[US Information Agency, 1983] NICARAGUA THE STOLEN REVOLUTION NICARAGUA: THE STOLEN REVOLUTION By Max Singer Max Singer is a Visiting Scholar at the Russell Sage Foundation and a free- lance journalist. He has written articles on Central America for The Washington Post, The Miami Herald, Commentary, and the Readers Digest. He is the founder and former president of the Hudson institute. Cover: Crowds gather during commemoration of first anniversary of the revolution against Somoza Introduction: know the answers before they looked have instituted policies designed to Making Judgments at the facts. Many in the United States, harass, eliminate or win control of the Europe and elsewhere seem to think press, independent labor unions and that any reform designed to help the political parties, the Church and ethnic poor at the expense of the rich and minorities such as the Miskito Indians. middle class is at least the first step In short, the Sandinista Directorate is down a slippery slope to communism. openly repressing the very groups F ree and progressive people Some still see any criticism of the United that are the essence of political and throughout the world exult when a States, or any connections with social pluralism. revolution succeeds in overthrowing a Russia or Cuba, as proof of com- Post-revolutionary Nicaragua tyrant. And so it is hard to accept facts munism. And some have a double probably has registered some gains. that show that the hopes raised by a standard that perceive any violence Health care has improved in some successful revolution have been against a government, however areas, and literacy has been increased betrayed, and the revolution has been tyrannical, as intolerable, but condone by 20 percent according to official transformed into a new tyranny and a violence by government forces. reports. At least for a time, more citizens new colonialism. On the other hand, many in- had a sense of political participation The Sandinista leadership dividuals uncritically accept the claims through a revolutionary block system, promised pluralism and pragmatism. of any group who learns how to the Sandinista Defense Committees. Did they mean it? Or were they classic disguise its true character with the But the price has been high: economic Marxist-Leninists determined to thinnest blanket of anti-Western, failure that has resulted in intermittent impose their ideology on their leftist rhetoric. Such people see any food shortages, uncontrolled inflation, countrymen by force as quickly as attempt to question the credentials of growing foreign debts, a weakened they prudently could? Were the visible those seeking power on behalf of the private sector vulnerable to elements of pluralism and prag- masses as automatically expropriation and severe problems in matism evidence of uncertainty or reactionary, or as excessive anti- agriculture. disagreement within the leadership? communist zeal. Cuban and Soviet influence is Or were they the result of a Sandinista Given such strong preconceptions large and growing, and the Sandinistas decision to move only gradually to among large numbers of individuals, have launched ambitious programs to install totalitarian rule? Did the the inability of political experts and militarize substantial segments of the Sandinistas move slowly in squeezing ordinary citizens, within Nicaragua society. Nicaraguas military, independent groups to conceal their and without, to reach clear-headed underwritten by the Soviet bloc, true nature for as long as possible, and judgments about the nature of the provides training, arms and logistical thus preserve the benefits of Western Sandinista regime is not surprising. The support to guerrillas in El Salvador and financial and political support? Or were difference between a genuine threatens its neighbors, Costa Rica they forced to militarize and to repress commitment to democracy may be and Honduras. opposition because of hostility and dan- difficult to distinguish from a forgery, at As a result of these domestic and ger from the United States? least initially. Therefore, it is necessary international policies, the Sandinista Initially, the question of what they to go beyond a recitation of superficial Directorate today is isolated; many of intended was confused with the ques- facts and statements and look at its former comrades-in-arms have left in tion of who they were. Was the revo- character, motivation and intention. disillusionment, and support for the lutionary government that of Alfonso Today, after a record of three regime is waning among virtually every Robelo, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, years of Sandinista rule, the evidence sector of Nicaraguan societyamong Eden Pastora, and dozens of other re- now is there for all to examine. the very people in whose name the formers and democratic revolutionar- Sandinistas fought the revolution. ies, or was it firmly in the hands of the As U.S. Assistant Secretary of Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Nicaragua Now State for Inter-American