KING ABDULLAH’S GAME: AUTOCRATS AND GLOBALIZED INTERESTS

A thesis submitted to the Kent State University Honors College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for University Honors

by

Sarah Jane Krisanda

May, 2013

Thesis written by

Sarah Jane Krisanda

Approved by

______, Advisor

______, Chair, Department of Political Science

Accepted by

______, Dean, Honors College

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS……………………………………………………………….v

CHAPTER

I. INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………...1

II. CONTEXT……………………………………………………………….14

III. INTEREST COALITION MODEL……………………………………...32

IV. ISLAMIC INTEREST COALITION NETWORK……………………...40

V. STATUS QUO INTEREST COALITION NETWORK………………...50

VI. REFORM INTEREST COALITION NETWORK……………………...56

VII. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………..71

REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………..74

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LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE 1………………………………………………………………………………..37

FIGURE 2………………………………………………………………………………..41

FIGURE 3………………………………………………………………………………..56

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis is a product of two years of laughter, tears, triumph, pain, and a whole lot of helpful people. I want to thank Virginia, David, and John Krisanda for their unconditional love and support. Thanks to my entire family for all your prayers and encouragement.

Thank you, Hamish Wallace and all my brothers from Alpha Phi Omega for everything. Thank you Jamie Johnson, Melisa Michael, and Victoria Sack for bringing me tea every time I pulled an all-nighter. I could not ask for better friends.

Many thanks go to Jeanne Smith and Gina DeNardi. I appreciate all of the guidance you have given me about writing and life. You kept me sane, and you forever changed the way I think about learning. Thank you for always believing in me.

I appreciate the scholars of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for

Scholars. Special thanks go to Dr. Frances Trix and Dr. David Ottaway. It has been a pleasure. Thank you, also, to Dr. Richard Robyn and the Washington Program in

National Issues class of 2013.

I have learned how to find the right answers at Kent State University, but one person taught me how to ask the right questions. Ahmed, thank you for your stories. You are the reason I began this thesis.

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Thank you, Dr. Joshua Stacher, Dr. Sara Newman, and Dr. Patti Dunmire. I appreciate all of your patience and your willingness to work with me. The passion you each have for knowledge and learning made my thesis worth writing.

My greatest appreciation goes out to Dr. Julie Mazzei. Without her, I never would have completed this project. In fact if her first class had not introduced me to the interesting side of politics, I never would have pursued a political science degree. Mazzei,

I can never thank you enough for all you have done for me. For all the emails you replied to at four in the morning, for all the times you put up with my hysterics, for every moment you asked me to consider a different idea, and for every time you expanded my world, I thank you.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The escalation of the Arab Awakening has raised doubts as to whether the autocracies of the Middle East will be able to survive much longer. Uprisings have torn through the Middle East, rejecting repressive governments. As each new country rises up against its government, we are all left asking, “who’s next?” Most of the world turned a blind eye to authoritarianism, human rights abuses and social issues in the oil-producing countries of this region as long as the oil kept flowing. The world believed that even though the living conditions for the people of these countries were not ideal, the regimes were at least stable and would continue to export oil. Now that the stability of so many of these regimes has been rattled, it is critical to understand why some regimes have fallen and others have not.

In an increasingly globalized society, the recent upheaval affects our entire world’s dynamic. The Middle East exerts a unique kind of influence on the world stage.

Because the Middle East holds some of the largest stores of oil, its countries are vitally important in the global economy. The conservatism of the region’s social and cultural life is highly publicized for its slow crawl towards reform. Politically, the Middle East represents a collection of autocracies, and it is infamous for its isolated extremism. Saudi

Arabia is unique even among other Middle Eastern states.

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Saudi Arabia, as a crucial source of oil for the United States and other countries, is particularly important on the world stage. It maintains an appearance of relative stability among uprisings in Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, but this stability should not be taken for granted. Saudi Arabia possesses characteristics similar to the political environments in the aforementioned countries, but its governance is handled with an elevated finesse. Not only is the government different, the society has a deeply imbedded tradition that sets it apart from the region. To understand the reasons Saudi

Arabia is different from the rest of the Middle East, political scientists’ understanding of stability maintenance needs to be re-contextualized. Today, political, economic, social, and cultural interests from around the globe intersect and are challenging the way we think about analysis. The structure of analysis used by international political analysts is outdated, and its resulting conclusions skew our interpretation of Saudi Arabia and our world.

How does King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia manage both domestic and global interests to maintain the survival of his regime? In this study, I will attempt to explain how Saudi Arabia has balanced global integration and societal isolation to maintain its stability. In the process, I will explain why current methodologies are no longer adequate to analyze the decision-making factors of governance and propose a revised theoretical model in response to the increasing trend of globalization. I will use the case of Saudi

Arabia as a framework to focus on the ways in which autocratic leaders have adapted to the globalized demands placed upon them.

Literature Review

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Current political analysis of international factors on domestic leaders’ actions examines the roles of political actors, namely, individuals, states, and systems. Political interactions among these actors shape the way in which policy decisions are made.

Individuals play a central role in policy making. Their behavior is influenced by many internal factors like their characters, ideologies, irrationalities, idiosyncrasies, and experiences. These internal factors contribute to the interactions individuals have with other individuals, and these interactions shape international relations (Rourke & Boyer,

2010).

Another level of political analysis focuses on the ways states interact with each other. The global governance system recognizes that state sovereignty is central to political interactions. This means that states retain the right to their individual authority, and they act as distinct political actors. States contain similar internal influences in the form of societal norms, government structures, and national contexts. These characteristics affect the ways in which they interact with the international community

(Rourke & Boyer, 2010).

System-level analysis examines the restraints on international relations. It focuses on the structures of interactions among political actors. Systems are affected by the organization of authority and the nature of relationships among actors. The economic and political contexts of international relations influence the ways political actors interact and form policy, and system-level analysis focuses on the ways context and relationships affect global politics (Rourke & Boyer, 2010). These three “levels of analysis” are falling short of fully examining political interaction. I argue here that utilizing these distinct

4 levels of analysis in scholarship has been made obsolete due to globalization, which has blurred the lines between actors in the different arenas.

Globalization takes many forms in the 21st century. Economic, social, political, technological, and cultural spheres are colliding and integrating. These spheres work together to form systems of cooperation. Globalization is the merging of peoples, economies, and ideologies, and it is transforming the way we think about politics (Brown,

2008; Lindholm & Olsson, 2011). Brown (2008) describes the evolution of globalization, writing, “prior globalizations were characterized by the obvious exploitative elements of military expansion and colonialism, [but] the current era of globalization has been brimming with promises for human development and global advancement” (p. 47). The evolution of technology and global capitalist markets has played a key role in enmeshing the ways in which international actors may influence domestic policy-makers.

Both economics and technology are changing the face of cosmopolitans’ social spheres1. The global market has brought people together as cosmopolitans, and technology has increased the speed with which people come in contact with each other.

Socially, “the global sphere can give rise to increased cultural understanding and resilience as well as create and aggregate tensions between national, social, and cultural groups” (Lindholm and Olsson, 2001, p. 225). As tensions grow, transnational actors form networks of interests, which shape global movements.

The globalization of political and economic systems results in an individual’s heightened sense of their human condition and relationship with the rest of the world

1Mary Kaldor (2006) defines a cosmopolitan as a global citizen. Globalization has produced multiple, overlapping identities for humanity. Cosmopolitans believe in a certain sense of universalism, identifying with other peoples while still recognizing the heterogeneity of the world.

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(Kaldor, 2006). The changes caused by global interaction can force a government to respond with economic and political reform or restructuring. However, this poses a threat to reforming governments as Gill (1995) explains, “restructuring along market-driven lines tends to generate a…pervasive disenchantment with conventional political practice”

(p. 420). Globalization has begun to influence the political and economic systems of

Saudi Arabia, and King Abdullah has had to respond to this influence by taking into account the resulting threats to his rule. Leaders of countries are forced to confront worldwide expectations, perceptions, and demands to protect their political survival.

They apply strategic theories to approach potential cooperation with global trends and demands.

Currently, two level game theory is an analytic framework used to understand global interaction among political actors and the way this interaction impacts policy.

Two-level game theory explains that international politics affects domestic politics and that domestic politics affects international politics. The theory frames negotiations in a model that accounts for decisions made in each sphere, as well as the way in which negotiations at one level can impact outcomes at the other. Putnam (1988) quotes

Katzenstein writing, “‘The main purpose of all strategies of foreign economic policy is to make domestic policies compatible with the international political economy’” (p. 431).

He stresses that governments must account for domestic and international negotiations at the same time, and that negotiations with domestic actors may impact plausible outcomes with international actors, but these spheres’ negotiations are still distinct. They are characterized by specific groups of actors who make demands of leaders that must be taken into account during each round of negotiations. Putnam lays out a framework for

6 negotiations, which states that agreements are tentatively formed in one sphere and then separate discussions form tentative agreements in the other sphere while accounting for the first negotiation. Win-sets in one sphere can be adapted to meet the demands of the second sphere, and then re-negotiations occur until a mutual win-set can be reached

(Putnam, 1988).

The two-level game model analyzes how domestic politics and international politics become entangled, and they require a leader to consider both spheres of influence at the same time. Each sphere has a distinct group of power brokers where “domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies” and “at the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments” (Putnam, 1988, p. 434). Therefore, domestic actors have one set of demands while international actors have another set of demands. Leaders must account for both sets of demands at one time. While this model describes interaction between distinct spheres, it fails to accurately capture the negotiations transpiring in a globalized world. As noted above, political actors are now often transnational in nature, and thus their dynamic role in negotiation is not captured by two-level game theory. The model requires modification for contemporary use.

Regardless of the mode of analysis, political scientists agree that political survival is always the primary aim for a leader. The political survival of a leader is a quest for autonomy, security, and increased power, and it is to be defended from within the confines of society (Migdal, 1987; Gandhi, 2007, p. 1293). Migdal (1987) quotes Aristide

Zolberg who writes that for autocratic leaders, “‘The major problem is not too much

7 authority, but too little’” (p. 392). Autocrats must accumulate as much power as possible to secure their position.

Political scientists have called into question the sustainability of the monarchical government structure. However, the real question is not whether monarchies are more likely to survive than republics. The real question is, how will governments evolve?

Government institutions are undoubtedly changing in the Middle East, but the way in which a government evolves will determine how likely it is for a monarch to maintain power and how the monarch will be able to exert his power.

Huntington (1968) developed the concept of the “king’s dilemma” in which the king is faced with the choice between success and survival. He argues that in order for a king to pursue political, social, and economic reform, the king must centralize power, but this centralization limits the people’s political participation, which keeps a monarch from expanding power. As a result, the monarchy cannot survive.

Anderson (1991) builds on Huntington’s theory, claiming that monarchies are suitable governments during the state-formation process. She writes, “monarchs who have been able to sustain and build their own power are neither more nor less adept at the politics of state formation than their republican counterparts” (p. 14). However, once a state is formed, its government institutions continue to respond to its global environment.

Herb (1999) writes that the key to the survival of a monarchy is not merely the postponement of revolution, but the gradual liberalization of the political order. He claims, “monarchism appears to provide a sound institutional base for the incremental emergence of democratic institutions” (p. 15).

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Saudi Arabia has put a system in place that has allowed it to weather the regional social changes witnessed in the Arab Awakening (House, 2012; Teitelbaum, 2011a).

However the system is now being forced to respond to global pressures to reform. The future of the Saudi regime depends on the ways the government adapts to new transnational demands. The Saudi regime has balanced the status quo and demands for reform by controlling or suppressing certain interests and appeasing or promoting other interests.

