Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

Changed Priorities in the Gulf WP and the Emirates Rethink Their Relationship with

Matthias Sailer S

Saudi Arabia and the (UAE) are likely to scale back noticeably on their generous financial gifts to Egypt under its President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. In the one year that King Salman has ruled Saudi Arabia, the kingdom has improved rela- tions with the , an organization the Egyptian regime portrays as the source of all evil. ’s overriding priority is now to stem Iran’s influence in the region, particularly in and . However, in Syria especially, al-Sisi’s stance diverges from Saudi Arabia’s. Moreover, both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are frustrated by the lack of progress Egypt has made in improving its financial, economic and security situation. In addition, low oil prices have brought about a more restrictive spending policy in the Gulf. Consequently, for the first time since the overthrow of President Mohammed Morsi, Germany and the EU have an opportunity to push for change in Egypt by offering financial support that is made conditional on implementing measures to increase political participation and improve governance.

Between 2011 and the death of the Saudi , primarily from King Abdullah in January 2015, Saudi and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, marched into UAE regional policies primarily targeted . Their mission was to support Bah- preventing the so-called from rain’s ruling family in violently putting spilling over onto the Arab Peninsula. For down a popular uprising. At the time, Bah- the rulers of the two autocratically governed rain’s leaders accused Iran of inciting the Gulf States these rebellions represented an country’s mainly Shiite population against existential threat. It became apparent as the ruling Sunni , though without early as 2011 that both countries’ foreign providing any evidence. policies were being militarized. This mili- However, both Gulf regimes saw the tarization occurred in parallel with the US, main threat as coming from the Muslim which for decades had guaranteed Saudi Brotherhood. That organization emerged security, reducing its military commitment victorious from Egypt’s first democratic elec- in the region. A foreign policy relying on tions in 2011/2012; and in Tunisia Ennahda, military means was first seen in March which is close to the Brotherhood, received 2011, when military and police units of the the most votes in the October 2011 elections.

Matthias Sailer is a Ph.D. Fellow in SWP’s Middle East and Africa Division. These Comments are published in the frame of the project SWP Comments 8 “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) between 2012 and 2015. January 2016 It was funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperated with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 The regimes of both Gulf States were con- well as the birthplace of the Muslim cerned that with its ever growing political Brotherhood, it initially had a key role influence, the Brotherhood might under- in the Saudi and UAE fight against that mine their systems of government from organization. Egypt. In the 1950s and 1960s, many mem- bers and sympathizers of the Egyptian Mus- lim Brotherhood had fled to Saudi Arabia Opponent: Qatar and the UAE to escape persecution in their On the other side were the rulers of Qatar, own country. Originally, these mostly well which supported the Muslim Brothers. They educated immigrants had been well received viewed the organization’s rise as a chance in the Gulf States as a boost to the educa- to extend their own regional and inter- tional sector, which was then being ex- national influence further. For decades, the panded. As teachers, however, they were country had been cultivating close relation- also able to spread their own ideology. ships with the Muslim Brothers and other Additionally, they became active in the civil Islamist organizations. It therefore seemed society, for instance in the charity sector. likely that Qatar would be among those Following the Muslim Brothers’ increasingly profiting most from regime change in the political behaviour, Saudi Arabia and the Arab countries in turmoil. However, with UAE prohibited their activities in the 1990s. Morsi’s overthrow in July 2013 and the sub- In 2011 the concern in the Gulf was that the sequent repression of the Muslim Brother- Egyptian Brotherhood might incite those hood by the new military regime, it became parts of the population that had been in- evident that this strategy would not work. fluenced by its ideology to rise up against From that point on, the Qatari leadership the monarchies. How threatened the rulers was increasingly forced to realize that it of the UAE felt by this scenario is shown by could not maintain its foreign policy against the fact that legal proceedings were insti- the will of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both tuted there against more than 100 people of which supported the new regime in between April 2011 and November 2014. Cairo. Most of the accused were charged with When Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bah- founding a secret organization affiliated rain recalled their ambassadors to Qatar in with the Muslim Brotherhood with the March 2014, the pressure became too great. aim of toppling the UAE regime. Some of Towards the end of the year, Qatar already the accused were Egyptians. seemed to be moving closer to its former Alongside the anxiety about an “export opponents’ position. At that time, for in- of revolutions” promoted by the Muslim stance, the Qatari leadership let it be known Brotherhood, there was a concern that to several high-ranking Brotherhood offi- Egypt under the Brotherhood might seek a cials living within its borders that their rapprochement with Iran. In August 2012 presence was putting great pressure on Mohammed Morsi was the first Egyptian Qatar. They left the country. The emirate President to travel to Tehran since the 1979 thus partly met Saudi and UAE demands Revolution. Further state visits between the not to give shelter to Egyptian dissidents. two countries followed. The Muslim Brother- This was good news for the military regime hood stressed that this upgrading of Iran in Cairo. was not aimed at the Arab Gulf states, but the latter remained sceptical. When a high- ranking official of the Muslim Brotherhood The end of the Saudi-Emirati block stated in June 2013 that the UAE would be- against the Muslim Brotherhood come “slaves of the Persians”, the Emirates’ Developments, however, took a different leaders saw their fears confirmed. And since turn. King died in Egypt is the most populous Arab country as January 2015, depriving Cairo of one of its

