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Iran's Shi`A Reach out to Mainstream Salafists

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Iran's Shi`A Reach out to Mainstream Salafists JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 Iran’s Shi`a Reach Out to design to make inroads into the Arab urged the Shi`a to rethink some of the Sunni world. The 2006 war effectively sect’s beliefs and practices, maintaining Mainstream Salafists hastened the deterioration in relations that unless re-examination first occurs between Shi`a and Sunnis, the old-age among the Shi`a the gap with the Sunnis By Alex Vatanka rift that had been violently rejuvenated will only widen. “You can see how following the fall of Saddam Hussein much Sunnis refer to the exaggerated the iranian state, politically and in Iraq. As with previous pan-Muslim statements in our books and traditions, spiritually led by Shi`a Ayatollah Ali gatherings in Tehran, the claim of and accordingly call us pagans,” he said. Khamenei, is publicly unwavering in the Iranian organizers was to provide “There are plenty of such statements,” its commitment to forge unity among a forum to generate debate among and unless “corrective measures are Muslim countries. Tehran is again Muslims of different sects and continue implemented the Sunnis will retain the reaching out to Arab adherents of to push for a charter on Islamic unity. opinion that Shi`a are apostates because Salafism and Wahhabism, the historical According to Iran’s state-funded Press they see their [Shi`a] imams as gods, antagonists of the Shi`a. Khamenei TV, the charter has already been signed which is not the case.” Rafsanjani also has declared the present Iranian year by 2,000 Muslim scholars, a key facet urged Shi`a to refrain from “insulting (ending March 2009) as the Year of of which is the rejection of takfirism, [the] Prophet’s disciples, the four National Unity and Islamic Solidarity. a school of thought among hard line caliphs and those who are regarded as Iran’s rival for leadership in the Islamic Sunnis that considers Shi’ism as heresy saints by Sunnis.”5 world, Saudi Arabia, is also emphasizing and sanctions violence against the the necessity of religious dialogue. Two latter.2 Advancing the need to curtail recent pan-Islamic conferences held in unorthodox Shi`a traditions and Tehran in May and in Mecca in June The conference in Tehran was practices has been a constant feature of were aimed at lessening intra-Muslim chaired by Ayatollah Mohammad Ali the theological debate in Iran, and pre- differences, although in both instances Taskhiri, Iran’s director-general of dates the present Islamist government scant explicit measures to achieve this the World Forum for the Proximity of that came to power in 1979. In recent objective were produced. Islamic Schools of Thought. Taskhiri, years, however, the urgency has handpicked for the position by mounted, at least in the eyes of those In practice, Shi`a-majority Iran Ayatollah Khamenei, courted Salafist clergy who are loyal to the concept of and its Arab Sunni neighbors are at participation for the event and spoke the Shi`a velayat-e faqih (Guardianship best reluctant, and at worst unable, of similar efforts having reduced Sunni of Jurisprudent) and the model of the to agree on a path to religious “misunderstandings” of Shi`a beliefs Islamic Republic. This is due to the rise reconciliation between Islam’s two and practices and particularly in regard of the popularity of Islamic mysticism largest branches. Much of the recent to Pakistani Sunnis.3 At the event, no in Iran, and the emergence of Shi`a publicized enthusiasm for dialogue senior Salafist/Wahhabi clerics were practices among some rural and poor among Islam’s various sects is above all present, although there were Arab urban communities in Iran that put driven by political motivations aimed Salafist participants from countries emphasis on revering Imams `Ali, at containing sectarian violence in the such as Kuwait, the United Arab Husayn or Hasan, and Fatima al-Zahra, Middle East. Genuine Islamic accord, Emirates and Saudi Arabia. the Prophet’s daughter. A number of particularly among Shi`a and Sunnis, Iranian Shi`a clergy have spoken against would require the full backing of senior Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Iran’s such trends, and warn that it effectively religious authorities, but this has not president from 1989-1997, and presently amounts to kufr (disbelief), as in Islam been forthcoming. chairman of two of Iran’s most powerful no human being should be worshipped.6 political institutions—the Assembly of Salafists Travel to Iran Experts and the Expediency Council— 5 See summary of speech by Voice of the Islamic Repub- From May 4-6, 2008, the Iranian devoted his address to the gathering on lic of Iran, Tehran, May 9, 2008. For a relatively recent authorities hosted some 850 Muslim likely rewards Muslim countries could Shi`a critique of the Wahhabi sect, see Hamid Algar, clerics (ulama) and intellectuals from garner if they overcame internal strife Wahhabism: A Critical Essay (New York: Islamic Publica- st 45 countries in Tehran for the 21 4 and isolated extremists. On May 9, tions International, 2002). Note that Algar makes an un- annual Islamic Unity Conference.1 Rafsanjani continued the same line, by ambiguous distinction between “Salafism” and “Wahha- The initiative had first been touted by stating in a sermon that “the extremist bism,” and it is the latter that is the target of his censure. Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Shi`a and Sunnis are separating two 6 Shi`a Muslims hold the following five people above Mottaki, in December 2006 who then important sections of the Muslim all others: Prophet Muhammad, Fatima al-Zahra (his stated that “the Islamic Republic world,” which is a “waste,” but that if daughter), his son-in-law and cousin, `Ali, and his of Iran has always called for unity anything “disagreements in the Muslim grandsons Hasan and Husayn. See Vali Nasr, The Shia among Muslims.” Mottaki’s pledge world are increasing.” He then notably Revival (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006). For an in- was political and made on the back of teresting sermon on Sunni perceptions of Shi`a on this accusations by Sunni states that the 2 “Iran to Host Islamic Unity Conference,” Press TV, matter, see Hojjat-ol Eslam Mehdi Daneshmand at www. summer 2006 war between Hizb Allah May 4, 2008. youtube.com/watch?v=_HOvsFspC3M&amp. Danesh- and Lebanon was an Iranian and Shi`a 3 “Salafi Scholars Can Also Express Their Opinions in mand decries some Shi`a practices that have emerged Iran,” Fars News Agency, May 1, 2008. in Iran, such as Shi`a ceremonial chanting that equates 1 “International Islamic Unity Conference Starts in Teh- 4 “Criticizing the Extremism of the Islamic World,” Imam Husayn with Allah, suggesting that they amount ran,” Islamic Republic News Agency, May 4, 2008. Etemad’e Melli, May 5, 2008. to kufr or the rejection of the oneness of Allah, and which JUNE 2008 . VOL 1 . ISSUE 7 In relation to Sufism, or Islamic mystic While the tough worded letter was a mere King Abdullah is engaged in a struggle sects, the state views their unorthodox re-statement of a sentiment prevalent of his own with radical Wahhabi clergy and unregulated religious practices as among Saudi Wahhabis, it was issued and their sympathizers in the kingdom. a challenge to the theocratic regime’s only three days before the opening of Nonetheless, the intended political monopoly on religious authority and an inter-faith dialogue conference held message in Mecca was palpable. At guidance, which it deems to basically by King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia in the opening ceremony, King Abdullah underpin its political legitimacy. Islam’s holy city of Mecca between walked into the conference hall with June 4-7. Bringing together some 500 Rafsanjani, who later sat on the king’s Since 2006, for example, Iran has Islamic scholars and academics, the left on the center stage, interpreted by witnessed a number of government Mecca-based Muslim World League Saudi media to signal that the Wahhabi crackdowns on Sufi orders, the first of (MWL), which organized the event, had kingdom does not have a problem with which occurred in the holy Shi`a city hoped the initiative would represent moderate Shi`a.12 of Qom in February 2006 when around 200 people were hurt in clashes between “Much of the recent Conclusion police, Islamist Basiji militias and Sufi In the final analysis, in neither Tehran disciples. Another Sufi place of worship publicized enthusiasm for nor Mecca did the attendees produce belonging to the Nimatullahi order was dialogue among Islam’s tangible action plans to facilitate razed to the ground on November 11, Shi`a-Sunni unity. This is a reflection 2007 in the western city of Boroujerd. various sects is above of the level of suspicion and doctrinal Official media reported that the clashes all driven by political divide, which is exacerbated due to the came after adherents attacked a Shi`a geopolitical rivalry of Iran and Sunni mosque whose clerics had been publicly motivations aimed at Arab states particularly since 2003.13 condemning Sufism over the minaret containing sectarian At the same time as Saudi Shi`a were loudspeakers.7 effectively facing disfranchisement in violence in the Middle relation to the Mecca conference, there Others Issue an Anti-Shi`a Letter East.” were reports of arrests of Sunni clergy Regardless of the nature of its in Iran’s Kordestan and Balochistan motivations, Iranian pleas for Islamic provinces, and fear that the United unity made little impression on some Arab Emirates is financing the spread of Saudi Arabia’s most senior Wahhabi Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah in of Wahhabism in southern Iran.
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