To achieve political survival, leaders tread a thin line between controlling and appeasing power brokers (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Migdal, 1987). Current political scientists focus on power brokers, as specific actors, to determine what actions leaders should take to survive. Leaders must analyze the constellation of power brokers to determine their role in transnational politics. It is a constant struggle for autocrats to balance their influence, image, policies, and relationships. The power brokers’ influences can either serve the leader’s ability to stay in power or pose a heavy threat to him. This often requires the leader to balance severe suppression or appeasing reform for threatening power brokers. An autocrat must often negotiate concessions to meet the needs of powerful actors, but at the same time, leaders may use force to suppress those who are likely to unseat them (Putnam p. 440; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011).

To decide who threatens political survival, leaders must look to people who are not isolated from the political system. They will have resources and access to global influence (Ray, et al., 2003). Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) write, “Who makes revolution? It is the great in-between; those who are neither immiserated nor coddled.

The former are too weak and cowered to revolt. The latter are content and have no reason

9 to revolt” (p. 103). They later explain that political survival is based on the ways in which leaders handle the needs of “winning coalition” upon whom the regime is dependent and the “selectorate” who have a say in choosing and supporting their leader. In a successful authoritarian regime, the winning coalition is very small and the selectorate is large. The winning coalition poses a threat to autocrats so they should be made to believe that they are in a good position where they are and that they do not have the ability to achieve more power. The selectorate should believe that they could, at any time, replace those above them or be replaced by those below them (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011).

The globalization trend has more deeply integrated both levels of the game.

Putnam’s argument states that leaders must consider both spheres simultaneously, but I argue here that leaders make policy decisions based on global demands rather than marrying multiple agreements from different negotiations together. Autocrats now play the role of negotiators constantly, factoring in the coalitions advancing interests, rather than more atomized actors. Because they are under continuous global scrutiny, their every move must account for the demands of the world. For this reason, they must actually become the “embodiment” of interests. The current structures of analysis including the aforementioned levels of analysis and strategic game analysis fail to account for the transnational nature of demands placed upon a leader. The question becomes, which interests should a leader embody? This study will explain how King

Abdullah maintains his political survival and his regime’s stability utilizing a new model of analysis.

Interest Coalitions

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The way in which a modern leader negotiates a leader’s political survival depends upon how he approaches global interests. Global interests could include transnational trends regarding things like demands for a government’s institutional reform or interest in a leader’s stance on social issues. Leaders would respond to these interests to negotiate their political survival rather than focusing on an individual, state, or system’s analysis.

This way, the leader creates a strategic vision of his regime’s place in the future.

To determine how to maintain their political survival, leaders respond to interest coalitions. An interest coalition is a loose collection of political actors who share a common demand for a political leader. The actors that make up each coalition come from around the globe. They may or may not form unified relationships with each other, meaning that they may or my not recognize their common demand. An interest coalition influences a leader to respond to the shared demands of its member actors. These demands will be referred to as “interests” because of they represent an actor’s investment in a leader’s political survival. Interest coalitions represent the common ground of global political actors towards a particular leader.

Interest coalitions form networks of specific common goals. Using the example above, concern for government reform and social equality merge as “interests” in a few ways, for example in their demand for broader political participation for citizens and their demand for voters’ rights. The connections between these two interests strengthens the degree to which a leader should consider them while making decisions. To consider both, a leader should both pursue policy that promotes these interests and “embody” these interests. To embody and interest, a leader must be perceived as the solution to any problem, the answer to every demand, and the realization of any interest that actors have.

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The leader must become the image of governmental reform and social equality, and he must shape policy around both forces.

This is not to say that political actors do not play a role in influencing decision- making. Obviously without political actors, interest coalitions would not exist. However, the role of the actor has changed. Current analysis focuses on each actor separately, accounting for an organization’s interest or a government’s policy demands. However, I argue that each actor is now secondary to his or her interests. For example, a foreign actor may wish to pressure one government to take steps towards both technological research and education reform. The government should not respond directly to the foreign actor.

Rather the state should first respond to technological development as an interest and interests in institutions of education.

To respond to interests rather than actors, the government might ask, “how influential is the force of technological advancement on a global scale?” and “how influential is the force of education structures on a global scale?” There are multiple actors within the separate interest coalitions, but the actions of a leader would be based on the strength of the globalized demand rather than the concerns of individual actors.

The state could react positively towards demands for technological research and development and negatively toward education reform based on the strength of the demanding coalitions. Of course, the strength of the foreign actor’s demands does not carry equal weight. There are different factors that contribute to the strength of demands.

The groups pursuing interests like education reform and technological development form interest coalitions. These coalitions include many actors, but an actor could find him or herself in many different coalitions. The strength of each coalition

12 depends on three factors: the leverage of the coalition’s combined actors, misinformation among the actors within the coalition, and the cohesion of the coalition’s actors. One actor could belong to the technological development interest coalition and the education reform coalition. His or her cohesion with the other actors in the first coalition may be stronger then his or her cohesion with the actors in the second coalition. This gives the technological development coalition more strength on the global scale.

The Case of Saudi Arabia

I chose Saudi Arabia as a case study because it is deeply integrated in the global system and in global interests. Its economy is inextricable from Western countries because of the importance of oil exports for Saudi income (Ménoret, 2005). The global

Islamic community finds its center in Saudi Arabia, and the contact Saudis have with all different kinds of Muslims can change the way they perceive their religion and their world. Saudi citizens are also gaining access to the newest technologies and utilizing them to connect to the world. As a result of all of these factors, Saudis and cosmopolitans are forming new interests and placing new demands on their government.

The countries involved in the Arab Awakening are forming newly globalized interest coalitions. Saudi Arabia is forming these coalitions as well, but it has remained stable. King Abdullah has proven that he is a capable leader who can balance global interests in the face of transnational change and upheaval. I have chosen Saudi Arabia as a case study of globalized interest coalitions because it seems to be one of the remaining exceptions to the Arab Awakening movement. However, the regime could still fall, and it is up to the king to find ways to balance global interests so the monarchy remains stable.

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In this thesis, I will illustrate the application of my analysis model to Saudi

Arabia, looking specifically at the demands of the status quo and reform interest coalition networks. I will not claim that this model can be generalized to imply findings or conclusions beyond the case of Saudi Arabia. The status quo and reform interest coalition networks are not the only interest coalition networks that affect King Abdullah. These networks are also not entirely independent from each other, but separately they provide clear examples for my case study of my theoretical model. In chapter 2, I will outline the history, governmental system, and factors that affect the political system of Saudi Arabia.

In chapter 3, I will outline in detail the Interest Coalition Model. In chapter 4, I will apply the model to the Islamic interest coalition networks to provide an example of the impact networks have on the Saudi regime. In chapters 5 and 6, I will apply the same model to the reform interest coalition network and status quo interest coalition network, which oppose each other.

CHAPTER II

CONTEXT

History

Saudi Arabia’s historical roots lay in a negotiated agreement between the emir,

Muhammad ibn Saud of Diriya, and Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, an Islamic purist.

Al Saud led an emirate in Arabia. Wahhab was a religious man who had tried and failed to bring his message to other emirates before he met Saud. Wahhab’s mission was to reform Islam by returning to the teachings of the Qur’an and the Prophet. He found that he needed political backing to spread his message after failing to convert other emirates.

Similarly, Saud found that he needed religious backing to expand his power to legitimize his right to rule if he wanted to expand beyond his emirate (Al-Rasheed, 2003;

Champion, 2003; Darlow & Bray, 2010; Dekmejian, 1994)

The pair became mutually dependent upon each other to pursue their respective missions. Wahhab promised to assert that Saud was chosen by Allah to lead, and Saud promised to help disseminate Wahhab’s teachings. In 1744 they formalized their agreement, which instated Saud as the political leader granted that Wahhab was promised the final say on all religious beliefs and rules throughout the kingdom. The religious core of the country’s government affects the relationships Saudi Arabia has with international

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15 actors (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion, 2003; Darlow & Bray, 2010; Jones, 2010;

Ménoret, 2005).

Throughout the 1800s, British, Ottoman, and outlying Middle Eastern forces loomed as an overwhelming external threat. Additionally, the al Saud family faced inner factionalism, which weakened their hold on autonomous power. The country’s throne would change hands multiple times. Eventually, the Rashid family—a long-time rival of the al Saud family—claimed power in the early 1880s amidst bombardment from both the Ottomans and the British, and the al Saud were forced to flee. Abdulaziz—who would eventually come to be known as ibn Saud—spent a lot of time with the Bedouin of Al

Murra where his family settled. His time with them would expand his understanding of his constituents and give him the proper training and military backing he needed to recapture Riyadh on January 15, 1902. This signaled the start of the Modern Saudi State

(Champion, 2003; Darlow, 2010; Al Rasheed, 2003; Ménoret 2005).

Ibn Saud was very popular and adeptly appeased international threats to maintain a relatively peaceful rule. Though this analysis will eventually focus on King Abdullah’s rule, ibn Saud’s story provides a foundation to understand what negotiations of interest coalitions for political survival look like. This political aptitude will also characterize

Abdullah’s rule in the future. First, ibn Saud began a tradition of protectorates in which international actors would serve to protect the state in exchange for political allegiance.

While many of the country’s neighbors waged wars against the stronger international powers and the international empires waged wars against each other, Saudi Arabia maintained good relations with them. This is only one of the many ways Saudi Arabia has served as the exception to many rules in Middle Eastern states. (Vitalis, 2007).

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Second, after ibn Saud settled into relatively stable power after World War I, he negotiated a way to ground the Ikhwan—bedouin Wahhabi followers—in his control by persuading the tribes to establish farming settlements (Darlow, Jones, 2010; Ménoret,

2005). In 1929 the Ikhwan revolted, but ibn Saud was able to squash the rebellion with the help of his British protectorate. The Bedouin tribes rivaled the king’s power, and their military force, if left unchecked, could have overthrown the al Saud. Ibn Saud forced the nomads onto farming settlements. They lost their military prestige, and warriors would transform into hadari—settled farmers—who were entirely subordinate to the king’s central power (Jones, 2010; Ménoret, 2005).

Third, ibn Saud balanced the needs of those with religious priorities and those with priorities of modernization. He called for a discussion between ulema with contradictory doctrinal practices. Also, as established by Saudi tradition, he based his rule on the Qur’an and Sunna (Darlow 2010). He was so respected by the religious community that the first international Islamic Congress named him “Servant of the Holy

Places” (Ménoret, 2005) However, he did not believe that this restricted progress

(Darlow, 2010). He accepted foreign, mostly Western, networks into the country to show powerful Western economies their dependence on Saudi oil (Vitalis, 2009). Those with

Westernizing and modernizing interests were thrilled when ibn Saud created the country’s first cabinet; its membership was appointed in 1954 (Herb, 1999). His quest for political survival eventually led to the creation of the recognized Saudi Kingdom.

After much fighting between the two territories, ibn Saud united Hijaz and Najd

September 16, 1932 (Champion, 2003). He established the Qur’an as the country’s official constitution. His rule also promoted modernization as he organized the

17 construction of transportation infrastructure, creation of modern communication systems, introduced modern technology, and established programs to improve education, healthcare, and agriculture (Embassy).

King Saud ascended the throne in 1953 after the death of his father, but many threats to his position from within the family riddled his ascension and the full term of his rule (Herb, 1999). Unrest caused by oil workers also jeopardized his position. He created the Council of Ministers; the Ministries of Health, Education, Agriculture, and

Commerce; and he established the King Saud University. In 1957 he became the first king to visit the United States, which promoted his cosmopolitan and ecumenical approach to politics. He sponsored the international Islamic conference in 1962, which would be renamed the Muslim World League (Embassy; Jones, 2010).

Saud’s brother, Faisal, eventually forced Saud out of power in 1964 using the paramilitary National Guard against Saud’s Royal Guard (Herb, 1999; Jones, 2010).

