Venezuela's Withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations And

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Venezuela's Withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations And Area: Latin America - ARI 54/2006 (Translated from Spanish) Date: 30/5/2006 Venezuela’s Withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations and the Consequences for Regional Integration (Part I) Carlos Malamud ∗ Theme: The unexpected announcement by Venezuela of its decision to withdraw from the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), plus the nationalisation of Bolivian hydrocarbons, have further shaken the already unsteady scenario of South American regional integration. Summary: The President of Venezuela took advantage of a meeting with his colleagues from Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay on 19 April 2006 to unexpectedly announce the country’s withdrawal from the Andean Community of Nations (Comunidad Andina de Naciones or CAN), the sub-regional integration block formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, whose annual trade turnover totals close to US$9 billion. Ten days later, Bolivia’s President Evo Morales announced the nationalisation of the country’s hydrocarbons. Venezuela insists that withdrawal from the CAN was a direct result of the immediate harm it would be caused by the free trade agreements (FTAs) signed by Colombia and Peru. Regardless of the real reasons behind Commander Chavez’s attitude, Venezuela’s move sent a deep shudder of concern through other CAN members and further stirred the already choppy waters of regional integration in the continent. In the Andean Community, Colombia and Peru held Chávez responsible for withdrawing from the block, Bolivia clearly aligned itself alongside Venezuela and Ecuador took a more neutral stance, although it defended the process of regional integration. Theoretically, Venezuela’s withdrawal from the CAN should imply a greater and more active role for the Bolivarian regime in Mercosur, which has not pleased Argentina and Brazil, who are suspicious of attempts by Chávez to align with the smaller countries in the block, Paraguay and Uruguay, which in turn have their bones of contention with the two major players. At the same time, Chávez was scathingly critical of Mercosur, adding that it needed to make a social turnaround if it did not wish to end up like the CAN. Venezuela’s withdrawal from the CAN threatens to undermine the viability of the two major regional integration blocks in South America (CAN and Mercosur) and places a major question mark over the future of the South American Community of Nations (Comunidad Sudamericana de Naciones or CSN), Brazil’s brainchild, and could even jeopardise Brazil’s leadership in South America. This threat was corroborated by two subsequent events: the Havana Summit, where Evo Morales decided to join the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (Alternativa Bolivariana para las Américas or ALBA), alongside Commanders Castro and Chávez; and, more worryingly for regional equilibrium, the Bolivian nationalisation decree. Despite the smiling faces at the Puerto Iguazú photo shoot which apparently augured well for the unviable South American gas pipeline, positions are starting to polarise and it is regional integration itself that is under the knife. ∗ Senior Analyst, Latin America, Elcano Royal Institute 1 Area: Latin America - ARI 54/2006 (Translated from Spanish) Date: 30/5/2006 Analysis: Venezuela’s Withdrawal On Wednesday 19 April, at a meeting in Asunción, Paraguay, between the Presidents of Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, Hugo Chávez announced Venezuela’s withdrawal from the Andean Community (Comunidad Andina de Naciones or CAN), which he uncompromisingly branded ‘a big lie’, saying it had been left mortally wounded after the signing of the FTAs between Colombia and Peru and the United States. According to Chávez, it makes no sense for Venezuela to remain in the CAN, a body which serves only the elites and transnational companies and not ‘our people, the Indians and the poor’. Accordingly, Venezuela should do something else. His complaint suggested that while Latin Americans are in the doldrums and some are trying to pull them together, ‘those who do not want us to integrate do have their strategy’ that is clearly aimed at disintegration. Chávez thinks that although Latin American countries know the essentials of regional integration, they do not have the right strategy to implement it. That is why he has opted for Mercosur, although without relinquishing his star project, ALBA, which at the recent Havana Summit gained another supporter, and expects to add Ollanta Humala and Daniel Ortega (present at the event) if they win their respective elections. The decision to opt for Mercosur is not a naive one, since it is a regional block which moves US$150 billion in annual trade, versus the CAN’s US$9 billion, and is much more significant from Chávez’s point of view. However, since its creation, the CAN has generated sizeable exports among its members. 