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2 most important supporters. The new king, former enemies. The Yemeni Islah and Saudi Salman bin Abdul Aziz al-Saud, changed Arabia had been on hostile terms after Saudi regional policy by speedily imple- Riyadh declared the Muslim Brotherhood menting a rapprochement with the Muslim a terrorist organization in March 2014. Brotherhood. This went hand in hand with In addition, there has been close coopera- a rapprochement with Qatar and Turkey as tion with Qatar and Turkey in Syria since well as a slight cooling of relations between spring 2015. The military successes of the Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. rebel alliance Jaish al-, forged by Saudi Since Salman’s accession, there have been Arabia and Qatar, brought Bashar al-Assad’s many reports about high-level meetings regime close to military defeat in the sum- of the Saudi leadership with top-ranking mer of that year. This rebel alliance includes officials of regional Brotherhood affiliates, militias that can be categorized as belong- such as Rashid al-Ghannouchi (Tunisia), ing to the Muslim Brotherhood. The defeat Hammam Saeed () and Khaled of the government troops was ultimately Meshaal, the representative of Palestinian prevented by Russia’s military intervention . So far, the highpoint has been in autumn 2015. Riyadh’s ambassador to Doha inviting the influential Egyptian legal scholar and TV preacher Yusuf al-Qaradawi for the occasion UAE: readjustment rather than of the Saudi national day in October 2015. change of course Few people symbolize the aversion to Egypt’s Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE have not military regime quite as much as al-Qara- initiated a clear policy change on the Mus- dawi, who is close to the Muslim Brothers lim Brotherhood. However, careful readjust- and has been living in exile in Qatar for ments are perceptible here, too. In Yemen, decades. for instance, the UAE demonstrate pragma- At the same time, King Salman has been tism. Despite not directly working together seeking closer relations with Qatar and with the Yemeni Islah against the Houthis, Turkey (Ankara’s relationship with Egypt they support the Saudi approach, which is tense as well). Photos of a meeting held comprises cooperating with the movement. in February 2015 by Mohammed bin Nayef, Ultimately, therefore, Abu Dhabi’s policy now the Saudi crown prince, and deputy indirectly strengthens the Yemeni Islah. crown prince , with While the UAE and Saudi Arabia have the Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani essentially been on good terms since showed the participants in a good mood: Salman’s accession, there is also potential clearly, relations between Saudi Arabia and for conflict. For the time being, the war in Qatar had substantially improved. Advisors Yemen is keeping the two countries close. to the Qatari government stressed that the According to high-ranking advisors in Abu improvement had occurred very suddenly Dhabi, however, once this factor ceases on Salman’s accession to power and that to exist, relations could certainly become today’s bilateral relations were very good. more difficult, mostly because of the coun- Proof of this rapprochement can also tries’ different attitudes towards the Mus- be found in the Saudi-Qatari cooperation lim Brotherhood. in the civil wars in Yemen and Syria. In By contrast, relations between the UAE Yemen, where Saudi Arabia is waging a war and Qatar remain cool. At the very core of against the Houthi rebels, cooperation with their divergences is Qatar’s friendly stance Yemen’s Islah – an umbrella organization towards the Muslim Brothers. The two that includes the local offspring of the Mus- countries clashed particularly hard over lim Brotherhood – is important. Qatar took the Brotherhood and Morsi’s overthrow on the role of mediator here and accom- in Egypt, causing lasting damage to their plished a rapprochement between the two relations.

