CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Provided by ScholarBank@NUS

THE LEVIATHAN PRUNES THE BANYAN TREE

CALIBRATED LIBERALISATION AND THE SPECTRUM OF CONTROL IN SINGAPORE

PRAVIN PRAKASH

(B. Soc. Sci. (Hons), NUS)

A THESIS SUBMITTED

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2015

ii

iii

I am often accused of interfering in the private lives of citizens. Yes, if I did not, had I not done that, we wouldn't be here today. And I say without the slightest remorse, that we wouldn't be here, we would not have made economic progress, if we had not intervened on very personal matters - who your neighbour is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what is right. Never mind what the people think.

Lee Kuan Yew (1986)

The First Law of Singapore Politics: The government abhors a political vacuum. It wants to fill every space and control every agenda.

The Second Law of Singapore Politics: Every action by citizens invites an unequal and opposite reaction by government.

Cherian George (2000) The Air-Conditioned Nation

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, this paper is dedicated and largely credited to the belief and faith that my Mother has always had in me. No achievement of mine is ever possible without acknowledging your immeasurable contribution. I also must thank my Father for always pushing me to do better and having faith that I would always be able to do so. This would never have been possible without your silent love. To my Grandmothers to whom I have dedicated this paper as well, I owe the unpayable debt of unconditional love. To my Grandfathers, thank you for creating within me the thirst of knowledge. I consider you both the foremost of my gurus. To my brothers, Ashwin and Navin for always making me feel like this would be like second nature to me if I applied myself. Thank you for all the support. And Food. To Aishwarya, who has been a source of strength and the love of my life, thank you. To my Supervisor and friend, Professor Luke O'Sullivan, for all your support and patience. Thanks for sticking with me through all the tough times and keeping faith with me. Your guidance has meant as much as your friendship and I really appreciate everything you have done for me. My sincere thanks and gratitude to Vandana Prakash Nair for all her input, suggestions, edits and support. This would have been impossible without you. Much thanks to Irna Nurlina, for all your support. This would have been a really rough ride without my bro. I am in your debt. I am indebted to Ms Noor Sham binte Abdul Hamid from the Political Science department for all the opportunities, counsel and guidance you offered me on my journey and for always keeping your door open for me. This would have been impossible without you. To Angeline Koh from the Political Science department for being a friend and just an amazing administrator. All your help and advice will never be forgotten. To Arivinthan and Rethinavel for the great company and support and the hours spent keeping me company just to make sure I kept going. A big thank you to my cousin Shona. Your support and help was invaluable To Hamoon Khelghat-Doost, who is great counsel, amazing company and an amazing friend. I am also indebted to Associate Professors Kenneth Paul Tan, Eugene Tan, Cherian George and Elvin Lim for taking time to speak with me about my research and indicating willingness to help whenever required.

v

To Associate Professor Bilveer Singh and Associate Professor Reuben Wong, thank you for all the guidance and support. Working under the both of you as a tutor got me passionate about Singapore politics. You are both great mentors. To Professor Karen Winzoski, you are incredibly missed. Thank you for always believing in me and putting your faith in me. NUS wasn’t the same without you. My sincere thanks to P.N Balji for your friendship and for sharing your invaluable experience on issues. You truly are a legend. Much gratitude to Mr. Arun Mahizhnan for sharing all your insights and for being a guide and mentor. To Walid, thanks for all the advice and guidance and for being a great example to all other graduate students. To Kokila Annamalai, without whom my interviews would have been an impossibility. Thank you so much. You truly are a godsend. To my friends Jayvarman, Jegan, Rangini, Usha, Sekar, Karthigayan and Kanchana, thank you for all the conversations, advice and support. Last and definitely not least, my uncles and aunties for all your love and support. To my Elaichan, thank you so much for all the memories. Losing you was hard. This dissertation is in homage to your memory.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page i

Declaration Page iii

Acknowledgements v

Abstract ix

List of Figures x

Chapter 1: Introduction 1

Chapter 2: Literature Review 10

Chapter 3: Theory and Framework 30

Chapter 4: The NLB Saga: Of Penguins, Books and Rights 62

Chapter 5: Thaipusam 2015: Of Drums, Laws and Privilege 77

Chapter 6: CPF Protests: Of Defamation Suits and Marching Routes 96

Chapter 7: Conclusion 112

Bibliography 117

Appendix A: List of Interviewees 139

vii

viii

ABSTRACT

This dissertation aims to investigate and analyse the strategies of control employed by the Leviathan in Singapore. It thus asks two broad research questions. Firstly, how does one explain and conceptualize the seemingly inconsistent, hybrid nature of the state’s strategy towards political control which often seems contradictory and paradoxical? Secondly, it asks how one can explicate the state’s approach towards the protest movements that have mushroomed and become more commonplace in Singapore since 2011?

The aim of this research is to show that explanations in the literature are insufficient in helping us understand the shifting and expanding approaches towards political control that the state in Singapore is adopting. While the literature has correctly articulated that there exists a ‘calibrated’ approach to coercion and co-optation as primary strategies of control, any attempt to understand the politics of control in Singapore is incomplete without understanding how the state calibrates liberalization as a third primary strategy of control.

This dissertation contends that a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the Leviathan’s hegemony must include an understanding of its spectrum of approaches towards political control, which this study terms the spectrum of control. I argue that using such a framework allows us to understand the varied and calibrated nature of PAP’s approach. I also add to the spectrum by offering a new theory of calibrated liberalization which I contend is used in tandem with other approaches of coercion and co-optation.

Using the case studies of three protest movements, namely the Central Provident Fund (CPF) protests in 2014, the National Library Board (NLB) saga in 2014, and the furore over the Thaipusam Festival in 2015, this comparative study thus focuses on theory development, using detailed case studies to examine the shift in government strategies of control.

This study is important because it contributes to the understanding that hybrid regimes with authoritarian features can expand their strategies of control, particularly by liberalizing in a calibrated and nuanced fashion. It offers a new framework to understand how strategies are calibrated to deal with new challenges and plugs the current gap in literature that fails to perceive liberalization as a means of extending control.

ix

List of Figures

Figure 1: Spectrum of Control 58

Figure 2: Spectrum of Control (Expanded) 59

Figure 3: Table for all 3 Protests 60

Figure 4: Letter From NLB to Teo Kai Loon 62

Figure 5: Free my Library Penguin Logo 68

Figure 6: Table for NLB Protest 76

Figure 7: Singapore Police Force Facebook post on Arrests during 79 Thaipusam 2015

Figure 8: Table for Thaipusam Protest 95

Figure 9: Political Cartoon on CPF 97

Figure 10: Table for CPF Protest 111

x

Chapter 1 Introduction

This dissertation is a contribution to the literature on the politics of control in authoritarian regimes. It aims to study the state’s strategies of control towards protest movements in the case of Singapore. In particular, it aims to offer a better understanding of how these strategies of control have evolved in

Singapore in the period since 2011 in particular, when a landmark election forced the government into a period of introspection about the state of politics and governance in Singapore.

In a landmark speech in 1991, then-Minister George Yeo articulated the deficiencies of a highly pervasive state and the need for greater space for non- government participation in nation building:

The problem now is that under the banyan tree very little else can grow. When state institutions are too pervasive, civic institutions cannot thrive. It's necessary to prune the banyan trees so other plants can grow…we cannot do without the banyan tree. Singapore will always need a strong centre…we need some pluralism but not too much because too much will also destroy us. In other words, we prune judiciously.1

The notion of a banyan tree being pruned by a ‘liberalising state’ has been a mainstay in discussions on Singapore politics since the late 1980s, as the state transitioned from Lee Kuan Yew to Goh Chok Tong as Prime Minister, who made similar declarations of a liberalising People’s Action Party (PAP) regime.

However, Rodan (2009) noted that any attempt at liberalising under Goh

1 George Yeo, “Civic Society- Between the Family and the State” (speech, NUSS Society Inaugural Lecture in Singapore, June 20, 1991). 1

“generally involved expanding the political space of the state rather than any greater toleration of independent, collective organisations engaged in political competition with or mobilisation against, the PAP.”2

George Yeo’s landmark speech on the pruning of the banyan tree came just four years after Operation Spectrum, where alleged Marxists were detained without trial under the Internal Security Act (ISA).3 It was this era that saw the development of Out of Bounds (OB) markers for regulating public discussion and the shift towards using defamation suits to stifle political opposition. The rhetoric of liberalisation and the expansion of civic space in the 1990s through grassroots organisations was accompanied in reality by a constant expansion of the state.

In the 2000s, the rhetoric remained much the same. Upon taking office in 2004, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong declared that “in his vision Singapore would thrive on public participation and debate, diverse views, unconventional thinking, innovative strategies, a spirit of adventure and a forward-looking orientation.”4 Kenneth Paul Tan (2007) argues that in fact, the “old politics that has tightly controlled the possibilities and limitations of civil society in the

1980s and 1990s (has) continue(d) to hold back any real transformation of

Singapore.”5

Tan further contends that any attempt at a ‘new politics’ would be “little more than a matter of resource management to produce a more complicated

2Garry Rodan, “Goh’s Consensus Politics of Authoritarian Rule,” in Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, ed by Bridget Welsh et al (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009):61. 3 Michael D. Barr, “Marxists in Singapore?,” Critical Asian Studies 42, no. 3 (2010): 335 – 362. 4 Kenneth Paul Tan, “New Politics for a renaissance city.” in Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, ed by Kenneth Paul Tan (Singapore: NUS Press, 2007): 28. 5 Ibid.,17. 2 political legitimacy” based on more complicated and nuanced levers of power.6

In his view, liberalisation in the Singapore context has traditionally been more gestural than anything else, with the state present even in exercises of

‘liberalisation’.7 Cherian George (2000), who shares this perspective, proposes that the “First Law of Singapore Politics” is that “the government abhors a political vacuum. It wants to fill every space and control every agenda.”8

Following the 2011 General Election, there was again a heightened sense of optimism about the prospects for liberalisation and greater freedom in political discourse in Singapore. Observers predicted there would now be a definitive “transitioning to a new normal” which would herald a more liberal and open form of politics in Singapore.9 The PAP’s vote share of 60.5% was its lowest since independence and it had also managed to lose a Group

Representation Constituency (GRC), “long thought to be an impossible feat.”10

This idea also gained traction following the release of the Population

White Paper on 29 January 2013. The paper triggered a national furore over its contents, with a disillusioned and angry populace voicing its discontent through every available medium, both mainstream and alternative media. The level of discontent shocked most political observers and pundits.”11 Far more shocking however was that on February 16 2013, a crowd of approximately “4,000 people

6 Tan, “New Politics”, 35. 7 Terence Lee, “Gestural Politics: Civil Society in “New” Singapore,” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia 20:2 (2005) 8 Cherian George, Singapore: The Air-conditioned Nation: Essays on the Politics of Comfort and Control, 1990-2000. (Singapore: Landmark Books 2000):127. 9 Eugene K.B Tan. "Singapore: Transitioning to a" New Normal" in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era." Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, no. 1 (2012): 265-282. 10 Ibid. 11 Teo Chee Hean, “The Closing Speech” (speech, The Parliamentary Debate on the Population White Paper in Singapore, February 8, 2013). 3 gathered at the Speakers' Corner at Hong Lim Park on Saturday afternoon to protest against the Population White Paper endorsed by Parliament.”12 This was the first organised mass protest in Singapore in decades, and a spectacle many younger Singaporeans had not experienced.

The state did not respond to the White paper protests with coercion, nor did it attempt to openly stifle conversation and mobilisation online. In fact, the presence of the state in the public sphere as a controlling and moderating force was notably absent. In the two years since the White paper protests, Singapore has seen a mushrooming of protest movements. The number of events registered at Hong Lim Park in 2103, Singapore’s lawfully sanctioned outdoor venue for protests without permits, nearly doubled from 2011, rising from 85 to 169.13

The state’s response to different protest movements has varied, with some (like the White Paper protests) drawing government engagement and space for public discussion while others have drawn more coercive responses involving suppression of online discussions, defamation suits, and prohibitions on protest rallies.

1.1 Research Questions and Significance of Study

This thesis asks two broad research questions. Firstly, how can we explain and conceptualize the seemingly inconsistent, hybrid nature of the state’s strategy towards political control which often seems contradictory and paradoxical?

12 “Parliament endorses population White Paper by 77 votes to 13,” The Straits Times, February 8, 2013,http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/parliament-endorses-population- white-paper-by-a-vote-of-77-to-13. 13 Ansuya Harjani, “Balmy Singapore contends with rising protests”, CNBC News, August 25, 2014, http://www.cnbc.com/2014/08/25/balmy-singapore-contends-with-rising- protests.html. 4

Secondly, it asks how we can explicate the PAP regime’s approach towards the protest movements that have mushroomed and become more commonplace in

Singapore since 2011.

The literature on state control in Singapore has increasingly portrayed the state’s strategy as highly nuanced and carefully calibrated. But the concept of ‘calibration’ itself has had little attention. I attempt to articulate exactly what is meant by talk of ‘calibrated’ policies and offer a new theoretical framework to understand the range of policy options available to authoritarian regimes to remain stable and maintain control and hegemony. In particular, I focus on the

PAP’s approach towards the protest movements that have mushroomed in

Singapore’s socio-political arena. I address the changing problems faced by the

PAP government in maintaining hegemony and explain the need for a wider spectrum of calibrated policies, including those that focus on liberalisation.

This dissertation focuses on the protest movements that have become more commonplace in Singapore since 2011. The movements would warrant study if only because there is a dearth of academic analysis of them. However, from a theoretical perspective, the protest movements are important because they allow us to understand the PAP as a hegemonic regime that is able to adroitly respond to new challenges, even those that constrain and limit its ability to function unilaterally.

Picking three different protest movements that attracted public attention and varied responses from the state, the dissertation complements a statist approach with a bottom-up approach. It makes use of interviews to understand the perceptions of the participants in the protest movements towards the

5

Singapore state while comparing their accounts to the state’s own justifications for its handling of the issues.

This paper argues that a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the PAP regime’s control and hegemony means understanding its use of a spectrum of approaches towards hegemony, the spectrum of control.

Using the concepts of calibrated coercion as articulated by George (2005) and calibrated secularism as articulated by Abdullah (2012), as well as the work of other scholars, this dissertation identifies the different gradations on this spectrum of control, while highlighting that the different approaches that these gradations represent are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they can be combined in multiple variations as befits the state.

The concept of the spectrum of control goes beyond the existing literature. Calibrated coercion explains state approaches towards civil society groups and the press.14 Calibrated secularism explains the state’s approach towards religious organisations such as the Islamic Scholars and Religious

Teachers Association (Pergas).15 Both approaches however are insufficient in explaining the state’s approach towards the protest movements that have flourished since 2011. This requires an appreciation of the strategy of calibrated liberalisation, an essential strategy in the spectrum of control. Using the case studies of three protest movements, namely the Central Provident Fund (CPF) protests in 2014, the National Library Board (NLB) saga in 2014, and the furore

14 Cherian George, “Calibrated Coercion and the Maintenance of Hegemony in Singapore.” Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 48 (2005). 15 Walid Jumblatt Abdullah “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of MUIS and Pergas.” Asian Survey 53, No. 6 (2013): 1182 – 1204.

6 over the Hindu Thaipusam Festival in 2015, this dissertation argues that the strategy of calibrated liberalisation and its position on the spectrum of control is essential to understanding the Singapore government’s approach towards negotiating and maintaining hegemony.

1.2 Methodology

In studying the diverse strategies employed by the state to maintain hegemony, and placing them on the spectrum of control, this dissertation will employ three broad strategies. Firstly it will explore the linkages and structures that exist between the state and the various groups or organisations concerned.

Secondly, it presents original research on the statements, actions, and failures to act of those involved in the three protest movements during the protest movements as well as those of state officials. Given that an overwhelming amount of the mobilization and discussion took place on online social networking sites, particularly Facebook, the groundswell is relatively easy to document.

Lastly, it makes use of interviews with organisers and participants in the protest movements as well as with other civil society activists. These interviews are important records of the impressions and opinions of organisers and participants that can help us understand the protest movements as well how the participants perceived the intentions and actions of the state. Interviews with other seasoned civil society activists also help us to establish an understanding of other strategies employed by the state, and how activists who have traditionally been involved with civil society see the government’s strategy to deal with this new challenge.

7

The process of establishing the theoretical framework has been carried out on the basis of an extensive analysis of the existing literature, which has focused on policies of coercion and co-optation. To anticipate the findings in a preliminary way, there is a dearth of work on the recent protest movements, including those that have been selected as case studies for this dissertation.

To correct this shortcoming, interviews were conducted with organizers and participants in the protest movements. Interviews were also conducted with seasoned civil society activists to gain an informed outsiders perspective on the protest movements as well as the actions of the state. Official interviews and statements by state officials and politicians will also be analysed to understand their perceptions and attitudes.

1.3 Thesis Outline

Chapter 2 undertakes a comprehensive literature review of the various strategies employed by the PAP regime. Inherent limitations and gaps in the existing work will be pointed out, while earlier research that in many ways foreshadowed the need to establish my more comprehensive framework will be acknowledged.

Chapter 3 will then build an alternative and complementary theory of calibrated liberalisation. The chapter also lays the foundations of the concept of a spectrum of control.

Chapter 4 will explore the case study of the NLB saga in 2014. The brief history of the saga, the actions and statements of the protestors and government officials will be dealt with. The chapter will then attempt to understand state action within the framework of the spectrum of control, with particular focus on the strategy of calibrated liberalisation. Chapter 5 will undertake the same

8 efforts with the CPF protests in 2014, while Chapter 6 will tackle the furore over the Thaipusam festival in 2014. The conclusion will underscore the key contributions and ideas propagated in the dissertation, propose further avenues for research, and highlight the limitations of this study.

9

Chapter 2 Literature Review

2.1 Overview of Chapter

There has been much research explaining the PAP regime’s political control in

Singapore as well as the various means and strategies of control employed by the regime. This section examines some of the most influential and critical works, and identifies key themes in the current literature on state control in

Singapore. It begins with an inquest on how scholars have come to understand the notion of political control in Singapore, following which it examines the dual strategies of coercion and co-optation. Lastly, it examines the academic literature on liberalisation in Singapore, noting its cynical slant and the paucity of research on the use of liberalisation as a strategy of control.

2.2 The Basis of Political Control in Singapore

The defining feature of the PAP regime has been extensive political and social

‘control’. Mauzy and Milne (2002) note that “control” is the only acceptable term that could be applied to the Singapore state and stress “the state’s persistence in attempting to penetrate many aspects of social life.”16 Rodan

(1993) articulates this as the “general pervasiveness of the state in the social sphere.”17 It is in this pervasiveness that Mauzy and Milne find great ambiguity.18 Indeed, the greatest stumbling block in defining the politics of

Singapore, is the difficulty of distinguishing between the party, government and

16 Diane K. Mauzy and R. S. Milne, “Singapore politics under the people's action party,” London: Routledge (2002): 35. 17 Garry Rodan, "Preserving the One-party State in Contemporary Singapore," in Southeast Asia in the Nineties: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, ed Kevin Hewison et al (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1993): 82. 18 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore politics, 35. 10 state and even further, between the bureaucracy, and para-political organisations such as the People’s Association, Town Councils and ethnic self- help groups such as SINDA, MENDAKI and CDAC. Perceived ambiguities however should not be seen as a limitation in studying political and social control in Singapore. Rather it is a useful starting point in understanding the scope and extent of control the regime has at its disposal.

Chan Heng Chee’s (1975) illustration of Singapore as an “administrative state” is useful in understanding the PAP regime in terms of its capacity and the extent of its political control. Chan noted as early as 1975 that “depoliticisation of a politically active and aggressive” citizenship had become “a conscious explicit philosophy” and that the administrative functions of the bureaucracy had evolved into the real locus of politics in Singapore.19 Highlighting that the

PAP had actively repressed opposition parties such as the Barisan Socialis

“through the application of the whole range of political weaponry” while saturating “electoral constituencies with community centres and…Citizens

Consultative Committees (CCC),” Chan argued that the regime had effectively stymied all political activity other than those of the regime.20 The “systemic depoliticisation and the de-emphasis on competitive politics”21, according to

Chan had resulted in the development of an administrative state which would result in: a system of rule in which the bureaucracy, focused on efficiency and the provision of services would become increasingly powerful and influential;

19 Chan Heng Chee, Politics in an Administrative state: Where has the politics gone? Occasional Paper 11. (Singapore: Dept. of Political Science, University of Singapore) (1975): 1-5.See also: Milton J. Esman, Administration and development in Malaysia: Institution building and reform in a plural society. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972):62. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 11 the increase in importance of the technocrat who can effectively and efficiently operate within an administration; and governance that is focused towards limiting and carefully regulating political participation; scorning the need for public consensus and putting faith in the ability and expertise of a technocratic leadership to strategize and legislate with irreversible and absolute power. 22

Chan, therefore, notes that in the Singapore model, the party, especially the cabinet, retains firm control of the reins of power. She contends that “the politicization in the public arena is to a great extent mirrored within the party arena” where the “leadership has firm control over rank and file” and the

“unseemly rambunctious scramble for power is absent and party discipline is strictly observed,” resulting in “amazing elite cohesion”.23

Chan’s analysis of Singapore as an administrative state should be seen more as a reflection of elite cohesion and control of state apparatus than a shift of power from the PAP party towards the bureaucracy. Natasha Hamilton-Hart

(2000) offers a sophisticated re-engineering of Chan’s earlier work by contending that political power and control in Singapore is wielded by a cohesive coalition of governing elite “encompassing bureaucratic, political and business actors” with many within the elite wearing multiple hats that stretch across all three sectors.24 Hamilton-Hart notes that while the bureaucracy is highly influential, it has remained entirely subordinate to the political leadership.25 The movement of bureaucrats into powerful roles within the public

22 Chan, Politics in an Administrative state, 4-5. 23 Ibid., 13-15. 24 Natasha Hamilton-Hart,” The Singapore state revisited” The Pacific Review 13, no. 2 (2000):199. 25 Ibid., 198. 12 and private sectors as well as into political positions in parliament and cabinet, according to Hamilton-Hart, signals that “real power is wielded by the ministers” and that the governing elite in Singapore possess an unparalleled dominance over state apparatus.26 The power structure and the ability to exert control is “essentially monolithic” and “heavily concentrated” in the hands of a governing elite that “continues to be able to “co-opt, contain or suppress most challenges”.27

Other academics studying political power in Singapore have come to similar conclusions. Case (2001) articulates that Singapore’s elite, made up principally of top position holders in the PAP and the bureaucracy, has never been less than tightly cohesive since the late 1960s.28 Khong (1995) notes that instead of striking deals and accommodating leaders and elites already present in Singapore, the leadership of the PAP co-opted various elites into its system and vision, creating a “governing coalition” where “the political regime may well be regarded as oligarchic, as decision making is effectively confined to the political leadership.”29 Embedded within this oligarchy were the top echelons of the civil service which merged with the political leadership, which crucially linked elite cohesion, control of state apparatus and its role in conferring legitimacy through the provision of economic growth and the effective provision of public goods and its constant refinement and improvements.30

26 Hamilton-Hart,” The Singapore state revisited”, 199. 27 Ibid., 202. 28 William Case, Politics in Southeast Asia: Democracy or less. Richmond, (Surrey: Curzon, 2002):86-87. 29 Khong Cho-Oon. "Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Managing Conformity." in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995):116-117. 30 Ibid., 132-135. 13

Leong (2010) offers a conclusive review of the arguments we have discussed thus far by contending that:

The Singapore political system has been transformed into a centralised structure characterised by the overlapping of party/government/state institutions. They are interrelated in astonishingly vast areas, with one helping the others to grow, resulting in the shoring and entrenchment of power. The PAP (the party) which forms the government has acquired governmental and non-governmental organs (the state) to achieve continuous political dominance. The Singapore state in essence is represented by a diverse range of institutions…The widespread co-optation of elites into the government and state…has resulted in a symbiotic and collaborative relationship between the state apparatus and the government.31

The key literature on political control in Singapore has illustrated that the regime has effectively established a symbiotic relationship between state, government and party. How then does one refer to the monolithic PAP regime?

A useful conceptualisation is offered by Dan Slater’s (2010) concept of authoritarian Leviathans, defined as “regimes that seek to use the full force of the state apparatus to subjugate society into a hierarchical, command centered body politic on a presumptively permanent basis” which seems perfectly tailored for the PAP regime in Singapore, given the arguments we have observed above.32 Slater articulates that the “power of the Singapore state to regulate and control social life is…legendary”33 and notes that Singapore is “the

31 Ho Khai Leong. “Political Consolidation in Singapore: Connecting the Party, the Government and the Expanding State.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010):76. 32 Dan Slater, Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010):14. 33 Ibid.,8. 14 strongest authoritarian leviathan in Southeast Asia.”34 Slater argues that the

Singapore Leviathan was forged by an elite collective coalition brought together by a ‘protection pact’ forged by the ‘contentious politics’ of pre-independence era, driven by anxieties of communist insurgency and the racial and religious conflicts of merger and separation from Malaysia.35 He further contends that even after these threats had subsided, these elites created strong ruling parties, state and security apparatus and institutions that continue to strengthen their coalition and the Leviathan.36

The basis of political control in Singapore, therefore, lies within the nexus of elite cohesion, which has allowed for the creation of an authoritarian

Leviathan with a depoliticized administrative, technocratic structure and a monolithic power structure which has effectively established a symbiotic relationship between state, government and party.

