[US Information Agency, 1983] THE STOLEN REVOLUTION NICARAGUA: THE STOLEN REVOLUTION

By Max Singer

Max Singer is a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation and a free- lance journalist. He has written articles on Central America for The Washington Post, The Miami Herald, Commentary, and the Reader’s Digest. He is the founder and former president of the Hudson institute.

Cover: Crowds gather during commemoration of first anniversary of the revolution against Somoza Introduction: know the answers before they looked have instituted policies designed to Making Judgments at the facts. Many in the United States, harass, eliminate or win control of the Europe and elsewhere seem to think press, independent labor unions and that any reform designed to help the political parties, the Church and ethnic poor at the expense of the rich and minorities such as the Miskito Indians. middle class is at least the first step In short, the Sandinista Directorate is down a slippery slope to communism. openly repressing the very groups F ree and progressive people Some still see any criticism of the United that are the essence of political and throughout the world exult when a States, or any connections with social pluralism. revolution succeeds in overthrowing a Russia or Cuba, as proof of com- Post-revolutionary Nicaragua tyrant. And so it is hard to accept facts munism. And some have a double probably has registered some gains. that show that the hopes raised by a standard that perceive any violence Health care has improved in some successful revolution have been against a government, however areas, and literacy has been increased betrayed, and the revolution has been tyrannical, as intolerable, but condone by 20 percent according to official transformed into a new tyranny and a violence by government forces. reports. At least for a time, more citizens new colonialism. On the other hand, many in- had a sense of political participation The Sandinista leadership dividuals uncritically accept the claims through a revolutionary block system, promised pluralism and pragmatism. of any group who learns how to the Sandinista Defense Committees. Did they mean it? Or were they classic disguise its true character with the But the price has been high: economic Marxist-Leninists determined to thinnest blanket of anti-Western, failure that has resulted in intermittent impose their ideology on their leftist rhetoric. Such people see any food shortages, uncontrolled inflation, countrymen by force as quickly as attempt to question the credentials of growing foreign debts, a weakened they prudently could? Were the visible those seeking power “on behalf of the private sector vulnerable to elements of pluralism and prag- masses” as automatically expropriation and severe problems in matism evidence of uncertainty or reactionary, or as excessive anti- agriculture. disagreement within the leadership? communist zeal. Cuban and Soviet influence is Or were they the result of a Sandinista Given such strong preconceptions large and growing, and the Sandinistas decision to move only gradually to among large numbers of individuals, have launched ambitious programs to install totalitarian rule? Did the the inability of political experts and militarize substantial segments of the Sandinistas move slowly in squeezing ordinary citizens, within Nicaragua society. Nicaragua’s military, independent groups to conceal their and without, to reach clear-headed underwritten by the Soviet bloc, true nature for as long as possible, and judgments about the nature of the provides training, arms and logistical thus preserve the benefits of Western Sandinista regime is not surprising. The support to guerrillas in El Salvador and financial and political support? Or were difference between a genuine threatens its neighbors, Costa Rica they forced to militarize and to repress commitment to democracy may be and Honduras. opposition because of hostility and dan- difficult to distinguish from a forgery, at As a result of these domestic and ger from the United States? least initially. Therefore, it is necessary international policies, the Sandinista Initially, the question of what they to go beyond a recitation of superficial Directorate today is isolated; many of “intended” was confused with the ques- facts and statements and look at its former comrades-in-arms have left in tion of who “they” were. Was the revo- character, motivation and intention. disillusionment, and support for the lutionary government that of Alfonso Today, after a record of three regime is waning among virtually every Robelo, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, years of Sandinista rule, the evidence sector of Nicaraguan society—among Eden Pastora, and dozens of other re- now is there for all to examine. the very people in whose name the formers and democratic revolutionar- Sandinistas fought the revolution. ies, or was it firmly in the hands of the As U.S. Assistant Secretary of Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Nicaragua Now State for Inter-American Affairs Sandinista National Liberation Front Thomas Enders has charged: “The (FSLN)? If the FSLN Directorate was new Nicaraguan regime is turning into in control, was it unified, or were there a new dictatorship based once again on pluralist factions within it? W hat are facts about a privileged and militarized caste. Like Despite the difficulty of these the Somoza regime before it, questions, some people seemed to Nicaragua? The Sandinista leadership Nicaragua’s government is beginning declared that they were committed to to make war on its own people.” pluralism and the encouragement of a mixed economy. Neither of these commitments is being kept. As the facts demonstrate, the Sandinistas

1 (at microphone), one of the leading members of the Sandinista Directorate, speaks to a gathering shortly after victory over the Somoza regime in 1979.

The Background oppressed the people of Nicaragua, accepting the leadership of its nine- and in return provided neither man Directorate, which included efficiency, inspiration, nor any other Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, redeeming feature. Tomas Borge and Jaime Wheelock. The best evidence of the nature of The main sectors of the commu- I t is not necessary to detail the Somoza’s rule is that by 1979 all nity, including the Broad Opposition wrongs committed by the Somoza elements of Nicaraguan society Front, the Superior Council of Private dynasty during the nearly half century except the National Guard had decided Enterprise (COSEP), and the National that it ruled the small Central American that the regime must be overthrown. Patriotic Front led by a distinguished republic of Nicaragua. It is an all-too- The consensus against Somoza “Group of Twelve” democrats, agreed familiar story of greed and corruption by included workers, the priests and to work with the FSLN only after nego- a regime maintained in power by the bishops of the Catholic Church, tiations in which the Sandinistas agreed repressive use of force. business and professional com- to preserve political pluralism and a The Somozas were no mild munities, peasants and villagers. mixed economy, and to hold free elec- authoritarian regime reasonably The history of pre-revolution- tions quickly. reflecting the desires of most of its ary and revolutionary Nicaragua is a Most of the Sandinista constituency and omitting only the complicated story of organizational Directorate were known to influential forms of popular control. The last of the and ideological maneuvering among Nicaraguans. It is a small country and line, Anastasio “Tacho” Somoza, various opposition groups and social generally the Sandinistas were not added incompetence to the family’s sectors. The final stage in the struggle peasants or villagers from the list of vices. He exploited and began in January 1978 after the hinterland, but sons of members of the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, small middle- and upper-class groups owner and publisher of La Prensa, of Nicaragua. Citizens knew that the Managua’s principal daily newspaper. three main factions of the FSLN had Democratic and moderate opposition groups then realized that all hopes of peaceful political protest and reform were vain, and decided to join forces with the Sandinista movement,

