BACKGROUNDER No. 2729 | SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 The Chávez Plan to Steal Venezuela’s Presidential Election: What Obama Should Do Ray Walser, PhD Abstract n October 7, 2012, some 18 mil- On October 7, 2012, Venezuela’s Olion Venezuelan voters will Key Points Hugo Chávez will stand for re- choose between the incumbent election against opposition candidate president, Hugo Chávez, and the uni- ■■ The October 7 presidential elec- Henrique Capriles. The Venezuelan fied opposition candidate Henrique tions in Venezuela pit anti-Amer- ican authoritarian incumbent presidential election matters to the Capriles Radonski. Chávez, president Hugo Chávez against democratic U.S.: Venezuela is a major oil supplier since 1999, seeks an unprecedented opposition candidate Henrique to the U.S.; Chávez’s anti-American third six-year term and the chance to Capriles. worldview has led to alliances with make Venezuela’s march to social- ■■ Venezuela’s presidential election Iran, Syria, and Cuba; and Chávez ism and a dominant-party state affects U.S. interests: Venezuela offers safe havens to FARC and irreversible. is a major oil supplier to the U.S., Hezbollah. Chávez also works to The contrast of forces is stark: and Chávez’s anti-Americanism weaken democratic governance a populist, charismatic autocrat has led to alliances with Iran, throughout the Americas. Under the against his polar opposite. Capriles, Syria, and Cuba and safe havens Obama Administration, the U.S. has former governor of the state of for FARC and Hezbollah. offered no comprehensive strategy Miranda and winner of a February ■■ Chávez is pursuing a multistep or policy for dealing with the man presidential primary, represents a strategy aimed at securing his who continuously demonstrates his unified democratic opposition with a re-election that is far from fair. If ruthlessness in implementing an constructive program for the return re-elected, he vows to crush the anti-American, socialist, Bolivarian to liberal democracy. Venezuelans opposition and make socialist rule irreversible. Revolution across the Americas, but must choose between further there is still time for the U.S. to descent into authoritarianism, ■■ Despite the regime’s abuse of the support democratic freedoms before archaic socialism, and official anti- advantages of incumbency, the democratic opposition believes it the election. Americanism and a return to repre- has a chance to win, return liberal sentative democracy, adherence to democracy to Venezuela, and free-market principles, and recovery This paper, in its entirety, can be found at improve relations with the U.S. of the rule of law and transparency, http://report.heritage.org/bg2729 ■■ The Obama Administration Produced by the Douglas and Sarah Allison as well as improved relations with should play a more active role 1 Center for Foreign Policy Studies the U.S. For the opposition, October in monitoring the elections, The Heritage Foundation 7 may represent the last stand supporting fair and free voter 214 Massachusetts Avenue, NE Washington, DC 20002 against Chávez’s tightening authori- participation, and preparing con- (202) 546-4400 | heritage.org tarian noose. tingency plans for a contested Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily The Venezuelan presidential and possibly violent election reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or outcome. as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill election matters to the U.S. With before Congress. oil reserves equal to those of Saudi BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2729 SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 Arabia, Venezuela is a major oil sup- process and the deterioration of legitimacy. Yet after 13 years in office, plier to the U.S. Chávez’s anti-Amer- democratic governance in Venezuela. it is clear that Chávez—his mindset, ican worldview has led to alliances Before October 7, President instinct, and ideology—is the polar with Iran, Syria, and Cuba, all state Barack Obama and Secretary of opposite of a true democrat. The sponsors of terrorism. Venezuela State Hillary Clinton should deliv- 58-year-old ex-soldier and leader offers safe havens to the narcoter- er strong messages of support for of a 1992 military coup attempt rorist Revolutionary Armed Forces democracy and against dictatorship has become an outsized strong- of Colombia (FARC) and the Islamist in Venezuela. Given the absence man (caudillo) on a messianic mis- terrorists of Hezbollah. Chávez also of serious international electoral sion to transform Venezuela into a works to weaken democratic gover- observation, the U.S. should support Bolivarian utopia.2 nance throughout the Americas. active civil society participation and Chávez is taking few chances. domestic electoral monitoring. From OCTOBER 