Faisal was much more successful with promoting public approval, financial comfort, and progressivism. He projected pathos of extreme piety as a tool for public support (Jones,

2010). He developed a ten-point program meant to hear the interests of the people and respond to public pressure. The program focused on a developmental reform. He responded to his constituents by reforming while remaining a beacon of Islam and maintaining their material comfort. He asked foreign scientists to lead the development of his country (Jones, 2010). Faisal determined that modernization and development would be forces of “social and political harmony” (Jones, 2010, p. 83)

Today, Saudi Arabia’s oil resources are the primary concern of the international community and the driving force of the country’s domestic economy. Oil was not

18 discovered until 1932 at the dawn of the modern state of Saudi Arabia. The discovery of oil and its subsequent wealth transformed the nation into a wealthy rentier state. Citizens began to expect more from their government, and the government increased the patrimonial nature of their rule. At the same time, the discovery of oil introduced the international community to the citizens of Saudi Arabia. Foreign workers and foreign markets began to globalize the country (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion, 2003; Jones,

2010; Ménoret, 2005; Vitalis, 2009). Even throughout the development and evolution of the country, the partnership between ruler and ruled prevailed. Today, the king’s political survival is intact because citizens still depend on the regime for goods and services.

After World War II, globalization was an undeniable force that put Saudis in contact not only with the outside world but also in deeper contact with each other and the first generations of cosmopolitans emerged. The first strike against oil companies began in Riyadh during Ramadan of 1942, but they picked up after the war. Strikes hit oil companies hard as workers encountered new cultures through foreign workers and radio broadcasts. The government and oil companies responded with brute force to keep workers in line and oil production going, reflecting yet another important allied relationship between the regime and foreign corporations (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion,

2003; Jones, 2010; Ménoret, 2005; Vitalis, 2009)

After the first Gulf War and the revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia’s King Fahd bin

Abdulaziz who ruled during the late 1950s and early 1960s faced many demands for reform. These demands varied from the demand for religious purism to a demand for a

“modernized” constitution. In response, he established “Basic Law,” a rather empty attempt at a written constitution. It was a vague document that asserted that the Qur’an

19 was the law of the land. Though it was supposed to represent steps toward a liberalized government, it did not truly improve the transparency of the government or clarify the law. At the same time, he maintained that Sunni Islam was the central tenant of Saudi governance and culture. He also focused on educational reforms and infrastructure projects, and he projected personal religious piety (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion, 2003).

Currently, King Abdullah faces a similarly restless nation that is trying to find its place in increasingly globalized politics. The youth, who make up a disproportionately large part of the population, often return to the country from studying abroad looking for jobs need to point out that they do not find them, and the unemployment rate is rising every day (House, 2012; Ottaway, 2012). The Islamic clerics are asserting their influence on Saudi social life even as the influence of secularism encroaches on culture. The royal family is aging, and succession causes uncertainty for the future, as will be discussed below. Women are speaking out against the inequalities they face in their day-to-day lives. The international community looks to Saudi Arabia for oil while at the same time striving for alternative energy. The Middle Eastern region is experiencing greater and greater unrest since the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. King Abdullah ruled de facto after King Fahd’s stroke in 1995 and became king in 2005. Throughout his rule, he has skillfully balanced the needs of both his constituents and the international community

(Echagüe, 2009; Jones, 2010; Ménoret, 2005; Nolan, 2011; Ottaway, 2011; Ottaway

2012). I will explore how he has accomplished this to maintain his political survival.

Government Structure

The government has a unique structural design for an autocratic theocracy. There is an alliance between the political leaders of the al Saud family and the religious

20 leaders—the Wahhabi clerics. They mutually enforce each other’s wali al-ahd—rightful leadership (Nolan, 2011). To do this, the ulema, or Muslim clerics, assert that the king is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques and has been chosen as the authority to dictate over the country by Allah. In return, the king allows the ulema policing power throughout the kingdom and consults them on political matters. Perhaps the most evident connection between politics and religion is that the constitution of the country is the Qur’an. The connection between religion and politics struggles to keep up with a world that demands secular state constitutions (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion, 2003; Ménoret, 2005).

The basic structure of Saudi Arabia’s government is shaped around the king. He is the head of state, head of the military, and head of religion. The members of the ulema are his partners. They provide religious legitimacy for his position, and they act as advisors to him. The ulema have their own police force, which enforces Islamic law throughout the kingdom. The king also appoints ulema to the Shura Council (majlis al- shura). The Council, which from the outside appears to be a legislative body, holds no law-making powers in reality. It only acts as an advisory board for the king (Nolan,

2011).

There is a Council of Ministers as well, which is led by the Deputy Prime

Minister who is Crown Prince. Ministers serve as heads of certain aspects of government like the military or the treasury, but they always answer to the king. The royal family also acts as advisors to the king. They approve appointments for Crown Prince, and they often serve as ministers or local government officials. Sharia, which is the Qur’an and Sunna— the Prophet Muhammad’s teachings—combined, is Saudi Arabia’s law However sharia is interpreted and implemented entirely by the king and the ulema (Al-Rasheed, 2003;

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Champion, 2003; Dekmejian, 1994; Nolan, 2011).

During the beginning of the first Saudi state, the al Saud family and their religious partners, the Wahhabis, expanded the state’s territory and influence together. They conquered peoples through force, negotiation, and intermarriage into the Saud and

Wahhab families. This strategic intermarriage at once enforced the connection of ruler to ruled like patriarch to family. This patriarchal structure is still in place today. Family is the central unit in Saudi Arabia. This structure appeals to the familial values of the Saudi people, intertwining the ruling families—Wahhab and Saud—with the people, which quite literally enforces patrimonial rule (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Ménoret, 2005).

Reforms began in 1992 when Crown Prince Fahd planned to put forth Basic Law with the help of an appointed constitutional committee. His plan included designs for the consultative council (majlis al-shura) and a constitution of governance. It was seen as the first step towards a more liberal government, which was supposed to clarify succession policy and implement institutional changes that forced the king to share powers. It was an attempt to appeal to transnational demands for government reformation. However, his appointed constitutional committee did not follow through on his plan. The document drafted did not offer a formal constitution with clear laws or mention of the public’s freedoms. The majlis al-shura held virtually no power. They could only act as advisors to the king, and in the end, the Basic Law only reinforced the powers of the monarchy (Al-

Rasheed, 2003; Dekmejian, 1994). The Basic Law was the first of many empty attempts to reform government. It was a show put on by the regime to suggest that the government was becoming more liberal, but it was only a show.

Thus though there have been efforts for reform, changes to the structure of

22 government have been vague and ineffectual. Deference to tradition stands in where structure and organization are lacking. The system is opaque, and the public’s ability to influence their government is nearly impossible. Because the constitution remains the

Qur’an, religious leaders are given rights to interpret the law and carry it out as they see fit. Their interpretation must be fluid because of rapidly changing global demands so many laws are unclear and ever changing. However, the ulema’s power is still subject to the control of the king (Champion, 2003).

Other steps towards reform have been implemented in many areas, including women’s issues, economic institutions, liberalization, and information sharing. Many of these reforms will be discussed later, but it is important to note that most of these reforms have been exclaimed publicly while lacking de facto implementation. Echagüe (2009) writes, “the effectiveness of any reforms is tempered by the fact that they are established by decree under the prerogative of one person and that they have no bearing on the underlying structures of power” (p. 2). King Abdullah has made gradual empty reforms to maintain his embodiment of prevailing globalized interests. There are no significant institutional changes.

Islam in Politics

As the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques Mecca and Medina, King Abdullah is responsible for the center of the Islamic community (Champion, 2003). Muslims worldwide look towards Saudi Arabia every day in prayer, and because of its high profile, the kingdom holds not only religious but also cultural and political influence over

Muslims. The stability of Saudi Arabia is important for both the kingdom and for global

Islam.

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The ulema’s interpretation of the Qur’an dictates much of Islamic culture and norms, but the king has struggled to balance their interests with transnational demands for progressivism. King Abdullah has strongly supported the ulema in public, but he has reframed their message and influence in order to keep up with global interests. The way in which he embodies their concerns about religion affects his legitimacy and claim to rule on a global scale. By defending the rights of the ulema to the public, he shapes

Islamic interests. He strengthens the coalition by broadcasting its leverage worldwide, and he made himself a defender of the Islamic interest coalition. They enforce his right to rule, ensuring his political survival, and in return he strengthens their global influence.

King Abdullah’s relationship with the ulema is vital for his political survival, but they have become a liability on the international stage. He must ensure that they support him, and he must always give them the impression that he supports them. The ulema have a great deal of political influence because of the regime’s dependency on them, and their teachings remain central to the interpretation of law in Saudi Arabia. However, the ulema’s policing power and participation in prisons are points of contention for the international community. Human rights organizations often accuse them of torture and unfair treatment of prisoners. Their system also lacks the proper rule of law, and the international community is finding it more and more difficult to ignore any unjust activities (Amnesty International, 2012a; Amnesty International, 2012b; Human Rights

Watch).

If we look specifically at Abdullah’s challenges within the Muslim community, a long-standing religious divide has caused upheaval in Saudi Arabia and across the world.

The Kingdom is primarily made up of Sunnis. Sunnis are the largest branch of Islam. The

24 conflict between Sunnis and Shiites stems from a disagreement from the year 632.

Muslim followers separated in their beliefs about who should assume political leadership of Islam after the death of the Prophet Muhammad. Shiites believed that the head of

Islam should be a descendant of the Prophet. Sunnis chose Abu Bakr, a close friend of the

Prophet as their leader. The conflict between the two groups was never resolved.

The Sunni sect of Islam has notoriously opposed Shiite communities. In Saudi

Arabia, this separation is pronounced and presents a precarious situation for the

Kingdom. The repressed Shiite community populates the outlying Eastern Province, and they have a high potential for rising up against the regime. The Eastern Province holds the country’s oil stores, which are vital to the Saudi economy (Vitalis, 2009). Any disruption in the region could have drastic consequences for the regime, and uprisings could threaten oil exports. However, discrimination against Shiites continues unchecked by the regime. Wahhabi clerics view Shiites as unworthy apostates, and the Sunni majority continues to view their Shiite counterparts as evil and inferior (Ottaway, 2011).

Human rights organizations highlight Sunni-Shiite clashes (AFP, 2012; Denied

Dignity, 2009; Teitelbaum, 2011b). They point towards the oppression Shiites face and the abuses of the state against Christians, Jews, Shiites, and even Sunnis who do not adhere to Wahhabi practices. This draws negative worldwide attention to the kingdom and depicts a repressive, even violent Islam.

Saudi Islam has also drawn negative attention since 9/11. It was the home of fifteen out of the nineteen hijackers and Osama bin Laden, and Saudi participation in terrorism has strained their international relations worldwide. The Western world points to extremism and accuses Islam of violence and terrorism. Abdullah has worked to repair

25 relations with the West, especially the United States, since then, and he seems to have succeeded. However, the prevention of religious extremism remains a high priority for the regime.

King Abdullah has paid special attention to the negative perceptions that the world sometimes has of Saudi Islam as established by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab.

His regime works to change perceptions of Islam, and he works to promote moderation and ecumenism within Saudi Arabia. Islam plays an important role in politics from the ulema’s involvement in government, to internal sectarian conflict, to perceptions of

Islam, and the institutions of Saudi Arabia must constantly respond to religious influences.

Oil and the Rentier State

The social, economic, and political spheres in Saudi Arabia have been fed and kept stable by the oil market and the capital it produces. Despite this stability, Jones

(2010) explains that Saudi Arabia currently has an unhealthy dependency on oil. He states that their markets are capital-driven rather than labor-driven, meaning that few workers are needed to collect income because it takes very little manpower to keep drilling. This dependency had not been problematic for years because the oil has produced enough money to keep the Kingdom more than comfortable. However, now

King Abdullah has to balance new dynamics. Energy markets are unstable abroad, especially as the race to develop renewable energy sources wages on. Because the oil- market is capital-driven and because the government provides many of the goods and services consumed by Saudis, there is an abundance of unemployment in the country.