2.3 Theories and Trends in the study of Political Control in Singapore

There are a few defining characteristics that stand out from the literature on state-society relations and political control in Singapore. Firstly, there is an acknowledgement that the PAP regime’s strategies of control are evolutionary in nature, constantly changing with the times, and expanding in capacity.

Secondly, there is a keen focus on coercion and co-optation as key strategies of political control. Rodan (2006) notes that strategies of regime reproduction and political control in Singapore “are two-pronged: shoring up the systematic

34 Slater, Ordering power, 229. 35 Ibid., 229-249. 36 I will revisit Slater’s Leviathan in greater depth in the following chapter. For now it suffices to understand that his concept of the Leviathan, inspired by Hobbes, much like the mythical monster, is one of great strength and capacity, functioning as a monolith. 15 obstruction of genuine political competition; and where possible, co-opting new social forces to PAP-controlled institution and values.”37 This approach, as we shall observe in greater depth later, seems to be a defining means of understanding Singapore’s strategies of control. Thirdly, there is great emphasis on the notion of a sophisticated, refined and calibrated means of control. This seems very much in step with the perception of an administrative and technocratic elite ruling with scientific precision.38 Barr (2010) argues that

“Singapore’s ruling elite runs a finely calibrated system of social and political control based on a mixture of monitoring and repression by the state, and self- monitoring and self-restraint by all elements of civil society.”39 The perspective of political control is thus imbued with notions of “moderation” and “tempered by the fact that coercive measures used are not excessive.”40 The state constantly evolves in its approach towards control, retaining a wide range of tools of repression and co-optation, constantly expanding, calibrating and refining the manner and means through which these tools are used.

2.4 Evolution and Expansion in the Strategies of Coercive Political Control in Singapore

Mauzy and Milne (2002) in their survey of authoritarian aspects of PAP rule highlight that while the PAP possess draconian laws such as the Internal

Security Act (ISA), which allows for the arrest and detention of persons without

37 Garry Rodan, “Singapore ‘exceptionalism’? Authoritarian Rule and State Transformation”, Asia Research Centre, Working Paper, No.131 (2006): 4. 38 Ibid., 10-15. 39 Michael D.Barr, “Marxists in Singapore? Lee Kuan Yew’s Campaign against Catholic Social Justice Activists in the 1980s”, Critical Asian Studies, 42:3 (2010):335. 40 Hwee Yeo Lay. "Electoral politics in Singapore." Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia. (Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002):213. 16 trial, there has been since the 1980s, a shift away from using the ISA as a means of silencing political dissent.41 Instead the PAP has resorted to using legal proceedings to silence, particularly defamation suits.42 Such an approach is possible largely because “the constitutional right to free speech in Singapore is limited by the exception of defamation law, including the use of innuendo” which has allowed for the use of defamation suits on opposition politicians such as J.B Jayaretnam and Tang Liang Hong. George (2007) in similar fashion, notes that there has been a shift from more spectacular punishments such as imprisonment towards more behind-the-scene controls” with “economic sanctions favoured over those that violate the sanctity of the individual,” particularly through the threat of libel suits.43

There have, however, been works that have focused on the use of hard coercion in Singapore. Barr (2010) for example offers an in-depth study of

Operation Spectrum which led to the arrest and detainment without trial of 22 activists, many of whom were social workers associated with the Roman

Catholic Church in Singapore.44 Barr’s main point of contention is that “there is no room to doubt that this was a personal campaign, micromanaged” by Lee

Kuan Yew, who was determined to “establish a firm pattern of effective authoritarian rule” in the twilight of his political career as he was planning to hand over the position of Prime Minister. Although Barr contends that Lee wanted to entrench a system of control that would confirm the compartmentalisation of politics through the threat of repression, the evidence

41 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore politics, 129-134. 42 Ibid., 134. 43 Cherian George, “Consolidating authoritarian rule: calibrated coercion in Singapore." The Pacific Review 20, no. 2 (2007):127-145. 44 Barr, “Marxists in Singapore?,” 335-339. 17 he offers points towards a more calibrated system of control. While the arrests were the most obvious form of control, the government quickly followed through with an equally firm legislative response through the Maintenance of

Religious Harmony Act (1990) which essentially criminalised the politicization of any religious organisation or group, under the auspices of guaranteeing religious harmony.45 Barr further argues that the use of the ISA on the activists as well as the passing of the Religious Harmony Act had a further effect of effecting “a new pattern whereby the Church supervised its own repression,” essentially putting in place a culture of self-censorship that permeated into greater civil society as well. The interplay between hard coercive measures like the ISA, the use of laws to socialise acquiescence as well as entrenching a culture of self-censorship must be seen as evidence of the Singapore Leviathan’s willingness even in the use of hard coercive measures to employ a calibrated strategy of control that would maximise effectiveness.

Rajah (2010) offers a comprehensive study of the use of legislation and other legal apparatus in maximising political control, and entrenching the indomitable position of the Leviathan in Singapore. Rajah argues that the use of broad, wide ranging laws offer an extension of the state’s capacity to expand control by concealing their “rule by law’ nature by masquerading within the official discourse and politically legitimized sphere of a ‘rule of law’.46 Rajah thus contends that the state’s use of legislative instruments to ensure political and social control is one in which ‘overt rule by law’ apparatus (ISA,

45 Barr, “Marxists in Singapore?,” 358-360. 46 Jothie Rajah, Authoritarian rule of law: Legislation, discourse and legitimacy in Singapore (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.): 17-18.

18 defamation proceedings) are used with an ever expanding means of ‘covert rule by law’ instruments, disguised as a legitimized discourse of a ‘rule of law’.47

Inherently repressive laws thus function as legitimate and necessary, a calibrated and “strategic rescripting of the rule of law into rule by law” while sustaining state legitimacy” and expanding state means of control.48

Perhaps the most sophisticated theoretical analysis of coercion and its calibrated nature in Singapore is Cherian George’s (2006, 2007 and 2012) theory of Calibrated Coercion.49 George focuses his notion of calibrated coercion on two basic notions; firstly, a constant expansion of the means of control and secondly the active use of self-restraint in terms of using these tools for the purpose of maximising the effectiveness of control at minimum political cost.50 Focusing on the coercion of the press in the first decade of independence,

George notes that Lee Kuan Yew and the PAP quickly realised, following the use of hard coercive measures in 1971, that such ‘victories’ were extremely costly to the political legitimacy of the regime and should be avoided whenever possible. The PAP thus began to buttress its means of control with laws such as the NPPA, which gave it a greater range of more subtle controls against the local and foreign press. These measures included the use of sanctions and fines thus closely linking profitability with the notion of compliance, effectively creating a climate of self-censorship driven by the desire to maximise profit as much as the fear of censorship. George, however, notes that while the PAP consciously practices self-restraint, it does so without ever surrendering its most repressive

47 Rajah, Authoritarian rule of law, 17-18. 48 Ibid., 46-50. 49 Cherian George, Freedom from the press: Journalism and state power in Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012).See Also George (2006 and 2007). 50 Ibid., 94-96. 19 tools like the ISA, left to function as an “omnipresent Sword of Damocles.”51

The theory is thus one of expansion, in which the state constantly looks to expand and evolve its means of control while actively refining and sharpening its use.

George argues that the use of calibrated coercion in only effective if certain conditions are met. Firstly, the regime must have the confidence and interest in a long term future in power. If short term power consolidation is of primary concern, then the incentive to restrain the use of coercive power would be in short supply.52 Secondly, calibrated coercion is only possible “after access to the political arena was restricted to a limited number of players” and after a

“period of repression” in which potentially contentious groups were

“rationalised and streamlined” to be “amenable to subtler carrots and sticks.”53

Third, a calibrated approach is only possible if there is a Leviathan, like the PAP regime, that has a strong control and monopoly of power. The regime’s absolute dominance of all branches of governance as well as the bureaucracy ensures that it can calibrate without someone throwing a spanner in the works. This crucially includes the primary agents of coercion, the police and the armed forces.54

Fourth, “the least visible forms of coercion are those that use instruments that the public assumes are somehow natural and outside of the ruler’s control – in particular the invisible hand of the market, and the anonymous workings of technology.”55 The Leviathan in Singapore has been adapt at embracing both neo-liberal market policies and new technology with greater success than its

51George, “Freedom From the Press,”99. 52 Ibid.,.114. 53 Ibid. 54 George, “Freedom From the Press,”115. 55 Ibid., 115-116. 20 contemporaries largely because it takes the initiative to co-opt and harness market forces and new technologies rather than viewing them as inherently adversarial.56 Fifth, “calibrated coercion requires a certain degree of meta- censorship: censorship of information about the exercise of censorship.”57 This is possible in Singapore, where the Leviathan is both monolithic and opaque, and has developed an extensive capacity for co-optation.

The literature on the strategies of coercive political control have thus focused on the notion of a constantly expanding and evolving Leviathan that has continued to refine, sharpen and calibrate its strategies of control. This is evident in its shift away from overtly draconian and coercive measures such as the ISA and towards more covert legislation that is legitimised through the discourse of the rule of law as well as an increasing propensity to embrace a philosophy of self-restraint to maximise the effectiveness of control while minimising political cost. The literature on coercion however, is insufficient to fully articulate the Leviathan’s strategies of control without an analysis of the co-optative strategies it actively employs.

2.5 Evolution and Expansion in the Strategies of Co-optative Political

Control in Singapore

The strategy of co-optation is one that has been used extensively by the PAP regime and it is seen as a key aspect of the PAP’s calibrated and sophisticated strategy of control. Abdullah (2013) notes that while the strategy of co-optation is one that is commonly employed, “no regime does it more deftly than the PAP

56 George, “Freedom From the Press,”115. 57 Ibid. 21 government. Through formal and informal means, the PAP has managed to successfully co-opt various people and groups into the state mechanism, and in the process further legitimate its rule.”58 George (2012) saw co-optation as the natural follow up to a strategy of calibrated coercion.59 He thus notes:

First the Government…neutralise(s) dissenters by force, and shock and awe their followers into quiescence. Then it introduces specific legislation to nip further dissent in the bud…Finally it co-opts and rewards those who are prepared to partner the PAP.60

Co-optation is thus seen as extensive and prevalent, a means through which Leviathan continually expands and extends its control across various sections of society. Barr (2014) has referred to democratic process and civil society in Singapore as a “bonsai version of the real thing…constrained, pruned, stunted and mainly for show.”61 The bonsai growing under the shade of the huge banyan tree “has no relevance or impact on the main tree” and operates in “an environment where the media, all the instruments of the state, and most elements of society are subservient to the ruling elite.”62 The Bonsai is an excellent metaphor for the coercion and co-optation of political opposition, civil society and contentious politics in Singapore. It is pruned (coerced) and left for display purposes (co-opted) to enhance the legitimacy of the state.

58 Walid Jumblatt Abdullah, “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of MUIS and Pergas.” Asian Survey 53, No. 6 (2013): 1185-1186. 59 George, “Freedom From the Press,”99. 60 Ibid. 61 Barr, Michael D. “The Bonsai under the Banyan Tree: Democracy and democratisation in Singapore.” Democratization 21, No.1 (2014): 32. 62 Barr, Michael D, “The Bonsai under the Banyan Tree,”36. 22

In the sphere of electoral politics, Rodan (2009) contends that the government has increasingly had to co-opt and foster a form of opposition and alternative views in order to “accommodate new social forces and to contain new tensions associated with the city state’s…development” and evolving needs.63 He argues that the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, formulated by the

PAP regime to foster alternative voices, where representatives are picked by a special Parliamentary select committee, is a means of co-opting key civil society personnel and creating an alternative to electoral opposition.64

The co-optative strategies of the state is perhaps most expounded in the literature studying state-religion relations in Singapore. Eugene Tan (2008) highlights that religion has been “co-opted in secular Singapore’s nation building process” and to reinforce the “teaching of moral values” and the secular vison of the state.65 The state thus “engages in a tightrope walk between secularism and control and influence over religion.”66 Tan further highlights that the “state is deeply involved in, concerned with and exerts a measured influence over religious matters” and organisations.67 This desire of the state to induct, yet ensure control over religion,” making sure that “religion does not cross over to the political domain” is most obvious in the state’s exerting a

“symbolic and putative influence on the administration of faiths subscribed to by Singapore’s racial minorities, viz. Islam, Sikhism and Hinduism.”68 The state

63 Garry Rodan, “New Modes of Political Participation and Singapore’s Nominated Members of Parliament.” Government and Opposition 44:4 (2009): 461. 64 Ibid.,442. 65 Eugene K.B Tan, “Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion.” in Religious Diversity in Singapore, ed by Lai Ah Eng (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008):57. 66 Ibid., 67 Ibid., 66 68 Ibid., 23 through these co-optative strategies “endeavours to draw a distinction between public and private life in order to preserve its hegemony in the former sphere”69

Tan (2009), builds on his earlier analysis by arguing that Singapore

“adopts a calibrated mixture of hard and soft law” in regulating and controlling religious groups which attempt to “ensure that the laws generate norms and behaviour that become self-enforcing.”70 According to Tan, the use of ‘soft laws’ such as the Declaration of Religious Harmony (DRH) and the Singapore

Muslim Identity (SMI) project is a “calibrated measure to combine reflexive self-regulation on the part of government”

Thio (2005) identifies three strategies of managing religion in

Singapore; co-operation where the state engages, sanctions and endorses religious practices and activities that they seem beneficial, control where the regime demarcates the parameters of permissible behaviour through formal

(hard, coercive laws, eg. MRHA and ISA) and informal laws (similar to Eugene

Tan’s soft laws, eg. DRH) and lastly co-optation, where the state yokes the moral and mobilizing potential of the state for nation building imperatives.71

Thio further notes that whenever possible, the state would prefer a strategy of co-optation as it empowers the state.72

Abdullah (2013) argues that the Leviathan in Singapore employs dual strategies of formal and informal co-optation with regards to religious

69 Tan, “Keeping God in Place”, 68. 70 Eugene K.B Tan “From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore.” Law & Policy 31, No. 3 (2009):371T. 71 Thio Li-Ann, “Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 33 (2005):253 72 Ibid., 24 organisations in order to legitimize its own authority. Studying state co-optation of the Majlis Ugama Islam Singapore (MUIS) and Pergas, two muslim organisations in Singapore, Abdullah argues that the state “adroitly administers”

Islam through strategies of muscular secularism and calibrated secularism.

According to Abdullah, “muscular secularism refers to a direct, interventionist approach characterised by draconian measures, harsh laws and formal co- optation” while calibrated secularism is a “more indirect form of intervention consisting of symbiotic relationships between religious organisations and the state, known as informal co-optation.”73

The literature on the strategies of co-optative political control has shown that while the Leviathan continues to calibrate its strategies of control, co- optation strategy is perceived as a tool that enhances the coercive strategies of political control giving strength to Rodan’s (2006) analysis that strategies of regime reproduction and political control in Singapore are two-pronged.74 The politics of control in Singapore have to be increasingly seen as a calibrated strategy in which coercion and co-optation are employed adroitly. However, there is also a need to survey the paucity of literature that examines the role of liberalisation in the realm of political control in Singapore.

2.6 The Limits of Liberalisation Discourse in Singapore

The defining characteristic of academic literature available on political liberalisation in state-society relations in Singapore is one of entrenched cynicism. There is an entrenched perspective that even if the space for political

73 Abdullah, “Religious Representation,” 1183. 74 Garry Rodan, “Singapore ‘exceptionalism’,”4. 25 participation and civil society expands, it is essentially “the PAP state that is expanding”75 From this perspective, “new forms of participation and engagement are…being championed by the state as an alternative to a liberal civil society and polity” as a depoliticized associational life is seen as a preferred option to contentious political and activist participation.76

Ortmann (2012) notes that in spite of the “recent moves towards liberalization” in the aftermath of the 2011 general elections, avenues to affect policy making remains largely the domain of the central government and planning departments, leaving “little space for external policy advocacy.”77

However, thanks to the “partial liberalization of the internet” and changing socio-political circumstances, the PAP regime has “been forced to accept alternative opinions to its dominant discourse” and “react to these new pressures”78

Chong (2011) offers a unique perspective into the liberalisation of political space in Singapore. Highlighting that the regime has traditionally emphasized its image as a “morally upright and morally conservative state” from independence, Chong argues that increasingly the PAP has “abdicated its role as moral guardian of society.”79 This in turn has created a perception amongst conservative elements that there was a clear trend that “the PAP state, pressured to deliver economic growth, was becoming more tolerant of liberal

75 Garry Rodan, “Singapore ‘exceptionalism’,”4. 76 Ibid. 77 Stephan Ortmann, "Policy Advocacy in a Competitive Authoritarian Regime: The Growth of Civil Society and Agenda Setting in Singapore." Administration & Society 44:6, (2012): 13S. 78 Ibid., 23S. 79 Terence Chong, “Compensating for the Abdication of the Moral State?” In The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore, ed Terrence Chong (Singapore: NUS Press, 2011):29-30. 26 lifestyle values,” and “no longer desired to play a leading role when it came to issues of morality.”80 Chong’s argument is refreshing largely because it indicates that the state may be choosing to actually step back and leave spaces open for civil society engagement, without the active and constant participation of the state. Accordingly, Chong notes that “both moral conservatives and liberals alike have sought increasingly to make themselves heard in the hope of swaying public discourse and policy decisions” in a robust fashion, instead of acquiescing to the directions determined by the Leviathan.

Lee (2005) perhaps offers the most sophisticated articulation of such a perspective. Lee notes that the discourse of “greater liberalization” in

Singapore, advocated by the PAP leadership, beginning in the late 1980s, and heightened during the 1990s, was also accompanied by the “entrenchment of

‘Out of Bound (OB) markers’, a golfing terminology that is intended to demarcate the parameters of political debate and thus render civil society meaningless.”81 Lee thus contends that:

The use of populist rhetoric like ‘openness’ and ‘inclusiveness’ as representations of a ‘civic’ and/or ‘civil’ society must not be taken at face value, since they are often cryptic and ambiguous. Rather these broad concepts exemplify what I would present as ‘gestural politics’ where, by displaying the ‘liberal’ gestures of the regime, Singaporean voters as well as foreign visitors would be attracted to the new Singapore and its leadership…In other words, the ‘gesture’ of civil society is more pertinent than its substance.82

80 Chong, “Compensating”, 29-30. 81 Lee, “Gestural Politics”, 134. 82 Ibid., 135. 27

Lee thus offers a compelling argument that the notion of liberalization in Singapore, under the close supervision of the state, cannot be anything more than gestural and performative politics with little actual liberalisation. Lee further postulates that the Speakers Corner, in Hong Lim Park with its need for permits and governed under the auspices of the cryptic OB markers, “is purely gestural, a political tactic ironically [aimed] at silencing opponents and libertarians who have campaigned many years for the right to open and free speech.”83 The “liberalization of the public sphere, and thus the expansion of society,” under the illusion of gestural politics, “if successfully executed…will improve the PAP government’s legitimacy and longevity.”84

2.7 Concluding Thoughts

The literature on liberalisation in state-society relations in Singapore and its role in political control in Singapore has been highly deficient and pessimistic when studied. Given the extensive role of strategies of coercion and co-optation in political control, this is hardly surprising. However, the lack of engagement with the discourse of liberalisation as a tool of political control in Singapore exposes deficiencies in the literature that needs to be addressed.

Firstly the notion of gestural politics, while informative, negates the possibility of any possible evolution. If all developments in the realm of civil society is gestural, then there no longer is any need for a study of it.

Furthermore, all of politics is in essence marred by an element of performance and is therefore on some level gestural. As such, gestural politics as advocated

83 Chong, “Compensating”, 146. 84 Ibid., 150. 28 by Lee (2005) while insightful on many levels, is also highly limiting due to its coloured lenses.

Secondly, there is increasing consensus that the Leviathan in Singapore adopts a calibrated strategy of control which is constantly expanding. To a large extent however, the literature has revolved around a calibration between the strategies of coercion and co-optation, while merely coercive strategy is seen as ineffective and too politically costly. The strategy of co-optation however, requires the presence of an individual or a structured organisation. A mob for example cannot be co-opted largely because it neither possesses leaders or a structure to identify and co-opt or coerce in a calibrated fashion.

The protest movements that have occurred in contemporary Singapore thus expose gaps and deficiencies in the literature. These movements are often organised online and take place without any elected leader. It would also often be too politically costly to use repressive and coercive measures on them. The presence of these movements from time to time indicate that increasingly, as we strive to understand the PAP’s calibrated approach to political control, we need to consider the role of liberalisation as a function of such strategies.

29

Chapter 3 Theory and Framework

3.1 Overview of Chapter

This chapter aims to build on the existing literature on calibrated approaches to political control in Singapore by expanding current analysis on dual levels.

Firstly it expounds a theory of calibrated liberalisation as a strategy that is increasingly being used by the state in Singapore. Having done so, it builds on the current conceptualisation of calibrated approaches by offering a new framework of a ‘spectrum of control’ on which the government adopts a more expansive calibrated strategy by adopting various calibrated strategies of coercion, co-optation and liberalisation in different levels to address differing cases of dissent.

The chapter begins by setting the parameters for the theory of calibrated liberalisation. It then defines and explicates the theory of calibrated liberalisation. Having done so, the chapter moves on to explain key questions surrounding the theory, by articulating why a strategy of calibrated liberalisation is necessary, what the key benefits of such a theory are, and why it is a feasible strategy. The chapter then moves on to articulate what the key characteristics of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation are before highlighting red flag issues, which greatly restrict the probability of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation being used. Lastly the chapter examines the spectrum of control as a new framework through which a strategy of calibrated liberalisation along with other strategies of control are calibrated to address new challenges and forms of organised dissent.

30

3.2 Setting the Parameters

The State as the Leviathan

It has been noted above that attempts to study the Singapore state has focused on the monolithic nature of the regime which has established firm control over almost all facets of governance. As I have sufficiently discussed the various academic perceptions of the Singapore state, I will now focus exclusively on

Slater’s (2010) concept of ‘Authoritarian Leviathans’ as this dissertation’s basis for conceptualising the nature of the Singapore regime.

Slater defines Authoritarian Leviathans as “regimes that seek to use the full force of the state apparatus to subjugate society into a hierarchical, command centered body politic on a presumptively permanent basis,” forged by ‘protection pacts’ between elites.85 Slater defines these protection pacts as

“broad elite coalitions unified by shared support for heightened state power and tightened authoritarian controls as institutional bulwarks against continued or renewed mass unrest,” seeing them as the strongest coalitional basis for authoritarian regimes to both extract resources from elites and to organise their most powerful elites.”86

The formation of these protection pacts and a broad elite coalition that leads to the formation of a formidable Leviathan is dependent on the presence of contentious politics that threaten to destabilise the fundamental interests of elites which includes the security of these elites and threats of redistribution.87

Slater contends that when “conflicts are perceived as both endemic and

85 Slater, Ordering power, 14 86 Ibid., 5-6 87 Ibid., 5-15 31 unmanageable…authoritarian regimes enjoy an excellent opportunity to craft a protection pact: a pro-authoritarian coalition linking upper groups on the basis of shared perceptions of threat.”88 Such powerful protection pacts enable

Leviathans to extract formidable acquiescence, consent and resources from elites, getting each group of elites to play supporting roles in strengthening the legitimacy, power and control of these regimes.

Slater perceives Singapore as the “strongest authoritarian Leviathan in

Southeast Asia”89 and his concept is particularly useful in understanding the capacity of the regime to effectively employ various strategies of control, largely due to the strong, broad levels of cohesion between elites. It also highlights the high levels of co-optation that have always existed within the regime where potentially powerful individuals and groups are quickly brought within the fold whenever possible instead of a recourse to suppression and coercion.

Furthermore, in a strong Leviathan, like the Singapore regime, power, resources and control always flows “from elites to Leviathan, and not the reverse,” leaving the Leviathan with the sole capacity to redistribute power.90

This extractive capacity and the power to unilaterally distribute power and resources is further strengthened when Leviathans exhibit strong organisational capacities. Slater argues that “it is primarily through the crafting of new political institutions that protection pacts gain their solidity over time.”91

88 Slater, Ordering power, 15 89Ibid., 229. Also refer to pages of Chapter 2 for a short explanation of Slater’s explanation on the creation of the Singapore Leviathan. 90 Ibid., 16-17. 91 Ibid., 18. 32

In Singapore, the threat of a radical left and Chinese chauvinism, as well as the fears and anxieties of communal conflict during separation from Malaysia drove elites into the arms of the PAP government, itself divorced from its leftist elements, and made up of elites fighting for political survival. The PAP’s use of naked repression against supposed radical elements was thus met with tacit elite approval and its strong state measures towards state-building and scripting nationhood post-separation, especially with regards to race and religion were thus often met with approval and applause by elites who had come to perceive communal conflict as a endemic possibility in the absence of a strong state.