7 REPRESENTS A CRITICAL His electoral strategy consists of dispatching extra State Department JUNCTURE. THE U.S. NEEDS TO four distinctive steps: (1) exploit personnel for observation on the the advantages of an uneven elec- ground to creating a bipartisan EMPLOY ALL AVAILABLE DIPLOMATIC toral playing field that highly favors group of experts to monitor the elec- TOOLS TO FOCUS ATTENTION NOT the incumbent; (2) conceal critical tions and prepare a comprehensive ONLY ON THE VOTING, BUT ALSO information needed to inform voter post-election report, the U.S. can ON THE FUNDAMENTAL LACK decision-making; (3) conduct an offer a serious assessment of whether OF FAIRNESS IN THE ELECTORAL inflammatory campaign aimed at the elections were genuinely free and deepening polarization and incit- fair. PROCESS AND THE DETERIORATION ing fears; and (4) tilt the process in Beyond October 7, the U.S. needs OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN his favor on election day. As a savvy a well-prepared contingency strategy VENEZUELA. operative, Chávez knows that the for dealing with potential violence best electoral outcome is one that is and governability issues in case of a determined—perhaps rigged or sto- Chávez loss or post-electoral disor- Chávez is aggressive, obsessive, len—before voters even arrive at the ders. If Chávez wins, the U.S. cannot and often paranoid. He self-identifies polls. abandon the millions of Venezuelans with Jesus Christ, Fidel Castro, and, Despite powerful and unfair dis- who cast their votes against an above all, South America’s “great lib- advantages, Capriles and the opposi- increasingly authoritarian regime erator,” Simon Bolivar. tion still believe they have a genuine that promises to curtail individual Chávez’s quest to spread socialism shot at winning. While polling data liberty, throttle economic freedom, and the Bolivarian Revolution is the are inconsistent, the race appears to and endanger the security of every- core of what is referred to as chavis- be tighter than initially predicted, one living in the Americas. It also mo. His socialism of the 21st century and the closer the race, the greater needs to plan for longer-term intelli- promises social justice and a perma- the temptation for Chávez to cheat. gence assessments and possible puni- nent rupture with “savage” capital- Currently, the U.S. lacks a com- tive countermeasures if Chávez’s ism, an end of the bourgeois state, prehensive strategy for the Chávez anti-American activities continue. and neo-liberal economics to achieve phenomenon or the upcoming elec- autonomous or “endogenous” growth. tions. October 7 represents a critical 21st-Century Socialism, Its chief elements are ever-increasing juncture at which the U.S. needs to the Bolivarian Revolution, state ownership of natural resources employ boldly all available diplomat- and Anti-Americanism and control of the means of produc- ic tools to focus attention not only on Although governing increas- tion through nationalization, con- the voting, but also on the fundamen- ingly as an autocrat, Chávez clearly fiscations, and collectivization. The tal lack of fairness in the electoral counts on the perception of electoral private sector is slowly asphyxiated, 1. Juan Forero, “Latin America’s New Authoritarians,” The Washington Post, July 22, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/2012/07/22/ gJQAMdtD3W_story.html (accessed September 11, 2012). 2. For good background on Hugo Chávez, see Michael Shifter, “What to Read on Venezuela,” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/ readinglists/what-to-read-on-venezuela (accessed September 11, 2012). 2 BACKGROUNDER | NO. 2729 SEPTEMBER 19, 2012 while private property rights are degraded. The Bolivarian Revolution: Key Features of Chavismo In the long run, the Chávez • Personality-centered; power increasingly concentrated in executive’s brand of socialism aims to wean hands.5 Venezuelan workers and managers • Reduced horizontal accountability (diminished checks and balances); from profit-seeking habits to build power is unitary in an increasingly politicized, polarized state. an economy of solidarity, happi- • Power/influence/wealth of state freely used to build a permanent major- ness, and humanistic values. As ity under a dominant “revolutionary” party.6 long as a competitive private sector • Control, restriction, and sanction of media without formal censorship. exists, Venezuela’s economy will be • “Autocratic legalism” that allows selective sanctioning and punishment of far too capitalist for Chávez’s tastes. opponents. Venezuela’s 21st-century future • Restriction of opposition nongovernmental organizations and civil soci- increasingly looks like Cuba’s 20th- ety; elimination of foreign support and funding. century Communist past. • Speaking on behalf of poor while building