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~N~I(Ll LA/CATFR INCOMING Fit)))Aiaaa FRP C ZR ~N~I(ll LA/CATFR INCOMING fit)))aiaaa FRP: . .4, ItatEDIATE STATE ACTION: ta)NE . INFO: CRL, DONOVA, NCECF, NCPM, OOPD-O, ODPN-N. ODPS-S, OOPW-W. OGI/FSI/PI, OGITNATAB2, OPCTR/EALA. PRINT. RF, SOV/RIG/OC. SOV/SP/W/M, SOV/SP/W/N, SOV/TW/RPL, TTC/CS, FILE. DD0-3. LA/CATFH. LA/CATFR-3. LA/NOG-S, LA/SAta)G. ALA/MC/E 1, ALA/MC/la)-2, ALA/MC/M2. ALA/MC/N-2, ALA/MC/PME-2, ALA/MC/RAE, ALA/PO/LA. CI/SA, D/FBIS-2, EPO/LA, EPS/IG. ICS/HC/LA. NCREG-5. NIO/DL/AL, NSD/SSB, OCA-3, OGI/GD/AWH. PCS/PGG. PPS/ALBC, PPS/EN38, PPS/ICB, PPS/PR-2. PPS/RB, (48/W) 86 9896725 SSO PAGE 001 NC 9896725 TOR: 130750Z FEB 86 STATE 045707 00 RUEAIIB ZOC ZZH Dept of' State, RPS/)PS, )kMgatat p Gcafeiti, Dia ZNY SSSSS STATE ' 00 RUEHC ~lee ( ( ) Den)t DcdaaHg DE RUEHC 45707 0440600 T)ate g + ZNY SSSSS ZZH 0 130557Z FEB 86 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUESMG/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA IMMEDIATE 0000 RUEHTG/AMEMBASSY TEGUCIGALPA IMMEDIATE 0000 ( BT ~ ~FteCeeks STATE 045707 5lhxa EXDIS CONTRA FOR AMBASSADOR OR CHARGE FROM ABRAMS TAGs: Fa), Iw, PINR. PINs @~CAPT(ogEQ SUBJECT: RESISTANCE LEADEPSHIP REF: TEGUCIGALPA 1612. MANAGUA 0830 1. ABBBaaae- ENTIRE TEXT 2. REFTELS WERE TIMELY, EXTENSIVE AN) FIRST RATE. THAN& YOU. 3. THE ALMOST-FINAL VERSION OF MY LETTER FOLLOWS BELOW. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO EXAMINE IT CAREFULLY Ata& PROVIDE ANY FURTHER COPNENTS BY COB TH)RSDAY. FEBRUARY 13. AS YOJ WILL READILY )4)TE, WE HAVE MOVED TO PUT THE ISSUE la)RE ON OUR TERMS THAN TH)SE OF OUR CRITICS. 4. BEGIN TEXT DEAR SENATOR LUGAR: 5. YOU ASKED ABOUT THE ALLEGATION THAT THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE CONSISTS OF, OR IS LED BY, SUPPORTERS OF THE LATE DICTATOR ANASTASIO SOMOZA. WE HAVE REVIEWED THE FACTS CAREFULLY Ala) CONCLUDE THAT THIS ALLEGATION IS INCORRECT Ata) MISLEADING. 6. THE LEADERS OF THE MAIN RESISTANCE ORGANIZATItaa, THE UNITED NICARAGUAN OPPOSITION ttla)). ARE ADOLFD CALERO. ARTURO CRUZ Ate ALFONSO ROBELO. ALL THREE OPPOSEO SOMOZA WHEN SO)a)ZA WAS STILL IN POWER. CALERtt WAS JAILED BY SOMOZA; CRUZ Ata) ROBELO LATER BECAltE JLEYTA MEM5ERS UITH THE Sata)INISTAS. WE HOPE THAT taa) WILL Cta)TI)4)E TO BROADEN THE MEMBERSHIP OF ITS COALITItat. BOTH INSIDE AN) OUTSIDE OF NICARAGUA, BUT WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY N3 OOLBT II THAT Laa)'5 LEADERS Ata) OBJECTIVES ARE ALREADY KlRE 0 95324 DE)a)CRATIC THAN THAN T)a)SE OF EITHER SOAR)ZA OR THE SA)4)INISTAS. 