2 been united by Fidel Castro, and that in to do the job, Nicaragua suffered “Group of Twelve” allied with the the preceding years Castro had massive bloodshed and destruction FSLN, and who had been made head of supplied at least two of the factions with before Somoza was ousted. The armed the national bank in the Provisional guns and money. struggle probably cost more than Government (GRN), described to But the leaders of the democratic 10,000 lives. Patrick Oster of the Chicago Sun- left and center who opposed Somoza During the final stages of the Times how he realized in the second decided to accept the risk of alliance. revolution, the Sandinistas, because of week after the revolutionary victory The third “Tercerista” faction of the their broad popular support at home, that the Sandinistas and not the GRN FSLN was less clearly Marxist-Leninist, received significant help from Junta were in control. On one day he and the entire Directorate made democratic governments in the area, got approval from the Junta for a bank solemn promises of political pluralism such as Venezuela and Costa Rica. action. But on the next, the Junta met and a mixed economy. The moderate On July 19,1979, a Government again with two uniformed members of leaders hoped that if the democratic of National Reconstruction (GRN) the Sandinista Directorate present, groups joined the struggle with the headed by a five-member Junta which and the Junta reversed itself. It was Sandinistas, and they made a re- included two non-Marxists, Alfonso Ro- clear to Cruz that the Directorate volution against Somoza together, the belo and (widow of controlled the majority of the Junta. democratic majority would be able to Pedro Joaquin Chamorro), officially as- The following April, Cruz reports, prevail. “By playing the game, we sumed power. The Junta also estab- the Sandinistas expanded the Council hoped to influence the process,” said lished a large Council of State whose of State to give themselves a majority , who held a series of high members represented a wide range of on that body too. That action led to the positions in the revolution until he re- views and affiliations, but which proved resignations of Alfonso Robelo and signed as Ambassador to Washington to have no substantial power. Violeta Chamorro from the Junta early in 1982. (Chamorro “for reasons of health”). Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro, But Robelo urged Cruz to take his place. father of Joaquin Cuadra, current FSLN The Struggle for And Cruz, although he says that he Defense Vice Minister, expressed a already could see that pluralism wasn’t similar hope when he said: “So we Revolutionary Control working, decided to join the Junta and reached an agreement with the clear try to change the situation. His efforts understanding that socialism is not were frustrated and he resigned from possible for Nicaragua. I saw my role the government, but he was prevailed as trying to rescue our youth from upon to accept the post of Ambassa- S ince the Marxist-Leninist radicalism.” dor to Washington-an action that, in The Sandinista promises to their minority had most of the top positions retrospect, was part of a successful ef- revolutionary allies were embodied in from the beginning, the “struggle for fort by the Sandinista regime to conceal the program released by the Junta of power” was never a close contest. its true character and direction. the Provisional Government on June Arturo Cruz, who was a member of the Yet the fact is that the 27,1979, in San Jose. These promises Sandinistas, like many ideologues, included: “effective democracy,” “the wrote and published openly about operation of political parties without their intentions. And even though they ideological discrimination (except spelled out their totalitarian plans and Somocistas),” “universal suffrage,” their commitment to the Soviet bloc, “freedom of expression, of worship, and they still were able to convince people for forming unions, guilds, and popular that they were “well-meaning idealists” organizations,” and “a foreign policy of and at least potentially neutral. On independence and nonalignment.” October 5,1979, the Sandinistas issued The Sandinistas made similar an “Analysis of the Situation and commitments to the Organization of Tasks of the Sandinista People’s American States (OAS) in a letter of July Revolution” containing the political 12, 1979, which also explicitly and military theses presented to a three promised “the first free elections our day Assembly of FSLN Cadre held country has known in this century.” from September 21 to 23. In this report, But even after virtually all of the FSLN Directorate stated: Nicaragua decided that Somoza’s rule had to end, and agreed to work together under Sandinista leadership

Anastasio Somoza, ousted dictator of Nicaragua

3 —The GRN (which had two need to train the army, to maintain an methods and to use that power to independents on the five-member alliance with the bourgeoisie and “the establish a Marxist-Leninist system. Junta) was “an alliance of expectation of financial help from the The Sandinistas also made it convenience organized by the Western bloc.” But they noted that this clear that they saw the world as divided Sandinistas to thwart Yankee “ need to appear reasonable during into imperialist and socialist camps, intervention [and] it was not necessary the ‘intermediate’ period was beginning and were determined that Nicaragua to negotiate with the bourgeoisie, just to cause dangerous problems such as would reject true nonalignment and to give some representation to people an independent labor movement.” ally itself completely with the socialist with a patriotic reputation. “ —The Directorate said that a camp (which does not include the —They noted that although variety of steps needed to be taken to West Germany led until recently by “without doubt there is no domestic protect the FSLN from “enemies of the Helmut Schmidt). power stronger than the FSLN,” they revolution” during the “stage of Humberto Ortega, one of the rep- had so far produced “only a democratic transition” in which small resentatives of the “least Marxist” Ter- foundation “ and were setting up a wide political parties must be maintained cerista faction, made another explicit array of their own organizations, “because of international opinion.” statement of FSLN thinking in a speech including “an army politicized without —They emphasized the need for to a meeting of “military specialists” precedent, organized within a state unity in an ideology of “support of the on August 25, 1981. that was trying to conserve relics of World Revolution. “ And they concluded Ortega said: old institutional forms.” by making it plain that “we are an —In their discussion of the organization whose greatest aspiration Marxism-Leninism is the economy they said that because of is to retain revolutionary power” and scientific doctrine that guides our grave difficulties “at the present that “the first task is to educate the revolution, our vanguard’s analytical moment it is necessary to maintain a people to recognize that the FSLN is tool for ... carrying out the neutral position with respect to the the legitimate leader of the revolution.... We cannot be Marxist- imperialists.” revolutionary process.” Leninist without Sandinism, and without —They saw no immediate danger Marxism-Leninism Sandinism cannot from a resurgent National Guard or This extraordinary document be revolutionary. Thus, they are from their neighboring countries. The makes it clear that the Sandinista indissolubly linked .... Our political main factors that had influenced their leadership was determined from the strength is Sandinism and our doctrine policies since July 10 included: the beginning to hold power by totalitarian is Marxism-Leninism.

Arturo Cruz, a former member of the Junta, The Nicaraguan Junta with Costa Rican was disillusioned with the Sandinistas President Rodrigo Carazo Odio in 1979. but continued in the revolutionary From left to right: Moises Hassan, Sergio government until 1982, when he Ramirez, Violeta de Chamorro, President resigned as Ambassador to Washington. Carazo, Daniel Ortega and Alfonso Robelo. Chamorro and Robelo, both non- Marxists, resigned in 1980.