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3 Changed perceptions of threats A strengthened Iran These ongoing adaptations of the Gulf Along with the weakening of the Muslim States in their relations to the Muslim Brotherhood there is, for Saudi Arabia and Brotherhood and to each other must be the UAE, the threat of Iran, which they per- seen against a series of regional and inter- ceive to have grown substantially. The fact national developments that have changed that Riyadh pulled out of the anti-Brother- the perceptions of threats in Saudi Arabia hood block should above all be interpreted and the UAE. These altered perceptions as an attempt to forge a broad alliance characterize their relationship with Egypt of Sunni states and transnational actors today. against Shiite Iran, in a less and less favour- able regional and international environ- ment. A weakened Muslim Brotherhood Saudi Arabia and the UAE have both There is first of all the regional standing of come to terms with the nuclear the Muslim Brothers. Two-and-a-half years accord on Iran in July 2015. However, on from the overthrow of President Morsi, although Riyadh and Abu Dhabi officially Saudi Arabia and the UAE view the Brother- welcomed the agreement, they believe that hood, which has been violently suppressed Iran’s desire to dominate the region con- ever since, as weakened. The two countries tinues to underpin its policies. Media state- still consider the organization’s ideology ments made by high-ranking government a threat to their own ruling systems. How- officials of both countries in the autumn ever, the threat is now categorized as long- of 2015 confirm this. The predominant per- term rather than acute. Yet in spite of their ception in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is that similar evaluation of the Brotherhood, they might come to be at a disadvantage in aversion to it remains much greater in Abu the power struggle with Iran. The improve- Dhabi than in Riyadh. Top-ranking advisors ment in relations between Iran and the US of the gravely ill UAE president and of the reinforces this view. Moreover, the Arab Abu Dhabi crown prince continue to stress Gulf States see the US, their traditional the great danger which they see as ema- security guarantor, as increasingly weak. nating from the Brotherhood. Public state- The hostile stance of the Sunni Gulf re- ments of the UAE Minister of State for For- gimes towards Iran is also based on the fear eign Affairs, Anwar Gargash, underline that Tehran might stir up the Shiite popu- this aversion. In late November 2015, for lation segments of the Arab Gulf States instance, he blamed the Yemeni Islah against their ruling . Along with for the difficulties experienced in recaptur- Bahrain, this applies above all to Saudi ing the Houthi-dominated Taiz province. Arabia, where the percentage of Shiites, Alongside the already mentioned allega- who are concentrated mainly in the east tions of putsch plans, there is a further of the country, is 10 to 15 percent. Com- possible explanation for the UAE’s harsher pounding this is Iran’s great influence in position on the Muslim Brotherhood: Syria, Lebanon and Iraq. Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan, the Abu Dhabi crown prince and the Emirates’ most important decision-maker in foreign affairs. Yemen as a red line Mohammed bin Zayed has had a military The great extent to which Iran is now per- career, and observers describe his world- ceived as a threat by Saudi Arabia and the view as heavily focused on security. Added UAE can be seen in Yemen. The two Gulf to this is the aversion for Islamism in States absolutely want to prevent Iran’s general and for the Muslim Brotherhood influence from spreading onto the Arabian in particular that the crown prince shares Peninsula. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi therefore with some of his advisors. consider Yemen the red line that must not