House (2012) reports that unemployment among youth in Saudi Arabia is at 40% and that

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40% of Saudis live on less than 3,000 Saudi riyals (850 USD) per month. She also claims that there is a great divide between the rich and the poor, and the gap is widening every day. This, compounded by the influx of cheap labor from foreign countries, leaves many

Saudi families dependent upon government aid (Champion, 2003; House, 2012; Jones,

2010).

The Saudi government currently meets its constituents’ needs as a rentier state, meaning that traditionally, “the kingdom has been kept together by the distribution of oil rent through an implicit pact whereby the population accepts the right of the ruling elite to govern in exchange for economic security derived from oil revenue” (Nolan, 2011, p.

3). The rentier state maintains stability using a top-down patron-client relationship. The economy is controlled by the regime that distributes money and services to the people.

Many Saudis then feel entitled to government handouts. Most Saudis hold government jobs and receive government services every day that are passed to them just like the money they receive through the rentier system. The government provides education, medical care, and jobs for its people. However, meeting their needs will not be possible forever because oil income is not sustainable long-term (House, 2012).

The problems of the rentier state are complicated a rapidly growing population.

People in Saudi Arabia have been historically guaranteed a comfortable lifestyle. The youth in particular face troubling prospects for future careers. In 2009 Nolan reported that

80% of the population was under the age of 30. According to the CIA in 2012, fewer than

8% of people are over the age of 55, whereas Reidel (2012) claims 60% of Saudis are 20 or younger. The rapidly increasing youth population demands jobs, but there are not enough positions. Abdullah initially sent students to foreign countries to study—mostly

27 in the West—with the promise that they would return home to employment, but they have often been sorely disappointed. As of 2009, 44% of university-educated people were unemployed (World Bank).

The way people use oil in Saudi Arabia is as unique as the way they receive it.

Saudis consume oil to the point of wastefulness because it is readily available. However, oil is a finite resource. Some estimates say that Saudi Arabia will become an oil importer by 2030 (Gosden, 2012). Other sources claim that Saudi Arabia will soon reach its “peak oil” meaning that it oil production will have hit its highest point (Walsh, 2011). Many worry that when this precious resource runs out the country will struggle (House, 2012).

This kind of consumption partnered with the rentier state structure spells disaster for

Saudi Arabia as the money runs dry.

Meanwhile, Yeates writes that welfare states are crumbling. It is becoming difficult for welfare states to keep up with globalized economies that present them with increased competition. The “race to the bottom” is causing transnational corporations to find foreign workers, and Saudi Arabia is no exception to the rule. Workers from India

Pakistan, and Italy have come to take jobs from Saudis at the Saudi Arabian Oil

Company—commonly known as ARAMCO (Jones, 2010; Vitalis, 2009). Even when jobs are available for Saudis, they often will not take them. Saudis are looking for skilled labor positions, and their need for particular positions is leaving them out of work and dependent upon government handouts (House, 2012). The economy is still a rentier institution, and the government does not have the capacity to employ those who cannot find work in the private sector.

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Oil causes another challenge for Saudi Arabia. The country’s dependence on the revenue from the West causes contention between Saudi culture and Western culture. The strongest tie between the United States and Saudi Arabia is the oil industry. Ménoret calls

Saudi Arabia a “suburb of the West,” that the West does not understand. Ménoret (2005) writes that “the strange proximity of Western modernity and a violent reaction against it is particularly shocking for Westerners, who do not understand how it is possible to consume in a Western way without adopting the values of the West” (p. 10). Oil fuels the

Saudi economy, but traditionalists balk at the West as a potential hazard for the religious foundation of the state (Nolan, 2011). Westernization has been a hot topic in the Middle

East for quite some time. To some, it poses a threat to the very core of society. To others, it is a pathway towards modernization and democracy (Ménoret, 2005). Still the West, especially the United States, has caused contention for years among the Saudi people. It is demanding a type of modernization that does not correspond with Saudi modernization, and it is demanding a system that rejects the state’s fundamental institutions.

Unemployment and foreign labor are another challenge for the oil industry.

Foreign workers from all countries and Saudis form social networks that exchange ideas about everything from fair labor practices to cross-cultural differences. This exchange has potential to cause upheaval especially in the Eastern Province where dissenting interest coalitions find overlapping reasons to call for change from the Saudi government and

ARAMCO whether the oppressed peoples work together or not. The first labor strikes against ARAMCO occurred in 1945, but the Saudi government and ARAMCO have always quickly squashed uprisings (Vitalis, 2009). Abdullah could not just put down the

29 uprisings. He had to minimize their impact by isolating the demands of the dissenting interest coalition.

Foreign workers have contributed to the unemployment problem in Saudi Arabia.

Scholars agree that unemployment is one of the most pressing issues for the Saudi regime

(Echagüe, 2009; Ottaway, 2011; Ottaway, 2012). Abdullah is looking to “Saudize” labor by pressuring companies to employ citizens rather than foreigners. Faisal began a campaign for Saudi laborers with his five-year plan (Champion, 2003). Abdullah has followed in his footsteps by creating incentives for companies to hire local labor. He has instituted multiple five-year programs for Saudization. He has also limited the lengths of foreign workers’ visas and enforced local employee quotas (Ottaway, 2011). Foreign labor has created an institutional economic problem, which prevents citizens from working that cannot be fixed with simple pressure (Jones, 2010; Echagüe, 2009; Ottaway,

2011; Prokop, 2003; Vitalis, 2009). Companies are finding loopholes in employment policy, and Abdullah must find another way to employ his citizens without isolating the business from transnational companies. Global demands for resources from the Kingdom are outpacing demands for labor in Saudi Arabia, and Abdullah is struggling to deal with economic interests.

Oil is the Saudi connection to the outside world. It brings academics, scientists, workers, politicians, companies, and governments into contact with each other constantly.

It brings technological advancements to the country and promotes the development of scientific education. After World War II, globalization expanded and began to affect technocrats. ARAMCO especially served as a vehicle for human interaction offering radio and face-to-face contact with foreign workers from Palestine, Syria, Egypt,

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Lebanon, and Italy (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Jones, 2010). The “first wave of Saudi administrators, technocrats, civil servants and oil millionaires, but also the first political prisoners, dissidents, exiles, and opposition literary figures” (Al-Rasheed, 2003, p. 100) began to emerge, and some of them began to speak out against their government. The invention and permeation of technologies and the clash of cultures undeniably thrust the world’s nations into an acute consciousness of each other.

This consciousness has manifested as a new movement in the Middle East. The

Arab Awakening began in Tunisia when Mohamed Bouazizi set himself aflame after a government official attacked him, physically abusing him and denying him his right to work as a street vendor. His suicide sparked protests against the government’s inability to meet its country’s needs. Passersby recorded his act and posted images of the immolation online. Media captured public outrage and the subsequent protests, and a global interest coalition began to form. (Chowdhury, 2012; Cottle, 2011).

The Arab Awakening—sometimes called the Arab Spring—currently surrounds

Saudi Arabia on all sides. Hassan (2012) writes that the Arab autocrats argue “either me or chaos” in defense of their own regimes, which is evident in Saudi Arabia. Hassan argues that dismantling the culture of fear often prominent in autocracies will take decades, but the process has already begun. The common masses of the Awakening states are uniting with supporters across the globe to call for democracy, transparency, and legitimacy in their governments. Protests range from peaceful marches to violent riots to self-immolation. Beginning in Tunisia, the Awakening spread across the Middle East.

While other autocracies fall, Saudi Arabia’s government stands. King Abdullah’s negotiating finesse keeps his constituents from revolting, but conditions in the country

31 are still precarious.

CHAPTER III

INTEREST COALITION MODEL

The classical game tree used to map a political leader’s policy-making decisions would end up looking more like a torn spider web in today’s world. Leaders can no longer look at the world in terms of actors. They must notice global trends and respond to the trends to maintain their political survival. Autocratic leaders are central to this analysis. They are involved in a reactionary kind of politics in an increasingly uncontrollable world. There are many uncontrollable forces pressuring leaders now because of globalization, but the strongest forces are global interests. These global interests form coalitions of actors who share common demands on a leader. So I have remodeled the analysis to fit a globalized view of interest negotiations.

The best way for a leader to respond to contemporary, globalized trends is to embody the strongest interests. Gandhi & Przeworski (2007) write, “to neutralize the threats to their rule that emerge from within society, autocrats attempt to co-opt or…

‘encapsulate’ the potential opposition” (p. 1281). The leader must take appeasement and suppression one step further by making himself irreplaceable. The point is for the leader to become the solution to conceptual problems. The actors within even today’s transnational interest coalitions will then see that their needs have been met. Instead of addressing the actor first, the leader addresses a demand like democratization, capitalist

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33 development, human rights activism, communism etc.

Becoming the Interest

A leader must focus on how he is perceived as much as he does his actual policy.

Now, his actions are under global scrutiny. He must not only form official policy and law as the world demands; he must also look as if he is constantly embodying the interests of the people. The superiority of interests to actors will be explained later, but the main idea here is that the leader must live up to the global demands he faces all the time. He must face global problems by making himself the solution. He must see a transnational interest in change and become the force of that change.

To become a force like democratization, the leader will not act as one actor demands, but rather, he will act independently by promoting democratic governance and submitting to elections. Then his constituents will view him as a force of democracy who responds to their demands, a foreign democratic nation will see the common ground they share, and a human rights organization will see him as an individual working towards accountability towards his people. Again, it is about how these actors view the leader.

Marina Ottaway and Michele Dunne (2007) write, “embracing the ideal of liberal democracy is now perceived as a necessity even by governments that have no intention of abiding by it” (p. 2). The leader does not necessarily have to create a democratic government and constitution. He only has to appear to embody democratic values and the intent to promote or work towards democracy. Whether or not this act will survive depends on the ability of a leader to appease and control interests.

Transnational Interests

Networks of actors find common interests that form transnational trends. Leaders

34 must then respond to these trends based on which interests will most affect their political survival. Interest coalitions are groups of actors who share common interests that account for global demands. For example there may be a reform coalition whose member actors demand change from a leader. These actors could include foreign countries, businesses, groups of elites, specific individuals who may be living around the world, businesses, groups of elites, networks of women and the like. Each shares the interest of the coalition.

Not every actor from one coalition will share membership in other coalitions. In the case of Saudi Arabia, for instance, the United States may be aligned with those in the reform coalition and in the feminism coalition while individuals participating in the Arab

Awakening may be interested in feminism but not in the type of reform that the United

States demands. Each actor belongs to multiple coalitions, and in terms of a leader’s policy-making, actors are secondary to their coalitions.

Coalition Networks

Coalitions can converge, however, and form their own networks. Interests share specific expectations and demands. For example, elements from a feminism coalition and a liberalism coalition may form a network based on their shared demands for broader access to politics. This demand is the common ground where elements of the coalitions converge and join as a network. Coalition networks are not grounded in connections among actors. They are made up of connections among interests. A network of interests reflects of global demands to which leaders probably must respond.

Leaders respond to global networks by identifying the interests that are behind the movement. Interests could be feminism, democracy, technological development,

Islamization, etc. Then leaders decide which interests are strong on the world stage. All

35 interests that are strong on the world stage affect leaders. They appease the strongest global interests and suppress the weakest. To determine whom to suppress and whom to appease, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) explained that the people who threaten the regime are the “great in-between.” Therefore, to maintain political survival, a leader must recognize the transnational interests of these “in-between” that are most likely to threaten him. Then he evaluates their strength on a global scale and determines how to proceed from there.

To suppress an interest, a leader cannot just crush actors. He must squash the demands themselves. Suppressing actors can cause too much negative attention. It can rally those with shared interests, and it could mean a leader’s downfall. Instead of responding to an actor first, a leader responds to an interest. The leader can evaluate a weak interest and then minimize and denounce it globally until the interested power brokers hold no power to threaten him. For instance, a leader could recognize extremism as a weak interest that still has the potential to threaten him. In response, he denounces extremism by villainizing it, isolating extremist interests, and suppressing its force on the world stage. To become a solution to the problem of extremism, he practices moderation in his public image and encourages moderation in his policy choices.

