Since these companions arrive in New Orleans. When the polls close on October 7, mere days before elections and take Venezuela and the world will demand tours of polling places escorted by OBSTRUCTIONISM BY CHÁVEZ- swift, honest, and transparent vot- Venezuelan authorities who are also FRIENDLY OFFICIALS AND POTENTIAL ing results. Will Chávez deliver the charged with preapproving their massive knockout punch he has statements or reports, the electoral INTIMIDATION BY PRO-CHÁVEZ worked so assiduously to develop? companions lack international cred- BULLIES COULD SLOW OR NEGATE Will Chávez and his loyalists accept a ibility.61 On October 7, allegations of VOTES IN MANY DISTRICTS. narrow defeat? Will they risk domes- voting improprieties or fraud will tic and international disapproval by lack validation by impartial external Promoting Disinformation. manipulating the vote? A victory for observers. The Chávez regime plants stories Capriles also opens not only the issue Cheating and Disenfranchising about alleged opposition plans to of acceptance by Chávez and his fol- Voters. Opposition experts have contest the election outcome and dis- lowers, but also a number of transi- expressed concerns about the lack rupt the post-electoral civil order. On tion challenges that would pit the of a comprehensive audit of the vot- August 9, Chávez announced that a new executive against the Chávez- ing register and about the ease with “mercenary” carrying a U.S. passport dominated legislature, courts, which voter identifications have been had been arrested in Venezuela, add- unions, and armed forces. issued, possibly resulting in dupli- ing matter of factly that “a group of cate voter documents and nonciti- the bourgeoisie is preparing to reject U.S. Policy: Defend zens being able to vote. On October 7, the people’s triumph…and [will] try Democracy and the the geographic distribution of polling to plunge the country into a politi- Vote in Venezuela stations—with higher numbers in cal crisis and fill the country with In recent years, U.S. influence pro-Chávez strongholds—and over- violence.”62 and presence in Latin America have crowding and inefficiency in pro- October Surprise. Despite the diminished noticeably. Challenges cessing registered voters will affect four-step Chávez strategy out- to democracy, the increased strate- voting. Obstructionism by Chávez- lined above, opposition candidate gic presence of China, Russia, and friendly officials and potential Capriles, the MUD, and millions Iran, and deep divisions in the inter- intimidation by pro-Chávez bullies of Venezuelans sincerely believe American system have characterized could slow or negate votes in many that they still have a real opportu- adverse trends in the region. A strat- districts. nity to win and alter the course of egy of American leadership requires

61. Ruben M. Perina, “The Future of Electoral Observation,” Americas Quarterly, Spring 2012, http://americasquarterly.org/perina (accessed September 11, 2012). 62. Christopher Toothaker, “Chávez: U.S. Mercenary Arrested in Venezuela,” The Huffington Post, August 9, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/10/ venezuela-arrests-us-citizen_n_1763827.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 63. “Venezuela’s Presidential Campaign: Gaining Ground,” The Economist, August 24, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/08/ venezuela%E2%80%99s-presidential-campaign (accessed September 11, 2012). 64. Jim Wyss, “Venezuela’s Chávez Faces New Election Threat—a Run of Calamities,” The Miami Herald, August 29, 2012, http://www.miamiherald. com/2012/08/29/2975215/venezuelas-chavez-faces-new-election.html (accessed September 11, 2012).

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a reaffirmation of U.S. commitments naming of senior Venezuelan officials What Needs to Be Done to deeply rooted interests and values. as drug kingpins has curbed Chávez’s October 7 and the Venezuelan These interests and values must be enthusiasm for anti-American presidential elections represent supported by policies that actively behavior.65 a strategic crossroads in Latin defend representative democracy, The Obama Administration, America. U.S. interests and val- human rights, economic freedom, moreover, has done little to focus ues stand in clear opposition to shared security, and a strong inter- a spotlight on Chávez’s misdeeds, chavismo and the growing blend of American system. claiming that verbal sparring and authoritarianism, criminality, and Under the Obama Administration, confrontations reflect an unproduc- anti-Americanism that seeks a per- the U.S. has offered no comprehen- tive “Cold War” or Manichean view manent foothold in Venezuela. The sive strategy or policy for dealing of relations and only add fuel to the only sound policy option for the U.S. with Venezuela and Hugo Chávez. Venezuelan leader’s anti-U.S. bonfire. is one that fully supports democ- On taking office, the Administration The Administration has been unable racy and stands in opposition to the made it clear that it was looking to build any sort of coalition critical march toward a populist dictator- for improvement in relations with of the deterioration of democratic ship in Venezuela. Chávez after U.S.–Venezuela ten- governance under Chávez in the sions during the Bush years. Modest OAS, and democratic nations such as UNDER THE OBAMA attempts at engagement—a hand- largely ignore the deteriorat- ADMINISTRATION, THE U.S. HAS shake between President Obama and ing conditions of democracy.66 Even Chávez at the first Summit of the Colombian President Juan Manuel OFFERED NO COMPREHENSIVE Americas in April 2009 and agree- Santos has downplayed his nation’s STRATEGY OR POLICY FOR DEALING ment to a return of ambassadors to concern about the state of democracy WITH VENEZUELA AND HUGO both countries—failed to influence or in Venezuela and ties with FARC in CHÁVEZ. alter Chávez’s behavior. an effort to advance a peace deal and In June 2009, the Obama maintain advantageous commercial Administration initially joined forces relations. Right now, the Obama with Venezuela to denounce the As recently as July 2012, President Administration can still focus U.S. removal of President Manuel Zelaya Obama said that “overall my sense is and international attention on the from office in Honduras in what that what Mr. Chávez has done over Venezuelan electoral process, espe- appeared to be a Chávez-inspired the last several years has not had a cially its lack of fairness and trans- power grab, and it was unprepared serious national security impact on parency. The Administration should for the firestorm of anti-American- us.”67 This readiness to minimize the protect and defend the ability of ism unleashed by Chávez when the nature of the security threat that the Venezuelans to cast their ballots U.S. signed a defense cooperation Chávez regime poses in the Americas without hindrance, in secrecy and agreement with Colombia in August has also helped to generate a sense without fear of reprisals. It should 2009. Chávez rejected President of complacency, both among neigh- exercise all possible vigilance to Obama’s nominee as U.S. ambas- bors and in the U.S. Also, the October monitor and, if necessary, validate sador to Venezuela in 2010. Neither elections, especially during a crisis, claims of fraud. modest sanctions on PDVSA for oil could become an unwanted intrusion To defend democracy in Venezuela sales to Iran in May 2011 nor the during the U.S. re-election campaign. while advancing U.S. interests and