Since the independence of Singapore, the Leviathan has strengthened both its extractive capabilities and its coalition pact through the Central

Provident Fund (CPF) and the provision of public housing through the Housing

Development Board (HDB) as well as grassroots organisations such as Citizens

Consultative Committees (CCCs) and the People’s Association (PA). These policies enabled the Leviathan to induct a large proportion of the population, notably the rapidly expanding middle class “into the evolving authoritarian power structure.”92 With basic welfare provision as well as a vast amount of capital invested into the system, most Singaporeans are both beholden and dependent on the stability of the Leviathan for their economic survival and progress. Slater thus argues that the CPF and especially the HDB, must be perceived as the “institutional exertion of the state’s formidable ordering power, not simply as a policy of regime provision.”93

92 Slater, Ordering power, 237. 93Ibid., 238 33

The early co-optation of elites, the strong coalitional protection pact, the creation of strong institutions and the Leviathan’s vast capabilities to order power married with the inherent enforced interest of a vast majority of

Singaporeans in resistance to any attempts at destabilizing the regime ensures that there are very limited avenues towards dissent and points towards a few observations in understanding political control in Singapore:

1. The state possesses a vast capacity of tools it can employ to control the

population.

2. The people themselves have a great investment in the stability of the

regime and therefore have very limited options for engineering change.

3. The Leviathan can therefore expand its arsenal of control to include

liberalizing spaces that do not threaten its core hegemonic ability

because the people have a vested interest in ensuring they do not end up

destabilizing the system and therefore the Leviathan that governs it.

This dissertation employs the Leviathan as a means of comprehending the

Singapore regime, with an appreciation for the formidable levers at its disposal.

This section studying Slater’s arguments is essential because it has articulated why the Leviathan in Singapore through perceptions of endemic vulnerability and the establishment of strong institutions has created strong attitudinal and institutional mechanisms of regime stability, creating a system where “the ruling regime’s power advantage is so vast as to make a collective political challenge impossible.”94 It also enables us to understand why the Leviathan in

Singapore is capable of constantly expanding its strategies of control and using

94 Slater, Ordering power, 276-277 34 lighter instruments, including the liberalisation of spaces, without having to worry excessively about regime stability.

While the concept of a Leviathan explains state capacity, it does not fully explain the concept of control and the basis through which control is established.

It is essential to note that while the Leviathan is extremely powerful, it is not omnipotent and while dissent in Singapore is muted, it is not absent. The

Leviathan thus finds itself having to constantly renegotiate its hegemony and its political control.

Perceiving Control/ Hegemony – A Gramscian Perspective

There is hence a need to articulate the conceptual understanding of political control that this dissertation employs in its analysis of the Leviathan in

Singapore. This dissertation uses the Gramscian concept of hegemony in articulating the central role of consent and persuasion in entrenching the political control enjoyed by a regime.

Benedetto Fontana’s analysis of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (1993) defines it “as intellectual and moral leadership (direzione) whose principal elements are consent and persuasion.”95 A ruling class thus assumes hegemony when it is able to institute and entrench core ideological and cultural pillars that are embraced by the vast majority of the people. The subordinated classes, fully accepting this now naturalized perspective of the world, come to accept it as common sense, which according to Gramsci, is how a subordinate class acquiesces to its subservience, with willing, tacit and even enthusiastic

95 Benedetto Fontana, Hegemony and power: On the relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993):140. 35 consent.96 Gramsci perceived common sense as “not something rigid and immobile” but as a perceived reality that “is continually transforming itself.”97

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and common sense however, is not one of static and impervious ideological control. Rather, hegemony is an ongoing process of negotiation and struggle in which consent has to be continually re- established. Hence, for Gramsci, hegemony is never undisputed and unchallenged and “is always the (temporary) mastery of a particular theatre of struggle.”98 Gramsci viewed civil society as the sphere in which this ideological struggle took place. It was the realm in which consent was manufactured, and political control was constantly negotiated.

Furthermore, it is essential to assert that while Gramsci perceived hegemony as means of establishing control via consent and persuasion, he conceded that political leadership and state hegemony involved the confluence of consent and coercion, which he perceived as being “indivisible” and “porous to one another.”99 This suggests that the politics of consent and persuasion are predicated on the politics of violence. Thus, state hegemony according to

Gramsci, “is characterized by a hegemonic equilibrium based on a combination of force and consent, which are balanced in varying proportions.”100

96Richard Collins, "Media studies: Alternative or oppositional practice" in Media Education: An Introduction, ed. Alvarado, Manuel & Oliver Boyd-Barrett (London: BFI/Open University, 1992):57-62. 97 Stuart Hall, "The rediscovery of ideology: Return of the repressed in media studies." Cultural theory and popular culture: A reader, ed by John Storey (1982): 111-41. 98 Stuart Hall, “Cultural Studies and the Centre, some problematics and problems,” in Culture, Media, Language, ed. Stuart Hall et. al. (Birmingham, West Midlands: Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham, 1980):35. 99 Steven Jones, Antonio Gramsci (London: Routledge, 2006):50-51. 100 Fontana, Hegemony and power, 141. 36

The above discussion is beneficial to the development of this dissertation on multiple levels. Firstly, by applying the Gramscian concept of hegemony to the context of Singapore, it enables us to dispense with the notion of authoritarian hegemonic rule as rigid and static with one predominant cultural source of power that is immune to change. Rather it enables us to perceive political control in Singapore as a continual process, with the recognition that hegemonies are continually being reconstructed with a shifting common sense and that there are “ongoing ‘projects’ of legitimating leadership and negotiating consent through a whole series of channels” and varied strategies.101

It is therefore imperative to demonstrate and establish the means through which the Singaporean Leviathan attempts to assert control through coercive measures like detention and libel suits as well as co-optative policies that attempt to absorb potential dissent into the ranks of the ruling party and its subservient bureaucracy. Equally important is the understanding that in the

Gramscian concept of hegemony that presumes counter-hegemonic contestation as an evolving certainty, the state never enjoys absolute hegemony.

As such, it is essential to study how the PAP regime concedes space to counter-hegemonic forces without employing coercive force which in many instances may be too costly to its ideological hegemony of consent. The politics of control and hegemony may thus necessitate in certain instances, under certain conditions, and pressures, to involve liberalising spaces in civil society and

101 Elaine Baldwin, Brian Longhurst, Scott McCracken, Miles Ogborn and Greg Smith, Introducing Cultural Studies (Harlow: Pearson; Prentice Hall, 1999): 106-107. 37 making concessions to subaltern groups, especially when the core ideological pillars of hegemony are not threatened.

The Limits of Coercion

As mentioned above, it is also essential to briefly consider why the Singapore

Leviathan would not employ purely coercive strategies in order to stamp out dissent, given that it exists in such limited spaces in Singapore. This dissertation employs Hannah Arendt’s (1970) discussion of violence and power. According to Arendt, power “corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert” with power never “being the property of an individual” as it “belongs to a group and remains in existence as long as the group keeps together.”102

Power is thus dependent on support and a popular perception of legitimacy.103

When employed with regards to earlier discussions on the Leviathan, it seems particularly relevant to note that the power of the Leviathan is dependent on the acquiescence of the various elite groups in the coalition and the endurance of the protection pact. The Leviathan in Singapore, strengthened by its broad coalition that has come to include its vast middle classes, is thus also limited by its need to be seen as a protector rather than an oppressor.

Arendt makes a compelling argument that while power can employ violence, it cannot find legitimacy solely based on it. George (2007), building on Arendt’s argument notes that “what power needs is legitimacy, and legitimacy is what is lost when violence is misapplied.”104 The key conclusion of her argument, therefore, is that the use of coercive force, is highly costly in

102 Hannah Arendt, On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt (1970):44. 103 Ibid., 50-51. 104 Cherian George, "Consolidating authoritarian rule,”129. 38 terms of political power, and hence must be used with restraint in order to maximise political power and control. George (2012) highlights that “Singapore can be seen as a textbook case of a state that has adopted a long term view of power, deliberately reining in its use of force in order to build ideological consensus” and hegemony.105

The Leviathan in Singapore, it may thus be argued, is highly dependent on maintaining its broad coalition of elite support and ideological consensus in order to sustain its political power and control. While it possesses great leverage and latitude while constraining the scope of dissent, it constantly needs to renegotiate its hegemony and cannot afford highly costly strategies of coercion if it continues to have a long term strategy towards political control and power.

This is particularly pertinent when one seeks to study new and different challenges to the Leviathan. As noted in the literature review, the study of political control in Singapore has largely revolved around the use of calibrated strategies of coercion and co-optation, with liberalisation given a largely negligible and viewed with a largely cynical perspective. It has also been articulated that this has resulted in a gap in the literature that fails to address how the Leviathan has attempted to address the protest movements in Singapore since 2011.

In the following section, taking into consideration the discussion employed earlier in this chapter, I offer a theory of calibrated liberalisation that

I argue will help fill the gap in the literature. The Leviathan it will be argued, given its broad coalitional support and extensive institutional strength possesses

105 Cherian George, Freedom from the press, 98. 39 great latitude and leverage in terms of strategies and can afford to liberalize strategically in order to strengthen control in more crucial spaces and extend political control and enhance its hegemony through establishing ideological consensus.

3.3 A Theory of Calibrated Liberalisation

In this section, addressing the discussions above and in the previous chapter, I forward a theory of calibrated liberalisation, which I contend is increasingly an important strategy of the Leviathan in Singapore. Before launching into a definition of the strategy, it is perhaps prudent to isolate and define both the terms liberalisation and calibration in the context of this dissertation.

Defining Liberalisation

Liberalisation, is an extremely loaded term, with greatly varied interpretations.

It is employed in this dissertation, in a very narrow context, as a strategy of a

Leviathan to extend and strengthen control. All notions of liberalisation as a democratising phenomenon thus have to be thrown out of the proverbial window. This dissertation’s conceptualisation of liberalisation is built on

Terence Lee’s notion of gestural politics, which as we discussed in the literature review chapter, referred to the performative nature of “greater liberalisation” in

Singapore, which under the close supervision of the state, had created a political culture in which “the ‘gesture’ of civil society is more pertinent than its substance.”106 Lee thus correctly perceived that liberalisation under such controlled auspices was always a calculated strategy engineered to extend and

106 Lee, “Gestural Politics”, 135. 40 strengthen the political control of the Leviathan. Indeed, Lee notes that the

“liberalization of the public sphere, and thus the expansion of society,” under the illusion of gestural politics, “if successfully executed…will improve the

PAP government’s legitimacy and longevity.”107 Lee however, dismisses the strategy of liberalisation by the Leviathan as being simply cosmetic without tangible change. This I contend is a cynical perspective that masks the more sophisticated approach employed by the regime.

Terence Chong (2011) has noted that increasingly the PAP has

“abdicated its role as moral guardian of society,” as it “no longer desired to play a leading role when it came to issues of morality.”108 As I noted in the literature review, this indicates that the regime may be choosing to actually step back and leave spaces open for civil society groups to contest and discuss, without the active and constant participation of the regime, with the state taking a back seat as a manager or adjudicator, rather than an active participant.109 Liberalisation, in the context of this dissertation, is a conscious, sophisticated strategy of control, in which the state consciously chooses to step back from the public sphere, to allow for active discourse and participation within the public sphere without active state participation.

Defining Calibration

As we have noted above, there has been an increasing emphasis on the notion of a calibrated approach to political control in the literature. Many analysts including George (2005, 2007, 2012), Abdullah (2013), Thio (2005), and Tan

107 Lee, “Gestural Politics”, 150. 108 Chong, “Compensating,”29-30. 109 Ibid., 32. 41

(2009) have highlighted that the Leviathan employs a calibrated strategy of either coercion or co-optation to ensure political control in various areas such as the press, religion and civil society. This dissertation seeks to build on the available wealth of literature by firstly expanding on the definition of calibration and by employing it towards the regime’s approach towards liberalisation as well.

George (2012) focused his theory of calibrated coercion on two basic notions; firstly, a constant expansion of the means of control and secondly the active use of self-restraint in terms of using these tools for the purpose of maximising the effectiveness of control at minimum political cost.110 Abdullah

(2013), in his analysis of the Leviathan’s co-optative strategies towards religious institutions, offers a theory of calibrated secularism, in which the state adopted a subtler more informal co-optative strategy where possible together with a more direct strategy of co-optation of muscular secularism. Similarly,

Tan (2009) postulates that Singapore “adopts a calibrated mixture of hard and soft law” in regulating and controlling religious groups which attempt to

“ensure that the laws generate norms and behaviour that become self- enforcing.”111

This dissertation builds on this consensus by defining a calibrated approach as one which is focused on the notion of self-restraint, in which subtler, softer approaches are employed whenever possible to minimize political cost, while maximizing political control. A calibrated approach to political control also constantly seeks to expand and evolve with changing political

110 Cherian George, Freedom from the press, 94-96. 111 Tan “From Clampdown”, 371. 42 challenges and demands. It is also reflective of the Leviathan’s ability to adroitly shift and take varied approaches to different contexts and situations.

A calibrated approach to strategies of control is also reflective of the guiding ideologies of the Singapore regime – elitism, pragmatism and a technocratic leadership and governing approach that believes policies can be adjusted and fine-tuned with almost mathematical precision.112 This is important largely because it highlights the state’s approach and perspective towards solving issues. A calibrated approach is feasible and preferred largely because the guiding philosophies of the Leviathan suggest that it is a natural direction it would embark on.

Much of the literature on calibrated strategies in Singapore has been limited to perceiving calibration as the fine-tuning of approaches towards individual strategies; eg. Calibrated co-optation or calibrated coercion. This dissertation perceives calibration on dual levels. Firstly it perceives calibration within the individual strategy of liberalisation. It acknowledges however that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation cannot stand alone and that the Singapore

Leviathan’s calibrated approach to political control almost always involves a calibration of various strategies in tandem; eg. Coercion, co-optation and liberalisation. This expands the scope of analysis largely and offers a broader basis for conceptual analysis.

112 For a sophisticated analysis of elitism and pragmatism in Singapore’s governing ideology and system, see Kenneth Paul Tan, "The ideology of pragmatism: Neo-liberal globalisation and political authoritarianism in Singapore," Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, No.1, (2012): 67-92. 43

Defining Calibrated Liberalisation

Calibrated liberalisation may thus be defined as a conscious strategy employed by the state to step back in certain instances to allow for increased discourse and activism in the public sphere without active state participation.

3.4 Why is such a strategy necessary?

Functioning in a ‘new normal’

Following the 2011 General Elections, there was a heightened sense of optimism with regards to political discourse in Singapore. Observers predicted a definitive “transitioning to a new normal,” namely a more liberal and open form of politics in Singapore.113 The consensus was that the 2011 elections would “likely be regarded as the starting point of (an) epochal political transition.”114

Other observers interpreted the elections as indicative of broad public discontent with the incumbent PAP government and argued that while still authoritarian, Singapore was now “newly competitive.”115 Although many of these pundits were also quick to point out that these assertions were potentially

“misleading”116 and that it was difficult to discern “whether the party will be able to reinvent itself and stay convincingly at the centre of a more resilient one party state”117, there was a strong belief that there was a “desire among

113 Tan, "Singapore: Transitioning”, 265. 114 Ibid. 115 Stephan Ortmann, “Singapore: Authoritarian but newly competitive." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 153. 116 Tan, "Singapore: Transitioning,” 279. 117 Kenneth Paul Tan, “Singapore in 2011: A “New Normal” in Politics?” Asian Survey 52, No.1 (2012): 226. 44

Singaporeans for a more open and vibrant political system (which) points to a nascent growing political consciousness.”118

Tan (2012) further noted the emerging “perspective that national matters are not just the sole preserve of politicians” and that there “was a growing need for the political system…to affirm that the citizen’s voice matters.”119 The lesson was that the government had to show a willingness to listen, and to give space for the people to express themselves in the public sphere without being seen as dominating and policing the discussion.

While the 2015 election has seemingly put to rest the concept that electoral politics in Singapore was becoming increasingly, never mind ‘newly’ competitive, it does not seem to have reversed the ‘lesson’ that the Leviathan had to learn to humble itself to the voices of the people. Indeed, following the victory of the PAP in the 2015 general elections, the rhetoric from the victorious

PAP camp and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was strongly focused on being

“deeply humbled” by the mandate accorded to him by the people.120 He further noted that a key “issue in this election has been the desire for diverse voices to be heard and given more weight” and that the government had to find more avenues for these diverse and even dissenting voices to be heard, albeit in a

“way that maintains the unique strengths of (the) system.”121

118 Tan, "Singapore: Transitioning,” 269. 119 Ibid. 120 “Good result for PAP but an excellent result for Singapore’: PM Lee,” Channel NewsAsia, Sep 12, 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/specialreports/sgvotes2015/latest/good-result-for- pap-but/2121698.html. 121 “Good result for PAP but an excellent result for Singapore’: PM Lee,” Channel NewsAsia, Sep 12, 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/specialreports/sgvotes2015/latest/good-result-for- pap-but/2121698.html. 45

This message of the need for greater humility and willingness on the part of the ruling elite to listen was repeated by the Prime Minister, in both his open letter to his MPs as well as an open letter to the PAP website. Other key leaders within the PAP also adopted ‘humility’ as an important feature of governance following the elections. Ambassador at Large Chan Heng Chee noted in her analysis of the 2015 election results that “in the ‘new normal’ of Singapore politics, expect the ‘old normal’ but with an electorate that is now more demanding, seeking participation (a voice), and more accountability than ever before.”122

The last two general elections in 2011 and 2015, by Singapore standards, have produced quite different outcomes. Yet the key conclusions from both elections seem to point to the need for increased humility and a more attentive attitude from the government as well as the desire for greater space in the public sphere for the voicing of alternative opinions. A strategy of calibrated liberalisation in which the state increasingly recedes strategically is thus increasingly necessary in order to facilitate a more vocal and assertive populace in a way that ‘maintains the unique strengths of the system.’

3.5 The Benefits of a strategy of Calibrated Liberalisation

Functions as a vent for repressed frustrations

As we have noted above, there is an increasing consensus that ordinary

Singaporeans need a means to vent deeply held frustrations in a way that is not politically too costly. Yet the 2015 General Elections suggest that many

122 Chan Heng Chee, “The strategic voter in the 'new normal', “The Straits Times, September 19, 2015. 46

Singaporeans do not seem to desire drastic political change. In fact there seems to be a genuine fear that an election could destabilize the regime or even bring about regime change. Most Singaporeans simply crave a means through which frustrations can be articulated without dire repercussions.

Social media platforms such as Facebook often function effectively as an outlet for frustrations, as long as certain limits are not crossed. Protest gatherings in the prescribed venue of Hong Lim Park, within legal boundaries and hence the reluctant blessing of the state, are thus increasingly viewed as a way to ‘let off steam’ against unpopular policies and to let the government know that large numbers feel they are causing substantial distress.

The idea that, given the presence of a strong Leviathan, strategic liberalisation can function as a pressure vent without destabilizing the regime has resonance in the study of authoritarian regimes as well. Brownlee (2007) argues that in the face of strong elite cohesion within a hegemonic ruling coalition and institutional structure (a Leviathan), liberalizing gestures do not result in definitive political change or contestation.123 Although opposition or dissenting movements are accorded a “further venue in which to face a cohesive elite,” the “asymmetry of power between the groups will persist, and incumbents would remain entrenched.”124 Organised dissent and protest, even mass protest, can be contained and deflected so long as a regime’s political coalition coheres.”125 The presence of a strong Leviathan thus enables the creation of strategic liberalised spaces that can accommodate a more articulate

123 Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007): 32 124 Brownlee, Authoritarianism, 32. 125 Ibid., 206 47 and assertive populace with strong dissenting opinions without fundamental change resulting.

Functions as a possible unfiltered feedback channel

As noted above, one of the key conclusions from the past two general elections in Singapore has been that there needs to be more feedback and communication with the government. The Leviathan in Singapore as we have noted above has traditionally preferred using top-down grassroots organisations and feedback channels monitored by organisations co-opted by the regime, often at their inception.

Increasingly however there is tacit recognition from the state that their co-opted grassroots networks no longer function effectively as means of public feedback, often clogged by groupthink and multiple levels of self-censorship. A calibrated liberalisation approach, which allows for increased space without active state participation permits the state to get a clearer, unadulterated response from the people on certain issues, particularly from the more dissenting extremes of society, which the state would otherwise struggle to engage. This is especially so given that official feedback structures are often shunned by dissenting groups in society.

3.6 Why is such an approach feasible?

The Surveillance State

The Leviathan in Singapore can afford to liberalise spaces and step back from active participation because it can monitor without participating, and participants are fully aware they are within the clear view of the state. Singapore is perhaps the best example of a surveillance state, and in many ways under the

48 auspices of a strong Leviathan, is “the perfect home for a centrally controlled, complex technological system designed to maintain national order.”126 Harris

(2014) argues that Singapore’s “embrace of mass surveillance” fits well with its existence as a “law and order society” where the “definition of “order is all- encompassing.”127

Furthermore the presence of mass surveillance in Singapore and its use by the state is not hidden from its citizens. Instead, like strong laws,

Singaporeans tacitly accept the presence of mass surveillance in exchange for security from external threats and internal sources of strife, a perspective derived from the vulnerability discourse that forms a crucial thread in the national narrative and philosophy. Harris contends that “in Singapore, electronic surveillance of residents is pervasive and widely accepted.”128

Beyond electronic surveillance, there is also constant surveillance of public spaces. Indeed, it is worth noting that “no form of surveillance is as pervasive in Singapore as its network of security cameras” which exist in almost all public spaces, including void decks of HDB blocks and even lifts, carparks and on streetlamps. Of particular interest to this dissertation is the presence of these cameras in Hong Lim Park, the only venue allotted for organised protest in Singapore.

The Leviathan’s expansive capacity for surveillance both on the internet, where protest movements are largely organised, and in the designated physical spaces where organised protest is allowed ensures that the state can continue to

126 Shane Harris, “The Social Laboratory”, Foreign Policy, July 29th, 2014, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/07/29/the-social-laboratory/. 127 Ibid. 128 “The Social Laboratory.” 49 be present and view, even when it does not actively participate; a situation that protestors are only too aware of.

Lee (2005), evoking Foucault, argues that “in a panoptic and auto- regulatory environment such as Singapore, the technologies of governmentality can be readily mobilised for various social, cultural and indeed, political ends.”129 The function of a culture of auto-regulation, according to Lee, “is the cultivation of a well-disciplined, hardworking, moral-minded technology-savvy and a self-regulated politically compliant cultural citizen.”130

It may thus be argued that by using “its well-documented ability to utilise ‘visible’ technological and legal apparatuses…Singaporean authorities have demonstrated” how, by using “centralised control,” and the “elegance of discipline” of the panoptic gaze, “docility-utility” may be extracted from citizens by ensuring a necessary level of auto regulation where even dissidents and protestors observe a basic level of discipline and generally do not transgress the prescribed limits of what is deemed ‘tolerable’ dissent.131 As we shall observe later, interviewees who had participated in and organised protest movements professed a high level of anxiety about following the letter of the law strictly so as to not tempt a coercive response from the state, often citing a desire to be ‘responsible citizens.’

An Evolved strategy of control

It is also imperative to understand that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation is to a large extent feasible because it is not in any sense a drastic shift in strategy for the Leviathan. Rather than a revolutionary shift of policy, it in many ways

129 Lee, “Internet Control,”89. 130 Ibid., 91. 131 Lee, “Internet Control,”89. 50 represents an evolutionary shift and indeed expansion of strategy by the

Leviathan. Observers who recall the regimes’ hard coercive stand n organised protests in decades past as well as the persecution of noted opposition members such as Chee Soon Juan when civil disobedience and protest marches were attempted may be tempted to conclude that the regime’s rather benevolent response to the protest movements since 2011 represents a drastic shift in policy.

However such conclusions fail to clearly identify the characteristics of a calibrated liberalisation approach and the origins of its evolution.

These protest movements and the Leviathan’s strategy towards them have largely evolved from its approach towards regulating the internet, described by the Media Development Authority of Singapore (MDA), the state regulator as a “light touch” which has focused more on a more liberal management of the internet as opposed to its “notoriously strict and censorious

‘lockdown’ traditional print and broadcast media.”132 The regime’s light touch approach has largely revolved around the use of Class License Scheme (1996) which along with the ‘Internet Code of Practice’ (1997) has focused on ‘self- regulation’ as a means of regulating the internet.

