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University Microfilms International 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 4B106 USA St. John's Road, Tyler's Green High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR 77-10,571 MESSMER, William Bruce, 1941- SOVIET AGRICULTURE AND THE THIRD WORLD: A CASE STUDY OF CUBA. The Ohio State University, Ph.D., 1976 Political Science, general
Xerox University MicrofilmsAnn , Arbor, Michigan 48106
© Copyright by William Bruce Messmer 1976 SOVIET AGRICULTURE AND THE THIRD WORLD:
A CASE STUDY OF CUBA
DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University
By
William Bruce Messmer, B.A., M.A.
* * * * *
The Ohio State University
1976
Approved By Reading Committee;
Philip D. Stewart Jan Adams David Lampton dvlser Departmental of Political Science VITA
June 3, 1941 Born, Dayton, Ohio
1963 B.A., Otterbeln College, Westerville, Ohio
1969 M.A.» Ohio University, Athens, Ohio
FIELDS OF STUDY
Major Field: Political Science
Subfields: Comparative Politics and Political Theory
11 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
VITA...... 11
LIST OF TABLES...... v
LIST OF FIGURES...... vi
INTRODUCTION...... 1
Chapter
I. CUBAN AGRICULTURAL IN PERSPECTIVE...... 16
Prerevolutionary Agriculture In Cuba...... 17 Agricultural Goals of the Castro Leadership. .. . 23 Strategies for Development In Cuban Agricultural . 32
II. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS: THE COMMAND PRODUCTION M ODEL...... 47
The Evolution of the Soviet Agricultural System. . 48 The Elements of the Command Model...... 53 The Soviet Model of Agriculture...... 73 The Soviet Model in the Cuban Context...... 76
III. CUBAN UNITS OF PRODUCTION: THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE...... * 81
Traditional Agricultural Prodcutlon Units.... 82 Post-Revolutionary Changes: The First Agrarian Reform...... 85 Cuban Adoption of Soviet Type Production Units . . 92 A Comparison of Soviet and Cuban Units of Production...... 99 The Adoption of New Units of Production: Problems and Alternatives...... 103 Conclusion...... 125
ill Page
IV. AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION IN...CUBA...... 133
Agricultural Administration: 1959-60...... 133 Agricultural Administration: 1961-63 ...... 136 1963-1970: Reorganization and Adoption of the Combines...... 139 Administration Through 1970: From Anarchy to Militarization...... 150 Post-1970 Administration: The Return to Orthodoxy...... 155 A Comparison of Cuban and Soviet Agricultural Administration...... 157 The Problems Resulting From the Adoption of a Command Agricultural Administration...... 159 Conclusion...... 176
V. PLANNING IN CUBAN AGRICULTURE...... 187
The Organizational Structure of Agricultural Planning...... 188 A Comparison of Cuban and Soviet Agricultural Planning...... 202 The Problems Resulting From the Adoption of Central Planning in C u b a ...... 204 Conclusion...... 216
VI. THE SOVIET MODEL AND THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE...... 224
A Pattern of Deviation From the Model...... 225 The Cuban Experience and Institution Building Theory...... 231 A Final Comment...... 246
BIBLIOGRAPHY...... 250
iv LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
2.1 Soviet Production Units...... 60
3.1 Cuban Farms by Size Groups, 1945 ...... 84
3.2 Distribution of Land and Employment By Type of Organization, August, 1961...... 96
3.3 Cuban Production Units ...... 98
6.1 Agricultural Production in Cuba: 1957- 74 ...... 242
v LIST OF FIGURES
Figure Page
2.1 Soviet: Ministry of Agriculture...... 64
2.2 Soviet Ministry of Agriculture and Party Structure...... 68
2.3 Administrative Structure of Ministry of Agriculture, Party and Production Un i t...... 71
4.1 INRA Structure Circa 1960...... 137
4.2 INRA Structure Circa 1916-62 ...... 140
4.3 Agricultural Administration Circa 1963 ...... 144
4.A Agricultural Administration Circa 1970 ...... 148
5.1 Agricultural Planning Organization ...... 192
vi INTRODUCTION
In 1961 Cuba undertook the adoption of the Soviet agricultural system. This dissertation is concerned with the consequences of
Cuba's adoption of this system, and the suitability of Soviet agricultural institutions for adoption by less developed nations.
The Soviet Union argues that its system of collectivized agri culture, which emphasizes control by the state through a set of highly centralized administrative institutions, should be adopted by Third World nations. It Bhould be adopted, according to the
Soviet argument, because state control will provide the best long term answer to Third World agricultural problems of food shortage and distribution. In addition, state control of agriculture through
Btate administrative institutions will best enable the regime to channel agricultural resources into efforts toward industrialization.1
Such are the strategic claims for what the Soviet system of agriculture can accomplish once it has been adopted and the institu tions organized and made to function in an efficient manner. A crucial assumption upon which such strategic claims rest is that the institutions can be readily organized and made to function effectively by such nations. In this present work, I am concerned with evaluating this basic assumption.
1 An evaluation of this sort is important not only because we need to judge Soviet assumptions about their institutions, but also because there seems to be a growing feeling among some western writers that authoritarian solutions of the Soviet type are the best answer to the desperate problems of the Third World nations.
Professor 1. Robert Sinai, for example, argues that the tasks of development require the destruction of vested interests and cherished traditions, and that such an undertaking can only be done within an authoritarian framework of institutions. Sinai goes further to suggest that communism, while not particularly attractive as a path away from underdevelopment, is the only alternative currently avail able. 2 In a similar vein, Charles K. Wilbur has also argued that the communist approach, particularly the Soviet approach, is worthy of consideration by Third World nations in their efforts to bring about development. Wilbur has written that while the "social costs" of the
Soviet approach (in particular the collectivized approach to agriculture) may be high, that the costs of continued underdevelopment are even higher. 3 The explicit arguments made by both Sinai and
Wilbur are similar to those made by Soviet writers, which is that state control will enable a modernizing regime to better utilize its national resources, including agriculture production, to meet its own developmental goals. Again, as in the Soviet case, the underlying assumption is that the authoritarian, Soviet-like institutions through which the state may control the economy, and particularly agriculture, can be readily adopted by third world nations. Thus, we need to ' 3 evaluate the adoptability of the Soviet agricultural system, for ourselves as yell as to judge Soviet claims*
In contradiction to such assumptions about the ready adopt ability of Soviet-like institutions, the literature on political development, and particularly the literature on institutional deve lopment, almost invariably leaves the reader with the view that the adoption of any type of new political institution in the context of underdevelopment is a difficult task, often of long duration.
Indeed, such literature makes it clear that institution building is perhaps the most difficult aspect of national modernization.
The intellectual roots of this position on the difficulty of institution building go back at least as far as the work of Max
Weber and Emile Durkheiro. According to Weber, the passage from traditional society with its "paternalistic*.1 institutions to modern society with its rational/legal institutions was so difficult as to require the presence of a charismatic leader to bind the nation together while new institutions were d e v e l o p e d . 4 While Weber's main interest was to point out the unique quality of the personal authority of the charismatic leader, he has, in the process, also indicated the difficulty of developing new institutions in a changing society. The work of Emile Durkheim also implies the difficulty of institution building in modernizing society. Durkheim discusses the prevalent problem of "anomie" or normlessness in individuals in modern society, and anomie, according to Durkheim, is the result of lack of sufficient organizational structure for the regulation of the individual,5 Durkheim*s point 1b not that modern society can not develop sufficient structure to embrace the individual, but that it is a difficult and long term process.
In the post-World War II period, with the burgeoning interest in the general problems of modernization and political development in the newly independent nations, the theme of Institution building in all underdeveloped societies became more common in the writings of political scientists. The foreign aid approach of the United
States to these nations was one that emphasized programs that brought about socio-economic modernization.** This, in turn, stimulated interest in the study of those institutions in recipient nations which administered the aid programs of the U.S. According to
F.X. Sutton, the quality of these adminstrative institutions was often very poor. In fact, according to Sutton, the problems proved so intractible and discouraging to those who sought to deal with them that by the 1970's there was a general "...growing doubt that we know what to do to bring about [Institutional] development. The problems encountered in creating effective institutions to administer aid and service programs have been widespread enough, according to
Fred Riggs, that "...the assumption that countries in the third world, in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, were developing was as much a wish as an empirically determined fact."** Riggs then goes on to discuss the difficulty of overcoming the problems of effective institution building over the past several years. The expanding literature on the development and reform of administrative institutions in third world nations over the past two decades is testament to the belief not only of the need for solving such problems, but also of the difficulty of overcoming poor instltu- Q tional development.
More recently, because of the growing number of coups, revolu tions, and military take-overs in the third world, there has been increasing concern with the stability of governing institutions in these countries. Thus, the concern with the development of effective administrative institutions has been joined by an interest in developing stable institutions, as well. As in the case of creating effective administration, however, the scholars who have been concerned with stability in third world governing institutions, see the development of such institutions as a long term process.
The most prominent scholarly figure in this re-focusing on the problems of creating stable institutions in changing societies, has been Samuel Huntington. Huntington argues that it is very difficult to establish stable and effective political Institutions in modern izing societies. This is so, he says, because the demands on government institutions continue to increase beyond the capacity of such institutions to satisfy these demands. Thus, frustrations and ultimately political instability result.Because he sees the problem of instability as resulting from the increased level of demands made upon government, Huntington tends to emphasize the importance of developing stronger "input" institutions (i.e. political parties, organized lobbies, etc.,) in creating a stable government. However, he also recognizes the Importance of "output" institutions
(i.e. administration of laws and services) as well, for stable
government. ^ More importantly for our purposes here, however,
is the fact that Huntington says that both types of institutions
are difficult to rapidly and effectively develop in third world
nations. In Huntington's words, "Institutions result from the
slow interaction of conscious effort and existing culture.
The difficulty of institution building in Huntington's view
is perhaps best reflected in a central theme that runs through his
writings on political development.^ According to this theme, he
argues that political development, represented by institutional
development, is not inevitable. In fact, political decay (i.e.
institutional decay) may be a more prevalent condition. According
to Huntington, "Institutional decay has become a common phenomenon
of modernizing countries".^ The Importance of this theme, once
again for our purposes in this study, is that it illustrates
another scholar's pessimistic view about the chances for successful
institution building in modernizing nations.
While this discussion of the problems of institution building has by no means covered all of the available literature, it does
give us the dominant perspective in that body of literature concern
ing difficulty of institution building in third world nations.
Given the perspective of this literature and the opposing views of the proponents of the Soviet agricultural system who assume its
ready adoptability, we have a substantial contradiction. The study which follows is meant to provide information which helps to resolve the argument that exists between these two opposing views.
Thus, we can formulate the following general question to which the present work attempts to provide an answer, "Can Soviet agricultural institutions be successfully adopted by developing nations"?
In early 1959 Fidel Castro led his rebel army to power in Cuba.
By 1961 Castro declared his regime to be Marxist-Leninist and he moved to adopt policies and institutions that were like those of the other socialist nations. In the realm of agriculture, which is by far the most important sector of the Cuban economy, CastroB govern ment moved to adopt the Institutions and procedures that are like those found in the agricultural systems of many communist nations, particularly the USSR. The fact that Cuba did adopt a system of agriculture which was based upon the Soviet system gives us the opportunity to evaluate their experience with implementing such an institutional arrangement, as well as the chance to develop a case study which can help to answer the basic question posited above, with which this work is concerned.
Because Cuba is representative of Third World nations in many ways, she provides an excellent national context for the study of the problem. Cuba has a recent colonial heritage (she gained her independence from Spain in 1898), and until the 1959 revolution she was dominated economically by foreign capital (primarily U.S.).
The economy is overwhelmingly agricultural and it has been devoted to the production of one export crop— sugar. Thus, Cuba has been a monocultural producer of a raw material for external markets. Furthermore,because there is very little industry in Cuba, most manufactured goods have had to be imported. Finally, the majority of the population (particularly the rural population) were charac terized by a poor level of education, poverty, subsistence employment, and had access to few social services. Thus, in rural
Cuba in particular, there was backwardness and general stagnation.
When taken as a group, these characteristics constitute an almost classic syndrome of problems that confront the regimes of Third * World nations. Thus, the findings on Cuba's experience with the
Soviet institutions should be useful to other Third World nations.
An important reason for evaluating the suitability of the Soviet agricultural system for adoption by third world nations such as
Cube, is the pressing need to find rapid solutions to the overwhelm ing agricultural and food production problems of many of these nations. This study is important because the Soviet approach, as the reviews of Wilbur and Sinai indicate, is one possible candidate solution. John Kautsky has pointed out that the Soviet approach to national development, particularly Industrialization, is perceived by third world elites as being one of the most successful of this century.^5 Becuase of this there may be the corollary assumption that the Soviet approach to agriculture is the best answer to agricultural development. Among western scholars, however, there is much criticism of the Soviet approach to agriculture. Much has already been written on the objectionable coercive features of the Soviet approach to agriculture under Stalin.^ There has also been significant criticism of the belief that state control of agriculture* as embodied in the Soviet institutional arrangement* allows a modernizing regime to "squeeze" from agriculture the resources it needs to underwrite industrialization and other areas of policy concern.U The need for critical (as opposed to ideological) analysis of the Soviet approach to agriculture still remains* and perhaps is greater now than in the past. The following study of agricultural institution building in Cuba, where the regime has been using the Soviet institutional approach as a model* is meant to add to our understanding of the suitability of the Soviet approach for overcoming the problems of underdevelopment.
In addition to evaluating the experience of Cuba in adopting
Soviet agricultural institutions* the following study is important because of the need for a systematic study of Cuban agriculture.
There has been much valuable work done on various aspects of
Cuban agriculture such as land reform* incentives, planning* etc.
However* there has been no overall study of the whole system that outlines its structural and procedural features. The present study should help to fill this gap in the literature on Cuba.
The following analysis of institution building in Cuba is by no means a full treatment of the Cuban experience with the Soviet approach to agriculture, A more comprehensive analysis might include a discussion of the critical role of Soviet aid to Cuba during the communist period. Also* a full treatment of the problem would include a discussion of the beneficial role of centralized, state control and how this has allowed the regime to control invest ments and resource utilization in all economic sectors. It has also 10 enabled the regime to equalize the distribution of goods and services among various population groups, particularly In the rural areas.
Certainly an analysis of this type would also Include a thorough discussion of the agricultural goals of the Castro leadership, and how such goals compare to that of the Soviet leadership vis-a-vis the Soviet-like system of agriculture. Finally, a full analysis ought to include a discussion of agricultural production both before and after the revolution, as well as the impact of Cuba's size, resources, history and natural conditions on contemporary agriculture. All of these areas which have been suggested as necessary parts of a comprehensive analysis of Cuba's experience with the Soviet approach to agriculture are touched upon in some way in the following work. However, none of them are thoroughly dealt with. Consequently, these areas represent possible future foci of study. This analysis, therefore, should be seen as a beginning step in an evaluation of the Soviet system of agriculture and its possible role in less developed nations such as Cuba.
In attempting to provide an answer to the question about the suitability of Soviet agricultural institutions for less developed nations the study has been organized in the following way: Chapter I is a general discussion of recent agricultural history in Cuba. In this chapter a brief and general analysis of the agricultural problems inherited by the Castro regime is undertaken. There is also some discussion of the goals and strategies that have characterized the poBt-revolutionary regime. Chapter II lays out the key institutional and procedural features of 11
Soviet agriculture and outlines the model of Soviet agriculture which has been adopted In Cuba, Chapters III, IV, and V are each about one major Institutional aspect of the Soviet model as It has evolved
In Cuba since the adoption of communism in 1961. In each of these
chapters we have basically tried to describe what the Cuban exper
ience has been with the institutional component of the model in question, and also, where there have been changes from the model we have attempted to outline the apparent causes of the deviation.
The concluding chapter, based upon the information presented in Chapters III, IV, and V, presents an evaluation of the suitability of the institutions for adoption by nations such as Cuba. A full evaluation of the Cuban experience could be undertaken in several ways as Indicated above. However, the central concern of this study is with institution building in third world settings. Consequently, the evaluation presented in the final chapter is primarily based upon whether the Soviet-like agricultural institutions, once adopted, have performed their mission adequately and been maintained, or whether there has been significant institutional reorganization resulting from a failure to perform assigned functions. Thus, the success or failure of the Cubans in making the institutions function • , as intended will provide our answer to whether Soviet agricultural
Institutions can be successfully adopted by third world nations such as Cuba. There is also a discussion of the importance of this study and its findings for the body of theory on institution building.
He essentially attempt to evaluate whether the Cuban experience has 12 been confirming or infirming for this body of theory. Finally* because productivity is an important index of the impact of new institutions on a society, there is a brief discussion of aggregate agricultural production levels for various crops from 1957 through
1974.
A brief word is necessary on the sources of information which has been used for this study. Chapters 1 and II are almost ex clusively based upon secondary source materials, and neither chapter is seen as an original interpretation of its subject matter.
Each is meant to provide only a general background of information that puts the remainder of the study in proper context. The sources for Chapter III, which is about the development of the new socialist farm units after the revolution, are primarily the first hand observations of numerous observers who were present during the transition process. There was little systematic newspaper coverage in Cuba during this time. The primary source material for
Chapters IV and V has been the pages of the Granma Weekly Review, which is the organ of the Cuban Communist Party. Granma Weekly
Review has been published since 1965,. Throughout the study we have also relied, in numerous instances, on articles from Cuba Socialista, the theoretical journal of Cuban Communism from 1962 until it was discontinued in 1967.
Any lengthy study of this type is never the result, solely, i of the efforts of the author. Numerous individuals have helped me to develop and organize the ideas which are presented here. In 13 particular, I would like to thank Professor Philip Stewart for his support and help at numerous critical junctures along the way, as well as his initial proposal of the general topic which is dealt with here. Also helpful were Professor Terry McCoy (parti cularly during the early stages), and Professors Jan Adams and
David M. Lampton for helpful suggestions during the writing.
Finally, 1 would like to thank my wife Cathy, for her support during various phases of the writing. However, most importantly, I would like to thank her for the periodic reminders that life is made up of more than dissertations and research, and thus helped preserve and prolong my strength of spirit which made possible the completion of this project. FOOTNOTES FOR THE INTRODUCTION
10. G. Klesmet, "The Significance Of The Socialist System For The Future Economic Development of Latin America," Soviet Images of Contemporary Latin America (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1970), edited by J. G. Oswald, p. 306.
^I. Robert Sinai, "The Case for Authoritarianism," The Developing Nations (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1972), edited by Frank Tachau, pp. 145-149.
^Charles K. Willbur, The Soviet Model And Underdeveloped Countries. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), Chapter Six.
^Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation" and "The Sociology of Charismatic Authority", From Max Weber (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), edited by Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, pp. 77- 128, and 245-252. See also Samuel Huntington's conflicting inter pretation of the role of charismatic authority in institutional development. "Political Development and Political Decay," Comparative Politics (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1968), Third Edition edited by Roy Macridis and Bernard Brown, pp. 528-538.
^See Steven Lukes interpretation of Durkheim's concept of anomie. "Alienation and Anomie," Philosophy, Politics and Society (Oxford, England: Alden Press, 1969), edited by Peter Laslett and W. G. Runclman, pp. 134-156.
®Mark Kesselman, "Order Or Movement," World Politics, October, 1973, pp. 139-140; Fred Riggs, Frontiers of Development Administra tion (Durkham: Duke University Press, 1970), pp. 3-8. Samuel Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 5. F.X. Sutton, "The Role of Foundations In Developing Nations," paper delivered ath the American Political Science Convention, Chicago, 1976.
^Sutton, ibid., p. 22.
®Riggs, op. cit.. pp. 3-4.
14 15
9Ibid.; Sutton, op. clt.; John Honey, Toward Strategies for Public Administration Development In Latin America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968); Ralph Braibantl, Political and Administration Development (Durham; Duke University Press, 1969); Ferrel Heady, Public Administration; A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.; Prentlce-Hall, 1966); Nimrod Raphaeli, Readings In Comparative Public Administration (Boston; Allyn and Bacon, 1967).
^Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," op. cit., pp. 521-538.
lllbid., p. 531.
12Ibid.. p. 532.
l^Ibid.. Huntington, Political Order In Changing Societies, op. cit.; Huntington, "The Change To Change," Comparative Politics Fourth Edition (Homewood, 111,; Dorsey, 1972), edited by Roy Macrldls and Bernard E. Brown, pp. 407-425.
U Ibid.. p. 530.
l^John Kautsky, "The Communist Perspective," The Developing Nations, op. cit., pp. 150-159.
^ W i l b u r , pp. cit.; Merle Farisod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard Press, 1965), pp. 526-534; Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1970).
l^James R. Millar, "What,s Wrong with the Standard Story," Problems of Communism, July/August, 1976, pp. 50-55. CHAPTER ONE
CUBAN AGRICULTURE IN PERSPECTIVE
The present work is concerned with answering the question about
whether Soviet agricultural institutions have been successfully
adopted in Cuba. To put this problem in perspective we need to
discuss, in general terms, the nature of Cuban agriculture and the
policies of the Castro regime toward agriculture. This first chapter
is a brief attempt at such a discussion. The first section of the
chapter is a discussion of the "under-developed" nature of pre
revolutionary agriculture so we can understand the situation which
confronted the new revolutionary leadership. The second section of
this chapter is a discussion of the agricultural goals of the new
regime. The final portion of the chapter is concerned with the general
strategies adopted by the leadership to meet their agricultural goals.
The discussion of pre-revolutionary agriculture which follows is only meant to be very general in nature and it is in large part based
on the more thorough work in this area already done by Archibald
Ritter, Andres Bianchi, Carmelo Mesa Lago and others.! it j.8 to the works of these scholars that the reader should turn for greater
detail.
16 17
PRE-REVOLUTIONARY AGRICULTURE IN CUBA
According to James O'Connor, "The history of Cuba Is the his tory of sugar."2 While this Is historically Inaccurate In that
Cuba did not produce great quantities of sugar until 250 years after being settled, It Is accurate In that it reflects the over whelming impact of sugar production on the development of post-
18th century Cuban history.
From its discovery In 1492, by Columbus, until the middle
1700's, Cuban development proceded very slowly. Its value to the
Spanish colonizers was initially its geographic location and port facilities which made it useful as a safe haven and supply depot ' for Spanish ships on their way to and from other parts of the new world.3 The real economic potential of Cuba, however, lay in its hospitable climate and fertile soils which gave it great agricultural potential.4 Initial agricultural production was concerned with cattle ranching, tobacco and sugar cane production which developed out of the need of passing ships for meat, tobacco and rum. Thus, prior to the mid-1700's Cuban agricultural pro duction was diversified among these three main products as well as such lesser items as coffee, molasses, hides and wood.5
From the 1760's until the current period, however, the
Cuban agricultural system moved toward sugar production specializa tion. Numerous factors played a role in this increasing sugar specialization. The proper natural conditions of good soil and climate were present in Cuba for the growing of sugar cane. In 18 addition, earlier restrictions on sugar trade and production were eased by the Spanish government. This allowed trade with more foreign markets as the U.S.6 This led to increased demand, which, in turn, led to greater and greater production until sugar was the primary export crop. Sugar reached a peak of 92.2% of Cubas' total exports in 1920.7 At that time approximately 50% of Cuba's tillable land was sown in sugar cane.® In the decade of the 1950's sugar exporting still accounted for approximately 80% of total Cuban exports, and in 1958, the final year of production before the revolution sugar amounted to 80.1% of Cuba's exports.9 At that time about 60% of
Cuba's tillable land was devoted to producing sugar. During the decade prior to the revolution (19A9-58) nearly 30% of Cuba's GNP was generated by sugar production.10
Thus in the two centruies spanning the period from the 1760's until the 1960's, Cuba had changed from a somewhat diversified agricultural producer to a sugar monocultural economy. Though it is useful to point out that throughout this period such crops as coffee and tobacco have provided additional sources of exportable materials.
The overwhelming importance of sugar in the Cuban economy re sulted in the development of additional significant features in the agricultural sltaution during the pre-revolutionary period. Perhaps the most important of these features is the fact that the island economy was directly linked to external foreign markets. Thus the
Cuban econojny improved or worsened depending on the fluctuating 19
price of sugar on international markets. In addition to the economic
uncertainties arising around the fluctuation of world market prices,
it amounted to a situation which was largely beyond the control of
Cuban governments though they consistently sought to improve and
expand markets through international agreements.H Thus, government
was in the unenviable position of being unable to do much about the
basic uncertainties surrounding the central product of the economy.
Partly because of this the Cuban people developed a minimal attach
ment and regard for any of the various governments which ruled them
since their independence in 1898..^
The cultivation of sugar required massive amounts of labor and
thus most rural Cubans were a part of this labor force.^ However,
sugar cultivation was a seasonal endeavor requiring intensive,
unskilled labor only for about four months out of the year. Thus,
for the Intervening eight months most rural Cubans were unemployed
or worked small subsistence plots of land. According to Mesa Lago,
during the time of the sugar harvest, the sugar sector employed
nearly 25% of the total labor force. However, during the "dead
season" it employed only 4 or 5% . ^ Though reliable statistics are
scarce it seems clear that this rural labor force (approximately
20% of the total Cuban labor force) was very poorly paid. O'Connor
indicates that about 1/3 of the populace (most of whom were from the
rural labor force) received only 5% of the national Income.*5 As might be expected, being poorly paid and seasonally employed at unskilled labor went hand-in-hand with poor rural educational and 2° health care facilities and opportunities, and generally poor housing and living conditions (i.e. lack of electricity, good water, trans portation and communications.) Thus a pattern of inequality, poverty, backwardness and stagnation characterized the lives of the rural populace in general.16
The influence of foreign capital was also substantial in the years preceding the revolution. U.S. owned sugar mills produced only 15% of the sugar in 1906. However, in 1915 U.S. mills produced
35%, and by 1927 close to 70% of the sugar was produced by U.S. owned mills.^ Later, U.S. control of sugar was reduced through
Cuban legislative efforts so that by 1959 U.S. owned mills produced only 37% of the sugar. It hardly needs to be pointed out, however, that it was still a substantial percentage of the total sugar pro duction. In some cases, as the following description indicates, foreign ownership virtually removed sugar estates and mills from the
Cuban economy:
The large American-owned sugar mills tended to become mere protrusions from the United States, incidentally resident in Cuba. Located frequently near the coast, served by their own subports, operating self-contained railways systems, importing directly most of their needs (includ ing a labor supply), shipping sugar directly abroad, making only modest contributions to tax revenues, and disbursing dividends to non-resident stockholders, many mills were in no sense integrated with the Cuban economy. Multiplication or growth of such separate cells was a process quite different from development of the national economic organism.
In addition to outright control of a large segment of the sugar production by private U.S. interests, the Cuban economy was 21
Integrated significantly with the nearby mainland U.S. economy and consequently subject to U.S. influence. Since 1934, Cuban sugar was allowed to enter the U.S. market at a fair price guaranteed by treaty. In exchange, U.S. manufactured goods were sold in Cuba and not subject to tariff controls on prices. Consequently, local industry in Cuba never developed to any great extent because competition from
U.S. firms usually made such efforts unprofitable. Thus, Cuban sugar was guaranteed a market at the expense of the development of nascent
Cuban industry and of diversifying an independent economy. In addi tion, as Ritter and others have pointed out the quota gave the U.S. great leverage over Cuba in official dealings.1® Finally, it should be pointed out that total U.S. Investments in Cuba were very sub stantial (second largest in Latin America) and in addition to sugar,
U.S. interests controlled oil refineries, mining, and public utilities.
During this period from 1949-58 a yearly average of 68.6% of Cuba's
•IQ entire foreign trade was with the U.S." This situation clearly allowed substantial U.S. influence in the Cuban economy and has caused
Dudley Seers to make the following observation:
This dependence had serious implications. Since most of the equipment came from the United States, the economy depended on a flow of spare parts from North American firms. The distributors in Cuba of both semi-manufactures and consumer goods were in the habit of ordering directly from the mainland (often by telephone); they knew only those sources of supply; they were accustomed to fairly rapid delivery; and customers were used to U.S. brands. The Cuban economy was so wedded to the U.S. economy that the country was in many ways an‘appendage of it though without enjoying, as a poor state in the United States does, federal social services or access to U.S. sources of employment.21 22
In summary, during the pre-revolutionary period, Cuba was over whelmingly an agricultural economy centered around the growth and production of one crop— sugar. In addition, she was without control of her external markets, and her labor force was characterized by a substantial number of under and unemployed, unskilled workers who lived in rural backwardness and poverty. Finally, the influence of foreign (in this case, U.S.) capital was substantial in the sugar sector and the economy aB a whole. When looked at from this perspective
Cuba seems more or less typical of many Third World, less-developed nations.
That the new Cuban leadership in 1959 shared this perspective seems abundantly clear in the following lengthy excerpt from Castro's
1960 speech at the U.N.
What did the Revolution find when it came to power in Cuba? What marvels did the Revolution find when it came to power in Cuba? First of all, the Revolution found that 600,000 able Cubans were unemployed— as many.proportionately, as were unemployed in the United States at the time of the great depression which shook this country and which almost created a catastrophe in the United States. That was our permanent unemployment. Three million out of a population of somewhat over six million did not have electric lights and did not enjoy the advantages and comforts of electricity. Three and a half million out of a total of slightly more than six million lived in huts, shacks, and slums, without the slightest sanitary facilities. In the cities, rents took almost one-third of family incomes. Electricity rates and rents were among the highest in the world. Thirty-seven and one half percent of our population was illiterate; seventy percent of the rural children had no teachers' two percent of our population, this is, one hundred thousand persons out of a total of more than six million suffered from tuberculosis. Ninety-five percent of the children in rural areas were affected by parasites; the Infant morality rate was very high, the average life span very low. 23 On the other hand, eighty-five percent of the small farmers were paying rents which came to almost thirty percent of their income for the use of land, while one and one-half percent of the landowners controlled forty-six percent of the total land area of the nation. The proportion of hospital beds to the number of inhabitants of the country was ridiculous when compared with countries that have only halfway decent medical services.
Public utilities, electricity, and telephone servic-es all belonged to United States monopolies. A major portion of the banking business, of the importing business, and the oil refineries, the greater part of the sugar production, the best land in Cuba, and the most important industries in all fields belonged to American companies. The balance of payments in the last ten years, from 1950 to 1960, had been favorable to the United States, with regard to Cuba, to the extent of on billion dollars.
This is without taking into account the hundreds of millions of dollars that were extracted from the treasury of the country by the corrupt officials of the tyranny, and which were later deposited in American and European banks.
One billion dollars in ten years. This poor and under-developed Caribbean country, with 600,000 unemployed, was contributing greatly to the economic development of the most highly indus trialized country in the world.
That was the situation we found, and it is probably not foreign to many of the countries represented in this Assembly, because, when all is said and done, what we have said about Cuba is like a diagnostic X. ray applicable to many of the countries represented here.22
Agricultural Goals of the Castro Leadership
There is no question that this Cuban leadership at the outset of the Revolution considered Cuba as an underdeveloped nation which in many ways was typical of all Third World countries. The theme of national development has since continued to be omnipresent in the speeches of Castro and other Cuban leaders. More recently, in a 1974 24 interview with American journalists Castro was asked "Do you consider
Cuba a member of the Third World?" And the following was his response:
In a way, because of our situation and our economic develop ment, we share many of the problems of Third World countries. And we have close ties with the African countries, the Latin American countries, and the Asian countries. Because of our underdevelopment we have much in common with them from the economic point of view.23
In the most general sense, given this concern with underdevelop ment, the overriding goal of the Castro regime has been to bring development to Cuba. Development clearly has meant many things to the revolutionary leadership. It has meant the Industrialization of the economy, the eradication of urban shanty towns, the improvement of education and social services, the end of foreign capitalist exploitation, and much more.
In agriculture the developmental goals of the post-revolutionary leadership were, to a large extent, direct reactions to the problems of post-revolutionary agriculture in Cuba, As early as 1953, in his impassioned and rambling "History Will Absolve Me" speech at his trial for the attack on the Moncada Fortress, Castro spoke of the need to change several aspects of the Cuban economy.24 in so doing he enunciated what might be called a set of general, developmental goals for agriculture which were closely related to the problems of pre-revolutionary agriculture discussed in the first section of the chapter. There were four such agricultural goals in Castro's 1953 program: (1) diversified agricultural production, (2) the end of 25 foreign (U.S.) domination of agricultural lands and produce, (3) full employment for the agricultural labor force, and (4) social services for the agricultural labor force.
1) Diversified Agricultural Production
Castro was critical of the overall lack of economic diversifica tion. In agriculture in particular he called for the diversified production of crops and livestock. While he did not specifically mention the sugar monoculture by name, it was clear that: he was advocating its replacement with an agricultural economy that produced several, perhaps many basic crops. Such a diversification would help to end food imports and would mean that Cuba was not subject to the fluctuations of any one international market.
2) The End of Foreign Domination
The end of the overwhelming influence of the United States in the overall economy was clearly one of Castros aspirations. In agriculture, he wanted both to end U.S. domination which resulted from massive land ownerships by private U.S. capital, and also to end U.S. influence exercise through the sugar quota and the concomi tant tariff free import of manufactured goods into Cuba.
3) Full Employment For Agricultural Labor
Castro also wanted full employment for the massive number of rural workers who were unemployed or under-employed. Here, he speci fically refered to; ...Cubans who are out of work and who want to earn their daily bread honestly, living here instead of having to 26
emigrate in search of a livelihood; we mean the...farm workers who live in miserable huts, who work four months and go hungry the rest of the year, sharing with their children the misery of not having an inch of land to farm, and whose existence would move anyone without a heart of stone to compaslon.25
4) Social Services For Agricultural Labor
Finally, Castro movingly discussed the whole syndrome of rural poverty and backwardness and specifically called for the improvement of housing, education, rural electrification and health services.
These agricultural goals in Castro's 1953 speech were echoed in 1956 in the "Program Manifesto of The 26th of July Movement", which was a major statement on economic policy put forward by the
Castro forces.26 And in 1959, when the new regime gained power it continued to hold up these developmental goals as the basis of future rural reality which it hoped to construct for the Cuban people.^7
All four of these agricultural goals are very much inter-related and initially all seemed to emanate from the presence of the sugar monoculture that had developed during the previous two centuries.
After all, the emphasis on sugar made Cuba excessively subject to the uncertainty of the international market place. Sugar was also thought to be the medium through which foreign domination of the Cuban economy had occurred. Finally, in the eyes of the new leadership, it was the nature of sugar cultivation which had generated the large estates upon which the rich prospered and required seasonal employment of cheap, unskilled labor and therefore was partly responsible for the excessive rural backwardness and poverty. There had been the traditional 27 presence of a "sugar phobia" In Cuba among pre-revolutionary
Intellectuals, as Ritter has documented, and the new leaderhslp was clearly influenced by the tradition in the initial years, as we shall see in the final section of this chapter.
In addition to the sugar phobia, and the general agricultural goals which were based upon the phobia, there was also a set of three specific policy goals, or what might be called "instrumental" goals.
These instrumental goals were essentially specific organizational tools that it was hoped would enable the regime to achieve its more general agricultural development goals. The instrumental goals were (1) planning, (2) Central governmental control, and (3) agrarian reform. Needless to say, there was initial confusion and difference of opinion over how the instrumental goals should be structured and applied in order to best help the regime achieve its general goals.
This was to be expected because of the inexperience of the new regime.
It also was the result of the new government's movement to the left toward socialism. As the new order polarized between moderate reformers and more radical socialists, indecision and hostility were generated over the issue of the instrumental goals. The differences over these
Instrumental goals, however, appeared to be more differences of degree rather than kind particularly in the case of agriculture. Nearly all factions appeared to feel that some form of planning, central control and agrarian reform was necessary.^9 The problems arose over the degree to which each would be implemented. In all three cases, the 28
socialists wanted more planning, governmental control and agrarian
reform than the moderate reformers, and ultimately the socialist
approach prevailed.
1) Planning
Castro had mentioned the need for planning in his, "History Will
Absolve Me" speech, though he did not go into any detail. The idea
of planning was also discussed at greater length in the Program
Manifesto of 1956. The following quote is from that document:
The experience of the economic development of other nations in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has demonstrated that the capitalist system of free enterprise inevitably leads to the accumulation of wealth in a few hands, while the majority is exploited. This experience has forced the most advanced nations, including the country most representative of the capitalist system— the United States— to resort to economic planning techniques that will guarantee the production and consumption of goods in accordance with the needs of the social order.