Appeasement is often thought of as more effective (Gandhi and Przeworski,

2007). Rather than squashing an interest coalition, a leader must become its demands. It is a form of job security for him. If he embodies an interest, the actors who ascribe to that interest will want to support his power. The more globalized an interest is, the stronger it may be, and the more threatening, potentially, to a regime. If many actors who have

36 significant leverage and cohesion share an interest or demand of a leader, it is likely important for the leader to respond to that interest and embody its demands.

Currently, technocratic interest coalitions, which are made up of scientists, educators, political advisors, and the like, are a strong force on the world stage. To appease this interest, a leader would surround himself with scientists and technocrats, and he would seek their council for the decisions he makes. He would promote global perceptions that his regime pursues technological advancements and that his country is technologically advanced. He would laud science and technology, and he would make sure to be seen using the newest technologies. This way, he not only appeases one actor’s demands, he takes into account global interests, and embodies the interests to integrate his regime into the world community.

The Interest Coalition Model can be depicted in a traditional Venn Diagram where the bubbles represent interests rather than actors. In this globalized environment, interests are typically transnational. They can be forces like feminism or Islamization, but they are always interests that groups of political actors share. The bubbles, or interest coalitions, contain groups of distinct power brokers. This helps leaders to focus on demands first, enabling them to address specific political actors second. In Figure 1,

Interests B and C oppose each other but each share certain aspects of Interest Coalition A.

Leaders should address Interest Coalitions A, B, and C before they consider the actors within each coalition.

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Figure 1

Interest Coalition A

Interest Coalition B Interest Coalition C

Transnational networks of interest coalitions define and contextualize the strategic game. In Figure 1, networks of interests are formed where the coalitions overlap. Let us assume that in Interest Coalition A there are five actors. Each of these actors is a formidable force on the global scene. Coalition B contains three actors, and Coalition C contains two actors. In Coalition A, two actors overlap with Coalition B, one overlaps with Coalition C, and two do not overlap at all. The two actors from Coalition B share no demands on the leader with the demands of Coalition C. For a leader, the sections where interests overlap are the most formidable networks, but the leader must also consider the strength of each coalition. This second step is when the actors belonging to each coalition become important.

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The leader’s actions will be based on the strongest interest coalition. The strength of the interest coalition depends upon the collection of actors within it, but the leader will act based on the interest, not the actors. The strength of these coalitions is dependent upon three factors: the members’ cohesion in serving the interest, the coalition’s collective leverage, and the level of misinformation within the group.

Members of interest coalitions may not form a monolithic network. The cohesion of the actors within an interest coalition is central to their ability to influence a leader.

Actors who share the same interest may not acknowledge this fact and place cohesive demands on a leader because of many different factors. Actors may have conflicting collective identities like the Sunnis and Shiites who will not unite to demand common

Islamic values. Actors may also be unable to define the common ground they share.

Certain actors may not be able to connect to other actors in their interest coalitions because of inability to influence global trends.

Different interest coalitions have varying degrees of leverage because of the influence of their member actors on the world stage. When considering economic issues, countries with stronger currencies hold more leverage even if their interests do not overlap with coalitions who have a larger number of actors. Globally, a coalition’s strength depends on the strength of the parties in relation to the coalition’s interest. For example, a democratic interest coalition is stronger than a theocratic interest coalition because democratic countries currently hold more power on the world stage.

Lack of access to information distribution among members in a coalition can significantly weaken the coalition. Actors who do not have access to Internet communication cannot disseminate their message, and as a result, their interest does not

39 have access to global influence. Actors cannot enforce cohesive interests when they do not recognize their partners on a global scale.

In Saudi Arabia, many of the king’s decisions must be made based on loyalties to specific interests rather than actors. Saudis are struggling to define themselves as any one identity with specific demands. A person is no longer a Shiite with concerns about oppression or a woman with concerns about her future. Instead, he or she is a collection of identities and a collection of interests, and it is the job of the king to embody the most powerful interests. This is a pivotal moment in Saudi Arabia’s history as it faces the upheaval of its neighboring states and the conflicting interests of the world. King

Abdullah now balances interests that command the world stage by becoming those interests and denouncing the opposition. For the king, it is a matter of deciding which interest to side with to maintain control. Instead of the classical game tree, I will illustrate the king’s negotiating position with the Interest Coalition Model.

CHAPTER IV

ISLAMIC INTEREST COALITION NETWORK

The Islamic interest coalition network is anything but monolithic. The ulema elites have tied Islam to the status quo, but some reformers have used Islam as a tool to expand their rights and demand changes in their government. I will use the Islamic interest coalition network as an example of the varied influences of coalitions in the same network on the Saudi regime. Later, I will apply this logic to the separate status quo and reform interest coalition networks.

As explained above, the legitimacy of the regime rests on the shoulders of the religious ulema. The kingdom is based on a dual system, monarchy and religion, with one enforcing the other; the state would crumble if the two were suddenly divorced. Religion plays a strong role in identity throughout the world, however the Kingdom is distinct for its coupled nationalistic and religious identity. Individuals in Saudi Arabia are more closely tied to their religious identity because of the fact that it is embedded in government institutions. Nationalism is tied to religious identity, and Ménoret (2005) goes so far as to say that “Islam is inseparable from Saudi national pride” (p. 59). This means that the nationalistic interest coalition and Islamic interest coalition directly overlap and strengthen each other, joining the Saudi nation to a transnational interest

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41 coalition. Therefore Islamic interests make up one of the strongest coalitions affecting the country.

The Transnational Interest Coalition Network

Figure 2

Shiite Coalition Sunni Coalition

Extremist Coalition

There are conflicting transnational coalitions within the Islamism interest coalition network that King Abdullah balances in order to maintain his political survival.

The global Islamic community is part of a loose global network of interests. The Islamic community is not monolithic in any sense. It includes actors like extremists, individual

Muslims, clerics, Shiites, Sunnis and many others. The key is that this coalition network is a network of interests not a network of actors. Each actor belongs to a coalition within the network.

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This is not a simple network of actors. For example the Shiite bubble in Figure 2 can include Iranians and Shiite clerics from around the world and Shiites in America, but the coalition’s first concern is their collective interest in Shiism. This coalition overlaps with some coalitions and clashes with others. The extremist bubble holds transnational extremist groups like Al Qaeda and people like Osama bin Laden2. The Sunni bubble holds the government of Saudi Arabia, individual Sunnis, Sunni groups etc.

When these actors are combined into their own interest coalitions, they lose their individual identities. Rather, they are a collection of actors in one interest. The actors are secondary to the interests. Therefore all of the separate interests that an American Shiite has do not necessarily have to overlap with all the interests of an Iranian Shiite. Their influence lies in their collective Shiite interests excluding their other respective interests.

King Abdullah has had to approach the Sunni and Shiite interest coalitions with caution because conflicts between the groups have threatened the regime in the past and attracted negative global attention to the Kingdom.

The Shiite Interest Coalition

The Shiite coalition includes actors like individual global Shiites, the state of Iran, and the inhabitants of the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. The Shiite population does not belong to the “great in-between” that greatly threatens the regime (Bueno de

Mesquita & Smith, 2011). The coalition is weak because its member actors do not have a high degree of leverage or cohesion. The actors are isolated and do not have the resources to have sufficient global influence. Note that the Shiite interest coalition bubble in Figure

2 While many extremist groups claim that they identify with Wahhabi Islam, their demands on the king are different from the Sunni coalition. Therefore, they will make up a separate interest coalition.

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2 is smaller than the Sunni bubble. This is not because there are more Sunnis than Shiites.

This is because the Sunni coalition is stronger and its demands have more influence than the Shiite coalition. The Shiite coalition generally does not form networks with other coalitions. As a result, the coalition’s influence is weak.

The kingdom has traditionally repressed transnational Shiite interests and demands. King Abdullah has highlighted tolerance and ecumenism in his speeches to the country, appealing to global coalition networks, but he struggles to deal with the abuses wrought against the Shiite minority. Historically, any domestic unrest in the Eastern

Province—a majority Shiite region that holds the country’s oil stores—has been swiftly and forcefully put down, but the region is still a hotbed of dissatisfaction for both Saudi and foreign workers there. King Abdullah has also put down any Shiite dissent using military force (Jones, 2010; Vitalis, 2009).

Both Bahrain and Iran’s Shiite communities pose threats to the Sunni majority of

Saudi Arabia. The Saudi government has sought to prevent uprisings by cooperating with regional governments who face similar threats. This was made evident in the Saudi’s military contributions to the Bahraini government when it faced Shiite uprisings

(Ottaway, 2011). Saudi Shiite protesters have claimed solidarity with all Middle Eastern

Shiites, and regional upheaval has empowered Saudis against the Sunni government.

While some believe that the transnational Shiite community could unite against the regime, Ottaway (2011) attributes the regime’s stability to the divide between the Shiite and Sunni communities. Ottaway (2011) argues that because the Shiites and Sunnis cannot unite, neither sect will have enough leverage or influence against the regime alone.

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Suppressing the Shiite interests entails more than just suppressing the Shiite actors and their actions. It also requires King Abdullah to repress the Shiite coalition’s demands and influence so that they do not threaten his political survival, but he has to do so in a way that does not attract negative attention to himself. To do so, the king has not stopped the ulema from calling the Shiites unworthy apostates. Abdullah has preached ecumenism, but this preaching is more for the sake of appeasing other stronger interest coalitions. His speeches have not served to empower the Shiites, and he has not allowed them any specific rights. He also allows ARAMCO to continue policing the Shiites of the

Eastern Province. While he does not directly dirty his hands with disabling Shiite interests, he does not stop other actors from doing so, and he still comes off looking as though he is ecumenical and pursuing equal rights for the Shiites. In this way, he diminishes the Shiite interest coalition because it is the weakest bubble in the model.

The Sunni Interest Coalition

King Abdullah works to appease the Sunni interest coalition because it has strong global influence. Its members are highly interconnected, especially in the Sunni- dominated Middle East region. The Sunni coalition also has a great deal of leverage transnationally. Most of the world’s Muslims are Sunni, and they form a cohesive coalition that has the strength to warrant the regime’s appeasement.

The most prominent Sunni actors in Saudi Arabia are the ulema, and internationally, they have a lot of influence. Abdullah has appeased the senior ulema by standing up for their legitimacy and power in the political system of Saudi Arabia

(Echagüe, 2009; Nolan, 2011). King Abdullah asserted “that criticism of religious scholars in the media would be met with swift prosecution—returning the favor after the

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Senior Ulema Committee issued fatwas condemning demonstrations as against sharia law” (Nolan, 2011, p. 6). The ulema are part of the transnational Islamic interest coalition, and his actions and words appeased this coalition. He turned himself into the protector of Islam, and as a result he enforced his political survival. Muslims worldwide are strongly affected by the Saudi ulema, and King Abdullah recognizes their strength of the demands of the Islamic coalition network.

Extremism Interest Coalition

Extremists see Islam as a tool; for them, it is the only way out of the hardships they face (Ménoret, 2005). Charismatic leaders who sometimes call for terrorism in the name of the religion exploit Islam transnationally. Unfortunately, institutional problems have led to the formation of extremist groups and individuals transnationally. King

Abdullah’s response has been to suppress the extremist interest coalition. To suppress an interest, a leader cannot just crush actors. He still does not repress the actors but the interests. He must squash the interests behind the actors’ coalition. Rather than simply ferreting out terrorists, Abdullah has worked to destroy extremist interests by reforming education, denouncing terrorism, and promoting religious moderation.