Lee (2010) however notes that “the power of a light-touch self- regulatory regime…lies in the way it operates carte-blanche in a ‘catch-all’ manner”; “any person or group posting content on the vast and ever-enlarging space of the internet becomes a de facto licensee as an ‘Internet Content

Provider’ defined under the Class Licence.”133 There is also an active

132Lee, “Internet Control,” 78. See also, Cherian George, Contentious journalism and the Internet: Towards democratic discourse in Malaysia and Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2006). 133 Terence Lee, The media, cultural control and government in Singapore (London: Routledge, 2010):116. 51 reinforcement of the message that other sweeping laws “such as the Penal Code,

Defamation Act, Sedition Act and Maintenance of Religious Act apply as much to communications on the Internet as they do in traditional print and broadcasting media.”134

The ‘liberal’ approach towards the internet thus takes place in the context of multiple layers of broad-scoped laws which gives regulators highly discretionary powers to deal with potential transgressors. Indeed, “with all possible bases covered, the MDA could openly lay claim to being ‘light- handed’, transparent and fair” and open to allowing honest dialogue on the internet.135 This, according to Lee (2010), results in a system of ‘auto- regulation’, where online users as “governed cultural citizens are steered towards making ‘correct choices and decisions via the joint application of legislative codes with other subtle mechanisms of discipline.”136 The Internet is thus an example of a ‘space’ in which greater liberalisation has been permitted with a light-touch approach while promoting a culture of auto-regulation and self-censorship.

The reasons why a strategy of calibrated liberalisation towards the protest movements since 2011 have largely evolved from the Leviathan’s strategy towards regulating the internet are twofold. The first is that the internet and its constant evolution as a means of mass communication, from websites, to blogs, to social networking platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, has in

134 Garry Rodan, "The Internet and political control in Singapore." Political Science Quarterly 113, no.1 (1998):81. 135 Lee, The media, 117. 136 Ibid., 113. Furthermore, the notion of auto regulation as part of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation has been dealt with earlier in the chapter. 52 many ways been an evolving challenge to the PAP and as such reflects its most recent calibrated approaches.

The second reason is the fact that most of these movements are popular movements that have mobilised via social networking platforms on the internet, most notably Facebook. They largely lack an organisational structure and are composed of unofficial groups on networking sites where information is passed by word of mouth. The challenges these groups present are thus highly connected to the challenges social networking sites present. Unlike earlier protest movements and organised dissent in Singapore’s history, there are no formal groups, associations, and institutions, behind these protest movements that can be coerced or co-opted. The Leviathan’s strategy has thus necessarily evolved from its approach towards the internet, even when the discussion and dissent leaves the virtual world and enters the real one.

3.7 Key Characteristics of a strategy of Calibrated Liberalisation

Having noted that the origins of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation are largely evolutionary, we should articulate some of the key characteristics of such a strategy. Firstly, while a strategy of calibrated liberalisation has the potential to be both proactive and reactive, since 2011 it has largely functioned as a reactive strategy in practice. The state responds to a groundswell on the internet and in the public sphere and then decides on the calibration of its policy.

The reactive nature of the strategy is indicative of the PAP’s approach towards control discussed above. The presence of broad, wide ranging powers defined in ambiguous terms which give the Leviathan incredible latitude in terms of defining dissent, coupled with the presence of vaguely defined

‘outward-bound markers’ and ‘sacred cows’ in terms of what constitutes

53 acceptable norms in public discourse, creates a self-regulating culture where even activists are keen to avoid sanction by erring on the side of caution and adopting a subtle approach. A reactive approach to liberalisation thus keeps activists guessing as to the response of the state, which can oscillate between a range of coercive methods and more liberal gestures. Does this then indicate that state strategy towards these protest movements and dissent in general is largely contradictory and haphazard, with an almost schizophrenic quality?

This dissertation argues that given the calibrated, calculated nature of the Leviathan, such an argument is mistaken. The second key characteristic of a strategy of a calibrated liberalisation is to set the level of liberalisation accorded by the state according to the threat perceived by the Leviathan in relation to the movement. The level of threat perceived is largely dependent on the key individuals and groups involved as well as the key issues that the protest movement purports to address.

Thus, less threatening issues which are perceived not to affect the core pillars of the Leviathan’s hegemony are more likely to be accorded greater space without the active participation and intervention of the state. Similarly, if a protest movement is spearheaded by activists largely without an affiliation with opposition political parties, who are perceived to not have political motivations or electoral ambitions, there is a greater chance for a more liberal calibration of state strategy.

The third key characteristic of a strategy of calibrated liberalisation is that it rarely functions as a lone strategy. As noted above, this dissertation defines a calibrated strategy as one that functions as one of several strategies in tandem, so that coercion, co-optation and liberalisation all work together. A

54 strategy of calibrated liberalisation thus often involves not just a decision to step back and allow for active discussion and activism in the public sphere without active state participation but also is often partnered with coercive and co- optative strategies as well. In order to grasp the use of calibrated liberalisation as a strategy, and to highlight the expansive nature of calibrated strategies of control, I suggest that we perceive these strategies of political control as functioning on what I term a spectrum of control.

3.8 ‘Red Flag’ Issues

Before turning to the idea of the spectrum of control however, it is essential to first examine situations in which a strategy of calibrated liberalisation becomes muted, limited or even insignificant. These are as ‘red flag’ issues in relation to which calibrated liberalisation no longer forms part of the Leviathan’s strategy.

The first red flag is that of race and religion. The legacy of racial and religious riots in Singapore’s pre-independence history, supplies a key element of the vulnerability narrative that forms a core pillar of the state’s hegemony and elite protection pact. The management of religion and race has thus long been seen as a problem that has to be cautiously navigated by the Leviathan.

Abdullah (2013) notes that the state exercises “great caution” in its careful supervision of religion in Singapore, given the “potential volatility inherent in religion” as well as its ability to function as a rallying point and means of mass mobilization, potentially in opposition to the state on certain issues.137

Tan (2008) observes that the state “maintains a watchful eye…and is willing to move pre-emptively against any threat to social cohesion and harmony,” operating from “a conservative and realist premise that religious

137 Abdullah, “Religious Representation,” 1182-1183. 55 premise that religious harmony cannot be taken for granted.” 138 He also contends that “this overarching fear and vulnerability ensure that close scrutiny, interventionist surveillance, and ultra-sensitivity to perceived threats are hallmarks of the government’s policy towards religion.”139 The Leviathan’s extensive caution and ultra-sensitivity towards race and religion makes any strategy that involves the state stepping back and refraining from active discussion and participation highly improbable, thus making it a red flag issue.

The second red flag is allegations against the Leviathan itself, particularly those that question the integrity of key political leaders in the ruling party, who function as the faces of the Leviathan. The political history of

Singapore is littered with defamation and libel suits against opposition politicians and critics of the state who have made even the slightest of slanderous accusations that impinge the integrity of politicians from the ruling

PAP party.140 A claim to incorruptibility and unquestionable integrity have long been the hallmarks of PAP’s political legitimacy.

Mauzy and Milne (2002) claim that “the PAP has always stood for purity and anti-corruption as symbolized by the white uniform worn by PAP members on official occasions.”141 They further note that the PAP leaders “do not tolerate corruption…among themselves, and they are conscious that they must be seen to be living up to their own high standards.”142 Similarly, Rajah (2012) argues that the state’s narrative of “corruption-free delivery of social order and efficiency” is highly “effective in securing continuing economic and political

138 Tan, “Keeping God,”58. 139 Tan, “Keeping God,”59. 140 Rajah, Authoritarian rule, 17-20. See also Mauzy and Milne (2002), 134 – 136. 141 Mauzy and Milne, Singapore Politics, 7. 142 Ibid., 54. 56 legitimacy” amongst the citizenry. Khong (1995) notes that the Singapore state’s “claim to moral authority is based on public recognition of its performance record,” which is determined by economic performance and the perceived incorruptibility of the government.143

This moral authority, now institutionalised, relies heavily on the unquestionable incorruptibility and honesty of Lee Kuan Yew and his pioneer generation of PAP leaders; an image subsequent generations of leaders have been anxious to perpetuate. The Leviathan’s ultra-sensitivity and intolerance towards accusations against the integrity and incorruptibility of its political leaders makes any strategy that involves the state stepping back and refraining from active discussion and participation in debates on this topic highly improbable.

3.9 The Spectrum of Control

This dissertation has posited that increasingly, the Leviathan’s strategy in terms of dealing with dissent and enhancing political control is calibrated over a widening range of various strategies. This means that while the state continues to take a calibrated approach towards coercion, co-optation and increasingly liberalisation, these strategies themselves are often used in tandem and calibrated at different levels to suit the state’s prescription for different issues.

It is thus argued that in order to have a more comprehensive understanding of the calibrated nature of state strategy, we have to situate these strategies on what

I have termed a ‘Spectrum of Control’. A spectrum may be understood as “a broad range of varied but related ideas or objects, the individual features of

143 Khong, “Singapore”, 133. 57 which tend to overlap so as to form a continuous series or sequence.”144

Similarly, a spectrum of control refers to a range of varied strategies that can overlap and can be used in tandem to offer a singular calibrated strategy of control for a particular issue or case of dissent. At a basic level the strategies may be represented as follows:

Figure 1 (Source; Author)

The strategy of liberalisation exists at one end of the spectrum while a strategy of coercion exists at the other end, and co-optation is placed at the centre. Thus, the spectrum of control is arranged according to the severity of government intervention with a highly coercive use of force at one end and negligible government intervention at the other. Co-optation exists in the centre with the understanding that co-optative strategies can co-exist with both liberal and coercive features.145 It is a strategy that generally lacks the severity of coercion while being more intrusive and severe than one of liberalisation.

144 Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spectrum. 145 Abdullah, “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore” 2013 58

When one considers the strategy of calibrated liberalisation espoused earlier in this chapter, as well as other strategies of calibrated coercion (George,

2012), calibrated secularism (Abdullah, 2013), muscular secularism, and liberal secularism as co-optative strategies (Ramakrishna, 2010), we can visualise the spectrum of control that encompasses these various theoretical strategies as follows:146

Figure 2(Source; Author)

In other words, these various theoretical strategies of coercion, co- optation and liberalisation all exist at separate points on a single spectrum of control, enabling us to clearly understand the scope and extent of the

Leviathan’s capacity for control. This dissertation, by offering a theory of calibrated liberalisation, has expanded on the current literature by contending that a strategic, calibrated strategy of liberalisation can function as a distinctive and effective strategy of control, albeit in tandem with other strategies of control.

146 It is noteworthy that Ramakrishna (2010) did not offer muscular and liberal secularism as strategies of co-optation. The notion that they functioned as co-optative strategies comes from Abdullah (2013) who used it to frame his theory of calibrated secularism while discussing co-optative strategies of the Singapore state towards religion. 59

Indeed, this dissertation attempts to advance the current understanding of the Leviathan’s calibrated approach towards political control and hegemony by suggesting that the state does not necessarily approach an issue or case of organised dissent with a singular strategy of calibrated coercion or calibrated liberalisation. Instead, given the spectrum of control available to the Leviathan, it frequently fashions a calibrated strategy that adopts elements of calibrated coercion, liberalisation and co-optation to varying levels, depending on the issue.

In the following chapter, we will be examining three protest movements in Singapore, the NLB saga (2014), the CPF protests (2013) and the Thaipusam protest movement (2015) to examine the Leviathan’s use of calibrated liberalisation as part of a wider strategy of control. Using the concept of a spectrum of control, it is argued that government strategy towards these protest movements may be put into the form of a table, as below:

Figure 3 (Source; Author)

60

3.10 Concluding Thoughts

A calibrated approach to liberalisation, I have argued, is increasingly becoming an important strategy in the arsenal of the Leviathan as it faces new challenges and constraints in negotiating its hegemony and maintaining political control. It has also been further contended that while a calibrated approach to liberalisation as a strategy of political control is increasingly both necessary and functional, a new framework which perceives calibration on dual levels with various calibrated strategies used in tandem in various levels as suits the issue at hand is necessary to better understand the Leviathan’s sophisticated approach towards political control.

This new framework allows for a more comprehensive range of strategical perspectives, which I have termed as existing on a ‘spectrum of control’. In the chapters that follow, I will critically examine both the role of calibrated liberalisation as a singular strategy and its place on a more expansive calibrated strategy encompassing various levels of coercion, co-optation and liberalisation in the Leviathan’s approach towards protest movements in

Singapore.

61

Chapter 4 The NLB Saga: Of Penguins, Books and Rights

4.1 Initial Dissent, a Firm Stance and a Coercive Response

On 8 July 2014, a Facebook post by Teo Kai Loon, in the Facebook group “We are Against Pinkdot in Sinagapore,” began to go viral. In his post, Teo shared email correspondence with the National Library Board (NLB) in which the NLB had acceded to his request to remove two children’s books from its shelves because they had been adjudged insufficiently ‘pro-family’ (see fig. 4).147

Figure 4 (Source; Facebook)

147 The first book, ‘Tango Makes Three’ was based around a true story of two male penguins acting as a couple hatching and raising a baby penguin. The second book ‘The White Swan Express’ revolved around the idea of adoption and portrayed a single mother and a lesbian couple as key characters in the book. 62

By 9 July, the post had created a huge furore online and was reported in most major news platforms. In his post, Teo exhorted his likeminded group mates to “continue to scrutinize the catalogue,” reminding them that the NLB’s response was proof that they were “empowered to make a difference.”148 It was further revealed that the NLB had previously removed a third book titled

‘Who’s in My Family? All About Our Family.’149 Although all three titles did not overtly promote same-sex, bisexual, or transsexual lifestyles, they were deemed to suggest that these lifestyles were acceptable, and as such were out of line with traditional family values. When contacted by the press, the NLB defended their actions by saying that:

Young children are among our libraries’ most frequent visitors. Many of them browse books in our children’s sections on their own. As such, NLB takes a pro-family and cautious approach in identifying titles for our young visitors.150

The NLB’s decision attracted widespread criticism from civil society activists and groups. Ms Jolene Tan, Programmes and Communications senior manager at the Association of Women for Action and Research criticized the decision, noting that “it is good for children to know that many different types of families exist, not just the one idealised family type of one man and one woman.”151 She also contended that “being pro-family also means understanding that many family types do exist — from single-parent families to

148 “National Library Board apparently banned two children’s books as they are deemed not pro-family”, Mothership.sg, July 8, 2014, http://mothership.sg/2014/07/national-library- board-apparently-banned-two-childrens-books-as-they-are-deemed-not-pro-family/ 149 This book is premised around a Family’s trip to the zoo and focuses on the inherent diversity of families. It references alternative family structures, including single parent and same-sex families. 150 “NLB pulls two children’s books that ‘don’t promote family values’”, Today Newspaper, July 9, 2014. 151 Ibid. 63 same-sex couples.”152 Noted LGBT activist Vincent Wijeysingha called the case a “really serious matter of public censorship.”

Many other critics asked whether the NLB had acted on the extreme demands of a fringe group and even if conservative religious sentiments had infiltrated the public institutions such as the NLB. Other groups such as the above-mentioned “We are Against Pinkdot in Sinagapore” and “Singaporeans

United for Family” rallied in support for the NLB’s decision, writing a letter praising the intention to protect the sanctity of traditional families.153 NLB’s decision was also supported by the Minister for Communications and

Information Dr Yaacob Ibrahim, who affirmed in a lengthy Facebook post that:

NLB’s decision was guided by community norms. Public libraries serve the community and it is right that they give consideration to community norms. The prevailing norms, which the overwhelming majority of Singaporeans accept, support teaching children about conventional families, but not about alternative, non-traditional families, which is what the books in question are about. This approach is shared between all public agencies dealing with the education and care of young Singaporeans.

NLB declared on 11 July that despite the uproar, the books would not be reinstated. Instead they announced that the books would be pulped in accordance with library policy. The library also decided that despite offers to buy the books, they would “not be resold or donated as usually happens with

152 “NLB pulls two children’s books that ‘don’t promote family values’.”, Today Newspaper, July 9, 2014. 153 Tay Ek Kiat, “The Year in Review: Policy and Political Developments in 2014,” Institute of Policy Studies (2015):12. 64 discarded books, because of concern that they might be unsuitable for young children.”154

The NLB’s initial response to the backlash it received was a firm and mildly coercive one. Having received official support from the Minister for

Communication and Information, The NLB not only stuck to its initial decision to withdraw the books, it announced its decision to pulp the books, choosing policy guidelines over public sensitivity. The NLB’s decision was a show of authority and a coercive response to the backlash it had received.155

4.2 Increased Backlash and the State Steps Back

The NLB’s decision to pulp the books however merely worsened the backlash, as more public intellectuals, writers, and members of the public began to voice their disapproval. Many luminaries in literary circles also began to boycott

NLB-hosted and sponsored events. Playwright Ovidia Yu stepped down from the steering committee of the Singapore Writers Festival, partly organised by the NLB, while other writers like Dr Gwee Li Sui, Dr Adrian Tan, Mr Felix

Cheong and Mr Prem Anand boycotted a previous agreement to be part of an

NLB panel discussion, leading to the event’s cancellation.156 Furthermore,

“three judges of the Singapore Literature Prize resigned from their positions, releasing a strongly-worded statement condemning both the hasty removal of the books and the intended pulping.”157

154 NLB saddened by Criticism. But it is not changing decision to remove three ‘unsuitable’ children’s books: CEO.”, The Sunday Times, July 13, 2014. 155 Interview with protest participant, 28 October 2015. 156 “NLB’s decision to withdraw books based on ‘community norms’: Yaacob.”, TODAY Newspaper, 12 July 2014. 157 Tay, The Year in Review,12. 65

The anger amongst literary society manifested itself most profoundly in a ‘novel protest’ on July 13, 2014, for which approximately “400 people showed up to make a ‘peaceful statement’ by making the withdrawn books available for the public to read.”158 The organisers, writer Jolene Tan, 31, and Ms Germaine

Ong, 30 organised the protest through Ong’s Facebook group, Singapore's

Parents Against Library Censorship, which had been set up to express disagreement with the library's decision to remove the titles.

The protest was noteworthy for several reasons. Firstly, it was couched in family-centric terms, with its principal organisers keen to point out that as two mothers of young children, they had no interest in pursuing anything that could potentially lead to unrest.159 The protest itself was organised around the idea of bringing children together to read peacefully in a library-like fashion.

Jolene Tan noted that:

We wanted make a “peaceful statement” and highlight what we find to be important and valuable in children’s literature, such as understanding people with different experiences and circumstances. We think that some of the books that have been withdrawn from the library are among the books that we think are useful for this purpose…Since they are no longer available here, we thought it would be nice to have an event where we make them available to those people who would want to come and read them.160

The protest was also notable for its venue, the National Library Building atrium, making it the only organised protest since independence which received

158 “A novel protest gets read out at the library.” My Paper, July 14, 2014 159 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015 160 “Hundreds gather to make ‘peaceful statement’ about removal of books.” Today Newspaper, July 14, 2014. 66 permission to occur outside Hong Lim Park. The organisers have also highlighted that permission was given very willingly, with the police even contacting the organisers and informing them that a permit was necessary and indicating their willingness to expedite the process.161 The police also directed the organisers towards key personnel within the NLB who would be able to give them permission to hold the event within their premises. Interviews with the organisers have revealed that NLB staff were “really supportive” and accommodating towards the protest, offering the premises as well as any help that was requested.162

The protest itself took place in precisely the manner prescribed by its organisers. There were no speeches or slogan shouting, placards decrying NLB or the government. The event, as the name “Lets Read Together” suggests, focused on showcasing parents’ willingness to read these allegedly contentious books to their children. The protestors set up a small library-like corner in the atrium for a couple of hours where others who attended the event could borrow books that were brought by fellow protestors. Stuffed penguin toys, symbolizing the “Tango Makes Three” book, were brought along and displayed prominently along with the banned books themselves. The event was marked by the presence of prominent civil society activists and member of the local arts and literary scene and was heavily covered by local press, giving it a high level of publicity.

Meanwhile the debate raged on online, with many sympathisers changing their Facebook profile pictures to a picture of three penguins with a caption saying ‘Free my library’ (fig. 5). As mentioned above, both camps

161 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015. 162 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015. 67 organised themselves through various Facebook groups and opinions were widely shared through Facebook status posts and blog articles. The Straits

Times noted that this issue had attracted the highest number of letters of any topic in 2014, making it the most hotly debated question in the public sphere.163

Figure 5 (Source; Facebook) There also seemed to be a difference of opinion within the leadership of the Leviathan itself. While Minister Yaacob Ibrahim and Deputy Prime Minister

Teo Chee Hean came out in support of the NLB’s decision, other PAP leaders seemed to disagree with it. Most notably, Hri Kumar MP, in a Facebook note titled “Pulped Friction,” expressed his dissatisfaction with the current decision.164 Hri Kumar’s open disagreement with NLB policy, especially after it had been openly supported by key leaders, was a definite shift away from the norm. Very rarely does the political leadership allow for a show of a difference of opinion within the ruling elite. Hri Kumar’s open disagreement with the

163 “It's about who decides what's right or wrong.” The Sunday Times, Jul 20, 2014. 164 Hri Kumar’s Facebook post, accessed May 12, 2015, https://web.facebook.com/notes/hri- kumar/pulp-friction/731193633593903. 68

NLB’s decision along with the observations we have made above thus suggests certain conclusions.

The state’s willingness to allow open debate on the issue suggests that it does not consider the issue to be a politically sensitive one that could potentially destabilize its legitimacy.165 Any issue of reasonable importance to the state would not be publicly debated within the ruling party, although it must be noted that even an ‘unimportant’ one being debated represents a significant shift in itself.166

The view that the presence of opposing views was not seen as opposition to the core interests of the Leviathan is also supported by the fact that the robust debate in the public sphere, both online and the mainstream media, went virtually unmolested. The state made no concerted effort to either stifle the conversation with thinly veiled threats, or to co-opt the conversation through official channels and its extensive grassroots networks (strategies we will observe in the other case studies later). When individual leaders within the

Leviathan did emerge to offer an opinion, it was neither domineering nor homogenous. In short, there seemed to be no attempt to use calibrated coercive and co-optative strategies.

Rather, there was a strategy of calibrated liberalisation at work. The

Leviathan had stepped back, and allowed for a contentious debate without its

165 For an academic understanding of the State’s evolving approach towards LGBT issues, see Chong, Compensating, 2011, and Lynette Chua, Mobilizing Gay Singapore (2014) 26–44. 166 There are a few instances of disagreements between PAP leaders becoming public. The building of casinos in Singapore divided the PAP on moral grounds with Lee Kuan Yew being notably against it. This suggest the PAP is more willing to debate issues of public morality, although it could just as easily be argued the PAP was merely co-opting and staging the disagreements within the public sphere to expedite the process of sanctioning the casinos. 69 pronounced presence. It allowed an organised protest outside Hong Lim Park for the first time since independence. Although protestors had to have a conversation with the police and apply for a permit, they were treated cordially by both the police and the NLB officials. Organisers of the protest expressed surprise that they had received the permit and highlighted that they were clearly aware that at every point permission was likely to be denied.

The decision to allow an active discussion without state intrusion also allowed the Leviathan to adopt the more powerful position of adjudicator instead of having to police the debate. As the debate went on without reaching a consensus, both sides petitioned the state to step in and decide the issue in their favour. There were also increased calls from more neutral observers to the state to find consensus and deliver a judgement that would satisfy both sides sufficiently for the heated arguments to subside. Cherian George astutely noted that this was reflective of a citizenry that for decades had “enjoyed the dubious privilege of turning to a nanny state whenever one feels offended.”167 Needless to say, being invited to the table to deliver a judgement was the best-case scenario and an offer the Leviathan simply could not refuse.

4.3 Judgement Delivered: A Calibrated decision befitting a Calibrated

Strategy

The issue finally found a modicum of resolution on 18 July, when Dr Yaacob, in a slight reversal of his initial stance, announced that he had instructed the library to return two of the three banned titles to the library shelves. The third,

167 Cherian George, “Moral Censorship – Pulp Friction,” Air-Conditioned Nation (blog), July 18,2014, http://www.airconditionednation.com/2014/07/18/diversity/.

70

“Who’s in My Family” had already been pulped. Dr Yaacob however stood by the NLB’s decision to remove the books from the children’s section and defended their right to “decide what books should be made readily available to children.” The restored books would be placed in the adult section instead.168

Dr Yaacob also instructed the library to review its policy and processes for dealing with books that receive public criticism and feedback.169

The move was conciliatory towards both sides of the debate and seemed focused on finding a compromise. NLB’s CEO, Elaine Law took a similarly conciliatory stance by noting that “one of the things we could improve is that we could seek more voices and find ways for external processes to feed into our decisions,” accepting that there was a need for greater engagement before making decisions that limit readers access to books based on notions of moral policing.170 She also seemed to accept that the NLB did bear some blame for the uproar by confessing that choosing to pulp the books despite the public outcry was “something we could have thought deeper about” and that “the processes we have in place for reviewing feedback about our books must improve.”171

The general, albeit grudging, public consensus was that this was “a reasonable move of compromise” given that neither camp was willing to give in to resolve the issue.172 Academics took a similar perspective. Cherian George

168 Yaacob Ibrahim, Facebook post, accessed May 8, 2015,https://www.facebook.com/yaacobibrahim/posts/800605309973979. 169 Ibid., 170 “NLB to evaluate its processes for reviewing feedback on books.” TODAY Newspaper, July 19, 2014. 171 “NLB may involve external voices in review process,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2014. See also, “Two removed children's books will go into adult section at library,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2014. 172 “Latest move by NLB welcomed – and criticised,” The Straits Times, July 19, 2014. 71 referred to the decision as a “passable compromise” and a more refined stance than the initial position taken by the state.173 Eugene Tan declared that the

Minister’s decision displayed the Ministry was “responsive to public feedback” while being “sensitive and nuanced…in what has been an unnecessarily divisive issue.”174 The general consensus was that while the jury was out on which side had won, the referee had done a really good job.