The 26th of July Movement favors a system of economic planning that will be capable of freeing the country from the ills of monoculture, concessions, monopolist privileges, latifundia, and other expressions of a colonial economy. In short, a system that will offer each Cuban the opportunity for material progress and dignity enjoyed today by the citizens of the great developed countries.30
After taking power a national economic planning board (JUCEPLAN) was
formed and in March, 1960 it was formally authorized to begin coordina
tion of the national economy. While more will be said of this national planning board in the following chapter on planning, it is important
to point out that this planning board came into existence more than a year prior to Cuba's official embracing of socialism in 1961. 29
Consequently, its authority in the first year was much more limited
than it would be in later years.
2) Central Control of the Agricultural Economy
The concept of planning Implies a certain amount of central
control if planning decisions are to be implemented other than on a
voluntary basis at the local level. Castro seems to have had this in
mind in 1953 at his trial, when he said "In the real world, no social
problem is solved by spontaneous generation."^ Clearly central
control and planning are implied by this statement. Elsewhere in
the speech his distrust of the private sector to solve the problems
of the national economy are obvious: "The future of the nation and
the solution of its problems can no longer depend on the selfish
interests of a dozen financiers, nor the cold computation of profits
by ten or twelve magnates in their air conditioned o f f i c e s . "32 When
Castro's regime took power some six years later it reflected these
same orientations as it moved to deal with the problems of the
agrarian sector. Needless to say, central control by Castro's govern
ment would allow the regime to determine to a greater extent the
crops to be produced and the wages and working conditions of rural
labor.
In May, 1959, a new governmental agency called the National
Insitute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) was founded. The INRA was to
be in charge, not only of the agrarian reform program (discussed below), but also of numerous rural social and agricultural services. 30
To carry out these functions INRA was given enormous authority.
According to Edward Boorstein, an American economist who worked in the new regime, next to the rebel army INRA was the most important agency of the new government. 33 it was through INRA that the govern ment was to control agriculture in the effort to eradicate the problems of the pre-revolutionary period and to implement planning decisions.
3) Agrarian Reform
The final instrumental goal of the new revolutionary government was the carrying out of an agrarian reform that would give land to the small farmers and squatters and eliminate the presence of the large often foreign owned estates that controlled so much of the best rural land area. Agrarian reform, like the other general and instru mental goals of the Castro government, had been a part of Castro's plans since at least 1953, when at his trial he said:
...one hundred thousand small farmers...live and die working land that is not theirs, contemplating it as Moses did the promised land, only to die before owning it and, like feudal slaves, having to pay for the use of that parcel of land with a large part of the crop, who cannot love that land or improve it or beautify it by planting a cedar tree or an orange tree because they do not know when the bailiff will come around with the rural guard to tell them they must leave... More than half of the best crop lands are in foreign hands. In Oriente, which is the widest province, the lands owned by the United Fruit Company and UEst Indian Company run from the northern coast to the southern coast. Two hundred thousand farmers and their families do not have a single foot of land on which to raise vegetables for their hungary children whereas nearly 9,900,000 acres of fertile land remain uncultivated in the hand of powerful interests... Revolutionary law [would grant] property, nonmortgageable and nontransferable, to all planters, tenant farmers, renters, sharecroppers, and squatters...34 31
Upon coming to power, the first agrarian reform law was passed
in May 1959 and was part of the same law which created INRA. A
second agrarian reform law was passed in 1963. The nature of these
agrarian reform laws is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III.
However, it is important to note here that this particular instru
mental goal appears to have been the most important one in the eyes
of the Castro leadership. According to Castro it was the "basic
law" to be enacted by the revolutionary government.3-* A reform of
the land tenure system which both created a new, productive, small
farmer class and ended the existence of the large estates which often
did not cultivate and produce to full capacity was critical in the
eyes of the leadership. Such a step would give employement and an
economic stake to thousands of poor, rural Cubans. Castro discussed
the importance of the reform in this regard during his speech to the
U.N. in 1960:
We made an agrarian reform. Was it a radical agrarian reform? We think not. It was a reform adjusted to the needB of our development, and in keeping with out own possibilties of agricultural development. In other words, it was an agrarian reform which was to solve the problems of the landless peasants, the problem of supplying basic foodstuffs, the problem of rural unemployment, and which was to end, once and for all, the ghastly poverty which existed in the countryside of our native land.36
In addition, the destruction of the large estates would help to curb
the power of the sugar sector, much of which was foreign owned, and ease the problems of agricultural diversification. As such, agrarian reform was the key element in the Castro governments economic reform program. 32 Thus, with regard to its three instrumental goals in agriculture
(national planning, central control and agrarian reform) the revolu tionary government moved quickly but as we shall see in following chapters with varying degrees of success. With regard to the general goals of the regime for agriculture, we shall discuss the degree to which these were achieved in the following section on regime strategy for agricultural development.
Strategies For Development In Cuban Agriculture
The strategies for agriculture we shall be discussing below have been the periodic grand designs for achieving development in agriculture through the manipulation of the new instrumental features of the Castro regime (i.e., planning, central control and agrarian reform) in ways specified by the strategy. There have been three such strategies since the revolution. The first strategy was in effect from 1959-63, the second from 1964-70, and now, the third from 1971 to the present.
1) 1959-63 The First Developmental Strategy; End of The Monoculture
The first developmental strategy of the new post-revolutionary leadership was to eradicate the traditional economic evils resulting from the sugar monoculture. Agricultural production was to be diversified so that less sugar and more of other types of crops (vege tables, fruit, meat, tobacco and coffee) were to be produced. This did not mean that sugar production was to be altogether stopped. 33
Sugar production was to be lessened in favor of a more diversified
and balanced agricultural output, In addition there was to be a massive effort to industrialize the Cuban economy. The strategy was
aimed at reducing the reliance on one export item— sugar— and the
simultaneous development of domestic production of needed manufactured
goods and food stuffs and thus the end of the importing of such goods
from foreign economies. Thus, in this respect the strategy revolved
around the first two general agricultural goals of the regime: attain ment of diversified agricultural production and an end to foreign economic domination.37
In addition to the crop diversification efforts in agriculture
during this period there was also considerable institutional restruc
turing occurring. The restructuring was initially due to the desire
for reform, and as we Bhall see in Chapter III a desire for rural political support. Also by 1961 it was the result of the adoption of socialism. The agrarian reform resulted in the confiscation of private land which was then given to the squatter, and to the small subsistence farmer who owned or rented his own land but wanted more.
Large state farms were also created on the former estates of wealthy . .
Cuban and U.S. interests which were nationalized in 1960. By the end of 1963 approximately 70% of the tillable land in Cuba had passed over to state control. Most of the 30% which remained was owned by small farmers. Thus, during the first srategy large private estates in general and foreign ownership in particular had been done away with. The newly created state agricultural bureaucracy (INRA) and 34 planning agency (JUCEPLAN) became the tools through which the state determined and monitored the productive activities of both large state farms and small farms alike. Thus, to a large extent private ownership and the market place were ended as Cuban agriculture moved toward a socialist solution to its problem. Needless to say, U.S. economic domination also ended.
The regime also made, substantial efforts at improving the living conditions of the rural labor force during the first strategy. Un employment lessened considerably as the diversification programs on newly created state farms began to require new sources of labor. The improvement of social services in the fields of education, medicine, and agricultural support facilities not only improved the quality of life of the agricultural labor force, but the Implementing of such services also provided further employment opportunities.^ Of course, the agrarian reform program which gave land to tens of thousands of families also helped greatly in putting the unemployed and underemployed to work. According to Mesa Lago, by 1962 overt unemployment had been eradicated in rural Cuba.^®
Thus, the first agricultural development strategy was to achieve all four of the general agricultural development goals of the leadership. Agricultural production was diversified at the expense of sugar, U.S. domination was ended, full employment was brought about and the social services were vastly improved in rural
Cuba. 35
One additional major factor in Cubas economic situation changed during the first strategy. Increasingly difficult relations with the
U.S. resulted in the suspension of the sugar quota and ultimately the trade embargo. As a result of this and the turn toward socialism by
1961, Cuba's foreign trade increased substantially with communist nations. In 1960, the USSR agreed to buy one million tons a year through 1965 and China agreed to buy one-half million tons a year over the same period. Cubas' trade with the communist bloc (in particular the USSR) continued to rise dramatically and from a miniscule 2% volume in 1959 it had risen to 82% by 1962.^1 thus, in addition to the far reaching domestic changes during the 1959-63 per iod, Cuba's external trade relations had also changed substantially.
The first strategy was only partly successful. The Improvement
In employment and rural social services were substantial and much to the credit of the new regime. However, the economic situation was very bad by 1963. In fact, Cuba was virtually bankrupt, and she had amassed large trade deficits with her new socialist trading partners.^2
The problem was that Cuba was buying substantial qualities of expen sive equipment from abroad for industrialization and her capacity to pay hard currency in the international market place had dwindled.
The de-emphaBis on sugar had resulted in much lower sugar production, and sugar was the traditional earner of money for Cuba- According to official Cuban estimates, due to crop diversification, the amount of land cultivated for sugar cane was reduced by 25% from 1958 to 1963.43 Sugar production fell from the peak of 6.7 million tons in
1961 to 3.8 million tons by 1963.44 The production of vegetables, fruits and meats during this four year period fluctuated substantially within vegetable categories (See Table 6.1 in Chapter VI for detailed production figures of non-sugar agriculture) and so it is difficult to precisely characterize production in across-the-board terms for the 1959-63 period. However, given the vast turnover of former sugar cane land to crop diversification programs, and the fact that the production of vegetables, fruits and meats did not appreciably rise during this period and in many cases declined, it seems accurate to say that crop diversification, in production terms, was a failure. The so-called industrial crops of tobacco and coffee also did not appreciably rise by the end of the period. (Again see Table
6.1, Chapter VI for yearly production figures.) Thus total Cuban agricultural exports were much lower. In essence, the declining sugar crop was not replaced by other exportable products. An interesting statistic which underscores the argument here is that even though sugar production declined substantially during the first strategy it never fell below 80% of the toal amount of Cuban exports. In 1963, when sugar productions reached its low point, sugar still accounted for 87% of Cubas exports. Other agricultural goods were not to hove been the only items which were to replace sugar in the export picture.
The industrialization program was also to provide some export products.
However, in relation to the cost of importing machinery and the 37
resources needed to industrialize, the industrial exports did not
pay for themselves nor fill the gap left by declining sugar pro
duction. It was in this respect that the first strategy was not
successful and consequently a change in strategy was necessary by
1963.
One additional problem should be noted here. The increased
employment meant increased demand for all types of consumer items
and foodstuffs in particular. The failure of the diversification program in agriculture meant that supplies did not expand as demand expanded. By the end of 1962 rationing on virtually all consumer
goods was imposed by the new regime to insure on equitable sharing of what was available.
2) 1964-70 The Second Strategy; The Return to SuRar
The second developmental strategy for Cuban agriculture was directly the result of the economic situation which had developed during the first strategy. Cuba could not afford to buy her way to national development under the first strategy. Therefore it was decided to emphasize her favorable conditions and experience in producing sugar. The sugar sector was to be expanded and efforts at broad scale agricultural diversification were deemphasized. Uithin
the socialist bloc Cuba was to specialize in sugar as her part in the international socialist division of labor, and in return to USSR and other bloc countries would provide manufactured goods.From the 38 domestic perspective it was felt that an increase in sugar production and exportation would improve the balance of payments deficit. This,
in turn, would allow the step-up of manufactured imports to improve
the agricultural system and achieve even better production. Additional objectives in agriculture were the improvement of mechanization, parti
cularly for the sugar harvest, and the development of a fertilizer industry. Other programs'of development in agriculture was improve ment of the cattle industry in order to improve domestic supplies of beef and milk as well as export products. There was also to be production for export of coffee, tobacco and citrus fruits, and an
Improvement in domestic levels of vegetables and poultry products.
The plans for rapid large scale Industrial development were shelved until the future when it was hoped that a vastly more productive agriculture could better afford to subsidize such a program.^
The second agricultural development strategy was, therefore, a repudiation of the goal of agricultural diversification. Employment and better social services which had been stressed under the first strategy continued to be important tasks for the Castro regime.47
The structural transformation in agriculture, which had been so predominant as the nation moved toward socialism under the first strategy, was largely completed by the time the new strategy was implemented in 1964. Thus, the second strategy was not marked by the sweeping and potentially chaotic changes that characterized the
1959-63 period. 39
The goal for sugar output was to rapidly increase production from the low of 3.8 million tons in 1963 to a massive harvest of
10 million tons by 1970. The Soviet Union had promised to buy increasing amounts of sugar from 1965 to 1970 (five million tonB a year during 1968-70)- at a price that was superior to the market price. It was a strategy in which Cuba was clearly dependent on the other bloc countries and particularly the USSR.^8
Thus, the second strategy seemed not only to be a repudiation of the goal of agricultural diversification, but also of the goal of ending foreign domination through the medium of sugar. A basic assumption of the Cuban leadership, as Mesa Lago has pointed out, must have been that the USSR and other bloc nations would not take advantage of the situation to force more difficult terms of trade ' upon her.^ Irrespective of this assumption, the dependency on one * product and upon one primary foreign market had returned.
The second strategy was largely unsuccessful in the sugar sector and considerable disruption occurred in the rest of the economy.
The planned yearly goals for sugar production for the period were only met in 1965. According to Meas Lago, the accumulated production for the 1965-70 period was 25% below the planned output. The 1970 harvest which was to achieve the goal of 10 million tons only produced
8.5 million tons. The accumulated deficit of sugar owed to the
Soviet Union alone for the period was over 10 million tons.50 40
In addition to the failure to achieve the yearly plans in sugar there were problems in other sectors of the economy which were the result of the massive effort in the sugar sector. Resources and manpower were drained from other sectors into sugar to achieve the substantial production goals. As a result the other sectors of agriculture, such as beef, milk, vegetables, and poultry were under fulfilled. The same situation was also largely true for the small, industrial sector of the economy. 1970, in particular, was a poor year in non-sugar sectors because of the amount of labor and resources that were drafted away from other sectors to try to attain the 10 million ton harvest.The rationing of consumer goods, including foodstuff8, continued throughout the 1964-70 period. The availability of such goods, in fact, worsened during the period of the second strategy.52
There were some bright spots in an otherwise unsuccessful strategy.
There was substantial improvement in some of the key support sectors of agriculture by 1970. The efforts to mechanize through importing had met with some success, and fertilizer production, irrigation capacity and amount of cultivated land also I m p r o v e d . 53 These improvements were a hopeful sign for the future.^ Nonetheless, the
1964-70 strategy had largely proven Incapable of meeting its objectives. Agricultural production in general had not improved and the accumulated balance of payments deficit had increased from some what lesB than 1 billion dollars in 1963 to an estimated 2 to 3 billion by 1969, and most of that was owed to the USSR.**'* Thus, 41
from the overall perspective, the economic situation had not
Improved, but had become worse in most respects. Because of this a
third strategy was adopted.
3) 1971-Present. The Third Strategy: Realism and Balance
The third, and present, developmental strategy for agriculture
in Cuba seems to best be described by the terms "realism" and
"balance". The strategy essentially is one which maintains the primacy of sugar, and agricultural development, in general, over non-agriculturally related heavy and light industry development.
What seems to havechanged is that lower and thus more realistic pro duction goals for sugar have been planned so that efforts to improve
the infrastructure and other sectors of the economy are not disrupted
in a yearly massive mobilization of resources and energies to bring in large sugar harvests. Thus, other sectors of agriculture and
the economy may continue to develop in a more balanced production effort. In effect, the third strategy (with respect to the second strategy) seems to be more of the same, only less* The strategy is thus based on the idea that slower, but steady and balanced growth is more effective than rapid and unbalanced growth.^6
In the 1970's Cuba is at least as dependent on the USSR as she was during the second strategy, and probably more so. The USSR is still the major recipient of sugar and the single most important source of Cuban imports. The most recent statistics available indicate that in 1972 60% of Cuban trade was with the USSR. In 42 addition, in 1972, Cuba became more formally integrated with the socialist bloc by becoming a member of COMECON, the East European economic union.
What is not entirely clear during the present strategy is how
Cuba plans to deal with an every increasing balance of payments deficit. By 1972 the cumulative sugar deficit owed to the USSR had risen to 20 million tons. • (As indicated above it was only 10 million tons in 1969). Clearly, lagging sugar production could not immediately help the problem. One estimate indicates that the total Cuban trade deficit by 1972 had risen to 4 billion dollars.^
Long term loans from the Soviet Union were announced by the Cuban government in 1973, and presumably these loans will cover at least some portion of current Soviet aid which, in the form of equipment and experts, should help Cuba to become more productive and thus able to pay off the loans at much later dates.What seems to be happening is that the Soviet Union is underwriting Cuban development until such time as Cuba is better able to manage her agricultural production. Cuba, meantime, is very dependent on the Soviet Union. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER I
Archibald Ritter, The Economic Tranaformation of Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Praeger, 1974); Andres Bianchi, "Agriduture: The Pre-Revolutionary Background", Cuba The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), edited by Dudley Seers; Cartnelo Mesa Lago, "Economic Policies and Growth," Revolutionary Change In Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press,, 1971), edited by Carmelo Mesa Lago; Sergio Roca and Roberto Hernandez, "Structural Economic Problems", Cuba, Castro and Revolution (Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1972) edited by Jaime Suchlicki; James O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism In Cuba (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1970).
^O'Connor, op. cit., p. 12.
■^Ritter, op. cit., p. 10.
^Rene Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Development (New York: Grove Press, 1970), pp. 1-3.
^Ritter, op. cit., pp. 10-12.
6Ibid., pp. 12-27.
7Ibid., p. 351
O O'Connor, op. cit., p. 15.
^Ritter, op. cit., p. 351.
*®MeBa Lago, op. cit., p. 278.
H -Ibid.; Ritter, op. cit., p. 43.
12ibid.
l^Ritter, pp. cit., p. 30.
l^Mesa Lago, op, cit., p. 279.
43 44
op. cit., p. 32.
^■^For greater detail on pre-revolutionary, rural Cuban life aee Kelson Valdes, "The Radical Transformation of Cuban Education," and Ricardo Leyva, "Health and Revolution In Cuba", in Cuba In Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1972), edited by R. Bonachea and N. Valdes.
l^Ritter, op. cit., p. 18; O'Connor, op. cit., p. 13.
18b . C. Swerling, "Domestic Control of An Export Industry: Cuban Sugar," Journal of Farm Economies. August, 1951, cited by Ritter, op. cit., p. 18.
19Ibid., pp. 43-44.
^OMesa Lago, op. cit., p. 278.
^Seers, op. cit., p. 20.
22Fidel Castro, Speech To United Nations, September 26, 1960, Fidel Castro Speaks (New York: Grove Press, 1969), edited by Martin Kenner and James Petras, pp. 6-7.
23Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, With Fidel (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1975), p. 188.
2^Fidel Castro, "History Will Absolve Me", Revolutionary Struggle (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1972), edited by R. Bonachea and N. Valdes, pp. 182-190.
25ibid.. pp. 183-184.
26"program Manifesto Of the 26th Of July Movement", Cuba In Revolution, op. cit., pp. 113-140.
2?For an example see Castro's U.N. speech cited in footnote 22 above.
28Ritter, op. cit., pp. 129-131.
29Ibid., pp. 64-70.
^Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement", op. cit., p. 129.
31Castro, "History Will Absolve Me." op. cit., p. 190. 45
32Ibid., p. 189.
33Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Montly Review Press, 1968), pp. 39 and 44.
3^Castro, "History Will Absolve Me." op. cit., pp. 184-185 and 187.
^O'Connor, op. cit., p, 90.
-*®Castro, Speech At the United Nations, op. cit., p. 11
3^Mesa Lago, op. cit., pp. 281-297; Roca and Hernandez, op. cit., pp. 70-77. 38 Michel Gutelman, "The Socialization of the Means of Production In Cuba," Cuba In Revolution, op. cit., pp. 238-260.
3^Roca and Hernandez, oj> cit., pp. 74-77.
^®Mesa Lago, op. cit., pp. 284.
^Roca and Hernandez, op. cit.,'pp. 70-71, and 73.
^2Ibid.. pp. 73-74.
^3Mesa Lago, op. cit., p. 283.
^See Table 6.1.
^3Roca and Hernandez, op. cit., p. 77; Mesa Lago, op. cit., pp. 297-301; Ritter, op. cit., pp. 165-171.
^Mesa Lago, op. cit., pp. 298-299.
^Better education, health, housing, etc., were themes which were consistantly stressed during this period in the speeches of the leader ship, and in the pages of Granina Weekly Review.
^Ritter, op. cit., pp. 209-217.
^Mesa Lago, op. cit., p. 299,
50Ibid., p. 303.
51Ibid., pp. 309-316. 46
52Ibld.
53lbid.. pp. 303-316,
^Ritter, op. cit., p. 198.
-’"’Mesa Lago, op. cit.. pp, 317-320.
^For a more thorough appraisal of the third growth strategy see Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba In the 1970*8 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), pp. 25-28, and especially Chapter II.
5?Ibid.» p. 18.
^Granma Weekly Review, January 14, 1973, pp. 2-3. CHAPTER TWO
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL INSTITUTIONS: THE COMMAND PRODUCTION MODEL
An analysis and evaluation of the suitability of Soviet agricultufal Institutions by less developed nations such as Cuba will be greatly facilitated if a model of the Soviet agricultural system and its institutions can be specified. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to outline a model of the Soviet agricultural system which Includes its major institutional components and pro cedures. Before discussing the model, however, a brief discussion of the tf*rm "model" is appropriate.
Here "model" refers to the most salient features of a given subject in study. The model serves to define, through an abstracted configuration of the essential aspects of reality, what that reality is like. In this case, we are interested in the most salient ele ments of the Soviet agricultural system. Therefore, the elements that make up our model should be those which most reflect the essential (defining) qualities of Soviet agriculture. As used here, then, the term model means a set of characteristics found in reality which when taken together form a more or less accurate and simplified representation of the reality that we wish to study.^
47 48
Models may also serve a second function in research. They are often used as heuristic devices, or guides, that help us to fecus our research and form our questions in study areas where scant information is available. Models also help in the organization of knowledge derived from using the model as a research guide. As one scholar has pointed out, models, when used to guide initial research are aids in the "discovery of information."^
The model of Soviet agriclture which is to be outlined here should serve both functions mentioned above, In the case of Soviet agriculture we belive the model is an accurate reduction of that reality to a manageable size. The model, therefore, allows us to discuss the features of the system parsimoniously yet thoroughly.
In the case of Cuban agriculture where certain features of the model have been clearly implemented and yet where little systematic study of the whole system is available, the model will serve as a guide for our inquiry and a framework around which information can be organized.
The Evolution of the Soviet Agricultural System
In 1917 when the Bolsheviks assumed power in Russia in the wake of the collapse of the tsarist autocracy and the ineptness of the liberal democratic regime, they found themselves in control of a nation that was overwhelmingly populated by peasants and primarily agricultural in its economy. It was to be over a decade, during which a savage and disruptive civil war was fought and 49 the communist party itself was beset internally with titanic policy and leadership struggles, before the outlines of the current agri cultural system was implemented.
In 1929 Stalin had successfully consolidated his position of leadership within the party, and he moved to enact a fundamental alteration ofthe peasant agricultural system that had evolved after the revolution of 1917. The cornerstone of the new agricultural system was the formation of large collective farms that were the result of nationalizing and uniting the dwar£ plots of the peasants.
The fate of the small, private farmer was virtually sealed by the policy. The peasants were Initially coaxed but often finally forced to become members of the large collectives that were being formed.
As the work of many scholars has indicated, it was a short but extremely violent struggle between regime and peasant, with the regime victor ious by the end of the decade of thd 1930's. Moshe Lewin's recent reexamination of the era of collectivization indicates that the ini tial pace of collectivization was envisioned by the Soviet hierarchy as one of gradual transformation from private to a collective economy that would take several years and would be essentially voluntary on 3 the part of the peasant. However, underlying mistrust of the peasants and private agriculture, presumably on the part of Stalin, led to a substantial increase in the pace of collectivization by the end of
1929. In 1929 there were 57,000 collective farms which included only
3.935 of the peasant housholds. In 1931 there were 211,000 collective farms which included 52.7X of the peasant housholds. And by 1938, 50 when the collectivization drive was coming to an end, there were
242,000 collective farms that included 93.5% of Russian peasant households.^
The reasons underlying this massive alteration of Russian
agriculture can be only partially justified with regard to agri
culture itself. A major goal of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) from the very beginning was the development of a modern industrial society. Such a goal was predicated partly
upon the need to be able to produce the sophisticated weaponry necessary to defend the "heartland" of the first communist revolu
tion. Just as important in the long run, howevers, was the fact that
the future realization of a communist society in the Soviet Union required an advanced industrial economy as the basis for such a society. The pace of the Industrialization process, of course, can be gradual, but in the Soviet instance the decision was made
to rapidly Industrialize and reap the benefits Booner, rather than later. The rapid development of a modem industrial economy re quires great amounts of capital and resources which are readily available to finance growth and the accumulation of productive knowledge and machinery. One source of capital available for invest ment in developing nations has historically been loans or invest ments from abroad. But because of the socialist ideology of the
Soviet regime neither loans or investments in sufficient quantities were available. Therefore, if rapid growth was to occur it would have to be financed by readily exploitable domestic resources and 51 capital could be taken from agriculture. Thus from agriculture was to come a surplus which was to be sold abroad in order *-o gain the foreign exchange necessary to finance the purchase and importa tion of industrial machinery and technology, and managerial expertise. Also, proper manipulation and control of the terms of trade between the regime and the agricultural sector would allow the regime to create what might be called forced savings that would be in the hands of the regime where it became investable domestic capital. It could thus be used to further the industrialization effort. Finally, from agriculture must come enough food to feed the expanding cities and growing urban work force that accompanied the growth of industry.^
The problem was that agricultural production was barely feeding the nation by the latter 1920's. It did not provide an easily controlable surplus that the regime could use for its own ends.
Thus the plan to collectivize the peasants was implemented to allow grater regime control of what the peasants did produce. Stalin undoubtedly hoped, also, that collectivization, which would facilitate mechanized farming, would lead to greater productivity, or what economists would refer to as the "economy of scale." In the writings of Marx there is support for the idea that large production units would produce more efficiently than smaller ones.6 However, as Jerzy Karcz and Arthur and Jan Adams point out, the primary goal of collectivization was regime control of what was produced, rather than increased production.^ A second need that was to be satisfied by collectivization
and which was only partly related to the proposed achievement of
rapid industrial growth, (it was more important for reasons of
political stability) was the need for closer control over the rural
population. The CPSU was essentially an urban party prior to the
revolution and therefore its support from the beginning was weak
in the countryside. Furthermore, hostile relations with the peasantry
had resulted from the policy of forced requisition of food for the
cities during the civil war period. In 1928 there were some 25 mil
lion peasant households that contained approximately 82% of the
Soviet populationspread out across the immense expanse of Russia.8
Collectivization would allow closer surveillance and the "proper" socialist education of future generations of rural Russians, who were so independent and geographically spread out as to be perceived by the CPSU as a potential threat to regime stability of an alter native to communist leadership arose. Thus collectivization would allow not only regime control of agricultural produce, but also greater political control of the rural producer. In addition the economies of scale and mechanization made possible by the existence of large collective farms would, it was felt by the leadership, generate a surplus supply of laborers that could be siphoned off into the cities where industrial growth would require their services.
Collectivization of the peasantry was clearly a radical restructuring of rural Russia by the communist political elite, and as such it constituted what some have termed a "revolution 53
from above". Whether or not it is properly described as a revolu
tion is an arguable proposition, but whatever we choose to call
it, it was certainly carried out from above and over the violent
protestations of many at the local level. The impetus, the methods,
and the goals of collectivization resulted in a very hierarchical
agricultural system, with the local level essentially at the
disposal of the policy makers in Moscow. For these reasons, from
the very beginning of collectivized Soviet agriculture, it is
accurate to talk about a "command" farming system. It is true, as
Karcz has pointed out, that the system was never a pure command
system in which conscious planning, exchange and quotas entirely
replaced local initiative, the market and labor incentives.9 It
is a system that has always combined some elements of the free
market economy with the command economy, but in its basic functioning
it is predominantly a command system and is not accuartely described
as such. The central features of this system can be abstracted
from Soviet reality and combined to form a conceptual framework,
or what was referred to above as the command model of Soviet
agriculture.
The Elements Of The Command Model
There are a multitude of features that could be included in a model of Soviet agriculture. The purpose of the model, however,
is to draw our attention to the most significant features of Soviet
agriculture that mark it as a unique command configuration with a special character of its own. Therefore, the model we shall be 54
using serves the purpose of illuminating the command elements and diverting our attention from extraneous features that are not useful
to the study. Thus, the model should draw our attention toward the
« organizational, the procedural and the political elements of the
system, and away from such things as for example, soil and climatic
conditions. The latter, of course, are largely beyond the control of men and societies and serve only to set rather general limits on what human endeavor may hope to accomplish, and here we are only
Interested in the human contributions to Soviet agriculture, for
that is what is transferable to other nationas, not natural conditions.
Jerry Karcz has already developed a complex and quantifiable command model of Soviet agriculture.^ But Karcz's model was designed to facilitate understanding of the actual production process and therefore it contains several variables that are not useful here. Arthur Adams has, however, taken Karcz's model and reduced it in size and simplified it to three elements. Adams then utilized his version of the command model to compare the agricultural system of the USSR and four East European communist agricultural systems. The result is a brief but illuminating study which analyzes the degree to which the EaBt European regimes and cultures have brought changes in the model after it was imposed upon them by the Soviet Union in the Stalin era.^ Adams' model provides a starting place for the discussion of the model to be used here. 55
The three categories of Adams' model are (1) production units*
(2) central planning and administrative organization* and (3) the mechanisms and agencies used by the central bureaucracy to control production unit activities. These three aspects of the command model* if altered slightly and supplemented with additional points will give us a fuller picture of Soviet Command agriculture.
The first category of Adams' model, (i.e. the production units) is a good place to start and by itself comprises a basic feature of any type of agricultural system. Thus* the production units of
Soviet agriculture are the first category of the model which is being outlined^ here. From the second category of Adams model we have taken both administration and planning and for our purposes here we are considering each an additional but separate category of our model.12 Thus* the model being used here is based upon the three components of (1) production units* (2) administration* and (3) plan ning. The final category of the Adams model (i.e. mechanism* and agencies of control) for purposes of simplification is not being used here. Having stipulated the categories of the command model it is important to look at substantive development in each of these three areas.
Types of Production Units
Under the policy of forced industrialization which was begun in
1929* the regime leadership felt that collectivization of agriculture was necessary. From these policy decisions and the drastic 56
reorganizaticm of Soviet agriculture that resulted, emerged the
agricultural model that is still largely present today. The
most visible feature of the system Is the actual production units,
or Soviet-style farm. In actuality there are three types of pro
duction units in the Soviet agricultural system, each of which is
significant for the gross agricultural output of the system. In
addition to the collective farms or kolkhozesthat were formed in
1929, is the state farm or sovkhoz, and the small, private garden plot of the individual peasant family. Though in principle all land
in the USSR belongs to the state, and has since a decree to this effect in 1918, we can most easily begin this effort to distinguish among the three types.of production unites on the basis of the
type of land tenure related to each. The state farm is legally owned and operated directly by the state. The land which is tilled by the sovkhoz is legally designated as state property. The collective farm is in theory, legally viewed as an independent producers cooperative. The land of the kolkhoz is occupied rent-
free and worked in common by the members of the collective farm.
The land is thus leased in perpetuity by the state to the collective farmers as a group. The third type of production unit, the private garden plot, is legally given over to the Individual households of the collective and state farm peasantry. Thus the three types of production units, when dlstingulsed by the form of land tenure may be said to constitute a rought type of continuum, with the state owned sovkhoz at one end, the privately owned plot at the opposite 57
end, nad the collectively controlled kolkhoz at the center of the
continuum. ^
It 1b also possible to distinguish the three types of production
units on the basis of how each is formally supposed to make local
decisions. The private plot is controlled by the individual peasant
household to whom the land has been given. The choice of what to
grow, how to cultivate, and how to use the produce (it can be
consumed by the family or sold directly on the open market for
whatever price the peasant can obtain) is largely determined by the
individual peasant family. The state farms, again at the opposite
end of the continuum, are directly administered by the state through
the bureaucracy of the Ministry of Agriculture. There has traditionally
been less possibility for local initiative on the state farms than
on either the collective farm or the private plot. State farms are
to a great extent told what to produce and how, through state
directives. The collective farm, which is a cooperative unit of
producers, elects its own leadership, determines its own rules and
procedures, etc. Thus, the nominal control of the kolkhoz is vested
in its membership, though as we shall discuss later, the reality of who controls the collective farm is different from the formally
defined precedure.^
We can also distinguish between the state farm and the collective
farm on the basis of the situation of the laborers found on each.
The state farm worker is paid a monthly wage based upon the skill level assigned to the special job that is his under the state farm 58 division of labor. He is, therefore, much like his counterparts
in the urban/Industrial labor force. The farm is operated much like
a factory. (It is, in fact, for this reason, and also because it is
state owned, considered to be an ideologically superior .production
unit to the collective farm and private plot.) The peasant worker
on the collective farm, as indicated above, is formally considered
to be a member of the group that controls and holds, in common, the
land fanned by the collective, In addition, unlike the state farm worker, who uses state equipment in his job, the collective farmer
owns in common the equipment and livestock that he uses and raises
in his daily activities. The remuneration received by the collective
farm workers was, until recently under Brezhnev (in 1966), determined
by the collective and based upon work shares derived from the pro
fit of the collective farm. Thus, the collective farmer did not
receive a guaranteed wage rate like his counterpart on the state
farm or the industrial laborer. However, in an effort to improve the quality of life of the peasant, and to achieve greater labor pro ductivity, the kolkhoznik is now paid a guaranteed minimum wage which is comparable to that paid to the state farm worker.^
The total numbers of each type of farm unit and the amount of land controlled by each type has varied since the 1930's. There has been a marked preference by the regime toward state farms over
collective farms, as indicated by the growing numbers of state farms and the diminishing number of collective farms. As indicated earlier, state farms are veiwed by the regime as ideologically superior 59 because they are state-owned rather than privately owned by an
Individual or a cooperative group, and for this reason collective farms are slowly being transformed into state farms. In 1940 there were 4,200 state farms which averaged 12,200 hectares in size.16
(A hectar is equal to about 2.47 acres.) Also in 1940, there were
235,000 collective farms which averaged approximately 400 hectares in size.I? By 1970, there were 14,958 sovkhozy and 33,200 kolkhozy.l®
As Table 2.1 indicates, the amount of land controlled by each type of enterprize has significantly changed from 1940 to 1969.
(Table 2.1 goes about here)
If the 1970 hectarage figures are reported in percentages, the state farms thus occupy 56% of the land, the collective farms control
37.8% of the land, and the combined private plots of peasantry on both the state and collective farms constitutes 1.4% of the agricul tural land.19 The remainder of the tillable land (about 5%) is used by various state research enterprises and experimental stations.
The figures in reported in Table 2.1 also indicate that despite the administrative amalgamation of collective farms into larger units and the coversion of collectives into state, farms, the private plot acreage of the peasants on the collectives has reamined about the same as it was in 1940. There has been a significant increase, how ever, as Table 2.1 indicates in the private plot acreage which has been given to workers on the sovkhoz. 60
Table 2,1 SOVIET PRODUCTION UNITS
State Farms Collective Farms (Sovkhozy) (Kolkhozy)
1940 1969 1940 1969
Total number of farms 4.200(a) 14.310(b) 235.500(a) 34.645(b)
Total Area of Land In Use (in hectares NA 331.400.000(c) NA 206.700.000(c)
Total Area of Private Plot Land (in 800.000 3.200.000 4,500.000 4,600,000 hectares) (d) (c) (d) (c)
Sources:
a) Roy Laird, "Prospects for Soviet Agriclutre," Problems of Communism, September/October, 1971.
b) Arthur Adams, "The Soviet Agricultural Model In Eastern Europe." East Europe Quarterly, January, 1975.
c) Leslie Symons, Russian Agriculture (London; Bell, 1972).
d) Erich Strauss, Soviet Agriculture in Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1969). 61
Planning The presence of a high degree of central planning in the Soviet economy, and In agriculture in particular, is an outgrowth of several divergent aspects of Soviet economic development. The marxist ideological basis of the regime has, from the very beginning, mili tated against the existence of a free market system. The free market is the basic mechanism of capitalism that encourages profiteering and exploitation. In Soviet economic theory, the anarchy of the free market and the capitalist concern with individual profit maximization is replaced with central planning with its conscious, rational and balanced approach to national economic development that is in the interests of the whole society.20
In addition to the ideological basis of central planning, the effort to bring about rapid industrialization in 1928 created the need for central planning. Rapid industrialization required overall system coordination of the growth of various interdependent sectors.