7. THE ACTUAL FIGHTERS OF THE RESISTANCE ARE OVERWHELMIAEM. Y RURAL YOUTHS LOYAL, TO THEIR FAMILIES Ata) IIII/NNI'l ppJ s8$hl%)8 86 9896725 SSO PAGE 002 NC 9896725 TOR: 130750Z FEB 86 STATE 045707 LOCALITIES AN3 DRIVEN TO REBELLION BY SA)43INISTA ATTACKS ON RELIGION AFD I)43EPE?4)ENT FARMING. t4)W MOSTLY 18-22 YEARS OLO, THEY WERE IN THEIR EARLY TEENS WHEN SOMOZA FELL IN 1979. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THEY ARE FIGHTING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AGAINST DICTATORSHIP 194) FOREIGN IMPOSITION, A)0 BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THESE PEASAN FIGHTERS RECEIVE THE MILITARY TRAINING A?43 WEAPONS THEY NEED TO RESIST THE SOVIET-ARMED A?43 CUBAN-TRAINED SA?4)INISTA ARMY. 8. THE FIGHTING FORCES OF THE RESISTANCE BELONG TO THREE MAJOR GROUPINGS. THE LARGEST A?43 MILITARILY 14357 EFFECTIVE BELONG TO THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCE (FDN) HEADED BY CALERO SINCE 1983. OTHER IMPORTANT RESISTAM:E ORGANIZATIONS INCLUDE ARDE, BUILT BY ROBELO AN3 FORMER SA?4)INISTA COMANOANTE EDEN PASTORA, A?43 MISURA. KISAN A)43 OTHER GROUPS ACTIVE AMONG THE MISKITO IN3IANS. 9. THE MILITARY COtMAA?43ERS OF THESE RESISTANCE ARMIES COME FROM ALL WALKS QF LIFE, BUT MOST COME FROM THE VERY GROUPS THE SAFDINISTAS CLAIM TO REPRESENT: NICARAGUAN PEASANTS, SMALL FARMERS. URBAN PROFESSIONALS A?43 STUDENTS, OPPONENTS OF SOMOZA. EVEN FORMER SAKIINISTA FIGHTERS. THE COMMAN3ERS DIFFER FROM THEIR TROOPS IN BEING OLDER ()4357 ARE 25-35) A?43 IN THAT AL?4357 HALF COME FROM URBAN RATHER THAN RURAL BACKGROU?435. 10. LESS THAN HALF OF THE RESISTANCE COIBUU4)ERS HAVE PRIOR MILITARY EXPERIENCE. T)4)SE W?43 00 HAVE MILITARY SKILLS ACQUIRED THEM IN MORE OR LESS EQUAL )444)ERS IN THE PRE-REVOLUTIONARY NATIONAL GUARD A)43 IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY SAl4)INISTA ARMY. THIS IS THE FON MILITARY. WHICH ORIGINALLY ASSIMILATED FORCES BUILT LARGELY BY FORMER GUARDSAIEN, THE OOMP(A?4)ERS ARE )4)W FOR THE MOST PART NICARAGUANS Wt4lSE MILITARY EXPERIENCE IS Llt4&ED TO THE FSLN, t4)T SO)4)ZA. 11. WHILE ACCEPTING THAT THE NICARAGUAN DE)eCRATIC FORC (FDN) HAS A PEASANT ARMY, A REPORT PREPARED LAST YEAR fOR