The king denounces all extremists by labeling them as terrorists and radicals, and he has worked to flush out terrorist groups in Saudi Arabia and throughout the Middle

East, saying that he will not tolerate extremists in an address to the Shura Council

(SUSRIS, 2010). He has similarly worked to eliminate any extremist interests from schools, and he has developed rehabilitation programs for self-admitted terrorists

(Ménoret, 2005). He works to maintain the material comfort of his constituents to prevent feelings of dissent. He has also encouraged moderate teachings from his cleric partners.

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He appeased the transnational demand for moderation, and in doing so, he has cemented his political survival. His actions and global perceptions of his moderation have secured his position as the solution to extremism for those outside this interest coalition.

Therefore no interest coalition that has enough strength has reason to threaten his rule.

The Islamism Interest Coalition Network

In the 1950s, King Faisal began a rigorous overhaul of the education system. As part of his development programs, he had new schools built throughout the kingdom, and he also provided institutions for vocational training. He put an emphasis on Islamic education, and he campaigned for religious learning. Taken as a whole, the educational developments contributed to his modernist image important both to the public and the international community. Modernism and Islam have been framed as forces that are diametrically opposed to each other, but Ménoret (2005) breaks through this misconception. He writes that Islam is “the language in which social progress can be profitable articulated” (p. 206). He claims that the pure Islamic texts have allowed Saudis to approach politics with religious rhetoric that promotes freedom and rationality.

Abdullah proved that modernization does not necessarily coincide with foreign values but can coexist with Islam (Champion, 2003). This way he did not isolate the strongest interest coalitions he faces.

Saudi Arabia’s education system has since come under close scrutiny on the international stage because of its religious curriculum. The international community, especially the U.S., alleges that the education system promotes extremism. Foreign countries often believe that Saudi schools impede on progress, but Saudi Arabia has developed a different kind of modernization for itself. The education a student receives in

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Saudi Arabia is both religious and nationalistic and that does not stand in the way of development (Ménoret, 2005; Prokop, 2003).

King Abdullah has promoted the cohesion of reform and Islam while carefully approaching the religious concerns of the international community with neutrality. This way he can appease Islamic and reformer coalitions without isolating the either group.

King Abdullah has encouraged moderate theology and a moderate perception of Islam saying, “Islam is a religion of dialogue, moderation and co-existence” (SUSRIS, 2010).

Education has been Abdullah’s strongest tool to encourage this moderate perception of

Islam.

Education in Saudi Arabia serves to shape students’ religious and nationalistic identities. History classes give students a foundation of pride in their traditional roots.

Science classes foster the understanding that Saudis are not immune to global pressures for scientific and technological advancements. Religious classes enforce the central role of Islam in Saudi society, and all of these combined factors contribute to a nationalistic identity. Thus, the kings have slowly implemented educational reform over the years to reform their constituents’ interests (Al-Rasheed, 2003; Champion, 2003; Ménoret, 2005).

Education reform has been a huge part of this movement towards the religious middle. Schools have been the place where religion and reform meet. Religious courses account for anywhere between one quarter and one third of early education, and for good reason (Prokop, 2003). While some foreign countries see religious education as a gateway to terrorism, the Kingdom maintains that religious education is more important than ever to combat extremism. Prince Abdul Aziz explains:

If you say terrorism is bad, you must show the terrorist in Islamic law why that is so… Everyone is fighting for the hearts and minds of the young. But they have

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their own minds. So we have two choices: let them all develop their own religion, or teach them the right religion so when they encounter ideas on the Internet, they can assess them correctly (House, 2012, p. 131).

Extremism is just as much of a threat to the regime as it is to the rest of the world, and education programs are imperative to the kingdom for maintaining stability. Education is the strongest tool the Kingdom has to suppress extremist interests and highlight the stronger network of moderate Islam. Abdullah has also called together a broader interest coalition network by promoting ecumenism.

King Abdullah backs his religious government, but he also calls for a certain level of ecumenism. He tries to minimize the conflict of Sunni versus Shiite; he brings a nation under the umbrella of one religion. Most importantly, the king calls together the worldwide Muslim community. In this way, he can fulfill a broader interest coalition. In an address to the Shura Council, he said, “We are part of the Arab, Islamic, and international world. Our role is based on defending their rights and making sacrifices for unity in their ranks” (SUSRIS, 2010). He organized the first International Islamic

Conference for Dialogue (Saudi Embassy, 2011). This annual global summit brings together Islamic figures and encourages communication and community. Here he can gather transnational voices and appeal to their common interests. In December of 2002,

Crown Prince Abdullah published the Reform Charter for the Arab World, in which he called for solidarity among Arab nations in the name of Islam (Ménoret, 2005; Charter,

2003).

Yet he does also promote goodwill towards other faiths; he even met with Pope

Benedict XVI. The two men talked about tolerance among the Jewish, Muslim, and

Christian faiths, and when King Abdullah left, he presented the Catholic with an ornate

49 sword (Pullella, 2007). He became the embodiment of ecumenical peace and cooperation, and he appealed to a larger number of overlapping coalitions. Because he has executed ecumenism well, ecumenical interest coalitions now see him as a fulfillment of their interests, and they demand his political survival.

The Wahhabi sect of Islam is grounded in tradition, but it is still a constantly adapting movement for reform. Ménoret (2005) explains how writers:

Feel the need to liberate Islam from shackles of cultural politics by speaking directly from and to the texts. This has posed a considerable challenge to the religious leaders no only because it breaks their monopoly of religious interpretation but, more important, because it exposes their attempt to reduce religion to its ideological use (p. 186).

Writers then use Islamic rhetoric to assert Saudi modernization rather than modernization as defined by foreign countries. Students use Islamic texts to liberate themselves from traditionalists. They can form their own interpretations of Islam without blindly following the ulema. King Abdullah has promoted this liberalization within Saudi schools. Women use the letter of Islamic laws rather than ulema teachings to expand their personal rights

(Ménoret, 2005). The Islamic interest coalition contains a widening group of Muslim- based demands, and it is Abdullah’s mission to guarantee that he is working to fulfill these demands. He has embodied the demands of the strongest Muslim coalition that has moderate interests, and he has appeased their interests by empowering their interests on the world stage.

CHAPTER V

STATUS QUO INTEREST COALITION NETWORK

Transnational Interest Coalition Network

The transnational status quo interest coalition network demands that Saudi

Arabia’s regime maintain current conditions. King Abdullah has responded to this network by focusing on the demands of religious traditionalists, demands for wealth, and demands for stability. Reformers oppose this stagnation, but many of the actors in the status quo network could pose a larger threat to the regime if their way of life is disturbed. The regime has found ways to appease the interests of the elites by promoting the idea that the elites would lose their power, wealth, and lifestyles should the Kingdom fall. This appeasement ensures Abdullah’s political survival because he has framed himself as the protector of the elites’ interests. Abdullah has appealed to the desirability of stability to promote his own political survival. By promising rentier wealth to the people, oil to foreign countries, and stability to the country, the king has suppressed the call for a revolution.

Religious Traditionalism Interest Coalition

As explained above, the legitimacy of the regime rests on the shoulders of the religious ulema. The kingdom is based on a dual system, monarchy and religion, with one enforcing the other; the state would crumble if the two were suddenly divorced. The

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51 ulema elites have tied Islam to the status quo. Religion plays a strong role in identity throughout the world. However the Kingdom is distinct for its coupled nationalistic and religious identity. Individuals in Saudi Arabia are more closely tied to their religious identity because of the fact that it is embedded in government institutions. Nationalism is tied to religious identity, and Ménoret (2005) goes so far as to say that “Islam is inseparable from Saudi national pride” (p. 59). This means that the Saudi nationalistic interest coalition and Islamic interest coalition directly overlap and strengthen each other, joining the Saudi nation to a transnational interest coalition. Therefore Islamic interests make up one of the strongest coalitions affecting the country.

Do not be fooled by the title “religious traditionalism interest coalition.”

Traditionalism is merely a means to an end. If the traditional government structure remains the same, then religious elites will benefit from the power. The ulema demand their right to police the streets and impose religious laws. They hold a lot of influence in the Kingdom because the legitimacy of the regime rests heavily on their shoulders. King

Abdullah protects their power to protect his own political survival.

There are also arguments that the regime is merely responding to social and cultural norms. There is a demand for traditional lifestyles in society, and people do not demand change. Ottaway (2011) claims that more conservatives are using the Internet than liberal reformers. He also writes that there are many women on the Internet who fight against feminism. House (2012) argues that some women cling to their traditional roles in society. This then does not become a government-run phenomenon. It is an embedded social norm, which demands the status quo from the government. The interests

52 served in this status quo interest coalition are demands for religious government, religious purism, and traditional religious norms and values throughout society.

Wealth Interest Coalition

One of the most important demands from the actors involved in the Arab

Awakening is stable income for the people. Oil is the main source of income for Saudi

Arabia, and the rentier system has made Saudis dependent upon government handouts from the oil export money. After the Arab Awakening hit Tunisia and Egypt, King

Abdullah handed out $130 billion in funding, spread across “almost every group in society that was unhappy or that conceivably become so” (House, 2012, p. 220). He set a minimum wage for Saudi workers and opened fatwa centers, in which citizens were given the opportunity to peacefully voice their dissent to the regime. The plan also provided stipends for the unemployed, housing for low-income families, grants for students, and funding for medical facilities (BBC, 2011b). Abdullah appeased Saudi demands for money and, at the same time, encouraged them to support the status quo, meaning his political survival.

It is Abdullah’s job to embody the strongest interests, not respond to specific political actors first. One of the largest hindrances to revolution is oil and the international attention that oil brings to the country. Oil-rich countries are less likely to fall victim to the Arab Awakening than those without the precious resource. This is partly due to the rentier system of oil economies. Wealth is distributed to the public in large enough amounts to make revolution unprofitable for the people (Bjorvatn & Naghavi,

2011). However, House (2012) cites increased poverty, unemployment, and homelessness throughout the kingdom, and she points to the fact that revenue distribution

53 is not necessarily keeping the people happy. House (2012) writes that there is a growing disparity between the rich and the poor in Saudi Arabia. Those who are wealthy benefit from the status quo and demand that Abdullah maintain their positions as elites and maintain their wealth.

International actors who have an interest in the oil market also have the ability to affect the potential for uprisings in Saudi Arabia. United States involvement in the country could absolutely stamp out any possibilities for upheaval. An unstable Saudi

Arabia could prove disastrous for the United States’ economy, and the U.S. is unlikely to disentangle itself from conflict that could affect the oil market. Therefore, the U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining King Abdullah’s political survival. If no one disrupts the king, then no one disrupts the oil market. King Abdullah has made this more than evident to the United States, and in doing so has embodied the United States’ demands.

Stability Interest Coalition

The fact that actors who are involved in the Arab Awakening belong to both the reform interest coalition network and the status quo interest coalition network illustrates my point that interests precede actors. However, stability seems more enticing to Saudis than the Arab Awakening. Ottaway (2012) argues that Saudi citizens will not participate in the Arab Awakening because of their inability to mobilize and their reluctance to follow in the violent footsteps of state uprisings. The Arab Awakening would also cause economic upset.

The wealth interest coalition and the stability interest coalition are very tightly bound together. ARAMCO arguably has the most to gain from the status quo. If the regime maintains the country’s economic conditions, then the company’s main interest

54 becomes Abdullah’s political survival. Foreign countries also benefit from the stability of

Saudi Arabia. If the country experiences uprisings and revolution, oil prices will skyrocket. The combined demands of the wealth, stability, and religious traditionalism interest coalitions form a network that pressures Abdullah to maintain the status quo.

CHAPTER VI

REFORM INTEREST COALITION NETWORK

Demands for government reform are similarly made up of a network of coalitions.

To shape this interest coalition network, reform will be defined as changes that could threaten the monarchical structure of the regime. Demands for reform challenge the status quo and can upset the relationship between the king and the elites who benefit from the current government institutions. The network I will describe below is a simplified collection of the demands for government reform placed upon the Kingdom. Included are the demands of the feminism coalition, liberalism coalition, and the Awakening coalition.