4 Ortega’s speech is over 4,000 “counterrevolution” from the top—like the Sandinista leadership is still “trying words of pure, hard-line Marxism- that of Fidel Castro and the Cuban to find its way.” The government of Leninism. For example, he refers, Communist Party in 1959-60. Instead of “Marxist-leaning guerrillas ... has yet without any hint of satire, to the Lenin- a real struggle for power, there has to define itself.” led Bolshevik revolution as “the been the largely one-sided process of creation of a classless society in which concentrating the tools of political and man’s exploitation of his fellow man physical power in FSLN hands, while Human Rights could gradually be eliminated.” weakening all independent groups He went on to say that: and leaders. From the moment of victory over I ...on July 19, 1979, world society Somoza, the Marxist- Leninists of the mmediately upon taking power, the was polarized into two major camps.... FSLN Directorate have controlled the FSLN began to build totalitarian the camp of imperialism, the camp of revolution almost totally, with no inten- instruments of physical coercion capitalism, headed up by the United tion of sharing power. They allowed and control. States and the rest of the capitalist the normal disagreements, failures of The Sandinista police, or security countries in Europe and throughout the coordination and differences of phras- force, which performs the functions of world ... [and] the socialist camp made ing among themselves to deceive peo- the former Somoza National Guard, has up of various countries in Europe, Asia, ple about their essential unity. And grown to more than 5,000 men. In and Latin America and with the Soviet from time to time they indulged their per- addition, a revolutionary block Union in the vanguard. sonal feelings and relationships with committee system, the Sandinista individual non-Marxist Nicaraguans to Defense Committees (CDs), similar to Although Ortega delivered this give an image of “personalism” and that established by Castro in Cuba, speech two years after the FSLN took flexibility. And they have made tempo- has been established to provide direct power, no one who reads it can believe rary concessions whenever neces- sources of information and coercion that he only recently had arrived at sary to reduce resistance and to pre- for the FSLN in each neighborhood. these convictions. At no point did he serve illusions of their pragmatism Eden Pastora, Commandante refer to any statements or actions of or openness. Zero, a hero of the revolution, stated on the Reagan Administration as having The Sandinistas also have used April 15, 1982: influenced his view of the United the simplest technique of all to confuse States. He gave no basis for seeing how people about their intentions. They ...in the light of day or in the dead any amount of American friendliness lied. As late as April 1982 Tomas Borge of night, the seizures, expropriations or generosity toward the Nicaraguan said to James Nelson Goodsell, Latin and confiscations oppress revolution could have changed his American correspondent for The somocistas and anti-somocistas, view of the world. Christian Science Monitor, “Nothing counterrevolutionaries and In the same speech, reported by will deter us from maintaining political revolutionaries, the guilty and the Branko Lazitch in the Paris-based pluralism and a mixed economy...no innocent. In the jails they beat the magazine Est & Ouest, Ortega notes matter what the cost.” Goodsell also counterrevolutionaries together with that, “on 19 July ... our people quotes a “top Sandinista leader” as the Marxist revolutionaries, these were ... ideologically backward.” And scoffing at reports of Nicaraguan latter punished for the grave crime of he also explained that the elections complicity in the arms flow to El interpreting Marx from a different point planned for 1985 “...will in no way— Salvador as “a pack of lies,” and cites of view than the comrades in power. like a lottery—decide who is going to Junta president Daniel Ortega as hold power. For this power belongs to saying, “We believe in nonalignment.” One of the most widely respected the people, to the FSLN, to our This technique worked even with figures in Nicaragua for many years Directorate ....” a reporter as experienced as Goodsell, was Jose Esteban Gonzalez, a vice In the same article Lazitch refers to who reports that “the Sandinista president of the Social Christian Party, another statement of Ortega’s Directorate...is composed of nine men who organized the Nicaraguan describing the temporary alliance with widely viewed as well-meaning Permanent Commission for Human the middle class as “exclusively idealists who are genuinely concerned Rights in 1977 to oppose abuses of the tactical. We have accepted the about the Nicaraguan people,” and Somoza regime. As noted in reports of collaboration of the middle class, are “self-proclaimed Marxists.” A his press conference in August 1982, which is ready to betray its country, but theme of Goodsell’s article was that during Somoza’s rule Gonzalez had at any moment we can take its been able to arrange the release from factories without firing a single shot ....” prison of Tomas Borge and other It is now clear that the defeat of Sandinista leaders. Borge returned the the democratic left majority in the revolution in Nicaragua was, to use the word preferred by revolutionaries Eden Pastora and Alfonso Robelo, a

5 favor by having Gonzalez jailed and The Press two days. Since then it has been forcibly lifting his passport. Only through the closed a number of times: five times in intervention of the International the last three months of 1981 alone. The Commission of Jurists, Gonzalez says, Orwellian reason given is that it was he able to go into exile. He since T ” violated freedom of the press.” Then has been sentenced in abstentia to 16 here now are three newspapers in January 1982, a mob attacked years in prison. in Managua. The afternoon paper is La the paper. Three people were wound- Gonzalez now heads the Prensa, which has been the country’s ed by shots from the paper’s guards, Nicaraguan Committee for Human leading paper for many years and one and it was closed again for two days. Rights in San Jose, Costa Rica. In of the foremost opponents of the A few days later the government March 1982 he wrote the following in Somozas. It is now edited by Pedro closed Radio Amor indefinitely for The Washington Post: Joaquin Chamorro, Jr., the older son of broadcasting a report that the owner of the man murdered by Somoza. The the station was beaten for having What has happened in Nicaragua two morning papers are Barricada, the broadcast a Venezuelan denial of is very grim. There have been official paper of the FSLN, run by Sandinista charges that Venezuelan massacres of political prisoners. I Carlos Fernando Chamorro, Pedro Embassy employees were plotting myself with other members of the Joaquin’s younger son, and El Nuevo sabotage in Nicaragua. Human Rights Commission examined Diario, a paper started by Pedro After declaring a “State of mass graves at two, different sites near Joaquin’s brother, Xavier Chamorro. Emergency” on March 15, 1982 the city of Grenada in October 1979 and Previously there were four (originally for 30 days, now extended March 1980. Other persons in whose newspapers. In January 1980, until January 1983), formal censorship truthfulness / have full confidence have security forces closed down the far-left began. Censorship is used witnessed similar evidence at other newspaper El Pueblo, and Bayardo extensively to harass the press and to sites—and even those who are still in Arce of the Directorate warned that hold back news that the Sandinistas Nicaragua will so testify. These killings other media could receive the same don’t want publicized—including such cannot be dismissed as rash acts of medicine. Similar threats are made straightforward items as the Conserva- post-revolutionary anger. They have frequently, and the regime has issued tive Party’s announcement that it was continued for over two years—some a number of decrees constraining the supporting Argentina in the Falkland- occurred within the past few months. news media. Malvinas dispute (as was the FSLN). The official number of political In April 1980, a Sandinista- The government even closed the prisoners in Nicaragua now stands at backed strike closed La Prensa for friendly El Nuevo Diario for a day for 4,200-higher than the highest figure three days. As part of the strike the offense of using the phrase “state of siege” (reminiscent of Somoza) to de- ever registered under Somoza. There settlement Xavier Chamorro left La Prensa and started the new pro- scribe the new state of emergency. have been hundreds of disappear- In his March Washington Post ances—although the government Sandinista paper, El Nuevo Diario. In July of the following year, the article, Jose Esteban Gonzalez said: never responds to inquiries about “The official Sandinista press such persons. government shut down La Prensa for

The recent report of Gonzalez’s Commission on Human Rights, covering the first three years of the revolution, cites many instance of torture by the security forces. Minister of the Interior Tomas Borge admitted the Sandinista use of torture as early as his press conference of November 14, 1979, at which he made unredeemed promises to punish those responsible.