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4 be crossed by Iran. They accuse Tehran of The UAE’s complex interests supporting the Yemeni Houthi rebels, who There has so far been consensus at Emirati stormed the capital Sanaa in September government level about the necessity for 2014 and drove the government of Presi- the deployment in Yemen, despite some dent Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi from office. divergent interests. Here, the decisive factor Comments made by Iranian politicians is the unity between Abu Dhabi – the richest have reinforced perceptions in Abu Dhabi UAE emirate by far – and Dubai, whose state and Riyadh that this is a part of Tehran’s companies were kept afloat during the finan- expansionism. For instance, after Sanaa had cial crisis in 2009 by around $10bn from been captured by the Houthis, a member Abu Dhabi. Dubai, the commercial centre of the Iranian parliament said that Iran of the UAE, has historic trade relations with now governed in four Arab capitals: Beirut, Iran and would like to maintain or expand , Baghdad and Sanaa. these ties. By contrast, Abu Dhabi sees Iran It is the Emirates’ military engagement mainly as a threat and has in the past used in Yemen that most clearly reveals their harsher rhetoric against it than Dubai. And concerns about Iran. Relative to the UAE’s yet the two Emirates do fundamentally small size, their deployment is extensive agree about the Iranian threat. Commercial and very risky domestically. According to interests are simply kept strictly separate a UAE general quoted by Reuters, around from fundamental security interests. This 4,000 soldiers from the UAE, Saudi Arabia, is shown among other things by the lively Bahrain and Sudan were fighting in Yemen economic relations between the UAE and in early December 2015. The UAE are in- Iran, which exist despite the fact that, volved in combat operations with their air since 1971, Iran has occupied three islands force and ground troops. Although there claimed by the Emirates. are no official numbers for the UAE con- There are further reasons for the UAE’s tingent, local observers estimate that its strong involvement in Yemen, besides feel- overall contribution of troops is greater ing threatened by Tehran. According to high- than Saudi Arabia’s. According to press ranking political advisors in Qatar (which reports, there are also 450 Latin American is a part of the Saudi-led alliance in Yemen), soldiers in the UAE ranks. A UN Security the military engagement of the UAE can Council report assumes that an additional also be explained as a reaction to Riyadh’s 400 soldiers from Eritrea are embedded in changed policy towards the Muslim Brother- the UAE armed forces. hood: the different attitudes are putting Local anecdotes about young Emiratis a strain on bilateral relations. With their demonstrate how risky the deployment is large-scale military deployment to Yemen, domestically: some of them received their the UAE have been able to strengthen them combat orders in disbelief and only took considerably. In other words, the deploy- them seriously when the military police ment also improves Abu Dhabi’s bargaining came looking for them because they had position in case of future political disagree- not reported for duty. The many stage- ments with Riyadh. managed visits of condolence made by high-ranking Abu Dhabi and Dubai royals to the families of fallen soldiers also show Saudi special interests clearly that the UAE leadership is aware of In the case of Saudi Arabia, too, the same the domestic risks. Should the mood of the political advisors give an additional ex- people turn against the intervention, then planation for the intervention in Yemen, their rulers’ legitimacy would suffer greatly. besides the Iran factor: Mohammed bin It must therefore be assumed that the Emir- Salman, the Saudi deputy crown prince, is ates’ leaders run this risk only because they also defence minister. According to them, really do feel threatened. the wish to reinforce his position also played