This coalition network is a high priority for the regime because of global attention to the Kingdom’s sluggish reforms. To keep up with global demands for change, King

Abdullah has been faced with the challenges of liberalizing his government, confronting the ulema and elites who benefit from the status quo, and calling into question cultural norms and values, and he has done it all in the face of the Arab Awakening. The greatest modern force of reform is the transnational support for the Arab Awakening and the regional tumult that it has caused. King Abdullah has maintained his political survival throughout the upheaval, but balancing the Awakening interest coalition’s demands has not been easy.

The Transnational Interest Coalition Network

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Transnational interest coalitions overlap to create the reform interest coalition network. King Abdullah attempts to balance the demands of these coalitions to maintain his political survival. The actors involved in each coalition include, but are certainly not limited to, regional Awakening states, foreign countries, students who are studying abroad, laborers, and transnational businesses. Each actor finds a place in the multiple coalitions in the reform interest coalition network.

Figure 3 Arab Awakening Reform

Feminism Reform Liberalism Reform

The Liberalism Reform Coalition

Reform can manifest in many ways, but many political actors hope to see reform as a force of liberalization. Ménoret (2005) describes what most outsiders see as a dichotomy between the imported Western modernization and the tribal and Islamic forces

57 of traditionalism (p. 41). He goes on to say that this perception is misleading. Ménoret

(2005) believes that Islam can be a force for reform against tradition and external forces can and do impose tradition (p. 41)3. Abdullah has recognized this as well, and while he has not blatantly opposed tradition, he has promoted an Islamic kind of reform.

To appease demands for a liberal government structure, while maintaining his autocratic political survival, Abdullah has appeared to pursue liberalization of government structures. He reshuffled his cabinet in 2009 to replace former members with moderates, technocrats, and reformists. Some of his other contributions include institutional changes like new municipal elections (Nolan, 2011). Many people criticize

Saudi government institutions like the Shura Council for their lack of power and the fact that they only enforce the authority of the king. However, Abdullah appears to be taking steps towards a liberalized government. By promoting this perception he has publicly strengthened his connection with the liberalist interest coalitions. King Abdullah has also updated his advisors and his rhetoric. He has appealed to the international demand for a different kind of legitimacy to his right to rule by enmeshing traditionalists’ support for his political survival and technocrats’ support.

To adapt to global pressures for reform, technological advancement, and scientific development, King Abdullah has integrated technocrats into his government’s structure.

Technocrats have emerged as strong players in Saudi politics as advisors to the king. The kingdom’s technocrats pursue modernity and seek to deliver it to the kingdom, but what they do not realize is that their language has changed the rhetoric of politics. Because

3“Islam and modernity can be counterposed to each other only if one assumes that modernity is necessarily Western.” The idea, ‘Islamize modernity’ or ‘modernize’ Islam’ was seen as an alternative to a Western form of modernity. (Ménoret, 2005, p. 113)

58 religion is globally losing its power as a justification for the right to rule, King Abdullah has expanded his claim to wali al-ahd by becoming the face of technological development. King Abdullah can use the information that he receives from technocrats as justification for his own political survival, and he can appeal to the technocratic interest coalition by integrating scientific rhetoric into his politics (Jones, 2010).

Jones (2010) tells us that the Kingdom puts many scientists and technicians in advising positions to the king. With their consultations, the king is able to re- contextualize political policy and action using apolitical terms. With scientific terms to back him up, the king’s rhetoric is taken as fact. Jones (2010) argues that this scientific rhetoric is used to manipulate nature and society to achieve the king’s political survival:

While they gathered and passed along valuable data about water, agriculture, and other natural resources, they helped shape the very terms by which Saudi Arabia’s future administrators would think about the environment, how to manage it, and those engaged with it. Saudi Arabia not only incorporated the knowledge but also embraced the science as a means to manage its interests, to order nature and society. The claim and widespread belief that science was by its very nature apolitical proved convenient for the Saudi government, which used scientific expertise as a justification for increasingly intrusive efforts to manage and remake nature and society (Jones, 2010, p. 13).

By changing the political rhetoric of the country, Abdullah has influenced the structure of his regime. He has represented status quo interests by protecting the traditionalist elites, and he has represented technocrats’ interests by speaking their scientific language. By joining the coalitions together, he has ensured his political survival.

Abdullah has attempted to liberalize politics. Upon ascension of the throne, he pardoned three political prisoners “who had called for constitutional monarchy”

(Echagüe, 2009). He held municipal elections, and he replaced conservative government ministers with politically moderate ministers (Echagüe, 2009). To expand political

59 participation, he acknowledges protesters like those who signed the “A Vision for the

Present and the Future of the Nation” and the “Partners in One Nation” petitions and he convened national dialogue forums (Nolan, 2011). He also increased the powers of the

Shura Council (Echagüe, 2009). By implementing these reforms, King Abdullah proved himself to be the solution to political reformers’ problems.

King Abdullah has reformed the policy that determines succession. He formed an

“allegiance council” that draws close family members into the decision-making process for the next king. The council can also remove the king if the king is not fit to rule. This is evidence of yet another claim to liberalism that is meant to appease the reform interest coalition. However, there are doubts as to whether or not this council holds any real power. The king still has the last word on all decisions that are made concerning succession (Nolan, 2011). Regardless of Abdullah’s reforms, the long-term survival of the regime is in question.

The Feminism Interest Coalition

The feminism interest coalition is made up of a transnational group of actors who are looking to pursue reform through feminist rights. Attention to issues surrounding women and women’s rights is not necessarily new in Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was the first to put an emphasis on girls’ education in the 1950s. Today, there is a government ministry focused entirely on girls’ education (Champion, 2003). Women now represent more than half of university students (House, 2012; Prokop, 2003). Since Faisal, transnational education, freedom, and technology have been used to pursue women’s rights.

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Women have appealed to a liberal ideal to claim their equality in political, economic, and social realms throughout the Kingdom (House, 2012). They demand participation in government and have been granted political positions in recent years

(BBC, 2013a). They use educational institutions to expand their opportunities for employment and economic participation (Champion, 2003; Prokop, 2003). Women use

Islamic laws to assert their rights. They cite Islamic texts for marriage and the family unit to negotiate their own freedoms in marital contracts with their husbands (Ménoret, 2005).

Women have united with global allies from around the world including Hillary

Clinton who said that “‘what these women are doing is brave, and what they are seeking is right’” and Catherine Ashton who asserted that “Saudi women were only demanding equal treatment ‘wherever they are’” (Ottaway, 2011). The feminism interest coalition today also includes the women on Facebook posting videos of themselves driving, demonstrating their opposition to the ban forbidding women to drive. The coalition is made of the men and women worldwide who are demanding changes for women. These demands include, but are not be limited to, expanded rights for women in Saudi Arabia like driving privileges, suffrage, the right for women to choose how they dress, etc. The liberalism interest coalition, which includes the U.S., Saudi students who studied abroad, corporations, human rights NGOs, etc, overlaps with feminist interests in certain ways.

Most women’s rights interests overlap with liberalism interests like broader political participation, which strengthens both coalitions.

One of the most notorious movements on the Internet was part of the women’s awakening. Forty-six women rebelled in 1990 against the driving ban, and recently the uproar about the issue has resurfaced (Ménoret, 2005). The laws banning women from

61 driving in Saudi Arabia are very contentious throughout the world. Many traditionalists see women driving as a slippery slope to Western lifestyles; others see it as a step towards a women’s awakening. As a result, the Internet community sat up and watched women’s protests online. On May 5, 2011, women came together by videotaping themselves driving. They posted these videos on Facebook and YouTube, and many were detained for their rebellion (Chowdhury, 2012). Saudi women have a strong presence on

Facebook with pages like Saudi Women to Drive and Saudi Women Revolution that have more than 8,000 likes each. The Internet has become a tool for Saudi women to access global feminists. The regime then has to respond to feminism in a way that will appease the entire interest rather than just the concerns of Saudi women.

Abdullah appointed the first woman to a senior minister position (Nolan, 2011).

In 2013, he appointed the first women to the Shura Council, the government body that can advise the king and suggest legislation (BBC, 2013a). While the council does not have significant power, appointing women to government positions allowed the king to move even beyond the demands of government requirements to appease global feminist and liberalist interests. He has also responded to the overlap of the liberalism and feminism interest coalitions that strengthen each other by forming a network that pressures him to act on their demands.

The Awakening Interest Coalition

The Arab Awakening reformists are making demands for transparency, structural government reform, and clearly written laws from autocracies. Actors within the Arab

Awakening Interest Coalition include, but are not limited to, Awakening states,

62 militaries, students, paramilitaries, and transnational businesses. Upheaval in Saudi

Arabia has manifested in a unique way and has not yet turned to violence.

House (2012) cites multiple examples of young people attacking their teachers and hitting the streets smashing in windows and causing upheaval. She also cites disgruntlement among the unemployed and homeless. She claims that boredom and anger at the government are two reasons for increased lawlessness. She has observed a surprising level of poverty among the people who do not have access to the rentier system, and dissent could be brewing there. These actors are forming a coalition with multiple shared demands, and the pressure of their interests increase as networks become more globalized.

Hassan (2012) explained how ex-president Bourguiba of Tunisia focused on both education and women’s rights before the Awakening struck. He wrote that these investments led to a demand for more rights (p. 233). The situation in Tunisia was similar to the current one in Saudi Arabia with high unemployment and lack of social mobility.

Women currently struggle across the Middle East with the inability to participate in politics, but Abdullah has worked to increase their access to politics. On September 25,

2011 King Abdullah issued a decree that would allow women suffrage in 2015

(Chowdhury, 2012). However four years is a long time for women who are educating themselves and demanding their rights now.

Today, the rentier-state system provides education for all Saudis. Students now progress into universities with the hopes that they will be able to obtain skilled jobs for the government. Tertiary education is provided within Saudi Arabia, but students are increasingly encouraged to study outside of the country. The state, the king, and certain

63 companies provide scholarships and grants for students to go to the West for college. The students who are sent abroad for their university education come into contact with different cultures, institutions, peoples, and perspectives. When they return home, they bring a new view of the world with them, and their expectations and interests have changed (House, 2012; Jones, 2010; Ottaway, 2012)

King Abdullah has taken steps to avoid upheaval, including showing concern for the interests of the opposition. In 2003 before the Arab Awakening, Abdullah met with petitioners who were calling for governmental reform. For the first time, the regime formally recognized dissent, and Abdullah subsequently created the National Center for

Dialogue, which connected Saudi citizens to government institutions (Ménoret, 2005).

According to journalist Abdallah al-Fawzan, this is when the Riyadh Spring began to take form (Ménoret, 2005). Abdullah began to embody open dialogue and receptive regime to appease potential protesters across networks of interest coalitions.

Though uprisings had already broken out in the outskirts of the country, the arrival of upheaval in the capital forced the king to pay attention to the reformist interest coalition. He put down the uprisings with military force, the way he had put down uprisings in the Eastern Province. However, the Arab Awakening had finally reared its head in a way that could actually threaten the regime. Saudi Arabia has pursued the

Awakening in its own way, but the future of the movement is unknown.

Saudi Arabia’s protesters against the regime planned a Day of Rage for March 11,

2011. This plan mirrored the Days of Rage in Egypt, Syria, Libya, and Yemen. It was to be a call for democracy—for an elected parliament and ruler (Abouzeid, 2011; Al

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Jazeera, 2011; Banerjee, 2011; Saleh, 2011). However in Saudi Arabia, the plan did not play out. Ottaway (2011) explains:

The rage, such as it was, had been confined to cyberspace and never made it down to the ground…while there might be signs of ‘disgruntlement’ among Saudis, the vast majority still felt there was more to lose than to gain right now by taking to the streets. The turmoil in Libya…had given many Saudis pause to reconsider” (p. 16).