Past and present editors of La Prensa, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, Sr. (left), an outspoken critic of the Somoza regime, was assassinated by an unknown gunman in 1978. Chamorro’s son, Pedro (right), took over as editor. Pedro Chamorro, Jr., has endured even worse censorship and harassment than his father as a result of the paper’s independent, often critical stance toward the regime in power,

6 regulations permit less freedom of the press in Nicaragua today than under the ‘black code’ of the Somoza dictatorship.” In his Washington press conference in August 1982, Gonzalez reported that in July Sandinista thugs beat up Horacio Ruiz, an editor of La Prensa, and that they attacked Cruz Flores, a photographer, a few days later. Censorship and harassment of La Prensa continues. In August 1982, editorial page editor Humberto Belli stated that he left Nicaragua for exile in Caracas because it was no longer possible to publish his opinions in La Prensa. Even within the strictures of existing censorship, he added, the selection and play of the news angers the Junta and results in repeated closings of the paper. One survey of La Prensa in mid- August 1982 showed that the Junta’s Office of Communications Media censored 60 to 65 percent of news material intended for publication. Most of the censored news stories related to confrontations between church and state, notably reports of violence in the town of Masaya that differed significantly from official versions published in pro-Sandinista newspapers. Violeta Chamorro wrote the following in a letter to “The People of Nicaragua,” which was censored in La Prensa:

With each passing day, freedom of the press is found to be more limited....But the ultimate limit of this lack of freedom has occurred with the letter which Pope John Paul II sent to the Nicaraguan bishops, which on three consecutive occasions we were prohibited from publishing. And when permission to publish was given to us, they wanted to impose the obligation of heading the letter with a communique from the Office of Communications Media, which besides being insulting to His Holiness, was false. For those Different front pages of the August 17, 1982, Issue of reasons La Prensa did not publish on La Prensa Illustrate the Impact of censorship imposed by the Sandinistas. Two headlines of the uncensored (the 9th, 11th and 12th) of August. edition, top—Niolence in Masaya” and “The Incident In the Religious Schools “—contrast with the censored version, above, approved by the government—“Pluralism Confirmed Best Government” and “PLO Exit Plan Approved.”

7 Scarcely three years (after I Political Parties In March 1981, the Sandinistas entered my homeland at the head of a blocked a MDN rally and mobs sacked new Government of National the houses of some of Robelo’s Reconstruction) the Sandinista supporters. In January 1982,the police government, guided by totalitarian N cancelled a rally of the Conservative ideologies imported from other icaragua has five political Democratic Party. countries far from our history and our parties in addition to the FSLN (which MDN head Alfonso Robelo had to culture, is trying to maintain the concept Daniel Ortega told Chicago Sun- flee the country in the spring of 1982. He that liberty of conscience is Times reporter Patrick Oster is not a po- divisionism or ideological war. litical party but “the vanguard” of the It has been my fate to live...during revolution): the Nicaraguan Democrat- the greater part of the 45 years in ic Movement (MDN), established in which we endured the bloodiest 1979 and headed by Alfonso Robelo, dynasty that this hemisphere has had. member of the first revolutionary Jun- Many of the current leaders had not ta; the Social Democratic Party; the So- yet been born and therefore do not cial Christians; the Democratic Con- know the brutal methods used by servative Party, a long-time opponent of Somoza .... But I feel now that I am Somoza; and the Liberal Constitution- reliving that horrible nightmare. alists. In April 1981, all of the parties joined in a statement condemning the In sum, Nicaragua is not yet as Sandinista attacks on political organi- totalitarian as some other countries with zations as demonstrating a “decision regard to the press. Independent of the Sandinistas to set up in our coun- media still function, albeit under try a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship.” tremendous pressures. They In November 1980, the govern- Alfonso Robelo, former continue, however, to be regarded as ment denied the MDN a permit to hold Junta member, resigned after nine enemies of the revolution, are a rally. A mob sacked party headquar- months with the Sandinista censored and harassed, and will be ters, with police watching; authorities Directorate, and has announced his support for tolerated only on Sandinista terms. prohibited publication of the story. Pastora (Commander Zero).

A hero in the 1979 revolution, Eden Pastora, known as Commander Zero, resigned as Deputy Defense Minister of the new government and formed an organization that opposes the current Sandinista Junta.

8 said in an interview on Panamanian mob. They then arrested him, refused powerful. Tomas Borge has tried to television: to notify the Archbishop, threw him into propagate this view, stating that: “We a cell and interrogated him, still naked, have a church of the rich and the church In Somoza’s time many of his for six hours. of the poor.” opponents, including myself, faced In the same month a mob badly But this description is false and him openly and decisively....I cannot beat the auxiliary bishop, Monsignor divisive. Archbishop Obando y Bravo return to Nicaragua. It would be Vivas. Several opposition “church and his bishops supported the revolt suicidal. I fought from inside, first as a groups” occupied the Church of Our against the Somoza regime, and have member of the government Junta... Lady of Fatima to protest the remained strongly committed to social and later from outside the government, Archbishop’s transfer of a priest who action on behalf of the poor and but always from within the embraced the “theology of liberation.” oppressed of Nicaragua. They believe, revolution....I am a part of the true A small group of priests, several however, that the Sandinistas are not Nicaraguan revolution, fighting of whom are in the government, and truly serving the poor. against the real counterrevolutionaries who call themselves the “People’s Pope John Paul II sent an eight- who are now in power in Nicaragua....I Church,” still support the Sandinistas. page letter to the bishops of Nicaragua spent two years in Nicaragua fighting But the hierarchy, led by Archbishop to express his support for them. He from the plains, denouncing the Bravo, and apparently most of the urged them to continue working for the Marxist-Leninist leaders, who respond priests, have become disillusioned unity of the Church in Nicaragua, stating only to Soviet- Cuban interests. My life with the FSLN. But as in Poland, the that it was “absurd and dangerous” to had been so gravely threatened that I freedom of the Church to criticize the assert that a “People’s Church” should felt that I had already taken enough government is limited. be organized next to the existing risks.... Some argue that the “split” in the Church. And he described such a Church is between ecclesiastical “Popular Church” as a “grave Religion conservatives concerned only with deviation” from the will and plan of religion and the hereafter, and those Jesus Christ. clergy who believe that the Church Most of the Protestant churches also must be concerned with the lives of also have become disillusioned with its parishioners. And some officials the Sandinistas after initially supporting N icaragua is 95 percent have tried to claim that the dispute is the revolution. In March 1980, the Catholic, with a feeling for the Church between those who believe the government arrested 20 Jehovah’s that is closer to that of Poland’s than to Church should identify with the poor Witness missionaries from the United that of Italy’s. Most of the rest belong to and oppressed, or with the rich and States, Canada, Britain and Germany. several Protestant denominations, notably Moravians, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Mormons. The Catholic hierarchy, led by Managua’s Archbishop Obando y Bravo, and the bulk of the clergy, were an important part of the opposition to Somoza. Most of the Protestant churches supported the revolution as well. The Sandinistas consider the Church a threat and have moved to control it and limit its influence, although they have been at some pains to emphasize that they are not against Nicaraguans practicing their religion. In July 1982,the government halted the traditional Sunday television broadcast of the Archibishop’s church service. Twice mobs have attacked the Archbishop physically, and his car has Archbishop Obando y Bravo greets some of his parishioners following a mass honoring heroes of been heavily damaged by mobs. the revolution. A long-time foe of Somoza, he has suffered from SandinIsta violence. In August a group of men seized Father Carballo, spokesman for the Church hierarchy, and beat, stripped and paraded him in front of a jeering