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5 a role – albeit a secondary one – in Saudi Sameh Shoukry welcomed Russia’s inter- Arabia’s military intervention because it vention there. This was a divergence from allowed this only 31-year-old son of King the Saudi position, which sees the Russian Salman to demonstrate his resoluteness air strikes primarily as assisting the Iran- and assertiveness. supported Assad regime. In contrast with Saudi Arabia, Egypt would essentially accept a solution to the Syria conflict even The secondary importance of IS if it provided a future leadership role for Compared to the efforts to contain Iran, Bashar al-Assad. even the fight against the so-called Islamic The Emirati position on the Syria con- State (IS) currently has only secondary im- flict is less clear-cut. On the one hand, like portance for Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Riyadh, Abu Dhabi is concerned about a There have been several terrorist attacks in possible expansion of Iran’s influence in Saudi Arabia claimed by IS, most recently Syria; on the other, the Emirates fear the in October 2015. Nonetheless, months ago powerful presence of Islamist groups there Riyadh and Abu Dhabi sharply reduced more than Saudi Arabia does. their participation in the air strikes against Relations between the Gulf States and IS in Syria and Iraq. This makes it very clear Egypt concerning the military intervention that the war in Yemen – and thus ultimately in Yemen are more complex. Egypt is criti- the containment of Iran – has greater prior- cal of it. However, its reservations in this ity. It is rather unlikely that the Islamic area are less principled in nature. Rather, anti-terror coalition announced by Saudi they seem to express dissatisfaction with Arabia in mid-December 2015 represents a the minor role that the Gulf States gave revised set of priorities. After all, the deputy Egypt to play in this conflict. A greater crown prince has already stated that the engagement would have given al-Sisi an coalition would not exclusively be aimed at opportunity to free Egypt from the one- IS terrorism. Moreover, several alleged mem- sided and almost total dependence on the bers seemed unaware of their own member- Gulf States. However, according to high- ship of the alliance as it was being an- ranking advisors close to Abu Dhabi’s nounced, which leaves its seriousness in crown prince, Cairo was not asked for a doubt. greater military contribution, even though it would not hesitate to expand its partici- pation if requested. This seems to confirm Foreign-policy divergences with that the Gulf States are not interested in al-Sisi being dependent on Egypt’s help either Saudi relations with the Egyptian President in Yemen or more generally. al-Sisi, whose rule is inextricably linked with the fight against the Muslim Brothers, are currently at a low because of the changed Frustration with al-Sisi’s domestic perception of threats in Riyadh. This is also policy performance reflected in some Egyptian commentators’ There is now criticism in both Riyadh and attacks on Saudi Arabia. For instance, in his Abu Dhabi of al-Sisi’s balance sheet in fi- TV show in November 2015, talk show host nancial and economic policy and domestic Ibrahim Eissa attacked the Kingdom’s fun- security. According to advisors close to the damentalist state religion and exclaimed, Qatari Emir, Saudi Arabia is disappointed “You are terrorism!” Since then, well-known at al-Sisi’s lack of success, and is concerned Saudi journalists have been openly and about Egypt’s stability. Saudi press reports, sharply criticizing al-Sisi, for example be- too, show that these issues are discussed cause of Cairo’s attitude to the conflict in critically by the country’s elite. In Novem- Syria. In October, Egyptian foreign minister ber 2015, for instance, prominent Saudi