Lack of such overall coordination could have meant that production failures and inadequate resources in some areas of the economy would have held up production in other dependent areas. (Such fail ures, in fact, do occur in the Soviet economy. However, central planning attempts to keep such occurances at a minimum.) Thus, a central plan which provided specific production goals and guaranteed the resources input needed to meet quotas was necessary if bottle necks were to be kept to a minimum and rapid growth maintained. In the area of agriculture, because of its Importance as the provider 62 of resources which would support rapid growth in other sectors, the presence of central planning was particularly inevitable. Live stock and crop produce was needed in calculated quantities which were dictated by planning.
The necessity of planning in agriculture was also made evident by the unpopular nature of the collectivization process. In essence, collectivized agriculture was an illegitimate system that had been imposed upon the Russian peasants, and without the presence of production quotas and other forms of production control that emanated from the planning process, it is uncertain what level of production would have been achieved. Certainly it would have been low. As one scholar points out, the regime felt the need to counteract the still present influence of the tradational private enterprise ethic, and planning was one way of doing it. 21
Since the inception of central planning in the late 1920's there have been a series of nine specific central plans that have each been five years in length, with the exception of the third which was interrupted by World War II and the sixth which was replaced by Khrushchev with the one (and only) seven year plan. With
Khrushchev's fall in 1964, the Brezhnev regime enacted the eighth central plan, which was of five years duration (1966-70). The ninth plan (1971-75) has recently been replaced by the tenth five year plan that will cover the 1976-80 p e r i o d . 22
The five year plans have been broad statements of regime economic goals. The plan specifies the aggregate amount of production for the entire economy for each of the years of the 63 plan (and thereby the percentage of production Improvement), the type and amount of Investment to be made In the various sectors, such as agriculture, and a myriad of other activities necessary for the system to function. In addition to breaking down production plans into yearly endeavors and levels of improvement, the five year plan also Includes within each of the yearly subplans a set of plans usually broken down into monthly plans.23
In order to understand the actual planning process for agri culture, it is useful to have some understanding of the structure of the Soviet agricultural bureaucracy. With the exception of much of the Khrushchev era (1957-64, in particular) when a variety of institutional arrangements were tried in an effort to improve production, the Ministry of Agriculture has been the top governmental agency which has been responsible for agriculture. The Ministry of
Agriculture is, like other ministers, a member of the USSR Council of Ministers which is the highest governmental (as opposed to party) organ. Below the top offices of the Ministry of Agriculture are a variety of intermediate agencies and republic, oblast, and local ministry offices which carry out orders from above in the process of coordinating and directing the activities of the farm uints. Most importantly, and directly involved in the processes of implementing orders and gathering information are the oblast (regional) level and raion (local) level officers of the Ministry of Agriculture.
(See Figure 2.1).
(Figure 2.1 goes about here) USSR Council of Ministers
GOSPLAN
Ministry of Agriculture
Republic Ministry of Agriculture
Intermediate Agencies
Oblast Ministry Office Local Ministry Office
[ Productive Units
Figure 2.1 SOVIET MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE 65
In addition to this vast ministerial bureaucracy (outlined in Figure 2.1) is the State Planning Commission or "gosplan", which is the central planning agency for the entire Soviet economy.
Gosplan is directly responsible to the USSR Council of Ministers and works with thevarious Individual ministries in the formulation of the five year plan. The planning responsibilities of gosplan are tremendous, given the centralized and complex nature of the
Soviet economy, therefore its authority in coordinating the overall plan are second only to the broad directives issued by the top governmental and party leadership.
The role of the party in the planning process can not be ignored.
As in all areas of endeavor at all levels of Soviet society, the party has the final responsibility for insuring success. At the top level, the past two General Secretaries, Khrushchev (Khrushchev's actual title was First Secretary) and Brezhnev, have both been active in the initiation of changes in efforts to improve the level of agricultural production. In this effort, both have been heavily involved in the planning process by virtue of the fact that each has raised the level of state investments to agriculture, and each has set increasingly higher goals for agricultural pro duction. Each, in his own manner and style, has been much concerned with the problems of Soviet agriculture and in the planning process that directs agricultural production.
Within the top party apparatus, in the secretariat, there is a Bureau of Agricultural Affairs. It is the responsibility of this 66 bureau to nxmitor agricultural affairs for the party. The bureau, therefore, maintains an oversight function vis-a-vis the work of
Gosplan and the Ministry of Agriculture during the planning process.
The current head of the bureau is F. D. Kulakov. Kulakov is also a full member of the Politburo and a CPSU Secretary.
At the lower levels of oblast and ralon offices it is the party first secretary at that respective level who is responsible for everything from "production to morals". There is little question that the party is heavily involved in various planning phases at the local levels, as well as the higher levels.^ Thus governmental bureaucrats responsible for agriculture do not operate in a vacuum.
The presence of the party in the planning process must be seen as significant. For this reason, Figure 2.2 is most accurate in representing the organizational structure of planning.
The actual planning process is a complicated affair involving all the levels indicated in Figure 2.2.25 it is often characterized as a process of interlevel bargaining and information gathering.
While it would serve no purpose to repeat the process in detail here, it is likened by some to the yearly budgetary process that occurs In western governmental bureaucracies.26 After quotas have been received tentative plans are drawn up at all levels for their appropriate areas of responsibility and passed upward for approval or disapproval and the inevitable bargaining over allocations and production quotas. A final balancing process occurs under the aegis of Gosplan, and the tentative final plan is submitted for 67
approval of the USSR Council of Ministers where some final haggling
nay occur anong the various ministers before final approval.
(Figure 2.2 goes about here)
The actual planning process for agriculture is less precise
and subject to greater uncertainty than industrial planning because
of the uncertainties of weather and regional differences in climate
and soil conditions. These uncertainties in agricultural production were exacerbated in the early years of planning, during the Stalin
era, by unrealistic production goals handed down by an inflexible
bureaucracy that allowed no planning input from lower levels. It was not until Khrushchev's ascendency in the 1950's that such planning problems were publicly recognized and the efforts was begun to make agricultural planning more realistic. Until the mid-1950's it was the practice of the regime to specify the total production plan for all phases of collective and state farm agriculture,with very little input from lower levels. The central plan not only specified the quota to be sold to the state procure ment agencies, but also the total amount of production above the quota, and the methods to be used during the various production phases. Needless to say, agricultural production plans were often set excessively high and consequently were not met. In 1955 the official planning procedure was changed&o that only the actual quota to be delivered to the state was made specific. In other endeavors, and in how it produced the quota, the farms were given greater Independence. It was clear however that from Khrushchev's own continued criticlms of bureaucratic Interference in farm 68
Politburo
USSR Council of Ministers
CPSU Bureau Gosplan For Ministry o£ Agricultural Agriculture Affairs
Republic Party Republic Organization Ministry of Agriculture Oblast and Local Party Intermediate Organization Agencies
Oblast Ministry Offices Local Ministry Offices
Production Units
Figure 2.2 SOVIET MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE AND PARTY STRUCTURE 69 activities that the Stalinist traditions were not easily .put aside.
Khrushchev himself was by no means free of the sin of tinkering in ‘ agricultural affairs. His various campaigns (such as the corn campaign of the latter 1950's) often were forced upon the production units with disastrous results.
After Khrushchev's fall in 1964, the new leadership of Brezhnev and Kosygin carried further the effort to make agricultural planning a more realistic process. Khrushchev's habit of trying new crops and methods on short notice was abandoned. Also, his penchant for new organizational panaceas to various problems was condemned as disruptive. His successors emphasized a return to a more routinized production and planning process than had been the case under Khrushchev.
The new regime continued to encourage greater local involvement in the planning process in order to temper possible unrealistic goals of planners who were higher up the bureaucratic ladder. It is
Important to stress, however, that the Soviet agricultural system is still highly centralized and accurately described as a command system. Though the production united now have some input into the formation of plans and quotas, the central planners and bureaucrats still make the final decisions and the local level must still depend upon the center for investments and resources that it needs to function.
Administration
In a centralized system of command agriculture, such as that found In the Soviet Union, the management or administrative function 70 is central in insuring the smooth and coordinated operation of the system. The presence of a national plan requires extensive administrative capacity in order to aggregate and disaggregate information and resources, and for the procurement of what has been produced. It is this administrative bureaucracy that we are con cerned with in this section.
As in the case of the planning process, the Ministry of
Agriculture is central in the administration of the agricultural production effort. Afterthe plan for agriculture has been approved by the top leadership, it is the Ministry of Agriculture that is officially responsible for achieving the plan, though as in the case of planning the party is also involved periodically (probably most often at harvest time) in the administration of agriculture at various levels, (see Figure 2.3)
(Figure 2.3 goes about here)
The proper role of the party official is to provide oversight leadership in the area of production efforts and to let the governmental administration handle the actual management and administration of agriculture. However, according to one observer, as harvest time draws near and higher party officials begin to check with lower party officials on plan fulfillment, the local party begins to become directly involved in agricultural administration.
As Robert Millar has Indicated, "...when the chips are down, as raikom officials have always known, errors of ommisslon are likely to be more severely punished than errors of commission."29 Politburo
USSR Council of Ministers CPSU Bureau for Agriculture Gosplan Ministry of Affairs Agriculture
Republic Party Republic Ministry Organization of Agriculture
Oblast and Intermediate Local Party Agencies Organization
Oblast Ministry Offices Local Ministry Offices
Manager
Farm (Exec) Board
General Meeting Production Unit - Brigade
Zveno
FIGURE 2.3 ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, PARTY AND PRODUCTION UNITS. 72
Below Che central ministerial level are the republic oblast and raion level ministry offices. It is through these intermediate levels hat production units are given instructions and input and production problems are dealt with. The actual management of the farm unit lies in the hands of a kolkhoz or sovkhoz manager who Is the top official on the farm. There is a procedural difference on the two types of farms with regard to the process of choosing who the manager will be. On the sovkhoz, the manager is appointed directly by the Ministry of Agriculture On the kolkhoz, however, the manager or "chairman" is nominally elected by his fellow kolkhozniks. In actuality, of course, the local party organization will prepare the nomination of farm mangers in advance, thus, in effect making the decision for the kolknoz.^O
In theory, the highest managerial body on the kolkhoz is a general meeting open to all members of the kolkhoz. It is required to meet four times a year, and it is the body that formally elects the chairman. It also selects his advisory executive board. In reality, the system has traditionally been one where the general meeting simply assents to decisions that have already been made by the party and state hierarchy.
Soviet farm labor forces are substantial in size (both sovkhoz and kolkhoz) and therefore they are normally divided into sub-units called brigades. And, in turn, brigades are made up of sub-unit work gangs called "links" (in Soviet terminology they are called a zveno) which perform the specific tasks of plowing, 73 planting, harvesting, etc., according to a production schedule. There has been periodic discussion of giving the link, or zveno, the total responsibility for a specific area of land within the overall farm unit. Included in such discussions is the idea that zveno member wageB should be tied to the productive success or failure of the land for which the zveno is responsible. Proponents of this change in zveno functioning argue that such an arrangement will help to counter the impersonality of the larger farm and thus recover the
"love of the land" that appears to have been lost during the past decades since forced collectivization. As of the present, however, this change is only an experimental option.32
The Soviet Model of Agriculture
In the above discussion of Soviet agriculture we have identified three institutional areas of the system as basic components of the
Soviet model. These three institutional components are (1) production units, (2) planning and (3) administration. However, to talk about the Soviet agricultural model as being made up of production units, planning and administration is to be too general. After all, there are production units and some degree of planning and administration in virtually all systems of agriculture. Therefore, in order to give the Soviet model its defining and unique character we need to be more specific about the types of production units, planning and administration we are including here as part of the model.
The discussion of the historical evolution of these facets of
Soviet agriculture Illustrates the fact that there have been 74 . institutional changes and procedural variations over time since
the early 1930's when the model was first adopted. Planning, for example, was much less flexible under Stalin than under later leadership. Also, the administrative structure has been through periodic reorganization and the size and predominance of the col- lective farm has changed, both absolutely and relative to the state farm. Nonetheless, despite these variations in Soviet practice, there have been specific consistent features present in each of the three areas of the model. These consistent features provide the specific character of each component of the model. Therefore, we are less concerned, for example, with differences in planning flexibility between the Stalin and post-Stalin eras, and more interested in what characteristics have been present in both periods. Similarly, in the areas of administration and production units there are consistent characteristics that are present and provide the defining character of the model used in this study.
1) State or Cooperatively Owned Production Units. What has remained constant since the 1930's vis-a-vis Soviet production units is the major form of ownership. The largest production units have been the sovkhoz and kolkhoz which control about 95% of the tillable land. The former is owned outright by the state and the latter is cooperatively owned by the farmers who comprise its labor force, In reality both are highly controlled by the state. Thus, irrespective of the effort to transform collectives' into state farms over the years, the defining characteristics of 75
Soviet production units has been the fact that state or cooperative ownership has displaced private ownership, which for the most part is now allowed. The private plot, which is privately owned and cultivated, is highly productive for its size, but it makes up only about 1.4% of the tillable land area.
2) Centralized Administration. The administration of agriculture in the Soviet Union has gone through periods of reorganization, parti cularly under Khrushchev. However, for most of the period since the adoption of the model there has been a single, centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy. It controls the activities of the pro duction units and insures that they operate in conformity with the decisions of the top officials of the Ministry. All agricultural production efforts for the entire gamut of major crops produced are, consequently, the responsibility of this one ministerial bureaucracy.
Also present in Soviet agricultural administration is the communist party. The party monitors the activities of the state administration to insure that it properly carries out the plan. Thus, the Ministry of Agriculture monitors the production units and the party monitors the Ministry.
3) Centralized Planning. The planning process in the Soviet agriculture is under the control of the state planning agency known as GOSPLAN. GOSPLAN is responsible for the fomulation of a single national economic plan that includes all sectors of the economy including agriculture. The agricultural plan itself is an integrated plan for the entire agricultural sector. The plans formulated by 76
GOSPLAN are based upon directives from the top political leader
ship of the party and state. There has recently been more local
involvement in planning but it comes as a reaction to directives
from the top. There is very little room for local planning init
iative.
Thus, the specific character of the Soviet agricultural model
which is being used here is marked by the following components:
1) State or cooperatively owned production units,
2) a centralized administration , and
3) centralized planning.
It is this model which shall be evaluated with regard to its
suitability for adoption by nations such as Cuba.
The Soviet Model In The Cuban Context
In 1961 the Castro regime officially turned to communism. At
that time the decision was made to adopt the institutions of Soviet
agriculture, 33 The three institutional components of the adopted model, as it turns out, were very similar to institutions already
being utilized by the Castro regime. In chapter one, in the second
section which is about regime goals, there was discussion of the three
instrumental goals of agrarian reform, planning and central control
of the agricultural economy. These instrumental goals were to
enable the regime to achieve its general developmental goals such
as crop diversification, etc. Thus, the instrumental goals were
concerned with the development of certain institutional arrangements 77 that: would help serve as tools for the new regime to achieve its purposes. In effect, the instrumental goals led to the growth of institutions which served as the basis of the three institutions discussed above that comprise the command system. The agrarian reform led to the development of state owned production units which in 1961 became the Cuban version of the state farm. Also, in 1961 the national planning advisory board, JUCEPLAN, which was developed in 1960, became the central planning agency that was the Cuban counterpart of GOSPLAN. Finally, INRA, the agency which was created to carry out the agrarian reform in 1959 became, in effect
(though the name was never changed) the Cuban ministry of agriculture.
Therefore, in 1961 when the Castro regime adopted communism and the
Soviet model of agriculture, there was a budding institutional basis already present on which they proceded to construct the new system.
We turn now to the analysis of Cuban agriculture as we try to answer our basic question concerning the suitability of the Soviet model for adoption by underdeveloped notions. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO
^Alan Isaak, Scope and Method of Political Science (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1969), Chapter 8,
2Ibid., p. 150.
^Moshe Lewln, "Collectivization; The Reasons", The Stalin Rev olution (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1972) Second Edition, edited by Robert V. Daniels, p. 79.
^Lazar Volin, A Century of Russina Agriculture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard, 1970), p. 211.
5Ibid., Chapters 9 and 10; Jerzy Karcz, "An Organizational Model of Command Farming", Comparative Economic Systems (Homewood, 111.: Richard Irwin, 1974), edited by Morris Bomstein, pp. 295-298.
®Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International, 1947), Chapter 30.
^Karcz, op. cit., p. 296, Arthur and Jan Adams, Men Versus Systems (New York: Free Press, 1971), p. 8.
®Volin, op. cit., p. 238.
®Karcz, op. cit., pp. 296-297.
10Ibid.
^Arthur E. Adams, "The Soviet Agricultural Model In Eastern Europe," East Europe Quarterly, January, 1985, pp. 462-463,
^Karcz' model (see Karcz, op. cit.) also differentiates between planning and administration functions, as do such Soviet economic scholars as Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York: Praeger, 1968) and Robert Campbell, Soviet Economic Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966).
13[jove, op. cit.. Chapter 1,
14lbid.; Campbell, op. cit., pp, 94-96,
7d 79
l-’Roy Laird, "Prospects For Soviet Agriculture," Problems of Communism, September/October, 1971, pp. 34-35.
l^Erich Strauss, Soviet Agriculture In Perspective (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 106.
^Stephen Osofsky, Soviet Agricultural Policy (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 258.
18Ibid.
^A. Adams, op. cit., p. 462
^^Nicholas Spulber, The Soviet Economy (New York: Norton, 1969) Revised Edition, pp. 9-10.
2lNove, op. cit., p. 99.
22z. M. Fallenbuchl, "How Does the Soviet Economy Function With out a Free Market?", Morris Bornstein and Daniel Fus£eld, The Soviet Economy (Homewood, 111.: Irwin, 1974), Fourth Edition, p. 8.
W. Davies, "Economic Planning in the USSR," Bornstein and Fus£eld, op. cit., p. 21.
^Robert Millar, "Continuity and Change in the Administration of Soviet Agriculture Since Stalin," The Soviet Rural Community (Urbana, 111.: Illinois University Press, 1971), edited by James Millar', pp. 75-77; Nove, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
25see Howard Sherman, The Soviet Economy (Boston: Little Brown, 1969) Chatper 6; Sherman indicates that there are as many as six phases to the yearly planning process.
26See Sherman, ibid., and Davies, op. cit., for a more thorough discussion of the phases of planning. Also the John Hardt and Theodore Frankel article, "The Industrial Managers", in H. Gordon Skilling and Franklin Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princton, N.J.: Princeton, 1971).
27n o v s , op. cit., pp. 99-101. Jerzy Karcz, "From Stalin to Brezhnev: Soviet Agricultural Policy in Historical Perspective," James Millar, op. cit., p. 64-65,
28Nove, Ibid., p, 102. Alec Nove, "Soviet Agriculture Under Brezhnev", Bornstein and Fusfeld, op. cit., pp. 203-207. Osofsky, op. cit.. Chapter 2. 80 29Millar, op. cit,. pp. 75-77.
^Leslie Symons, Russian Afiriculture (London: Bell, 1972) p. 8.
31lbid.
320sofsky, op. cit.. Chapter 8; Roy Laird, ’’New Trends and Old Remedies" Problems of Communism. March/April, 1966, pp. 21-28.
33There was never an official statement to the effect that the Soviet system of agriculture was to be adopted. However, later statements of the Cuban leadership make It clear that the Soviet system was being emulated. For example, see Che Guevara, "On The Cuban Experience", Venceremos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968), edited by John Gerassl, p. 257-266. See also Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968) Chapter 5; and Archibald Ritter, The Economic Development of Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Praeger, 1974) pp. 226-228. CHATTER THREE
CUBAN UNITS OF PRODUCTION: THE TRANSITION FROM TRADITIONAL TO SOCIALIST AGRICULTURE
The adoption of a Soviet-like, socialist agricultural system
in Cuba did not occur immediately as a result of the overthrow of
Batista in 1959* The development of a command agricultural system
in Cuba has evolved through a series of steps that have taken place
over several years. The new post-Batista regime was not even
overtly socialist in orientation until more than two years after
the revolution. The types of units of production which were in
existence in the early years of the Castro regime reflect this
ideological uncertainty. However, as the new regime moved from a basically reformist position toward adoption of the more radical
socio-economic forms required in a socialist society, the nature of Cuban production units changed drastically. Thus, the changes in production units reflected the increasing radicalization of the
Castro government and its movement toward communism. In the dis cussion which follows we shall look at the transition process from
traditional to socialist units of production, then compare Cuban units to the Soviet production units discussed in Chapter One, and finally, evaluate the problems involved in the process of adoption of new production units. 82
Traditional Agricultural Production Units
The nature of traditional agriculture In Cuba, and the type of
production units that were present prior to 1959 is inextricably
related to the most important crop that was produced— -sugar cane.
Sugar cane has been, for approximately two centuries, the crop to which most commercial Cuban agriculture has been devoted. Since the mid-1770's increasing demand for sugar on the world market has
caused more and more of Cuba's agricultural production to be given
over to the growth of sugar cane. In 1958, the last year before
Castro assumed power, sugar amounted to 80.1% of total Cuban exportB.^
Numerous scholars have argued convincingly that the developing sugar monoculture had a substantial impact on the types of production units found in immediately pre-revolutionary Cuban agriculture.^
Until the latter part of the 19th century, most of the sugar was grown on small and middle-size farms which were worked by their owners. However, with the improvement in transportation and refining technology, the mill owners began to purchase large amounts of surrounding land in order to insure a sufficient and inexpensive cane supply. The result was that small and middle farms gave way to large sugar plantations or sugar latifundia. Developing along side of the cane latifundia was an increasingly large group of very small subsistence farms, or roinifundla. There were also increasing numbers of small tenant farmers and squatters. Many of the minifundistas, tenants and squatters were hired seasonally by the 83
largecane latifundia to help during the harvest seasons.3 Thus,
the Impact of sugar cultivation on the nature of production units was to create a system of very large commercial plantations and very small mlnlfundla. Table 3.1 indicates the number and size of
Cuban farms in 1945. Blanchl further indicates that over one third
of the total number of farms were less than 2 hectares (one hectare
equals 2.47 acres).
(Table 3.1 goes about here)
In the two separate decades of the 1870's and the 1890's
(particularly the latter), during which the Cubans fought for and finally gained their independence from Spain, many sugar mills were destroyed. The need to replace expensive equipment which was destroyed by the fight for independence, combined with the increasing expense of more efficient equipment made it necessary and possible for foreign capital to invest in sugar cane production. With the
United States intervention in 1898, and the defeat of Spain, the limitations on foreign capital investment were done away with and increasing foreign capital (particularly U.S. capital) penetrated and controlled much of the sugar production and refining operations.^ '
In 1959, U.S. interests controlled 36 of the total 161 active sugar mills which produced over 37% of the total sugar output.
Thus, on the eve of the revolution, Cuban agricultural pro duction units were characterized primarily by very large estates, and also by small plots often less than five acres in size. Land ownership was concentrated in a small number of hands; and the 84
Table 3.1 CUBAN FARMS BY SIZE GROUPS, 1945
Farms Area
Size Groups (Thousand (Hectares)a (Number) (Per cent) Hectares) (Percent)
0.4 - 24.9 111278 69.6 1021.9 11.2 25.0 - 99.9 35911 22.5 1608.0 17.7 100.0 -499.9 10433 6,5 2193.6 24.1 500.0 -999.9 1442 0.9 992.5 10.9 1000 and over 894 0.5 3261.1 36.1
Totals 159958 100.0 9077.1 100.0
a One hectare equals 2.471 acres.
Source: Cuban Agricultural Census, 1946. Cited by Dudley Seers, Cuba The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 75. 85 bulk of the rural population were usually landless squatters or tenant farmers who were seasonally employed by the large sugar plantations. That the Cuban leadership after the revolution also shared this view was confirmed by Castro in a speech in the early years of the revolution:
In our countryside lat the time of the revolution] two types of production centers existed: the large latifundios and the small farmers... Among the small farmers there were certain distinct characteristics. The small farmer who was the owner of land was the cultivators of coffee and cocoa in the mountains, who, although they did not pay rent, always lived under the threat of eviction. There was also the farmer who paid rent, who, together with te squatters, constituted the great majority.
Castro also shared the view that private U.S. economic interests were very powerful in the Cuban economy, particularly agriculture. The following quote from Castros1 speech to the U.N, General Assembly illustrates this fact:
[After the Cuban War of Independence in 1898] began the new colonization of our country, the acquisition of the best agricultural lands by United States firms, concessions of Cuban natural resources and mines, concessions of public utilities for purposes of exploitation, commercial concessions of all types. These concessions turned... Cuba from a Spanish colony into an American colony.^
Post-Revolutionary Changes ; The First Agrarian Reform
The idea of agrarian reform was central in Castro's program of development from the very beginning of his revolutionary attempts to gain political power. In his trial, after the unsuccessful 1953 attack on the Moncada Barracks, Castro called for an end to the large sugar cane latifundia and a more equitable distribution of land among the small farmers and landless peasants.** In 1956, Castro's 86
"26th of July Movement" Issued the Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement, which Indicated in general terms the necessity of land reform as a prerequisite to a just and humane' society. It also made it clear that foreign domination of the economy was unacceptable, though it did not rule out some degree of foreign investment.^
The earliest specific agrarian reform program issued by Castro was made public in October of 1958 when he was in the final stages of ousting the Batista regime. The 1958 decree was Issued from the
Sierra Maestra and promised "land ownership to the [peasant] tiller," without specifically indicating the fate of the latifundia or private property in general. According to Michel Gutelman, the
1958 decree was meant to bring peasants and small farmers to the side of the revolutionaries without unduly frightening large property owners. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez (current member of the Cuban
Politburo, the secretariat, and after Castro probably the most influential man in the Cuban economy) supports Gutelman on this point:
In preparing this [1958] law Fidel paid special attention to problems of tactical order. By this tlme-September/ October 1958-Batista had to all intents and purposes lost the support of the big latifundists and sugar refiners... Over considerable areas in Oriente, and also in Las Villas province, the owners of sugar refineries began paying taxes to the Rebel Army as the new revolutionary government. Some of the latifundists, sugar planters and cattlemen offered the revolutionary forces material aid in various forms. Under the circumstances it would have been a mistake to introduce an agrarian law which would have dealt a direct blow at the local and foreign latifundists; this would only have made them rally around Batista again and would have disclosed the aim of the revolution to imperialism before 87
power had been won. In a word, the enemy would have been put on his guard.11
Batista fled Cuba in December, 1958, and Castro's revolutionary
regime took power in January of 1959. The first action taken by
the new regime vis-a-vis land ownership was the expropriation of all
the property (Including rural estates) of Batista and his supporters.
However, thiB was insignificant in comparison to latter regime actions. On May 17, 1959, the first official agrarian reform law was Issued by the new government. The general text of the law is
thoroughly discussed elsewhere and it would serve little purpose to spend time on all of its aspects h e r e . What is important here is to discuss the actual impact of the law on the traditional land tenure structure, and to discuss the type of production units created by the new law. As indicated above, pre-revolutionary Cuban agri culture was characterized by large latifundia which were seen as the sources of socio-economic Inequality in the rural areas, and the small subsistance plots or mlnlfundia which contributed little to national marketable production and thereby little to the well-being of those who cultivated such plots. The law was intended to attack both types of production units by reducing the size of the former and increasing the size of the latter. At the same time it called for state assistance to coordinate, support, and make more productive the acti vities carried out on each. The law, which did not attack the concept of private property or foreign owned property (only property size), sought to improve overall production and at the same time the well-being of the mass of rural workers. Thus, the law seems to 88
clearly reflect the initial "reformist" orientation of the
government.
The most Important provision of the law vis-a-vis the latifundia
was its first article which forbade their existence. Owners of
large estates were allowed to keep 30 caballerias of land.l^
(One caballeria is equal to approximately 13.4 hectares or 33.5 acres.
Thusf latifundia owners were allowed to keep 402.6 hectares or
approximately 1000 acres.) Any property that was cultivated by
squatters or tenants was liable to expropriation even if the owner
possessed less land than the 30 caballerias allowed by the law.
According to Jacques Chonchol, a. U.N. advisor in Cuba from 1959
to 1961, to keep productionas high as possible during the unsettled
period of the carrying out of the reform, the law allowed for the
continued Intact existence of those latifundlas whose yearly
production exceeded the national average by 50%. The absolute size
limit for even those exceptions qualifying under this section of the
law, however, was set at 100 caballerias.^
Land in excess of the 30 caballeria limit (or the 100 cab.
limit for the more efficient latifundia) was taken by the state.
The owner was given 20 year bonds which carried an annual interest
rate of 4.5%. The value of the land was based upon the assessed
tax value of the land.15 The land which was expropriated was given
to landless peasants in farms that were not less than 26.8 hectares
in size. The land was also given to those small peasant landowners in sufficient additional amounts so that they would also have not 89 less than 26.8 hectares. The land was given free of charge, and the
26.8 hectares limit was termed the "vital minimum" below which the newly created farms could not be subdivided..16 Thus, the first agrarian reform law shaped the nature of private, individually owned production units so that the largest farms owuld be limited to 402 hectares and the smallest farms not less than 26.8 hectares.
Due to the limited number of recipients who desired their own farms, the small size of the farms that were created, and the massive amount of land that was expropriated, there was an excess of land that was not given out to individuals. The originators of this first agrarian reform law assumed that there were a limited number of individuals who would desire land; and, in addition, the Cuban leader ship wanted to retain the economies of scale that it was believed would result from large size production units. Therefore, the law provided for the establishment of large cooperateive farms on the excess expropriated land. These co-ops would be given to groups of
Individuals and had to be worked as a large farm rather than sub divided into smaller units, as was the case with the Mexican e.lido, or Russian mir under the last czars. There was to be an elected head administrator of the co-op from among the members of the cooperative, as well as a state appointed coordinator who was to work with the elected head of the cooperative in providing and coordinating state s e r v i c e s . 17 The cooperativistas were to be paid a monthly wage that was to ome from the members' shares in the annual profits of the cooperative. By May of 1960, there were 881 such cooperatives. They 90 were primarily devoted to the production of crops rather than live stock and were mostly in the 200-300 hectare size range.Though the Bpirit of the law seems to have viewed the cooperatives as privately owned and operated by the recipient group; in fact* the state administrator often ran the farm.^ it is interesting to note that the new Cuban cooperatives were very much like the Soviet collective farms, and yet there was no official talk of socialism during this time in Cuba, In sum, the first agrarian reform law
(at least in spirit) created two types of privately owned production units. The one type was the Individually owned farm (which ran from 26.8 to 402.6 hectares in size) and the other was the group owned large cooperative farm.
A second type of large farm unit, which was state owned, was also created in 1959. This second type of unit was created when the regime took over the entire operation of most of the large cattle and rice ranches. Many cattle latifundia which were within the acceptable size range as indicated in the May, 1959, law, were also expropriated bringing the legality of the regime actions into question.20 The apparent stimulus for the regime actions vis-a-vis the cattle and rice latifundia was the failure of the original private ownership to operate their estates at maximum efficiency.
These estates were directly operated by the regim through an appointed manager. The labor force was paid a wage and in all likelihood had worked for the previous owner. By May 1960, there were approxi mately 511 of these state administered farms, of which 500 were 91 producers of cattle and the remainder of r i c e . 22 By 1961, there were approximately 900 of these uints of which all but a handful produced cattle.23
A third type of large farm unit was created when the government moved to expropriate the large sugar latifundia during 1960. In
1959, Castro had indicated that cane estates would not be expropriated until after the 1960 harvest. The reason for not moving sooner to take over sugar cane estates was, according to Castro, that the regime lacked the administrative personnel to manage these l ands.2^
Presumably, Castro announced that the sugar estates would not be expropriated until after the 1960 harvest in order to encourage pri vate ownership to maintain production. After expropriation of these lands in 1960 the third type of large production unit was created and these new units were called "cane cooperatives."
The legal basis for expropriating the estates which were con verted into the cane cooperatives was established by two successive laws in 1960. Law 851 was enacted on July 6, I960 and called for the nationalization of all U.S. owned sugar mills and agricultural lands.
On October 13, 1960, Law 890 was passed and it called for the national ization of all large Cuban and non-U.S. foreign owned enterprises.
The cane cooperative was neither a pure cooperative nor a pure regime operated farm. The cane cooperative manager was appointed by the state, but there was also a board of directors that was elected by cane cooperative workers. In addition, the cane cooperative worker received a monthly wage which was supplemented at year's end by farm 92
profits.^ ThuB, by the end of 1960, there were four separate types
of agricultural production units; (1) the individual privately
owned farms that ran in size from 26.8 hectares to 402 hectares,
(2) the agricultural cooperative which were owned in common by groups
of individuals, (3) the state administered farms which were created
from the privately owned cattle and rice latifundia, and (4) the
cane cooperatives which were created from the nationlized Cuban
and foreign owned sugar cane latifundia. To a large extent, the
variety of types of large production units which existed in 1959 and
1960 is reflective of the regimes own lack of clarity about what
type of agrarian reform and revolution it was carrying out. How
ever, in 1961, the regime clearly moved to adopt socialist policies
in both the domestic and International arenas and the agricultural
production units reflect this turn to socialism.
Cuban Adoption of Soviet-Type Production Units
In January, 1961, in response to the changing international
environment and the increasingly radical political and ideological
nature of Cuba's revolutionary regime, organizational changes were brought about in the units of production. The original cooper
atives (i.e. the cooperatives which were owned by groups of private individual^ and the state run cattle and rice estates were reorganized
into a new type of production unit which was called granjas del
pueblo, or literally "peoples farms". The granjas, as the name hints,
represented the conscious adoption of a socialist form of production
unit organization and land tenure. Castro indicated that the granjas were the first official Cuban version of the Soviet state farm or
sovkhoz.^ The granjas in organizational terms were not substantially
different from the original state administered farms. What the
name change really seems to reflect is the solidification and
clarification in regime intent and ideology. ^ The establishment
of the granjas and the eradication of the original cooperatives
also reflected the need to bring some organizational permanence and
efficiency to a crucial sector of the economy which was in disarray
because of the thorough nature of the reform which had occurred.
Furthermore, the pressure brought to bear on the Cuban leadership
at this time because of the U.S. trade embargo probably had the ef
fect of making the Cuban government more concerned with centralized
control of their own economy in order to successfully fight the
"colussus of the north" and to insure a supply of food to its own
people. The conversion to a state farm system would facilitate
theregime desire for greater control.^9
The granjas were managed by a state-appointed administrator who was in turn aided by state-appointed assistants who were in charge
of specialized activities on the farm. The workers were paid a
standard factory like wage for a days work (which was unrelated to
farm production) and workers received housing and medical care
free of charge. The land itself, of course, was legally defined as belonging to the state. Thus, the original state-administered
farms and private cooperatives were completely phased out and replaced by this new unit of production. One obvious feature of 94
this new type of unit of production was the extremely large size.
By May of 1961, there were 266 state farms which averaged approximately
9.000 hectares. One particular farm in Oriente Province alone was
47.000 hectares in size."*®
In addition to the creation of the granjas del pueblo, the new
regime organized the small, independent private farms into the
Associacion Nacional de Agricultores Pequenos, or National Associa
tion of Small Farmers (ANAP). ANAP was formally organized in May,
1961, just two years after the first official agrarian reform was
enacted. Membership was restricted to farmers .owning less than 5
cabs, or 67 hectares of land.31 Since the vital minimum for farm size was 2 cabs, or 26.8 hectares, ANAP members owned no less than
26.8 hectares and no more than 67 hectares. The purpose of ANAP was
to coordinate Bmall farm production with goals set by national leader ship. The principle of voluntary cooperation was stressed, but the capacity of the regime to influence ANAP members was substantial. In essence, the state subsidized the growing of products it deemed most important and it was to the small farmers financial advantage to accede to regime wishes. To those who were members of ANAP the regime made seed, fertilizer, tractors, credit, etc. more readily available at better prices in the effort to coordinate small farm production.32
According to Michel Gutelman the impact of the initial agrarian reform, through its policy of giving land to thosewho wanted it, was to create approximately two-thirds of the small private farmers who were in existence after the revolution**^ It seems probable, since such farmers 95
owed their existence to Castro and his regime, that this would work
to the regime's advantage in influencing small farm production.