Affairs Sandinista National Liberation Front Thomas Enders has charged: The (FSLN)? If the FSLN Directorate was new Nicaraguan regime is turning into in control, was it unified, or were there a new dictatorship based once again on pluralist factions within it? W hat are facts about a privileged and militarized caste. Like Despite the difficulty of these the Somoza regime before it, questions, some people seemed to Nicaragua? The Sandinista leadership Nicaraguas government is beginning declared that they were committed to to make war on its own people. pluralism and the encouragement of a mixed economy. Neither of these commitments is being kept. As the facts demonstrate, the Sandinistas 1 Daniel Ortega (at microphone), one of the leading members of the Sandinista Directorate, speaks to a gathering shortly after victory over the Somoza regime in 1979. The Background oppressed the people of Nicaragua, accepting the leadership of its nine- and in return provided neither man Directorate, which included efficiency, inspiration, nor any other Daniel Ortega, Humberto Ortega, redeeming feature. Tomas Borge and Jaime Wheelock. The best evidence of the nature of The main sectors of the commu- I t is not necessary to detail the Somozas rule is that by 1979 all nity, including the Broad Opposition wrongs committed by the Somoza elements of Nicaraguan society Front, the Superior Council of Private dynasty during the nearly half century except the National Guard had decided Enterprise (COSEP), and the National that it ruled the small Central American that the regime must be overthrown. Patriotic Front led by a distinguished republic of Nicaragua. It is an all-too- The consensus against Somoza Group of Twelve democrats, agreed familiar story of greed and corruption by included workers, the priests and to work with the FSLN only after nego- a regime maintained in power by the bishops of the Catholic Church, tiations in which the Sandinistas agreed repressive use of force. business and professional com- to preserve political pluralism and a The Somozas were no mild munities, peasants and villagers. mixed economy, and to hold free elec- authoritarian regime reasonably The history of pre-revolution- tions quickly. reflecting the desires of most of its ary and revolutionary Nicaragua is a Most of the Sandinista constituency and omitting only the complicated story of organizational Directorate were known to influential forms of popular control. The last of the and ideological maneuvering among Nicaraguans. It is a small country and line, Anastasio Tacho Somoza, various opposition groups and social generally the Sandinistas were not added incompetence to the familys sectors. The final stage in the struggle peasants or villagers from the list of vices. He exploited and began in January 1978 after the hinterland, but sons of members of the murder of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, small middle- and upper-class groups owner and publisher of La Prensa, of Nicaragua. Citizens knew that the Managuas principal daily newspaper. three main factions of the FSLN had Democratic and moderate opposition groups then realized that all hopes of peaceful political protest and reform were vain, and decided to join forces with the Sandinista movement, 2 been united by Fidel Castro, and that in to do the job, Nicaragua suffered Group of Twelve allied with the the preceding years Castro had massive bloodshed and destruction FSLN, and who had been made head of supplied at least two of the factions with before Somoza was ousted. The armed the national bank in the Provisional guns and money. struggle probably cost more than Government (GRN), described to But the leaders of the democratic 10,000 lives. Patrick Oster of the Chicago Sun- left and center who opposed Somoza During the final stages of the Times how he realized in the second decided to accept the risk of alliance. revolution, the Sandinistas, because of week after the revolutionary victory The third Tercerista faction of the their broad popular support at home, that the Sandinistas and not the GRN FSLN was less clearly Marxist-Leninist, received significant help from Junta were in control. On one day he and the entire Directorate made democratic governments in the area, got approval from the Junta for a bank solemn promises of political pluralism such as Venezuela and Costa Rica. action. But on the next, the Junta met and a mixed economy. The moderate On July 19,1979, a Government again with two uniformed members of leaders hoped that if the democratic of National Reconstruction (GRN) the Sandinista Directorate present, groups joined the struggle with the headed by a five-member Junta which and the Junta reversed itself. It was Sandinistas, and they made a re- included two non-Marxists, Alfonso Ro- clear to Cruz that the Directorate volution against Somoza together, the belo and Violeta Chamorro (widow of controlled the majority of the Junta. democratic majority would be able to Pedro Joaquin Chamorro), officially as- The following April, Cruz reports, prevail.