9 who live there, including 55,000 Miskito Fagoth was released because he Indians, comprise about half the promised to go to the Atlantic Coast to population of the area. The Indians are try to calm the situation and travel to the organized in 256 communities with Soviet Union for study. Instead he fled elected representatives. The people of to Honduras. the Atlantic largely have kept The pressure on the Miskitos, and aloof from politics in the rest of the the movement to Honduras continued country. They did not support during the rest of 1981. Fagoth states: Somoza. And 115 Miskitos, led by a “December 27, 1981, there was a member of the Council of Elders, massacre at Leimus. Thirty-five joined the FSLN, although they left after people were buried alive; some were a few months because of Marxist- dug out by their relatives. One Leninist indoctrination. survivor, a 19-year old named Vidal Shortly after coming to power in Poveda from Waspu, lives today in a July 1979, the Sandinistas tried to refugee camp in Honduras. On replace the Councils of Elders of the December 27, 1981, another Miskito communities with Sandinista massacre occurred in Pilpilia....” Defense Committees. In the first week Some investigators who have tried to of August, authorities arrested a confirm reports of such massacres number of Miskito leaders. The have found evidence to support the conflict soon worsened when the claims, others have not. Crowds attend a religious Miskitos grew angry with Cuban By February 1982, 10,000 of the procession in Masaya, where teachers working in a literacy program 55,000 Miskitos estimated to have been violent protests in 1982 who tried to propagate “Marxist in Nicaragua in 1979 had fled to between anti-Sandinista groups dogma.” In October a Miskito leader, Honduras, where about half of them are and government supporters over Incarceration of a priest, left Lyster Athers, was murdered under living in refugee camps. several persons dead and Injured. suspicious circumstances. The Sandinistas then moved The Miskitos also rejected against the entire Miskito community. government proposals that they felt They forcibly removed at least 8,500 Nineteen were deported; security would have amounted to confiscation Indians from their homes along the forces killed one “while attempting to of their property and given the Coco River, leveled their villages and escape,” according to the Ministry Sandinistas the power to select placed them in new settlements. Many of Interior. Miskito leaders. Subjected to of them, such as those located at Tabsa On August 9, 1980, Sandinista intensifying harassment, some Fry and Sumubila, are more Community Defense Organizations Indians began moving across the Coco accurately termed detention camps, (CDs) temporarily occupied more River into Honduras. since the inhabitants, after being than 20 small churches belonging to In March 1982,Steadman Fagoth, marched there, are not permitted to several Protestant groups. The the elected representative of the travel beyond the immediate vicinity of spokesman for the CDs charged that Miskitos, reported in the AFL-CIO the camps. the action was directed against the Free Trade Union News: On February 18, 1982, the Epis- Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and copal Conference of Nicaragua issued Seventh Day Adventists, alleging that While I was in Seguridad Estado Jail a communique signed by all of the na- these churches were counter- Number 3 in Managua, on March 18, tion’s bishops. The communique explic- revolutionary and in communication 1981, at seven in the evening Tomas itly recognized the right of the govern- with the CIA. Borge, Juan Jose Ubeda and Raul ment to take actions it deems neces- Gordon came to my cell and warned sary in connection with national de- me that Sandinismo would be fense, but noted that there are “inalien- The Miskito Indians established on the Atlantic Coast, able rights that under no circum- even if every single Miskito Indian had stances can be violated.” The bishops’ to be eliminated. On May 10, 1981, I communique went on to state: was put under house arrest after having been tortured for 59 days by the ... we must state, with painful T he Atlantic Coast region of Sandinistas. surprise, that in certain concrete Nicaragua traditionally had been cases there have been grave violations largely isolated from the main part of of the human rights of individuals, the country. The 70,000 Protestant, families, and entire populations of English-speaking Indians and blacks peoples. These include:

10 Miskito Indians, displaced by the Sandinistas, are forced to live in “ resettlement” camps which they are not permitted to leave Miskitos were given six hours to gather their personal effects and leave their homes After an eight-day walk, they arrived at camps such as this. Rather than accept Marxist-Leninist doctrine and live in what amount to detention facilities, many Miskitos have sought refuge in Honduras. Because of their resistance to the Sandinistas, some Miskitos have been tortured or killed.

—Relocations of individuals by military operations without warning and without conscientious dialogue; —Forced marches, carried out without sufficient consideration for the weak, aged, women and children; —Charges or accusations of col- laboration with the counterrevolution against all residents of certain towns; —The destruction of houses, belongings and domestic animals; —The death of individuals in circumstances that, to our great sorrow, remind us of the drama of other peoples of the region.

The Sandinistas claim that their actions are part of a long-term plan to improve the living conditions of the Miskitos and to protect them from “counterrevolutionaries.” But the so- called counterrevolutionaries only became a threat following Sandinista repression. Aerial view of a Miskito “resettlement” camp in Sumubila, Nicaragua.

11 Labor and the Private Sector compete with the two main free union The Sandinistas have continued movements, CTN and CUS, often us- their role as strikebreakers. On the day ing the army and the police. Armed units that they succeeded in ending a strike frequently accompanied CST by sugar-cane cutters, the head of the organizers to meetings of workers, for Marxist-oriented union explained on B efore the revolution, example, and increased their vote the radio that “the working classes are Nicaragua possessed a labor union totals accordingly, either because independent in capitalist states movement with a growing democratic audiences were impressed or because there are antagonistic wing that had two main components: intimidated. Many workers also joined contradictions. In the revolutionary the Nicaraguan Workers’ Central the CST because they thought it would state these contradictions do not exist. (CTN), affiliated with the inter- have more influence on Sandinista- Any differences are resolved through national agencies of the Christian- managed enterprises formerly owned high level dialogue, through revolution- Democrat labor centers; and the by Somoza interests. ary positions held both by the adminis- Confederation of Labor Unification In December 1979, as part of a trators of the state and the workmen (CUS), affiliated with the International campaign to pressure the Health Care who produce material goods.” Confederation of Free Trade Unions Workers Union (FETSALUD) into On November 24, 1980, the CST (ICFTU), and which participates in the leaving CTN and joining CST, released a document describing its programs of the U.S. labor movement’s authorities imprisoned a FETSALUD view of the role of labor. It said that American Institute for Free Labor leaderin El Chipote, formerly Somoza’s although some unions resorted to Development. (Despite a propaganda prison for political opponents. “labor stoppages,” the CST would campaign to the contrary, the Institute Members of the Junta appeared at a “intensify the revolutionary process by has never received any CIA money). FETSALUD branch meeting calling constantly increasing production.... A Somoza-controlled labor group on the workers to switch affiliations, and the workers must work under austere was also active, as well as a CTN protestors were arrested. conditions.” breakaway Marxist-oriented labor The Sandinistas used similar The conflict between the free organization. actions against other branches of unions and the CST and the FSLN CUS was a leader in the general CTN. Police machine gunned their continues. The pressure of arrests strike of business and labor protesting offices and vehicles, and the CST and beatings, together with various the murder of Pedro Chamorro and in seized the CTN office in Pueblo Nuevo legal and economic actions, has the final general strike of June 1979. with the help of the army. greatly reduced the strength of CUS Luis Medrano, the CUS Secretary In January 1980, authorities, at the and CTN. As with all organizations that General, who went abroad to try to pro- instigation of the CST, arrested the seek to remain independent and resist mote an international boycott of Nicar- CUS leader of the stevedores union in repression, the Sandinistas falsely agua, was murdered on his return. Corinto, Zacarias Hernandez, and accuse them with being counterrevolu- CUS and CTN were part of the held him without charges for several tionaries and agents of the CIA. Broad Opposition Front (FAO) against days. The house of a CUS officer was The CLAT, the organization of Somoza. But although the FAO had bombed, and the army arrested two Latin American unions associated numbers and organization in the fight officers of another CUS union. In the with Christian Democratic parties and against Somoza, the FSLN had most next month, two CUS activists, Victoria the AFL-CIO, has condemned the of the guns. Garcia Montoya and Guadalupe CST and strongly supported the free When the FSLN took power it Garcia, were arrested and interrogated unions in their struggle to survive immediately began to create its own in prison. against the Sandinistas. But the ICFTU mass organizations to take the place In March a “spontaneous” and other labor groups have not of FAO groups: workers in the demonstration led by the police, officially supported the position of the Sandinista Workers’ Central (CST), with members shouting “people’s free unions, with which they long have farmers in the Association of power,” stormed the offices and been affiliated, in their dispute with the Campesino Workers (ATC), as well as arrested the leaders of the Central for government-sponsored unions, be- mass organizations for women, youth Labor Action and Unity (CAUS), a cause they are effectively unable to and children. Maoist-led union with strong take a stand different from that of the The CST, which in 1981 joined representation among textile workers Socialist International. Many people the Soviet-controlled World Federation who were on strike because of the think it ironic that the socialist of Trade Unions (WFTU), began to decline in real wages. Ivan Garcia, the movement should find itself being used Secretary-General of the Sandinist to protect government-controlled CST, who witnessed the demonstra- “company unions” in their effort to tion, said that “the Nicaraguan workers destroy free unions. have realized that all those elements that help stop production here are acting against the fundamental interests of the revolution.”

