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ASEAN civil society under the Myanmar chairmanship Rother, Stefan
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Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation: Rother, S. (2014). ASEAN civil society under the Myanmar chairmanship. (GIGA Focus International Edition, 10). Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-408854
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2014
ISSN 2196-3940 INTERNATIONAL ASEAN Civil Society under the Myanmar Chairmanship Stefan Rother
The 2014 ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) in Yangon, Myanmar, saw a record attendance and provided a surprisingly open space for civil society. But the opposing trends of democratic developments and authoritarian backlash in the member states have also had significant repercussions at the regional level.
Analysis In a time where civil liberties and human rights seem to be on the decline in the re- gion (e.g. Brunei’s introduction of sharia law, the shooting of demonstrating textile workers in Cambodia, Thailand’s coup d’état), ASEAN civil society is presenting it- self as organized as rarely before. But government crackdowns are on the rise, and nation states are denying civil society representatives space at the regional level. Civil society has the potential to address the democratic deficit of regional organi-
zations by establishing alternative regionalism from below. EDITION Civil society can give voice to transnationally marginalized groups, such as migrant workers, whose interests are represented neither by their states of origin or resi- dence nor at the regional level. All justified doubts about the sincerity and sustainability of its transition process notwithstanding, Myanmar has currently opened up spaces for civil society advo- cacy. National organizations can benefit from interactions with the regional level. ASEAN’s ambitious plan to establish a “people-centered” community is under- mined by the reluctance of several member states to engage in dialogue with civ- il society.
When faced with attempts to limit its space for participation, civil society has to English adopt either an “inside-outside” or “outsider by choice” approach. If it wants to be accepted as a legitimate partner, civil society has to be transparent about the sourc- es of its own legitimacy and democratic internal structure.
Keywords: ASEAN, civil society, democratization, regionalism, Myanmar, Southeast Asia, social movements, migration
www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus The Democratic Deficit of Regional regions, recreate the processes of regional inte- Organizations gration and advance people-centered regional al- ternatives.” The democratic deficit has been an often lament- ed aspect of European integration. But consider- ing the existence of a parliament and regularly ASEAN – A “People-Centered” Community? held elections, the European Union still displays more democratic features than most other region- There is increasing awareness among member al organizations. A lack democracy is even more states that not only grand projects such as the apparent in organizations such as ASEAN, where ASEAN Economic Community but also the con- currently none of the 10 member states can be con- cerns of specific, often marginalized groups such sidered fully democratic according to the latest as women, children, victims of trafficking and Freedom House Index.1 Besides having no direct to some degree migrant workers are best dealt input in ASEAN, the people of these states also with on a regional basis (Manea 2009). Still, the have limited or no influence on their governments’ “ASEAN way” with its emphasis on noninterfer- politics with regard to this regional-level organi- ence in the domestic affairs of member countries zation. There are, however, actors who are trying is a deeply embedded norm in the regional polit- to address this democratic gap – namely, transna- ical culture (Rother 2012b). Member states often tional civil society organizations (CSOs) that have face difficulties in agreeing on issues such as en- formed networks in order to create space for their vironmental challenges and the treatment of mi- advocacy and participation. This increasingly in- grant workers because of significant discrepan- cludes the regional level. cies in their respective economic development and These actors have the potential to create an “al- thus bargaining power. Civil society has the po- ternative regionalism” from the ground up. The tential and ambition to address these “touchy” is- analysis provided here understands regions as a sues, but the actual space provided for civil soci- social construct and thus “examines the roles of ety engagement at the ASEAN level is very limit- not only states but also other varieties of non-state ed. This stands in marked contrast to one of the actors such as domestic firms, transnational cor- most ambitious projects of the regional organi- porations, NGOs, and other types of social net- zation: the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community works and social movements in the process of re- (ASCC), which was introduced as the third pil- gionalization” (Igarashi 2011: 4). Alternative re- lar of the Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II in gionalism is not merely an academic concept, but 2003. According to the ASCC blueprint published one that has been brought forward explicitly by in 2009, the goal is to establish a “people-cen- activists themselves. For instance, the People’s tered” community by “building a caring and shar- Agenda for Alternative Regionalisms (PAAR),2 ing society which is inclusive and harmonious a network of networks with several civil society where the well-being, livelihood, and welfare of members from Southeast Asia, aims “to contrib- the peoples are enhanced” (ASEAN 2009). Many ute to the understanding of alternative regional of the major human rights demands of NGOs are integration as a key strategy to struggle against mentioned in the publication, but such ambitious neoliberal globalization and to broaden the base goals only find their way into regional declara- among key social actors for political debate and tions and agreements in a watered-down form or action around regional integration.”3 PAAR pro- not at all. motes the concept of “people’s integration” in re- gional processes, which clearly aims at democra- tizing regionalism with the goal to “reclaim the The ASEAN Civil Society Conference (ACSC) and the ASEAN Peoples’ Forum (APF)
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GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 2 - Assembly, which was strictly modeled on a “se- civil society engagement under Myanmar’s chair- lectively inclusive corporatist structure of region- manship of ASEAN. After all, even among its less al governance” (Rüland 2014: 254). Subsequent than democratic fellow member states, Myanmar meetings were organized under the guidance of has for a long time been considered a pariah that Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA), had to be brought closer to the association through which is seen as the leading network attempting “constructive engagement.” In 2006, under duress to engage ASEAN and comprises approximately from the United States and the European Union, 100 national and regional organizations (Gerard ASEAN reluctantly denied Myanmar the chair- 2013: 417). Tellingly, SAPA and the ACSC (which manship of the association because of the antidem- has now merged with the APF) are affiliated net- ocratic and oppressive practices of its government works of the aforementioned PAAR and adhere to (Renshaw 2013). Five years later, in 2011, ASEAN its concept of democratizing regionalism. Through awarded Myanmar the 2014 chairmanship on the its counterhegemonic advocacy work, SAPA chal- basis of its confidence in Myanmar’s program of lenges ASEAN on a wide number of human rights– reform. Still, there was doubt whether Myanmar related issues. There is, however, a certain frustra- had either the resources to host the large number tion within SAPA regarding the fact that its annual of meetings associated with the chairmanship or resolutions rarely lead to specific outcomes. the political authority to address sensitive issues Over the years, a consistent format for the such as the South China Sea dispute. ACSC/APF has been established. The conference But observers have so far been surprised at takes place before the annual ASEAN summit, how well Myanmar is handling its new position, where the heads of government of each member several caveats and weaknesses notwithstand- state meet. Several days of plenary sessions and ing. For once, the chair was able to facilitate a workshops result in the drafting of a “people’s consensus among the member states for a stron- statement” addressed to the ASEAN leaders. The ger ASEAN voice vis-à-vis China on the maritime declaration is presented at the “interface meet- disputes in the South China Sea.4 Domestically, ing,” which brings together government represen- the country has, in accordance with the ASEAN tatives and civil society representatives from each blueprint, installed a national commission for hu- ASEAN country. The appointment of these repre- man rights to which violations can be reported. So sentatives, however, has been a constant source of far, only Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the tension, with several authoritarian states reject- Philippines have set up similar institutions. But ing the delegates selected by civil society and re- this development is also exemplary of the fragile placing them with representatives from so-called nature of reform in Myanmar: a recent report by GONGOs (government-organized nongovernmen- three NGOS (Burma Partnership, a national NGO, tal organizations). as well as Equality Myanmar and Forum-Asia, In addition, the provision of physical and po- both regional NGOs) denounces the “continuing litical space for ACSC/APF participants is very ineffectiveness” of the Myanmar National Human much dependent on the host government (i.e. the Rights