65. On “Venezuela’s Sanctionable Activities,” see testimony of Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism; Kevin Whitaker, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs; and Thomas Delare, Director of the Office of Terrorist Finance and Economic Sanctions Policy, Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State, before the Joint House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Homeland Defense and Foreign Operations and House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere and Subcommittee on the and South Asia, June 24, 2011, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/112/ben062411.pdf (accessed September 11, 2012). 66. Diego Ore, “Brazilian Strategists Star in Venezuela Election,” Reuters, July 9, 2012, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48121689/ns/world_news-americas/t/ brazilian-strategists-star-venezuela-election/#.UD-QfSK0aDl (accessed September 11, 2012). 67. Patricia Mazzei and Erika Bolstad, “Mitt Romney, GOP Howl over President Barack Obama’s Remark About Hugo Chávez,” The Miami Herald, July 11, 2012, http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/07/11/2891728/republicans-attack-obama-for-chavez.html (accessed September 11, 2012).

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values, the Obama Administration the State Department to assemble ■■ Develop an aggressive, proac- should: a high-level working group of tive plan of action. October 8 analysts, congressional staff, aca- will mark the starting point for ■■ Support Venezuelan civil demics, and electoral experts to one of two courses: either one of society. Despite restrictive monitor and evaluate the election sustained cooperation and sup- Venezuelan laws, the U.S. should and its outcome. port for the restoration of democ- increase its democracy assistance racy in Venezuela or one of tough, to civil society and NGOs by work- ■■ Heed early warning signs proactive responses to Chávez’s ing to train domestic electoral of violence and instabil- promised radicalization. Potential observers, encourage voter partic- ity. The Administration should policy tools for leverage include ipation, coordinate collection and closely monitor the situation in visa denials, further Treasury des- tabulation of voting results, and Venezuela on October 7 for evi- ignations of corrupt Venezuelan urge all polling stations to report dence of incitement to violence by officials, financial and trade sanc- electoral infractions to the CNE political parties, harassment of or tions, interdiction of Venezuelan and the MUD. harm to opposition figures, repri- vessels and aircraft used to sals against voters, distribution of transport drugs, the designation ■■ Conduct systematic public arms to militias, and increases in of Venezuela as a state sponsor of diplomacy. The Administration politically-related violence. terrorism, and an embargo on the should prepare a public diplomacy purchase of Venezuelan oil. All of brief examining the erosion of ■■ Establish a coalition for these tools should be considered democracy and the unfair advan- Venezuelan democracy. The U.S. in the event of , tages accumulated by Chávez. It should employ active diplomacy to significant electoral violence, or should report the fact that elector- establish a coalition of democratic hostile acts contrary to U.S. secu- al conditions are far from fair. leaders—one that could certain- rity interests. ly include , , ■■ Reaffirm principles of democ- , , , the United Conclusion racy. President Obama and Kingdom, and others—to act in Hugo Chávez is by nature a dema- Secretary Clinton should speak unison in case of fraud or violence. gogic populist, nationalist, and mili- out on democratic principles and tary-minded leader who believes that the commitment to full democra- ■■ Continue support for democra- history has assigned him a mission to cy, not merely holding elections, in cy. Although the defeat of Capriles convert a representative democracy the Americas, highlighting what is would clearly demoralize many and free-market economy into a one- at stake in Venezuela, urging citi- Venezuelans, the U.S. must none- party, authoritarian, socialist state. zen participation and transpar- theless continue to offer sustained His goal is to crush the opposition ency, and holding Chávez account- support for civil society, a free with a winner-take-all approach. able for the preservation of peace. press, free labor unions, and other If the people of Venezuela reject voices for liberty and preserve the this somber plan for the future and ■■ Dispatch U.S. observers. The resilience of a unified opposition vote to return the country to a more U.S. embassy in Caracas should for future elections. democratic course, it is vital that the send its staff in a systematic U.S. stand as a leader in support of a fashion to monitor the elections ■■ Appoint a high-level Cuba/ transition to democracy, rule of law, on October 7, and Washington Venezuela Mission Director. and economic and personal liberty. If should assign additional State The position of Cuba/Venezuela Chávez prevails, as he is confident he Department officers to temporary Mission Director in the Office of will, the U.S. needs to prepare for the duty in Caracas. the National Intelligence Director increasingly dangerous consequenc- should be filled with a senior-level es of a radicalized, despotic, anti- ■■ Call for bipartisan monitoring. official with responsibility for all American leader with six more years The Administration should call on ALBA countries. to make the Bolivarian Revolution

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and socialism of the 21st-century irreversible. —Ray Walser, PhD, is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

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