The creation of ANAP was an important step by the regime to
further its influence over agricultural production. As Table 3.2
indicates, the public sector controlled 35.1% of the tilled land and
ANAP members controlled 24% of the tilled land. When these two
sectors were combined this meant that the regime had influenced or direct control over nearly 60% of the productive land. Thus giving
substantial control over total agricultural production in 1961.
(Table 3.2 goes about here)
Table 3.2 is also useful because under "sector" column it indicates all of the types of production units that were present in Cuba in
1961, as well as the concentration of the labor force in the different types of farms*
In August, 1962, the position of elected administrator of the cane cooperative was done away with, leaving only the state appointed coordinator to make administrative decisions. The type of wage which was paid (i.e. a wage payment and a share of farm profits) was changed so that it was like the "factory" wage which was paid on the state farm. Thus the state farms and cane cooperatives were administered and wages paid in essentially the same manner. In
1963, the two types of state farms were combined; their old names were dropped; and from that time until the present they have been called "state farms" or granr1as e s t a t a l e s .34 96
Table 3.2 DISTRIBUTION OF LAND AND EMPLOYMENT BY TYPE OF ORGANIZATION, AUGUST 1961
Area Labor Force Number Percent Percent of Hec of of Sector Units tares Total Number Total
Public Sector (Total) 3,534.5 35.1 265,562 63.9
Granjas del Pueblo 260 2,656.7 26.4 96,500 23.2
Cane cooper atives 622 877.8 8.7 169,062 40.7
Private Sector (Total) 95,000 6,534.5 64.9 150,000 36.1
ANAP Members 85,000 2,416.3 24.0 85,000 20.5
Non-ANAP Members 10,000 4,118.2 40.9 65.000 15.6
TOTAL 10,070.0 100.0 415,562 100.0
NOTE: Many small fanners were not ANAP members by mid-1961 and are excluded from these figures.
Sources: D. Seers, ed., Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 129; J. Chonchol, "La Reforma Agraria en Cuba," Panorama Economtco nos. 227-29 (Santiago, Chile, 1962), pp. 45, 102. Cited by Archibald Ritter, The Economic Transformation of Revolutionary Cuba (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 77. 97
The final major change In the structure of agricultural pro duction units was made by what has been called the "Second Agrarian
Reform Law" which was enacted on October 13, 1963. Under this law all privately owned farms that were above five cabs, or 67 hectares in size were confiscated by the government and became part of the state farm complex. Thus, by 1963, with the exception of the small farmer (i.e. between 2 and 5 cabs in size) and some 3000 larger farm units which were especially efficient and productive, privately owned agricultural units had become a thing of the capitalist past.35
After this time, the regime directly controlled approximately 70% of land used for agricultural production.36 If we include the land belonging to ANAP membership, then the Castro regime had direct control, or substantial influence over, approximately 93% of the productive land in use.
With the completion of this phase of production unit restructuring, the regime settled down to the demanding task of making the existing units function as efficiently as possible. There have been some changes made in state farm sizes and in internal functioning, which will be discussed in depth elsewhere. For our purposes, however, the basic nature of Cuban agricultural production units was fixed by
1963. There were two basic production units; the state farm or granjas estatales, and the small, private farm of between 2 and 5 cabs in size.3? Table 3.3 indicates the number of each type as they have existed since 1961.
(Table 3.3 goes about here) Table 3.3 CUBAN PRODUCTION UNITS
1961 1963
Number of State Farm 880 880 (combined cane coops (620 Cane Crops) and granjas In 1961) (260 Granjas)
Number of Small Private 150,000 • 165,000 Farms
Source: Michel Gutelman, "The Socialization of The Means of Pro duction In Cuba," Cuba In Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1972), edited by R. Bonachea nad N. Valdes. 99
A Comparison of Soviet and Cuban Units of Production
In the Soviet agriculture system, as Indicated in greater detail in Chapter One, there are three types o£ production units: the sovkhoz (state farm), the kolkhoz (collective farm), and the private garden plots of both the collective and state farm workers.
In Cuba, as indicated above, there are only two major types of production units: the Rranjas estatales (state farm) and the small private farm. Since the conversion of the original cooperatives in 1961 and the cane cooperatives in 1962 to the status of granjas, the Cuban agricultural system has no production unit which approxi mates the Soviet kolkhoz.38 Mesa Lago argues, with some justifica tion that the small Cuban farms are controlled by the small farm bureaucracy (i.e. ANAP) in much the same manner as the kolkhoz is controlled. However, his statement that "...the private [Cuban] farm has been converted into a sort of Soviet kolkhoz..." seems unnec essarily extreme.39 The smallfarm is, as he points out, individually cultivated (or more likely family cultivated) and that alone is a substantial difference between the Cuban small farm and the Soviet collective. Also certainly significant is the fact that decisions about daily routine, etc., are determined by the farmer and not an administrator. In addition, the small farm is individually owned, and the profit goes to the small farmer while the collective is owned in common by the collective membership and its profit is shared with scores of other kolkhozniks. These amount to sub stantial differences and justify the consideration of the farm 100 and the collective farm as qualitatively different types of produc tion units.
The Cuban small farm shares some similarity with the private garden plot of the Russian peasant. Each is Individually owned and . cultivated and the profit from each goes directly to the tiller.
Both are also highly productive. In the latter 1960's, the Cuban small farm supplied 90% of the coffee and tobacco, 70% of the fruit and vegetables, 46% of the root vegetables, 34% of the grain, 25% of the sugar and 42% of all livestock. These figures had not appreciably changed by 1975. During the same time period in the USSR, the small plot produced 60% of the potatoes, 40% of all vegetables, more than 40% of the meat, 39% of all milk and 68% of the eggs.^O
There are also substantial differences between the small farm and the garden plot. The size differs greatly. The size of the
Russian garden plot has varied but it has never legally exceeded 2 hectares and is usually smaller. The Cuban small farms range from
26.8 to 67 hectares, which is considerably greater in size than the Russian garden plot. Also, in terms of the total national percentage of tillable land controlled by each, we find substantial differences. The small farms of Cuba contain nearly 25% of the tilled land of the nation; while the garden plots include only 1.4% of the tilled land in the USSR. Finally, the Cuban small farmer works his land as his only full time job; while the Russian peasant works on the collective or state farm on a full time basis and works the garden plot in his spare time. 1 01
The only clearly comparable units of production in Russian and Cuban agriculture are the state farms of each system. Each is structurally organized and also functions administratively in a similar fashion. (This is discussed in detail in Chapter IV.)
The state farm in each system also controls more land than any other type of production unit. The sovkhozy, in 1970, controlled 56% of the agricultural land of Russia, while the Cuban granjsB control about 70% of Cuba's agricultural land.
It is clear that the Cubans have not adopted the entire gamut of Soviet production units (we shall return to a discussion of the reasons for this below) and it is Important to point out this variation from the Soviet agricultural model that we find in this regard in Cuba. It is also important, however, to point out that the planned future production unit configuration for each agricultural system is reasonably similar. In both systems, the state farm is considered to be the most advanced type of unit of production.
Each country is thus working actively, albeit slowly, to convert its agricultural land to the care of its state farms. As indicated in Chapter One, the Soviets have traditionally considered the state farm to be an ideologically superior form of production because it Is owned by the state rather than privately by a group or indi vidual. Since the 1930's the number and size of state farmB has steadily increased at the expense of the kolkhozy. The current
Soviet leadership, led by Brezhnev, has publicly committed itself to the maintenance of the kolkhoz along side the sovkhoz and 102 promised to continue its development. The following quote from
Breshnev indicates this position:
It is necessary to assume that these two types of social economies [the Bovkhoz and the kolkhoz] ...will exist and develop for a long time yet. At the contemporary stage our duty consists not in speeding the transformation of one form into the other, but rather in rendering all-around aid to develop and make powerful both types of social economy. ^
However, despite these words, since Krushchew was ousted in 1964, the number of kolkhozy has continued to diminish and the number of sovkhozy has continued to increasethus indicating that the traditional bias continued to have its effect.
In Cuba, the same ideological orientation is present, as the words of Castro indicate:
Even the concept of the cooperative though a form superior to that of small scale land holding, is inferior to the system of socialist ownership of peoples farms [i.e. granjas] which we have now established, because with this system you can utilize the land in an optimum way, absolutely rational, determining at each moment that whatever crop benefits the nation shall be produced.^3
Castro has also indicated, however, that though the land will some day all be organized under the state farm system, that it will occur through an evolutionary process which will occur through an evolu tionary process which will occur slowly and voluntarily. In Castro's words:
It does not matter to us if within twenty years, twenty per cent of the land is privately owned; if within forty years, ninety per cent is nationalized and ten per cent is privately owned. It doesn't matter how long it takes. It will be a completely evolutionary process.
In sum, then, our comparison indicates that Cuba shares the
Soviet long range goal of its total agricultural sector being 103 organized into large* state farm units of production. However* because of substantial differences in other types of production units which are present in each system* the two nations are approaching the same goal from somewhat different positions. So* we have found some similarities and some differences.between pro duction units of these two communist systems. We turn now to a consideration of the problems that Cuba has had in adopting the state farm system* in the course of which we also include a dis cussion of why the Castro regime chose to develop its own alterna tives to the Soviet kolkhoz and private plot.
The Adoption of Hew Units of Production: Problems and Alternatives
The specific choice of the types of units of production in the form of the small farm and the state farm has brought with it numer ous operational problems for the Castro regime. However* many of these problems are related to the actual functioning of the new agricultural system and have only surfaced once the system was fully adopted. These are the types of problems that will be dealt with in the following chapters on administration and planning.
What we are concerned with here* in the most general sense, are the problems generated in the process of transition from the tradi tional Cuban units of production to the new units of production.
It is also necessary to make an additional qualification about the type of problems which we are concerned with in this chapter.
It should be remembered* particularly during the following discussion 104
concerning the Cuban state farms, that the Cuban revolution was not
communist in orientation at the beginning. Thus, we are looking
at a process of change that was not initially guided by the Soviet model. Therefore, we shall be looking at an evolutionary process
in which the final socialist production unit configuration was the
end product but not always the guiding inspiration. As a result,
there are certain problems which were present because of the long,
drawn out transition process to state farms and were caused by the lack of clarity about what type farms should be adopted rather than
the actual character of the final type of production units which were adopted. For example, between 1959 and 1963 there were six different types of large production units which created numerous administrative problems. The problems were real enough for the
Cubans, but were the result of the lack of initial clearity of goals. If the Soviet-like state farm had been the goal from the beginning, these problems would have been non-existent or minimal in importance. To be distinguished from this type of problem are the problems which were present and would have been even if the state farm system had been immediately adopted. It is this latter set of problems in which we are interested.
The overall focus of the present work is centrally concerned with the adoptability of the Soviet model of agriculture. More specifical ly in this chapter we are Interested in the adoptability of Soviet units of production. Since we know from the above discussion that the Cuban state farm is the only unit of production that is directly 105 comparable to a Soviet production unit, we shall look at the prob lems arising out of Cuba's choice to adopt the Soviet-like state farm. Just as significant as the problems arising from the adoption of the state farm, however, are Cuba's reasons for not socializing all property (as is the case with the Soviet model) and its choice to allow private agriculture to the significant extent that we find today. Why does Cuba differ from the USSR on this point? Why did the Cuban communists convert all of the early cooperative farms
(the Cuban version of the Soviet kolkhoz) into state farms? The answers to these questions are as important as knowing the problems that resulted from adopting the state farm because of what such answers-may tell us about the objectionable aspects of adopting all Soviet units of production. Thus the following discussion is concerned not only with the problems of adopting the state farm but also the reasons for the variation from the Soviet model in the production unit category. With the above qualifications and questions firmly in mind, we may proceed to a discussion of Cuba's transition to its new units of production.
A. The General Problem of Agrarian Reform as a Prerequisite Measure in Creating New Units of Production
The adoption of new units of production in Cuba, after the revolution, did not occur in a socio-economic or political vacuum.
The decision to bring about fundamental change in the nature of agriculture sent reverberations throughout the rest of society.
Cuba, like all pre-industrial, underdeveloped countries was 106
essentially an agricultural nation in 1959. In such societies land
ownership has traditionally been an important basiB for social
position, political power and economic livelihood. Therefore, to
tamper with traditional forms of land tenure through agrarian reform
programs is to introduce a profound alteration of the basis of the
traditional society. John Kenneth Galbraith offers a pithy comment
on the impact of agrarian reform:
Unfortunately some of our current discussions of land reform in the underdeveloped countries procedes as though this reform was something that a government proclaims on any fine morning— that it gives land to tenants as it might reform the adminis tration of justice. In fact, a land reform is a revolutionary step; it passes power, property, and status from one group in the community to another. ^
The history of agrarian reform in such culturally diverse nations as Chile and Russia is clear testament to the accuracy of
the perspective. 46 Land reform of any type, whatever end result is envisioned by the reformist regime (and in Cuba's case it seems evident that there was little initial clarity of goals) is a radical step that will engender substantial social and political
tension. Samuel Huntington Indicates a likely specific impact of agrarian reform:
Peasant and landlord...coexist in the traditional society, and the destruction or transformation of their existing social, economic and political relationship (which may be of centuries standing) is the essence of change in the agrarian order... Land reform, consequently, does not mean just an Increase in the economic well-being of the peasant. It involves also a fundamental redistribution of power and status, a reordering of the basic social rela tionships which had previously existed between landlord and peasant.47 107
Thus agrarian reform polarizes the society by pitting peasant
beneficiaries against the threatened landlord. In such a polarized
atmosphere the reformist regime is also likely to feel the impact.
In Cuba the first agrarian reform law was written during the early
months of the new regime. At that time the government leadership
was composed not only of Castro and those close to him, but also
moderate liberals such as Manuel Urrutia (the first President of
- the new Cuban government after the fall of Batista) who did not
envision the type of radical reform program which the Castroites
wanted. When the law was enacted and made public in May 1959, its
impact upon the government, the society and even the international
sphere were felt almost immediately. James O'Connor writes that:
When the law was finally disclosed, a storm broke over the island and the revolution quickly began to polarize... It was the immediate reason for the resignation of many cabi net members, an indirect cause of the purge of the tradi tional labor union leadership, and the first important issue to divide Cuba and the United States. ®
In separate accounts, both Rene Dumont and Michel Gutelman have
written that the law was not radical but on the contrary, rather
"tepid" in comparison with the reform programs of other nations.49
From a comparative perspective, their judgement may be correct, but
nonetheless the reaction was as O'Conner has indicated. Men like
Manuel Urrutia began to resign from the government.50 The agrarian
reform law had divided the new regime and the society and as those
in the government who opposed the law began to resign the Castro
regime also experienced its first major opposition within the society at large over this question. 108
Domestic opposition to agrarian reform within the society at
large surfaced quickly. Only a few days after the law was made
public some 500 landowners demonstrated against it in Pinar del Rio
Province and vowed to die before giving up their property.51 Organ
ized agricultural groups such as the rice growers and cattlemen's
associations made strong public statements against the reform. For
the most part, however, according to Jacques Chonchol, FAO representa
tive in Cuba, the initial opposition remained vocal and did not turn
into violence. The number of landowners who were initially effected
by the law remained low (only about 3000 were effected) and this
certainly had to have some impact on the relatively tranquil process
of expropriation. 52 What is important to point out here is that in
its first agrarian reform action the regime had driven a wedge
between itself and those threatened by the reform. In essence, the desire of the regime to carry out the agrarian reform and establish new units of production (which it saw as an essential part of its
economic developmetn program) clashed with the desire of the large landowners to retain their property. There was no acceptable com promise and as the reform was carried out, it began to cost the new government significant political support of moderates and land owners.
Perhaps the most significant Initial reaction to the agrarian reform by large landowners took place in the economic rather than the political realm. The impact of the law was to bring about a general suspension of long range investment efforts and the attempt to turn rapid and extensive short range profits. After the enactment of the May, X9S9 law the large cattle ranches Increased their slaughter rate of available livestock In order to make short run profits prior to possible expropriation. However, such large ranches also refused to buy young cattle from small and middle size cattle farmers to replenish their depleted mature herds. The small and middle-sized cattleman had no pasture to fatten the cattle and were faced with bankruptcy if a solution was not found for their problem. In addition, from a long range perspective, the national meat supply was threatened by the failure of the large ranches to purchase young cattle for later slaughter. The result was that the government stepped in much more quickly than it had originally planned and rapidly expropriated the large ranches. These ranches became the first state administered farms. The regime then brought up cattle from the small and middle cattlemen and maintained minimal cattle production, though overall herd size was reduced and caused rationing of beef by 1963.53
The large sugar estates also reacted in a similar fashion by harvesting a greater percentage of the total crop for short run profit maximization. However, replanting and cultivation was not adequately pursued for future crops because of the likelihood of expropriation. In this case, the regime did not expropriate immediately. As indicated earlier in the chapter, the regime guar anteed not to expropriate until after the 1960 crop was harvested and profit had been made by private owners. This encouraged 110
somewhat better sugar production. But after the 1960 harvest*
the regime turned all cane latifundla into cane cooperatives.*^
By 1960, as the expropriation process picked up momentum, the
vocal and economic opposition to the reform crossed over to violent
reaction. Crops and buildings were burned rather than letting the
regime take control of them; and counter-revolutionary armed groups
were formed in the Cuban hinterland which now had as their goal not
just the stopping of land reform, but also the overthrow of the
Castro government.55 The most visible example of violent opposition
to the regime was the unsuccessful invasion by Cuban emigres at Flaya
Giron (the Bay of Pigs) in April, 1961. According to one estimate
the majority of the invading force was made up of exiled landowners
or their sons.56 The probable conclusion is that agrarian reform
had not only cost the regime the political support of Cuban land
owning groups but it had helped to push opposition to the extreme
length of armed reaction. In addition, the expropriation of foreign
interests, particularly U.S. interests, had done much to alienate the
U.S. from Castro's revolution,and undoubtedly was a major part of
the reason the U.S. had helped arm and train the Cubans who
Invaded at Playa Giron.^
There is no intent to judge as right or wrong the Castro approach
to agrarian reform. What is of concern to us here, however, is to draw out the fact that agrarian reform, the necessary first step on the road to adopting any new units of production, created the problem of a potentially overwhelming opposition that ultimately Ill
sought the destruction o£ the regime. Thus, adoption o£ Soviet
like units of production, which are created inevitably through
agrarian reform may cost the regime its political li£e. The
decision to adopt the Soviet system is indeed for the reason alone
not to be taken lightly. In the case of Cuba, the Castro regime
generally neturalized the opposition and where the opposition
turned to violence such as the Bay of Pigs, the regime defeated
it. The reasons for this are important not only because they
Indicate the manner in which the regime built strong additional
support for itself but also because it has much bearing on the
question of why all property was not socialized. But we shall
return to these questions in later discussion.
B. Creation of the State Farms: Problems and Benefits
The actual creation of state farms was a releatively easy step for the regime if we ignore the political impact of expropriation of private property. The first version of the state
farms were set up on the large expropriated cattle and rice estates which were intervened beginning in the summer of 1959. It simply involved the transition from the private owner/manager to a state appointed manager. Hired labor remained intact and wages were paid by the state rather than the old owner. There was no change in type of livestock or crop and old boundaries remained intact. The old production units simply functioned under new management. The fact the production went up in both beef and rice by 1960 over 1958 and 1959 indicates that the impact of the transition process was notharmful to production, at least in the short run.5® 112
One factor that enabled the regime to rather easily maintain
the large estates Intact rather than breaking them up into small
farms was the fact that there was a minimal desure for land on the
part of many rural Inhabitants. Thus, there was little of the vaunted peasant "land hunger" that characterized the initial Russian
reform period after that revolution in 1917. The historical impact of large sugar estates which provided seasonal employment for many
rural Cubans was apparently to create what Guevara called a "rural proletarian" mentality among the Cuban peasantry who had lost the urge to own and cultivate their own farms, ^ According to Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez , it was more than just the presence of the sugar latifundia. It was the pre-revolutionary work of the sugar workers union which had served to alter the aspirations of the rural cane workers:
During this period hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers were organized. They took an active part in strikes, demonstrations and conferences. Meetings, radio broadcasts and other educational measures were organized to raise their political level.
In the course of these years, thanks to the growing trade union struggles, the agricultural laborers won significant social gains. Incomes grew notably compared with the grim early thirties, although poverty and unemployment remained widespread. Their wages exceeded several times— in both absolute terms and the relative terms of purchasing power— the wages of agricultural laborers in the rest of Latin America and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries of Asia and Africa. At the same time, there was a continued deterioration of the economic position of the poor and middle peasants who were increasingly caught up in a process of proletarianization.
Because of this, the overwhelming majority of the agricultural laborers came to see the solution to their problems not in an agrarian reform which would give them land and make them small agricultural producers, but In a revolution which would guarantee them steady work and a higher standard of living as workers. The Insecurity of the small peasant was less attractive than the living standard of the better-paid urban workers, such as those engaged in the tobacco, brewing, and some other industries. It can be said— and history bears it out— that the Cuban agricultural laborers did not experience the "land hunger" typical of the peasants and farm workers of Europe and some areas of Asia.®®
For the new regime, the lack of desire for land enabled the main
tenance of productive land in large production unit form.
In 1961, as the regime moved distinctly toward socialism and
the command model of agriculture, it created the Granjas del Pueblo.
The regime amalgamated the original private co-ops and the state administered cattle ranches. There were approximately 900 of the
former , which averaged from 200-300 hectares in Bize, and about
900 of the latter which were much larger. From these approximately
1800 farms were created some 260 granjas which averaged approxi mately 9000 hectares in size.^ The motivation behind the creation of such large farms is not entirely clear. However, according to Rene Dumont, Castro was so enamored of the idea of efficiency derived from size alone that he was originally contemplating granjaB that would have been from 27,000 to 47,000 hectares in size. Apparently Castro felt that scarce machinery, and also the scarcity of trained administrators, would be more efficiently used on the large farm units where they would be more fully utilized.^
The creation of large farms, however, resulted in significant problems from the regime. The sheer size, alone, of the granjas put 11.4
tremendous additional strain on an already overworked staff. Andres
Bianchi writes the following of the problem on one particularly
large granja:
The magnitude of the task faced by a manager will perhaps be understood better from the characteristics of some of the big farms in Camaguey. The Jose Marti farm stretches over more than forty thousand hectares, has sixteen modern rural towns, eleven peoples stores, 10.5 thousand head of cattle, 104 irrigation turbines, and six dairies. Six thousand people live on it, and the labor force of permanent and seasonal workers reaches 2.8 thousand. 3
The Jose Marti granja was exceptionally large, since the average
granja was only 9000 hectares, nonetheless, it is indicative of
the problem of efficient management that the large production units
f created. It was a problem that was made worse by the fact that
the managers were often poorly equipped by virtue of experience or
formal training to be good managers. According to Bianchi,
The managers of the peoples farms were usually former peasants, with little, if any scientific training and with scarce knowledge of the...crops or of administra tive techniques.
We shall say more of the problem of lack of qualified administrative personnel in the following chapter on agricultural administration.
However, for our purposes here, it serves to illustrate the intensified difficulties created by the adoption of very large state farmB as the basic state-owned unit of production.
It is significant to point out that a downturn in national production coincided with the formation of the granjas system. There was a downturn in cane production by 1962; but it is explainable because of government plans to reduce the cultivation of sugar. 115
What Is significant is that the crops df rice, potatoes, and other
root vegetables which the new granja were to produce in Increased
amounts, were produced in decreased amounts. The decrease resulted
in shortages and rationing of such vegetables by 1962.^5 The pro
duction of rice from 1964 to 1969 plumeted downward (it was up
in 1970) and the production of potatoes and root vegetables remained
low during most of this period.^ The impact of the transition to
the granjas, thus, lingered on through most of the decade of the
1960's. There were significant additional administrative and plan
ning problems that contributed to the productionslowdown, beyond
the problems of sheer unit size, but these problems will be
examined in the appropriate chapters which follow.
An additional problem which occurred in the formation of the
granjaB was related to the fact that the property controlled by one
farm unit often was divided up into several geographically separate
pieces of property. Because the farm was made up of several
property pieces spread out over a broad area, and separated by
privately owned farms, it was difficult to coordinate activities of
the various sub-units. In addition, the manager had to spend
much energy and time in unproductive travel over bad roads,as he moved from one sector of the farm to another. According to James
O'Conner several granjas contained at least a dozen separate parcels
of land. Andres Bianchi also discusses the problem and illustrates
the situation with the following example: "The Roberto Reyes farm
(which I visited) is about [40,000 hectares], has 22 thousand 116 head of cattle, 75,000 chickens, and more than 1.2 thousand workers.
The area of the farm is divided into 18 separate units."6? This problem was significantly eased by the expropriation of the middle- sized farms during the second agrarian reform in 1963 and the re sulting geographic reorganization.
Thus the complete transition to a state farm system was accompanied by significant problems. The large farm size could have yielded increased production through various economies derived from scale (i.e. better utilization of machinery and management, labor specialization, transportation and communication centralization, etc.) though it did not (due to administrative and planning weakness and non-geographically contiguous granja sub units). The major benefit of the creation of the granjas was that the regime had greater control over agricultural production. What specific crops were produced could be more centrally controlled by the regime, as well as what was done with the crops once harvested. Also, what was produced could be shared more equitably, thus making shortages perhaps more bearable. Though it could also have meant widespread loss of support, state control of the farms allowed control of incentives and work conditions which could.have worked to bring greater support to the regime.
C. The Abandoning of the Cooperatives As a Production Unit Type
When the Cuban regime amalgamated the cooperatives and the state administered farms into the granjas del pueblo in 1961, and similarly when the cane cooperatives were transformed into state 117 farms in 1962, the Cubans were rejecting the type of production unit most analogous to the Soviet collective farm. The Cubans were, therefore, choosing not to adopt the Soviet production unit which in 1970 still made up more than two-thirds of the total number of large Soviet production units and which controlled nearly
40% of the agricultural land of Russia. The reasons for this re jection of the cooperative/collective form of agricultural production are significant for what they tell us about the Cuban perceptions of the objectionable features of this form of production.
Ideologically, the Cuban cooperative, like the Soviet kolkhoz, was based upon a less pure form of organization and land tenure than the state farm. Since the co-op, in theory, was privately owned by its members and because it tied wages in part to unit production levels, it helped to maintain the acquisitive and individualistic instincts in man which are fostered by capitalism.
We can usefully refer to the phrase of Huberman and Sweezy here, who in discussing private forms of Cuban agriculture, describe then as "permanent carriers of a petty bourgeois mentality and outlook.As indicated earlier, such is also the view of the
Cuban leadership toward the less than pure form of ownership and organization manifested in the cooperative.^ However, since small private farms are still allowed we can assume that there were additional reasons for the eradication of the cooperative that may have been more important than such ideological considerations. 118
In 1959 and 1960 when the original cooperatives and cane coops were formed, the Cuban economy still operated according to market principles. However, in 1961 the Cuban economy was moving away from the market approach toward full planning. A major goal of national planning was the overall control and coordination of pro duction unit activities and as Castro has indicated on several occasions (see the quote on page 102) the state farm is more subject to central control in favor of national interests, than the cooper ative farm. Presumably, the functioning of the cooperative was being hampered by local desires about production, and by traditional methods of cultivation. Certain crops require greater labor and may yield less return to the co-op members and thus may not be produced despite their desirability from the national perspective.
Furthermore, by 1962 the crop diversification and alteration was meeting with greater success on state farms than on the cane cooperatives. Thus, the change to state farms made it possible to dictate the crops to be grown by the units and yet also equalize pay between production units growing more and less remunerative crops.
In addition to the problem of control of production for national interests, there is the problem of rich and poor cooperatives. Since the yearly income of the cooperativistas was partly determined by what and how much was produced, there were certain "rich" co-ops that were blessed with more fertile soil, equipment and. knowledge of how to produce more remunerative crops. According to one first hand observation "political and social tensions had been created by the 119 uncomfortable existence of 'rich cooperatives' (prominent In the tobacco sector) and 'poor cooperatives' side by side."71
Finally, In addition to ideological factors and the need for national control, several Cuban leaders, Castro, Guevarra and Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez among them, also discussed a practical problem which arose with regard to the cane cooperatives after their formation in
1960. The various state enterprises in agriculture and elsewhere
(i.e. construction, public works, state farms, etc.,) paid better wages than the coops and the results was a flow of labor out of the cooperative sector into the state sector. The result for the cane cooperatives was "general neglect of the cultivation of cane" and increased administrative problems due to a decreasing and too fluid supply of labor. 72
For these reasons, in 1961, the original cooperatives were amalgamated with the state administered cattle ranches into the first state farms, the granjas del pueblo. In 1962, the cane cooperatives were transformed into the state cane farms and in 1963, the official differentiation between state cane farms and granjas del pueblo was officially dropped. Thus, for these reasons the Cuban communists found cooperative form of agricultural production to be wanting, and chose to transform all large farms to the state farm category. r
D. Private Agriculture In A Socialist Economy
As Samuel Huntington has indicated the enactment of land reform polarizes the society into beneficiaries of reform and those threatened by the reform. In Cuba, as the regime created hostile 120
conditions between itself and the large landowners by carrying out
the first land reform, it also helped create much support for
Itself by the reform policies toward the middle and small farmers.
According to Rodriguez, the regime avoided the expropriation of the middle farms (more than 67 hectares and less than 402 hectares in size) until 1963 in order to avoid an alliance between the middle and large farmers.^3 in retrospect, it appears to have neutralized
the potential opposition of the middle farmer and maintained his much needed production.
Before the revolutionaries came to power, in an effort to gain peasant support, they made public the decision to carry out an agrarian reform that would give land to the landless peasant and small farmer. Once in power, one purpose of the agrarian reform vis-a-vis the small farmer was to improve his socio-economic situation. At the same time, however, it was to insure a strong base of political support in rural areas amongst a grateful small farmer class who owed their economic position to the regime. The apparent success of the strategy was touched upon by Che Guevara in an article published on April 9, 1961: "The poor peasant, rewarded with ownership of the land, loyally supported the revolutionary power and defended it against its imperialist and counter-revolu tionary enemies."^ Guevara's words were put to the test scarcely a week later, at Flaya Giron, where the outcome supported Che's contention, Castro's military forces were aware that an invasion was imminent, but they did not know where it would start. Thus, 121
the Cuban military had to wait and be ready to move from a series
of central po4r*ts. When the invasion started, the regime force was
not met by the professional military, but by worker and peasant
militia who subsequently kept the invasion force pinned to the
beach until the military arrived to win the final victory.It
seems probable that the agrarian reform was a very important factor
In generating regime support at this time. The expected anti-
Castro uprising, which the invasion was suppoed to trigger, simply
did not materialize. Rodriguez also supports this view:
The role of the peasantry in the Cuban revolution is self- - evident. There is no need to underscore it by subscribing to the questionable thesis that from the moment Fidel Castro and the survivors of the Granma established themselves in the Sierra Maestra the revolutionary process in Cuba basically assumed a peasant character. What is unquestion able, however, is that one of the factors which helped to overthrow Batista and enabled the revolution to withstand the onslaught of U.S. imperialism was the resolute support of the vast majority of the poor and middle peasants and the participation of their vanguard in the revolutionary battles— witness the large numbers of peasants who joined Castro's forces in the Sierra Maestra and the formation of the "alpine" battalions of "guajiros" which now too supple ment the regular armd forces.
A statistical appraisal of the total agrarian reform process by the end of 1963 lends further support for the belief that the
Castro regime had moved wisely in its efforts to create political support in the rural sector. During the four years from 1959-1963,
the agrarian reform had taken land from approximately 13,000 individual and corporate owners,^ and it had created farms or given additional land to approximately 160,000 peasants and their families.The regime had aided many more than it had disenfranchised in the course 122
of four years of agrarian reform. The small farmers in combination with the state farm workers whos life has also been vastly improved
in the first years of the revolution amounted to a substantial
bulwark of rural popular support.
The argument being made is that the private property which was desired by the small farmers was not nationalized and turned
into state farms by the increasingly socialist Cuban government because the Castro regime felt that it was important to maintain political support among the small farmers. Perhaps the most authoritative opinion on regime intentions and reasoning, however, comes from Castro, himself, in an interview conducted in 1965:
[Prior to the revolution], you must realize, those small farmers were exploited. They paid rent, they received very low prices for their produce; they were charged high interest on loans; they had no roads or schools or hospitals. The Revolution has freed them from paying any rent; it had offered them [land]; and it has given them peace of mind by promising that there will be no new measures of an agrarian nature for them. This creates the conditions for the union of the campesinos with the Revolutionary Government. It is important to follow a correct policy toward the farmers, because the power of the Revolution is based upon the intimate union of workers and peasants.
Since those early years of the revolution, when popular support was so crucial for the regime, the Castro government has not changed its general policy toward the small farmer. At the recent 1st Party
Congress of the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) in December, 1975,
Castro once again, aB on numerous previous occasions, reaffirmed the promise to the small farmers not to take their land in a "third* agrarian reform.®® However, the regime has moved to actively 123
encourage peasants to give up their small farms and voluntarily
enter Into cooperative arrangements with other small farmers.
Presumably such coops will ultimately create cooperative units
that will be incorporated into the state sector.Also, the regime
has moved indirectly to hasten the evolutionary disappearance of
small farming. The obvious means by which the regime moved to do
away with private agriculture was to make it illegal for a small
farmer to sell his property without giving the state the first
chance to purchase it. In April, 1966 INRA issued a resolution which
encouraged small farmers, who had trouble finding enough hired help
or were too old to farm any more to sell their farms to the state.
According to an article in Granma Weekly Review about 1700 small
farmers in the Sierra Maestra region, who were having these types of problems sold out to the state in 1966.**3 And according to Jose
Acosta, from 1967 to 1971 another 10,000 small farms were acquired
In this manner by the state for similar reasons. OA Theregime has also hastened the eradication of some small farms by requiring children on isolated farms to attend live-in school which are great distances from the farm. Through re-education and changes in vocational goals, such children may be reluctant to return to the farm once they are grown. In this manner, says Archibald Ritter,
the regime ends the desire of new generations to continue small farming.Also, the absence of the children removes a source of labor which the small farmer has traditionally counted upon. Some of the sales of small farms to the state have occured because of 124 this.®® The regime also moved in 1968 to curtail the private sales made by the small farmer to the urban citizen.This curtailed the small farmer's income and made his existence less "privileged" in comparison to the farm worker in the state sector. This, in turn, has lessened the desirability of being a small farmer. Finally,
Castro has on numerous occasions argued that the small farmer is less productive for national interests, than the state sector and that it is desirable that in the future all farm land be included in the state sector.®® And given Castro's enormous prestige, his public opposition is certain to result in various minor pressures on the small farmer to at least join in some cooperative efforts with other small farmers.
Despite these moves, however, it is clear that Castro and the current regime have no intention of any direct expropriation of the remaining small farms. The Soviet collectivization process of the
1930's, during which extreme animosity between peasant and regime was engendered, looms large as an example of what could result from the use of force. Thus, the policy of an evolutionary eradication of private farming is still generally followed by the regime. It is likely, under this policy, that such an evolution will be a very lengthy process. In 1975 the regime announced that 30% of the farm land was still held by small farmers.This isthe same approximate percentage of land held by the small farmer after the second agrarian reform in 1963. 125
Conclusion
It is a difficult and somewhat arbitrary process to evaluate the lessons of a chaotic and lengthy period of time Buch as occurred in Cuban agriculture from 1959-1963. There are, however, certain elements of the final production unit complex in Cuba which require comment when compared to the production unit component of the
Soviet model outlined in Chapter One.
The most obvious difference between Cuba and the Soviet model is the presence of a substantial and productive small farm sector
(30% of total farm land in 1975) in Cuba. As we shall see in detail in following chapters, despite the fact that the small farms are privately owned, their production is well controlled by the state.
It, nonetheless, ‘constitutes a significant deviation from the Soviet model. For this reason, there have been criticisms of this remnant of capitalism from various sources both inside and outside of
Cuba.90 However, the reasons for the maintenance of private property in Cuban agriculture appear to be sound, if not obvious. Allowing private property is the cost of maintaining rural political support that Castro feels his regime must pay. And this deviation from the
Soviet model, and the reasons for it, point to a significant problem underlying the adoption of the model. The basic units of production of the Soviet model require the eradication and amalgamation of private farms into large, state controlled production units. This policy may well cost the e xpropriating regime much political support and perhaps its very existence. It is not the purpose here to say 126
that for this reason, the Soviet model Is impractical and nonadopt-
able. The Cubans have found a way to adopt a less than "pure"
variation of the model in the realm of production units (and,
for that matter, the Soviets, themselves, permit the existence of
private plots). It is the purpose to point out that this substantial
problem must be dealt with if the model is to be adopted. It is
sufficient cause for careful consideration of its situation vis-a-
v 1b rural political support by any third world regime contemplating
adoption of the command model.