2005 was the second consecutive year of record highs, at US$8.92 billion, up 21% on 2004 (US$7.30 billion). The CAN dates back to 1969, when Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru signed the Andean Pact to set up a customs union within 10 years and, while Venezuela joined in 1972, Chile withdrew in 1976, under the Pinochet dictatorship, triggering the Community’s first crisis. Politically, Mercosur might be seen as more cohesive than CAN, although internal wrangling (Paraguay and Uruguay against their ‘mistreatment’ by Argentina and Brazil, and Argentina against Uruguay due to the construction of the Fray Bentos paper mills) plus the announcement by Uruguay that it plans to strengthen ties with the United States do not augur well for what was formerly the ‘model’ for Latin American integration. The announcement of its withdrawal from the CAN came when Venezuela was exercising the rotating presidency, enabling it to block some urgent initiatives, such as the call for a presidential summit. Consequently, Chávez either knowingly and skilfully or unwittingly managed to undermine the entire South American geo-strategic game board and not just the CAN. With one fell swoop, all South American Foreign Affairs ministries offices were affected. Subsequently, President Morales added fuel to the flames by suggesting that some CAN governments (in direct reference to Colombia and Peru) had made a deliberate effort to weaken it, and he branded President Toledo a ‘traitor’ for signing the free trade agreement with the United States. He also said he was not surprised by President Uribe’s support for the free trade agreement, since ‘we all know where he comes from’. At the same time, he aimed his criticism at Allan Wagner, the Secretary General of the CAN, saying that ‘he had played dirty’. Vice-President García Lineras underpinned the Bolivian position by indicating that ‘when a person tells the truth, he has no need to apologise’. The purpose of the Asunción meeting was to announce the construction of a gas pipeline between Bolivia and Paraguay, to be partly financed by Venezuela and which would eventually supply gas to Uruguay. No-one quite understood Chávez’s presence at the meeting, except because of his interest in evidencing leadership in energy matters and his sponsorship of the Morales government in Bolivia. In fact, by supporting construction of the pipeline, Chávez sent a clear message that he is able to act in the south of the 2 Area: Latin America - ARI 54/2006 (Translated from Spanish) Date: 30/5/2006 continent without being spoon-fed by Brazil and Argentina, to the irritation of Presidents Lula and Kirchner. The next day, in a speech during his visit to Brazil, Chávez said that the free trade agreements between the United States and Colombia and Peru were a nail in the CAN’s coffin and sparked his decision to withdraw, since it was to become a kind of small Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), undermining Andean integration and contravening regional trade dispositions. In contrast, Colombia and Peru cite ‘Decision 598’ by the CAN, relating to the Cartagena Agreement, which establishes that in the event that it is not possible to negotiate as a community, bilateral talks may take place. Article 2 of the Decision clearly provides as follows: preserve Andean law, take into consideration the trade sensitivities of the other Andean partners in regard to free trade and maintain an adequate exchange of information and consultations throughout talks, within a framework of transparency and solidarity. The two governments under fire from Chávez claim that they have fulfilled all these requirements and that it was Venezuela which breached Decision 598 when it decided to link up with Mercosur. In view of this background, the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oscar Maúrtua, said that the CAN allows its members to sign free trade agreements with the United States or the EU in order to open new markets. Although the CAN treaty establishes that after denouncing the Cartagena Agreement the withdrawing country should maintain the free trade benefits for its former partners during five years, traders in the region, especially in Colombia, pessimistically suggest that the chances of Chávez turning a blind eye to international law are not low. However, Chávez did offer a glimmer of hope that trade flows might remain open via bilateral agreements, although without specifying their main characteristics. This possibility was received by some Colombian business organisations as the lesser of two evils, although they recognised that they would lack the efficacy of a multilateral agreement. Chávez’s move to withdraw from G3 (the Group of Three), also comprising Colombia and Mexico, has made evident that withdrawal from the CAN is all but final. The announcement came at the same time as the decision by Chávez not to attend the inauguration ceremony of the new President of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias. Arias had been hoping to take advantage of the occasion to set up a meeting between Chávez and Uribe to iron out differences in regard to bilateral agreements.
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