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6 commentators bluntly denounced the still tendency for the other Arab Gulf States as desperate economic and financial situation well. In late December, the Saudi leader- in Egypt. ship, which is faced with a budget deficit Indeed, Cairo offers scope for criticism. for 2015 provisionally estimated at $98bn, Foreign exchange reserves, for instance, was already forced to curtail subsidies for were hardly higher at $16.4bn in November petrol, electricity and water. 2015 than just before Morsi’s overthrow ($14.9bn). Since then, however, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have together poured an esti- Conclusion: the Gulf States will cut mated $25bn to $41.5bn into Egypt in the their financial support to Egypt form of grants, soft loans, and oil and gas Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt products. In Abu Dhabi, too, there is an are particularly difficult at the moment. awareness that Egypt’s economy is in a Their very different opinions on what role bad way. After Morsi’s overthrow, the UAE the Muslim Brotherhood should play are had sent a taskforce to Egypt to implement virtually impossible to reconcile. For Saudi projects that were intended to swiftly create Arabia, the rapprochement with the Brother- jobs and bring tangible improvements to hood is a part of its own strategy against people on low incomes. However, the UAE Iran – which Riyadh sees as the greatest are aware that these projects cannot by threat by far. Al-Sisi’s position on the Syria themselves stabilize the country economi- conflict also diverges from Riyadh’s, and cally and thus also politically. High-ranking Egypt’s precarious economic and security advisors in Abu Dhabi assume that the situation has stoked the Saudi leadership’s Egyptian economy and employment situa- disapproval. At the same time, the low price tion will not fundamentally improve in the of oil puts limits on Saudi Arabia’s financial foreseeable future because of strong popu- largesse. For this reason, the Kingdom is lation growth. Every year, up to 800,000 likely to significantly reduce its financial young professionals flood the Egyptian job support to Cairo. However, the Saudi leader- market, which is incapable of absorbing ship will not consider completely stopping such large numbers because economic its support, as such a move would risk en- growth is too weak. There is dissatisfaction dangering Egypt’s stability and jeopardiz- in Abu Dhabi over Egypt’s too-slow imple- ing Saudi political influence there. mentation of urgent economic reforms. The expected decline of Saudi Arabia’s Moreover, there is noticeable scepticism generosity was already evident in its new about the capability of the al-Sisi regime to support package for Egypt, announced in get to grips with Egypt’s terrorism problem. December 2015. It held out the prospect of state investments over a period of three to five years, but no new grants. The package Low oil prices, high military also comprises help to cover Egypt’s oil expenditure needs over the next five years. However, Between July 2014 and mid-December this is not in the form of grants either, 2015, the price of Brent Crude plummeted but loans. by about 65 percent. This has drastically Relations between Abu Dhabi and Cairo reduced Gulf state revenues. Their initial are less tense, but likewise increasingly bur- optimism that prices would soon rise again dened with problems. Their shared aversion has now vanished. In addition, there are to the Muslim Brotherhood is a uniting fac- the costs of the war in Yemen. The con- tor. In the Syria conflict too, both sides are vergence of these two factors has already closer to each other than is the case with led to a more restrictive attitude to spend- Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But delays in im- ing in the UAE. Influential businessmen plementing economic reforms in Egypt, who are active in the region confirm this and Cairo’s hitherto unproductive efforts

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7 to solve the country’s terrorism problem, are causing growing impatience in the Emirates. The tenor in Abu Dhabi is that there will be continued material support for Egypt, but not nearly to the same extent as previously, because of the lastingly low price of oil. With Saudi and UAE generosity decreas- ing, Cairo will find it noticeably harder to cover its own expenditure. The Egyptian leadership will therefore have to look for complementary or alternative sources of income. A new situation for Germany and the EU

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und is thus taking shape. Up until now, al-Sisi Politik, 2016 could afford to do without Western support, All rights reserved which would have been conditional on These Comments reflect better governance or greater inclusion of the author’s views. the suppressed opposition. The Gulf States SWP paid even without such conditions. How- Stiftung Wissenschaft und ever, if their generosity now decreases, this Politik German Institute for will put Germany and the EU in a position International and to influence Egypt’s development using Security Affairs conditional aid. This will be an opportunity Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 to prevent the country’s political and eco- 10719 Berlin nomic situation from getting worse and thus Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 stop Egypt from becoming a failed state. www.swp-berlin.org [email protected]

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Translation by Tom Genrich

(English version of SWP-Aktuell 1/2016)

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