4.4 Reflecting on State Strategy towards the NLB Protests

The state’s strategy towards organised protest and dissent is a calibrated one, often with various strategies used in tandem. In the case of the NLB protests, it favoured calibrated liberalisation, with no use of coercive or co-optative strategies. The first level of analysis in dissecting state strategy, however, is to reflect on the conditions that make such a strategy possible. We mentioned in chapter 3 that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation would be abandoned in the presence of two particular ‘red flag’ issues.175 In the case of the NLB saga, both these issues were absent.

Firstly, protestors were not making accusations about the integrity of key political leaders in the ruling party. The protests were not directed at the government, but on a decision made by the NLB, not a key facet of the

Leviathan. Secondly, the protests also did not directly involve issues of race and religion and did not make accusations against any particular faith or race or against the state’s treatment of any particular race or faith. The protests were also not championed by any particular religious faith or institution.

173 George, blog post on “Moral Censorship.” 174 “Latest move by NLB welcomed – and criticised.” 175 Refer to Chapter 3, Section 7. 72

However, given the state’s ultra-sensitivity towards issues of race and religion, it may still have been of some concern to the state that the ‘pro-family’ online groups that had supported the NLB’s decision were largely driven by conservative religious sections of society. The state’s concern to maintain a balance between understanding the concerns of conservative religious groups while maintaining the state’s stand of secularism in the public sphere may have been a key factor in the eventual decision for the Minister for Communications and Information to intervene directly and make a decision for the NLB.

It was also noted above that a strategy of calibrated liberalisation adjusts the level of liberalisation according to the threat perceived by the Leviathan.

The threat level is largely dependent on the key individuals and groups involved as well as the key issues that the protest movement purports to address. The

NLB saga in this context was relatively low-risk. The protest revolved around

LGBT issues and the disaffection from arts and literary enthusiasts over the act of pulping books. Both Facebook groups and protestors who turned up at the

NLB library atrium were not focused on criticizing the state at large. Many online posts on Facebook and letters to editors in mainstream news platforms criticizing the NLB’s decision in fact took pains to point out that the NLB had a fantastic track record in terms of service provision.176 Protestors were thus focused on getting the NLB to be more transparent with its review process and to retract its decision to ban the books, and worse, pulp them.

Similarly, the key personnel involved were non-threatening to the

Leviathan. There were no organisers with close connections with opposition

176 “Books helped reader feel accepted“, The Straits Times, ST Forum, July 10, 2014. 73 parties. Furthermore, the protests were framed as a peaceful gathering organised by parents to read the books that had been taken from the shelf to children show both support for the cause of reinstating the books. The protests were also not organised by any particular advocacy group, NGO or civil society organisation.

Although Jolene Tan, one of the two principal organisers, was a full time employee of the Association of Women for Action & Research (AWARE), an active NGO and advocacy group, AWARE played no official or visible role in organising the protests.177 Interviews with participants and organisers also highlighted that organisers took pains to highlight their status as “ordinary bourgeois lad(ies) who carry handbag” with little interest in radically changing society. With such narrow and non-threatening aims and given the absence of key personnel with strong socio-political agendas, the NLB protest was in many senses primed for a strategy of calibrated liberalisation.

An analysis of the NLB protest also shows how a calibrated strategy of control by the Leviathan is often a reactive one, as suggested in Chapter 3. As we have observed above, the NLB’s initial reaction to the furore was to stand its ground very firmly. The NLB’s stance was also strongly echoed by the

Minister for Communications and Information. What defines state strategy with regards to the NLB protest however, was the lack of any coercive actions or even words, in an attempt to stifle or silence dissent.178

177 Interview with Corinna Lim, Executive Director – AWARE, dated October 29, 2015. It was also pointed out by Corinna that while AWARE consciously pushes boundaries and raises contentious issues, it also works closely with the State and has worked closely with high ranking civil servants and Ministers to further its causes. The presence of AWARE thus presents little threat to the Leviathan. 178 We will observe in our analysis of other protest movements later, that the lack of coercive measures makes the NLB protests a novelty in terms of how the Leviathan treats protest movements 74

Rather, after the Minister’s initial strong words of support, the state stepped back and allowed an active debate. The public sphere, especially in cyberspace and in mainstream media, was for the ten days the saga lasted, dominated by the public, with both sides locked in a heated, spirited debate. The

NLB and the Leviathan even allowed a protest within the NLB premises itself, surprising the organisers themselves.179

The Minister’s eventual decision to reinstate the books, albeit in the adult section, was also essentially reactive, both in terms of responding to the robust debate which had raged in the ten days past, and in terms of being a decision that gave an indication that the debate, and public opinion had been heard. It indicated that the voices of average citizens when voiced in unison were heard and that there had been a liberalisation of the public sphere. The perception of liberalisation, as we have noted above, is often as important as the liberalised space in itself.180

The NLB saga also sheds light on the benefits of such a strategy for the

Leviathan. Interviews with the participants all described it as a positive experience in which progress was made. One participant noted that the experience of protesting at NLB premises against NLB was:

Very powerful and very empowering. I think everybody who came for NLB event, went away saying this was so great. It was a good time and made us feel empowered. I think it is important.181

179 Interview with protest organizer, 27 October 2015 180 Refer to Lee, “Gestural Politics”, 2005 for an understanding of the Leviathan’s use of performative gestures of liberalisation. 181 Interview with Protest participant, 29 October 2015 75

The protests thus made participants feel that their opinions were being heard and responded to. Participants in the NLB protests were more convinced that a level of liberalisation had occurred in the last few years than participants from the CPF protests and the Thaipusam protests.

It also seems likely that the protests and the robust discussions in the public sphere functioned as an unfiltered feedback channel to the Leviathan, providing it with a more accurate depiction of public sentiment, thereby allowing it to find a compromise acceptable to both sides.

4.5 Concluding Thoughts on the NLB Saga

In the case of the NLB saga, the Leviathan adopted a calibrated strategy heavily dominated by a calibrated liberalisation approach, with very minimal use of coercive or co-optative strategies. As we have hypothesized earlier, it embraced such a strategy in a reactive manner, responding to increasingly vociferous responses from the public sphere. The lack of red flag issues also meant that the

NLB protest was a good candidate for a strategy of calibrated liberalisation.

Finally the decision in favour of a calibrated liberalisation approach has also offered shown the benefits of such a strategy for the Leviathan. In conclusion it may thus be noted that the state’s strategy towards the NLB saga may be understood as such:

Figure 6 (Source; Author)

76

Chapter 5 Thaipusam 2015: Of Drums, Laws and Privilege

5.1 Thaipusam and the Ban on Musical Instruments

Thaipusam is one of the oldest Hindu festivals celebrated in Singapore at a scale that is publicly performative.182 The festival is celebrated by a 3km religious procession by devotees carrying paalkudams (milk pots) and Kavadis from

Srinivasa Perumal Temple at Serangoon Road to Thandayuthapani Temple at

Tank Road. It is organised by the committees of the two temples under the guidance of the Hindu Endowment Board (HEB).

The Thaipusam festival and other Hindu festivals such as Thimithi and

Panguni Uthram are “unique from the point of view of laws that regulate religious processions in Singapore” where religious foot processions have not been permissible by law since 1973.183 1973 was also the year that the government “enacted a ban on music in all religious processions” without exempting Thaipusam and the other Hindu festivals.184 The ban on musical instruments was justified in 1973 by the then-Minister for Home Affairs, Mr

Chua Sian Chin on the grounds of the ensuing traffic disruption and congestion caused by devotees dancing to the beat of the music.185 The ban over the years has been justified on other grounds, including a “history of rivalry and fights between competing groups that disrupted the procession” and the slowed pace

182 Vineeta Sinha, “Religion-state Encounters in Hindu Domains: From the Straits Settlements to Singapore,” Springer Science & Business Media 1 (2011):211. 183 Ibid.,.224 184 Jim Sykes, "Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space: Tamil Music and the Ethical Life in Singapore," Ethnomusicology Forum 24,no. 3 (2015):397 185 Sinha, “Religion-state Encounters,” 226. 77 due to musical instruments “sometimes causing friction between participants, which in turn could lead to public order issues and disruption to other members of public.”186 Government sensitivity regarding religious processions were justified based on the racial riots of 1964, when a peaceful religious procession ended in a bloody riot between Malays and Chinese.187 Despite the government’s sincere concerns over sensitivities, the ban “continues to be criticized and has remained controversial.”188

The ban on musical instruments has also been contested several times since 1973. Sinha (2011) highlights that although the HEB is often blamed by angry devotees for colluding with the government, it has “on several occasions appealed to the relevant authorities to lift the ban on music during the procession,” albeit without success.189 Sykes (2015) however contends that the

HEB has supported enforcing the ban, particularly because of concerns that

“youths had been turning Thaipusam into a ‘comic opera’ and ‘carnival’.”190

The ban has come to be seen as a form of moral policing and a sanitization of the festival leading to a loss of ritual and religious significance.

5.2 Arrests, Groundswell, Mobilisation and Protests

The arrest of three devotees, Ramachandra Chandramohan, Jaya Kumar

Krishnasamy and Gunasegaran Rajendran on 3 February 2015, during the

Thaipusam festival after a scuffle with the Singapore Police Force (SPF) caused

186 ”MHA Statement on Thaipusam Procession,” Feb 13, 2015, https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/press-releases/Pages/MHA-Statement-on-Thaipusam- Procession.aspx. 187 Ibid., see also Sykes, "Sound Studies,”398. 188 Sinha, “Religion-state Encounters,” 226. 189 Ibid. 190 Sykes, "Sound Studies,”398. 78 a huge uproar online, triggering allegations of police brutality, religious discrimination and a wave of sympathy for the arrestees. The incident that led to the arrest has been heavily disputed by both the SPF and the group of devotees involved in the scuffle. Figure 7 shows the SPF’s reported version of the incident. 191

Figure 7 (Source; Facebook)

191 Singapore Police Force’s Facebook post, accessed April 30, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/singaporepoliceforce/posts/10153644774559408. 79

In a long Facebook post, however, Ramachandra Chandramohan gave his version of the events. He confirmed that the issue between his group of devotees and the SPF revolved around the ban on musical instruments. He however claimed that because the police officers were not in uniform, it was impossible for them to have known they were being aggressively accosted by the police.192

Mr Chandramohan also disputed police allegations that he and his compatriots had been drinking. He claimed to be a teetotaller and criticized the police for making unfounded allegations and the mainstream media for publishing falsehoods. Mr Chandramohan further accused the police of using excessive force, particularly toward, his sister-in-law.193 A video of the incident circulated online seemingly showed the police using force to quell a dispute and a woman being pulled to the ground. The woman involved in the altercation also made a police report alleging that she had been assaulted by the police.194

The allegations of excessive force are very significant because it seems to have had a profound effect on the extent of the groundswell of support for the Thaipusam protests. All the protestors who were interviewed pointed to police violence against devotees as the trigger factor that motivated them to act.

The issue was simplified and framed on social media in a manner that suggested that the police had used violence against devotees who had dared to question

192 “News reports wrong about Thaipusam incident, says devotee”, The Online Citizen, February 7, 2015, http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2015/02/news-reports-wrong-about- thaipusam-incident-says-devotee/. 193 Ibid., 194 “Wife of man charged over Thaipusam scuffle claims she was assaulted by police”, The Straits Times, February 8, 2015. 80 them over an unjust rule that prevented them from expressing their right to religious freedom. An interviewee noted that:

I was deeply saddened by the incident that happened during Thaipusam. Police mishandled the devotees…There was a fight and dispute and the Police weren’t in uniform. They used extreme force to pin them down…and mishandled the situation. This provoked me as a Hindu and a Tamilian. I couldn’t accept it. This is my culture and an important festival so why can’t we play the instruments? I was very taken aback. I couldn’t sleep for 3 days.195

All parties agree however is that the disagreement was provoked by the ban of musical instruments at the Thaipusam festival. The arrest of the three devotees triggered off long aggrieved sensibilities within sections of the Hindu community regarding the ban on musical instruments during Thaipusam, with the video of the altercation going viral on social media platforms. By the very next day, two Facebook pages had been set up to mobilize protest against the incident. The first page was set up by a group called ‘Voices of One’ titled

‘Speak Up For Singapore Thaipusam’ (SUFST).196 The second page was titled

‘Voices of Singaporean Indians’ (VOSI).197 In the page description section the

SUFST page claims that “we want answers from HEB on the musical instrument banned in Thaipusam and request meetings with all the organizations involved in Thaipusam.”198 The VOST page description page suggests a broader goal,

195 Interview with Online protest organiser, 27 October 2015. 196 ‘Speak Up For Singapore Thaipusam’ Facebook page, accessed July 3, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/Speak-up-for-Thaipusam-We-want-answers-from-HEB- 1429853677306656/. 197 ‘Voices of Singaporean Indian’ Facebook page, accessed June 12, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/Voices-of-Singaporean-Indians-811433515595787/. 198 Speak Up For Singapore Thaipusam, Facebook post. 81 claiming that it wanted to rectify problems encountered by the Singapore

Hindu/Indian community. 199

Interviews with the key personnel from both groups suggest that the focus of both groups was very much on Thaipusam and triggered a serious debate on the ban on musical instruments as well as allegations of police brutalit. The SUFST page had generated more than 9000 likes and the VOST page had generated more than 3000 likes at the time of this research.200

5.3 Calls for a Public Holiday and a Protest Rally

The discussions also unearthed a long dormant discussion about Thaipusam being a public holiday which it had been until 1968, when it was abolished under the Holidays (Amendment) Bill.201 The plea to make it a public holiday again had resurfaced multiple times in previous years and it found newfound resonance in the wake of the arrests. Sangeetha Thanapal, a vocal activist on issues of race, posted a Facebook note titled ‘Thaipusam & the right to cultural and religious expression in Singapore’ in which she raised the issue of making

Thaipusam a public holiday as well as the ban on musical instruments during the procession.202 The note was very strongly worded and made serious allegations about the status of the Indian community in Singapore. Ms Thanapal alleged that the current state of affairs was indicative of “institutionalized

199 Ibid. 200 This would be around June 2015, although there are indications that the majority of this number had been achieved by the end of Feb itself, based on my interviews with the persons involved with the running of both pages. 201 Singapore Parliamentary Report, Vol. 27 (1968): 808-816. 202 Sangeetha Thanapal’s Facebook post on “Thaipusam & the right to cultural and religious expression in Singapore,” accessed May 30, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/notes/sangeetha-thanapal/thaipusam-the-right-to-cultural-and- religious-expression-in-singapore/10153110682379529. 82 racism” in which the state showed a “cavalier disregard” for an “ethnic minority that was already numerically vulnerable” and that it treated “Indians as less important.”203 Sangeetha’s note was shared by both Facebook pages and many alternative news sites and blogs online, including The Online Citizen.204 Her grievances also manifested itself in an online petition titled “Make Thaipusam a religious holiday in Singapore” which was addressed to Mdm Halimah Yacob,

Chairman of the Public Petitions Committee, Parliament of Singapore.205

The response to the petition, by Singapore standards, was astounding. It received 10,000 signatures in a single day and in two months managed to garner more than 20,000 signatures in total. It was a strong show of public support for the cause. Another online petition focused on the ban against musical instrument titled “Allow urumi mellam and thavil to be played for Thaipusam,” started by

Mr Subramaniam Arumugam gathered 4600 signatures.206

The popularity of Ms Thanapal’s petition and the widespread support it received attracted the attention of other activists in Singapore. Mr Gilbert Goh, a well-known activist organised a protest rally on 14th February. According to

203 Ibid. 204 "Thaipusam & the Right to Cultural and Religious Expression in Singapore," The Online Citizen, June 1, 2015, http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2015/02/thaipusam-the-right-to- cultural-and-religious-expression-in-singapore/. 205 “Make Thaipusam a religious holiday in Singapore,” Change.org, accessed June 1, 2015, https://www.change.org/p/mdm-halimah-yacob-make-thaipusam-a-religious-holiday-in- singapore. 206 Subramaniam Arumugam, “Allow urumi mellam and thavil to be played for Thaipusam.” Change.org. Online Petition. This petition lacked the outreach and the publicity of the other petition by Sangeetha Thanapal. Many protestors whom I spoke to themselves were unaware of the petition or struggled to recall signing it. Most also didn’t know Mr Arumugam and claimed he wasn’t part of their various groups. My intuition is that Sangeetha, as an activist with a prior record was able to publicise her efforts to a wider audience. 83 key personnel involved in the planning of the protest, around two to three thousand people had expressed interest in attending the protests on Facebook.

5.4 The Leviathan Strikes Back – Calibrated Coercion

The Leviathan’s response to the groundswell of public protest and disaffection was decidedly dominated by the use of calibrated coercion as espoused by

George (2012) of which a key characteristic is the fine-tuning of coercive strategies with the active use of self-restraint for the purpose of maximising the effectiveness of control at minimum political cost.207 The state’s calibrated coercive strategy was tempered with low levels of calibrated liberalisation and co-optation so as to minimize political cost.

Coercion was employed strategically at different levels towards different facets of dissent. The strongest level of coercion was reserved for the three men who were involved in the altercation with the SPF. All three were charged with disorderly behaviour and face multiple charges. Of the three,

Ramachandra Chandramohan faces the highest number of charges. He was alleged to have “punched, kicked and verbally abused four police officers.”208

If found guilty of physically abusing the officers, he faces the prospect of caning along with a jail term.209 The charges, with no sign of leniency, is very much in line with the Leviathan’s low tolerance for breaches in law and order, let alone skirmishes with the police. The Leviathan was not moved by the groundswell

207 Cherian George, Freedom from the press, 94-96. 208 “Three Singaporean men charged with disorderly behaviour, attacking police at Thaipusam event,” The Straits Times, February 7, 2015. 209 Ibid. 84 of sympathy for the three men and chose to make an example of them to anyone who would consider in any circumstances a similar course of action.

The state’s strategy towards addressing the mobilization of protest both online and the planned organized protest rally at Hong Lim Park was more nuanced. The state first embarked on a series of indirect and thinly veiled threats which were focused on highlighting the sensitivity of the issues being addressed and the possibility of strong state action as well as the potential for racial and religious tensions. Minister of Law, K. Shanmugam responded to the issues raised by highlighting that “Hindus should not feel they are being discriminated against just because musical instruments are not allowed during Thaipusam” because “they are the only ones here allowed to hold not just one but three religious processions.”210 No other religion, he noted, “is given this privilege.”211 His comments were echoed by then-Second Home Affairs

Minister S.Iswaran who noted that the “longstanding ban on playing instruments during such processions had been in place as a result of past instances of fights between competing groups of musicians, and disruption to the procession and to devotees.”212

The rhetoric employed by the two ministers must be examined critically as they focus on two specific ideas. The first was that there were clear laws forbidding religious processions. The celebration of Thaipusam, in whichever form it was allowed was hence a “privilege,” which unlike a ‘right’ could be easily confiscated by a less munificent state. The second idea, revolves around

210 “Shanmugam clears the air on Thaipusam,” The Straits Times, February 7, 2015. 211 Ibid. 212 “Street procession rules, including music ban, help keep events safe and peaceful: S. Iswaran,” The Straits Times, February 6, 2015. 85 the vulnerability of the state, and the need for strong laws and governance to mitigate its existential vulnerability. In its response, the state referred to the riots of 1964 and previous instances of skirmishes, and the need for religion to be handled carefully. The rhetoric is highly paternalistic, combining the tendencies of parents to be both stern and concerned about the well-being of a naughty child.

This strategy of responding with a paternalistic voice, tempering coercive threats with a tone of concern due to existential vulnerabilities was adopted by both the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and the Attorney General

Chambers (AGC). MHA in its press release on the Thaipusam procession on 13

February echoed both Ministers by highlighting that:

MHA's general approach to events is to strike a balance between facilitating the activity while ensuring public safety and law and order. Religious foot processions pose a higher risk to public order…Emotions can be easily aroused when religious sensitivities are offended, which can trigger disorder and even violence. A general ban on religious foot processions was imposed following the racial riots in 1964, which had started as a peaceful procession but ended with the loss of lives…The reactions to the incident in this year's Thaipusam show that race and religion continue to be sensitive issues.213

MHA further noted that the Thaipusam procession was an “exception” that had been made for the Hindu community. They also highlighted that:

There have also been misrepresentations and rumours online and offline regarding the Thaipusam procession. If such activities are deemed to incite enmity between different communities and

213 MHA Statement on Thaipusam Procession. 86

races, the Police will investigate and take firm action against anyone responsible for such offences. Singaporeans should reject such actions and never allow them to take root in our society.214

The emphasis once again seems to be focused on a cocktail of implicit and indirect threats and a constant re-emphasis of the fragile vulnerabilities inherent within Singapore. The AGC echoed MHA’s warning about the online discourse by reminding the public “to refrain from making comments regarding three Singaporean men charged with offences allegedly committed during a

Thaipusam procession.”215 An AGC spokesman noted that doing so “may be sub judice contempt of court” and the public “was advised to refrain from making any public comments, or posting any statements on the Internet on these matters.” The vague nature of both the MHA and AGC’s warnings made any conversation about issues surrounding Thaipusam in 2015 problematic.

Within a span of a week, two senior party leaders, and the responsible arms of government had issued statements echoing one another. Within the context of Singapore’s political culture, driven by an inherent insecurity in the perpetual gaze of a paternalistic state and a culture of auto-regulation, the effect of constantly re-affirmed, thinly veiled threats cannot be underestimated.

Perhaps as a final nail into the proverbial coffin, the SPF rejected Gilbert

Goh's application for a permit which was essential for organising events involving race and religion.216 The Police declared that the application was

214 Ibid., 215 “AGC reminds public to refrain from making comments related to 3 men charged in Thaipusam incident,” The Straits Times, February 11, 2015. 216 “Police reject activist Gilbert Goh's application for Speakers' Corner permit,” The Straits Times, February 13, 2015. 87 rejected because the event "runs a significant risk of public disorder and could incite feelings of hostility between different racial and religious groups in

Singapore."217 In its rejection, the SPF affirmed that while the "The Speakers'

Corner is a public space where Singaporeans can speak outdoors in public on any issue,” that privilege did not extend to “matters related to religion…which may cause feelings of enmity, hatred, ill-will or hostility between different racial or religious groups in Singapore."218

The refusal to issue a permit must be seen in context of the political climate of Singapore since 2011. The Leviathan had weathered constant criticisms of its housing, transport and immigration policies. It had also not prevented protest rallies organised in response to the Population White Paper and other issues. The firm refusal to even negotiate sent a clear message that the

Leviathan would not be benign with regards to the Thaipusam issue.

The overall effect of all the repeated warnings from the Leviathan was a chilling one. A key activist involved in the organising of the protest rally informed me that the permit was rejected because issues of race and religion

“were too sensitive” and that he agreed with the police decision. He further noted that given the climate at the time, he had become “afraid that there would be some ugly scenes” and that he would then “be the one to blame.”219 When prodded further about whether he foresaw the rally becoming rowdy, he replied that:

217 “Police reject activist Gilbert Goh's application for Speakers' Corner permit,” The Straits Times, February 13, 2015. 218 Ibid., 219 Interview with protest organiser, 27 October 2015 88

Yes…because its religion and people are more sensitive. So I feel this is getting quite difficult. We had planned 10-20 bodyguards around the stage if needed. We were afraid it would get out of hand and I am actually very relieved that the Police didn’t give us the permit…It was a very contentious period and things moved very fast. It’s a bit sensitive. Im glad we didn’t get involved.220

The sense of trepidation and the tendency towards auto-regulation in the face of issues regarding race and religion was especially striking. It led me to query the interviewee why an experienced and seasoned activist like himself had so much apprehension with regards to this rally, to which he responded tellingly that:

Im not young…but for people like you I guess you would wish that race and religion is part of an open discussion. But now we still cant. I grew up in the era of Lee Kuan Yew where race and religion is taboo. I wish moving forward we can…Now its still deeply segmented.221

The notion that debating issues of religion and race are deeply taboo, and the fear of repercussion from the state, is deeply prevalent even amongst seasoned, experienced activists. This chilling effect of the state’s strategy was also observable in interviews with protestors closely involved with the two

Facebook pages. One interviewee, who had helped set up one of the pages, noted that constant and consistent statements by key government leaders and various government organisations coupled with the police refusal to give a permit:

220 Interview with protest organiser, 27 October 2015. 221 Ibid. 89

Definitely scared the community. Sometimes people can only sit behind a computer screen and ‘like’ things. They dare not come in front to speak. They don’t have guts…We are modern slaves… The threats and the cancellation of the rally changed the mindset of the people. It scared them. They immediately felt it was too sensitive to talk about. The music ban also they accepted and they just followed along with it. This is the culture of our community.222

The Leviathan’s strategy of calibrated coercion, imposed a ‘chilling effect’ on the furore. At the same time, it also began to employ low levels of calibrated liberalisation and co-optation, thereby adopting a strategy that was more nuanced, and limiting political cost.