Commission (MNHRC), in particular its current chair of ASEAN). In previous years, there failure to probe reports of human rights abus- were allegations of restrictions and intimida- es amid the communal violence in Myanmar’s tion. For instance, at the civil society meetings in Rakhine state with its strong Rohingya popula- Cambodia in 2012, participants were threatened tion and the armed conflict in the Kachin state.5 with power cuts and being locked in the venue if The paper also questioned the independence of sensitive issues such as land evictions were dis- the commission from government influence. It is cussed (Gerard 2013: 420). CSOs also considered unclear whether the decision of Myanmar’s pres- the meeting in Brunei Darussalam the following ident, Thein Sein, to reshuffle the MNHRC in the year to be a further disappointment. same week as the report was issued was a direct
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GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 3 - reaction. This event, however, highlights the in- ernment. In 2012 the Rakhine state riots, which creasing prominence of national NGOs and the were sparked by an alleged case of rape, resulted growing interdependence between them and re- in the killing and displacement of many Rohingya. gional NGOs. While social media in Myanmar is full of agitated Myanmar’s decision to release more than 3,000 calls for the Rohingya to leave the country and “go prisoners has also been linked to its ASEAN chair- home,” their alleged place of origin, Bangladesh, manship since the announcement came just one has not welcomed the group either. An estimat- month before the Ninth East Asia Summit in ed 1 million Rohingya have fled Myanmar (with November 2014, which was attended by the US around 800,000 remaining), many of them staying president, Barack Obama, and other world lead- in Southeast Asian countries. In contrast, the re- ers. The national NGO Assistance Association for gion’s Muslim countries have been very outspo- Political Prisoners (AAPP) pointed out that only ken in their support of the Rohingya, thus mak- three political prisoners were among the 3,073 to ing their plight an ASEAN challenge and a natural be released. The Asia-Pacific director of Amnesty cause for civil society. But the reluctance among International saw the release as an “empty ges- the Burmese ACSC/APF participants to address ture” and claimed its timing “smacks of politi- the issue tarnished an otherwise impressive civil cal opportunism.”6 During his visit, Obama laud- society gathering. ed the democratization process in the country. However, young Burmese activists – many of whom had also participated in the ACSC/APF Hungry for Participation: The ACSC/APF in – expressed a different view during one of his Yangon speeches by holding up posters with slogans like “Reform is fake.” While SAPA remains influential in the ACSC/APF, In sum, Myanmar’s track record on human a comprehensive organizational structure for pre- rights, press freedom, women’s rights, and the paring the meetings has been established over protection of religious and ethnic minorities re- the years. To sustain the regional character of the mains very uneven and rollbacks can happen at event, the conference is organized by the region- any time. The most divisive topic – one that has al networks and facilitated by CSOs from the chair repercussions for other ASEAN member states country. There are eight committees and bodies, and NGOs and also at the regional level – remains which includes drafting and finance and regional the plight of the Rohingya, the country’s Muslim and national organizing committees. Preparatory minority. The controversy even extends to the use meetings are held at both the national and region- of the term “Rohingya,” which in Rohingya refers al levels. The high level of interest in the nation- to “people from Rakhine” (formerly known as al events held before the Yangon conference indi- Arakane). However, the predominantly Buddhist cated that Myanmar civil society is “hungry” for a majority in the state of Rakhine rejects the use of space in which it can participate and voice its con- the term, instead referring to the Rohingya – as do cerns. Still, the attendance at the actual conference many others in Myanmar – as “Bengalis.” By not exceeded all expectations: more than 3,000 indi- accepting the Rohingya as one of the 130 ethnic viduals and delegates from CSOs and grassroots races in Myanmar and instead classifying them as organizations representing the ASEAN region stateless Bengali Muslims from Bangladesh, the and Timor Leste as well as observers from aca- Burmese state has been denying them the right to demic and international organizations came to the citizenship since 1982 (Delius 2014). Myanmar Convention Center – twice the number This policy was reinforced in March 2014 when expected by organizers. Out of these, 2,275 par- the Myanmar government did not allow Muslims ticipants were from Myanmar, with participants to register as “Rohingya” in its first census in three from more remote regions often traveling for sev- decades. Discrimination and serious human rights eral days to reach Yangon. violations were widespread under the junta re- Despite reports by participants and organiz- gime and have continued under the present gov- ers that the government attempted to influence the agenda in the run-up and that secret police 6 Online:
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 4 - region as a whole. In her opening speech, May – in the latter the sultan instated the death penal- May Pyone, chair of the ACSC/APF 2014 Steering ty for homosexuality shortly after the 2014 ACSC/ Committee, described the gathering as a “show- APF. Also very visible in Yangon were sex work- case event for civil society” and a “vital compo- er activists carrying red umbrellas, signaling their nent of the ASEAN project.” President Thein cooperation with the Red Umbrella Fund, an ini- Sein sent a congratulatory message in which he tiative that came out of the Donor Collaboration to spoke of a “watershed moment” for the peoples Advance the Human Rights of Sex Workers. of ASEAN as well as goals such a lasting peace, The event workshops were divided into four the transition to a true democracy, social justice, clusters (peace, justice and human rights, devel- and protection of the environment – all endeavors opment, and democratization) and covered a wide in which “the role of civil society is paramount” range of issues, such as challenges in ceasefire and (ACSC/APF 2014). peace process negotiations, the promotion and pro- Critics of gatherings like the ACSC/APF may tection of the rights of children on the move in see their reliance on symbolic measures, work- ASEAN, and labor rights and migrant workers. shops, and speeches as a weakness and the final The civil society–initiated Task Force on ASEAN declarations as outcomes with no measurable ef- Migrant Workers (TF-AMW) was among the hosts fect on actual politics. But from the perspective of of these workshops. Its advocacy work is a prime the organizers, the act of formulating such a dec- example of alternative regionalism from below laration is already part of the goal. For once, it en- (Piper and Rother 2014), which refers to civil soci- ables activists from the ASEAN member countries ety’s attempts to address shortcomings at the na- to network and search for common ground and to tional and regional levels. For example, the TF- develop strategies addressing issues that are of- AMW has come up with a proposal consisting of ten transnational in nature. In the specific case of 192 specific recommendations for an ASEAN in- Myanmar, national civil society has a lot of catch- strument on the governance of labor migration, ing up to do in terms of organizing, funding, ad- while migrant-sending and -receiving countries vocacy, and strategic action. The aforementioned remain in a gridlock over this issue. joint action between the national and regional lev- Most Burmese speakers in the program seemed els in exposing the shortcomings of the MNCHR reluctant to address the issue of the Rohingya, can be seen as an example of such cooperation. so it was up to the delegates from other ASEAN Such meetings also provide regional networks member states to repeatedly bring up the topic in with the opportunity to recruit and educate their several rounds of discussions, sometimes being members. The ACSC/APF also provides space for met with opposition from nationalistic Burmese national and local activists to voice their concerns. monks. Considering that even Aung San Suu Kyi For instance, in a plenary session titled “Myanmar has been remarkably reluctant to talk about the is- in Transition,” Ko Moe Thwe, the secretary gener- sue, outside voices in the ACSC can help to give al of the National Youth Congress and president voice to a group that is marginalized even with- of Generation Wave (a prodemocracy Burmese in national civil society. Still, the cause of the youth movement) stated, “Our country is still un- Rohingya did not find its way into the final docu- der a military government, the military has to- ment of the meeting. tal control of the administration and legislation.” Barring the exclusion of the Rohingya, the final He blamed the dictatorship for systematically de- declaration sought to be inclusive, which came at stroying the country and leaving behind a deteri- a price: ensuring that every group in attendance orating educational and economic system as well felt represented saw the discussion over the pre- as endemic poverty. amble alone take up a large portion of the time Another function of the ACSC/APF is to pro- reserved for adopting the final statement. Still, vide visibility and voice to often marginalized the document makes several clear statements on groups. Maybe the most notable example was the the challenges of Myanmar’s transition, ASEAN’s strong presence of LGBTIQ (lesbian, gay, bisexu- shortcomings in following its own blueprint, and al, transgender, intersex, and questioning) activ- specific issues related to the four clusters debat- ists. Although not enforced in recent years, same- ed at the conference. Among those clusters were sex activity is illegal in Myanmar. The situation, calls to guarantee the rights of all workers includ- however, is much worse in Malaysia and Brunei ing migrant workers, to address the widespread