If this problem can be adequately dealt with and if the problem
of large numbers of land hungry peasants is not extreme, then the
actual creation of the state farms seems to be a minimal obstacle.
There is, however, the problem of optimal size in relation to
management, labor, and technical capacity and as the Cuban case
indicates, production may be hampered if size outstrips these
skills and resources. This, too, is a problem area where
adopting regimes should move with great care. Because of state-
controlled production units, the regime will have control of whatever quantity of crops and livestock is produced. However,
if poor organizational planning (i.e. puductlon unit size) leadB
to lower production and food rationing, then it can work through
this medium, to cost the regime significant political support.
There is no clear indication in the Cuban case, whether this has been a continuing problem for them. 127
In sum, Cuba's experience in adopting Soviet-type production unitB seems to offer a set of results that warn its adherents to move with great caution. The benefits of state control are obvious, but the costs of miscalculation can also be extreme. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE
^Archibald Ritter, The Economic Transformation of Revolutionary Cuba, (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 352
^Andres Bianchl, "Agriculture: Post Revolutionary Development", Cuba: The Economic And Social Revolution, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), edited by Dudley Seers; Rene Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Development (New York: Grove Press, 1970); and Ritter, op. cit. 3 C. R. Rodriguez, "The Cuban Revolution and the Peasantry," World Marxist Review, October 1965, pp. 62-63; Ulanchi, op. cit., pp. 74-79.
^Bianchl, op. cit.. p. 68; Dumont, op. cit.. pp. 4-16.
^Ritter, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
^Fidel Castro, Fidel Castro SpeakB (New York: Grove Press, 1969), speeches edited by M. Kenner and J. Petras, pp. 34-35.
7Ibid., p. 5.
®See Chapter One.
^"Program Manifesto of the 26th of July Movement", Cuba In Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1972) edited by R. Bonachea and N. Valdes, pp. 113-140.
^Michel Gutelroan, "The Socialization of the Means of Production in Cuba," In Bonachea and Valdes, Ibid., p. 238.
^Rodriguez, op. cit.. p. 64.
12See Ritter, Dumont, Gutelman, op. cit.. but most importantly see Blanchi, op. cit.. and Jacques Chonchol, "Analisis Critico de la Reforma Agraria Cubana", El Tremestre Econoroico. Jan-Marcg, 1963, pp. 89-94.
^Bianchi, op. cit., p. 101.
128 129
^Chonchol, op. cit.t p. 89.
15Castro, op. cit., p. 12.
^Chonchol, op. cit., p. 91; Bianchi, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
^Guteltnan, op. cit., pp. 243-244.
^■®Bianchi, op. cit., pp. 105-106.
l^Guteltnan, op. cit., p. 244.
SOlbid.
21Ibld: Blanchl, op. cit., pp. 106-107.
22Bianchi, op. cit.. p. 107.
23James O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism in Cuba. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell, press, 1970), p. 113.
^Rodriguez, op. cit., p.65.
23Bianchi, op. cit.. pp. 107-110; Gutelman, p. 250. 26 Roberto Bernardo, "Managing The Firm", Revolutionary Change in Cuba, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971) edited by Carmelo Mesa Lago, p. 207, see footnote 18.
*'See,2 7 for example, Castros speech on agrarian reform cited in footnote , above, where he discusses the superior ideological qualities of the granjas.
2®Bianchi, op. cit., p. 123.
29Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba. Cubas' Fiedel. (New York: Vin tage, 1969) p. 97. 30 Bianchi, op. cit., p. 124; Chonchol, op. cit.. pp. 128-132.
31Ibid.
32Rodriguez, op. cit.. p. 70; Ritter, op. cit.. p. 75.
33Gutelman, op. cit,, p. 254.
34Ibid, pp. 215-253.
330'Connor, op. cit., pp. 129-130; Lockwood, op. cit.. p. 99. 130
Rodriguez, op. cit., p. 70.
■^There were some coops administered under ANAP after 1963, but the number and acreage involved is not significant.
3®See footnote 37.
39Carmelo Mesa Lago, "Economic Policies and Growth', in Mesa Lago, op. cit., p. 382.
^Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Socialism In Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 114; Granma Weekly Review, December 28, 1975, p. 7; Stephen Osofsky, Soviet Agricultural Policy (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 153.
^Osofsky, Ibid., p. 14.
42Roy Laird, "Prospects for Soviet Agriculture", Problems of Communism, Sept/Oct, 1971, p. 36; Ellen Mickiewicz, Handbook of Soviet Social Science Data, (New York: Free Press, 1973), p. 68,
^Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
*4Ibid.. p. 101.
45john k . Galbraith, cited by K. Karst and K. Rosenn, Materials on Law and Development in Latin America (Mlmeo, University of Wis consin, Land Tenure Center), pp. 38-39.
^Lazar Volin, A Century of Russian Agriculture (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Press,, 1970), chatpers 2-6; Terry McCoy, "The Politics of Structural Change in Latin America: The Case of Agrarian Reform in Chile," Land Tenure Center Research Paper; Terry McCoy and Jennie Lincoln, "The Politics of Agrarian Reform in Latin America Revisited: A Comparison of Chile and Peru", unpublished paper.
^Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 299. Huntington's sentence order has been changed but the sentiment remains the same.
^®0'Connor, op. cit., p. 91.
^^Gutelman, op. cit., p. 240.
■*®K. S. Karol, Guerillas in Power (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970), p. 27.
51o*Connor, op. cit., p. 93. Rodriguez, op. cit., pp. 66 and 68; Gutelnian, op. cit., pp. 245-246; Lockwood, op. cit., pp. 101-104; Karol, op. cit., p. 37. 56Karol, op. cit., p. 17.
57Ibid., pp. 12-19. 58Bianchi, op. cit., pp. 111-120.
^®Che Guevara, Che Guevara Speaks (New York:Grove Press, 1968), edited by G. Lavan, p. 29.
88Rodriguez, op. cit., p. 63. 6*0*Connor, op. cit.. p. 115; Bianchi, op. cit.. pp. 139-140.
82Dumont, op. cit.. p. 54.
63glanchi, op. cit., pp. 409-410, see footnote 135.
6*Ibid., p. 39.
8**Ibld., pp. 128-141; Ritter, op. cit.. pp. 144-150.
66Granma Weekly Review (hereafter GWR), No. 12, 1967, p. 4. Ritter, ibid.. pp. 188-189. 67Bianchi, op. cit.. pp. 409-410, see footnote 135.
88Huberman and Sweezy, op. cit., p. 120.
8®Dumont, op. cit.. pp. 55-56; Che Guevara, op. cit., p. 29.
70 Bianchi, op. cit., p. 123; O'Connor, op. cit.. p. 110, footnote 41. 7i0'Connor, op. cit., p. 118.
72Bianchi, op. cit.. p. 133; O'Connor, op. cit.. p. 111.
73Rodriguez, op. cit.. pp. 65-66.
7^Che Guevara, op. cit.. p. 29. ^Karol, op. cit., p. 18.
78Rodriguez, op. cit.., p. 62.
770*Connor, o p . c it., p. 322'. 254-255. 78Rodriguez, o p . cit., p. 68; Gutelman, op- cit^, pp.
79Lockwood, pp. cit.> p. 101.
80GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 6.
Sllbld.
87GWR, January 29, 1967, p. 3. 83lbid. SAcannelo Mesa Lago, Cuba In the 1970^ (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 90.
85Ritter, op. cit., pp. 239-240.
8 6 g w r , January 29, 1967, p. 3.
87GWR, March 24, 1968, p. 7 and 9. 88GMR> October 2, 1966, p. 9; GWR, January 4, 1976, f
89Ibid.
90gee Huberman and Sweezy, op. cit., for example. CHAPTER FOUR
AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION IN CUBA
In a command system of agriculture the administrative struc ture is, of course, of central importance. In Cuba, as in the
Soviet Union, the agricultural administration makes and Implements decisions, collects produce, aggregates and disaggregates informa tion and generally coordinates all aspects of the national production effort. As the following discussion indicates, however, the Cubans have also tried their own distinctive variations in the administra tion of agriculture. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the structure of the agricultural bureaucracy, compare it to its
Soviet counterpart, and finally to illuminate and analyze the problems arising from its adoption.
Agricultural Administration; 1959-60
The agrarian reform law of May, 1959, in addition to outlining the nature of the reform, also created the government agency that was to carry it out^. The National Institute of Agrarian Reform, or INRA, was created by the law, and in the minds of the law makers was to be the key governmental structure for carrying out the agrarian reform process. INRA was also to administer the agricultural
133 134 sector of the economy once the reform was carried out. INRA has since remained as the central agricultural administrative bureau cracy.
In 1959, INRA was given enormous and comprehensive power to carry out the process of land expropriation and distribution, and to insure that agricultural production was maintained. The first chief administrator of INRA was Castro, himself. According to such observers as Boorstein, Bianchi and O'Connor the offices were staffed primarily with trustworthy cadre from the rebel army,2 indicating the importance placed upon a successful agrarian reform by the new regime. The creation of INRA was in addition to the already existing, pre-revolutionary Ministry of Agriculture. The old Ministry was pushed aside and given minor responsibilities such as reforestation, and finally in 1961 it was abolished.3 The failure to use the old
Ministry of Agriculture was a manifestation of the mistrust of the new order for the old.
During 1959 and 1960, INRA continually gathered responsibilities for even broader areas of concern to the regime. INRA took responsi bility for a variety of rural social services, including housing, education, health care and construction.4 INRA also absorbed several independent pre-revolutionary agencies, such as the Cuban Institute for Sugar Stabilization and the Committee for Tobacco Production, in order to control and coordinate their functions.3 In addition to rural activities INRA developed a Department of Industries which controlled substantial non-agricultural industry. In 1961, 135 this department was detached from INRA and becamer Cuba's first independent Ministry of Industries, under Che Guevara.^ There is little question that next to the rebel army itself, INRA was the most powerful organization in Cuba in the immediate years after the revolution.^
Under INRA's central authority, the agricultural bureaucracy was hierarchically organized into six provincial offices which corresponded to Cuba's six geographic provinces (Pinar Del Rio,
Havana, Matanzas, Las Villas, Camaguey and Oriente). Below the pro vincial level offices of INRA, the country was divided into 28 Zones of Agricultural Development (ZDA). The ZDA officials ("zone chiefs") were the primary individuals responsible for implementing the agrarian reform and carrying out the various services discussed above.® Below the level of the ZDA's were the various production units. The zone chiefs were responsible for appointing the first cooperative and state administered farm managers, who in turn, were chief administrators of their respective production units. The position of manager of the production unit was the bottom level of the nascent Cuban agricultural administration.
In 1960, with the nationalization of the sugar cane latifundia, and the formation of the cane cooperatives, the General Administration of Cane Cooperatives (GACC) was set up within INRA's central Havana offices. GACC was a separate bureaucracy which was independent of the ZDA authority. Between the cane coops at the bottom, and the central office of GACC were provincial level and regional level 136
(agrupaciones) GACC offices. The regional level, agrupaclon office was responsible for 10 to 15 individual cane coops.® The GACC appointed a manager for the cane coops, who, in theory, served alongside of an elected coop manager and council. In reality, the appointed manager had paramount authority and in 1962 the position of elected manager was abolished.
Thus, in 1960 with the formation of the cane coops, there were two separate bureaucracies administered out of INRA*s central offices: the GACC and the bureaucracy to which the ZDA's were attached. The latter bureaucracy had responsibility not only for the private coops and state administered farms, but also for the safeguarding of the reform process and performance of numerous social services. Figure 4.1 indicates the organizational structure in chart form.
(Figure 4.1 goes about here)
Agricultural Administration: 1961-63
In 1961, as the regime moved to formally adopt socialist units of production, there was a corresponding change in the organization of INRA. In 1961, the partial eradication of the market, which also reflected the move to socialism, required a centralized bureau cracy to carry out the functions of the marketplace. Thus, from
1961 we can speak of the adoption of a command, Soviet-type admini stration structure. With the amalgamation of the original cooper atives and the state administered cattle latifundia, and their conversion into the Granjas del Pueblo, the General Administration 137
GACC
GACC Prov. Office Province INRA Office
Aggupaciones |
[ Cane Coops J | Coops |Social State Services Admin Farms
FIGURE 4.1 INRA STRUCTURE CIRCA I960 138
of Peoples Farm (GAPF) was formed within INRA.*® There was no inter
vening levels of bureaucracy between the GAPF in Havana and the
production units themselves. As one INRA official indicated in
1961, "they .are centrally managed, one by one."H The Zones of
Agricultural Development (ZDA) were abolished in 1961 during this
reorganization.*2
Also, in 1961, INRA moved to bring the small farms under greater
control. The formation of the National Association of Small Farmers
(ANAP) was undertaken by INRA. The top administrator of ANA? was
appointed by INRA. There was also provincial and regional ANAP
organizations with the base unit being local peasant associations**
of which there are currently more than 6,000 in number,*4 ANAP also
controlled credit, various technological services and "peoples stores"
at the local level.**
The cane cooperatives, formed in 1960, remained intact as did
their administration (GACC) during the 1961 reorganization. The establishment of an independent Ministry of Industry outside of INRA
in 1961 created an additional administrative structure for the cane
coops to deal with, however. The new Ministry of Industries included a department in control of sugar refining (i.e., mills, transportation, etc.) which coordinated the actions of the cane coops with the rest of the sugar industry, particularly during the harvest period.*6
INRA, which was, in effect, the Ministry of Agriculture, reported to the Council of Ministers where, along with the Ministry of
Industries, Transport, Labor, etc., it coordinated its efforts with 139 other sectors of the economy. Castro was not only the head of INRA in 1961, but he was also the Prime Minister, and consequently, he presided also over the Council of Ministers. Thus, agriculture was well represented in the highest circles of government.
A final organizational addition in 1961 to the economic admini stration were the Boards of Coordination. Execution and Inspection
(Juntas de Cooperacion, Execuclon y Inspecion), or JUCEI. The
JUCEI organizations were established at the local level to coordin ate and inspect the activities of the various production enterprises, including the cane coops and the granjas.^ The JUCEI were to en courage involvement in local projects and thus were seen partly as responsible to the local level. However, the JUCEI were also responsible to higher administrative bodies. As we shall see in the next chapter, the JUCEI are also part of the planning apparatus in that they transmit information to upper level planning agencies.
After the reorganization of the basic units of production in
1961, the agricultural administration can be represented in chart form by Figure 4.2.
(Figure 4.2 goes about here)
1963-1970: Reorganization and Adoption of the Combines
In 1963, the year of the second agrarian reform, another major administrative reorganization was carried out. The lack of admini strative levels between the granjas and general administration offices of INRA led to a kind of overcentralization. Too many day- to-day decisions had to be made at the top and this resulted in Council of Ministries
Ministry of INRA * Industries
| GACC jGAPF ANAP
GACC ANAP Prov. Prov. Office Office
j Agrupaciones j Regional Office
JUCEI ; ---- Sugar Mills| Cane Coops | Granjas del Peasant Peoples Pueblo Association Stores
Credit» Service Organizations
Individual Small Farmers
FIGURE 4.2 INRA STRUCTURE CIRCA 1961-62 141 inevitable delays and inefficiencies. Furthermore, the central administration was often poorly informed about local peculiarities.
Carlos Rafael Rodriguez who had replaced Castro as head of INRA in 1962, described the situation in the following way:
Centralization engenders serious vices and dangers. Bureau cratic centralism is the worst of these. The method of issuing general directives without considering the specific peculiarities of each locality gives rise to grave errors in agriculture...If in all lines of production these vices of centralism are abominable, in agriculture they become deadly...agriculture requires changing solutions from month, day to day, and sometimes hour to hour. No rules can substitute for conscientious initiative and tech niques derived from an analysis of local experiences.18
The resulting 1963 reorganization was a thorough-going event which touched all- levels of agriculture. The GACC and GAPF bureau cracies were abolished and at the bottom, theGranjas del Pueblo and the cane cooperatives (called granjas caneros since 1962) were com bined and called granjas estatales or state farms. This new production unit waB organized much as before the name change and amalgamation.
Each state farm had an appointed chief administrator, who was assisted by a council. There were also offices responsible for land, economics, machinery, and supply and sales. In addition, each farm was divided into, sub-geographic units with an assigned labor brigade and brigade chief who were responsible for planting cultivation and harvesting. 19
The next administrative level up was the Agrupaciones Baslcas de
Producion Agropecuaria (Basic Agricultural Production Grouping) or agrupacion. The agrupacion was a sub-regional level administrative unit that was responsible for a small number of state farms (10-15) 142
In the same geographic area, and which produced the same crop.20
Thus crop specialization was a key feature of the agrupacion. The agrupacion had been a feature of the GACC bureaucracy prior to this 1963 reorganization and with the combining of the old production units the agrupacion principle was simply extended to the entire new state farm sector. Because the Individual state farm units, which made up the agrupacion, all produced the same thing, it was considerably easier for the agrupacion-level administrator to manage his responsibilities. The agrupacion director was assisted by a council (with sections for economics, technology and machinery), plus other offices concerned with organization, supervision, peoples stores, supplies, construction, etc.21
Perhaps the key aspect of the agrupacion level administration was that its very presence and need for some degree of decision making authority helped to decentralize what Rodriguez had felt to be an overly-centralized bureaucracy. There were also other factors, that at least in theory, made the general adoption of the agrupacion concept a worthwhile decision. Since the agrupacion farm units were now encouraged to specialize in one crop, greater production efficiency was possible. Prior to the 1963 reorganization some farms produced as many as thirty-five different c r o p s .22 This large a number of crops would make it difficult for the managers or workers to master knowledge of any crops very well. An additional factor that made the new agrupacion level of bureaucracy useful was that much additional farm land had come under state control as a result of the second agrarian reform. This meant that greater administra- 143 strative capacity would be needed and the agrupaclon helped satisfy this need.
Above the Individual production units and the agrupaciones was a regional level office which in turn was responsible to the central
IWRA offices. At the central offices, the GACC and GAPF were replaced by the office of Vice-Ministry of Agrarian Production which directed all production activities of the lower levels.23 in addition to the public sector, the activities of the small farmers organization,
ANAP, was also coordinated by the Vice Ministry office. Thus, by late 1963 the agricultural administration of Cuba had adopted this new administration which is represented by Figure 4.3.
(Figures 4.3 goes about here)
With this reorganization the structure of Cuban agriculture was essentially fixed in the form that we find today. There have been some important new organizations added, as discussed below, but the essential structure described above has remained intact.
The immediate years after 1963 brought additional institutional changes which are important to note. Perhaps the most significant change was the establishment of an independent Ministry of Sugar in
1964. (The Ministry of Industries had formerly controlled sugar processing as well as numerous other industrial responsibilities.
However, the Ministry of Industries from 1964 to 1967 was gradually dismembered into five separate ministries, the first of whch was the
Ministry of Sugar.) In order to improve efficiency in production, the Ministry of Sugar was made responsible for all phases of sugar j^Council of Ministers'"!
| INrT ^ ---- \
\ « ANAP Regional INRA V Offices S
| Agrupaclones J
Director Admini '.. \ strative Council _JUCEI J Administration Offices
State Farm
Farm Manager Administrative Council
Administrative Labor Offices Brigade Chief
Labor Brigade
FIGURE A.3 AGRICULTURE ADMINISTRATION CIRCA*1963 145 production, from harvesting through milling, processing and foreign and domestic sales.^ Thus, the state farms under 1NRA which grew
cane (like the original cane cooperatives) also had to coordinate production activities with the new Ministry of Sugar.
The organizational principle embodied in the agrupaciones and
the Ministry of Sugar, that of administrative specialization and
responsibility for one crop through several processes or phases, was also reflected in the formation of agricultural "combines,"
(from combinados, in Spanish). Little information is available on
the actual structure of the combines. They are organizations which are hierarchically structured with central, provincial, and regional offices and the responsibility for just one crop or livestock product.25 The combines are responsible for research, and for seeds or small plants which are delivered to the production units. Then, the production unit raises the product until harvest time. Pre sumably, during this time, the responsibility for the product lies with the INRA-controlled production unit rather than the combine organization. At harvest time the combine again resumes responsi bility and remains responsible through any industrial processing and, finally, for sales and distribution (foreign or domestic).26
The combine principle of integrating the various phases of production and distribution has so far been applied in three product areas. The first of these was the poultry combine (Combinada
Avicola Nacional) which was organized as an independent agency in
1964. The poultry combine is responsible for poultry and egg pro duction. The tobacco combine (Cubatabaco) was organized in 1966 146 as an Independent agency within the industrial sector of the Cuban economy. Cubatabaco is responsible for research, harvesting, the storing, manufacturing and exporting of tobacco products like cigar ettes and cigars, as well as matches.^ The third product area is the coffee combine (Cubacafe) which waB organized in 1968. Cubacafe is responsible for coffee and cocoa crop products and is a sub-agency of the Ministry of Food Industries.28 The three, combines and the
Ministry of Sugar all function similarly. However, presumably because sugar is the mainstay of the economy, it was organized as a ministry rather than as the less prestigious and less powerful combine organization.
The exact relationship of the combines and the Ministry of Sugar to INRA (who's production units grow their raw materials) is not entirely clear. The state farms which grow sugar cane, as indicated above, must coordinate their efforts with the Ministry of Sugar, especially at harvest time. However, where ultimate authority lies and how coordination occurs during planning, etc., is in doubt. Both
Tobacco and Coffee are produced primarily by small farmers (in 1975 the small farm produced 82% of the tobacco crop29 and the small farm has traditionally produced about the same percentage of the coffee cro p^O) and so the combines for these two crops would presumably coordinate with ANAP which controls small farm seeds, credit, machinery, etc. However, how coordination occurs and who has primary responsibility for the various operations is not clear. All of these
Ministries, combines and agencies must coordinate at the Council of 147
Ministers level. It seems inevitable, however, that coordination roust occur at lower levels, and it is here that the exact relation ship is unclear. Despite the lack of clarity on the exact relationship of the production units to the combines and Ministries,
Cuba's agricultural administration for the latter 1960's can be approximately represented as in Figure 4.4
(Figure 4.4 goes about here)
One aspect of agricultural administration has so far not been brought into the discussion, and that is the role of the Cuban
Communist Party. For varying reasons, the role of the PCC in agricultural administrations, and the economy in general has not been very strong. Perhaps the most important reason is that Castro came to power on the strength of a military organization, the Rebel
Army, and not through the work of a party. A political organization was only developed after Castro assumed power. In 1961, the ORI
(Integrated Revolutionary Oranizatlon) was formed to be the political party of the new regime. It was an amalgam of several pro-Castro organizations, including the pre-revolutionary communist party, the
26th of July Movement, and the Student Revolutionary Directorate.
In 1963, ORI became the United Party of the Socialist Revolution
(PURS), and in 1965, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) was finally formed from PURS.^ Thus, the PCC was a late arrival and consequent ly, as we shall see, it has not been unitl the 1970's that it has been given some actual responsibility for running the society and the economy. -j Council of Ministers
/ " Ministry of INRA Vice Ministry Sugar of Agricultural Production Combines poultry, j ANAP tobacco, coffee }
Regional INRA ! Provincial { i Provincial i Office j ANAP \ J
Agrupacion 1 j Regional j Regional , | ANAP \ V
JUCEI * Individual Local I Small Farm Office Sugar Mills! - State Farm sugar, poultry, i cattle, etc. J
*JUCEI renamed Municiple Administrative in 1966
FIGURE 4.4 AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION CIRCA 1970 In the political rhetoric of the regime, the various party organizations (ORI, PURS, PCC) have been given the "leading" or
"vanguard" role in Cuban society. Like the CPSU in the Soviet Union, the role of the Cuban party in the administration of agriculture has been to carry out the oversight function. However, in reality it has not been strong enough in terms of numbers prestige, or leader ship support to adequately carry out the oversight responsibility.
In fact, if we look to see who has had the responsibility for checking on production at the local level, particularly in the early 1960's it is the JUCEI (renamed Municiple Administration in 196632) which most fill the need, rather than a minimally existent party apparatus.
Raul Castro's description of the functions of the JUCEI Bound very much like the responsbllities attributed to local party organizations in the USSR. According to Raul, the role of the JUCEI was to:
...see to it that each locality and each Institution receives the plans and decisions of the government and the Ministries, and to foster their enforcement and application; coordinate the activities of the state bodies so that tasks are performed; see that everyone, in the province and the locality, is better informed about the general plans and helps execute them with greater efficacy, each one from his post; organize work so that men can work with maximum effectiveness and yield the maximum; establish a closer and regular relationship between the people and the authorities...33
From this functional perspective, Mesa-Lago is almost certainly wrong when he says that the JUCEI has no "prototype" in other socialist systems.3^ The JUCEI, in all likelihood, were created because of the absence of a strong party apparatus at the local level, and thus the communist party found in the Soviet model is the functional prototype of the JUCEI. 150
Administration Through 1970; From Anarchy to Militarization
The actual functioning of agricultural administration was accompanied by numerous problems during the decade of the 1960's.
The rapid transition from a free market economy to a centrally planned and administered economy put enormous responsibility on the shoulders of the state administration in all sectors. In agricul ture, the officials of INRA were hard pressed to know all of the necessary inputs to the various types of production units. The task of actually delivering the necessary seed, fertilizer, machinery, labor, etc., was next to impossible because of the disorganization of the INRA bureaucracy^ and the effects of the embargo Imposed by the United States.
Edward Boorsteln, an American Marxist economist who worked in
INRA, has written the following description of the agricultural administration during the early years of the revolution.
On paper there was an organizational hierarchy: there were provincial INRA Delegates, Zonal Delegates, and the admin istrators of the cooperatives; the "direct administration farms" were to be managed centrally from Havana— "one by one," according to INRA's Chief of Production. But it would be an error to assume that actual administration bore much resemblance to the organization charts. Every one by-passed different parts of the organization when it seemed quicker and more convenient to do so.^
• Boorstein only mentions the anarchy in the state sector of agriculture. According to Oswaldo Dorticos, the President of
Cuba, there was great confusion in parts of the private sector as well.3^ Archibald Ritter, in his major study of Cuban economic development, reports that there was Inadequate availability of 151 seeds, fertilizer, machinery, etc., in the private sector even in the mid 1960's.39 This situation is hardly to the credit of the agricultural administration.
By the latter 1960's as the date neared for the production of the 10 million ton sugar harvest, the pressure on the agricultural administration to carry out its responsibilities must have intensified greatly. In theory, and according to the formal organizatlonl charts, the bureaucracy of INRA, with the party looking over Its shoulder, should have been attempting to meet the challenge. However, numerous pieces of evidence support the view that this was not the case. The bureaucracy and the party were apparently not equal to the task, and the indications are that the military rather than the party and state organizations became lncreasinly responsible for administering the agricultural sector.
There are numerous indications that the INRA bureaucracy was not functioning adequately from 1966 until 1970. A major theme in the speeches of the Cuban leadership from 1966 to 1970 was that there was a great need for qualified (i.e., trained and experienced) management and technical personnel in agriculture.^ The implication, of course, was that such personnel were lacking. Raul Castro, was openly critical of agriculture administrators in a 1966 speech.^
During this period there were also numerous attacks in the party press against unproductive bureaucracy, and the agricultural administra tion was, at tiroes, singled out for criticism.^ In 1969, during a visit to Cuba, Harvard economist Wassily Leontief was told by high 152 level economic officials of the poor quality of agricultural administration.43
In addition to these indications about the poor quality of agricultural administration, it is also clear that the PCC was weak and could not perform its oversight function adequately. The PCC was founded in 1965, and perhapB for this reason, JUCEI was renamed and reorganized in 1966. Presumably the party was to have replaced JUCEI as the local production level Inspector. However, the PCC was too weak and, itself, needed more capable cadre. In
1965, the membership of the PCC numbered only 55,000.44 According to Bias Roca, member of the PCC Secretariat, there were still only
55,000 members by 1969.^> This is less than 1% of the total Cuban population of 8 million in 1969. Armando Hart, also a member of the
PCC Secretariat, was openly critical of the PCC's lack of membership and its inability to maintain its oversight responsibilities not only at the local level in agricultural production units, but also at the top in the central governmental agencies.46 Also, the party had no statutes nor an official program, and it apparently did not fill vacancies that arose in the Central Committee.4? Castro, himself has indicated that the top party organs did not carry out their functions from 1966-70.48 Thus, the picture that emerges from this period is a party that existed largely on paper. Therefore, it is difficult to see how the PCC could have functioned at any level as the overseer of the agricultural administration. 153
there Is additional Information about the PCC which is illustra
tive of its character during this period. The organizational back
ground of the overwhelming majority of the top party leadership was
with the military. 67% of the first Central Committee appointed
in 1965 were military men from Cuba's armed forced.^ The percentage
of military and guerilla backgrounds in the Politburo and Secretariat
during the 1965-70 period is somewhat higher than the Central Commit
tee.^ The importance of these percentages is that they illustrate
the potentially overwhelming influence of the military within the
rankB of the PCC. It is likely that the primary allegiance of such
men was to the military rather than the party apparatus because their
association with the military was longer, and it was there that
they spent their day-to-day existence. Consequently, the PCC was not
only small and without major economic responsibility, but also further weakened as an independent organization by the presence of the mili
tary in its leading ranks. Me may refer, with some justification
than, to the militarization of the PCC.
Rene Dumont, the French marxist agronomist who visited Cuba during 1969, brings further illumination of the administrative situation.
Dumont's strongest impression (and criticism) of Cuba at that time was the "militarization" of the economy. He writes the following:
Cuban agriculture is certainly more and more militarized. From the beginnings of the agrarian reform the army has played an essential role, and agricultural is now directed from a national command post— pueato de mando. All important jobs are entrusted to the army; all important enterprises are headed by a major, a captain or a first lieutenant. ^ ISA
Raul Castro, in a speech delivered three years earlier, had predicted the type of situation which Dumont observed in 1969. Raul asserted that the Cuban military had reached a stage in its development when it could not only carry out its defense mission, but that it would also be able to administer the agricultural economy,52 Three years later, under the pressure of reaching the 10 million ton sugar goal, given the weakness of the state administration and the PCC, it is likely that such a situation existed.
During this 1966-70 period, the Cuban leadership depended to a large degree on mobile brigades of military troops; or mili tarized worker brigades, who waged a campaign style "war" to achieve agricultural production objectives.And in 1969 Castro announced that approximately 100,000 troops were working in the fields helping to secure the harvest.^
In 1975, Castro substantiated the view that militarization of the economy had occurred in the latter 1960's. Xn speaking on
Cuban military deployment prior to 1970, Castro said:
The armed forces assigned a considerable number of their men to productive work, adversely affecting military training and combat readiness.55
Given this evidence, it appears likely that the oversight responsi bility for the economy lay largely with the military, and that it is possible that in many cases the actual day-to-day administration of agriculture was taken over by military cadre. 155
Pogt-1970 Administration; The Return of Orthodoxy
Since 1970, and Che failure of Che 10 million Con sugar harvest,
Chere has been a movement away from economic militarization. The changes which have occurred in Cuban agricultural administration have primarily been changes in responsibility and process rather than changes in structure. Thus, the organizational chart that portrayed administrative structure from 1963-70 is still accurate for the post-1970 period. The emphasis of the regime's change in approach has been to try to strengthen INRA and return to day-to-day administra tive responsibility to it. In May, 1970 after the failure to reach the massive harvest goal was publicly announced, Castro criticized the party and, in effect, the military, for being too directly involved in agricultural administration. In the future, he promised, administration would be left to the state agencies.56
In other moves, the regime moved to strengthen the state economic apparatus in general. In November, 1972, a revamping of the Cuban
Council of Ministers took place. The Council of Ministers was charged with specific duties and reorganized. The 27 ministries were grouped into 9 super-ministries or groupings. As might be expected, the Ministry of Sugar, by itself, constituted one of the nine groups. Non-sugar agriculture (the INRA), was grouped with defense and internal security.Thissounds unusual until we know that this group is under the control of Castro (he is Commander In
Chief of the Military as well as head of the INRA). This grouping combines two of his areas of keen interest and expertise. It was 156 also a sound move politically for Fidel, because in the aftermath of the 1970 sugar harvest failure there may have been those who wanted to replace him.
The 1972 reorganization strengthened the INRA in at least two ways. In the first place, the reorganization should haveserved to re-energlze the administrative apparatus by emphasizing its importance. In the aftermath of the 1966-70 experience, the appar atus was probably dispirited both because of the harvest failure and because of the regime reliance on the military. The reorganization made the INRA, and other bureaus, of Importance again by emphasizing their responsibilities. Secondly, the reorganization created new rules and one of these was that:
[Central] directives cannot be altered under any cir cumstance without prior knowledge and approval of the pertinent central authority,
The central state agencies were undoubtedly reacting to past instances of being ignored by local, perhaps military, officials.
Clearly, the state bureaucracies were moving to strengthen their position vis-a-vis other organizations at the local leve.
More recently at the 1st Party Congress, with respect to the regimes' recent emphasis on developing a separation of party, military and state institutions, Castro spoke at length of the necessity of maintaining an independent and expert state administra tion. He once again emphasized that the party must not take the place of administration.
And the role of our Party— this be well understood— cannot be and can never be that of replacing the administration... An uninterrupted process of advance on all working 157
fronts of the revolution was initiated in 1970, having among its most outstanding acts:... The strengthening of the state apparatus.59
Finally, the PCC in the 1970's has also been substantially
strengthened and is presumably now in a better position to carry out
its oversight function and monitor the activities of the state
bureaucracy. In addition to the Importance of holding the First
Party Congress (indicating Increased party cohesion, discipline and
organization), the size of the party membership has grown to over
200,000, in 1975.^0 Also, in the early 1970's, new local and
regional level party organs were established and the communication
links between the various party levels were established, allowing
the party to function more effectively.61 And, at the recent party
congress, the executiveorgan membership was expanded and new members
elected and these bodies were charged with new tasks and (presumably)
energies.
A Comparison of Cuban and Soviet Agricultural Administration
As in the case of comparing production units in Cuba and the
USSR (as we did in Chapter Two), we find in a comparison of
administrative structure and process that there are similarities and
also differences,. Administration is the same in both systems in the
general sense in which authority eminates from the top downward and
in which the local level essentially does as it is told to do. Thus,
both systems are very clearly, "command" systems of agriculture.
The two systems are also the same structurally in that there is a
central bureaucracy which is organized with regional and sub-regional 158 level offices. And it is also true that this central bureaucracy in both systems controls Investment, seed, fertilizer, etc., which is necessary for the various types of production units to function. Finally, the state farms production units in each system function in Internal administration in a similar manner. Each has an appointed chief administrator, and advisory council of assistant administrators, and the farm is broken down in geographic sections and work brigades.
In addition to these general similarities, there are significant differences that should be pointed out. Perhaps the most significant difference in the administrative structure has to do with the policy of vertical intergratlon of collection, processing and distribution functions embodied in the combines and the Ministry of Sugar. There is no structural arrangement like it in the Soviet agricultural
■system. In the USSR, the Ministry of Agriculture is entire responsi ble for production and procurement of crops and livestock products in all areas. The Cuban arrangement is unique in its administration of sugar, poultry, tobacco and coffee in that two bureaucracies are involved in the total process in these areas. INRA is, of course, responsible for the procurement function in agricultural areas outside the combines (cattle, vegetables, etc.) and in these areas Cuba and the USSR function in the same manner,
A second significant difference between the two systems has been the Cuban reliance on the military to both oversee and administer agriculture. Both the economic involvement of the military and 159
Che weakness of Che party are deviations from the Soviet model.
The Cubans clearly want to emmulate the Soviet example In the
post-1970 period. The spirit of humility Is in the speeches of
Castro as he often refers to the need to follow the path of "other"
socialist nations.62 However, the problem of the weakness of the
party and state bureaucracies, which compelled the regime to use
the military in the first place, will not be easily or rapidly
overcome. This brings us to the consideration of the basic
problems which resulted in the weakness of the agricultural
administration, and which, in turn, have been brought to the sur
face by the decision of Cuba to adopt a command agricultural system
in the first place.