5.5 Limited Liberalisation and Co-optation

On 11th February 2015, Minister K. Shanmugam, having earlier reminded

Singaporean Hindus that Thaipusam was a ‘privilege’, appeared to soften his stand on the issue. The minister, speaking at MediaCorp Vasantham’s current affairs programme Ethiroli (Echo) suggested that while it was only fair that

Hindus were expected to adhere to expectations that they behave in an orderly and peaceful manner, it was also true that music accompaniment “was something that we have to look into” and that the HEB would have to consult the people.223

Almost as a response to the Minister, simultaneously, the HEB released a statement on the 13th of February professing that the HEB had on multiple occasions “represented the community interests by requesting authorities to

222 Interview with online protest organiser, 27 October 2015 223 Ibid., 90 adjust the rules to take into consideration the importance of music to our religious rites.”224 HEB further stated that it had never lobbied authorities to tighten the rules regarding playing of instruments but that it would “engage interested members of the community through feedback sessions to gather their views.”225 HEB’s decision to conduct feedback sessions was publicized in the mainstream media and through government feedback platforms like REACH.

The public perception thus was that the state had softened its stand and was willing to engage in dialogue.

Interviews with protestors who attended the feedback sessions however reveal deep frustrations with the session. Interviewees revealed that the feedback sessions were conducted in small groups, preventing different groups that the HEB might find contentious to engage them at the same time. The groups from the two different Facebook pages for example were not allowed to meet with HEB at the same time, although they had requested that they be allowed to.226 Furthermore, the feedback sessions ended up being strictly a means through which the HEB collected feedback, often responding to questions with answers like “noted” without engaging the in a discussion or providing answers to questions in any elaborative way. Interviewees also noted that the HEB had initially agreed to provide a transcript of the session but had since reneged on the agreement. They also expressed dissatisfaction with the fact that following the feedback session, HEB had stopped being responsive to queries regarding the outcome of the feedback sessions conducted. Interviewees

224 “Statement from Hindu Endowments Board on Thaipusam,” last modified February 13, 2015, http://heb.gov.sg/thaipusam15statement.aspx. 225 Ibid., 226 Interview with online protest participant, 25 October 2015 91 universally agreed that the feedback sessions came across as an insincere exercise conducted for the purpose of fooling the community into believing that the HEB was engaging and taking concerns of the community seriously and as such they seriously doubted the potential for any change. Interestingly, two interviewees suggested that if there was indeed any hope for the ban to be removed, it lay with key political leaders, whom activists were better off lobbying as opposed to the HEB. The Leviathan, in forcing potential dissenters to offer feedback within the carefully pruned structures of its official feedback system, had co-opted the only form of tangible dialogue that eventually took place. The co-opted conversation was limited and beneficial only to the HEB which managed to gather the feedback it required while assuaging the concerns of the majority of citizens who weren’t active activists that honest feedback had taken place.

Following the forced cancellation of the protests, there have been no attempts to stifle conversations on the issue on the blogs or Facebook groups.

Interviewees noted that the ‘chilling effect’ created by the state’s indirect threats and the refusal to issue a permit for the protest rally had meant that the conversation had slowed down considerably and was limited to a much smaller group of netizens, and there had been no attempt to stifle or muzzle conversations within the pages despite many statements clearly contravening the AGC’s warnings. The state thus having already employed a strategy of calibrated coercion, was now stepping back to allow for discussion in the public sphere without its active presence, a muted form of calibrated liberalisation.

92

5.6 Reflecting on State Strategy towards the Thaipusam Protests

In the case of the Thaipusam protests, the state’s strategy seems to be calibrated heavily in favour of a calibrated coercion approach, with very minimal use of coercive or co-optative strategies. It is clear why a strategy favouring calibrated liberalisation was not feasible to the state in this instance. The issue raised the red flag issue of race and religion. Accusations of racism and religious intolerance on the part of the Leviathan were also openly espoused by more vocal and contentious elements within the movement. This would naturally have led the Leviathan given its ultra-sensitivity towards race and religion to view the protest movement as one that was highly threatening, even though the movement lacked any potential political threats.

It is also worth considering briefly, why the state chose to employ a strategy dominated by calibrated coercion, despite its potential to be politically costly. The first key reason, is that the discourse of vulnerability, especially with regards to race and religion is one that permeates even experienced activists and protestors. The Leviathan thus has greater latitude in dealing with contentious issues regarding race and religion as opposed to other issues.

Secondly, the Thaipusam festival itself has a contentious place in

Singaporean history, and is divided along issues of class and caste within the

Hindu community in Singapore. Although today it is viewed as an

“unambiguously Hindu festival,” Thaipusam has historically been viewed by upper class and upwardly mobile sections of the Hindu community “as backward, barbaric, primitive, (and) superstitious.”227 These sections of the

227 Sinha, “Religion-state Encounters,”211. 93 community perceived the carrying of spike kavadis and the piercing of flesh that accompanies it as “self -mortification,” “self-torture” and “degrading rituals” that “opened them up to ridicule from upper class Indians (Non-Tamils), the

Chinese and the Malays.”228 Sinha (2015) notes that such perceptions continue to be “clearly embarrassing to middle-class Hindu sensibilities.”229

The ban is thus highly contentious within the Indian community because there is little agreement within the community as to whether it is for the greater good, with perceived notions of class and caste often coming into play, with some sections feeling that they are being victimised by other sections’ notions of superiority while other groups fear the stigma within greater Singaporean society due to an ‘unregulated’ Thaipusam. The lack of cohesion within the

Hindu community with regards to the festival thus enables a more coercive strategy to be employed, with sections of the community lobbying for greater regulation and control of the festival.

5.7 Concluding Thoughts

Based on the discussions above, it may be concluded that in the case of the

Thaipusam saga of 2015, the Leviathan evoked a calibrated strategy heavily in favour of a calibrated coercion approach, tempered with muted use of liberalisation or co-optative strategies. It has been argued that the state used coercion in a nuanced fashion, making an example of three publicised dissenters and then preferring to use indirect threats to produce a ‘chilling effect’ on other protestors. The presence of the red flag issue of race and religion also meant

228 Ibid., p.213 229 Ibid. 94 that the Thaipusam protest was in many senses primed for a strategy dominated by calibrated coercion. In conclusion it may thus be noted that the state’s strategy towards the Thaipusam saga may be understood as such:

Figure 8 (Source; Author)

95

Chapter 6 CPF Protests: Of Defamation Suits and Marching Routes

6.1 The CPF Minimum Sum, Roy Ngerng and the Defamation Suit

On 8 May 2014 the Central Provident Fund (CPF) board and the Ministry of

Manpower announced that the CPF minimum sum would be raised from

S$148,000 to S$155,000 from July that year.230 The rise in the minimum sum occasioned great frustration among middle and lower income Singaporeans, many of whom felt that the amount was being raised to a level they could not afford to match, negating their ability to access their funds in a way they would prefer.231

These frustrations manifested themselves in criticisms of the CPF as a

“money hoarding monster” that had deviated from its original objective of providing “subsistence living.”232 Public intellectuals like Devadas Krishnadas noted that it was necessary to understand the “angst as reflective of a disappointment in the Singapore model” and a need to re-evaluate and renegotiate “an outdated social compact.”233 Krishnadas also noted that the government’s “well intentioned effort at communicating a complex phenomenon that is the CPF model may not have silenced the critics or

230 “CPF minimum sum to be raised to S$155,000 from July,” TODAY Newspaper, May 8, 2014. For a simple understanding of the Minimum Sum, kindly refer to “What is CPF Minimum Sum? 7 Things to know,” The Straits Times, Jan 21, 2015. 231 For a clear articulation on the CPF system and the various criticisms it attracted, refer to Lim Pei Ying and Tan Shin Bin, “Saving the CPF: restoring public trust in Singapore’s retirement savings system,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (2015). 232 SY Lee and Leong Sze Hian. “CPF Minimum Sum: Retirement scheme, or money hoarding monster,” The Online Citizen, May 9, 2014, http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2014/05/cpf- minimum-sum-how-the-scheme-mutated-into-a-money-hoarding-monster/. 233Devadas Krishnadas, “Why it’s so hard for S’poreans to understand CPF,” TODAY Newspaper, May 28, 2014. 96 comforted the anxious.”234 Figure 9 provides an interesting perspective of this dissatisfaction and frustration.235

Figure 9 (Source; Facebook) It was in these circumstances that blogger-activist Roy Ngerng posted an article on his blog, The Heart Truths, regarding the CPF and its perceived inadequacies, titled “Where Your CPF Money Is Going: Learning From The

City Harvest Trial.” In the article, Ngerng drew comparisons between how the state managed CPF funds and the City Harvest Church trial which had descended into a financial scandal in which church leaders were alleged to have misappropriated church funds. His article also included a picture which mapped

234 Ibid., 235 Lee and Leong, “CPF Minimum Sum”. 97 the alleged relationships between PM Lee, the CPF, the Monetary Authority of

Singapore, Temasek Holdings and GIC.236

On 18 May 2014, the Prime Minister’s lawyers sent Ngerng a letter of demand, calling upon him to remove the post from his blog as well as from

Facebook. PM Lee’s lawyer Davinder Singh contended that the blog post suggested that PM Lee “is guilty of criminal misappropriation of the monies paid by Singaporeans to the CPF.”237 He further alleged that Ngerng’s blog article constituted “serious libel against Mr Lee and disparages him and impugns his character, credit and integrity” and that it was “published maliciously.”238 The letter warned Ngerng to take down the post by 21 May, and to make an offer of damages, failing which a defamation lawsuit would proceed.239

What followed in the next ten days can only best be described as a cat and mouse game between Ngerng, PM Lee and their respective legal teams.

Ngerng first requested an extension till 23 May, which was granted. He then removed the article and “apologised unreservedly” to the Prime Minister and

“acknowledged that the allegation was false and completely without foundation.”240 He further requested that the demand for damages be dropped, which was rejected by Mr Singh who claimed that the Prime Minister was

“entitled in law” to be compensated.”241

236 Tay, Policy and Political Developments, 25-26. 237 “PM Lee demands apology and compensation from blogger,” The Straits Times, May 22, 2014. 238 Ibid., 239 Ibid., 240 Tay, Policy and Political Developments, 25-26. 241 “Blogger says sorry; PM rejects plea against damages,” The Straits Times, May 24, 2014. 98

Ngerng responded by uploading a YouTube video in which he reiterated his request for the state to be more transparent about CPF funds, which led to a new letter of demand and allegations from the Prime Minister’s legal team that

Ngerng had been not been genuine in his apology. Ngerng then “removed videos before deadline and made an offer of S$5000 in damages to PM Lee” which was rejected for being a “derisory” offer which disregarded the extent of

Ngerng’s "calculated and systemic aggravation.”242 PM Lee’s team then launched legal action on a defamation suit on 28 May 2014.

The defamation lawsuit earned Ngerng a groundswell of sympathy.243

While many felt that his article had been poorly and insensitively worded, it was undeniable that he had tapped into strong public resentment towards the CPF.

The debate in the public sphere regarding the relevance of the CPF and the lack of transparency surrounding around it intensified. Ngerng temporarily earned

‘martyr status’ amongst many agitated Singaporeans who admired his courage for speaking up against the government.244 Evidence of the sympathy Ngerng aroused came in the form of the response to his appeal to the public on 29 May for help with fighting his legal battle with the Prime Minister, estimating that the total legal fees would easily total to S$70,000 at the very least. By 4 June, he had amassed S$81,000 in sympathy.245

It is important to note that Roy was not the only person writing about the CPF, or suggesting that the Government had failed to manage it properly.

242 “PM Lee rejects offer of S$5,000 in damages from blogger,” TODAY Newspaper, May 28, 2014. 243 Banyan, “Opinion in Singapore: A butterfly on a wheel”, The Economist, June 13, 2014, http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/06/opinion-singapore. 244 Ibid., 245 Tay, Policy and Political Developments, 25-26. 99

His allegations of government misappropriation directed at the Prime Minister meant that he took his allegations further than almost everyone else, but while this was significant to the political leadership, it was a nuance that was lost on a many Singaporeans, who were thankful that the issue had gotten so much publicity. Coercion by a defamation suit was thus seen by many as an attempt by the Leviathan to stifle debate over the CPF issue, not just to silence Roy

Ngerng. The decision to sue Roy for defamation and damages was especially coercive because it was the “first defamation suit by a political leader for online postings” in Singapore.246

The Prime Minister’s legal team’s decision to dismiss Ngerng’s offer to pay S$5000 in damages as ‘derisory’ also offended many Singaporeans to whom that amount of money represented a substantial sum. Ngerng’s argument that the amount he offered was based on his “modest living and income” also further entrenched an image of persecution in the hearts of many Singaporeans.

The defamation suit and the perceived persecution of Roy Ngerng was an important factor in fanning the flames of the CPF protest movement and a major factor in getting people to attend the protest rally that was organised on 7 June

2014 at Hong Lim Park.

6.2 The CPF Protest Rally – 7th June 2014

On 7 June 2015, thousands of Singaporeans attended the “Return Our CPF” protest, which called for higher flexibility, increased CPF returns, and greater transparency, and agitated against the increase in the CPF Minimum Sum.247

246 “The case in two minutes: Lee Hsien Loong vs Roy Ngerng,” The Straits Times, July 3, 2015. 247 “Speakers at CPF protest call for flexibility, better returns, greater transparency for CPF scheme” The Straits Times, June 7, 2014. 100

Organiser Han Hui Hui claimed that 6,000 people attended the protest, while

The Straits Times estimated the crowd “was about 2,000” strong.248 While

Ngerng had initially been one of the organisers, on the advice of his lawyers, he withdrew from this position, but chose to remain as a speaker, alongside organiser Han Hui Hui, 2011 presidential candidate Tan Kin Lian, ex-Singapore

Democratic Party (SDP) member Vincent Wijeysingha, Reform Party chief

Kenneth Jeyaretnam, and statistician Leong Sze Hian. SDP leader Chee Soon

Juan, who was overseas at the time of the protest and had his speech read by blogger Ariffin Sha.

There are several notable facts about the CPF protest rally. Firstly, at

2000 people (or 3000), the rally had the highest attendance of any rally after the population White Paper protest of 2013. Several interviewees noted that they thought the high turnout was driven by the perceived success of the White Paper protests. Protestors also perceived large protest rallies as a means to get the government’s attention.249 While this alone may not be indicative that a majority of Singaporeans were highly concerned about the state of the CPF system, when taken together with the defamation suit, the uproar online, and the ferocious debate in mainstream and alternative news media outlets, it was clear that this issue resonated with the population.

Secondly, Ngerng was very much at the centre of the rally, both in terms of determining the eventual turnout as well as being at the centre of attention.

248 Ibid., Other online sources such as Yahoo News Singapore estimated the turnout at closer to 3000. 249 “‘Return Our CPF’ protest – the people have spoken,” The Online Citizen, accessed on July 1 2015, http://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2014/06/return-our-cpf-protest-the-people-have- spoken/. 101

The Straits Times noted that Ngerng received the “loudest cheers from the crowd.”250 Other sources noted that many protestors turned up to “express displeasure for the lawsuit that the Prime Minister had taken up against him.”251

Ngerng was given almost celebrity status during the event by the crowd with large numbers surrounding him, taking pictures, and even chanting his name during his speech. There can be little doubt that the defamation suit and the perceived persecution from the Prime Minister had been interpreted by many as a sign of state coercion.

6.3 The Leviathan Strikes Back – Calibrated Liberalisation and Co- optation

The Leviathan’s response to the protest at Hong Lim Park and the furore online was a marked departure from its responses to both the NLB and Thaipusam sagas. Unlike the Thaipusam case study, the state did not respond coercively to allegations of coercion. The protest rally occurred without much state intrusion.

Sources close to the organisers intimated that they faced no real obstacles from the state.252 They were not requested to obtain a police permit, unlike either the

NLB protests or the Thaipusam protests. Other than last minute cancellations from stage contractors and other companies providing support for the event, there were virtually no allegations of attempts to stifle the protest by the organisers.253

250 “Speakers at CPF protest call for flexibility, better returns, greater transparency for CPF scheme,” The Straits Times, 7 June 2014. 251 “ ‘Return Our CPF’ protest.” 252 Interview with source close to CPF protest organisers, 1 November 2015. Other close sources indicated similar opinions. 253 “Blogger Roy Ngerng’s ‘Return Our CPF’ rally draws large crowds”, Mothership.sg, accessed July 1, 2015, http://mothership.sg/2014/06/blogger-roy-ngerngs-return-our-cpf- rally-draws-large-crowds/. 102

There was also no coercion via indirect threats towards online discussions and debates, as in the Thaipusam case study. Rather, most major alternative news sites online and many socio-political blogs published opinion pieces on the issue. Meanwhile, Facebook groups like “Return our CPF,” “In

Solidarity with Roy Ngerng, The Heart Truths” and “CPF broken promises” all provided space within the public sphere for Singaporeans to vent their frustrations over the issue.

Indeed, leaders seemed to increasingly acknowledge a need to debate the CPF. In the days and months following the protest rally, there was greater engagement from the state. Minister for Manpower Tan Chuan Jin took to platforms like Facebook and the Ministry of Manpower’s (MOM) blog to defend the CPF system and to explain what he alleged were misconceptions with regards to it.254 In his post, the Minister argued that “the CPF system is a good and fair one that is a more sustainable system than most other retirement schemes... (and) CPF funds are absolutely safe.” He further moved to reassure

Singaporeans that “the CPF is put in place to help Singaporeans have peace of mind when it comes to their retirement years.”255

PAP MPs also “called for a holistic review of the CPF system in

Parliament,” an indication that they were acknowledging the saliency of the issue.256 MOM subsequently announced “the setting up of a 13 member CPF

Advisory Panel consisting of academics, financial industry experts and

254 Tan Chuan Jin, “The Truth About Our CPF and the Minimum Sum”, The Manpower Blog, May 25, 2014, http://momsingapore.blogspot.sg/2014/05/the-truth-about-our-cpf-and- minimum-sum.html. 255 Ibid. 256 Tay, Policy and Political Developments, 9. 103 representatives from unions and the grassroots and social sectors” in response to the MP’s requests.257 The CPF Advisory Panel, once set up, announced that it would meet with Singaporeans in focus group discussions and would welcome suggestions in writing before offering its recommendations the following year.”258

The state announced several feedback forums with grassroots leaders and PAP MPs and Ministers, facilitated by grassroots organisations. It also engaged academics and the intelligentsia through forums organised by think tanks like the Institute of Policy Studies.259 PAP MP Hri Kumar held a dialogue session with his constituents that allowed for a frank and open exchange with the MP on the CPF. The Straits Times noted that “the volley of questions and concerns rarely faltered, and most centred on the Minimum Sum, and the monthly pay-outs during retirement.”260

The session attracted some controversy after videos of an emotional outburst by an elderly lady who spoke at length of her difficulties with withdrawing her money from the CPF, as well as a brief exchange between MP

Kumar and Reform Party chief Kenneth Jeyaretnam, made its rounds online.

However the general consensus seemed to indicate that these forums were a positive sign that the state was listening to the concerns of the people. This opinion gained credence when the Prime Minister spent a significant portion of

257 Ibid., 258 “CPF proposals: Advisory panel offers more ideas to make retirement fund more flexible,” The Straits Times, Feb 4, 2015. 259 “What CPF reform should achieve,” TODAY Newspaper, July 25, 2014. 260 “Questions and more questions on CPF at dialogue session,” The Straits Times, June 15, 2014. 104 his annual National Day Rally, seen as the most important political speech of the year, discussing the CPF.

At the rally, the Prime Minister “acknowledged Singaporeans concerns and pledged to change parts of the CPF system” while defending the overall system as a sensible and sound one.261 The Prime Minister’s acknowledgement that the system required more flexibility and that it would be seriously looked into by the Advisory Panel was seen as a very positive step and a sign that rather than being adversarial to dissent and protest, the state had instead realised the legitimacy of some of the concerns.

This opinion was shared by CPF protestors interviewed. One interviewee shared that the “PM addressing it during the National day rally showed that it’s being looked into seriously” and that “it also showed how the government had managed to control the narrative and react to the protests very well.”262 Another experienced activist noted that

The government responded well. They had a lot of focus groups talking about it. Some MPs also spoke to their residents about it in discussion sessions. I think the government has looked at changes. It’s still ongoing but its promising…The government took action and used it (the protest) as a listening platform and started their own conversation with focus groups and their grassroots. They took over the conversation!263

261 Chun Han Wong, “Singapore to Revise Parts of Pension Plan amid Retirement Concerns,” The Wall Street Journal accessed on July 11, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/singapore- to-revise-parts-of-pension-plan-amid-retirement-concerns-1408300084. 262 Interview with source close to CPF protest organisers, 3 November 2015 263 Interview with source close to CPF protest organisers, 27 October 2015. 105

The Leviathan’s calibrated strategy with regards to the CPF protests was nuanced, utilizing a range of options available on the spectrum of control.

Although state strategy began coercively with a defamation suit against Roy

Ngerng, the realisation that the libel suit and the CPF issue had resulted in a huge groundswell of popular support for his position meant that the state then changed tack in favour of liberalisation and co-optative strategies. The state allowed for an active conversation in the public sphere, contributing to but never controlling the conversation online. It also did not make any attempt to stifle the protest movement in Hong Lim Park.

The decision to pursue a strategy of calibrated liberalisation in this instance is especially significant. In Chapter 3, we had noted that the Leviathan would liberalise according to how much of a threat it perceived the issue or key personnel involved would be. In this instance, the state did not decide against a strategy of calibrated liberalisation, despite the presence of opposition politicians or the fact that the CPF as a core socio-economic policy was a highly sensitive issue for the Leviathan.

Instead the Leviathan actively pursued a strategy of co-optation. The use of extensive grassroots organisations and the offer of access to key political decision makers co-opted the conversation and in doing so, set its boundaries and shaped the potential for change. Through dialogue sessions with PAP leaders, focus group sessions with the CPF advisory panel set up by the state, and feedback sessions with grassroots leaders, the Leviathan offered an alternative means of evoking change, albeit under its careful gaze.

106

The success of the PAP’s carefully calibrated strategy was evident over the next few months. Subsequent protests attracted protestors only numbering in the hundreds, a significant dip from the large crowds of 7 June.264 One interviewee who attended the 7 June rally, but did not attend subsequent protests, suggested that:

There seemed no reason to go Hong Lim and scold the government when it was obvious they were interested in listening and changing things. If they don’t listen we scold, they listen also we scold, the protests will end up losing effect. We must be willing to say that they are doing a good job when they admit things need to change and they are trying to change.265

6.3 ‘Heckle-gate’ and a Realisation that the Sword Swings Both Ways

The state’s strategy of stepping back and co-opting the conversation also paid unexpected dividends due to the unfortunate sequence of events on 27 Sept 2014 during a planned protest rally called “Return our CPF” which attracted a few hundred protestors. Once again led by Han Hui Hui and Roy Ngerng, protesters marched around the park. Hearing that then-Minister of State (Trade and

Industry) Teo Ser Luck was in attendance as the guest of honour at a charity carnival called Proms@the Park organised by voluntary welfare organisation

YMCA, Hui Hui and Ngerng chose to make their presence felt.266 The Straits

Times described the events that followed:

Waving Singapore flags, they (the protestors) stopped near the stage, in front of which sat rows of elderly guests, and shouted

264 “Hundreds attend protest against CPF and Medishield Life policies, “The Straits Times, July 12, 2014. 265 Interview with protest participant, 23 October 2015. 266 “When Protests Cross the Line,” The Straits Times, October 4, 2015. 107

chants, including "Return Our CPF" and "Vote Them Out, PAP.” These chants were apparently directed at Mr Teo, who was speaking to the audience of seated senior citizens. Jeering was also heard. At the same time, a group of special needs children, the Y Stars, had taken to the stage for their dance item. Several children, shocked by the rowdiness, missed a beat. The performance had to be restarted.267

The public backlash was deafening. The protestors, particularly Ngerng and Hui Hui, came under heavy criticism for their rowdy behaviour, particularly for heckling special needs children and senior citizens. PAP leaders were particularly stern in their rebukes with Minister Tan Chuan Jin referring to their behaviour as “…vile (and a) total and absolute disgrace.”268 The protestors also came under harsh criticism from opposition politicians, public intellectuals and noted bloggers, many of whom had previously been supportive of Ngerng and the first protest rally.