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 5 - discrimination of women, to establish an envi- ACSC, AYF, and the ASEAN Interface: Two ronmental pillar in ASEAN, and to democratize Steps Forward, One Step Back? ASEAN by providing space for civil society, par- ticularly within ASEAN human rights institutions. After the euphoria created by the Yangon meet- The limited time to debate the final resolution, ings, the networks had to face some harsh political the central role of the drafting committee, and realities. Although Myanmar seemed determined the trade-off between inclusive and concise state- to organize an inclusive 30-minute interface ses- ments are common challenges for all civil society sion on 11 May during the 24th ASEAN Summit conferences (e.g., World Social Fora) and events in Naypyidaw, the governments of Cambodia, held parallel or counter to state-centric global gov- Malaysia, and Singapore demanded to substi- ernance meetings (e.g., WTO or the Global Forum tute three civil society delegates with their own on Migration and Development) (Rother 2012a). nominees. As a result, the whole ACSC delega- tion withdrew from the interface, citing a clear breach of the principles consistently reiterated by The Power of Youth? civil society (i.e., meaningful dialogue, advance- ment of people’s voices and advocacy, mutual re- These challenges were also faced by the ASEAN spect, and self-selection). The Regional Steering Youth Forum (AYF), which held its sixth meet- Committee and interface delegates emphasized ing at Yangon University directly before the that they had been flexible and would even have ACSC. Established in 2009 by the ASEAN Youth been willing to accept the rejection by govern- Movement, the AYF has in the past rather flown ments of some civil society delegates as long as under the radar of ASEAN observers and re- those delegates’ seats remained vacant. Replacing searchers – something that is very likely to change these delegates with GONGO nominees was not after the Myanmar gathering. Youth issues are seen as an acceptable proposition. (Obviously, in of particular relevance in a region that includes authoritarian countries such as Vietnam all NGOs countries like Cambodia, where around 40 per- are GONGOs, but their representatives had been cent of the population is less than 20 years old. accepted beforehand by the ACSC.) Because of the lack of prospects, these young peo- In contrast, the AYF chose a different strate- ple are often forced into migration. For example, gy. Although only three countries (Philippines, it is not uncommon for underage women from Indonesia, and Myanmar) were genuinely repre- the Philippines or Indonesia to use fake identifi- sented by selected delegates, the organizers still cation documents or criminal recruitment agen- attended the meeting. This decision was made cies to find employment as domestic workers in on the basis that all delegates, including govern- Singapore or Malaysia. These young women ob- ment-appointed youth, embraced and endorsed viously constitute an especially vulnerable group. the Yangon Declaration. The opportunity to deliv- The Yangon AYF declaration contained top- er its fairly progressive agenda to the states rep- ics similar to those on the ACSC agenda (of resentatives outweighed the challenges of time, course, explicitly discussed from the perspective space, and genuine representation. Mark Barredo, of young people), such as democracy, good gov- an organizer from the Philippines, considered the ernance, anti–land grabbing, anti-trafficking, mi- meeting a success because “it was the first time grant rights, the situation of sex workers, corrup- that young people shifted their discourse from tion, and LGBTIQ rights. The three-day meeting mere actors of cultural exchange to active and rele- marked a significant step forward for the AYF in vant stakeholders for a youth-driven, rights-based, two regards: First, they managed to negotiate their people-centred, sexuality-embracing, open, trans- own interface session with government represen- parent and accountable ASEAN community.” tatives for the first time. Second, their call to be represented in the ACSC/APF Steering Committee found widespread support in September 2014. Glorifying Civil Society? After all, the network claims to represent about 60 percent of the total population (based on the AYF ASEAN has formulated an ambitious goal that defining youth as including those up to the age of aims at establishing a “people-centered” commu- 35) in the ASEAN region. nity. But these declarations ring hollow when seen