THE ARMS CONTROL A)43 FOREIGN POLICY CAUCUS (W)43 ARE THE CONTRAS'?. APRIL 18, 1985) CLAIMEO THAT THE FDN "ARMY IS ORGANIZED A14) COIW?AN)EO BY FORMER NATIONAL GUARDSMEN. ' THIS ALLEGATION HAS BECOME ALKIST AN ARTICLE OF FAITH FOR MANY Wte OPPOSE U. S. SUPPORT FOR THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE. IT IS KIT SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS. 12. THE CAUCUS STAFF CLAIMEO THAT t46 OF THE 48 POSITIONS IN THE FDN MILITARY LEADERSHIP ARE HELD BY EX-NATIONAL GUARDSMEN. ' GUARDSMEN WERE SAID TD KILO 'ALL BUT CNE OF THE 12 TOP CENTRAL STAFF. ' INCLUDING THE STRATEGIC O)814A?4)ER. 'FIVE OUT OF SIX REGI(XVAL CD?8tA?4)ERS. A?43 ALL 30 TASK FORCE 00)8(A?4)ERS. ' 13. THE CAUCUS STAFF IS CORRECT IN IDENTIFYING THE FDN'5 MILITARY CHIEF AS A FORMER GUARDSMAN. IT IS ALSO ON THE MARK IN DESCRIBING THE FQN'5 REGIONAL A143 TASK FORCE CO?8tA)4)ERS AS 'THE KEY MILITARY FIELD LEADERS. ' BUT THEN MISREPRESENTATION RAPIDLY TAKES OVER. THE REPORT'5 EXTRAORDINARY MATHEMATICAL PRECISION WAS DOCUMENTED AT 4 PO CRITICAL POINT WITH THE SENTENCE 'OUR SOURCES CLAIM THAT MOST At4) PROBABLY ALL OF THE 30 TASK FORCE D?N8(At4)ERS ARE FORMER GUARDS. ONLY THREE SOURCES WERE NAMED. ONE IS AN ACADEMIC EXPERT W?4) DENIES HE DISCUSSED THE TASK FORCE OOFYWI?4)ERS WITH THE AUT)4)RS OF THE REPORT. THE OTHER TWQ SOURCES BR(ME I?1TH THE FD)t AFTER St(RVING N -MILITARY evh' CRE S( T)~P, „~~ 86 9896725 SSO PAGE CO3 NC 9896725 TOR: 130750Z FEB 86 .STATE 045707 14. OUR LATEST INFORMATION IS THAT THE FDN HAS 52 TASK FORCES OR EOUIVALENT COMMAt41S (TASK FORCES RANGE IN SIZE FROM 60 TO 700 MEMBERS). WE OBTAINED DATA ON 47 OF THE COMMA)4)ERS (NO BACKGROUt47 INFORMATION WAS AVAILABLE FOR FOUR COltMA)4)ERS AAD ONE CDFYAAND WAS VACANT). THEIR PREVIOUS OCCUPaTIONS wERE: 21 PEASANTS OR SHALL FARMERS; 13 GUARD (3 OFFICERS At47 10 ENLISTED); 12 SAFE)INISTAS (3 OFFICERS AN) 9 ENLISTED). AN) ONE STUDENT. 15. IN SHIRT. ONE OUARTER (13) OF THE TASK FORCE COb6tat47ERS HAD PRIOR GUARD SERVICE; BUT AL)675 THREE OUARTERS (35) HAD NEVER SERVED IN THE GUARD IN ANY CAPACITY. 1 16. THE FDN HAS 14 REGIONAL COWIA ACH HAD 2 TO 4 TASK FORCES TOTALLING ROUGHLY 1900 COMBATANT ) . THE 14 REGIE(NAL COtaaat4)ERS INCLUDED 6 SA ENLISTED MEN, 2 PEASANTS OR 5MALL FI1RMERS, 2 GUARD ENLISTED MEN, 1 GUARD LIEUTENANT, 1 CIVILIAN MEDICAL DOCTOR, 1 EVANGELICAL PASTOR. AN) 1 STUDENT. RATHER THAN 5 OF 6 REGIONAL COMMAta)ERs BEING FGRMER GUARD MEMBERs as ASSERTED IN THE CAUCUS REPORT. WE FOU)47 3 OF 14. 