The Problems Resulting From the Adoption of a Command Agricultural Administration
In the course of setting up the centralized, command administra
tion numerous problems were confronted by the regime. The destruction
of the old modes of management, and the erection of a new
administrative bureaucracy and criteria of management created
formidable problems. For example, at what levels and in what
geographic areas should offices be set up and what were to be the
limits of authority given to such offices. These were basic
types of problems encountered by the regime. Another problem that pervaded the atmosphere was what we might well call "revolutionary euphoria," The realization of victory over Batista and the rapid move to construct a new, egalitarian socialist society in Cuba were a heady wine to Castro and his followers. Imperialism and dictator ship had been defeated and the belief was common that socio-economic prosperity and rapid modernization were just ahead. The Impact of this state of mind was to cause numerous policy errors born of unrealistic beliefs in the potential of Cuba to move rapidly forward*^.
However, these are problems that were either short-term and rapidly solved or would most likely have been present to some degree, irrespective of the type of post-revolutionary regime that emerged.
They were, to a large extent, problems which resulted from the defeat of the old, rather than the construction of the new. These are not the type of problems which we intend to disucss. We are more interested in basic and more-or-less long term problems which were encountered specifically because of the adoption of a command system of administration in and underdeveloped nation such as Cuba.
A careful reading of the views of the Cuban leadership on the problems which they have confronted in this area, as well as a review of the observations of those who have visited Cuba, indicates that two problems seem to have stood out as most troublesome. The first and most difficult problem was the lack of qualified administrative personnel. The second problem has been the lack of discipline and authoritative cohesion which has characterized the agricultural bureaucracy. These problems are, to some extent, inter-related in their causes as well as in their manifest stage. For example, it is not always absolutely clear whether an example of bad leadership is not also an example of poor discipline in which a subordinate has refused to follow the advice of superiors. Nonetheless, we have 161
attempted to separate them and discuss such examples and their
underlying causes.
A) Lack of Qualified Personnel
The most critical problem which resulted from the adoption of
a centralized administration was that of finding enough trained
and experineced personnel in order to properly staff the various
levels of the organization. From the production unit manager up
through the INRA's top leadership there was a demand for individuals
with a thorough understanding of agricultural as well as, the
functional requisites of bureaucratic administration. This lack
of qualified administrators has continued to plague Cuban agricul
ture from the onset of the revolution until the present.
The need for administrative personnel in a centralized, com
mand system cannot be over emphasized. The end of private property
means the end of the existence of the traditional owner/manager,
and an increased need for state administrative personnel to replace
the loss of the owner/manager. Furthermore, because of the destruction
of the market and the presence of a central plan, an especially
heavy administrative load falls to the command system administrator.
The thousands upon thousands of market transactions, governed by the
profit motive and law of supply and demand, are destroyed under a
command system and the administration roust begin to substitute
rational, planned interaction for the "anarchy" of the market.
The fact that Cuba has lacked such personnel has been indicated by the Cuban leadership in a variety of discussions related to a 162 great range of agricultural problems. Perhaps the earliest evidence of the problem was in 1959 when Castro decided to wait until 1960 to expropriate the sugar can latifundla. The reason for the delay, according to Castro, was the lack of regime personnel who could effectively manage the great quantity of cane land that the state would receive in the expropriation process.6/+ And Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez, who was the head of INRA from 1962 until 965 has Indicated that the second agrarian reform of 1963 was originally contemplated as early as 1960 but was put off unitl 1963 because of the shortage of managerial personnel to assume control over this additional vast amount of l a n d .65 jn a 1966 speech Castro discussed the general problem of lack of sufficient numbers of administrators. The lack of administrators, he said, had forced the regime to enlist peasants who were "good militants," but usually not trained or experienced.66
Again in 1975 Castro returned to the same theme in his main report to the First Party Congress when he lamented the failure of the nation to produce sufficient quantities of m a n a g e r s67 . Thus, the lack of sheer numbers of administrators has been a consistent problem since the onset of the revolution.
Another facet of the problem has been the lack of properly trained administrators, From the very top leadership down to those who have been drafted to manage the state farms, the level of formal agricul ture training has been minimal. And here, the best of intentions and ideological purity cannot t^ke the place of formal agronomical training, Castro, who has headed INRA for most of its existence 163
(Carols Rafael Rodriguez, who Is a trained economist, was head of
INRA from 1962 to 1965) has not had formal training in agriculture.
Castro often praises the good Intentions of regime leaders, but he usually tempers his praise with a reminder that "...unfortunate ly, many of our political and administrative cadres are still in the dark about production techniques."^ Archibald Ritter discusses the inappropriate background of two ZDA chiefs in Pinar del Rio
Province. One had been a pharmacist's assistant and the other had worked in a bank.69 in a speech in 1975 Castro again referred to the poor training of many economic managers, and discussed the necessity of instituting "crash courses" for the training of such cadres.This was a speech made after nearly 15 years of experience with the command system. Clearly, the problem of trained admini strative cadre is still very much with the revolution.
Two visitors to Cuba have also written about the problem of lack of experienced personnel. Edward Doorstein, writes the follow ing observation of the guerillas qua administrators:
The leaders of INRA were without experience in the admini stration of large organizations. They had little con ception of how to delegate responsibility and still maintain control, how to use staffs which analyze problems and alternative courses of action to assist leaders in making decisions, how to Issue policies and directives which can guide and control the work of large groups of people even from a distance. The idea of a large organization as a hierarchy In which each level has an appropriate range of authority and responsibility, in which the function of the top is to direct those below, not try to do all the jobs themselves, was foreign to the Cuban leaders at this time. Their experience had been in the guerilla army in which the commandantes carried rifles. 16A
Dumont also discusses an example In which lack of formal training was not the reason for the poor quality of administration found In
Cuba. Fedrlto Betancourt, a ZDA chief who had been a professor of rural economy at the Agronomic Institute In Havana, "...made the worst sort of Imprudent mistakes.: The culprit, Dumont Implies, Is the lack of field experience to compliment Betancourt's theoretical training.
The magnitude of the task of developing a nation-wide cadre In any field is enormous. It Is undoubtedly a process that takes many years, perhaps generations. The task of developing a corp of sufficiently trained experienced agricultural administrators for the more than 500 state farms and the various levels of numerous agricul tural agencies and bureaucracies is staggering to contemplate. The demands on the individual administrator are great. He must combine advanced knowledge, field experience, and the capacity to manage other people, if he is to maximize the productiveness of this area of responsibility. Thus, the fact that the Cuban leadership is still calling for such cadre after some fifteen years of experience is somewhat more understandable.
In addition to the inherent difficulties of the task, however, there are special reasons which are present in the Cuban situation which have made the problem more difficult. The first of the reasons, and perhaps the most obvious, is the fact that the revolutionary regime inherited an educationally underdeveloped society from the pre-revolutionary, capitalist era. The level of formal education 165
In general was low In Cuba and the number of Cubans with university-
level training was particularly low. Less than 1% of Cubans in
pre-revolutionary Cuba had graduated from a university, and only
3% had graduated from secondary school* 71 J Thus, the level of Cubans who could possibly have been exposed to formal, advanced training
in agriculture, and economics and business was very low. Basic
agricultural know-how, of course, is often passed on from father
to son, and consequently many rural Cubans had rudimentary knowledge
of small farm procedure or of one or a few crop or livestock types.
But with the collectivization of much of the land after the revolu
tion, the need was for individuals with broad knowledge of many
aspects of agriculture and who could manage people as well. Thus,
the need for trained and experienced people was greater than ever,
after the adoption of socialist agriculture. I j* The problem of inadequate numbers of agricultural administra
tors was further exacerbated after the revolution by the emmigration of many potentially useful people who were out of sympathy with a socialist revolution. Americans, or other foreign nationals*, left as the regime began to natioanlize their property. More serious, however, was the substantial number of Cubans who emigrated as the revolution moved leftward. It is difficult to know the exact numbers who left the country. However, some approximations have been made.^ One estimate places the number of Cubans emigres to just the Western hemisphere at approximately a half million people.
This amount is equal to approximately 7% of the total Cuban population of 8 million in 1969.^ It is even more difficult to
know the past vocational training (if any) and experience of this
emigre group who has spread over the world. However, a demographic
study of the large Dade County Florida community of Cuban emigres
is Interesting for what it indicates about vocational training and
experience. Of the original wave of refugees who came to Florida
from 1959-62, approximately 35% had completed a professional degree
or at least had some years of college toward a degree. Thus,
more than 1/3 of the early refugees (who, of course would have
included nonworking wives and children) had the type of education
that would probably have made them of some use-to the new regime and
undoubtedly many of these might have been useful in an administrative
capacity. Based upon hard data from the Dade County sample, Eric
Baklanoff estimates that approximately 165,000 of the total 500,000
emigres by 1969 were potential members of the work force and that
of the 165,000, some 54,000 were professionals, semiprofessionals, managers and executives. Among the remainder, 59,000 were clerical
and sales employees, 21,000 were skilled and semi-skilled workers, and 31,000 were unskilled laborers.^ Even if the estimates run high, the loss of administrative-type professionals is obviously
significant and constitutes a virtual Cuban "brain drain". The
Cuban regime Is obviously concerned about the problem because in 1966 it stopped registration for the airlift of those wishing to leave
Cuba for the United States, According to Baklanoff the Cuban
Government has further restricted the emigration of technicians, 167
professionals, and skilled laborers.^8 It Is difficult to know what numbers of those who did emigrate might have specific agricul
tural training and management experience, but it would have been
better for the regime had whatever numbers of those with agricul
tural background stayed in Cuba. According to Dumont, there was
disdain and arrogance amongst the new regime leaders in the early years for the "bourgeoise" and their skills.^ This lack of sensitivity to its own need for trained and experienced individuals was undoubtedly responsible for many of these individuals emigrating
to other nations.
There has also been a third factor at work which served to inhibit the growth of an experienced and trained group of agricultural managers since the revolution. The Cuban leadership from the very beginnings of the revolution in 1959 through most of
the decade of the 1960's, exhibited a strong antipathy to bureau cracy, Jacque Chonchol, the FAO, observer of the first agrarian reform process, writes that fear of bureaucracy among the Cuban leaders was very great. The fear of bureaucracy was based on the feeling that INRA might become too large and cumbersome and that the agrarian reform would bog down and not be completed. Thus, a major pillar of the regimes program might not be carried through.8®
To avoid this, the number of middle level functionaries was kept to a minimum. (Andres Bianchl also indicates that in numerous conversations with INRA officials during the first reform, he detected a "fear ofbureaucracy."81) This fear of bureaucracy, 168
consequently, worked against the development of a large cadre of
people gaining administrative experience. While In this Instance
It may have helped the regime to rapidly achieve a basic goal, It
also served to limit a valuable experience for potential administra
tors In agriculture.
Later on, by 1964, the antipathy to bureaucracy had developed
into a full scale anti-bureaucracy campaign. The anti-bureaucracy
campaign was aimed at curtailing the growth of a stratum of
privileged individuals (i.e., the Cuban version of the "new class")
who became more concerned with personal success than with the national
interest. From 1964 to the end of the decade there were continuous
articles, editorials, and the glorification of books and movies, which carried on anti-bureaucracy theme, in the pages of Granma Weekly
Review.
It was a basic theme In the speeches of every political leader
during the 1964 to 1968 period. The regime even produced a film entitled, "Death of a Bureaucrat," which was the story of a bureau crat's death and how the man had to be dug up and reburied a second
time because his family had not filled out the proper forms the
first time around.And the Cuban author, Rene Nuez, in an attempt at "socialist realism" Cuban-style published a satirical novel of bureaucracy entitled, Passing the Buck.
The sentiments of the regime toward bureaucracy and bureaucrats during this period led to official efforts to reduce the number of employees in various administrative organizations, some of them 169 agricultural in purpose. Some 31,500 positions had been done away with by 1967, In the battle against bureaucracy, as the regime sought to cut out unproductive assignments.The motivation of the anti-bureaucracy campaign may have been laudlble and to some extent necessary to improve administrative efficiency. However, at the same time, the administration in all sectors, including agriculture, was bound to have been weakened. The regime's con cern with the ills of "bureaucratismo" worked, in spirit, to prohibit the development of a strong cadre of agricultural admini strators. It had this effect partly because a further reaction of the regime to bureaucratization was to Increase the decision making powers of the central bureaucracies in order to reduce the decisions and therefore the number of bureaucrats at lower levels.
This worked not only to reduce the number of bureaucrats, but also to make it difficult for lower level administrators to use their initiative and to be innovative in finding solutions to problems.
Rene Dumont's following illustration helps to clarify the problem:
The supervisor of one sector of a rice plantation... receives orders covering everything that he is to do day by day, from the day the rice grain sown germanates to 110.or 120 days later-the date established for its harvesting and threshing.
Thus there was limited room for individuals to grow in administrative expertise in the course of management problem solving. They became, in effect, what Carlos Rafael Rodriguez called "administra tive puppets".®^ 1 7 0 Recently, the regime divulged that the number of students at the Institute of Economics declined from the mid 1960's to the end of the decade. In 1964-65 there were 4818 and by 1969-70 there were only 1338.®® Castro used these figures to buttress his criticism that the regime had, in general, paid too little attention to requirement of formal schooling for economic administrators in hte past. In the same address, Castro was also critical of the lack of "economic consciousness" of current Cuban agricultural and industrial administrators. The importance of Castro's remarks here are that they not only indicate the continuing nature of the problem of lack of qualified personnel, but that it is possible that the regime's fear of bureaucracy and the disdain for the bureaucrat worked against the effort to formally educate a new stratum of administrators during the initial decade of the command agricultural system. Thus the effects of the anti-bureaucracy campaign and the anti-expert spirit may still be haunting the regime. It is interesting to note that the regime has made substantial efforts to improve the situation. Currently, the government is trying to encourage people to become educated in economic management,®9 Perhaps as significant as thes'e positive steps, however, is the fact that since 1970 there has been no anti-bureaucracy campaign of the type and intensity seen in the latter 1960s.90
A final influence that combined with the first three factors to work against the establishment of a professional cadre of administra tors was the regime's insistence on the political reliability of of those administrators it appointed. According to Bianchi, the first coop managers which the regime appointed usually had very 91 w little education but were politically reliable. The original ZDA chiefs were usually members of the rebel army and well known to the leadership, and the very fact that INRA was established at all, given the presence of an already existing Ministry of Agriculture, imply very strongly that in the early days the revolutionary leaders, demanded political trustworthiness from those high, middle, and lower level functionaries who were entrusted to administer agricul tural policy.92 Above, we discussed the fact that two zone chiefs in Pinas del Rio Province had backgrounds of bank clerk and pharmacy. What is also Important to note, for our purposes here, is that both were also veterans of the rebel army and thus presumably of political reliability. 9 3 It is certainly understandable, particularly given the leftward movement of the revolution, that political reliability has been a part of the criteria used in the selection of administrators and managers. However, if politically reliable individuals are inexperienced and unqualified, they also will not make efficient and knowledgeable administrators.
It seems logical that by a decade after the revolution that the leadership would have been less concerned with political reliability « and more concerned with expertise. However, one of Rene Dumont's criticisms of Cuba in 1969 was that the Insistence on political reliability was still paramount over other factors, ^ 172
The problem of qualified personnel which was, thus, initially present because of the under-developed character of pre-revolutionary
Cuban society, has been exacerbated after the revolution by the flow of trained personnel from the country, the fear of the bureau cracy and the excessive desire for politically trustworthy economic cadre over economic considerations. These factors have all combined to insure the continuation of the low numbers of qualified personnel after nearly two decades have passed.
B) Lack of Discipline
A second major problem which was evident in the functioning of the command administration of Cuban agriculture during the initial years was the inability of the central leadership of INRA to control the actions of middle and lower level administrators. The essential characteristic of a command administration is that a small group of the top leadership can make decisions for the entire system and then expect that such decisions will be obeyed. The basic assumption of the Cuban leadership on this point was indicated by Castro himself in his talks with Lee Lockwood in 1965;
...with this system you can utilize the land in an optimum way, absolutely rational, determining at each moment that whatever crop benefits the nation shall be produced.95
Thus the establishment of authoritative relations from the top down in a command system is essential, and the Cuban system has had problems in this area.
During the initial agrarian reform process, in the course of the / expropriation of the latifundia lands over 405 hectares, many 173 instances of over-zealous expropriation occurred,Carlos Rafael
Rodriguez indicates that in 1964 the regime returned some illegally expropriated property or made appropriate payment to the owners,^
Rodriguez also disucsses the fact that during 1962 and 1963 the procurement arm of INRA resorted to force in some instances to take the produce of peasants from them,9® This was against the regime policy of maintaining a strong alliance with the peasantry, and was clearly a case of breach of the orders of INRA.
Edward Boorstein is again a useful source of "inside" informa tion on the nature of the INRA bureaucracy in the early years. The lack of discipline and authoritative cohesion, which made it difficult for the center to control its operatives in the field, is discussed in Boorsteln's book, He described the often free wheeling and undisciplined nature of Cuba's early agricultural administration. He calls the administrative style, por la libre and describes it in the following manner;
The method of work and administration that prevailed during the first years of the revolution was known to the Cubans as por la libre.It is not easy to give the full flavor of this much used Cuban term in English. It means 'freely without restraints.1 When an official does something without bothering to get instructions from above or to coordinate with other officials who might be interested, he is said to be acting por la libre— on his own.,.The general method of administration is el por la libre— free wheeling. 99
The lack of discipline among lower level administrators was also disucssed by Guevara who refereed to it as guerillerismo. 174
The similarity of guerlllerlsmo to por la libre is clear upon reading Guevara's description of guerlllerlsmo:
The first steps as a revolutionary state, as well as the early period of our formation as a government was strongly colored by the fundamentals of guerilla tactics as a type of state administration. 'Guerillerlsmo' transferred the experience of armed struggle from the mountains and fields of Cuba into the various administrative and mass organiza tions, which mean in practice that only the important revolutionary slogans were followed (and often interpreted in different ways...) by all administrative...organizations. The way to solve specific problems was left to the free will of each of the leaders.1®®
Therefore, from two knowledgeable sources we have discussion of the similar general problem of lack of discipline and authoritative cohesion in Cuban administration during the early years.
The reasons for the poor discipline in the new bureaucracy of
INRA must have been partly because of the guerilla heritage in which individual field leaders often had to rapidly make "field expediant" decisions independently of the guerilla army top leader ship. Guevara refers to the impact of this legacy in the quote above. However, there was another probable factor that encouraged the poor discipline, and that was the general disorganization of the
INRAcentral offices. Boorsteih discusses the character of INRA in the early years;
Notwithstanding the organization on paper and the statement about centrally managing the state farms one by one, the administration of agriculture was in practice highly decentralized: decentralization simply imposed itself. INRA did not haye the organization or knowledge to exercise systematic direction, review, and control of the cooperatives and state farms. There was highly centralized decision making on specific problems, often on details. But it was sporadic: it touched only a fraction of the work 175
of the farms. The responsibility for continuous every day work and problems fe],l on the farms themselves.101
In effect, the administrator at the production level or the middle
levels often had to make decisions because the center did not make decisions or worse, made inappropriate decisions because of
insufficient knowledge of local conditions. Thus, to some extent,
the lack of discipline was a function of inappropriate actions at
the top levels. Rene Dumont relates the experience of. some of the granjas in Pinar del Rio province which did not receive planting instructions for the year until November* And, "Some areas were never sown at all in 1963, after being plowed four times for different crops."102 Such experiences were bound to encourage even the most conscientious managers to take action on their own. The fall of total national agricultural production in 1962 and 1963 as indicated earlier are understandable in the light of such a situation.
The presence of poor discipline is understandable in the early years of the revolution, when old habits persisted and new organiza tions had just formed. However, it is a problem that still appears to effect Cuban agricultural administration to some extent. The following example should serve to illustrate this point. In January,
1971, after the beginning of the sugar harvest that year, Castro called together the administrative heads of various levels and agencies of INRA, labor and the Ministry of Sugar, and lectured them on the necessity of using a new method of cane harvesting (called cane burning). What is clear from Granma Weekly Reviews' reporting 176
of the Incident is that orders had previously been Issued by the
leadership to use the new method, and yet in many areas the managers
of the granjas were Ignoring the orders and using traditional
methods to harvest. According to Castro, "...the Party and INRA
leadership in the provinces and the regions didn't understand the
problem...The cane burning method has run into the traditional
resistance all new methods encounter." It was the language of an
exasperated man. He was, in effect, having to scold a reluctant and
undisciplined bureaucracy. Furthermore, his comments suggest (as
we are arguing here) that other regime attempts to alter traditional
methods had also been disregarded in the paBt. At the end of the
meeting Castro directly ordered the administrators to see that the
new method was u s e d . 103 xt was probably an instance where lack’of
educated personnel (who might have better understood the new procedure
for cane harvesting) and lack of authoritative cohesion in the
administrative apparatus went hand in hand to create a substantial
problem for the leadership. Clearly the problem of poor discipline
still haunts the regime in the 1970's.
Conclusion
The adoption of the command agricultural system in Cuba required
the presence of a competent, knowledgeable, centralized administrative
apparatus to carry out the decisions of the leadership and to
coordinate the diverse parts of the system. It seems clear from the events of the past fifteen years that the Cuban agricultural 177
administration has had Its share of problems. The lack of qualified personnel and the lack of discipline have made it difficult for the
command administration to function as effectively as possible.
The Cuban version of command administration has differed
substantially from the Soviet model, particularly in the latter
1960's. The use of the military to control and oversee the
functioning of agriculture has been very different from the type
of administration called for by the Soviet example. The use of the military, in all probability, was necessitated by the weakness in
the administrative bureaucracy, and the ineffectiveness of the
PCC to carry out its oversight function. There were undoubtedly other factors in the situation which encouraged the Cuban leaders
to use the military (i.e., the guerilla tradition ofthe regime, and the extraordinary pressure generated by the 10 million ton
sugar harvest goal of 1970). However, the basic problems of lack of qualified personnel and discipline had to be significant
factors in bringing about the militarization of the economy. Thus,
the problems which surfaced because of the choice to adopt the
command model in the first place, were causal factors in the later deviation from the model. In effect, the Cubans were saying, when
they used their military, that an effective command administration was beyond their capabilities at that time.
The combines are a second deviation from the Soviet model of administration, and it appears likely that the decision to adopt
the combine-type of organization was related to the problems of 178
lack o£ personnel and discipline, also. The tobacco combine
(CUBATARACO) was adopted, according to President Dorticos, because
of the confusion which existed in the tobacco sector under the
origianl INRA supervision. In discussing the reasons for the new
organization, Dorticos described the old situation under INRA:
The chaotic disorganization of the tobacco industry prevented, among other things, an inner synthesis of the entire sectors activities and a unified direction that would centralize its efforts In the interests of the final ends of the product...104
Thus, the tobacco combine, and presumably the other combines,
represented a decentralizing retreat from the effort to centrally
control all aspects of the agricultural economy from one administra
tive bureaucracy (INRA) that was not capable of the task. Certainly,
poorly trained, experienced and disciplined personnel would have
had a key role in the failure. There are additional agruments in • favor of the combine arrangement, such as effeciencies derived from
the production specialization, which may also have worked for its
adoption. However, it seems clear that administrative weakness
encountered in one centralized administration was also a factor.
Thus, again, the deviations from the Soviet model seem to indicate
that a command administration of the type indicated in the model were beyond the capacities of the regime.
In the post-1970 period the Cubans seem to be moving back toward
the more orthodox system represented in the Soviet model. As we have
indicated, there seems to be a determined effort to strengthen the
PCC, and the state bureaucracy in general, including INRA. The 179 removal of Che military from the economy seems to be an additional goal. The return to a reliance on state agricultural administration is probably the result partly of the desire to make the civilian bureaucracy work, since the long run interests of the economy would be best served by this, and perhaps by increased confidence in an increasingly better educated and experienced bureaucracy. The reduction in production goals from the 1970 target have also reduced the pressure on the agricultural administration. The post-1970 goals have been approximately half of the 10 million ton goal of
1970, thus making it more realistic to expect the agricultural administration to function in an adequate fashion. Castro has, himself, alluded to this when he was recently critical of the unrealistic goal of 1970.105 In addition, the end of the anti bureaucracy campaign may have removed the disfavorable atmosphere in which all administrators must have had to work, prior to 1970,■
However, given the continued stress on the need for trained admini strative personnel and technicians in agriculture, and such incidences - as the failure to follow harvest guidelines in 1971, it seems clear that Cuba is till suffering from an ineffective agricultural administration.
A general assessment of Cuba's experience with command admini stration indicates that though an orthodox, centralized version of the command apparatus was adopted initially, that by the mld-
1960's the Cubans were forced to decentralize in certain sectors
(i.e., those areas of the economy now controlled by the combines). Moreover, by the latter 1960*8, under the pressure of unrealistic sugar production goals, the regime was forced to rely on the military to run the rural economy becuase of the ineffectiveness of the state bureaucracy. Since 1970, the Castro government increased the role of the state bureaucracy, while at the same time it has reduced its production goals substantially. In sum the command administration which now exists in Cuba is less centralized then the type originally adopted. It clearly allows greater regime control, but the Cuban experience also indicates that command administration
« in its most centralized form has been difficult to effectively utilize. Thus, a modified version of the type found in the Soviet model has become necessary. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR
^-Jacques Chonchol, "Analisis Critico dc la Reforma Agraria Cubans," El Trimestre Economlco, January-March, 1963, p. 92.
2Andres Blanchl, "Agriculture: Post Revolutionary Development", Cuba; The Economic and Social Revolution, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), edited by Dudley Seers, pp* 103-104.
3James O'Connor, The Origins of Socialism In Cuba. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Press, 1970) p. 132.
^Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 46.
C Bianchi, op. cit., p. 104.
^Ibld., p. 402, see footnote 12.
^Boorsteln, op. cit., pp. 39 and 44, EdwardBoorstein w s b an American economist of marxist persuasions who worked in the Cuban economy bureaucracy (INRA) in the early years of the Castro regime.
^Chonchol, op. cit., p. 93.
^Bianchi, op. cit. p. 110.
^Economic Survey for Latin America for 1963 (hereafter ECLA), by U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, New York: United Nations, 1964.
^Cited by Bianchi, p. 124.
Connor, op. cit.. p. 103.
l^Chonchol, pp. c i t . , pp. 128-132.
l^Granma Weekly Review (hereafter, GWR), May 2, 1967, p. 4; GWR, January 4, 1976, p, 6,
^ECLA, pp. cit., p. 261; Bianchi, op. cit,, pp. 126-127,
^Bianchi, op. cit., p. 403, see footnote 26.
181 182
17Amaldo Milan, "Experiencia de la JUCE1 en Las Villas," Cuba Socialists, November, 1961, pp. 45-46,
lBCarlos Rafael Rodriguez, "El Nuevo Camino de la Agriculture Cubana," Cuba Soclallsta, November, 1963, pp. 81-82.
19Roberto M. Bernardo, "Managing and Financing the Firm," Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), edited by Carmelo Mesa Lago, pp. 192-193.
2®ECLA, op. cit., p. 265j Bernardo, ibid., p. 192.
21Bernado, ibid., p. 192.
22Rene Dumont, Is Cuba Socialist? (New York: Viking, 1974), pp. 29 and 32.
23ECLA, op. cit., p. 261, see footnote 6.
2^Bernado, op. cit., p. 195; Carmelo Mesa Lago and Luc Zephlrin, "Central Planning", in Mesa Lago, op. cit., pp. 162-163.
25CWR. July 16, 1967, p. 12.
2*>GWR, July 16, 1967, p. 12. The article cited here is only concerned with CUBATABACO, the tobacco.combine. However, we are assuming that all combines are organized in a similar faBhlon. There is very little information available on the combines as a . result there is some difference of opinion about them. For example, Dumont says that they are responsible for all phases of production including planting and cultivation. However, based on the cited article, the position here is that the combines are not responsible for such phases as planting and cultivation. The INRA bureaucracy and the appropriate production unit staff are responsible for this phase.
27CWR, July 16, 1967, p. 12
2%esa Lago and Zephirin, op. cit., pp. 156-157, and 162-164.
OQ GWR, December 28, 1975, p, 6.
30Leo Huberman and Paul Sweezy, Socialism In Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 114,
3^-For a more detailed discussion of party organlztlon see Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroism and Communism (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1970).
32GWR, September 10, 1967, p. 4, 33rus1 Castro, cited in Millan, op. cit., p. 45.
34carmelo, Meas Lago, The Labor Sector and Socialist Distri bution in Cuba (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 31.
35see Boorstein's discussion of INRA, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
36che Guevara, "On Economic Planning in Cuba," Venceremos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) edited by John Gerassi, pp. 139-152.
37uoorstein, op« cit.. p. 48-49.
38g w r , July 16, 1967, p. 12.
^®Ritter, op. cit., p. 236.
40see GWR for thiB period.
41gWR, October 9, 1966, p. 4.
42see, for example, GWR, March 5, 1967, pp. 2 and 4.
43wassily Leontief, "NoteB on a Visit to Cuba", NY Review . August 21, 1969, p. 19.
44cWR, January 4, 1976, p. 9.
^^Andres Suarez, "Leadership, Ideology and Political Party", in Mesa Lago, op. cit., p. 10,
46cWRt May 14» 1967, p. 11; GWR, September 3, 1969, p. 4.
^ S u a r e z , "Leadership, Ideology and Political Party," op. cit., p. 10.
4®GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2
49carraelo Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970*8. (Albuquerque; University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 68.
SOlbid.
SlDumont, op. cit.. p. 96.
52GWR. October 9, 1966, p. 4.
S^GWR, November 12, 1967, p. 1; Dumont, op. cit., pp. 98-100.
54g w r , November 4, 1969, p. 2. 184
55G W R , January 4, 1976, p. 7.
56GWR, May 31, 1970, p. 12.
57GWR, November 26, 1972, 58ibld.
59g]£R, January 4, 1976, p. 2.
60GWR. January 4/ 1976, p. 9.
^George Volsky, "Cuba Fifteen Years Later", Current History January, 1974, p. 11
^2GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2; GWR, March 7, 1975, p. 12. See also Raul Castro's speech, GWR, March 14, 1976, p. 2.
^Ritter, op. cit., pp. 80-81.
64q *Connor, op. cit., p. 93.
65carlos Rafael Rodriguez, "The Cuban Revolution and the Peasantry," World Marxist Review, October 1965, p. 65.
8®GWR, September, 1966, pp, 3-4.
6?GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2.
68GWR, September 4, 1966, p. 3.
69Rltter, op. cit., p. 95.
7QCWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2.
7lBoorstein, op. cit.. p. 48.
72Ibld.. pp. 20-21.
73Nelson Valdes, "The Radical Transformation of Cuban Education," Cuba In Revolution. (New York: Doubleday, 1972), edited by R. Bonachea nad N. Valdes, pp. 424.
7^Erlc Baklanoff, "International Economic Relations", Mesa Lago, Revolutionary Change in Cuba, op. cit., pp. 269-271,
75Ibid., p. 269.
76Ibld., p. 270.
77Ibid., p. 271. 185
78ibld., p. 270.
79Dumont, op. cit., p. 33.
80Choncol, op. cit., pp. 94-95j Fidel Castro, "Economic Reform: Cuba's Agrarian Reform", Fidel Castro Speaks, (New York: Grove Press, 1969), edited by Martin Kanner and James Petra, pp. 33-49.
^Bianchi. op. cit., p. 493, see footnote 13.
82G W R , August 14, 1966, p. 10.
83GWR, May 15, 1966, p. 7.
84GWR, October 8, 1968, p. 4.
88gittcr, op. cit., p. 249.
8®Dumont, op. cit., p. 97.
87Rodriguez, "El Nuevo Camino de la Agriculture Cubana," op. cit., pp. 81-82.
88g w r , January 4, 1976, p. 2
89Ibid.
98See speeches of leaders in GWR for this period.
"Bianchi, op. cit., p. 106.
®2Boorstein, op. cit., pp. 18 and 21 says that Fidel and Che and their associates had read Lenin's State and Revolution, and this influenced their move to exclude the skilled "bourgeoise" of Cuba as politically unreliable,
"Ritter, op. cit.. p. 95.
^Dumont, op. cit.,
"Lee Lockwood, Castro's Cuba, Cuba's Fidel, (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 97.
"O'Connor, op. cit., p. 104,
"Rodriguez, "The Cuban Revolution and the Peasantry," op. cit.. pp. 68.
98Ibid., p. 66. 186
^Boorstein, op. cit.. p. 135.
lOOche Guevara, "Against: Bureaucratism," Gerassi, op. cit. t p. 220.
^■^^-Boorsteln, op. cit., p. 49.
op. cit., p. 29.
103g w r , January 31, 1971, p. 1.
104GWR, July 16, 1967, p. 12.
1Q5g w r , December 28, 1975, p. 5. CHAPTER FIVE
PLANNING IN CUBAN AGRICULTURE
The decision to eradicate private agriculture (with the ex
ception of the small farm) and the destruction of the free market
mechanism in the early years of the revolution made planning a
necessity in Cuban agriculture. Planning was desirable in the eyes
of the Cuban leadership because it would mean central control over
all aspects of the national production effort. Central planning
along, with centralized administration and state ownership of the
land, would allow the leadership to determine what and how much
(within the limits of resources, technology levels, etc.) was to be
produced. The regime could plan production which was supportive of
its political, ideological and developmental goals. Reginio Boti,
the first Minister of the Economy expressed it in the following way
Economic planification is...the rational utilization of the productive forces of a society in order to reach...the goals that society has outlined for the satisfaction of its material and cultural necessities.1
Thus, the decision to adopt Soviet-like central planning was made with great enthusiasm.
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the structure and ' process of central planning in Cuba, then to compare it to the
Soviet approach, and finally to discuss the problems and lessons arising from the adoption of central planning in Cuban agriculture. 188
The Organizational Structure of Agricultural Planning
The idea of planning having a role in the Cuban economy was
first hinted at by Castro as early as 1953 in his "History Will
Absolve Me" speech at the Moncada trial.2 In 1957 the "Thesis of
the 26th of July Movement" specifically called for planning in the 3 Cuban national economy. During the initial year of the revolution*
1959, their was discussion about the type of planning that would be desirable, and in March, 1960* a Central Planning Board (JUCE PLAN -
Junta Central de Planiflcatlon) was established. Since JUCEPLAN was initially organized prior to the public adoption of socialism, its initial goals were primarily to coordinate the economic policy of the new regime with the public and private sectors of the economy.
In 1961, when the regime moved to fully implement a socialist ecbnomy, JUCEPLAN was made the central planning agency with the necessary authority and responsibilities to carry out such a function.
JUCEPLAN was and still is today presided over by the Prime Minister
(Castro) and its membership is made up of representatives of the principal economic ministries and other agencies such as the National
Bank, plus its own permanent staff. JUCEPLAN is subordinate only to the Council of Ministers.^
JUCEPLAN'S responsibilities and internal structure have varied somewhat since 1961. From 1961 until 1966 JUCEPLAN was organized as follows: There was (1) a general, plenary council which was con cerned with broad matters of responsibility in the economy, (.2) an 189 executive committee of the plenary council made specific policy and
Issued plan and budgetary directives (.3) an executive secretariat made up of permanent staff which worked for the executive committee, and
(4) six directorates (also permanent working staff) responsible for planning in the six major sectors of the economy* The six directorates were, Central Administration, Agriculture, Industry, Domestic Trade and Transport and Construction, Balances, and Statistics. During this period from 1961-66 JUCEPLAN was responsible for both short range, yearly plans and for longer range plans of several years duration. As the titles of the last two directorates indicate, JUCEPLAN was also responsible for collecting appropriate Information both as a check on £ the plan in operation and for use in making future plans.
The agricultural portion of the national plan during this 1961-1966 period was the responsibility of the agricultural directorate. The agricultural directorate worked with the INRA in determining and imple menting the plan for agriculture. It is almost certainly true that when the Ministry of Sugar was formed in 1964 (and later the various combines) it was included in the planning process for the sugar sector of agriculture. Within INRA the administration for the state sector, and ANAP for the private sector, were used to disaggregate the pl'an and collect information for JUCEPLAN.^
In addition to JUCEPLAN there was the local planning and watchdog agency known as the Board of Coordination, Execution and Inspection
(JUCEI - Juntas de Cooperacion, Execucion y Inspecion). JUCEI boards were established in 1961 to help coordinate and monitor local production 190
efforts (see Chapter IV) and to help serve as information collectors
for JUCEPLAN at the local, production unit level, JUCEI vas also to
encourage local Involvement In national planning as well as encourage
O purely local planning of local projects.