12 Even though Nicaragua is a The Sandinistas have placed 2.3 percent of its population in the country of only 2.5 million people, its more than two and one-half percent of armed forces. Its army is large enough private sector has been organized the Nicaraguan population in the to dominate its neighbors (except the extensively. The umbrella armed forces, with 22,000 in the stand- U.S.), to provide overwhelming support organization for the private sector— ing military and 50,000 in the still- for the ruling party at home, and to including business, professional and growing militia, according to Oster of the make forces available for overseas agricultural groups—is the Superior Chicago Sun Times. (There are pub- missions such as in Angola and Council of Private Enterprise lished reports that the Sandinista plan Ethiopia. (COSEP), which opposed the Somoza calls for a standing military—including The Sandinista military program, regime and joined with the FSLN in the air force-of 50,000.) They have which was well under way by early 1980, the revolution. added 36 major military installations to is moving Nicaragua to a new level of The move against businessmen the 13 that Somoza had, and have ex- armament for Central America. They began early in the regime. On panded four airfields—all document- are preparing for advanced jet fighters November 17, 1980, the Sandinista ed in aerial photographs released by (while their neighbors have planes of security forces, using a sophisticated the U.S. government. the early-1950’s), for heavy tanks (so entrapment plan, killed Jorge Salazar, In military terms Nicaragua is far 20 to 30 T-55’s have arrived, plus a a prominent businessman, and following the Cuban pattern. Cuba has dozen armored personnel carriers), arrested others. As a result, COSEP and the moderate political parties withdrew from the Council of State. Harassment continued in a variety of forms. Then on October 21, 1981, four businessmen, including Enrique Dreyfus, President of COSEP, were taken from their homes in the middle of the night, imprisoned and interrogated rigorously for several weeks. Three were released four months later, after being convicted of anti-government activities. Their crime: writing a public letter to the government criticizing its actions. MMilitarization ost Latin American countries have only a quarter or third of one percent of their population in the military (active duty and ready reserves). Exceptions are Argentina and Peru with more than half of one percent, Chile with three quarters, and Uruguay with more than nine tenths of one percent in the armed forces. Prior to his final year in power, Somoza’s National Guard—a combined national police and defense force—did not exceed 7,500 men. During the last year, the Guard’s ranks rose to slightly less than 15,000—and at that swollen level Parade of tanks (top) rolls by a crowd during celebration of first anniversary of victory over constituted no more than three-fifths Somoza. Nicaragua’s rapidly expanding military buildup threatens Its neighbors. Among the of one percent of the country’s latest additions to the army’s inventory. heavy Soviet T-55 tanks. population. Local militia (above) unit Is part of military force that Is twice as large as that of any country in Central America-and is still growing.

13 heavy artillery (including 152-miIlimeter 17,600 men, but it is heavily engaged Nicaragua is continuing to train guerrilla howitzers), anti-aircraft and anti-tank by local guerrillas armed and supported units that are infiltrated into El guns, and missiles. by Nicaragua, Cuba and Soviet Salvador, as well as to transship locally The military, which will dwarf the bloc forces. significant amounts of arms into the forces of Nicaragua’s neighbors, is The expanding Nicaraguan army country. Debates in the press on this is- composed of 20 newly formed and poses a major threat to its neighbors, sue usually revolve around the nature armed battalions, one of which is even if political constraints prevent it and quality of this evidence. No sophis- armored, and half of which are from crossing borders in brigade- or ticated Latin American has any doubts motorized. division-size invasions. It can send that Nicaragua is providing such sup- Costa Rica, Nicaragua’s “volunteers,” or provide recruits for port; Castro and Nicaraguan leaders southern neighbor, is noted for not guerrilla forces. The Nicaraguan even occasionally admit it in private. having any army at all, although it does military certainly will be capable of In late 1980 and early 1981, have a small semi-military national powerful military raids against any Nicaragua served as an important police force of several thousand men target within 50 to 80 kilometers of its staging site for a massive Cuban- equipped with light arms. Honduras, borders. None of its neighbors will directed flow of arms to Salvadorean Nicaragua’s other neighbor, has an have the ability to defend effectively guerrillas. The Salvadorean anti- army of only 12,000 men. Some exile against such raids, which gives, government guerrilla coalition, groups of Nicaraguans, a minority of Nicaragua’s neighbors an the Farabundo Marti National whom are ex-Guardsmen, are also in uncomfortable sense of vulnerability. Liberation Front, (FMLN), continues to Honduras, but they could not Moreover, there is no good reason receive sustained logistic support with assemble even a lightly armed military to doubt, despite the denials, that the help of the Sandinistas, primarily by force of as many as 3,000 men. El air and sea, but also by land. Salvador, whose border is only 80 Nicaragua also is the site of FMLN kilometers from Nicaragua, has a training camps. more sizable army, totaling some

14 Fidel Castro (opposite page, third from left) accompanied by Daniel Ortega and members of the Junta, arrives in Nicaragua for celebration of first year of Sandinista rule.