For example, Devadas Krishnadas referred to the protest leaders’ actions as “anarchic…visceral and vicious” and accused them of “self-indulgence, social carelessness, and “immaturity.”269 Bertha Henson, a noted former journalist and popular socio-political blogger, chastised Han Hui Hui for her

“antics” and described her actions as “disrespectful” towards attendees of the

267 Ibid., 268 “Online reactions to Hong Lim Park rallygoers’ heckling of special needs children at charity carnival”, Mothership.sg, accessed July 8, 2015, http://mothership.sg/2014/09/online- reactions-to-hong-lim-park-rallygoers-heckling-of-special-needs-children-at-charity-carnival/. 269 Devadas Krishnadas’s Facebook post, accessed 18 May, 2015, https://www.facebook.com/devadas.krishnadas/posts/10152692637060801. 108

YMCA event. She referred to the actions of the protestors as an “absolute farce!”270

There was also a groundswell of anger towards the protestors within the public sphere, with many taking to social media to make their opinions known.

Police reports were made against the actions of the protestors which led to six protestors, including Han Hui Hui and Roy Ngerng being charged with committing acts of “public nuisance.”271 Han Hui Hui and Ngerng were

“additionally charged with allegedly organising a demonstration without approval.”272 This time, however, there was no outpouring of public sympathy or accusations of persecution. An experienced activist who had organised several protests reflected on the CPF saga:

To me, it is something that is one step forward, two steps back. The arrests scared off protestors and attendance kept dropping after that. People lost faith a little I think. Even myself, to organize events. We’re now putting off quite a few events…We were happy the CPF protests took off. What we are not happy with is they were too vigorous and too contentious and not too law abiding. That’s how they got into trouble. We weren’t comfortable with their actions…We have some events where there’s another group doing their own stuff and there must be mutual respect… I think a bit of wisdom and following the law is needed…To me, their actions actually derailed the movement. A lot of us are not comfortable now to organize any

270 Bertha Henson, “To those who use the Speakers’ Corner, with respect”, Bertha Harian (blog), September 27, 2014, https://berthahenson.wordpress.com/2014/09/27/to-those- who-use-the-speakers-corner-with-respect. 271 “Six protesters, including activist Han Hui Hui and blogger Roy Ngerng, charged with public nuisance, “The Straits Times, October 27, 2014. 272 Ibid., 109

protests…We don’t want to end up like them or that people aren’t coming.273

The actions of Ngerng, Han, and the backlash they received, inadvertently revealed a key lesson for would-be protestors. Singaporean society remains conservative and expects protestors to conduct themselves in a socially responsible manner. Furthermore, social media and the public sphere is a medium through which criticisms can enjoy a multiplier effect. This potential can be exploited by the Leviathan as well as by its opponents when protestors and dissenters choose to function in a social irresponsible way. Furthermore, activists and public intellectuals are very protective of the public sphere they have managed to carve for themselves. Any action by fellow activists deemed damaging to its existence, either by the state or by public opinion, will be met with harsh criticism.

6.4 Concluding Remarks

The Leviathan’s strategy with regards to the CPF protests best represents the range of calibration available to it on the spectrum of control. The state first employed a coercive strategy against Ngerng, a strategy it deemed necessary because of Ngerng’s decision to make personal accusations against the integrity of a key political leader within the Leviathan. This was a red flag issue which our model predicts would invite a strong response from the Leviathan. But having noted the resultant groundswell of sympathy for Ngerng and discontent with the CPF, the Leviathan then responded with a nuanced, calibrated policy that involved the liberalisation of the public sphere and a careful co-optation of the conversation through its grassroots networks with the incentive of enacting

273 Interview with source close to CPF protest organisers, 27 October 2015. 110 real change. The Leviathan’s strategy can thus be seen to be one of a careful calibration of coercion, co-optation and liberalisation. In conclusion it may be noted that the strategy in the case of the CPF can thus be represented as follows:

Figure 10 (Source; Author)

111

Chapter 7 Conclusion

This dissertation has explored the varied and seemingly contradictory strategies of control employed by the Leviathan in Singapore. It has focused on the protest movements that have mushroomed in Singapore since the 2011 elections to study how the state’s strategies of control are evolving. I have argued that the

Leviathan employs varied strategies of control in tandem, in a calibrated fashion, to maximise political control at minimal cost. In my analysis of three protest movements, I have contended that in response to each movement, the state has employed differently calibrated strategies.

7.1 Summary of Main Arguments

This dissertation has made some key contributions to the current literature.

Firstly, it has argued that any attempt to understand the strategies of control employed by the state in Singapore needs to account for the way in which the state liberalises in a strategic fashion. This study has hence introduced a new strategy of state control, namely, ‘calibrated liberalisation’. Secondly, this dissertation has also built upon the previous understanding of the term

‘calibration’ by explaining that it refers to a combination of strategies. Lastly, it has conceptualised a new framework of analysis, the ‘spectrum of control,’ on which we can locate the various strategies used by the state.

In chapter 4, the case of the NLB protests illustrated that the Leviathan adopted a strategy heavily dominated by a calibrated liberalisation approach, with very minimal use of coercive or co-optative strategies. The lack of red flag issues, and the lack of perceived threats, both in terms of key individuals and

112 the nature of the issue, meant that the NLB protest was a good candidate for a strategy of calibrated liberalisation. The case study was important in highlighting that a strategy of liberalisation, given the right conditions, could form the dominant element in a calibrated strategy of control.

In Chapter 5, the case of the Thaipusam saga of 2015 demonstrated that the Leviathan employed coercion, tempered with muted use of liberalisation or co-optative strategies. The state used coercion in a nuanced fashion, making an example of three publicised dissenters and then using indirect threats to produce a ‘chilling effect’ on other protestors. The presence of the red flag issue of race and religion also meant that the Thaipusam protest was in many senses primed for a strategy dominated by calibrated coercion.

In Chapter 6, the Leviathan’s strategy towards the CPF protests best represents the full range of options available to it on the spectrum of control.

The state first employed a coercive strategy against an individual activist for making personal accusations against the integrity of the Prime Minister (a red flag issue). It then responded to the resultant groundswell of sympathy for the activist and general discontent with the CPF with a nuanced, calibrated strategy that involved the liberalisation of the public sphere and a careful co-optation of the conversation through its grassroots networks with the incentive of enacting real change. The Leviathan’s strategic toolbox involved a careful combination of coercion, co-optation, and liberalisation.

7.2 Limitations of Research

There are limitations and areas for improvement in this study. Firstly there is a question of universality that must be addressed. Given the strength of the

113

Leviathan in Singapore, it is worth considering if other regimes could employ the same level of sophistication and calibration when formulating strategies of control. It is also questionable whether the spectrum of control could be employed as a framework of analysis for other regimes. Yet there are some important conclusions that I believe are applicable for the study of other

Leviathans and semi-authoritarian regimes. It is increasingly worth questioning how states that straddle democracy and authoritarianism liberalize as a strategy of control. While this dissertation was meant as a detailed study of the regime in Singapore, I do believe that the strategy of calibrated liberalisation is relevant to the study of other Leviathans and semi-authoritarian regimes.

The second limitation lies in the theoretical framework of the spectrum of control. Given the limited scope of this dissertation, I have focused on establishing a theory of calibrated liberalisation and placed it within a wider framework of strategies that can be employed in tandem. I have not been able to further articulate and develop the spectrum of control as I would have liked.

This dissertation has been able to establish that such a spectrum is indeed a viable way to comprehend thestrategies of control at work in Singapore and must remain satisfied with that.

Lastly, this dissertation was limited by its ability to collect data. Given the perceived sensitivity of the case studies, gathering interviewees proved to be a daunting task. While in most instances, key organisers were willing participants, many participants proved to be extremely unwilling to be interviewed, even with assurances of anonymity. It sometimes took several sessions of online cajoling and the assurances from well-known activists before many were willing to even meet for an informal chat. Some, in the instance of

114 the CPF protests were still embroiled in court cases, and as such were unwilling to correspond. While this suggests strongly that a climate of fear and the culture of self-censorship and auto-regulation that the study has articulated still exists, it greatly limited the number of interviewees willing to participate.

7.3 Avenues for Further Research

There is greater scope to develop the spectrum of control as a theoretical framework. The spectrum of control, I believe, can be developed into a system that incorporates other strategies. It can also function as a means of articulating more clearly the level of calibration of the state’s strategy towards a particular issue. In future research I hope to focus exclusively on the spectrum of control.

I also hope to reach out to stalwarts and promising researchers in the field like

Cherian George and Walid J. Abdullah to collaborate on the establishment of this theoretical framework.

Furthermore, much more research can be done on the notion of liberalisation as a strategy of control, and the theory of calibrated liberalisation.

It can be extended to the study of the media, civil society organisations, religious institutions and organisations, as well as other areas to further our understanding of the strategy. It is also worth studying whether the feasibility of calibrated liberalisation as a strategy of control varies greatly amongst different sectors and areas. Again, I hope that other scholars will see this as an interesting avenue of study.

As Singapore becomes more diverse in composition and more connected via technological leaps, a more vocal population will continue to demand more accountability and greater freedoms. Accommodating these calls for greater

115 space and liberalisation will increasingly govern the concerns of the Leviathan.

Calibrating the degree of liberalisation it can allow will be an essential strategy as it carefully prunes the banyan tree to ensure its continued hegemony.

116

Bibliography

Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt. “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Study of MUIS and Pergas” Master’s thesis, National University of Singapore, 2012).

Abdullah, Walid Jumblatt. “Religious Representation in Secular Singapore: A Case Study of MUIS and Pergas.” Asian Survey, Vol.53, No. 6 (2013): 1182 – 1204.

Alagappa, Muthiah. “Civil Society and Democratic Change: Indeterminate Connection, Transforming Relations.” In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 478 - 508, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Alagappa, Muthiah. “Contestation and Crisis.” In Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 54- 68, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Alagappa, Muthiah. “Introduction.” In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 1 – 24, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Alagappa, Muthiah. “The Anatomy of Legitimacy.” In Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 11 -30, Stanford, California : Stanford University Press, 1995.

Alagappa, Muthiah. “The Bases of Legitimacy.” In Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 31 - 53, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Aljunied, Syed Mohammed Ad’ha. “Governing Civil Society in Singapore: Enhancing Political Control and Calibrating Political Participation.” Asian Profile, Vol.42, No.5 (2014)

Arendt, Hannah. On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1970.

Arnold, David. "Gramsci and peasant subalternity in India." The Journal of Peasant Studies 11.4 (1984): 155-177.

Artz, Lee and Bren Ortega Murphy. Cultural Hegemony in the United States. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, 2000.

Au, Alex. “Soft Exterior, Hard Core: Policies towards Gays.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 399 - 408, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

117

Balaji, P.N. “A Journalist’s Note on a Quiet Rebel.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 34 – 39, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Barr, Michael D. “Beyond Technocracy: The Culture of Elite Governance in Lee Hsien Loong’s Singapore.” Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook Paper, No.6 (2005)

Barr, Michael D. “MARXISTS IN SINGAPORE?” Critical Asian Studies, Volume 26, 42:3 (2010): 335 – 362.

Barr, Michael D. “Perpetual Revisionism in Singapore: The Limits of Change.” The Pacific Review, Vol.16, No.1 (2003): 77 – 97.

Barr, Michael D. “Singapore’s Catholic Social Activists: Alleged Marxist Conspirators.” In Paths not taken: Political pluralism in post-war Singapore, edited by Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, 228 – 247, Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.

Barr, Michael D. “The Bonsai under the Banyan Tree: Democracy and democratisation in Singapore.” Democratization, Volume 21, No.1 (2014): 29 – 48.

Barr, Michael D. The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence. London: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2014.

Barr, Michael D., and Zlatko Skrbiš. Constructing Singapore: Elitism, ethnicity and the nation-building project. No. 11. Copenhagen: Nias Press, 2008.

Barr, Michael. Lee Kuan Yew: the beliefs behind the man. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000.

Bates, Thomas R. “Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony.” Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol.36, No.2 (1975): 351 – 366.

Birch, David. “Staging Crisis: media and citizenship.” In Singapore Changes Guard: Social, political and economic directions in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan, 72 - 83, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993.

Black, David, Arina Dafir and Philip Behnke. “The Digital Heartland: Social Media and the Political Transformation in Singapore.” In Social Media and Elections in Asia-Pacific – The Growing Power of the Youth Vote, edited by Alastair Carthew and Simon Winkelmann, Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer- Stiftung, 2013.

Bloodworth, Dennis. The tiger and the Trojan horse. Marshall Cavendish International Asia Pte Ltd, 2010.

118

Boeder, Pieter. "Habermas’ heritage: The future of the public sphere in the network society." First Monday 10.9 (2005).

Boothman, Derek. “The Sources of Gramsci’s Concept of Hegemony.” Rethinking Marxism, Volume 20, Number 2 (2008).

Bower, Ernest Z. “Singapre Is Changing and Why That Matters.” Southeast Asia from Scott Circle, Volume V, Issue 20 (2014).

Brewer, John D. “Competing Understanding of Common Sense Understanding: A Brief Comment on ‘Common Sense Racism’.” The British Journal of Sociology, Vol.35, No.1 (1984): 66 – 74.

Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Calhoun, Craig. “Introduction: Habermas and the Public Sphere.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 1 – 50, Massachusetts, United States: MIT Press, 1992.

Case, William. Politics in Southeast Asia: democracy or less. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon. pp.86-87 (2002).

Castells, Manuel. Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the Internet age. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012.

Chan, Heng Chee, and U. Obaid. "The Prophetic and the Political: Selected Speeches and Writings of S. Rajaratnam." Singapore: Graham Brash (1987).

Chan, Jasmine S & Lily L. L. Kong. “Patriarchy and Pragmatism: Ideology Contradictions in State Policies.” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2000)

Chan, Soo San. “The Singapore Government and Civil Society.” In State- Society Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, 122 - 130, Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

Chang, Stewart L. “Gay Liberation in the Illiberal State.” Washington International Law Journal, 24.1 (2015)

Chatterjee, Partha. “Beyond the Nation? Or Within?” Social Text, No.56 (1998): 57 – 69.

Chatterjee, Partha. “Community in the East.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No.6 (1998): 277-282.

Chee, Soon Juan. A Nation Cheated. Singapore: Chee Soon Juan, 2008.

Cheong, Yip Seng. OB Markers: My Straits Times Story. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2013.

119

Chesterman, Simon. “One Nation Under Surveillance: A New Social Contract to Defend Freedom Without Sacrificing Liberty (Introduction).” New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers (2011)

Chia, Roderick. Democracy and Civil Society in Singapore. Singapore: Singaporeans for Democracy, 2012.

Chong, Terence. "A return to normal politics: Singapore general elections 2011." Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 2012 (2012): 283-298.

Chong, Terence. "Singapore's cultural policy and its consequences." Critical Asian Studies 37.4 (2005): 553-568.

Chong, Terence. “‘Back Regions’ and ‘Dark Secrets’ in Singapore: The politics of Censorship and Liberalisation.” Space and Polity, 14: 3 (2010): 234-250.

Chong, Terence. “Civil Society in Singapore: Popular Discourses and Concepts.” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Vol.20, No. 2 (2005): 273-301.

Chong, Terence. “Filling the Moral Void: The Christian Right in Singapore.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41:4 (2011): 566-583.

Chong, Terence. “Singapore’s Population White Paper: Impending Integration Challenges.” No.9 (2013)

Chong, Terrance. “Christian Evangelicals and Public Morality in Singapore.” ISEAS Paper, No.17 (2014).

Chong, Terrance. “Embodying Society’s Best: Hegel and the Singapore State.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.36, No.3 (2006)

Chong, Terrence. “Compensating for the Abdication of the Moral State?.” In The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore, edited Terrence Chong, 25 – 35, Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.

Chong, Terrence. “Introduction: The Role of Success in Singapore’s National Identity.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong, 1 – 21, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.

Chua, Beng Huat. "Multiculturalism in Singapore: An instrument of social control." Race & Class, 44:3 (2003): 58 – 77.

Chua, Beng Huat. "The cultural logic of a capitalist single-party state, Singapore." Postcolonial Studies 13.4 (2010): 335-350.

Chua, Beng Huat. “Arrested Development: Democratisation in Singapore.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1994)

120

Chua, Beng Huat. “For a communitarian democracy in Singapore.” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 27 - 34, ISEAS, 1994.

Chua, Beng Huat. “Liberalising Culture.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 436 - 443, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Chua, Beng Huat. “Making Singapore’s Liberal Base Visible.” In The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore, edited Terrence Chong, 14 – 24, Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.

Chua, Beng Huat. “State and Society: Ambling towards Greater Balance.” In Singapore Re-Engineering Success, edited by Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan, 69 - 81, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002.

Chua, Beng Huat. “Taking Group Rights Seriously: Multiracialism in Singapore.” Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No.124 (2005)

Chua, Beng Huat. “The Relative Autonomies of State and Civil Society in Singapore.” In State-Society Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, 62 -76, Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

Chua, Beng-Huat. Communitarian ideology and democracy in Singapore. London: Routledge, 1995.

Chua, Lynette J. Mobilizing gay Singapore: Rights and resistance in an authoritarian State. Singapore: NUS Press, 2014.

Clammer, John. “Deconstructing values: the establishment of a National Ideology and its implications for Singapore’s political future.” In Singapore Changes Guard: Social, political and economic directions in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan, 34 - 51, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993.

Cotton, James. "Political Innovation in Singapore: The Presidency, the Leadership and the Party." In Singapore Changes Guard, edited by Garry Rodan, Melbourne: Longman Cheshire, 1993.

Countinho, Carlos Nelson. Gramsci’s political thought. Leiden, the Netherlands: Brill Academic Publishers, 2012.

Crehan, Kate. “Gramsci’s concept of common sense: a useful concept for anthropologists?” Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 16:2 (2011): 273 – 287.

Cunha, Derek Da. “The Intellectual’s role in society.” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 3 – 8, ISEAS, 1994.

121

Davies, Derek. “The Press.” In The Singapore Puzzle, edited by Michael Hass, 91 - 126, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999.

Debatin, Bernhard. “The Internet as a New Platform for Expressing Opinions and as a New Public Sphere.” In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 64 - 70, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Deleuze, Gilles. "Postscript on the Societies of Control." October, Vol.59 (1992): 3-7.

Devan, Janadas and Geraldine Heng. “A minimum working hypothesis of democracy for Singapore.” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 22 - 26, ISEAS, 1994.

Diamond, Larry Jay. "Thinking about hybrid regimes." Journal of democracy13.2 (2002): 21-35.

Diamond, Larry. "Facing up to the democratic recession." Journal of Democracy 26.1 (2015): 141-155.

Esman, Milton J. Administration and development in malaysia: Institution building and reform in a plural society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972.

Fetzer, Joel S. "Election strategy and ethnic politics in Singapore." Taiwan Journal of Democracy 4.1 (2008): 135-153.

Fontana, Benedetto. “Political space and hegemonic power in Gramsci.” Journal of Power, 3:3 (2010): 341 – 363.

Fontana, Benedetto. Hegemony and power: On the relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

Foucault, Michel. Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison. Vintage, 1977.

Friedman, Kerim P. “Ethical Hegemony.” Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 21:3 (2009): 355 – 365.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. "Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats." Comparative political studies, Volume 40, Number 11(2007):1279 – 1301.

Garnham, Nicholas. “The Media and the Public Sphere.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 359 – 376, Massachusetts, United States: MIT Press, 1992.

122

George, Cherian and Harish Pillay. “Media and Civil Society.” In State- Society Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, 198- 202, Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

George, Cherian. "Consolidating authoritarian rule: calibrated coercion in Singapore." The Pacific Review 20.2 (2007): 127-145.

George, Cherian. "The internet's political impact and the penetration/participation paradox in Malaysia and Singapore." Media, Culture & Society 27:6 (2005): 903-920.

George, Cherian. “Building Networks: Process, Problems and Possibilities.” In Building Social Space in Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative in Civil Society Activism, edited Constance Singam, Tan Chong Kee, Tisa Ng and Leon Perera, 147 - 154, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002.

George, Cherian. “Calibrated Coercion and the Maintenance of Hegemony in Singapore.” Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 48 (2005)

George, Cherian. “Control-shift: The Internet and Political Change in Singapore.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong, 257 - 271, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.

George, Cherian. “History Spiked: Hegemony and the Denial of Media Diversity.” In Paths not taken: Political pluralism in post-war Singapore, edited by Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, 264 - 280, Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.

George, Cherian. “Legal Landmines and OB Markers: Survival Strategies of Alternative Media.” In Battle for Hearts and Minds: New Media and Elections in Singapore, edited by Tan Tarn How, Arun Mahizhnan and Ang Peng Hwa, 29 - 48, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2016.

George, Cherian. “No News Here: Media in Subordination.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 444 - 450, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

George, Cherian. “Singapore’s Emerging Informal Public Sphere.” In Singapore perspectives 2007: a new Singapore, edited by Tan Tarn How, 93- 103, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2007.

George, Cherian. Contentious journalism and the Internet: Towards democratic discourse in Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2006.

George, Cherian. Freedom from the press: Journalism and state power in Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012.

123

George, Cherian. Singapore: The Air-conditioned Nation: Essays on the Politics of Comfort and Control, 1990-2000. Landmark Books (Singapore), 2000.

Ghani, Azhar and Gillian Koh. “Not Quite Shutting Up and Sitting Down: The Singapore Government’s Role in the AWARE Saga.” In The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore, edited Terrence Chong, 36 - 50, Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.

Gilley, Bruce. “The Limits of Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 1 (2003): 18 – 26.

Gomes, James. Publish and perish: the censorship of opposition party publications in Singapore. Singapore: National Solidarity Party, 2001.

Gomez, James, and Robin Ramcharan. "Evaluating Competing “Democratic” Discourses: The Impact on Human Rights Protection in Southeast Asia. “Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33.3 (2015): 49-77.

Gomez, James. "Dumbing down democracy: Trends in Internet regulation, surveillance and control in Asia.” Pacific Journalism Review 10:2 (2004)

Gomez, James. "International NGOs: filling the" gap" in Singapore's civil society." Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia (2005): 177-207.

Gomez, James. "Online opposition in Singapore: Communications outreach without electoral gain." Journal of Contemporary Asia 38.4 (2008): 591-612.

Gomez, James. Internet politics: Surveillance and intimidation in Singapore. Think Centre, 2002.

Green, Marcus. "Gramsci cannot speak: Presentations and interpretations of Gramsci's concept of the subaltern." Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 14.3 (2002): 1-24.

Gunther, Albert C., Richard M. Perloff and Yariv Tsfati. “Public Opinion and the Third-Person Effect.” In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 184 - 189, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Gunther, Richard, and Larry Diamond. "Species of political parties a new typology." Party Politics 9.2 (2003): 167-199.

Haas, Michael. “The Politics of Singapore in the 1980s.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 19:1 (1989): 48 – 77.

Habermas, Jürgen. "The public sphere: An Encyclopedia article." New German Critique, No.3 (1974): 49 -55.

124

Habermas, Jürgen. “Further Reflections on the Public Sphere.” In Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun, 421 - 461, Massachusetts, United States: MIT Press, 1992.

Hack, Karl. “Remaking Singapore, 1990 – 2004: From Disciplinarian Development to Bureaucratic Proxy Democracy.” In Singapore from Temasek to the 21st century: reinventing the global city, edited by Karl Hack, Jean- Louis Margolin and Karine Delaye National, 345 – 377, Singapore: NUS Press, 2010.

Hall, Stuart. "The rediscovery of ideology: Return of the repressed in media studies." Cultural theory and popular culture: A reader (1982): 111-41.

Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. “The Singapore State Revisited.” The Pacific Review, Vol.13, No.2 (2000): 195-216.

Hartley, William J. “Hegemony and Cultural Politics: The Praxis of Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks.” Socialism and Democracy, 3:2 (1989): 35-53.

Hass, Michael. “A Political History.” In The Singapore Puzzle, edited by Michael Hass, 15 -44, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999.

Hass, Michael. “Mass Society.” In The Singapore Puzzle, edited by Michael Hass, 181 - 219, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999.

Hass, Michael. “The Singapore Puzzle.” In The Singapore Puzzle, edited by Michael Hass, 1 -14, Westport, Conn: Praeger, 1999.

Heng, Russell. “Foolish to hamper democracy’s growth.” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 19-21, ISEAS, 1994.

Heng, Russell. “Give me liberty or give me wealth.” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 9 - 14, ISEAS, 1994.

Hewison, Kevin and Garry Rodan. “Southeast Asia: The Left and the rise of bourgeois opposition.” In Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Politics, edited by Richard Robison, 25 – 37, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Hewison, Kevin. “Political Space in Southeast Asia: ‘Asian-style’ and Other Democracies.” Democratization, 6 .1 (1999): 224-245.

Hill, Michael, and Kwen Fee Lian. The politics of nation building and citizenship in Singapore. Vol. 10. Routledge, 2013.

Ho, Khai Leong. “Political Consolidation in Singapore: Connecting the Party, the Government and the Expanding State.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong, 67 - 79, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.