17. AS CONCERNS THE HEADQUARTERS, THE CAUCUS COUNT OF 11 FORMER GUARDSMEN OUT OF THE 12 TOP POSITIONS ARBITRARILY COUNTED SOME SPECIALIZED SUPPORT SERVICES (AIR, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE. PSYCHJLOGICAL WARFARE. TRAINING. MISURA LIAISON) BUT N)T OTHERS (NAVY, MEDICAL, LEGAL. /a„.. FINANCE. LOGISTICS At47 COA44JNICATIONS). THE RESULT WAS g TO EXCLttDE PERSONS WFEt WERE NDT FORMER GUARDSMEN. OUR INFORMATION IS THAT, COUNTING ALL OPERATIONAL CDt44ANDERS. ALL CHIEFS OF SUPPORT SERVICES. AN) ALL MEMBERS OF THE STRATEGIC AN7 THE CIVIL-MILITARY COANANDS YIELDS 4 TOTAL OF 12 FORMER GUARDSMEN (INCLUDING BERMUDEZ) OUT OF 21 PERSONS. THIS IS A SEE)STANTIALLY HIGHER PROPORTION THAN FOR THE FIELD COWIA)47ERS. BUT HARDLY A DECISIVE OR CONTROLLING FORCE. CONSIDERING THAT THE HEADQUARTERS MJST PROVIDE THE PROFESSIONAL MILITARY CONTENT BETWEEN THE OFTEN STRONG-WILLED AKI ItEiEPEI4)ENT FIELD COMMAt47ERS Wte CONTROL THE TROOPS A)47 THE STRATEGY OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. 18. AS NOTED ABOVE, IT IS TRUE THAT ENRIOUE BERMJOEZ, THE FDN'5 MILITARY Ob6latZ)ER, blAS A COLONEL IN THE NATIONAL GUARD. BUT IT IS WRONG TO CALL HIM A BACKER OF SOMOZA. SOMOZA HAD HIM POSTED OUT OF NICARAGUA DURING THE LAST THREE YEARS OF HIS REGIME. 74)T EVEN THE SAF47INISTAS ACCUSED BERMXtEZ OF HJMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (46)ER SOMOZA. IN 1979. SO)67ZA REJECTED A CARTER ADMINISTRATION SUGGESTIONS THAT BER14XtEZ ASSUME COtaaatat OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AFTER HIS DEPARTURE. UNLESS ONE IS SEEKING TO DENY TO THE RESISTANCE THE SERVICES OF ALL FORMER GUARDSMEN AT A TIME WHEN THE SA)4)INISTAS THEMSELVES ARE USING FORMER GUARDSMEN AN& MANY FOREIGNERS TO BUILD THE BIGGEST MILITARY ORGANIZATION IN Tt(E HISTORY OF CENTRAL AMERICA. IT IS HARD TO FIND THIS RECORD OBJECTIONABLE. 19. ANALYZING AN ISSUE ON ONE PARTICULAR SET OF TERMS CAN BE MISLEADING. IN THIS CASE, THE FOCUS ON IDENTIFYING FORMER GUARDSMEN IN THE RESISTANCE SHIFTS ATTENTION FROM TYO CRITICAL POINTS. 95322 20. THE FIRST IS THE NATURE OF THE MILITARY FORCES OF THE GOVERF8(ENT OF NICARAGUA. THE SAFE)INISTA ARblED FORCES ARE 5IX TO TEN TIMES LARGER THAN TteSE OF SOMOZA.
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