Shiite protesters from the outskirts of the country seemed to be the only people who acted; there were no protests in any major cities. There was heavy police presence where protests did occur, and the government asserted that protests including any language against the government or Islam was banned (Abouzeid, 2011; Al Jazeera, 2011;

Banerjee, 2011; Saleh, 2011; Teitelbaum, 2011, Saudi)

Certain conditions exist consistently in the countries of the Awakening. High unemployment, increased militarization, and increased opportunities for globalization confront opaque authoritarian regimes, creating a recipe for revolution. The Saudi regime has been increasingly threatened by these conditions. Higher education and technological developments are bringing Saudis in contact with the world and increasing globalization every day. Unemployment is increasing as educated Saudi youth enter the job market demanding skilled jobs, and the kingdom is forced to confront opposition with force like it did on the Day of Rage.

House (2012) writes, “For many Saudis, these latest tips, however generous, reinforce their sense of entitlement, their resentment over unequal distribution of wealth, and their humiliation over the indignity of dependence on royal favors that they believe should be a public right. In today’s Saudi Arabia, money may buy passivity, but it rarely buys gratitude” (p. 220). She also writes, “Modernizers saw his action as another lost

65 opportunity to institute changes that might reverse the country’s downward course” (p.

220).

Some scholars do not believe that the conditions in Saudi Arabia are right for revolution. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2011) doubt that the downtrodden could pose enough of a threat to any autocratic regime. Ottaway (2011) writes that Saudi citizens have seen the consequences of upheaval in other countries and will stay away from conflict. He writes that they look to Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia and cannot be bothered with such destruction. Cultural norms also prevent Saudis from participating in such a violent movement. Overthrowing a patriarchal government would be just as shameful as rejecting the father of a household. King Abdullah has made sure to broadcast these points to the world to decrease the appeal of upheaval for his constituents.

King Abdullah has ensured the regime’s stability and avoided upheaval by appeasing the Awakening interest coalition rather than suppressing it because it is too strong on a global level. The Arab Awakening has gathered attention from the entire world, and if King Abdullah is seen attempting to squash out the interests of the

Awakening, he will be perceived as other failed autocrats have been. He cannot ignore a movement that is so large and so deeply integrated into transnational interest coalition networks for change. Instead, he appears to appease the interests by implementing slow reform programs to ensure his political survival.

The Reform Interest Coalition Network

Some interests and demands from both the liberalism coalition and feminism coalition overlap with the Awakening reformist coalition, but others do not. The

Awakening has its own demands for transparency and written law, but House (2012)

66 writes that this does not necessarily mean that they demand government that is structured as democratic governments are. It has its own demands, and the global network of

Awakening reformists has claimed its own demands that are independent from the democratic demands and from global feminists. King Abdullah has had to appease the interests of all reform interest coalitions because of the strength of their interests worldwide. He has utilized education and technology to keep up with the globalized demands for government reform, and he has kept the Awakening at bay by embodying reformist demands while at the same time working to avoid isolating the interests of the status quo interest coalition network.

King Abdullah follows in the footsteps of King Faisal who became the face of

Islam and at the same time “made his name synonymous with modernization” (Al-

Rasheed, 2003, p. 122). This allowed Faisal to draw interest coalitions together showing them that Islam and modernity were not at odds with each other (Ménoret, 2005). King

Abdullah similarly promotes modernization through technological research and application without threatening the religious establishment. He built the King Abdullah

University of Science and Technology (KAUST)—a university that was financed by the regime to keep up with technocratic interest coalitions worldwide (Jones, 2010). The king also embodies religious piety. For instance, Saudi Arabia requires that students obtain a religious education while they are in school. Through his actions and his image, King

Abdullah has appeased the interests of both the reform and status quo interest coalitions.

King Abdullah is responding to the interest coalition that demands education reform. Saudi Arabia is creating a new five-year program called A Higher Education Plan or Horizons. If approved, it will reform tertiary education to improve students’ critical

67 thinking skills as opposed to the current system where students memorize and regurgitate information (House, 2012). This type of thinking could be seen as a threat to the kingdom, but it is a positive step towards change while the regime still controls the way in which students are educated. Within Saudi Arabia, universities like the King Abdullah

University of Science and Technology are pockets of modernity. In these universities, men and women intermingle with each other and with male and female non-Saudis.

Foreign students work side-by-side with Saudis, and as a result, interests converge

(House, 2012; Jones, 2010).

Both reformers and traditionalists utilize the newest technologies to disseminate their messages. Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter are among the strongest tools for social and political change in the world right now. People calling for reform are forming interest coalition networks transnationally, and technology has become the fastest method of interest interaction. Saudis are connecting to global actors, to the turbulent Middle East, and to each other (Prokop, 2003).

Conservatives within the government are using the newest technologies as well.

The Saudi government employs people to defend the government on the Internet and sway public opinion (Ottaway, 2011). The traditionalist public and the ulema are using the Internet to spread conservative interests just as much as reformers are, and the battle online connects peoples of all belief-systems. The Internet reaches beyond being a forum for exchange of ideas and calls to activism. It is a tool that can connect ruler to ruled and protester to allies.

Similarly, the chief of the Royal Court, Khaled al-Tuwaijri, set up a Facebook page to connect the people to government offices. People can post their complaints and

68 questions to the page (Ottaway, 2011). The page offers a government-issued outlet for dissident voices, allowing people to feel empowered while at the same time containing their protests. The government also uses the Internet to track the activities of terrorists and those who oppose the government. They can use the information that they gather to anticipate protests like the Day of Rage when they were able to increase police presence to control upheaval (Ottaway, 2011). The government is appeasing dissidents by giving them controlled forums to organize and understand interests.

Unfortunately, there are no clearly written laws about what can and cannot be posted on the Internet. Hamza Kashgari became famous for Tweets he posted that were allegedly anti-Prophet Muhammad. King Abdullah ordered his arrest, and the blogger had to seek asylum in Malaysia where he was detained. Amnesty International advocated for Malaysia to release Kashgari without forcing him back to Saudi Arabia, but his experience illustrates the fine line that Internet-users face in Saudi Arabia (Amnesty

International, 2012). Though Abdullah’s arrest order attracted negative attention from human rights coalitions, he had suppressed a much more threatening voice of dissent that was mobilizing global coalitions. There is no written law that governs what can and cannot be posted on the web, and people approach this line with varying degrees of caution. This allows the regime to exploit misinformation and lack of cohesion among interest coalitions of dissent.

The Internet is too large to control, and even the censors set up by the government cannot account for everything. Suppressing dissident voices online is a priority for the regime because online voices are not just individual actors. These voices mobilize threatening global interest coalitions, and appeasement is often impossible. The king also

69 has to worry about the fact that he is constantly being scrutinized. Not only are others thrusting their demands out to the world online, they are recording every second of Saudi politics. It is the king’s challenge to constantly project an image of the strongest global interests so he will not end up offending coalition networks online.

Reform programs have been implemented slowly as signs of concession to modernization and global evolution. The rate with which the reforms are implemented prevents backlash from Saudi Arabia’s political dichotomies. For example, Abdullah’s

“first move upon accession to the throne was to pardon three activists who had called for a constitutional monarchy” (Echagüe, 2009, p. 1). This is a rather small offering to the government reformist interest coalition in a country whose prison systems are exceedingly corrupt (Echagüe, 2009; Amnesty International, 2012). However, it was an appeal to transnational reformist interest coalitions to perceive him as a solution to the prisons’ institutional problems and an advocate for their demands.

Saudi Arabia’s movements towards integration in the world’s politics are slow moving, and they must continue that way if the country wishes to avoid upheaval. Any rash changes could upset the delicate balance with which King Abdullah has maintained the regime’s survival. Abdullah embodies reform:

Presumably in order to bring the general population on board regarding the need for change, initiatives such as the National Dialogues were conceived. Although this hardly amounts to a will to reform the system it has contributed to the portrayal of King Abdullah as a reforming and capable monarch who has made an attempt to address the country’s resource dependency and severe demographic challenge… Nevertheless, King Abdullah enjoys a popularity in Saudi Arabia that is seldom acquired by a ruler with such extensive powers. The weakness of the reform process is essentially that it is dependent on the grace of the king and has not acquired a momentum of its own among the Saudi citizenry” (Echagüe, 2009, p. 3).

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By responding to global interests for change in his country, Abdullah proactively became the embodiment of reform. He appears to lead the changes when in reality he is responding to global interest coalition networks.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The Islamic, status quo, and reform networks and the interest coalitions that they contain provide three examples of the Interest Coalition Model. This is not to say that they are the only networks. However, separately, they are contained networks than can be analyzed very easily and illustrate the model for analysis I am proposing. Abdullah has embodied the most important interest coalition networks, and his work has ensured his regime’s political survival. While the model I propose does not yet apply to cases outside of Saudi Arabia, it has provided an understanding of Abdullah’s actions and his regime’s stability. The only question left is, “what’s next?” One of the largest uncertainties is the next king and his ability to maintain the Kingdom’s stability and his regime’s survival.

Succession and Insecurity

Since the 1950s, the sons of King Abdulaziz ibn Saud—known as Ibn Saud— have been kings. Succession traditionally passes from brother to brother rather than father to son, but the kingdom is running out of brothers. The brothers that are left make up a

“gerontocracy” of old and aging leaders (Ottaway, 2011, p. 17). Now that Ibn Saud’s sons have run out, the royal family’s next choices for king are uncertain, and it could mean rocky transitions of power in the coming years.

In 1995 King Fahd, who had governed since 1982, had an embolism and Crown

Prince Abdullah took over as de facto leader (Ménoret, 2005). Now Abdullah is king, and

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72 he is one of the thinning numbers of Ibn Saud’s sons. Those in line to be king after him are extremely old, and their health has become a major concern. The king is 90. Crown

Prince Salman is 77 and has dementia. The recently appointed Second Deputy Prime

Minister, Prince Muqrin stands next in line, and though he is said to be in good health, he is 70 years old (Henderson, 2013).

Consequently, the line of succession is unclear. The rules of succession are not formal or institutionalized. A Crown Prince is appointed by the king and approved by baya—the royal family’s consent. The king also appoints the Second Deputy Prime

Minister who often succeeds the Crown Prince. However, the Current Second Deputy

Prime Minister Prince Muqrin breaks the mold. The kings chosen from Ibn Saud’s sons have had the same mother, though Prince Muqrin was born of a different Yemeni woman.

Some see this as a desperate attempt to continue appointing the kingship from the same generation. The Second Deputy Prime Minister is not guaranteed to be next in line after the Crown Prince, and Prince Muqrin may still not become king because of his maternal heritage.

It is possible that ascendancy may fall to a younger generation. Even if Muqrin becomes king, the next generation will eventually have to take over the throne, but who will the royal family choose? There are thousands of princes to choose from, and House

(2012) writes, “in no other country on earth is there a royal family on anything like this scale…the monarch sees their diversity, divisions, and demands as just one more problem requiring skillful management” (p. 125). The sons of Ibn Saud have been in power for nearly the entirety of the modern Saudi state, but they are running out, and an injection of youth into the regime could mean a new perspective.

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No one necessarily knows what is next for Saudi Arabia. Abdullah’s reforms are not all necessarily sustainable, and his successor could fail to embody the correct interest coalition networks. The conditions for dissent and revolution are all there, but King

Abdullah seems to be the exception. The next king must be able to embody the global interest coalitions mentioned above and his ability to do so could mean the difference between stability and an Awakening in the Kingdom.

From my model, we can see that the most stable autocracies have considered global interests rather than analyzing each actor the must confront separately. King

Abdullah has illustrated that global interests should be the primary concern for a leader, and he has noticed the big picture before confronting each political actor separately.

Whoever comes after King Abdullah must be able to balance the transnational interest coalitions that he has balanced. He has embodied the strongest interest coalition networks and appeased their demands, and he has suppressed the demands of the weakest coalitions.

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