In 1966 JUCEPLAN underwent a major reorganization and it lost some
of its former responsibilities. Internally, JUCEPLAN was organized
into three vice-minlstrles, One was in charge of economic development,
the second was responsible for sectoral planning and absorbed the old
directorate, and the third was In charge of national balances. There was also an office in charge of statistics and another in charge of
organization and methodology.
In addition to Internal reorganization JUCEPLAN lost its responsi
bility for determining the medium and long range plans. This responsi
bility was given to the Economic Commission of the newly formed PCC.
Thus, JUCEPLAN retained official responsibility only for the annual
plan.^ JUCEPLAN also remained responsible for the collection of infor mation. The local JUCEI organizations continued to function under
JUCEPLAN, however, they were renamed as Municiple Administration in
the same year of 1966.^®
In 1970, after the failure of the 10 million ton sugar harvest, and the ensuing economic shake-up, JUCEPLAN was again made responsible
for medium and long range planning, in addition to its yearly planning
duties, A five year plan for 1976-80 was prepared by JUCEPLAN during
the early 1970's11, and it was adopted by the First Party Congress in
1975.12 191
The outward structural features, despite the internal reorganiza tion of 1966 and 1970, have remained the same today as they were In
1961. This organization is outlined in Figure 5,1*
The yearly planning process has been outlined by Cuban economic officials in at least two separate publications, 13 and the descrip tion which follows is based upon these outlines. It is important to remember, however, that what follows is a description of the ideal planning process, and as we shall discuss below, the ideal process has not always been followed.
The first: step in the planning process in the issuing of broad economic directives by the political leadership. After considering resources available, goals and alternative strategies top leadership
(Fidel and Raul Castro who are Prime Minister and First Deputy Prime
Minister, ■ and others) issues these directives from the supreme economic organ, the Cuban Council of Ministers to JUCEPLAN. The directives are, of course, approved by the party hierarchy (there is obviously some overlap here since Fidel and Raul are not only first and second in command of the Council of Minister, but also are First and Second
Secretaries of the PCC apparatus). These directives generally Indicate the yearly growth rate for the economy and the various sectors, the distribution of gross production between consumption and Investment, etc.
These broad directives are taken by JUCEPLAN and converted into rough draft, albeit more detailed sectoral plans. These sectoral plans, including agriculture, indicate such elements as the level of Council of Ministers
; JUCEPLAN Ministry of INRA Sugar
Regional Prov Administration ANA?
i n ■ — .*■ ■■ f Agrupacion Regional Regional I
JUCEI j Prod UnitSmall Farm | Local |
(Administracions Locales)
FIGURE 5.1 Agricultural Planning Organization. 193
Investment, labor requirements an levels of production. For
the overall economy about 200 key physical, production projections * , for specific products are Indicated. These "material Balances" amount to a projection in physical measuring units of total planned outputs for these 200 products, many of which are agricultural or agricultural derivative products, The material balances for the agri cultural products become the agricultural sector production quotas.
These aggregate quotas are then disaggregated down through the various levels of INRA, with each subsector of 1NRA (i.e. ANAP and the state sector) being given their individual aggregate quotas. Thus the basic state farm and private farm production units ultimately receive an * individual plan for type and amount of crops to be produced, amount of land to be cultivated, amount of seed and machinery and general investment level to be received. The production unit and the aggrupa- clon evaluate the plan, and the quota to estimate its realism and accuracy. Then the basic levels of the system pass their reactions
(i.e. attempts to get more of this input and less of that quota) back up through the bureaucracy. The central offices of ANAP and INRA rcaggregate the plan and new estimates from lower levels and after consideration pass the plans and quotas (which may be altered from the original) back to JUCEPLAN, Further haggling may occur, and ultimately the agricultural plan is reaggregated with the other sectors and passed back to the Council of Ministers for approval. The Council of Ministers then approves this finalized plan in the form of directives and quotas which become the new yearly plan to be approved and accepted by the 194 party, This process takes about a year to complete. The first five year plan (1976-80) which recently went Into effect took longer to prepare (It was In preparation since at least 1972) but essentially follows the same pattern, It Is, of course, more general In nature, than the yearly plans which are the specific regime planning statement.^
As indicated above, this is the way the planning process is to proceed ideally. In actuality, the planning process has often been much different and considerably less organized. Edward Boorsteln who worked In the Cuban economic bureaucracy from 1960-1963 indicates that the early transition to a planned economy was indeed very disorganized
/ and a difficult undertaking tf'at was sometimes, perhaps often, less than successful.*5 The Cubans adopted the Soviet planning model which was taught to them In late 1960 by Czechoslovakian economists (Czechos lovakia was also using the orthodox Soviet planning model at that 16 time). There was very little adaptation of the planning procedures to fit Cuban circumstances, and apparently little discussion or under standing of why certain actions were undertaken. Che Guevara, who was at the time the Minister of Industry, later wrote that "...we copied with exaggerated exactitude the techniques of planlfication of a brother country*. And, Boorsteln observed the following of the conference where Czechs taught-Cubans their planning system:
There was no discussion of why the different [planning] organiza tions were set up the way they were, what alternative forms were possible, and what advantages and disadvantages they might have. The planning models used in Czechoslovakia were presented as immutable and fully applicable everywhere... Placing all the emphasis on the formal methods of planning, the visiting techni cians made no attempt to isolate and grapple with Cuba's 195
concrete economic problems. No one discussed the special importance of agriculture, sugar and foreign trade in the Cuban economy. No one touched on the problem of tailoring programs and goals to resources. The lectures translated into Spanish for Cubans, could, with minor changes have been translated into Persian for Iranians,1®
Given this lack of give-and-take discussion, the understanding of the planning system must have been superficial on the part of the
Cubans. Boorsteln substantiates this by indicating that the Cuban planners used copies of the same forms for collecting information, that the Czechs and Soviets used in their own more advanced economies.^
Knowing about this superficial understanding of planning on the part of the Cubans at least partially helps to explain what happened in the following months and years as the system was implemented.
The first annual plan in Cuba was for the year 1961, and Guevara wrote of it, that it was unrealistic, ..."a laboratory plan, ... merely a written expression of our good intentions... It was a bureaucratic plan Isolated... and not linked to reality."^ Furthermore, as Guevara was to write in 1963, the planning process for all of the early years was sporadic and continually interrupted by military mobilizations for real or fanciful invasions by U.S. and Cuban emigre forces. 21
Boorsteln supports Guevara's assertion when he discusses the develop ment of the 1962 plan,
Boorsteln says that the planning process for 1962 was not begun until March, 1961 and it was interrupted almost immediately by the mobilization caused by the Bay of Pigs invasion, 22 Boorsteln goes further to say that when the planning process was again taken up about ten days afterward it was characterized by excessive formalism. Forms 196 were filled out with statistics that were often based on guesses because upper administrative levels demanded that the forms be filled out.
The lower levels of the administrative and planning bureaucracies guessed at statistics where they had little hard information and upper levels filed the forms away and, because of their inapplicable and erroneous quality, never used them. In effect, the formal requirements of the planning process became as important as the actual production process itself which the planning was to guide. 23
In addition to the excessive formalism of the bureaucratic "game" of planning, lack of realism in estimating production potential began to manifest itself. Production goals were set at levels that simply could not be reached. No doubt, as Castro himself has indicated, part of the problem was due to revolutionary exuberance and the the desire to set high goals in order to get the greatest production efforts out of people,^ However, the problem also had to be partly the result of the poor quality of information available to planners. The 1962 plan was completed in September of 1961 and was so unrealistic that it was never used and a new version was immediately called for. There were ultimately seven versions of the first plan before it was found to be formally acceptable. 25 And even then, according to Boorsteln:
The 1962 Plan did not control the Cuban economy... The Plan could not be given the force of law— this would have been to legislate unreality and error, to force people into doing what was clearly wrong just because this plan told them to.26
The result was disorganization and general chaos. In spite of the plan,
(or perhaps because of its unrealistic nature) the administrators in agriculture, (as indicated in Chapter III) began to make decisions 197
on their own* Managers give lip service to the plan but made deci
sions according to their own criteria. Again, according to Boorsteln,
Whenever people saw that the plan offered no answers, or clearly erroneous answers to the problems confronting them, they disregard ed it; they took whatever action the problems seemed to call for. A large gap developed between the Plan and the practical work of running the economy. The Plan became a ritual which people per formed with respect, they held meetings on the Plan, worked up new variants, and later even made a few attempts to check on plan ful fillment, But the real work of running the economy was still being done por la libre.27
According to Michel Gutelman, a French scholar, who was in Cuba,
the reaction of the regime to the economic disorganization of 1961-62 was to increase central control. Agricultural planning was done at
the top levels only and lower levels were given the plan to execute, 28 without having participated in its preparation. The plans which
resulted were rigid and still unrealistic in their goals, however.
According to Alban Lataste, a Chilean economist who (like Boorstein) worked in the Cuban economic bureaucracy (from 1960-1966) these high
level planning decisions were disorganized and had little basis in
economic reality. Plans during this period were made according to what was most desirable in Castro and Guevara's eyes rather than what was economically feasible. Central planning was, thus, whimsical or "subjective" in nature rather than relevant to improved long-range economic decision making. 29 The impact on production was to continue 30 the disorganization and low levels of output.
In 1966, along with the reorganization of JUCEPLAN, and undoubtedly because of the chaos and ineffectiveness in the planning sector, the nature of planning began to change. Prior to this time the attempt 198
had been made to formulate an Integrated yearly plan for the entire
economy. After 1966, and until the 1970*8, the planning approach
taken was to develop separate plans, or what Castro calls "minlplans",
for various Important sectors of the economy. In agriculture there
were miniplans for sugar, cattle, eggs, vegetables, coffee, etc.*^
The plans were not yearly plans but multi-yearly (The sugar mlniplan,
for example, was from 1964 until 1970 and was to culminate in the 10
million ton harvest) and the coordination of the various miniplans
was to be on a practical, day-to-day basis, rather than on an advanced,
highly integrated and long range basis. 32 In effect, it was a long
step away from central planning. The plans were formulated and imple
mented on a relatively independent basis in the various economic sec
tors.
The effect of the miniplan approach was not desirable as the
failure of sugar plan indicates. According to Wassily Leontief, a
Harvard economist who visited Cuba in 1969 and talked with Carlos
Rafael Rodriguez, a major impact of the non-integrated planning approach was that sufficient overall system coordination was not present.
In the words of Leontief;
No wonder bottlenecks develop everywhere, inventories run down, and unforseen shortages occur resulting in frequent extremely costly shutdowns,33
Thus, as a result of these planning problems, economic inefficiencies
continued to plague the Cuban economy in the latter 1960*8.
A further feature of Cuban planning during the latter 1960*s was
the adoption of special projects, usually at the request of Fidel 199
Castro.^ These special projects were usually concerned with one more or less isolated project (such as Fidel’s crocodile farm). 3 5
Allocations were taken from the input to normally planned operations with less priority (i.e, projects that had not caught the special
Interest of top leadership). This resulted in shortages for already
planned endeavors that were underway and the general disruption and dis
credit of routine planning and administration. The impact of such spon
taneous projects was to create further production inefficiency and
disruption. 36 Such a situation undoubtedly helped to prompt Edward
Gonzalez sentiment that the post-1970 emphasis on institutionalization and routinizatlon of the Cuban system was as much to protect Cuba from
Castros "presence" as from his unexpected absence. 37
In 1970, coinciding with the failure of the 10 million ton harvest and the economic dislocation it had caused in the rest of the economy, the system underwent substantial change again. In the planning sector the miniplan approach was abandoned in favor of a return to central planning. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who had worked to Improve central planning since the mid-1960's, was apparently largely responsible for its reimplementation. Mesa-Lago indicates that during the latter 1960's,
Rodriguez put together a team of economists and statisticians whose goal was to develop a central planning system that would work more 38 effectively than the central planning of the early 1960's, In 1969, according to Wassily Leonteif, this team of planners was officially attached to JUCEPLAN.3® The.fact that this team of planners were
Initially put to work on improving central planning, during a period 200 when mintplanning was the prevailing modus operendi, suggests that the whole miniplan approach was not well liked and/or a stop-gap measure. When seen from this perspective, it is likely that the Cuban leadership wanted to reinstitute central planning as soon as it was possible to do so without the chaos which marked the process in the early years.
Though information is scarce, in 1971 the first yearly plan since the early 1960's was implemented.^® There were also yearly central plans for 1972 through 1975,^ There was also much discussion of the development of the first five year plan prior to its implementation in 1976.^ What is clearly signaled by the presence of such plans is a return to Soviet-like central planning orthodoxy. Three factors are present in the 1970's which were not present in the early 1960's that helped to justify the return to a system that did not work before.
The first factor is the obvious one of having had a decade of experi ence with planning, and the presence of more experienced men such as
Carlos Rafael Rodrigues and his team of economists and statisticians.
The second factor is the change of strategy. Since 1970 the produc tion goals in sugar and elsewhere have been lower and more realistic.
Thus, there has been considerably less pressure on central planning.
President Oswaldo Dorticos told a congress of sugar cane technicians in 1972 that they would not be asked to make a "single, great push" in sugar again. Rather, he argued that slower but steadier growth would be the strategy of the leadership.^ Sugar production goals 201 have been approximately 6,5 tons per year since the failure to meet LL the 10 million ton plan of 1970,
The third factor which has encouraged the Cuban return to central planning is the presence of substantial Soviet aid and advice. In
December, 1970 Cuba and the USSR signed an agreement which created a joint organization called the "Commission For Economic, Scientific, and Technical Collaboration", The general purpose of the Commission was to create an official forum where:
,,,the collaboration given by the USSR to Cuba for the latters economic, scientific and technical development will lead to the discovery of new ways for mutual collaboration...^5
One of the apparent, specific purposes of the Commission was to allow the Soviets to oversee the Cuban planning process on a continuing yearly basis. During the meeting in December 1970, Nikolai Baibakov, the
Chairman of Soviet G0SPLAN, apparently reviewed the Cuban plan and how it related to the Soviet plan.^ Since that time there have been numerous meetings by the Commission. In 1972 Cuba formally joined
COMECON, and also joined the "Intergovernmental Commission of Social-
A 7 1st Countries for The Development of Electronic Computation .
Each of which would have provided channels of more planning aid and advice. In terms of actual planning personnel, one report indicates that there are approximately 3000 Soviet civilian economist/planners in Cuba in the mid-W?©^,^®
These changes in the situation in the 1970's have undoubtedly led to a more successful approach to planning. According to Castro, the overall economic growth rate in Cuba since 1970 has risen at a rate 202
that was better than expectedimproved planning is undoubtedly part of the explanation* Nevertheless, there have continued to be some deep-rooted problems in planning that continue to frustrate
Cuban effort at development in agriculture. These problems are long standing and are not only present now but were at the root of the early central planning chaos of the 1960*3. The nature of these prob lems is related to the general problem of underdevelopment, itself.
However, before discussion of these problems, we turn to a brief com parison of Cuban and Soviet planning.
A Comparison of Cuban and Soviet Agricultural Planning
The nature of agricultural planning is the USSR has been described in chapter one. A reading of that chapter and the first part of this chapter (above) indicates that in many ways the Cubans have attempted to follow the Soviet approach to planning. There is a central planning agency in each system (JUCEPLAN in Cuba, and GOSPLAN in the USSR) which is responsible for the planning process. These central planning agencies are formally responsible to their respective Councils of
Ministers, who formulate overall national production goals that are to be embodied in the plan. Both GOSPLAN and JUCEPLAN work through the various levels of the agricultural administration apparatus in each system in the course of plan formulation and implementation.
Also, in each system there is a formal responsibility vested in the party to oversee the planning function. 203
There are also some differences that are significant. The fact that agricultural administration Is essentially decentralized among
INRA, the combines and the Ministry of Sugar, means that JUCEPLAN must work with several administrations in aggregating the overall agricultural plan, In addition, the presence of the Municipal Adminis tration or JUCEI at the local level, which aids in the collection of information for planners, is also an Institutional variation from the
Soviet model. In all likelihood it results from the general weakness of the party at the local level in Cuba. It may also be present, of course, to encourage local participation in the planning process.
There have been other differences in the planning process, how ever, between Cuba and the Soviet Union which appear to indicate the presence of more serious problems resulting from the adoption of the
Soviet model. The Cubans originally set up all the appropriate insti tutions which were like their prototypes in the Soviet system, but they did not seem to be successful at making them function. The chaos and disorganization that Boorsteln and Guevara have described as being present in the early years indicate the great difficulty of utilizing a sophisticated system of central planning on a short term notice in a third world nation such as Cuba. In addition, during the latter part of .the 1960's it appears that the entire system of central plan ning broke down and the sectoral or miniplans, as well as special pro ject plans, replaced the idea of an integrated yearly plan for all of agriculture. In effect, under the strain of the approaching 10 million 204
ton harvest of 1970 the entire planning procedure seems to have been
decentralized in much the same manner the agricultural administration
was decentralized.
In the period of time since 1970, there appears to have been an
effort made to return to orthodox central planning. The public re
emphasis on Integrated yearly and five year plans by the leadership is
one indication of this return to orthodoxy. In addition, Cuba has
begun to work much more closely with the USSR nad COMECON to gain plan
ning aid. Such aid and advice as the Cuban's have gotten is undoubt
edly orthodox in nature and encourages integrated central planning.
Finally, Castro's public recognition of the breakdown of the planning
process in the latter 1960's seems to imply that such deviations as
poorly integrated planning will be avoided. The unrealistic goals
of the 1960's, particularly in sugar have also been abandoned, pre
sumably to allow the planning institution a better chance of success.
The problems which were present in the first decade that brought about a decentralized planning approach , however, are not easy ones to over
come. They still are very much present. We turn now to a discussion of these problems.
The Problems Resulting From the Adoption of Central Planning in Cuba
During the process of creating a new society in post-revolutionary
Cuba, the Castro government has encountered problems of all types with varying degrees of importance for the development of agriculture.
Specifically in the area of planning there have been a variety of 205 critical problems. For example, one of the most important features of the new regime was the atmosphere of revolutionary euphoria that seemed to permeate all official endeavors. This euphoria, or over confidence, periodically resulted in over estimating the capabilities of the regime and the society to meet certain goals. In 1963, Guevara wrote the following about the impact of over-confldence in planning:
We have Cried to act upon nature subjectively, as if our direct contact with it would accomplish what we were after... When we used to say that there is no country in the world in the process of development that has a rise in revenue of 20 percent a year, we told ourselves that we could do it. When we tackled the problem of growth in our country, we did not investigate what we had, what we could spend, and what could allow us to develop.-’0
Later on, the unveiling of the unrealistic 10 million ton sugar plan in 1965 has been the most obvious case where this over-confidence has created problems.
There have also been the purely administrative problems of deter mining what types of planning controls to use, what types of individuals to hire and/or trust, etc. But such administration problems and the problem of revolutionary over-confidence seem to be relatively inevit able for whatever type of radical.or reformist regime might have gained power via Che route of armed revolution. What the following study is * more concerned with are the problems that were brought to the surface in Cuban agriculture as a result of the implementation of a Soviet-like
* central planning system. As the previous discussion has indicated, there was considerable chaos and lack of effectiveness in central planning in Cuba during the first part of the decade of the 1960's.
Later, the Cubans abandoned central planning in favor of a decentralized 206
type of planning that featured sectoral mlniplans. The following
discussion is about the specific problems that were responsible for
these failures encountered in adopting central planning.
Again we find, as in the case of adopting centralized administra
tion, that the major problem identified by the Cuban’s in the adoption
of central planning, has been the lack of qualified personnel. A
second, and related problem has been the lack of information available
to the planners. We turn now to a discussion of these basic and long
term problems that have made it difficult for the Cubans to utilize
central planning.
A) Lack of Qualified Personnel
The importance of planning in the Soviet-like system of agricul
ture can not be over-estimated. It serves the vital function of re
placing the market mechanism that exists in capitalist agricultural economies. From the viewpoint of socialists everywhere planning is a
conscious, rational attempt to determine in advance of production, what
the society has in the way of resources and what the society needs
to produce from its resources for the interests of the whole society.
Thus, central planning replaces the system of contending individual
interests of private capital, which in the communist view does not yield control by society over the general goals of production and further more leads to exploitation and the irrational effect of pitting man against man. 207
The presence of planning in the Soviet approach to development is
especially' attractive to leadership in third world nations because it
Implies regime control over limited or underdeveloped resources and
allov;s the concentration of production efforts in limited areas deemed
appropriate by the regime. However* as the Cubans have found out* the
rapid development of an effective planning system is an extremely diffi
cult task. The most critical problem which has impeded the develop
ment of a planning system has been the lack of qualified individuals
who are essential to making such a system work. From the local level
production units and municlple agencies to the very top of the system
in the offices of JUCEPLAN there is the need for a virtual army of
planners who are theoretically educated about the rationale and goals
of planning and who also understand and can use the specific mechanisms which are needed to gather* utilize and dispense Information and
directives. Thus* the personnel requirements of an effective system of
planning are of high order both in terms of individual qualifications
and the sheer numbers of such individuals who are needed. Cuba has
lacked such personnel from the very beginning until the present. Need-
less to say* the development of such a cadre is a long-term process of many years* perhaps generations.
In 1975, at the first Party Congress of the PCC, Fidel Castro spoke
at length about the lack of qualified cadre across most of the spectrum of institutions that can be found in Cuba today. In particular* he was
critical of the leadership of the economy at all levels. He acknow
ledged the lack of education and experience of such cadre* even at the 208
highest levels. Castro critized the planning sector* among others,
for the shortcomings of the 1965-70 effort to achieve the 100 million
ton sugar goal. 52 What seems so significant about Castro's remarks was
not that he uttered them for the first time, but that he was speaking
again about a problem which has been omni-present for the entire
existence of the regime. Clearly, the lack of qualified personnel
in planning, and elsewhere, has proven difficult to overcome. Perhaps
the difficulty of overcoming the problem was best implied in the langu
age of President Dorticas in 1972;
The lack of technicians, of qualified resources, is the most maddening deficit and the sharpest prod of all the lacks to be found in an underdeveloped society, in a country with a backward economy. The lack of technicians, of qualified human resources, constitutes the most complex, thorniest problem, the one that hits the hardest, in an underdeveloped country.53
In 1961, the first year of attempting to utilize central plan ning, Che Guevara spoke about the "serious" problems of planning.
There were simply not enough capable personnel, or as Guevara says, a "...total lack of experts.And a year later, in 1962, Guevara spoke specifically about the need for cadre in industrial planning, but the language was relevant for agriculture as well:
We still lack...an indlspenslble complement. Without scientific, technical, and technological training of all the cadres at all levels, and without special attention given to finding and developing future leadership, the entire plan will remain a mere dream,
The theme of needing trained cadre at all levels, including planning was constantly reflected in the pages of the party news paper, Granma Weekly Review, after its founding in 1 9 6 6 . And, in 1969, JUCEPLAN published a document about the nature of planning
in Cuba and specifically mentioned a need for "...the availability
of trained and experienced planners at the different levels," as
a major problem that disrupted planning. Elsewhere the document again mentions the planning problem of "...few trained staff... to
formulate the annual operational plans [and] structuring the medium-
term plan."^
The lack of qualified cadre and its causal relationship to the chaotic problems of planning in the early 1960's and later to the abandonment of central planning in the latter 1960's is clearly re
flected in writings of Cuban leaders as well as the work of foreign visitors to Cuba. Edward Boorsteln, after discussing the early plan ning chaos and failure, argues that it failed,
Mainly because it is hard in a country without a long tradition of organization, without a large number of trained and experi enced people, to convert an anarchic economy into a planned economy overnight.58
Both Che Guevara, and Rene Dumont after his first visits to Cuba in the early 1960's also expressed similar opinions about the impact of
CQ poorly qualified personnel on planning. 7
Castro has discussed critically, the fact that in the early years the lack of qualified personnel caused a pattern of extreme centralization in the economy and planning in particular.Rene
Dumont discusses the impact of over-centralization In planning which leads to inflexibility: 210
Each [production] unit receives and must apply a blueprint [i.e. plan] that has been worked out at the provincial (ornational) headquarters.^. All areas are allotted the same intensity of agricultural production, although the naturally richer or better Irrigated areas could move further ahead. Everybody keeps the same developmental level, although the better educated, more astute unit chief should be free to move ahead and try new techniques... In short, the blueprints lack flexibility, they don't allow for enough [local] Initiative...61
Dumont also relates the following lengthy tale of the impact of over centralized and inflexible planning on productive work at the local level:
Late in 1967 a French technical mission using French equip ment— caterpiller scrapers, steam shovels, and road graders— was sent to Cuba to establish rice fields on horizontal terraces. By 1968 the Cubans had seen that the scrapers could be used for many other purposes. After a meeting with Castro on December 10, 1968, it was decided that before the May rains twenty-five scrapers would be used to create 1340 hectares of level rice fields south of Havana.
When on December 13 the French team received the preliminary plan, it learned that it would have to make do with ten scrapers and begin work on December 22. At the end of the year the anticipated site was shifted sixty kilometers because of (and we shall come back to this) a planned future highway. A month went by before a commission completed a very superficial topo graphical survey of the zone. On February 2 it was decided to limit the project to 330 hectares, but a more detailed topo graphical study was necessary before the equipment could be brought in. At a new meeting, the French expert was asked to limit himself to thirteen hectares - in other words, one per cent of the original project — and two scrapers. He neverthe less, proposed to do fifty-four hectares, if he could get some topographers.
The students counted on for this job had in the interval been assigned elsewhere. However, thirty student rice specialists became available for the job on March 1. They had to wait two weeks for truck transportation to the site (they could have reached the site more quickly on foot). Once there they were taught practical topography in three days of intensive train ing - they abounded in good will and in two weeks they com pleted an impeccable relief map. These young people then 211
received orders to return to their institute, and they left heartsick, persuaded that their work had been to no end. The Party representative swore on his honor as a revolutionary that he would make sure the work was finished....
The scrapers arrived on the morning of April 19, but the students were no longer there to help the drivers carry out the leveling, (the drivers had to be taught their job from scratch, since the men who had been trained for it had been sent off to cut sugar cane.) One scraper broke down almost immediately; the other could not be used until the morning of April 21. By three in the afternoon an earller-than-usual series of torrential rains began: it was too late for the job to be done. "We'll begin again in October."
At this point the French expert announced that he was "disgusted at just doing nothing and being paid for it with money accumu lated by cutting down on food for the Cuban people," and refused to remain.62
Finally, JUCEPLAN Itself has indicated the impact of poorly qualified personnel on the efforts at centralized planning. In the document on planning in Cuba, which was issued in 1969, JUCEPLAN official discussed the lack of integrated central plans of medium length and the fact that lack of planning personnel has been respon sible for this problem. The presence of the sectoral, mlniplans is also presented as resulting from this problem.
One of the main difficulties encountered was how to determine the scope of planning work. An attempt was made to give the . medium-term plan the features of a short-term operational plan in that it presented an integrated and consistent picture based on a relatively large number of indicators covering all sectors and branches of the economy. There was very little likelihood of ever being able to put a plan of this cope into practice since it would have meant diverting a fairly high proportion of the few trained staff who had to formulate the annual operation plans to structuring the medium-term plan... so far there is no medium-term or long-term plans covering the economy as a whole... It was thought preferable to organize a work programme based not on the formulation of a disaggregated plan covering the 212
whole of the economy but on a Integrated study by the central planning board of a sizeable number of programmes which con stitute the most dynamic activities in the Cuban economy*63
B) The Problem of Poor Information
A second major problem which has plagued the Castro regime in its efforts to utilize central planning has been the lack of adequate information that may be used by planners. Having adequate informa tion is, of course, essential for accurate plans. In the words of one agricultural economist;
Socialist planning... replaces "the invisible hand of profit" which in a capitalist regime corrected many errors through management that had definite pre-established goals. Substitut ing his reasoned will for automatic mechanisms, man must be better informed than he is by the "law of the market place" if he is to be able to intervene in the proper way.®^
The agricultural plan in Cuba, to be realistic, must be based upon such accurate knowledge as the amount ot tillable acreage and type of soil and climate conditions available, as well as amounts of seed, fertilizer and labor inputs available. There must also be informa tion available on past success and failures (i.e. good feedback).
This very essential information has often not been available to
Cuban planners.
The effect of poor information on planning efforts as well as on attempts by the leadership to map out the general strategy of Cuban development has been devastating. The outlines of the first develop mental strategy, for example, which called for industrial develop ment and agricultural diversification, were based upon an assumption, that Cuba abounded in untapped natural resources that were necessary 213 to support such a strategy. The optimistic assumption that such resources were available is reflected in the following remarks made by.Che Guevara during a televised speech made in 1961.
The laterite deposits in the Nicaro zone of northern Oriente are among the richest sources of potential wealth. They contain low-grade iron ore, as well as lead, sulphur and nickel... These mines have resources estimated at about three billion tons... [These] are Cuba's great reserves of iron... In all, we have enough iron for sixty years... There are clear indications that we... have [large deposits of] -petroleum in C u b a . 65
In 1975, at the Part Congress, Castro spoke about Cuba's re sources in a much different way:
Our country is poor in natural resources, we have no coal deposits, nor oil in any considerable quantities according to research... Our iron abounds in laterite form and not in iron oxide, which is the one used traditionally by the steel industry... The lack of a raw material basis for the development of the steel industry and petro-chemistry, two crucial industries in any modern economy, has up to now been a great disadvantage.
Later on in the same speech he said tht this, in conjunction with the U.S. blockade, lack of technology and organization meant that,
"No ambitious plan of industrial development under those conditions was really possible.At the risk of over-stating the obvious, the point here is that good information is necessary for planning and in forming its first growth strategy it seems clear that the
Cubans did not have it, at least with respect to industrial develop ment.
In agriculture, in the early years, there have been nuroberous indications the lack of information has hampered planning. Such foreign visitors to Cuba as Andres Bianchi, Rene Dumont and James 214 68 O'Connor all discuss the problem In various ways. But that was
perhaps to have been expected, given the confusion generated by the
revolutionary changes In Cuban society and Its Institutions. What
Is of greater Interest Is the fact that a full decade after the revolu
tion the lack of appropriate Information still seemed to be somewhat
of a problem. According to Rene Dumont, after his 1969 visit,
"...it has become all but Impossible to obtain reliable data upon
which to establish a more rational investment priority, leading to maximum productive growth."®® And the 1969 JUCEPLAN document says
that in addition to lack of qualified personnel, the lack of "an
appropriate statistical and information system" has hurt planning efforts.Finally, in 1975 Castro spoke of the need for better
Information and at the Party Congress proposed a new "economic management system" that would enable planners and administrators to
"measure the use we make of our production resources.. ."^
Poor information is, to some extent, a secondary effect of not having enough qualified personnel. For example, the following situ ation related by a Cuban leader, concerning the gathering of mining information, illustrates the problem.
How have we developed our mining industry? Our two main problems were a complete lack of knowledge of our national territory and total lack of experts... We have six million in habitants, and taking into account all the geologists which we have imported — Soviet, Chilean, Peruvian, Mexican, and others — we have two hundred. And if we were to count only the Cuban geologists, I think that we could count them on the fingers of our two hands. ^2 215
Thus, there must be an adequate supply of trained technicians and professionals outside of the planning apparatus, in order to gather
Information for planners to use. There are numerous sources which
Indicate that the problem of lack of technicians to help with Infor mation gathering has been a problem in agriculture. Rene Dumont, for example, criticizes the planning apparatus on numerous occasions for not knowing local soil conditions.^
The problem of inadequate personnel inside the planning apparatus, of course, could also lend itself readily to the problem of inadequate information, as the following observation, illustrates:
An untried planning technician is far less likely to notice defects, and in particular the causes of these defects. He therefore transmits incomplete if not erroneous information to the top level. There is then an enormous bottleneck of useless Information at the Center...74
Poor information can also be due to poor organization as Castro implicitly recognizes when talking about the need for a new economic management system to gather information for current Cuban planning.
The lack of information can also be due to poor bureaucratic tools for the gathering of information. Edward Boorsteln is gain useful as a source of information and his writings illustrate this latter point. As indicated before, the planning system was initially taught to the Cubans by Czechoslovakian and Soviet economists. In addition, the first information gathering forms used by Cuban planners were copies of the Czechoslovakian forms. According to Boorsteln, as the following account indicates, the information forms were not useful: 216
One day our office, which was in charge of the Financial Plan of the Ministry, received a set of forms for this plan from the JUCEPLAN* On studying the forms for the Export and Import Enterprises, we noticed that they simply did not apply... We arranged a meeting with the head of the Finance Division of the JUCEPLAN to propose more appropriate forms... We did not get far... Eventually our office had to fill the senseless forms with numbers, which were later accepted by the JUCEPLAN without a word. In filling out the forms, the measure of achievement became the quantity of statistics prepared, not their a c c u r a c y . ^5
Thus, for a variety of reasons the quality of information received by the planners in Cuba must be considered of questionable value.
The lack of success and modifications in the planning system during the latter 1960's support this perspective.
Conclusion
The adoption of the Soviet-like agricultural system in Cuba in 1961 brought into existence the system of central planning which, except for the miniplan deviation of the latter 1960's, still exists today. Central Planning requires the presence of a competent, trained staff of planners who exist in sufficient number and have at their disposal sufficient information to be able to accurately plan for future production. The weight of evidence presented above indicates that central planning has proved difficult to rapidly implement and that two of the major problems with it have been inadequate per sonnel and information.
The reasons for lack of personnel in agricultural administra tion have been discussed in Chapter IV. This includes the condition of underdevelopment in education, communication, economic production, etc., in the society which thq Castro regime inherited (i.e. the very conditions that motivated Castro to seek political power in the first place^), as well as the post-revolutionary emmlgratlon of trained professionals in many areas of Cuban society, the anti-bureau cracy campaign, and the official desire for political reliability among those who have worked for the regime. All of these factors have been at work also in helping to cause the shortage of qualified personnel that are needed to staff the planning agencies. It is also likely that these same conditions are largely responsible for the poor quality of Information available to planners in Cuba. The need for technicians outside of the planning apparatus who are competent and capable of obtaining basic Information is substantial, and just as clearly, such individuals are in short supply. The poor quality of cadre Inside the planning agencies has also inhibited the flow of accurate and useful information. Thus, it has been difficult to effectively Implement central planning in Cuba.
In the above section which compares Cuban and Soviet planning, it was pointed out that the Cubans initially adopted a.very orthodox
(i.e. Soviet-like) system of planning. It was a system that was copied from Czechoslovakia which had, in turn, been given to the
Czechs by the Russians. Because of the confusion and Ineffectiveness which surfaced during the early efforts at central planning, which were due to the problems of personnel and information shortages, central planning ultimately gave way to a system of miniplans by the latter 1960's. However, this sectoral miniplanning was never very effectively coordinated, causing bottlenecks and general 218 dissatisfaction with this "decentralized" approach to planning.
What seems clear from this sketch is that the ineffectiveness of early central planning (due essentially to conditions of underdevelopment and the political climate inherent in the move toward socialism) caused the Cubans to deviate from the Soviet agricultural model in the area of planning. Therefore, the deviation from Soviet-like central planning in the latter 1960's was, in effect, an admission that rapidly implementing effective central planning was beyond Cuban capabilities at that stage of the country's development.
During the 1970's the Cubans have returned to orthodox central planning. However, this return has been acceptable as we indicated because of (1) Soviet aid, (2) approximately 10 years of experience with planning, and (3) the change in developmental strategy that re duces particularly the production goals for the all important sugar sector. Nonetheless, a continuing theme in the speeches of the polit ical leadership during the 1970*s has been the need for better personnel. While it seems probable that improvement has occurred, it is also clear tha problems still remain, more than fifteen years after the introduction of planning. Based upon the above perspective it is difficult to support claims that effective Soviet-like central planning is readily adoptable in a third world country such as Cuba. FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE
^Reglnlo Boti, "El Plan de Desarrollo Econotnlco de 1962", Cuba Socialists, December, 1961, p. 19.
^Fidel Castro, "History Will Absolve Me", in Revolutionary Struggle, (Cambridge, Mass.; M.I.T. Press, 1972) edited by Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdes, p. 190.
^"Program Manifesto of The 26th of July Movement", in Cuba In Revolution (New York: Doubleday, 1972), edited by Rolando Bonachea and Nelson Valdes, p. 129.
^Boti, op. cit., p. 21; Carmelo Mesa Lago, The Labor Sector and Socialist Distribution in Cuba, (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 28.