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 6 - in the light of the actual space provided for civ- References il society participation. Despite the secretariat of the organization appearing to be open to engaging ACSC/APF (2014), Proceedings of the ACSC/APF in dialogue, member countries such as Malaysia, 2014, Yangon. Singapore, and Cambodia are sabotaging these ef- ASEAN (2009), ASEAN socio-cultural community forts by insisting on only talking to GONGOs – and blueprint, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. thus pretty much to themselves. There may be ma- Delius, U. (2014), Streit um Staatsbürgerschaft ny justified doubts about the sincerity of there- der Rohingya, in: U. Köster, P. Le Trong and forms in Myanmar, but in a climate where civil so- C. Grein (eds), Handbuch Myanmar: Gesellschaft, ciety is seen as hostile, disruptive, and unpatriot- Politik, Wirtschaft, Kultur, Entwicklung, Berlin: ic by many ASEAN member countries, the former Horlemann-Verlag, 359–365. pariah state’s proclamations of support for civil Gerard, K. (2013), From the ASEAN People’s society engagement at the regional level is still re- Assembly to the ASEAN Civil Society Confer- markable. ence: the boundaries of civil society advocacy, It is important, however, to refrain from over- in: Contemporary Politics, 19, 4, 411–426. glorifying civil society, especially when contrast- Igarashi, S. (2011), The New Regional Order and ing civil society advocacy with the bleak situa- Transnational Civil Society in Southeast Asia: tion in the respective home country. Like any- Focusing on Alternative Regionalism from be- where else, civil society in Southeast Asia is very low in the Process of Building the ASEAN Com- heterogenic: legitimacy and internal democratic munity, in: World Political Science Review, 7, 1. structures are contested, while groups often have Manea, G.-M. (2009), How and Why Interaction conflicting interests and compete with each oth- Matters: ASEAN’s Regional Identity and Human er in the donor market. But as the Yangon meet- Rights, in: Cooperation and Conflict, 44, 1, 27–49. ings have shown, Southeast Asian civil society is Piper, N., and S. Rother (forthcoming), Alternative also able to create a sense of ASEAN communi- Regionalism from Below: democratising ty and solidarity – something the states in the re- ASEAN’s migration governance, in: International gion have yet been able to achieve. Thus civil soci- Migration. ety can play an important role in the region-build- Renshaw, C. S. (2013), Democratic Transformation ing project by establishing alternative regionalism and Regional Institutions: The Case of Myanmar from below. Civil society networks also represent and ASEAN, in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian a largely untapped source of knowledge, input, Affairs, 32, 1, 29–54. and control measures for ASEAN. Rother, S. (2012a), Standing in the Shadow of Civil The Yangon meetings have demonstrated that Society? The 4th Global Forum on Migration the organizational level of ASEAN civil society and Development (GFMD) in Mexico, in: has evolved significantly. The next summit, which International Migration, 50, 1, 179–188. is scheduled for March/April 2015 in Malaysia, Rother, S. (2012b) Wendt meets East: ASEAN cul- might thus prove to be a litmus test for the will- tures of conflict and cooperation, in: Cooperation ingness of ASEAN to engage with its regional con- and Conflict, 47, 1, 49–67. stituency – especially since Malaysia has, on the Rüland, J. (2014), The Limits of Democratizing one hand, initiated the ACSC process but, on the Interest Representation: Asean’s Regional other hand, proven its unwillingness to accept civ- Corporatism and Normative Challenges, in: il society as a legitimate counterpart. As Debbie European Journal of International Relations, 20, 1, Stothard, coordinator of the Alternative ASEAN 237–261. Network on Burma and secretary general of the International Federation for Human Rights, re- marked during the Yangon conference, “We need to send a message to our ASEAN leaders that if you want a more people-centered ASEAN, please listen to the people.”
GIGA Focus International Edition/English 10/2014 - 7 - The Author Dr. Stefan Rother is a researcher and lecturer at the Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Germany. He is currently a research fellow at the Freiburg Institute for Advanced Studies (FRIAS). He is a member of the Freiburg Southeast Asia Area Studies Program, supported by the German Federal Min- istry of Education and Research (BMBF). His research focus is on international migration, global gover- nance, social movements, regional integration, and non-/post-Western theories of international relations. E-mail:
GIGA Research GIGA Research Programme 4 “Power, Norms and Governance in International Relations” examines sim- ilarities and differences in the regional and global development of power and governance structures in- volving government, nonstate and hybrid actors. The Research Team 3 “Comparative Regionalism Research” employs structure- and actor-centered diffu- sion approaches dealing with isomorphism among organizations and tests their power to explain simi- larities between regional institutions.
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