May 1980. Daniel Ortega visits the Soviet Union for d1scussions with President Leonid Brezhnev,

The size of the military and security Men like Eden Pastora felt that they Five of the eight new Nicaraguan military forces means that young Nicaraguan hadn’t freed their country from Somoza training camps. According to U.S. citizens face a draft plus strong to turn it over to Fidel Castro, however sources, Bulgaria has trained pressures to serve in the militia or much they preferred a progressive Nicaraguan pilots to fly the advanced reserves, which many individuals political orientation. Soviet MIG aircraft that recently have resent. It is unlikely that foreign military The armed forces of Nicaragua— been shipped to Cuba. Soviet-bloc assistance accounts for all the costs of which number 70,000, including militia personnel also provide advanced the military program. As a result, the and ready reserves—have communications and other technical Nicaraguan economy, and in the end, approximately 2,000 Cuban advisers capabilities, U.S. officials report, with the people, bear a large part of the and trainers. This means that Cubans, Cuba coordinating many of these mounting cost of the Sandinista military in addition to advising at headquarters programs as well as providing support establishment. and running training and technical for the intelligence services. programs, can be assigned down to It is easy to underestimate the im- the company level. pact of such a large foreign presence. Foreign Influence Dozens of East Germans are The Nicaraguan labor force is about working with the secret police and other 800,000, of whom 500,000 are farmers, security forces. The Palestine which means that since the FSLN took Liberation Organization has a power, there has been one Cuban in Ni- M large “embassy” and, according to caragua for each sixty or so Nicara- any supporters of the Christopher Dickey of The Washington guan non-farm workers. Although a ma- revolution overlooked all the failings, Post, was involved in the operation of jority of the Cubans have been doctors and even the crimes, of the FSLN as and teachers, they perform political part of the inevitable excesses of any work as well, and constitute part of a revolution; but they are unable to accept large, intrusive foreign presence. the degree of Cuban domination of their country that they have witnessed.

15 In 1979 shortages forced people to stand in long lines for food, as here in Masaya. Today, three years after the revolution, failing economy continues to plague the country.

Welfare and the Economy assistance has been used to buy the freedom and human rights, and the medicines that Nicaragua needs. pressure on the Church. The practical In the beginning virtually all day-to-day costs that most people Nicaraguans supported the revolution experience come largely from two enthusiastically. In getting rid of the directions: the demands for military T he individual Miskito Indians, Somozas, citizens felt that they had service and failure of the economy. union leaders, members of the press, taken control of their lives, that, at long Sugar is rationed, for example, and clergy, and business and political last, they had a government that each adult is allowed only one pound leaders who have borne the weight of worked and spoke for the peasant and per week regardless of the size of the Sandinista repression are only a small the working man and woman. Much of family. Real wages have declined minority of the population. The rest of the new activity, such as the sharply because of the increased the populace has suffered less and appearance of foreign doctors and inflation rate since 1979. had some compensating gains. Some teachers, and the work of block In 1979 Nicaragua was a fairly poor of the Cuban aid has been used to committees, made people feel that the country, but far from the ranks of the implement educational programs, and government cared about them. As a poorest. According to the World Bank its the medical assistance program result, many were willing to accept per capita Gross National Product probably has raised the level of health sacrifices, including limits on political (GNP) was $840 in 1978and had grown care, although not enough foreign action and expression, as the price to 14 percent since 1970. This placed be paid for these gains. Nicaragua at a level with Colombia But the cost of the revolution now and the Dominican Republic. has become too high for most people and the benefits—including the psychological gains—are fading. These costs go beyond the loss of

16 The fight to overthrow Somoza Clearly there are many negative a mixed economy. The government caused substantial damage and factors in the Nicaraguan economic inherited the Somoza family disruption to the economy. With last- situation for which the regime is not to enterprises, which automatically gave minute plundering by Somoza and his blame. But the Sandinistas are the state an immediate major share cohorts, 1979 GNP dropped by about responsible for policies that have in the economy, perhaps as high as one quarter. But in 1980, the first full damaged the economy severely, 40 percent. year after the revolution took power, among them high military and security From the beginning, however, the GNP apparently only climbed about costs, and weakened business Sandinista leadership demonstrated half way back up to where it had been inconfidence and productivity. that it gave absolute priority to 1978. According to the government, The cost of the increase in military gaining a monopoly of political power GNP increased 8.7 percent in 1981, manpower alone probably and developing a military/security which meant that average income still approaches one percent of GNP, even machine over the needs of the remained below that of 1979. assuming that the heavy weapons economy. The years since the revolution and support construction comes free These priorities certainly hurt the have been difficult for economies like from foreign suppliers—which it private sector; but in addition, the San- that of Nicaragua all over the world. doesn’t. Overall, it is reasonable to dinistas set out on a conscious course High interest rates and oil prices, estimate that Sandinista militarization to weaken and reduce the private sec- combined with low commodity prices has cost Nicaragua at least$100 million tor. Sandinista expropriation of private and world recession, hit many countries in 1981 alone, or in excess of $300 enterprises may have raised the gov- hard—although nations comparable per family. ernment share of the economy to to Nicaragua still managed to increase The support that enabled the close to 50 percent. their GNP. Nicaragua also suffered Sandinistas to take power had been If the Sandinistas have displayed from heavy rains and floods in 1982. based on a Sandinista commitment to malice in their policies toward private

Two members of the Nicaragua Junta, Daniel Ortega (second from left ) and Sergio Ramirez (fourth from the left) join cotton pickers in Leon. The regime’s mismanagement of agriculture has resulted in plummeting harvests.