125

Ho, Khai Leong. “Singapore Civil Society and British Power (Review).” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Volume 21, Number 2 (2006): 271 - 274.

Hoffmann-Lange, Ursula. “Studying Elite vs Mass Opinion. “In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 53 - 62, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Hong, Lysa, and Jianli Huang. The scripting of a national history: Singapore and its pasts. Vol. 1. Hong Kong University Press, 2008.

Hsing, Chi-Chung. Progressing towards a refined, gracious society. Hillview Publications, 1993.

Huntington, Samuel P. “Democracy’s Third Wave.” Journal of Democracy, Vol 2, No.2 (1991): 12-34.

Hwee, Yeo Lay. "Electoral politics in Singapore." Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia. Singapore: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2002.

Jayasuriya, Kanishka. “Review Essay: Legalism and Social Control in Singapore.” South East Asia Research, Vol.4, No.1 (1996): 85 – 94.

Jeyaretnam, Philip. “What sort of culture should Singapore have?” In Debating Singapore: Reflective essays, edited by Derek Da Cunha, 89 - 94, ISEAS, 1994.

Jones, Steve. Antonio Gramsci. London: Routledge, 2006.

Kadir, Suzaina. “Muslim Politics, the state, and society.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 131 - 158, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

Kadir, Suzaina. “Singapore: Engagement and Autonomy within the Political Status Quo.” In Civil Society and Political Change in Asia, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 324 - 356, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004.

Kawasaki, Kenichi. "Cultural hegemony of Singapore among ASEAN countries: Globalization and cultural policy." International Journal of Japanese Sociology13.1 (2004): 22-35.

Khng, Russell Heng Hiang. “Suffer the Rebellious Children: The Politics of Remaking Singapore and the Remaking of Singapore Politics.” In Management of Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong, 521 - 535, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.

Khong, Cho-Oon. “Singapore: Political Legitimacy through Managing Conformity.” In Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral

126

Authority, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 108 - 135, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995.

Koh, Gillian and Ooi Giok Ling. “Relationship between State and Civil Society in Singapore: Clarifying the Concepts, Assessing the Ground.” In Civil Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan, 167 – 197, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004.

Koh, Gillian, and Debbie Soon. "The Future of Singapore’s Civil Society.” Social Space (2012): 92-98.

Koh, Gillian. “Pruning the Banyan Tree? Civil Society in Goh’s Singapore.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 93 - 106, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Kong, Lily. “Religious Processions: Urban Politics and Poetics.” In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng, 298 - 320, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.

Kuhonta, Erik Martinez. “Studying States in Southeast Asia.” In Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, Tuong Vu, Stanford, 30 – 54, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Kumar, Krishan. "Civil society: an inquiry into the usefulness of an historical term." British Journal of Sociology, Vol 44, No.3 (1993): 375-395.

Kumar, Krishan. “A further note on civil society.” European Journal of Sociology, Vol.41, No.1 (2000): 167 – 180.

Kuo, Pao Kun. “Contemplating an Open Culture: Transcending Multiracialism.” In Singapore Re-Engineering Success, edited by Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan, 50 -61, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002.

Lai, Ah Eng. “Conclusion: Some Remarks on Religious Diversity.” In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng, 3 – 27, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.

Lang, Kurt and Gladys Engel lang. “Advocacy: Alternative Expressions of Public Opinion41.” In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 41- 51, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Le Blanc, Paul. From Marx to Gramsci: a reader in revolutionary Marxist politics. New York: Humanities Press International, 1996.

127

Lee, Hock Guan. “Introduction: Civil Society in Southeast Asia.” In Civil Society in Southeast Asia, edited by Lee Hock Guan, 1 – 26, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2004.

Lee, Hsien Loong. “Building a Civic Society.” Speech. Harvard Club of Singapore's 35th Anniversary, January 6, 2004

Lee, Terence. "Recalibrating government communication in Singapore: A Post-election analysis." Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No.171 (2011).

Lee, Terence. “Gestural Politics: Civil Society in “New” Singapore.” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Volume 20, Number 2 (2005): 132 – 154.

Lee, Terence. “Internet Control and Auto-regulation in Singapore.” Surveillance & Society, 3: 1 (2005): 74-95.

Lee, Terence. “The Politics of Civil Society in Singapore.” Asian Studies Review, Volume 26, No.1 (2002)

Lee, Terence. “The Politics of Civil Society in Singapore.” Asian Studies Review, Vol. 26, No.1 (2002)

Lee, Terence. The media, cultural control and government in Singapore. Routledge, 2010.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. "The rise of competitive authoritarianism.” Journal of democracy 13.2 (2002): 51-65.

Linger, Daniel T. “The Hegemony of Discontent.” American Ethnologist, Vol. 20, No.1 (1993):3 – 24.

Lingle, Christopher. Singapore's Authoritarian Capitalism: Asian Values, Free Market Illusions, and Political Dependency. Barcelona: Edicions Sirocco, 1996.

Lydgate, Chris. Lee's Law: How Singapore Crushes Dissent. Scribe Publications Pty Limited, 2003.

Lyon, David. “Surveillance Society.” Talk for Festival del Diritto, Piacenza, Italia (2008)

Lyons, Lenore & James Gomez. “Moving Beyond the OB Markers: Rethinking the Space of Civil Society in Singapore.” Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Volume 20, Number 2 (2005): 119 -131.

Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. "Political order and One-Party Rule." Annual Review of Political Science 13 (2010): 123-143.

128

Magaloni, Beatriz. "Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule." Comparative Political Studies, Volume 41, Number 4/5 (2008):715 - 741.

Mahizhnan, Arun “Networked Society in an Intelligent Island: Laying the Foundation.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 409 - 424, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Mahizhnan, Arun, and Tan Tarn How. “Not Quite an “Internet” Election: Survey of Media Use of Voters.” In Battle for Hearts and Minds: New Media and Elections in Singapore, edited by Tan Tarn How, Arun Mahizhnan and Ang Peng Hwa, 1- 28, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2016.

Mahizhnan, Arun. “Introduction.” In Singapore Re-Engineering Success, edited by Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan, vii- xxii, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002.

Mahizhnan, Arun. “Rashomon Effect: Introduction.” In Battle for Hearts and Minds: New Media and Elections in Singapore, edited by Tan Tarn How, Arun Mahizhnan and Ang Peng Hwa, xv – xxii, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2016.

Mathi, Braema. "Growing civil society in Singapore." Social Space (2008): 80-83.

Mauzy, Diane K., and Robert Stephen Milne. Singapore politics under the People's Action Party. London: Routledge, 2002.

McKee, Alan. The Public Sphere An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Means, Gordon P. “Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore.” Journal of Democracy, 7.4 (1996): 103 – 117.

Mohamed Nasir, Kamaludeen, and Bryan S. Turner. "Governing as gardening: reflections on soft authoritarianism in Singapore." Citizenship Studies 17; 3-4 (2013): 339-352.

Morera, Esteve. “Gramsci and Democracy.” Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol.23, No.1 (1990): 23 – 37.

Mutalib, Hussin. "Constitutional‐Electoral Reforms and Politics in Singapore.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 27.4 (2002): 659-672.

Mutalib, Hussin. “Constructing a “Constructive” Opposition.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James

129

Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 83 - 92, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Mutalib, Hussin. “Illiberal Democracy and the Future of Opposition in Singapore.” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2000): 313 – 342.

Mutalib, Hussin. “Singapore in 1992: Regime Consolidation with a Twist.” Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No. 2 (1993): 194 – 197.

Nair, C. V. Devan. “Foreword.” In To Catch a Tartar: A Dissident in Lee Kuan Yew's Prison, Yale Southeast Asia Studies Monograph 42, 1994.

Nair, CV Devan. "Not by wages alone." Singapore National Trades Union Congress, 1982.

Nathan, Andrew J. “Authoritarian Resilience.” Journal of Democracy, Volume 14, Number 1 (2003): 6 – 17.

Neville, Warwick. "Singapore: ethnic diversity and its implications." Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol.56, No.2 (1966): 236-253.

Nielsen, Rasmus Kleis. “Hegemony, Radical Democracy, Populism.” Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social Theory, 7:2 (2006): 77 – 97.

Nun, Jose & William Cartier. “Elements for a Theory of Democracy: Gramsci and Common Sense.” Boundary 2, Vol.14, No.3 (1986): 197-229.

O’donnell, Guillermo, and Philippe C. Schmitter. Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies. Baltimore, Maryland: JHU Press, 2013.

Ooi, Giok Ling. “State-Society Synergies: New Stakes, New Partnership.” In Singapore Re-Engineering Success, edited by Arun Mahizhnan and Lee Tsao Yuan, 98 - 111, Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002.

Ortmann, Stephan. "Democratization and the Discourse on Stability in Hong Kong and Singapore." Taiwan Journal of Democracy 10, no. 1 (2014): 123- 145.

Ortmann, Stephan. "Opposition and Regime Legitimacy A Comparative Study of Singapore and Hong Kong." Journal of Asian and African Studies 45, no. 1 (2010): 67-86.

Ortmann, Stephan. "Policy Advocacy in a Competitive Authoritarian Regime: The Growth of Civil Society and Agenda Setting in Singapore." Administration & Society 44, no. 6 suppl (2012): 13S-25S.

130

Ortmann, Stephan. "Political Change and Civil Society Coalitions in Singapore. “Government and Opposition 50, no. 01 (2015): 119-139.

Ortmann, Stephan. "Singapore: Authoritarian but newly competitive." Journal of Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 153-164.

Ortmann, Stephan. "Singapore: the politics of inventing national identity.” Journal of current Southeast Asian affairs 28.4 (2010): 23-46.

Ortmann, Stephan. "The ‘Beijing consensus’ and the ‘Singapore model’: unmasking the myth of an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model. “Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies 10, no. 4 (2012): 337- 359.

Patnaik, Arun K. "Gramsci's Concept of Common Sense: Towards a Theory of Subaltern Consciousness in Hegemony Processes." Economic and Political Weekly (1988): PE2-PE10.

Patterson, Thomas E. “The News as a Reflection of Public Opinion.” In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 34 – 40, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. "Durable Authoritarianism as a Self-Enforcing Coalition.” Annual conference of the American Political Science Association. Vol. 30. 2007.

Pietsch, Juliet. “Authoritarian Durability: Public Opinion towards Democracy in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties, 25:1, (2015): 31-46.

Rahim, Lily Zubaidah. “A New Dawn in PAP-Malay Relations?.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 350 - 362, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Rahim, Lily Zubaidah. “Winning and Losing Malay Support: PAP-Malay Community Relations, 1950s and 1960s.” In Paths not taken: Political pluralism in post-war Singapore, edited by Michael D. Barr and Carl A. Trocki, 95 -115, Singapore: NUS Press, 2008.

Rajah, Jothie. Authoritarian rule of law: Legislation, discourse and legitimacy in Singapore. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Rajah, K.S. “Negotiating Boundaries: OB Markers and the Law.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget

131

Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 107 - 118, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Ramakrishna, Kumar. "“Muscular” versus “Liberal” Secularism and the religious fundamentalist challenge in Singapore." RSIS Working Paper (2010).

Reuter, Ora John, and Thomas F. Remington. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem The Case of United Russia." Comparative Political Studies 42.4 (2009): 501-526.

Rodan, Garry. "SINGAPORE: Continuity in Change as the New Guard's Agenda Becomes Clearer." Southeast Asian Affairs (1990): 295-316.

Rodan, Garry. “Embracing Electronic Media but Suppressing Civil Society: Authoritarian Consolidation in Singapore.” The Pacific Review, Vol. 16, No.4 (2003): 503-524.

Rodan, Garry. “Goh’s Consensus Politics of Authoritarian Rule.” In Impressions of the Goh Chok Tong Years in Singapore, edited by Bridget Welsh, James Chin, Arun Mahizhnan and Tan Tarn How, 61 - 70, Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Rodan, Garry. “Information Technology and Political Control in Singapore” Japan Policy Research Institute Paper, No. 26 (1996)

Rodan, Garry. “Introduction: challenges for the New Guard and directions in the 1990s.” In Singapore Changes Guard: Social, political and economic directions in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan, xi – xxii, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993.

Rodan, Garry. “New Modes of Political Participation and Singapore’s Nominated Members of Parliament.” Vol. 44, No. 4 (2009): 438 – 462.

Rodan, Garry. “Singapore ‘Exceptionalism’? Authoritarian Rule and State Transformation.” Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 131 (2006)

Rodan, Garry. “Singapore’s Founding Myths vs. Freedom.” Far Eastern Economic Review, 169, 8 (2006): 13.

Rodan, Garry. “Singapore’s Leadership Transition: Erosion or Refinement of Authoritarian Rule?” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 24.1 (1992): 3-17.

Rodan, Garry. “State-society relations and political opposition in Singapore.” In Political Oppositions in Industrialising Asia, edited by Garry Rodan, London: Routledge, 1996.

Rodan, Garry. “The growth of Singapore’s middle class and its political significance.” In Singapore Changes Guard: Social, political and economic

132 directions in the 1990s, edited by Garry Rodan, 52 - 71, New York: St. Martin Press, 1993.

Rodan, Garry. “The Internet and Political Control in Singapore.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.113, No. 1 (1998):63 – 89.

Roessler, Patrick. “Agenda – Setting, Framing and Priming.” In The SAGE Handbook of Public Opinion Research, edited by Wolfgang Donsbach & Michael W. Traugott, 204 - 214, London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 2008.

Schedler, Andreas. "The menu of manipulation." Journal of democracy 13.2 (2002): 36-50.

Seow, Francis T. Beyond Suspicion? The Singapore Judiciary, 2006.

Seow, Francis T. The media enthralled: Singapore revisited. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.

Sim, Soek-Fang. "Hegemonic authoritarianism and Singapore: Economics, Ideology and the Asian economic crisis." Journal of Contemporary Asia 36.2 (2006): 143-159.

Singam, Constance and Tan Chong Kee. “Available Spaces, Today and Tomorrow.” In Building Social Space in Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative in Civil Society Activism, edited Constance Singam, Tan Chong Kee, Tisa Ng and Leon Perera, 155 - 174, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002.

Singh, Bilveer. Politics and governance in Singapore: An introduction. McGraw Hill, 2007.

Singh, Bilveer. Whither PAP's Dominance?: An Analysis of Singapore's 1991 General Elections. Pelanduk Publications, 1992.

Sinha, Vineeta. “Religion-state Encounters in Hindu Domains: From the Straits Settlements to Singapore.” Springer Science & Business Media Vol 1 (2011): 211

Slater, Dan & Sofia Fenner. “State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability.” Journal of International Affairs, 65, 1 (2011): 15

Slater, Dan. "Can leviathan be democratic? Competitive elections, robust mass politics, and state infrastructural power." Studies in Comparative International Development 43.3-4 (2008): 252-272.

Slater, Dan. "Strong-state democratization in Malaysia and Singapore." Journal of democracy 23.2 (2012): 19-33.

133

Slater, Dan. "The Architecture of Authoritarianism Southeast Asia and the Regeneration of Democratization Theory." Taiwan Journal of Democracy, Volume 2, No.2 (2006): 1 – 22.

Slater, Dan. “Democracy and Dictatorship Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political Regimes in Southeast Asia.” In Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, Tuong Vu, Stanford, 55 - 79, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Slater, Dan. Ordering power: Contentious politics and authoritarian leviathans in Southeast Asia.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Smith, Benjamin. "Life of the party: The origins of regime breakdown and persistence under single-party rule." World Politics 57.3 (2005): 421-451.

Soon, Carol & Hichang Cho. “Flows of Relations and Communication among Singapore Political Bloggers and Organizations: The Networked Public Sphere Approach.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 8:1 (2011): 93 -109.

Sreekumar, T. T., and Shobha Vadrevu. "Subpolitics and democracy: The role of new media in the 2011 general elections in Singapore." Science Technology & Society 18.2 (2013): 231-249.

Sunstein, Cass R. Why societies need dissent. London:Harvard University Press, 2005.

Sykes, Jim. “Sound Studies, Religion and Urban Space: Tamil Music and the Ethical Life in Singapore.” Ethnomusicology Forum, 24:3 (2015): 380-413.

Tan, Chong Kee. “The canary and the crow: Sintercom and the state tolerability index.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 159 - 184, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

Tan, Eugene K.B. “From Clampdown to Limited Empowerment: Soft Law in the Calibration and Regulation of Religious Conduct in Singapore.” Law & Policy, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2009)

Tan, Eugene K.B. “Keeping God in Place: The Management of Religion.” In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng, 55- 82, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.

Tan, Eugene K.B. “Singapore: Transitioning to a “New Normal” in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era.” Southeast Asian Affairs 2012.1 (2012): 265-282.

Tan, Eugene K.B. “The Evolving Social Compact and the Transformation of Singapore: Going Beyond Quid Pro Quo in Governance.” In Management of

134

Success: Singapore Revisited, edited by Terence Chong, 80 -99, Singapore: ISEAS, 2010.

Tan, Eugene K.B. “Who Dragged Christianity into the AWARE Saga?: Observations on the Role of Christians, Value Pluralism and Contestation in Public Discourse.” In The AWARE Saga: Civil Society and Public Morality in Singapore, edited Terrence Chong, 51 - 73, Singapore: NUS Press, 2011.

Tan, Eugene KB. "Singapore: Transitioning to a" New Normal" in a Post-Lee Kuan Yew Era." Southeast Asian Affairs 2012, no. 1 (2012): 265-282.

Tan, Kenneth Paul & Andrew Sze – Sian Tan. “Democracy and the Grassroots Sectors in Singapore.” Space & Polity, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2003): 3 -20.

Tan, Kenneth Paul & Gary Lee Jack Jin. “Imagining the Gay Community in Singapore.” Critical Asian Studies, 39:2, (2007): 179 – 204.

Tan, Kenneth Paul Andrew Sze-Sian. "Civic society and the new economy in patriarchal Singapore: Emasculating the political, feminizing the public.” Crossroads: An interdisciplinary journal of Southeast Asian studies (2001): 95-122.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Censorship in whose name?.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 71 - 94, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Civic Society and the New Economy in Patriarchal Singapore: Emasculating the Political, Feminizing the Public.” Crossroads: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol.15, No.2, (2001): 95 – 122.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Forum Theater in Singapore: Resistance, Containment, and Commodification in an Advanced Industrial Society.” positions 21.1 (2013): 189-221.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “In renaissance Singapore.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 1 -16, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Meritocracy and Elitism in a Global City: Ideological Shifts in Singapore.” International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No.1 (2008): 7 -27.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “New Politics for a renaissance city.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 17 - 36, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

135

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Optimists, pessimists and strategists.” In Renaissance Singapore? Economy, Culture and Politics, edited by Kenneth Paul Tan, 253 - 269, Singapore: NUS Press, 2007.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Religious Reasons in a Secular Public Sphere: Debates in the Media about Homosexuality.” In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng, 413 - 433, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Sexing up Singapore.” International Journal of Cultural Studies, 6.4 (2003): 403-423.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Singapore in 2011: A “New Normal” in Politics?” Asian Survey, Vol. 52, No.1 (2012): 220 – 226.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Singapore in 2014: Adapting to the “New Normal.” Asian Survey, Vol. 55, No.1 (2014): 157 – 164.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Singapore’s National Day Rally Speech: A Site of Ideological Negotiation.” Journal Contemporary Asia, Vol. 37, No. 3 (2007): 292 – 308.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “The Ideology of Pragmatism: Neo-liberal Globalisation and Political Authoritarianism in Singapore.” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol.42, No.1 (2012): 67 – 92.

Tan, Kenneth Paul. “Who’s Afraid of Catherine Lim? The State in Patriarchal Singapore.” Asian Studies Review (2009): 43 – 62.

Tan, Kevin Y L. “Understanding and Harnessing Ground Energies in Civil Society.” In State-Society Relations in Singapore, edited by Gillian Koh and Ooi Giok Ling, 98 - 105, Eastern Universities Press, 2003.

Tan, Netina. "Constitutional Engineering and Regulating Ethnic Politics in Singapore." New York University 2012.

Tan, Netina. "Institutionalized Hegemonic Party: The Resilience of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore." (2009).

Tan, Netina. "Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore." Electoral Studies 32.4 (2013): 632-643.

Tan, Netina. "The 2011 general and presidential elections in Singapore.” Electoral Studies 35 (2014): 362-405.

Tay, Kheng Soon. “Prospects of Civil Society in Singapore.” In Building Social Space in Singapore: The Working Committee’s Initiative in Civil Society Activism, edited Constance Singam, Tan Chong Kee, Tisa Ng and Leon Perera, 1 – 18, Singapore: Select Publishing, 2002.

136

Tay, Simon S.C. “Towards a Singaporean Civil Society.” Southeast Asian Affairs (1998): 244-261.

Teo, Chee Hean. “The Closing Speech.” Speech. The Parliamentary Debate on the Population White Paper in Singapore, February 8, 2013.

Tham, Seong Chee. “Religious Influences and Impulses Impacting Singapore.” In Religious Diversity in Singapore, edited by Lai Ah Eng, 3 – 27, Singapore: ISEAS, 2008.

Thio, Li Ann. "Religion in the Public Sphere of Singapore: Wall of Division or Public Square?." Religious diversity and civil society: A comparative analysis (2008): 73-103.

Thio, Li-Ann. “Control, Co-Optation and Co-Operation: Managing Religious Harmony in Singapore’s Multi-Ethnic, Quasi-Secular State.” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly, 33 (2005).

Turnbull, Constance Mary. A history of modern Singapore, 1819-2005. Singapore: NUS Press, 2009.

Vadaketh, Sudhir Thomas, and Donald Low. Hard choices: Challenging the Singapore consensus. Singapore: NUS Press, 2014.

Verweij, Marco & Riccardo Pelizzo. “Singapore: Does Autritarianism Pay?.” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 20, No.2 (2009): 18 – 32.

Weiss, Meredith L. “Civil Society and Close Approximations Thereof.” In Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis, edited by Erik Martinez Kuhonta, Dan Slater, Tuong Vu, Stanford, 144 - 170, California: Stanford University Press, 2008.

Weiss, Meredith L. “Electoral Patterns in Southeast Asia: The Limits to Engineering.” ISEAS Working Paper No.3 (2014).

Wiegmink, Pia. "Performance and Politics in the Public Sphere." Journal of Transnational American Studies 3.2 (2011).

Woodier, Jonathan. The media and political change in Southeast Asia: karaoke culture and the evolution of personality politics. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2009.

Woolcock, Joseph A. “Ideology and Hegemony in Gramsci’s Theory.” Social and Economic Studies, Vol.34, No.3 (1985): 199 – 210.

Yap, Mui Teng. "Singapore's Population Conundrum: The Great Balancing Act 2." Southeast Asian Affairs, Volume 2013 (2013): 274-284.

137

Yeo, George. “Civic Society- Between the Family and the State.” Speech. NUSS Society Inaugural Lecture in Singapore, June 20, 1991.

Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, 76, 6 (1997):22

Zene, Cosimo. "Self-Consciousness of the Dalits as “Subalterns”: Reflections on Gramsci in South Asia." Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society, 23.1 (2011): 83-99.

Zhang, Weiyu. “The effects of political news use, political discussion and authoritarian orientation on political participation evidences from Singapore and Taiwan.” Asian Journal of Communication, 22:5 (2012): 474 – 492.

Zhang, Weiyu. “The Silence of the Majority: Political Talk during Election Time.” In Battle for Hearts and Minds: New Media and Elections in Singapore, edited by Tan Tarn How, Arun Mahizhnan and Ang Peng Hwa, 227 -246, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd, 2016.

138

Appendix A: List of Interviewees

NLB Protests

1. Protest Organizer, Female, 27 October 2015 2. Protest Participant, Female, 28 October 2015 3. Protest Participant, Female, 29 October 2015 4. Protest Participant, Female, 30 October 2015 5. Protest Participant, Male, 31 October 2015

Thaipusam Protests

6. Online Protest Participant, Male, 23 October 2015 7. Online Protest Participant, Male, 24 October 2015 8. Online Protest Participant, Female, 25 October 2015 9. Hong Lim Park Protest Organiser, Male, 27 October 2015 10. Online Protest Organiser, Female, 27 October 2015 11. Online Protest Organiser, Male, 31 October 2015 12. HEB Feedback Activist, Female, 30 October 2015

CPF Protests

13. Protest Participant, Male, 23 October 2015 14. Protest Participant, Female, 24 October 2015 15. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 27 October 2015 16. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 1 November 2015 17. Source close to CPF protest organisers, Male, 3 November 2015

 Due to the sensitive nature the research, most respondents desired to remain anonymous. Furthermore, my application to conduct the interviews was approved on condition of anonymity by the IRB board; a condition that convinced many interviewees to participate.  An organizer may be either the applicant and chief organiser or merely someone within a close cadre of personnel involved in the mobilization work required for protests to occur. I have desisted from providing too many details as the community of activists is a small one.  A source close to an organiser refers to someone with intimate knowledge of the planning and execution of the protest without actually being part of the planning itself. I have refrained from calling them participants, as they have much deeper knowledge than someone who merely turned up to protest.

139