^"Economic Planning In Cuba," (Document ST/ECLA/Conf.30/L.17), Administrative Aspects of Planning (UN: New York: 1969), pp. 120-125. Hereafter cited as JUCEPLAN.
^Edward Boorstein, The Economic Transformation of Cuba (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968) pp. 148-150; "The Cuban Economy In the Preiod 1959-63," Economic Survey for Latin America for 1963, U.N* Economic Commission for Latin America (New York: U.N., 1964), p. 259, hereafter cited as ECLA. JUCEPLAN, pp. 137-142
^JUCEPLAN, pp. 137-142; ECLA, pp. 259-262; Boorstein, op.cit., p. 150.
®Arnaldo Milian, "Experiences de la JUCEI en Las Villes," Cuba Socialista, November, 1961, pp. 42-46.
®Alban Lataste, cited in Carmelo Mesa Lago and Luc Zephlrln, "Central Planning", Revolutionary Change in Cuba (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971), edited by Carmelo Mesa Lago, p. 158; JUCEPLAN, pp. 153-154.
^Granma Weekly Review, September 10, 1967, p. 4; hereafter cited CWR.
219 12GMR, December 28, 1975, p. 8. Castro outlines the five year plan for 1976-80.
13JUCEPLAN, pp. 131-142; ECLA, pp. 259-262.
3^For more detail, see the JUCEPLAN document.
ISuoorstein, op. cit., chapter 5, especially pp. 151-179.
16Ibid., pp. 151-155.
l^Che Guevara, "On the Cuban Experience", in Venceremos (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) edited by John Gerassi, p> 260.
*-®Boorstein, op. cit., pp. 153-4.
l^Ibid.( p, 153 and 160.
2^Che Guevara, "On Economic Planning in Cuba", Gerassi, op. cit., p. 150; Che Guevara, "Our Industrial Tasks", Gerassi, op. cit., p. 193.
^Guevara, Gerassi, op. cit., p.260.
22Boorstein, op. cit., p. 158.
22Boorstein, op. cit., pp. .158-166.
2^GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2.
25]3oorstein, op. cit., pp. 163-165.
26Ibid., p. 166.
27lbid., p. 166.
28Michel Gutelman, cited by Mesa Lago and Zephlrin, op. cit.. p. 182.
^Lataste, cited by Ibid., p. 156.
^®See Table 6.1, in Chapter 6. ^ Rene Dumont, Is Cuba Socialist (New York: Viking, 1974) pp. 45-47. Wassily Leontief, "Notes on a Visit to Cuba", The New York Review, August 21, 1969, p. 19.
32JUCEPLAN, PP. 121-122, and pp. 131-133.
^^Leontief, op. cit., p. 19.
3^Mesa Lago and Zephirin, op. cit.. p. 159; Dumont, op. cit.. pp. 45-47.
35[)umont, op. cit., p. 46.
36j u c EPLAN, pp. 122-123; Mesa Lago and Zephirin, op. cit.. p. 159 Dumont, op. cit., pp. 45-47.
^Edward Gonzalez, "Castro and Cuba's New Orthodoxy", Problems of Communism, Jan/Feb., 1976, p. 5.
3®Carmelo Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970*8 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974), p. 30; Leontief, op. cit., confirms, p. 18-19.
^Leontief, op. cit.. p. 19.
4°CWR. May 16, 1971, p. 12.
41-Mesa Lago, Cuba in the 1970's, op. cit.. p. 31.
42see GWR, September 10, 1972, p. 2.
43gWR, September 10, 1972, p. 2.
44*rhe goal for 1971, for example, was 6.65 million tons. GWR. May 16, 1971, p. 12.
45g w r , September 12, 1971, p. 7.
46GWR, May 2, 1971, p. 12.
47GWR, July 23, 1972, p. 10.
4®Gonzalez, op. cit.. p. 12. 222
49g w r , December 28, 1975, p. 5* Here Castro is referring, apparently to the overall economic growth rate because as we point out in Chapter Six, the rate of production in agriculture was still disappointing. The growth rate that Castro says occurred in the 1970's was 10 percent per year. For the years 1961-65 it was only 1.9 per cent.
SOcuevara, Gerassi, op. cit.. p. 260.
^Ironically, it was the failure of this greatest goal that led to a change toward more realism in planning-. Castro, himself, refers to "certain idealisms" with regard to this goal. GWR, October 4, 1970, p. 3-4.
52GWR, December, 1975, p. 5.
33GWR. September 10, 1972, p. 2,
54cuevara, Gerassi. op. cit., pp. 142 and 148.
55ibld., p. 198. See also, Guevara, "The Cadre, Backbone of the Revolution", ibid., pp. 206-207
3®See, for example, GWR editorial of June 11, 1967, p. 3. Also Castro speeches reported in GWR of October 13, 1968, p. 9 and March 16, 1969, p. 2-5.
57JUCEPLAN, p. 131 and 155.
SSBoorsteih, op. cit., p. 166.
S^Rene Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Development (New York: Grove Press, 1970) Chapter 4. Guevara, Gerassi, op. cit., p. 148, 198, 204-5, 207 and 264.
60gWR. January 4, 1976, p. 2.
^lpumont, Is Cuba Socialist op. cit., pp. 103-104.
62Ibld., pp. 104-105.
63JUCEPLAN, pp. 153-154.
^Dumont, Is Cuba Socialist, op. cit., p. 110.
65cuevara, Gerassi, op. cit., pp. 143-144. 66gWR, December 28, 1975, p. 5.
67lbld.
®®Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Development, op. cit., pp. 110-111; Andres Bianchi, "Agriculture: Post Revolutionary Development," Cuba: The Economic and Social Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1964) edited by,Dudley Seers, p. 137 and pp. 142-146
®^Dumont, Is Cuba Socialist, op. cit., p. 71.
70JUCEPLAN, p. 131.
7^-GWR, January 4, 1976, p. 2. f 7^Guevara, Gerassi, op. cit., p. 142.
7^See, for example, Dumont, Is Cuba Socialist, op. cit.. pp. 46-47
7^Dumont, Cuba: Socialism and Development, op. cit.. pp. 115-116.
7^Boorstein, op. cit., p. 160-161.
7^See Chapter One. CHAPTER SIX
THE SOVIET MODEL AND THE CUBAN EXPERIENCE
The general question which originally promoted this study and
guided our efforts throughout most of It, is "Can the Soviet system
of agricultural institutions be readily adopted in an underdeveloped nation such as Cuba?" On the one hand we are presented with claims on this point by proponents of the model and Its ready adoptability, and on the other hand by claims of the institution building litera
ture that stress the difficulty and long-term nature of the taBk.
In Chapter Two we presented the Soviet model and discussed its three
institutional components. In Chapters Three, Four and Five we
respectively examined the Cuban experience with each of the three
Institutional components of the model. In these latter three chapters we basically tried to do two things: First of all, we sought to find out what happened when Cuba adopted the institutions. Secondly, where there were problems and deviations in this adoption process we attempted to point out why such problems and deviations occurred.
The following concluding discussion is an overall assessment of Cuba's experience with the model as a whole. In the first part of the conclusion we attempt to draw out points that are relevant for claims made by the proponents of the model, as well as the literature which
224 225 argues against its ready adoptability. In the course of outlining the Cuban experience with the model, we provide an answer to the basic question initially stated above. In the second part of the conclusion we specifically deal with the implications of this case study for the body of theory on institution building. Finally, in the last section, we relate Cuban agricultural productivity to the various organizational and strategic changes outlined in the bulk of the previous analysis.
A Pattern of Deviation From the Model
The Cuban experience with each Institutional component of the , model (i.e. state controlled production units, centralized admini- stration and central planning) has essentially been one in which there has been a departure from the model. In each case, there has been an initial and continuing desire on the part of the Cuban leadership to closely emulate Soviet institutions. However, because of the variety of problems discussed (i.e., need for political support, inadequate personnel, etc.) the Institutions have either not been completely adopted, or they were adopted and then changed due to improper functioning.
In the case of production units, the Cuban regime has only partially adopted what is called for by the Soviet model. The
Cubans have adopted the state farm as a primary production unit.
It controls about 70% of the tillable land. After initial efforts to develop cooperative farms, however, (which would have been the 226
Cuban counterpart: to the Soviet-kolkhoz) the coops were transformed
into state farms. This was done to Insure greater state control over production and incentives. The Cubans most significant departure
from the model has been the maintenance of the small farm which means
that approximately 160,000 small farmers still own about 3 05E of the
tillable land. It is true that the regime has significant influence
over the production of Bmall farms. Nonetheless, the small farmer maintains ownership of his farm and dally independence from the dictates of state administrators. Also important is the fact that
the small farmer receives a higher remuneration for his work than does his countrymen in the state sector. Thus, there is still an independent class of rural private farmers that continues to exist
today.
With regard to agricultural administration the Soviet model calls
for the adoption of a single, centralized, hierarchical bureaucracy
that controls agricultural production units, implements the plan, and generally coordinates all agricultural activities. Implicit also in the Soviet model is the presence of the communist party which acts as an overseer of agricultural administration to insure that it is effectively carrying out its mission. In Cuba, a centralized bureau cracy of the type called for by the Soviet model was adopted in 1961.
The National Institute of Agrarian Reform (INRA) had already been organized and was given a high degree of control over agriculture in 1959. After the turn to socialism in 1961 INRA became Cuba's 227 ministry of agriculture, and It controlled all aspects of the national agricultural production, effort. The only major difference between the Soviet model and the Cuban System was that there was no effective party organization to act as overseer of the central administration. The Castro regime did develop a local organization known as the JUCEI (later, renamed The Munldple Administration) which attempted to monitor all economic management at the lcoal level, Including agricultural administration.
In 1964, however, due to an unsatisfactory performance in its first years (as described in Chapter Four) the Cuban agricultural administration was, in effect, rapidly decentralized. It moved away from the type centralized administration called for by the
Soviet model. The Ministry of Sugar was formed in 1964 and it was made responsible for all phases of sugar production from harvesting through sales. This principle of administrative de centralization and specialization (i.e. one bureaucracy responsi ble for only one crop) was also followed in the formation of the poultry combine (1964), the tobacco combine (1966) and the coffee combine (1968). All of the combines, like the Ministry of
Sugar, have since remained organizationally separate from INRA which has retined responsibility for the rest of agriculture. The weakness of INRA and the party organization continued through the latter 1960's, and consequently we also saw the entry of the mili tary into the field of agricultural administration. It was not until the 1970's that the PCC began to gain strength and the 228 military was withdrawn from the economy. Nonetheless, agricultural administration has reamlned organizationally decentralized with the continuing presence of the Ministry of Sugar and the Combines.
Thus, as with the Cuban production units, there has been a substantial departure from the Soviet model in Cuban administration.
The Cubans attempted to adopt a centralized administration of the type called for by the Soviet model and then backed away from it.
It Is also clear that toward the end of the initial decade that admini stration tended to become an additional task of the military because of the weakness of the state agricultural administration. This deviation from the model has since been abandoned and followed by a return to more orthodox management by state authorities. In effect, we have seen initial centralization, (1961-64) then decentralization and militarization (1964-70), and then a movement away from militari zation but a maintenance of organizational decentralization (1970- present).
In the realm of agricultural planning the Soviet model calls for a single, national planning agency. This agency is responsible for the development of a yearly agricultural plan as well as for a five-year plan. These central plans are to include all agricultural sectors in an integrated and coordinated planning effort. The plans are to be based upon directives and production goals which have been handed down to the planning agency by the political leadership of the nation. While there may be some local involvement in planning, it comes as a reaction to central directives rather than as the initiation of production plans. 229
* In Cuba, an effort was initially made to follow this approach
to planning. A previously organized agency, the Board of Central
Planning (JUCEPLAN), was given responsibility for the development of a yearly central plan and a five-year plan in 1961. It was given
directives by the Castro leadership, which were to be embodied in
the plan. The approach to planning, therefore, in 1961 was like
that advocated by the Soviet model.
As Chapter Five illustrates, however, these early attempts at central planning were confused and chaotic. The five-year plan was never published and the first yearly plan was apparently never implemented. By the mid-1960,s central planning was given up in favor of sectoral mini-plans. The mini-plans were multiyear, sectoral plans (i.e. sugar, cattle, milk, etc.) which were only minimally Integrated and coordinated with other mini-plans. Long- range, central planning which would have integrated the entire agricultural sector on a long-term basis also was apparently not carried out. JUCEPLAN remained in existence but its major function was to help with the preparation of the various mini-plans and provide the minimal yearly coordination of these mini-plans. Thus, during the latter half of the 1960's planning in Cuba was decentralised and not like the type of planning which is described by the Soviet model. In effect, the Cubans had backed away from central planning because they were unable to make it function effectively.
In 1970, due to the lack of overall coordination inherent in mini-planning, and with Soviet and Comecon aid, Cuba returned to 230 central planning. There were yearly central plans prior to 1975 and the first five year plan (1976-80) was approved at the First Party
Congress in December, 1975. JUCEPLAN was again made responsible for this central planning. Thus in the 1970's Cuba has returned to the orthodox style of planning called for by the Soviet model.
Thus, in planning, as with the other components of the model, we have illustrated a pattern of deviation from what is called for by the model. The attempt was initially made to adopt the centralized planning of "Brother" socialist nations such as the USSR. (1961-64)
However, the Cubans could not effectively implement central planning and moved to decentralize the planning effort by implementing a series of mini-plans (1965-70). When this also proved ineffective, central planning was re-initiated with the help of the USSR and other
Comecon nations (1970-present),
The overall pattern of deviation from the Soviet model is clearly evident in the above account. In both administration and planning the regime unsuccessfully adopted the orthodox arrangements represented by the model. Due to poor functioning the original Soviet- like arrangement in each case was changed to a less centralized variation in order to make it’ function. In the case of production units there was not even the initial attempt to create all state farms or collectives farms, and thus conform to the model. In the estimation of the Cuban leadership, the political costs of such a move were potentially too high. Thus, from the very beginning, in the organization of production units there has been a deviation from the
Soviet model. 231 « The pattern of deviation from the Soviet model Is, therefore,
present In all three areas of the model. The Cuban experience with
the model indicates that at least initially it is difficult to adopt
in its orthodox or pure form. Thus, the Cubans have been unable
to adopt the model and make it function effectively or, as in the
case of production units, have been afraid to even try to adopt
what is preferable in the minds of the leadership. Only in the
area of planning has there been a second attempt to return to
Soviet orthodoxy. The lesson of the Cuban experience with the Soviet
model seems to be clear. The model has not been readily adopted in
Cuba in its most orthodox form.
The Cuban Experience and Institution Building Theory
The Cuban experience with adopting the institutions which are
at the heart of the Soviet model has not been one of success. In
this general sense, the institution building literature, with its
claims about the difficulty of institution building in Third World nations, seems to be confirmed. We can reasonably Bay that this
literature has successfully forewarned of the difficulty of rapidly
implementing new institutions in Cuba. We turn now to the problems of why the orthodox version of the model was not successfully adopted and we want to see whether the institution building liter
ature is as useful in pointing out why the Cubans have had problems, as it was in predicting that problems would exist.
In reviewing the diverse literature on institution building it is easy to find agreement on such general problems as the difficulty of implementing new institutions in the transitional societies of developing nations. It is more difficult to put together a comprehensive list of reasons why this task is so difficult. There are always the problems of misinterpreting the differing contexts
for which the literature waB intended, or upon which it is based.
There Is also the difficulty of adequately covering an ever expanding body of literature such as we find in this field. With these problems in mind we have come up with the following list of points
that seems most representative of the literature as a whole, with regard to the causes of the difficulty of adopting new institutions in the context of underdevelopment.1
1) Perhaps the most generally adopted position in the litera ture, with regard to the reasons why it is difficult to adopt new institutions, is that underdeveloped nations always seem to lack the qualified personnel to staff and effectively run such Institutions.
As Heady points out, "The problem Is usually not a general shortage of employable manpower.Rather, it is a problem of the high level of skills required in such a group of managers, program planner and technicians. Dube illustrates the nature of planning and administra tion and the type of skills required of those involved in such programs
Planning for economic growth is an extremely complicated busi ness which involves highly specialized knowledge and developed manipulative skills; the implementation of these plans pre supposes deep administrative insights and a keen evaluative perspective,3 233
Such skills simply do not exist in the population of a nation that is not developed and has had little experience with modern organl- ; ration.
There are numerous contributing factors to this problem of lack of personnel. Pye indicates, on the basis of his study of
Burma, that a major problem is that many administrators never really abandon their traditional perspective for the more rational approach required in a modem bureaucratic setting.^ Others, such as Fainsod, tend to blame lack of adequate personnel on traditional or non existent educational systems.5 Still others, like Eisentadt, blame an emphasis on political patronage. It is agrued that the chief criteria for appointment to new Institutions in third world setting are not skills and experience, but whether or not the appointee is a member of the proper political party or movement.6
As can be seen, there are numerous explanations about why there are shortages of trained cadre. What is significant here, however, is that most observers mention this problem of lack of personnel as a major course of the ineffectiveness of newly adopted institutions.
2) A second problem that afflicts new institutions in deve loping countries is that which Riggs calls "formalism." Formalism is when the task which an institution performs, has no relationship with reality. It Involves itself in "paper shuffling", or "busy- work" which justifies its presence (at least to its administrative cadre) but really has no effect on the problems that the Institution 234 was created to deal with or solve. Formalism can also mean a situation
In which the official duties and hierarchy of an Institution are given lip-serivce, but in fact are ignored. In reality its members involve themselves In other problems and disassociate themselves from
Institutional authority lines. Thus, formalism is when "behavior does not conform to the prescribed norm."?
3) A third, and chronic problem which the literature stresses as characteristic of ineffective new institutions is that they have what Huntington calls a lack of "discipline",8 or what Heady euphemis tically refers to as "a generous measure of operational autonomy."9
A lack of discipline can be represented by the presence of flagrant nepotism or corruption which occurs in spite of institutional rules.
It is also viewed in other ways. Huntington argues that the major source of stability in transitional societies is the presence of strong political institutions that can "govern" (i.e. make decisions and make them stick). It is the lack of internal coherence or discipline in institutions as reflected in corruption, which can make them ineffective. There must be an awareness of and responsi bility to higher authority and its dictates within a new institution.
Provincial and locr' offices must obey the central offices, much in the manner that the isolated army unit continues to carry out its mission after separation from the main body of the army. One scholar has observed that, "Discipline and development go hand in h a n d . " ^ 8 On the basis of the literature we might say that, discipline and institutional development also go hand in hand. 235
4) A final point which the literature, in general, seems to stress is that new institutions often do not function effectively because they are not acceptable or familiar or legitimate in the eyes of those whose lives are effected by them. The three previous problems we have dicussed have been essentially internal problems in the effective functioning of the Institutions. This final point is essentially a problem that arises externally between the insti tution and the recipients of its services. An example of this view of why new institutions may not function effectively is the per spective that holds that modern (usually democratic) political
Institutions are unacceptable in developing societies because such societies usually have a long history of elite rule to which the m o d e m mass ethos is antithetical in spirit. Thus threatened elites do not effectively support modern mass institutions. Also, the masses may share this view that a "master-slave" or "landlord- peasant" hierarchy is inevitable and proper, it may even be sanctified by religion, and thus, they may not fully support such moiern political institutions.^ Another variant of this position is that political institutions are not stable and long-lasting in under-developed societies because of the presence of a high degree of personalism in the culture which orients Individuals to the leaders of institutions, rather than the institutions themselves.
Thus, when the leader dies or is removed from power, institutions, which are not legitimate, become less acceptable and consequently less effective.^-2 236 This same problem of lack of acceptability of institutions is
reflected in the view that the decisions of the institutions of govern
ment may not be accepted or popular with the part of the population
that is effected by governmental action. Thus* Institutions may
function very poorly or fail. The literature on a variety of reform
efforts lnwhich administrative institutions have attempted to carry
out changes from above, (i.e. land reform, Industry nationalization,
taxation, etc.) is representative of this perspective.13
The literature of institution building in third world nations
contains numerous contentions and observations, both Implicitly and explicitly, about the causes of institutional failure or ineffective ness. What has been attempted here is a summation of the common themes
that seem to run through most of this literature. As a result of this we have arrived at the following list of points which are most likely to be present and cause ineffective functioning on the part of new institutions.:
1) Lack of qualified personnel
2) Formalism
3) Lack of discipline or authoritative cohesion and,
4) Lack of popular acceptance
A comparison of.these points with the experience of the Cubans in adopting the Soviet model is very interesting because once again it seems to largely confirm the literature on institution building.
The literature, thus, not only effectively argues with claims about the ready adoptability of the Soviet model of agriculture, but it 237 relatively accurately predicts the types of problems which Cuba was likely to have in adopting the model. The major problem with both planning and administration in Cuba was the lack of qualified personnel. Both the Cuban leadership and foreign observers have stressed the exaspirating presence of this basic problem. And, as indicated above, this was the most common theme emphasized in the institution building literature as being responsible for Ineffec tive institutional functioning.
The problem of formalism that is also a common theme in the literature on institution building, seems to have been a less pre valent problem in the Cuban case. This is not to say that mani festations of it were not present in Cuba, becuase they clearly were. In both the chapters on planning and administration we discussed the problem of agencies in the very early years which were involved in bureaucratic busy-work which in fact bore no resemblance to the real world of problems. The attack on "bureau cratism" by the regime is one reference to the existence of the problem. However, we have not discussed it as a major problem because it appears only to have been present for a short period of time in the initial stage of the revolution. It seems probably that the shortlived nature of formalism was the result of the campaign waged against it by the political leadership.
A third problem for the Cubans, particularly evident in the administration of agriculture, was the lack of disciplinary cohesion with the INRA. This was especially the case during the 238 early years, but it was still somewhat of a problem In the 1970's, as Chapter Four Illustrates. Again, we find that the literature Is very useful because it stresses the likely presence of lack of disciplinary cohesion in newly adopted institutions. A fourth problem experienced by the Cubans was the loss of political support for its newly adopted Institutions (i.e. INRA in particular) among those who had land confiscated during the change-over to the new units of production called for by the model. The literature on insti tution building also sensitizes us to the probable presence of this factor, and the literature on reform policy emanating from government institutions clearly indicates that such Institutions will rapidly lose support among unfavorably effected groups. It is also Interesting to note that the strategy the Cubans have followed in generating new sources of institutional support (i.e. organizing the beneficiaries of land reform — the small farmer) has been followed by other regimes
(i.e. Chile and Peru) and has become a part of the literature.^
Finally, the Cuban experience indicates that poor information has severely hampered the regimes efforts in agricultural planning.
Nonetheless, there is minimal emphasis on this problem in the litera ture. This is most likely a special problem of socialist regimes because of the presence of total planning which attempts to consciously and rationally substitute plans for the multitude of micro-level activities and interactions that occur in a capitalist system.
Program planning in any society must rely on accurate information.
However, the Cuban system, as with all communist systems, needed 239 much more information than capitalist systems with their lesser amount of planning, Thus, it is a problem-that might not be en- countered in most non-communist third world regimes. It seems probable that for this reason it has not been stressed in the literature.
Two additional conclusions should be mentioned at this point, though we do not have the space to deal with either except In passing.
The first is that by finding out the problems the Cubans have experienced in adopting the model, and seeing these problems for the most part confirmed by the literature on institution building, we are in a position to tentatively identify what appears to be the prerequisites which are necessary for the models adoption. There is an obvious need for (1) sufficient numbers of qualified personnel,
(2) sufficient political support for the new institutions, (3) suf ficient discipline among administrative cadre to enable the central administrative leadership make decisions and have them followed at the local level, and (4) the presence of sufficient, accurate information to allow a centrally planned system to function effectively. Needless to say, the problem of formalism or bureau cratism must also be guarded against.
A second concluding point should also be made here. This second point is that the study of institution building in new communist systems in the Third World is worthy of attention as much as the institution-building problems of non-communist regimes.
There has been relatively little effort in this direction. This is probably partly due to the problems of gaining accurate informa tion about domestic matters in communist systems. A second factor which inhibits such study is that communist system specialists tend not to relate their work to the broader theoretical questions of comparative politics such as the work on institution building. Soviet specialists, for example, tend to Isolate themselves and to Interact primarily with other Soviet scholars. Thus, an insulated and some what parochial community of scholars and scholarly concerns is the result. The third factor that has worked against the study of institution building in communist systems is to some extent inter related with the second point made above. Communist system specialists
(and other comparativists, as well) seem to have assumed that communist regimes have little trouble in building effective institu tions.^ xhe secret of such regimes it is assumed, is that they are
Inherently authoritarian and rely on coercion to enable their institutions to function more or less effectively.^ This assumption in turn, is related to the major theoretical paradigm concerning communist systems which is that they are totalitarian systems. This underlying totalitarian paradigm of communist system studies, as the major theoretical base of such studies, thus generates most of the questions with which communist shcolars deal. As a result, when systems are assumed to be totalitarian currently or in their recent past (i.e. the Stalin era), the assumption is made that such questions about institution building are irrelevant. In effect, it is argued, 241
"Why study the problem of Institution building In systems that are based upon strong institutions built upon fear and coercion." Two points should be made here. The first is that the role of coercion has been negligible in Cuba and therefore the totalitarian per spective is not very useful. The second point is that if communist system specialists (especially Soviet specialists) were more attuned to the broader theoretical concerns of comrarative politics, we might generate different and perhaps more useful types of questions about communist systems. Studying the problems of institution building is but one such new focus for future study. f
The Production Pattern and The Soviet Model
The fact that the Soviet model was not readily adopted in Cuba, is clear from previous discussion. In this final section it is relevant to point out that the production statistics In various key areas of agriculture reflect the problems that ensure with the adoption of the model and help to explain the organizational and strategic changes which have occurred. The overall yearly production statistics are presented for key areas in Table 6.1.
(Table 6.1 goes here)
In the sugar sector, as Table 6.1 indicates, production stood at a very high 6.7 million tons and thereafter in 1962 and 1963 fell to 4.8 and 3.8 respectively. This can be at least partially explained by the decision to de-emphaslze the production of sugar under the first growth strategy. (1961-63) A complimentary feature of the first strategy in agriculture was the crop diversification program. Table 6.1 AGRICCLTOTAL PRODtJCTIOS IK CUBA: 1957-1974
Zten 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
Sugar* 5.6 5.7 5.9 5.8 6.7 4.8 3.8 4.3 6.0 4.4 6.1 5.3 4.3 8.5 5.4 4.5 5.5 6.0 Potatoes 94.3 70.6 82.9 101 85.7 75.3 83 104 104 119 95 77 95 77 75 76 70 76 Tonatoes 43.9 55.2 65 116 109 140 92 111 120 133 164 98 44 62 85 57 70 70 Onions 1.3 7.8 11.1 18.0 6.0 16.1 11.6 8 5.8 10.9 15.5 18.6 18.6 11.9 10 6.0 10.0 10.0 Lenons KAKAKA KAKA KA 8.7 6.5 9.4 7.3 8.1 11.7 12.3 8.0 11 12 12 13 Svcct Orange KA KA KA KAKA KA 75.9 87.1 84.9 117 6.5 120 108 122 90 119 120 125 Sour Orange KA KA KA KAKA KA 5.9 7.3 5.4 9.6 6.6 6.2 6.1 6.6 KA KA KA KA Grapefruit KAKAKA KAKA KA 14.0 11.5 10.5 12.5 13.9 14.7 12.6 16.9 14 19 19 20 Bananas KA KAKAKA KA 76.5 42.7 32.7 36.3 29.0 26.9 25.0 28.5 47.2 50 75 75 75 Tobacco 41.7 50.6 35.6 45.3 57.6 53.4 47.6 43.8 43.4 51.3 45.5 45.0 45.0 45.0 27.0 45.4 46.0 46.5 Coffee 36.6 31.0 55.1 37.0 46.5 55.0 34.7 32.0 23.9 33.4 34.3 34.3 30.0 30.0 28.5 23.5 30.0 27.0 Soybeans KA 0.3 1.1 2.7 0.7 1.1 KA KAKAKAKA KAKAKAKAKA KA KA Rice 167.3 207.2 232 306 212 229 204 123 50 68 93 94 177 290 330 350 375 400 Cotton KA 0.2 4.3 21.7 14.1 10.8 10.7 2.6 2.5 1.4 3.0 1.9 2.0 2.0 4.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 Scef 185 163 176 170 163 147 143 170 165 KA KA KAKA KA 184 186 189 190 Pork 42.0 33.9 36.7 41.6 KA KA 12.3 16.5 18.4 13.2 13.0 10.0 4.2 11.9 38.0 38.0 38.0 38.0 Chicken 47.0 16.6 19.9 30.6 KA 24.8 34.8 40.2 34.2 25.3 24.5 25.3 20.4 20.4 32.0 33.0 35.0 34.0 Milk HA 765 770 767 700 690 695 715 575 462 565 580 590 520 505 520 530 560 Eggs 275 312 341 429 433 530 190 297 920 1019 1173 1196 1285 1400 KA HA KA KA
Figures arc In thousands of nctric tons unless otherwise noted.
♦Millions of netric tons
Source: Archibald Ritter, The Econoalc Transformation of Revolutionary Cuba (Kew York: Praeger, 1974) pp. 183-194; O.K.F.A.O., Production Yearbook (Rone: FAD) 1973 and 1974, Yolunes 27 and 28.1. zn Thus, In other areas we might expect some improvement in production from 1961-63. In the tobacco sector, however, the amount produced fell from 57.6 thousand metric tons in 1961 to 47.6 thousand metric tons in 1963. Also, in coffee production, the amount fell from 46.5 to 34.7 thousand metric tons. Milk production fell slightly from
700 to 695 thousand metric tons. Egg production fell drastically from 433.9 million to 190.9 million eggs. Ab the table further indicates the list of crops such as vegetables, meats, grains, etc., where production fell from 1961-63 could go no much further. The point to be made here is that a general production downturn occured following the initial adoption of the model in 1961 thru 1963. The change in strategy from a de-emphasis of sugar and crop diversifica tion was, thus, called for by the downturn in production as well as the failure of the industrialization discussed in Chapter One. The role of unqualified personnel, lack of information and discipline, in addition to the generally unsettled nature of the new agricultural situation, also certainly play a role in the downturn of production.
The 1963-64 reorganization in administration and planning also are more understandable when placed against this background of production statistics.
The second agricultural strategy from 1964-70 called for a re emphasis on sugar production. The cattle industry was also to be improved to provide more beef and milk, and such selected crops as coffee, tobacco, citrus fruits and vegetables were to be Improved 244 in order to end domestic rationing and provide exportable surpluses.
Such crops as cotton, soybeans, garlic and millet, which had been unsuccessfully tried during the diversification program of the first strategy was de-emphasized.
As Table 6,1 again indicates, however, the improvement in production was largely confined to sugar, though even here the record was spotty (i.e. sugar production was only 4.3 million tons in
1969). Tobacco and coffee production was generally lower in most years than in 1963, when it was, in fact, down from 1961. While statistics for beef are not available after 1965, (a year in which production was barely above the 1961 level though considerably above the low 1963 level), Castro has since complained that cattle production has continually been disappointing.^-? Milk production fell much lower after 1963, whith the exception of the year 1964.
The production of vegetables was up in some areas (i.e. potatoes) over 1963 and down in others (tomatoes), though in few areas was
1970 vegetable production higher than in 1961. An important point to remember here is that food rationing continued through this period. The only areas which shows sustained production improve ment is citrus fruits and egg production.
The pattern that appears in these production statistics, for the 1964-70 period is again one of decline, as in the 1961-63 period. In most cases, production during the 1964-70 period is even lower than during the first strategy. This indicates that the decentralizing moves in planning and administration, (and the 245
agrarian reform of 1963) were not successful in production statistics.
These figures provide an additional clue as to why the Cubans moved
back toward Soviet organizational orthodoxy after 1970. What must
have been even more difficult to accept was that in many areas such
as meat, milk, tobacco, and coffee, production in 1970 was not only
lower than 1963 and 1961, but that it was also still below pre-revolu
tionary levels. Thus, in terms of aggregate production in non
sugar and non-cltric agriculture the increased state control led to
more equitable sharing of what was produced, but it did not lead to
greater production.
The production statistics of 1971 through 1974 indicate that
sugar production has averaged slightly less than 5.5 million metric
tons per year, with 1972 being the low of 4.5 million tons and 1974
being the high of 6.0 million tons. Both tobacco and coffee production
have remained below the low 1963 levels. Meat production has also
not improved since the outset of the revolution (with the exception
of poultry). In fact, pork production has been very low, as Table •
6.1 indicates, until just recently, and even in 1975 it remained
below pre-revolutionary levels. Two areas of success, outside
of sugar, again are citrus fruits and egg production. Nonetheless,
it is again significant to point out that for this latest period the
overall production record is still generally below the first years
of the revolution and often still below the pre-revolutionary levels of production. An unpleasant but inescapable fact is that not only
have the Cubans found many institutional building problems resulting 246 from the adoption of the Soviet nodal,, but they have also seen a general and continuing downward trend in agricultural production since the adoption of the nodel in 1961. Thus on both of the themes of institutional adoption and productivity the Cuban experience does not provide us with favorable information con cerning the desirability of adopting the Soviet model of agriculture.
A Final Comment
The study which we have undertaken here has been concerned with institution building in Cuba. The evidence seems to clearly indicate that Soviet institutions (contrary Soviet claims notwith standing) are subject to the same problems In third world settings as western institutions. However, as was indicated in the intro duction, this type of evaluation must be seen as only one type of analysis among many which should be used in a full evaluation of the
Soviet model. Among the many successful achievements of the Cuban regime, which is directly related to the adoption ofthe model and the resulting control of agricultural production, is a more equitable sharing of food despite lower production, than was the case prior to the revolution. State control has also enabled the regime to channel its resources to the areas which it deems most appropriate.
Consequently there have been massive campaigns and projects, such as increasing citrus fruit cultivation and improving water storage facilities, which have helped to improve production (as Table
6.1 indicates in the categories of citrus fruits) and infrastructural 247 aspects of Cuban agriculture* Thus, In some areas, important suc cesses have been achieved. An additional element, however, that also must be injected into a full evaluation, and which was here only mentioned in passing, is the fact that the Soviet Union Is contributing enormous amounts of financial, material and human aid to Cuba. The USSR seems to see Cuba as a positive example to be held up to other third world nations, and consequently, much of
Cuba's ability to continually utilize the Soviet model, despite the institutional and overall production problems must be viewed in this light. It is open to questions whether Cuba would still be utilizing the model without this substantial amount of aid. Thus, a full evaluation would go much beyond the study which has been presented here. While such an evaluation would clearly be a diffi cult and complex undertaking, it is also clear that its findings would be of enormous importance. The study presented here Is a beginning step in this evaluation. I
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX
For a more extensive discussion of the problems of institu tion building, see the following: Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970); Fred Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries (Boston: Hougton Mifflin, 1964); Ferrel Heady, Public Administration: A Comparative Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); Joseph LaPalombara, editor, Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Nimrod Raphaeli, editor, Readings in Comparative Public Administra tion (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966); Ralph Brnlbanti, editor, Political and Administrative Development, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1969)John C. Honey, Toward Strategies For Public Admini stration Development in Latin America (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
o 4Heady, op. cit., p. 70.
^S.C. Dube, "Bureaucracy and Nation Building in Transitional Socieites," in Raphaeli, op. cit., p. 211.
^Lucien Pye, "The Costs of Political Acculturation: The Administrator," in Raphaeli, op. cit.. pp. 295-306.
^Merle Fainsod, "Bureaucracy and Modernization: The Russian and Soviet Case." in LaPalombara, op. cit., pp. 254-255.
6S. N. Eisenstadt, "Problems of Emerging Bureaucracies in Developing Areas and New States," in Raphaeli, op. cit., p. 222.
^Riggs, op. cit.. p. 15; Heady, op. cit.. p. 72.
^Huntington, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
^Heady, op. cit.. p. 72.
10Huntington, op. cit., p. 24.
11lbid!_, pp. 32-39.
248 249
i^This Is particularly the case with some Latin American Scholars. See, for example, John Gillin, "The Middle Segments and Their Values," The Dynamics of Change in Latin American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971), edited by John D. Martz, pp. 86-89.
l^Emst Fedor, The Rape of the Peasantry (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Merle Falnsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule (New York: Vintage, 1963); James Petras and Robert La Porte, Cultivating Revolution (New York: Vintage, 1871). ^Ibid.
ISiiuntington, op. cit., p. 335.
know from the Soviet files of the Smokensk Archive that such is not the case. Falnsod, Smolensk Under Soviet Rule, op. cit.
^Cranma Weekly Review, December 28, 1975, p. 6. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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