17 business, their record in agriculture is killed and mutilated by the security ser- —The Directorate established one of ineptitude. Nicaragua’s harvests vice after trying to steal a car. In August close ties to Cuba and to other have dropped by as much as 50 per- 1982, violent protest in Masaya, the town communist and terrorist countries and cent since the regime assumed power, where the Sandinista revolution organizations, such as Libya and the including drastic cuts in output of the began, lasted several days. PLO, in the same period. Cuba had country’s chief export crops, cotton In brief, three years after the over 2,000 people working full time in and coffee. FSLN takeover, the people are op- Nicaragua by July 1980. And although its economic impact pressed by a regime unable to provide —The totalitarian, militarized is minor, many Nicaraguans also have either bread or freedom. Moreover, they character and program of the FSLN been affected psychologically by see- must bear an increasing military bur- was clearly evident by July 1980, the ing Sandinista leaders take over the den and accept growing Soviet and Cu- end of their first year in power. large villas and Mercedes cars of the ban intrusion in their domestic affairs. —During the Sandinista’s first Somocistas. As in Russia and China, year, U.S. banks made a generous the high-ranking cadre live very well in- extension of Nicaragua’s foreign debt deed in Nicaragua, and at a time when The Failure of Excuses with current payments to be less than workers are being exhorted to practice half the market level (the rest to be paid “revolutionary austerity.” at the end of the loan). The United The result of these blows to the States also greatly increased its aid to economy, and of Sandinista economic T Nicaragua, compared to what it had disinterest and mismanagement, is that he Sandinistas and their given during Somoza’s regime. The Nicaragua simply isn’t producing supporters take advantage of people’s Carter Administration suspended aid enough to go around. In the end, the ignorance or forgetfulness about in December 1980,only when it was people pay the price—and must make Central American history to develop evident that Nicaragua was some hard decisions about who is re- convenient myths that excuse their continuing to supply arms and training sponsible for this growing economic fi- own actions and place responsibility for to guerrillas in El Salvador. asco. Are these hardships the legacy of the new Nicaraguan tyranny on the —Western governments and Somoza, the result of outside forces, shoulders of others. It is vital to keep the international financial institutions and the necessary price for revolution? record straight: provided hundreds of millions of dollars Or is the economic suffering the result —The Sandinistas propounded to Nicaragua during the Sandinistas of policies of a clique who is sacrificing the main features of their basic commit- first year, with U.S. support. the welfare of the people to the de- ment to Marxist-Leninist totalitarian- —There is no real “Somocista” mands of ideology and their own politi- ism in the report of their meetings of threat. The remnants of the National cal aggrandizement? September 21-23, 1979. Guard are either in prison or dispersed Eden Pastora, a founder in 1959 of —Individuals and organizations in- in exile. Those in Honduras possess the FSLN, who still believes that “in- dependent of the Sandinistas have neither the arms nor the numbers to justice and class exploitation are the been systematically forced from power. challenge the regime. Somocism has roots of the tragedy,” thinks that many In April 1980, for example, Violeta no substantial political appeal or of Nicaragua’s people have come to the Chamorro and Alfonso Robelo re- supporters, even among exiles and second conclusion. He says: “With signed from the Junta to protest the those who now reject that new regime. sadness I have seen in my people the FSLN unilateral move to give itself a It has never represented a danger to the reign of unease, of anguish, of fear, majority in the Council of State. revolution in Nicaragua. and of the bitterness of frustration and —The regime moved immediately —Occasionally, news stories ap- personal insecurity, ... (because of) against the Atlantic Coast Indians. pear about groups of Nicaraguan exiles this regime of terror....” Miskito leader Lyster Athers was mur- “training” in private camps in the Recently mass demonstrations dered in October 1979. Sandinista southern United States. Politically, have broken out against the govern- promises to return his body and punish these stories bolster the myth of Nicar- ment. According to eyewitness ac- his murderers were never fulfilled. aguan beleaguerment and provide con- counts, 3,000 people in San Judas Since then, large numbers of Miskitos venient justification for the Sandinista joined a funeral procession for a boy have been forcibly deported from military expansion. But realistically their homelands and placed in settle- such groups pose no military threat to ments that are little more than Nicaragua whatsoever. detention camps. —The Sandinistas were implementing plans for a greatly expanded army and rapid national militarization by the first half of 1980.

18 Conclusion: The Now and enlist aid from Cuban and the Soviet Honduran citizens living in the border Future Nicaragua bloc nations to secure their domestic areas. Second, Nicaragua is a threat power base; and to build a large to El Salvador, where the Sandinistas military organization. already provide a flow of arms and At present, Nicaragua is a grave logistical support to guerrilla forces. I threat to all the countries of Central One of the reasons why some po- n 1979, the Sandinistas chose to America, beginning with its immediate litical leaders in Honduras and Costa militarize Nicaragua; to destroy the neighbors, Costa Rica and Honduras. Rica have hesitated to oppose Nicara- political power of their democratic allies Sandinista troops regularly cross the gua and to organize their defenses is in the unions, the Church, and in the border into Honduras and have been that they are concerned about the in- business and political communities; to responsible, according to recent ternational political and intellectual build a security apparatus that can reports, for the kidnapping and forces that Nicaragua might bring to enforce totalitarian controls; to disappearances of more than 100 bear against them. But if Nicaragua is

Sandinista Soldiers on training maneuvers near the Honduran border

19 isolated from all political support ex- As Jose Esteban Gonzalez wrote cept that of Cuba and the Soviet Union in March 1982: and its allies, and if nonaligned coun- tries, and independent left voices The people of Nicaragua still around the world join in unmasking Ni- yearn for freedom, and have no wish for caragua’s totalitarian character and a return to government like that of the tactics of aggression, then regional Somoza era. The Catholic Church is democratic forces will be able to unite to strong, and firmly devoted to human defend themselves. rights. Other groups—the private sec- Recently, the democracies of tor, political leaders, trade unionists— Central America have moved are still pressing for the fulfillment of the collectively to counter the Sandinista promises of the revolution. And the threat by bolstering their own defenses, Sandinistas have at times proved sen- and through concerted diplomatic sitive to international pressures for initiatives. Honduras, for example, has human rights. proposed a regional plan calling for an An international campaign for Ni- end to border incursions, a freeze on caraguan human rights could have a imports of heavy weapons and very significant impact ... [but] stop ro- comprehensive verification. The United manticizing a revolutionary leadership States also has made a series of that has turned against the democratic proposals centered around a promises of the revolution. nonaggression agreement between the U.S. and Nicaragua, and an end to International awareness is a pow- Nicaraguan intervention in El erful weapon in the hands of the forces Salvador and interference in Costa of democracy. They can focus so much Rica and Honduras. And in October attention on La Prensa, the Church, 1982 at San Jose, Costa Rica, the the free unions, political parties and the nations of Belize, Columbia, El private sector that the Sandinistas Salvador, the United States, Honduras, cannot afford the political Jamaica, Costa Rica and the cost of eliminating them. Further, Dominican Republic called upon all Western democratic political organiza- nations in the region to respect each tions and nations can deny legitimacy other’s territorial integrity, to reaffirm to Nicaraguan claims against its the commitment to human rights, to neighbors. These actions can reduce reject threats or the use of force, and to the Nicaraguan threat and help halt escalation of the arms race in demonstrate that democracies can Central America. understand and defeat totalitarian Almost all of the allies of the aggression. Marxist-Leninist leadership of the The voices of pluralism and de- FSLN have become disillusioned and mocracy in Nicaragua, and their moved into opposition, including figures oppressors, need to know that eyes as diverse politically as Eden Pastora, from all over the world are on them. If Alfonso Robelo, Arturo Cruz and the free and progressive people every- editor of La Prensa, Pedro Chamorro, where maintain a continuing commit- Jr. Moreover, the regime has alienated ment to the issue of freedom in Nicara- the entire spectrum of moderate, demo- gua, if they insist that the Sandinistas cratic-left and center groups and orga- comply with their promises to their revo- nizations, from the Church to union, lutionary partners and to the OAS, business and professional groups. then the islands of democracy in Nicar- Although Nicaragua is ruled by an agua can be sustained and endure. ideological regime that has estab- lished much of the apparatus of totali- tarian control, islands of indepen- dence, small democratic voices, still survive. These independent demo- cratic groups and individuals have little authority or power, and are unable to influence policy. Yet they remain—and must be preserved.

20 Editors: Howard Cincotta, Adrienne Price Art Director: Gary Soderstrom, Robert Banks Editorial Assistant: Diane Lewis

Photos

Front Cover. Sygna/Owen Franken. 2. Sygma/Patrick Chauvel. 3. The Washington Post. 4. Left. The New York Times/Teresa Zabalo; UPI. 6. Left. UPI. The New York Times/Alan Riding. 8. Left. The New York Times/Alan Riding; Sygma/Emilio Rodriguez 9. Sygma/Chauvel. 10. Top. The New York Times/Riding. 11. Top. Phillopot (2). U.S. Defense Department. 13. Top. Sygma/Franken; Sygma/ Phillopot. 14. Sygma/Franken. 15. Tass from Sovfoto. 16. Gamma-Liaison/Matthew Naythons. 17. The New York Times/Riding. 19. Gamma-Liaison

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